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The U.S. Transition in Iraq: Iraqi Forces and U.S. Military Aid

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INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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in Strategy

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
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U.S. & Status of Iraqi Security Forces

- UK MoU for Navy training expires on November 22, 2010; US MoUs last through end 2011, but new Iraqi government can renegotiate at any time.
- US-Iraqi Strategic Partnership agreement is open ended, but 5 Joint Coordinating Committees and 24 Implementation Working Groups committees have lacked ability to resolve key issues since election. Everything dependent on US and Iraqi government decisions at any given time.
- The Iraqi Army is functioning as a counterinsurgency force, the Navy is providing offshore oil terminal defense, and the Air Force is increasing capability and capacity in mobility, airspace control, and ground attack.
- Current training plans and equipment expectations anticipate a shift in ISF operations, with MOI forces assuming a larger role in internal security as MOD forces move to a more conventional force structure and focus on external threats, while retaining the ability to conduct targeted counterinsurgency and stability operations.
- Tentative plans call for more than 320 U.S. advisors to work with the MOI on developing Iraqi judicial and legal institutions.
- The GOI provided more than \$270 million to pay SOI salaries in 2009 and an estimated \$75 million thus far in 2010. However, timely pay continues to be a challenge.
- Anecdotal reporting from U.S. advisory teams embedded within the IA indicates the GOI is providing minimal logistical and security support to the SOI—including inadequate ISF protection and support at checkpoints.

Shifting the Balance in the Gulf and MENA

Shift in the Iraq-Iran Balance: 2003-2010



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane's sentinel series

Details of Iraq's Loss of Deterrent and Defense Capability: 2003-2007


<u>Category</u>	<u>2003</u>			<u>2010</u>		
	Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio	Iraq	Iran	Force Ratio
Active Manpower	424,000	513,000	8:10	191,957	523,000	2:5
Reserve Manpower	650,000	350,000	19:10	0	350,000	NA
Main Battle Tanks	2,200	1,565	7:5	149	1,613	1:10
OAFVs	1,300	815	8:5	505	725	7:10
APCs	2,400	590	4:1	1,479	650	23:10
Towed Artillery	1,900	2,085	9:10	0	2,010	NA
SP Artillery	150	310	1:2	0	310	NA
MRLs	200	889	1:5	0	876	NA
Combat Aircraft	316	283	11:10	0	312	NA
Attack Helicopters	100	85	6:5	0	50	NA
Major SAM Launchers	225	205	11:10	0	234	NA

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane's sentinel series

The Post US Withdrawal Insurgent Threat

Patterns of Violence: 2004-2010 (July Report)


FIGURE 2.18
SECURITY INCIDENTS AND FATALITIES IN IRAQ, 1/2004-6/2010



Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. "U.S. Surge" denotes period when at least 150,000 U.S. troops were in Iraq. ISF fatality data for deaths that occurred before 1/4/2005 is not available. Security Incidents data from two sources are displayed: MNC-I, for 1/1/2004-6/24/2009 and USF-I for 4/1/2009-3/26/2010 (USF-I Incorporates GOI reports).


Sources: DoD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 2/2006-9/2009; DoI, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/5/2010, 4/12/2010, and 7/7/2010; Brookings Institution, *Iraq Index*, 6/30/2010, pp. 3, 5, 13; SIGIR, *Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress*, 4/2009, 10/2009, and 1/2010; GOI, response to SIGIR data call, 12/21/2009; MNF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008, 7/2/2009, 3/31/2010 and 4/1/2010; CENTCOM, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/10/2009 and 2/22/2010; USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 3/31/2010 and 7/7/2010.

Major Security Incidents: 2004-7/2010



Source: USF-I/USCENTCOM, 7-10

Ethno-Sectarian Violence: 2006 -2009




Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 05-Sep-09; weekly beginning 01-May-06

Post Election Cycles of Violence: March-July 2010

FIGURE 2.19


SECURITY INCIDENTS IN IRAQ, 3/7/2010–7/18/2010



Sources: MNF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 10/6/2008 and 7/2/2009; CENTCOM, response to SIGIR data call, 1/10/2009; USF-I, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/1/2010, 3/31/2010, and 7/1/2010; SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open source information in English and Arabic.


FIGURE 2.20

CYCLE OF VIOLENCE IN IRAQ




Sources: David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010.

Levels of Security and Travel: April 2010



Source: DoD Quarterly Report, April 29, 2010 p. 37



Source: DoD Quarterly Report, April 29, 2010 p. 38


Impact of U.S. Withdrawal

U.S. Role in Iraq and the Gulf

- Strategic partnership agreement give Iraq the initiative in defining US aid and cooperation.
- Keep force of roughly 49,000 US advisors in Iraq through end-2011.
 - Four Advisory Assistance Brigades with major combat power. Have advisors added to regular combat strength.
 - Limited special forces support.
- Tentative plans for continuing US military advisory mission and training. \$US billions in Future FMS purchase aid until Iraqi economy recovers and strengthens.
- State Department to provide major police and MOI training mission from FY2011 onwards. Tentative plans call for more than 320 U.S. advisors to work with the MOI on developing Iraqi judicial and legal institutions.
- Major continuing combat air support with no fixed term. Can provide from carriers, and contingency bases in Gulf. Can back up with cruise missiles, stealth capability.
- Strategic airpower capability to check any outside invasion.
- Detailed intelligence support and aid for all Iraqi operations in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and deterrence/defense.
- Dominant naval power in the Gulf.
- Contingency bases with key allies: Kuwait, Qatar. Possible future air presence and land prepositioning.
- Military cooperation and support of Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman; Major new military sales and preliminary efforts towards cooperative missile defense.

The Impact of U.S. Withdrawal in CY2010

PROJECTED U.S. FORCE STRENGTH IN IRAQ, 6/2010–9/2010



Note: All totals are as of the first day of each month. "Commanders" denotes positions held by flag-rank officers.

Source: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2010.

--369 bases & facilities returned or closed as of 6/2010.

--99 during March to May 2010.

--126 remained in June.

--Only 33 had 100 or more personnel

SECURITY FORCES PROTECTING IRAQ, AS OF 6/30/2010

SERVICE		ASSIGNED PERSONNEL	TREND
U.S. Forces ^a		75,000	↓
DoD/DoS/USAID Armed Private Security Contractors ^b		20,738	↑
Iraqi Security Forces			
Ministry of Defense ^c	Iraqi Army (IA)	197,336	—
	Training and Support	46,459	—
	Air Force	4,023	—
	Navy	2,910	—
	Total MOD	250,728	—
Ministry of Interior ^c	Iraqi Police	301,286	—
	Iraqi Federal Police	43,957	↑
	Border Enforcement	60,605	↑
	Oil Police	29,411	↑
	Facilities Protection Service (FPS)	90,000	—
	Total MOI	525,259	↑
Special Forces		4,120	—
ISF Total		780,107	↑
Grand Total		875,845	↑

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

^a Number of troops as of 7/15/2010.

^b PSC numbers shift continually based on changing contract activity and level of security services required.

^c Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 1/2009–7/2009; OSD, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/2/2009, 7/1/2009, and 9/30/2009; DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 12/31/2008; OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2010; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, RSO, response to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2010; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 7/2/2010.

Continuing Impact of US Airpower

Operation Iraqi Freedom	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
CAS	16870	15630	19500	18380	8800	4620
ISR	4380	5330	7360	10900	10040	6200
Weapons	350	180	1650	880	90	10
Airlift	54680	54450	38060	33400	27930	17910
PAX	854300	1066000	930000	965000	844000	470000
Cargo (sTons)	132000	201500	216000	113300	103600	52700
Fuel offloaded (pounds)	130650	270560	464460	428860	196990	83670
Receivers	11150	25460	46820	46790	23690	11480

Close Air Support

	Sorties	Weapon/Sorties %
2007	19,542	9%
2008	18,422	5%
2009	8,061	1%
2010	4,446	0%

Weapons Releases

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2007	132	48	77	45	52	207	360	177	237	173	109	91	1,708
2008	400	104	133	64	71	25	35	70	8	1	3	1	915
2009	3	34	41	26	3	0	3	1	6	2	0	0	119
2010	6	0	0	0	0	10	0	0					16

Adapted from: USAFCENT Public Affairs Directorate; ABC News; and Noah Shachtman, U.S. Air War Soars in 'Post-Combat' Iraq, Danger Room, Wired, September 20, 2010,

<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/u-s-air-war-soars-in-post-combat-iraq/>


Iraqi Force Development

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- Everything dependent on US and Iraqi government decisions at any given time.
- The Iraqi Army is functioning as a counterinsurgency force, the Navy is providing offshore oil terminal defense, and the Air Force is increasing capability and capacity in mobility, airspace control, and ground attack.
- Current training plans and equipment expectations anticipate a continuing shift in ISF operations, with MOI forces assuming a larger role in internal security as MOD forces move to a more conventional force structure and focus on external threats, while retaining the ability to conduct targeted counterinsurgency and stability operations.
- Plans for US military training mission and FMS- US military aid await formation of new government. M-1 and F-16 programs are symbols of eventual shift to Iraqi national defense capability.
- Tentative plans call for more than 320 U.S. advisors to work with the MOI on developing Iraqi judicial and legal institutions.


Security Forces 2004 – Mar 2010

SECURITY IN IRAQ, 1/2004–3/2010




- Overall total forces has increased since SIGIR Jan 30, 2010 Report
- U.S. forces have decreased
- Private security contractors have decreased
- Iraqi Police Service & Federal Police has increased

Iraqi Security Forces in Mid-2010



Source: US Department of Defense

The “Security Gap” As U.S. Forces Withdraw



Note: Adapted from original. The time line and force capabilities are illustrative.

Source: David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq: A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 13.

Key MoD Force Developments - I

- Ministry in semi-limbo because of election crisis. Forces severely affected by budget crisis.
- Top heavy, rigid leadership and decision making structure problems compounded by “wasta” at every level.
- Serious problems in staffing, JHQ operations and planning, leadership, oversight, C2/IS&R, interoperability, resource & acquisition management, operational sustainment, and IA/IG/HR oversight.
- Serious problems with acquisition process at planning, management, and execution levels.
- Budget crisis led to freeze at 253,000 personnel in 2009. In May 2010 have roughly 250,000 versus MTOE requirement of 332,000.
- Budget crisis delaying M-1, artillery, and key mechanized enabler progress beyond end CY2011.
- Budget crisis slightly easing. \$4.9 billion in FY2010. This is a 20% rise, but compares to a \$7.4 billion request. Almost all goes to personnel (\$3.3 billion) at expense of O&M and procurement.
- Iraqi army has 13 infantry divisions and is forming one ,mechanized division. Has 196 combat battalions operating in 55 combat bridges (51 inf. 3 mech. 1 tank) + 20 Iraqi protection battalions and six ISOF battalions.
- Enablers are coming on line, but but crisis has forced crippling slow down on CS and CCS unit formation.

Key MoD Force Developments - II

- Logistics functions gradually coming on line. Seeking to rationalize equipment pool. Cut vehicles types from 214 to 71. Fuel, ammo, and operating supplies still a serious problem.
- IA Training base now Iraqi led; shifting from COIN to national defense training at officer level. have trained 64% of the specialized qualification cadre needed. Initial artillery training (81mm & 120 mm mortar) in place.
- Some 68% of IA officers and 86% of NCOs, for MTOE average of 77%. NCO training improving but still an issue.
- “Leave” rate still as high as 25%.
- Iraqi Air force (IAF) steadily improving and has 106 fixed and rotary wing aircraft, but will not meet fixed-wing airlift and airspace control goals for end-2011.
- Pilot training still an issue, but improving. Aging pilot force will be a problem.
- Planning for development of modern combat forces in IAF still in formation. F-16 has become symbol of progress.
- Iraqi Navy should meet basic goals for end-2011, and be cable of autonomous operations by September 2011.
- Budget crisis helped to lead to serious IN manning, officer, and NCO shortfalls. Marine force just developing basic operational capability.
- Delivery of last two of four Italian patrol ships. FMS contracts in place for 15 patrol boats and two offshore support vessels by end-2011.

Key Counterterrorism Force Developments

- Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force still in legislative limbo until new government is formed and acts. Critical problem in CT capability.
- Have 5,725 men in Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force (NCTF), 384 in Counterterrorism Service (CTS), and 914 in Counterterrorism Command (CTC)
- Two INCTF or ISOF Brigades in formation. 1st Brigade has all 4 battalions (1 commando, 1 ICTF, 1 support & 1 recce) and 2,793 men. 2nd Brigade commands four regional commando battalions, and has 1,633 personnel.
- Need rotary wing, better intel, extraction, airborne IS&R, and training.
- Hope to have national central command facilities in Baghdad finished in November.
- Good specialist training for CTS and CTC. Hope all but one regional command facility will be finished in 2010 (Hope RCB Shaibah ready in early 2011.)

Key MoI Force Developments - I

- Ministry in semi-limbo because of election crisis. Forces severely affected by budget crisis, but have \$6.144 billion in 2010 (\$630 million or 11% rise).
- Critical problems in staffing; leadership; IG, IA, and other oversight; C2/IS&R; communications and IT; interoperability; resource & acquisition management; and operational sustainment.
- Staff is revising 2010-2012 strategic plan developed in August 2009. (“Oceans document”)
- November 2008 hiring freeze has been major problem, but has programmed increase of 45,000 in FY2010 budget.
- End backlog of basis training efforts; focusing on skills. 36 functioning training centers.
- Beginning to create 12 Counter Explosive Teams.
- Serious problems in retaining trained regular police; large portion locally recruited with minimal formal training. Serious shortfalls in leadership. Problems with corruption and abuses.
- Federal police is key paramilitary force, but have 43,000 of 89,880 personnel and only authorized to hire 52%. Trying to boost by folding in 2,000-3,000 men in BPERTs.
- Seeking to create Four FP divisions. Now have two in formation at 62% and 63% of MTOE.
- FP has major facilities, leadership, and procurement shortfalls. Seek eight mech battalions for FP, but only have 180 armored vehicles, or enough for 4 battalions.

Key MoI Force Developments - II

- Border Police (DBE) seeking five regions with 14 brigade headquarters and 45 line btns. Have 45,550 authorized and some 40,000 on hand; Need 60,700. Lack funds for procurement, facilities, and IS&R systems.
- Port police (POED) lack facilities, services, explosives detection, clear authority. Most of 14 air and sea ports weekly staffed and equipped.
- Oil Police is still in formation. Only has 29,500 of minimum of 47,000 required. 10,000 short of force need to replace 16 IA Btms guarding pipelines.
- Electric police have 18,000 and are in process of reorganization.
- FPS has 17,000 police and 77,000 contractors. All contractors are to become part of FPS, with new total of 110,000. Training still poor to non-existent. Contractor training began in 2/2010.

Iraqi Force Costs


Total GoI vs. US Financial Support for Iraqi Security Institutions: FY2007-FY2010

\$ Billions

GOI Budgets for the MOD and MOI

MINISTRY	BUDGET CATEGORY	CALENDAR YEAR				TOTAL
		2007	2008	2009	2010	
MOD	Operating	4.09	4.92	3.85	4.52	17.38
	Capital	0.05	4.92	0.27	0.38	5.62
	Subtotal	4.14	9.84	4.12	4.90	23.00
MOI	Operating	3.14	5.16	5.27	5.89	19.46
	Capital	0.04	0.54	0.22	0.26	1.06
	Subtotal	3.18	5.70	5.49	6.14	20.51
Total		7.32	15.54	9.61	11.04	43.51
Combined MOD/MOI Budget as % of Total GoI Budget		18%	22%	16%	15%	18%

Defense Spending, as a Percentage of GDP (Ranked by Percentile)




ISFF Appropriations

MINISTRY/CATEGORY	FISCAL YEAR				TOTAL
	2007	2008	2009	2010	
MOD	3.57	1.59	0.55	0.00	5.71
MOI	1.57	1.26	0.38	0.00	3.21
Related Activities	0.40	0.15	0.08	0.00	0.63
Total	5.54	3.00	1.00	0.00	9.54
ISFF as a % of Combined MOD/MOI Budget	76%	19%	10%	0%	22%

Notes: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. GoI support includes operating and capital budget allocations to the MOD and MOI. Most U.S. funding to assist these ministries comes from the ISFF. Other U.S. funds also support Iraq's security institutions, but in a more limited capacity. The figure displays spending on defense programs as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Data is from the most recent year available. GDP is calculated on an exchange rate basis, not in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP).

Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 7/13/2010; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Treasury Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 1/17/2010; GoI, "Federal Public Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2010," 1/27/2010, Annex Schedule B; CIA, *The World Factbook*, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.html, accessed 7/16/2010.

Iraqi Annual Force Costs: FY 2006 – FY 2010




Note that 2008 totals for Base Budget include supplemental.

Iraqi Forces Quarterly Costs : FY 2005 – FY 2010

ISFF: QUARTERLY EXPENDITURES, BY MINISTRY AND SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP, FY 2005– FY 2010

\$ Billions and % of Total



Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/12/2010; SIGIR, *Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress*, 10/2005–1/2010.

Iraqi Force Development: Trying to Recover from the Budget Crisis

ISFF FY 2009/2010 SPEND PLAN (REVISED)


MINISTRY	SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PLAN	PROPOSED CHANGE	REVISED SPEND PLAN
Defense	Sustainment	91.8	22.5	114.3
	Equipment	260.1	48.6	308.7
	Training	196.5	-71.1	125.4
Interior	Sustainment	20.0	62.0	82.0
	Equipment	125.6		125.6
	Training	231.0	-62.0	169.0

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: USF-I, "Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) FY 2009/2010 Spend Plan (Revised)," 1/2010, p. 2.

US and Outside Military Aid

Priority to Afghanistan After FY2009: Comparative U.S. Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces Funding (in \$US billions): FY2004 - FY2011



Iraq	5	5.7	3	5.5	3	1	0	1	2	*23.2
Afghanistan										
Total										

Source: Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, RL33110 CRS Report RL30588, July 16, 2010.

Note: Draws on Congressional appropriation reports for each fiscal year.

a. Includes all appropriations through FY2008 Supplemental/FY2009 bridge (H.R. 2642/P.L. 110-252), including funds provided to the President in FY2004 shown in square brackets.


b. Figures in [] brackets are funds to train Afghan and Iraqi security forces that were appropriated to the President and transferred to the Coalition Provisional Authority, and implemented by the Army. Iraq total includes enacted funds from all U.S. sources. Afghanistan total does not include about \$1 billion to \$2 billion that Afghan security forces received in FY2004 and FY2005 through State Department or foreign military sales financing according to GAO-05-575, "Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined," June 2005, p. 9. Figures reflect CRS calculations from public laws and conference reports.

Iraqi Security Forces Fund, July 2010

ISFF: STATUS OF FUNDS

\$ Millions

Appropriated **\$18,039.3**
Obligated **\$17,090.7**
Expended **\$16,002.8**



Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: P.L. 108-7; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32; OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 7/13/2010.

- 95 % of the appropriated funds have been allocated to four major sub-activity groups: Equipment, Infrastructure, Sustainment, and Training.
- The remaining 5% has been allocated to smaller sub-activity groups.

Total U.S. ISFF Funding by Activity for MoD and MoI Forces: July 2010

ISFF: STATUS OF FUNDS, BY MINISTRY AND SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP
\$ Millions

MINISTRY	SUB-ACTIVITY GROUP	STATUS OF FUNDS		QUARTERLY CHANGE	
		OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
Defense	Equipment	4,621.7	4,472.5	29.4 (1%)	87.8 (2%)
	Infrastructure	3,075.5	2,839.0	-13.1 (0%)	76.1 (3%)
	Sustainment	1,882.9	1,775.4	4.8 (0%)	66.6 (4%)
	Training	466.2	423.0	15.0 (3%)	27.2 (7%)
	Subtotal	10,046.3	9,509.8	36.1 (0%)	257.6 (3%)
Interior	Training	2,449.2	2,387.4	20.8 (1%)	13.8 (1%)
	Equipment	1,753.7	1,592.9	2.6 (0%)	56.0 (4%)
	Infrastructure	1,374.9	1,164.0	-4.1 (0%)	56.1 (5%)
	Sustainment	595.2	554.2	-0.3 (0%)	7.5 (1%)
	Subtotal	6,172.9	5,698.6	19.0 (0%)	133.3 (2%)
Varies	Related Activities	871.5	794.5	-5.2 (-1%)	28.1 (4%)
Total		17,090.7	16,002.8	49.9 (0%)	419.0 (3%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: OSD, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/12/2010 and 7/13/2010.

Funding from the U.S.: FY2010 and FY2011 To Date

FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL AND FY 2011 REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS, AS OF 7/22/2010						
\$ Millions						
	FUND	FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL				FY 2011 REGULAR
		REQUEST	HOUSE	SENATE	APPROPRIATION	REQUEST
Foreign Assistance						
Defense	ISFF	1,000	1,000	1,000	*	2,000
	CERP					200
	Subtotal	1,000	1,000	1,000	*	2,200
Foreign Operations	ESF	0				383
	INCLE	517	650	650	*	315
	NADR	0				30
	IMET	0				2
	Subtotal	517	650	650	*	729
Total Assistance		1,517	1,650	1,650	*	2,929
Reconstruction-Related Operating Expenses						
State		1,570	1,030	1,030	*	0
Total Operating		1,570	1,030	1,030	*	0

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. The table reflects the House Appropriations Committee's July 1, 2010, amendment to H.R. 4899. The amounts passed by the House and Senate are not final. Negotiations are ongoing, and it is not known when the final bill will pass.

Sources: DoD, "Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request: Overview," 2/2010, Chapter 6, pp. 5, 9; DoS, "FY 2010 Supplemental Budget Justification," 2/1/2010, p. 31; DoS, "FY 2011 Foreign Assistance Congressional Budget Justification: Summary Tables," 3/8/2010, p. 23; H.R. 4899; Senate Report 111-188, to accompany H.R. 4899, "Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster and Relief and Summer Jobs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes," pp. 25, 55, 64.

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

How U.S. Security Force Development Aid was Spent: As of April 5, 2010

SECURITY: STATUS OF FUNDS, BY SECTOR, WITH SELECTED PROGRAMS

\$ Millions

SECTOR	PROGRAM	STATUS OF FUNDS		QUARTERLY CHANGE	
		OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
Equipment	MOD Equipment (ISFF)	4,592.3	4,384.7	180.3 (4%)	229.1 (6%)
	MOI Equipment (ISFF)	1,751.0	1,536.9	51.3 (3%)	95.5 (7%)
	Other	690.9	690.5		
	Subtotal	7,034.2	6,612.2	231.5 (3%)	324.7 (5%)
Training	MOD Training (ISFF)	451.2	395.8	23.1 (5%)	23.6 (6%)
	MOI Training (ISFF)	2,428.4	2,373.7	6.1 (0%)	14.1 (1%)
	Other	2,874.9	2,847.5	-0.8 (0%)	-0.8 (0%)
	Subtotal	5,754.4	5,617.0	28.4 (0%)	36.8 (1%)
Infrastructure	MOD Infrastructure (ISFF)	3,088.6	2,762.9	3.9 (0%)	22.1 (1%)
	MOI Infrastructure (ISFF)	1,379.0	1,107.9	1.5 (0%)	5.6 (1%)
	Other	1,081.5	1,075.5		0.8 (0%)
	Subtotal	5,549.1	4,946.3	5.4 (0%)	28.6 (1%)
Sustainment	MOD Sustainment (ISFF)	1,878.1	1,708.8	19.6 (1%)	59.0 (4%)
	MOI Sustainment (ISFF)	595.5	546.7	1.0 (0%)	17.7 (3%)
	Subtotal	2,473.7	2,255.5	20.6 (1%)	76.7 (4%)
Rule of Law	Protective Measures (CERP)	473.1	371.4	36.6 (8%)	36.1 (11%)
	Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, & Civil Society – Penal Facilities (IRRF)	92.1	83.3	4.2 (5%)	6.9 (9%)
	Other	964.9	864.9	1.5 (0%)	2.1 (0%)
	Subtotal	1,530.1	1,319.6	42.3 (3%)	45.1 (4%)
Related Activities	Related Activities (ISFF)	876.7	766.4	8.6 (1%)	29.1 (4%)
	Other	290.5	274.9	1.0 (0%)	1.5 (1%)
	Subtotal	1,167.2	1,041.2	9.7 (1%)	30.5 (3%)
Total		23,508.7	21,791.9	337.9 (1%)	542.3 (3%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Programs listed in this table had changes of at least \$5 million in combined quarterly obligations and expenditures. Appendix C shows the status of programs in the “Other” categories, which had nominal or no quarterly change. OSD does not report CERP obligation and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. SIGIR pulls CERP project category data from the IRMS, which lags in reporting by one quarter. Therefore, category totals found in the Funding subsection of this Report may not match top-line values found in the four subsections on major reconstruction areas.

Sources: DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 7/16/2009; IRMS, *USF-I CERP Category Report*, 4/14/2010; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2010; OSD, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009 and 4/12/2010; SIGIR, *Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 1/2010.

SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 2010, p. 47

ISF Training Centers



Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 5/15/2010.

Changing the Police Program

Transitioning Aid to the Iraqi Police


POLICE TRAINING PROGRAM: DoD vs. DoS

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Developing ability of Iraqi Police Service (IPS) to perform basic policing functions	Developing leadership and management skills for senior officials to effectively manage the IPS and its operations
Focus on counterinsurgency operations	Focus on community policing
Advising and mentoring on all levels of IPS (individual police station up through the MOI)	Advising/consulting at senior levels of IPS (Provincial Police HQ and training centers, police colleges, and MOI); no police station visits
Military-led, with civilian advisors	Civilian-led; no military support
An estimated 5,000 military personnel and 400 civilian advisors, not including combat troops	350 advisors and no more than 1,500 support personnel, including private security contractors
Conducted operations out of 50+ bases and training centers throughout Iraq	Based out of three program hubs in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil
Focused on force generation and basic training	Focused on training in management personnel and developing technical skills
Operational equipment (such as vehicles) provided to Iraqis	No operational equipment provided

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call, 3/17/2010.

Police Transition Process: CY2010-CY2011

TRANSITION OF IRAQI POLICE TRAINING TO INL



Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call, 3/17/2010.

Changes in US Police Training Aid

TRANSITION OF IRAQI POLICE TRAINING, 1/2010–12/2011




Note: The nature of this transition is still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.


Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, responses to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2010 and 1/15/2010.

U.S. Rule of Law Aid

U.S.-FUNDED PRISONS, COURTS, AND POLICE FACILITIES
Value of Completed Projects and Location of Ongoing and Not Started Projects



U.S. FUNDING FOR RULE OF LAW FACILITIES
\$ Millions



U.S.-FUNDED RULE OF LAW FACILITIES
\$ Millions


	COMPLETED	ONGOING	NOT STARTED	TOTAL
Police Facilities	157.33	0.06	2.89	160.29
Prisons	144.17	0.80	0.36	145.33
Courts	122.24	7.87	0.15	130.26
Total	423.74	8.73	3.40	435.87

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. This list of reconstruction projects is based on IRMS data, which is not fully accurate or complete. Therefore, project totals do not reconcile with top-line obligations and expenditures provided by the agencies.

Sources: IRMS, *Global Benchmark*, 4/5/2010; USACE, "Courthouse Renovation Helps Return Rule of Law to Mosul," 5/10/2009; USACE, "U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Prepares Iraq for Upcoming Elections," 1/11/2009; USACE, "Chamchamal Partners Cut Ribbon On Correctional Facility," 3/29/2009; USACE, "Renovations Complete at Ft. Suse Correctional Facility," 2/15/2010; USACE, "U.S. Military Transfers Prison to Iraqi Government," 3/16/2010; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, RoL, response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2010.

U.S. Transition to Advisory Role

U.S. Troop Levels: Build-Up in Afghanistan vs. Build-Up in Iraq



Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, RL3110 CRS Report RL30588, July 16, 2010; Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL34387, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale; CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale.

Notes: Actuals through May 2010; CRS estimates for June-September 2010. Figure design by Amber Wilhelm, CRS Graphics.

U.S. “Boots on the Ground”: Afghanistan vs. Iraq

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2001												
Afghanistan									0	0	0	0
Iraq									0	0	0	0
Both									0	0	0	0
2002												
Afghanistan	4,100	4,200	5,000	6,600	6,900	7,300	8,900	9,500	10,400	10,500	10,200	9,700
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Both	4,100	4,200	5,000	6,600	6,900	7,300	8,900	9,500	10,400	10,500	10,200	9,700
2003												
Afghanistan	9,800	9,500	11,450	9,300	9,900	10,900	10,900	12,700	9,800	12,100	12,000	13,100
Iraq	0	0	0	93,900	145,700	147,400	149,400	146,000	130,300	136,900	131,300	123,700
Both	9,800	9,500	11,450	103,200	155,600	158,300	160,300	158,700	140,100	149,000	143,300	136,800
2004												
Afghanistan	13,500	12,300	14,100	19,500	17,700	17,800	17,400	15,700	16,800	17,500	17,800	18,300
Iraq	126,900	108,400	119,600	131,700	139,800	144,300	140,600	126,800	137,700	134,600	135,900	142,600
Both	140,400	120,700	133,700	151,200	157,500	162,100	158,000	142,500	154,500	152,100	153,700	160,900
2005												
Afghanistan	18,700	20,300	20,900	19,500	20,000	19,200	21,100	17,400	18,000	17,800	17,400	18,500
Iraq	152,300	161,200	147,800	147,900	140,000	141,100	139,300	139,200	143,700	150,000	159,800	156,200
Both	171,000	181,500	168,700	167,400	160,000	160,300	160,400	156,600	161,700	167,800	177,200	174,700
2006												
Afghanistan	20,300	22,700	20,000	23,300	21,800	22,300	20,800	19,700	20,400	19,800	20,500	21,800
Iraq	155,100	139,300	133,500	132,500	132,300	130,300	127,300	133,500	143,400	142,600	151,200	136,900
Both	175,400	162,000	153,500	155,800	154,100	152,600	148,100	153,200	163,800	162,400	171,700	158,700


Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110 CRS Report RL30588, July 16, 2010.

U.S. “Boots on the Ground”: Afghanistan vs. Iraq

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2007												
Afghanistan	26,000	24,800	24,400	23,900	26,400	23,800	24,000	24,000	24,500	24,400	24,800	24,600
Iraq	131,500	138,300	141,200	147,900	147,400	152,500	159,600	161,400	169,000	164,700	170,300	165,700
Both	157,500	163,100	165,600	171,800	173,800	176,300	183,600	185,400	193,500	189,100	195,100	190,300
2008												
Afghanistan	27,000	28,000	28,800	33,100	35,600	34,000	33,700	34,200	33,500	33,000 ^a	33,000 ^a	32,500
Iraq	160,200	158,100	160,500	152,300	158,900	153,300	147,400	145,100	146,800	147,650 ^a	148,075 ^a	148,500
Both	187,200	186,100	189,300	185,400	194,500	187,300	181,100	179,300	180,300	180,650 ^a	181,075 ^a	181,000
2009												
Afghanistan	32,800	35,900	38,350	39,000	44,700	55,100	56,500	62,600	62,300	65,800	67,500	69,000
Iraq	144,100	146,400	141,300	139,400	134,100	134,500	132,300	132,600	129,200	120,300	119,300	114,300
Both	176,900	182,300	179,650	178,400	178,800	189,600	188,800	195,200	191,500	186,100	186,800	183,300
2010												
Afghanistan	70,200	74,600	85,000	87,600	89,680 ^b	91,760 ^b	93,840 ^b	95,920 ^b	98,000 ^b			
Iraq	112,400	101,100	95,900	98,850	89,080 ^b	79,310 ^b	69,540 ^b	59,770 ^b	50,000 ^b			
Both	182,600	175,700	180,900	186,450	178,760 ^b	171,070 ^b	163,380 ^b	155,690 ^b	148,000 ^b			

Source: Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110 CRS Report RL30588, July 16, 2010.


U.S. Withdrawal and Reorganization, January 2010



U.S. Equipment Drawdown and Transfer


DISPOSITION OF U.S. EQUIPMENT

Pieces of Equipment, Millions




Source: DoD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, 11/4/2009, p. 36.

U.S. Equipment Drawdown: 2009-2010




Source: Frank Oliveri, "How Deep In After We're Out," *CQ Weekly*, 3/15/2010, p. 620.

U.S. Withdrawals: Rolling Stock and Cargo: 4/2010




Rolling Stock Drawdown

Container, Non-Rolling Stock Drawdown



Cutting the Role of US Contractors

DOD Contractors in Iraq vs. Troop Levels: 2007-2010




Source: CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; CRS Report R40682, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues*, by Amy Belasco; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Boots on the Ground" monthly reports to Congress. September troop levels based on CRS estimates determined through media reports and DOD press releases.

Notes: The y-intercept for the level of troops and contractor personnel is similar. The R2 value for the linear trend line for contractor personnel is 0.84 and for uniformed personnel is .92. R2 is a statistical term used to describe the goodness of the fit between the trend line and the data points. R2 is a descriptive measure between 0 and 1. The closer the R2 value is to one, the better the fit of the trend line to the data.

25


Iraq DOD Contractor Personnel by Type of Service Provided, March 2010



Source: DOD US CENTCOM 2nd Quarter Contractor Census Report.


Notes: Numbers may vary slightly from data in other sections of the report due to differences in the points in time when data was gathered. The Department of Defense did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or Training until the first quarter of 2010.

Iraq DOD Percent of Contractors Performing Types of Service, March 2010



Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, July 2, 2010. p.9

DOD Contractor Workforce in Iraq, March 2010



Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis, July 2, 2010. p.10

The Role of DoD Contractors (4/2010)


ESTIMATED SCALE OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS

CONFLICT	ESTIMATED PERSONNEL (Thousands)		CONTRACTOR TO MILITARY RATIO
	CONTRACTOR	MILITARY	
Revolutionary War	2	9	1:6
War of 1812	N/A	38	N/A
Mexican-American War	6	33	1:6
Civil War	200	1,000	1:5
Spanish-American War	N/A	35	N/A
World War I	85	2,000	1:24
World War II	734	5,400	1:7
Korea	156	393	1:2.5
Vietnam	70	359	1:5
Gulf War	9	500	1:55
Balkans	20	20	1:1
Iraq, 2008	160	200	1:1
Iraq, August 2010 (Projected)	75	50	1:0.7

Note: Adapted from original, which estimated total contractor personnel in-theater to be 190,200 as of April 30, 2008, including 30,300 DoD contractor personnel supporting Iraq operations from neighboring countries. Projections for August 2009 include only DoD contractor personnel—estimates from DoS and USAID were not available. Estimates also do not include LOGCAP contractors, who may number as many as 189,000, making the contractor to military personnel ration significantly higher. For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the U.S. government.

Sources: CBO, "Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq," 8/2008, pp. 9, 13; CWC, press release, "Wartime Contracting Hearing to Focus on Managing Contractors during Iraq Drawdown," 3/19/2010; DoD, "Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request: Overview," 2/2010, Chapter 6, p. 1.

Cut in DoD Support Contractors




DoD Contractors Largely Base Support: More than 50% Iraqi (as of April 2010)

DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, AS OF 2/2010
100,035 Total Contractors

National Origin



Type of Service Provided



Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: ADUSD(Program Support), "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan," 2/28/2010.

Fewer Private Security Contractors, April 2010

PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

	U.S. CITIZEN	THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONAL	HOST NATION	TOTAL
DoD	776	9,127	1,192	11,095
DoS/USAID	1,001	1,671	123	2,795
Total	1,777	10,798	1,315	13,890

Note: DoD data as of 12/31/2009. DoS/USAID data as of 3/31/2010.

Sources: ADUSD(Program Support), "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan," 2/28/2010; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 4/1/2010.

Status of Contractors to U.S. in Iraq, July 2010

U.S.-FUNDED CONTRACTORS AND GRANTEES IN IRAQ, AS OF 6/30/2010

AGENCY	PURPOSE	U.S. CITIZEN	THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONAL	IRAQI NATIONAL	TOTAL
DoD	Non-security	31,071	13,467	44,913	89,451
	PSCs	1,365	14,136	1,311	16,812
	Subtotal	32,436	27,603	46,224	106,263
DoS	PSCs	1,202	2,491	1,177	4,870
	Non-security	*	*	*	*
	Subtotal	1,202	2,491	1,177	4,870
USAID	Non-security	157	1,190	138	1,485
	PSCs	3	541	487	1,031
	Subtotal	160	1,731	625	2,516
Total		33,798	31,825	48,026	113,649

Note: Data not audited. SIGIR did not receive reporting from DoS on the number of non-security contractors and grantees.


Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, RSO, response to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2010; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2010; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 7/2/2010; USACE, response to SIGIR data call, 7/3/2010.

Source: SIGIR Report, July 30, 2010. p. 46.


Indicators of Future Size of Contractors

DoD CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, 3/2008–3/2010

Number of Contractors, by Type of Service Provided



Percentage of Contractors, by National Origin



Note: Data not audited. DoD ADUSD(Program Support) provides top-line data for the number of contractors by national origin and the number of contractors by type of service provided; DoD does not disaggregate national origin data by type of service provided, so it is not possible to determine, for example, if security contractors are predominantly third country nationals. DoD did not separately track Logistics/Maintenance or Training until the first quarter of 2010; those categories are grouped into the "Other" category here.

Source: SIGIR Report, July 30, 2010. p. 47.

- About 65% of contractors are assigned base support functions such as maintaining the grounds, running dining facilities, and providing laundry service.
- There is an increase in third-country nationals and a pronounced decrease in construction contractors.
- The number of contractors providing security has increased.