Afghanistan and the Uncertain Metrics of Progress

Part Two: Transitioning to the New Strategy

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Overview

The war in Afghanistan is now in its tenth year. In spite of that fact, the US, allied countries, ISAF, and the UN have failed to develop credible reporting in the progress of the war, provide meaningful transparency on the problems and challenge it faces, and a meaningful plan for the future. Moreover, since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content – effectively “spinning” the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead.

**Drawing on Unclassified Official Reporting Lacking in Credibility and Transparency**

The US is scarcely alone in failing to provide adequate reporting on the Afghan conflict. No allied government provides credible reporting on the progress of the war, and the Afghan government provides little detail of any kind. The UN, which has major responsibilities for aid, has failed to provide a meaningful overview of how aid requirements are generated, how aid efforts are managed and coordinated, of how funds are used, of the quality of fiscal controls and auditing, and of the effectiveness and impact of aid.

There are, however, some useful unclassified metrics in spite of the tendency to limit their content “spin” and “message control.” Moreover, some reflect real progress since the adoption of the new strategy for the war, and indicate a more frank, meaningful, and open reporting system would do a far more convincing job of winning support for the conflict – as well as be a way of obtaining the kind of feedback and informed criticism that could help meet the many problems and challenges that still shape the course of the fighting.

**The Six Part Series Analysis of the War**

The Burke Chair has prepared a six-part analytic overview of unclassified metrics, and of their current content relates to the challenges in policy, plans, resources, and management of the war that now reduce the prospects of victory. It should be stressed that such an analysis is only a way of flagging key trends and developments within the limits imposed by using unclassified official reporting.

Moreover, metrics are not a substitute for the kind of narrative that is critical to understand the complexity of this war, and put numbers, charts, and maps in context. This is a case where facing the real-world complexity of the conflict is essential to winning it.
Even an overview of the strengths and weakness of unclassified metrics does, however, provide considerable insight into both what is known about the war, and the many areas where meaningful reporting is lacking and the reporting available is deceptive and misleading. The US, its allies, and ISAF may currently be repeating the same kind of overall messaging as the “follies” presented in Vietnam, but there are enough areas where facts still become public to put much of the war into perspective.

**Part Two: Transitioning to the New Strategy**

The first report in this series has already been circulated and is now available on the CSIS web site. It is entitled *Part One: The Failures that Shaped Today’s War*. It highlights the US failure to resource the Afghan campaign, and the extent to which US failure to react to the growth of the Taliban, the al Qa’ida sanctuary in Pakistan, and the failures of the Afghan government turned near victory into near defeat.

This second report highlights graphics and tables that summarize the new strategy and campaign plan, the initial impact of the result build-up of US forces and changes in tactics and strategy on the intensity of the war, and early estimates of how the changes in strategy will impact on the US budget and the affordability of the war.

**Setting the Stage: The Key Areas of Uncertainty that Shaped the New Strategy and Which Remain Key Challenges**

The first chart highlights seven major challenges that drove the formation of the new strategy, that still affect every aspect of the war, that are reflected in the metrics shown in the following four parts of this series, and where the US and other ISAF and donor governments need to do far more to provide credible and transparent unclassified reporting:

*Tactical victories against insurgents are meaningless unless they are used to provide the population with lasting security and the kind of stability, prompt justice, and governance that wins loyalty and leads most insurgents to reconcile.* Short term tactical successes and US-ISAF ability to secure the population in scattered areas do not measure the Taliban and other extremist capability to carry out terror and night campaigns, keep sleepers in place, move to different areas, and outwait the US and ISAF in a war of political attrition. As the metrics in this and the following reports show, these issues have not been addressed in meaningful form.

*The effectiveness of an alliance has nothing to do with the number of countries involved or the size of the forces involved. It depends on effective unity of effort in carrying out a strategy that can win.* ISAF has removed even its “map” of force strength
from its web site. There is no listing of the national caveats that severely limit the role many national military contingents can play, and there are no effectiveness measures of the national forces involved. The same is true of the national Provincial Reconstruction Teams and civil-military efforts critical to implementing the “hold, build, and transition effort” essential to providing the kind of stability, prompt justice, and governance that wins loyalty and leads most insurgents to reconcile. Ten years into the war DoD reporting does indicate that the number of major caveats has continued to grow, and there are no meaningful metrics that address any aspect of the effectiveness and coherence of ISAF efforts – either military or civil.

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The creation of effective Afghan forces is critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is equally critical to allowing “build” to provide stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy, as well as some form of transition where Afghan forces replace US and ISAF forces. The integrated NATO and US training mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) is the one aspect of reporting on the war that consistently provides transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the war. As Part Six shows, however, NTM-A is drastically short of the trainers it needs to succeed, and there is intense pressure to produce manpower numbers versus manpower quality. More seriously, there is no matching mix of transparent, credible metrics and narratives on the quality and effectiveness of any element of Afghan forces once they leave formal training and enter the field, and no meaningful data on the quality of the partnering they need to succeed.

The effectiveness measures that are reported measure formal training and equipment resources and not performance in the field. Uncertain loyalties, ties to power brokers, retention and attrition problems, corruption are not addressed. The capability to both support the new strategy and support transition is not rated or analyzed in objective terms. Moreover, the police are rated independently from the rest of the justice system and the presence of effective governance – ratings that are virtually meaningless if the police are to play a key role in “hold, build, and transition” and free the Afghan Army to perform its military mission.
Effective Afghan governance at the national, provincial, district and local levels is equally critical to providing security and the “clear and hold” phase of the war on a national level. It is the core of creating the “build” capability necessary to providing stability, prompt justice, governance, and a functioning economy. So far, negative progress seems to have occurred over the last two years. Two election crises, and friction between Karzai and the US has offset limited progress at the ministerial, provincial, district and local levels. A failure to create effective military and civil contracting systems has led to both vast waste and a flood of funds into a unstable Afghan power structure that has turned the low-level corruption normal in grey economies into a crisis.

There is still grossly inadequate coordination within the overall UN, national, and NGO aid effort. As Part Five of this series shows, there also is no focus on either achievable mid and long-term goals that aid might actually achieve, or finding ways to allocate, manage, and measure the effectiveness of the short term civil and civil-military efforts that are critical to give tactical success in the “clear” mission lasting meaning through “build” and “hold.” The limited metrics and reporting on aid consists largely of uncoordinated spending activity, funding requests, project titles, and “spin” as to accomplishments that have little credibility. There is no evidence of fiscal responsibility, validated requirements, and above all lasting effectiveness – even in meeting the most urgent Afghan grievances and needs.

It is equally important to note that each ongoing challenge involves issues that raise serious issues as to whether the US can really create a successful transition and lasting end state, and whether the future cost of the Afghan War represents the best overall international investment of US and allied national security and aid spending. As recent US metrics do show, there is no real prospect that the kind of ambitious goals set in the Afghan Compact, Afghan Development Plan, and various international conferences will be funded. (See pages 17 & 18, and Part Five)

The need to objectively examine realistic end state and transition plans and the ability to achieve them. It is far from clear that it will be possible to achieve a successful end state in Afghanistan even if far more modest and realistic goals are set for what ISAF, the UN, and US must accomplish. It is uncertain they can create the more limited “end state” defined in the ISAF campaign plan summarized on page 15:

…the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the security of GIRoA. Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate government extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of the Afghan people. GIRoA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security. (ISAF, May 2010.)
Equal problems exist in making “transition” an exercise in political symbolism, rather than real world planning. Neither 2011 nor 2014 are realistic deadlines for the end to a US and allied military presence or an end to major civil and military aid. In fact, one of the critical aspects of official plans, analyses, and metrics of the war is that they do not lay out a detailed or credible path forward to any meaningful end state, or even reduced level of troop presence and aid expenditure. They remain vague conceptual end states – whose generalization are often in direct conflict with other official statements.

_Facing the reality that Pakistan is far more critical than Afghanistan._ Virtually all unclassified US, ISAF, and allied metrics and analyses focus on Afghanistan. They not address the critical role of Pakistan in shaping the fighting in Afghanistan and the extremist threat as an integrated part of the war, or involve matching analysis of the risks that Pakistan will become unstable or refuse to support the US and ISAF in ending Taliban, Al Qa’ida, and other extremist sanctuaries.

As is seen in Part Seven of this series, the US and ISAF fail to produce meaningful unclassified analysis or metrics of the course of the war in Pakistan that directly affects the war in Afghanistan, and Al Qa’ida’s role and sanctuary in Pakistan. This is critical because the stability of, and end state in, a nuclear armed Pakistan is far more important than the end state in Afghanistan, and the Afghan War loses most or all of its grand strategic purpose unless Pakistan becomes both friendly and stable.

The same is true of reporting on the role of Iran and other Central Asian states, China, and Russia; and the limited amount of “end state” analysis ignore them completely.

_Dealing with the strategic cost-benefit of continuing the war:_ No government has made a public effort to either estimate the future cost of the war in money and casualties, or to justify its strategic value relative to other uses of these resources. This is a critical failing, given the intense pressures on national security spending, shrinking forces in most countries, the risks in other regions of the world, and the severe limits to even US power projection capabilities.

**Seeking the Right Strategy and Campaign Plan**

All of these issues have to be considered in examining every aspect of the war, but especially the current strategy for winning it. The first major section in this brief summarizes the new strategy that NATO, ISAF and the US have adopted since the spring of 2009.
No graphics can adequately summarize the details of this strategy, whose evolution is laid in far more detail in various ISAF reports, and the Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010 Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), http://www.defense.gov/pubs/.

Even a brief review of the key graphics in this section does, however, reveal both the emergence of a focused new strategy and continuing problems in translating that strategy into a focused and effective NATO, ISAF, UN and US effort. It is clear that ISAF did try to address most of the challenges that have just been discussed in formulating the new strategy, that it focused on the Afghan people and creating a meaningful “end state,” and no tactical victories that did much to alienate Afghans and nothing to build their loyalty. It is also clear that it set more realistic goals for such an “end state.”

There has, however, been little follow-up to this reporting since mid-2010. The ISAF web site might flatteringly be described as an “intellectual desert” and “short term ‘spin’ center.” The Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan does update some of this material in more depth, but does not address many of the key analytic problems listed earlier, provide an analysis of a credible path towards any key stage of transition, or address the major problems in creating a truly integrated civil military effort or the gap between the realism of the ISAF campaign plan and the far more ambitious US and NATO “strategic framework” shown in the other metrics in this section – which the bottom chart on page 17 shows will have something like a 70% shortfall in available resources in 2012-2013.

**Transitioning to the New Strategy**

The second section shows the operational focus of the new strategy. This again, is one of the few areas where unclassified reporting has been update since the shift to “spin” in mid-2010. The problem is that there are no supporting analyses and metrics that provide any consist picture of progress – of the lack of it – in any major part of the campaign now underway.

What are lacking are follow-ups to the reports and metrics ISAF and the Department of Defense issued in late 2009 through mid-2010 that showed progress in terms of the level insurgent activity and influence by district, progress in governance, and progress in aid and development. Reporting by ink spot is not a meaningful way of reporting on the success of the new strategy and the progress of the war.
Measuring the Rising Intensity of Combat Following the New Strategy: 2010-2011

There are many metrics that show the rising intensity of the fighting, and of its impact on security and stability as measured in terms of access to aid efforts. There is broad agreement that the level of the fighting – as measured in terms of major security incidents – has doubled over the last year. As Part Seven shows, there are also reports and metrics that show major progress in Helmand and a steady movement forward in the Kandahar area. There are also media and think tank reports that indicate major progress in the use of Special Forces and UCAVs.

Such progress is almost inevitable, however given the US military build-up in these areas, and increase in resources. US military activity is far more intense, and the metrics in the next section show the cost of US military operations in Afghanistan has risen from $29 billion in FY2008 to a budget of $101 billion in FY2011 – a roughly 250% increase since the new strategy began to be implemented. (See page 38.) What is not yet clear, for the reasons listed earlier, is whether this is reversing enemy gains and providing a lasting movement towards “hold,” “build,” and “transition.”

Uncertain Cost and Affordability

The cost of the war in blood is analyzed in the next party of this series. There is no way as yet to analyze the total cost of the war to Afghanistan or to ISAF, and comparable breakouts of the financial cost of the fighting to individual allied countries is not available on their Ministerial web sites.

The US metrics in this section, however, are a warning of the steadily rising cost of the war, and the risk that the US and allied publics will not sustain such efforts. So far the US, ISAF, and participating allied countries do not attempted to explain and justify war costs. No public effort was ever made to cost the new strategy, and no in depth estimate seems to have been made of the cost to any major stop towards transition. Virtually every estimate of US costs also differs in detail from the others – and the estimates of aid costs are grossly inconsistent.

The rough estimates in this section, however, do show that the US – which clearly leads ISAF spending on the war -- is under intense pressure to cut all federal spending. It shows that the direct cost of the Afghan War alone will be close to one trillion dollars by the end of FY2011. (It would be over $1.2 trillion if related longer-term medical and reset costs were considered.) It also seems likely that only full political accommodation or sudden collapse of the Taliban/Haqqani network could keep costs below $100 billion a year through 2014, and remove the need for major military and economic aid expenditures well beyond 2020.
As noted earlier, this highlights the need to have a credible end state and transition plan for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to explicitly consider whether funding the overall war is the best global use of US strategic resources. The answer may still be yes, but current unclassified reporting does not even address the issue.

The Need for Credibility, Integrity, and Transparency and Future Reports in this Series

Virtually every expert on the Afghan War could add new points to this list. It is also obvious from many of these points that the metrics shown in this report can only hint at a few key trends and problems. In far too many cases, there are no metrics and no reliable detailed histories – although the kind of metrics and analysis that should have existed is easy to derive from the summary of each problem.

At the same time, it is critical to stress that the other parts of this report show that major progress is being made in addressing many of the issues involved, and metric are only part of that story. For all of the spin and omissions that still surround reporting on the war, major progress has occurred over the last two years, and additional major efforts to correct these problems are underway.

They will be analyzed in the future parts of this report:

*Part Three: Key Ongoing Challenges*
*Part Four: Hold and Build, and The Challenge of Development*
*Part Five: Building Effective Afghan Forces*
*Part Six: Showing Victory is Possible*
“Winning” Must Still Address Seven Centers of Gravity

• Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

• Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

• Building up a much larger and more effective (and enduring base for transition) mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

• Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy (and lasting stability) at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

• Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil and civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

• Dealing with Pakistan both in the NWFP and as a potential failed state. Finding stable relations in India, Iran, “Stans,” Russia, and China

• Making effective trade-offs with other US domestic and security interests
Seeking the Right Strategy and Campaign Plan
The ISAF View of Challenges and Risks

Critical Risks:
- **Governance**: Ineffective or discredited
- **Pakistan**: Insufficient steps to curb insurgent support and sanctuary
- **Afghan ownership**: Inability to mobilize and share responsibility

Key Challenges:
- Civ-mil disconnect in clear-hold-build campaign
- Divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines
- Waning domestic (coalition) political support
- Rejection of reconciliation by ‘spoilers’
- Resilient and growing insurgency
- Rejection or stagnation of ANP

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
But, ISAF Concludes the War is Still Winnable

*The situation is serious -- significant change is required.*

- We have a key advantage – Taliban is not a popular movement (yet); population is frustrated by GIRoA, we must make them believe ISAF / GIRoA can succeed

- Taliban represents an existential threat -- only they have sufficient organizational capability and support to pose a threat to GIRoA’s viability (they are most coherent in the south)

- Regional instability is rapidly increasing and getting worse

- New strategy will incur risks -- not properly executing the strategy has greater risk
  - Longer war
  - Greater casualties
  - Higher overall costs
  - Loss of political support

- Taliban strength is the perception that its victory is inevitable; reversing momentum requires protecting the population and changing perceptions

- Under-resourcing significantly elevates risk, increases lag time, and is likely to cause failure

- Success requires operating / thinking, in a fundamentally new way

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.

- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.

- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.

- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.

- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.

- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.
COMISAF Intent

**Purpose**
- Assist GIROA in defeating the insurgency
- Protect the Afghan population and separate insurgent influence
- Gain popular support for the government
- Allow sustainable progress and promote legitimacy
- Prevent the return of transnational terrorists and eliminate potential safe havens

**Method**
- Conduct the operation in three stages: A) Gain the Initiative; B) Achieve Strategic Consolidation; and C) Sustain Security.
- Gain the initiative and stop insurgent momentum in the next 12-18 months
- Establish closer cooperation with the International Community
- Achieve improved integration and CIV-MIL operational cohesion

**Endstate**
- Insurgency defeated to within GIROA’s capacity
- Legitimate governance extends to local levels
- Socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people
- GIROA, with ISAF support, is capable of assuming the lead for security

ISAF, May 2010
Campaign Design

Lines of Operation

PROTECT the Population
- Partner with ANSF to secure population centers
- Tailor force packages with mentor teams
- Isolate INS from population
- Reduce INS intimidation, coercion, persuasion
- Disrupt INS C2, operations and sustainment

ENABLE Afghan National Security Forces
- Recruit and train ANSF for COIN operations
- Build sustainable capacity and capability in ANSF
- Professionalize the force thru reform/accountability
- Identify corruption; assist GIROA with detainee system
- Disrupt foreign sponsorship / support to INS in AFG
- Prevent narco-state; deny narco-profiteering
- Enhance Regional Cooperation

SUPPORT Extension of Governance
- Increase GIROA Institutional capacity; enhance RoL
- Enhance Provincial Reconstruction Teams
- Support formal and informal sub-national structures
- Support provision of essential services

SUPPORT Socio-economic Development
- Establish infrastructure and transportation networks
- Increase employment opportunities / alternative livelihoods
- Establish education programs
- Solicit Donors / establish Afghan Development Zones

Operational Objectives

Tier 1: Kandahar, Helmand, Khowst, Paktia, Paktika;
Tier 2: Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar River Valley, Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Zabul, Uruzgan;
Tier 3: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kunduz.

Accelerate ANA growth to 134,000 by Fall 2010. BPT raise new target ceiling of 240,000 for ANA. BPT raise target strength of ANP to 160,000. Increase mentors, trainers, partners, funding and GIROA participation.

Malign actors are marginalized, illegitimate governance denied, narcotic profiteering reduced, foreign fighter networks disrupted, development project extortion reduced and majority of population views GIROA as legitimate.

Ministries and sub-national governance partnered with civil surge; Afghan reconciliation policy established; local governance mechanisms allow for reintegration; RoL and legitimate, responsive, and accountable governance extended to the population.

GIROA revenue collection and resource distribution mechanisms enhanced; infrastructure and road networks bolster licit economy and increase employment; incentive structures increase stability in local communities.

Ends

Phase 3 ends when the insurgency is defeated and no longer able to threaten the survival of GIROA, Afghanistan is stabilized, legitimate governance extends to local levels, socio-economic programs benefit the majority of Afghan people, and GIROA, with ISAF in support, is capable of assuming the lead for the provision of security.

MEANS

- GIROA and ANSF
- NATO-ISAF, Troop Contributing Nations, UNAMA, Partners
- Funding: International Community, Donors, UN, NATO, EU

ISAF, May 2010
**Phasing of Progress Toward Stability**

Operational Progress → Civil Progress → Strategic Progress

- **Upturn in Violence**
  - Increased operational tempo results in temporary increase in violence

- **Violence**
- **Governance Campaign**
- **Security Campaign**
- **Afghan Confidence**
- **Governance lags security**
- **Confidence lags both**

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
Strategic Framework for US Efforts: June 2010 - II
Transitioning to the New Strategy: 2010-2011
ISAF Campaign Plan – June 2010

Strategic Main Effort: Grow the ANSF

Operational Main Effort

Shaping/Supporting Effort

Economy of Force

Kunduz-Baghlan

Badghis-Ghormach

#4 – Islam Qal’eh

#7 – Torah Ghundey

#1 – Tor Kham

Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman

Paktika, Paktiya, Khost and Ghazni

Central Helmand

Kandahar

#5 – Zaranj

#6 – Shayr Khan Bandar

#3 – Hairatan

#2 – Wesh (Chaman)

#1 – Ghulum Khan

#8 – Ghulum Khan

COMISAF Campaign Overview, June 2010
ISAF Campaign Plan – November 2010

Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level: Struggle for the Rest of the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas

- Prevent GIROA development and influence
- Limit population ability to choose

Elements of Insurgent Influence
- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Essential Security Influence

- Create time and space
- Enable population opportunity to choose

Elements of Security Influence
- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

ISAF, May 2010
Operation Omid (Hope)
Measuring the Rising Intensity of Combat Following the New Strategy: 2010-2011
ISAF Warns that “Time is Running Out....”

- The Taliban-led insurgency has the momentum...but additional effective counterinsurgency forces and operations will challenge them in select districts and provinces.

Kinetic Events by Geography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Maps</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 Jan 05 – 15 Dec 05</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Map 1" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Jan 07 – 15 Dec 07</td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Map 2" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Jan 09 – 15 Dec 09</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Map 3" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kinetic Events by Week and Type

- Taliban influence expanding; contesting and controlling additional areas.
- Kinetic events are up 300% since 2007 and an additional 60% since 2008.
- The Taliban now has “Shadow Governors” in 33 of 34 provinces (as of DEC 09).

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 12 NOV):
- Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
- Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
- 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, as of 22 DEC, 2009
DOD attack data as of March 2010 show that the pattern of enemy-initiated attacks in Afghanistan has remained seasonal in nature, generally peaking from June through September each year and then declining during the winter months (see fig. 1). As the graph indicates, while attacks have continued to fluctuate seasonally, the annual attack “peak” (high point) and “trough” (low point) for each year since September 2005 have surpassed the peak and trough, respectively, for the preceding year. Similarly, while attack levels have fallen since their August 2009 peak, they remain higher than comparable figures from prior years. For example, total attacks against coalition forces between September 2009 and March 2010 increased by about 83 percent in comparison to the same period last year, while attacks against civilians rose by about 72 percent. Total attacks against the ANSF increased by about 17 percent over the same period.

Source: GAO, 4/2010
The War Becomes Real:  
Total Weekly Kinetic Events 7-08 to 9-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2009</td>
<td>1034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2009</td>
<td>1682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2009</td>
<td>2862</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1 2010</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2010</td>
<td>3016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2010</td>
<td>4723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been increases in all methods of attacks, except IEDs, which were lower in August 2010 than they were in August 2009, and direct fire (DF) is increasing at a higher rate than indirect fire (IDF). This is possibly due to the amount of resources it takes to attack utilizing IDFVs versus DF and IEDs. Overall kinetic events are up 300 percent since 2007 and up an additional 70 percent since 2009. Total kinetic events increased nearly 55 percent over the previous quarter and 65 percent compared to the third quarter, 2009, as Figure 12 below indicates. The overall increase was driven primarily by increased incidents of direct fire. Insurgent-initiated attacks also increased this quarter by over 60 percent, and direct fire attacks comprised the majority of this increase. The rise in violence is partly attributable to the increase in Coalition Forces and ANSF as well as greater operational tempo. The sharp increase in insurgents' use of direct fire attacks may be significant, as it suggests capacity limitations for the insurgents.

Chart displays enemy action and explosive hazards to include executed attacks; potential attacks (IEDs/mines found & cleared) are not included.

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011
Cache: A facility or location where supplies are hidden or otherwise concealed and are not readily available. A cache may consist of weapons or other equipment that supports insurgent activities. Examples are unarmed/incomplete devices, IED paraphernalia, ammunition, radios, uniforms, as well as narcotics and explosive precursors.

Source: ISAF, March 24, 2011
Consistent with the five year trend (above) attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were 64% higher than 2009, the highest inter-annual growth rate we have recorded (see inset graph above). If averaged, the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per day, every single day of the year. In September this rate jumped to more than 50 attacks per day, or 1,541 operations, as they ramped up their efforts to disrupt parliamentary elections that month. The year followed a familiar pattern with Jan/Feb starting slow, as AOG remobilize from the winter retreat, followed by seven solid months of expansion and a rapid de-escalation back to December. The final month closing out at 47% higher than December 2009.

UN Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month: 1/2003 to 7/2010

Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
Major Increases in the Impact of US Air Power

### OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/International Security Assistance Force

#### Close Air Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sorties</th>
<th>Sorties w/Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13,962</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>19,092</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26,474</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33,869</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Weapons Releases

<table>
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<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>381</td>
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<td>275</td>
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<td>719</td>
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<td>300</td>
<td>517</td>
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<td>467</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>880</td>
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### OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM/OPERATION NEW DAWN

#### Close Air Support

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>18,422</td>
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#### Weapons Releases

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<th>May</th>
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<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>45</td>
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The Key Risk is Still in the South: UN Security Ratings in March 2010

Security map (as at 30 March 2010) and opium cultivation in Afghanistan by province, 2010

Source: Security map: UNDISA
Source: Opium cultivation: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations
The War is National: District Security Ratings in

The map shows the 02 September 2010 security district assessment results. The arrows indicate positive or negative change compared to the 18 March 2010 security district assessment. The change captured in the above figure is a district that changed to or from a “satisfactory” rating. A “satisfactory” rating is equal to green (secure environment) or yellow (occasional threats). The proportion of the population residing within the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts living in areas rated as “satisfactory” remains relatively unchanged over the past three quarters, (a “satisfactory” rating comprises the highest two rating levels, “Secure Environment” and “Occasional Threats.”) The map in Figure 10 below depicts the current ratings of the 124 key terrain and area of interest districts as assessed by IJC. The arrows indicate districts that have increased to or decreased from a rating of “satisfactory” compared to June 2010. In RC-East, three districts’ ratings decreased from June to September 2010. In particular, the Nawah ye Barakzai district in RC Southwest improved its security rating.

The War is National: ANSO (NGO) Security Ratings by Provide in January 2011

This table provides raw AOG attack rate data per province for 2009 and 2010, plus the percentage growth rate, per province. The average referred to is the 64% overall growth rate countrywide. Notable is that of the 10 provinces in RC-North six of them saw above average growth from 107%-252%. As a bloc, the provinces of P2K (Paktya, Paktika & Khost) plus Ghazni saw the sharpest deterioration with an average 158% increase of attacks across all four. Only five provinces saw less violence than last year with one being the capitol.
Uncertain Cost and Affordability
Putting The Economic Burden of Defense Spending into Perspective (% of GDP)

Outlays, by Category

(Percentage of gross domestic product)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Defense, Nondefense, and Total Discretionary Spending

(Percentage of gross domestic product)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021, January 2011, p. 79
3/30/2011
Funding Iraq at the Expense of the Afghan War: FY2001-FY2011
(In Current $US Billions)


3/30/2011
# CBO Estimate of U.S. Cost of Wars: 2001-2011

Estimated Appropriations Provided for U.S. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and for Other War-Related Activities, 2001 to 2011

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</table>

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: * = between zero and $500 million.
CBO “Guesstimate” of Future U.S. Cost of Both Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Outlays for Operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Other Overseas</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Operations in CBO’s Baseline</td>
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<td>170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Deficit in CBO’s Baseline</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011 deficits and 2012 interest on the deficit</td>
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<tr>
<td>-1,480</td>
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</table>

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.
Notes: Negative numbers indicate an increase in the deficit; positive numbers indicate a decrease in the deficit.

GDP = gross domestic product; AMT = alternative minimum tax; * = between -$500 million and $500 million.

a. This alternative does not extrapolate the $159 billion in budget authority for military operations and associated costs in Afghanistan and Iraq provided for 2011. However, it incorporates the assumption that future funding for operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere would total $118 billion in 2012, $83 billion in 2013, $54 billion in 2014, and about $35 billion a year from 2015 on—for a total of $496 billion over the 2012–2021 period. (See Box 3-2)
b. Excluding debt service.
c. Under this alternative, appropriations for 2011 for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are extrapolated according to the rules that govern CBO’s baseline.
d. The estimates are from the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and CBO and are preliminary.
e. This alternative incorporates the assumption that legislative action extends title I of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (which extended for 2011 and 2012 income tax provisions enacted in 2001, 2003, and 2009) and title III of that act (which modified estate and gift taxation for 2010 through 2012). It does not incorporate the assumption that the AMT is indexed for inflation. The effects of that alternative are shown separately.
f. This alternative incorporates the assumption that the exemption amount for the AMT (which was increased through the end of 2011) is extended at its higher amount and, together with the AMT tax brackets, is indexed for inflation after 2011. In addition, the treatment of nonrefundable personal credits (which was also continued through the end of 2011) is assumed to be extended.
g. The combination of extending certain income tax provisions scheduled to expire on December 31, 2012, and indexing the AMT for inflation reduces revenues by more than the sum of those alternatives considered alone. The total shown here includes an additional revenue loss of $657 billion over the 2013–2021 period resulting from the interaction of the two policies.
h. These estimates include the impact of extending about 80 expiring provisions. Many of those credits are set to expire at the end of 2011 and many have been extended previously, such as the research and experimentation tax credit and the tax credit for ethanol-blended motor fuels. The additional first-year depreciation deduction of 50 percent for business equipment is set to expire at the end of 2012.

CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021, January 2011, p. 23
The Future Cost of Underspending: Guesstimate of Annual and Cumulative Cost of “Worst Cost” Success in the Afghan War: FY2010-FY2020
(In Current $US Billions)

--Extremely intense fighting with dropping allied support.
--"Supplemental" in FY2010
--Make decisive gains by FY15.
--US and ISAF withdrawal cautiously

--Maintain significant support funding of Afghan forces and government through FY2020 & beyond
--DoD pays cost of police as well as armed forces, and protection of remaining civil & military advisory presence though FY2020.