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Afghanistan: Campaign Trends

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
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July 14, 2010

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
The War Escalates: 2004-2009




Source: Adapted from Major General Michael Flynn, *State of the Insurgency, Trends, Intentions and Objectives*, Director of Intelligence, International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, based on Afghanistan JOIIS NATO SIGACTS data as of 15 December 2009 reporting.

Threat Summary: 5-2010


The insurgency in Afghanistan has expanded geographically



Security Incidents 2007




Security Incidents 2008





Security Incidents 2009

Insurgent Influence and Capability


- Not Assessed
- INS Limited Capability
- INS Demonstrated Capability
- INS Effective Capability




The Insurgency had momentum in much of the South and East




Population Density of Afghanistan



Where the Fighting Is: End 2009



The Afghan Insurgency at End-2009




Militant Groups

- Taliban (TB)
- Hezqani Network (HQN)
- Hezbe-e Islami Qulbuddin (HQ)
- Hezbe-e Islami Khalis (HIK)
- Mahsud/Tehrik-Taliban PAK (TTP)
- Tehrik-i-Netaj Shariat Muhammad (TNSM)/TTP
- Nazir
- Lashkar-e Islam (LeI)
- Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT)
- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
- Key al-Qaida concentration

PAK STATS (Open Source—as of 15 DEC):
 Suicide Attacks: 66 (793 KIA / 2086 WIA)
 Other IED Attacks: 83 (760 KIA / 875 WIA)
 39 attacks since 17 OCT (~ 30 days)

- We face a TB dominated insurgency -- Two groups emerging; Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban
- Overarching strategy and plans remain unclear, but strategic goals are clear and coming into alignment
- Operational level coordination occurs across the country; most frequent observed at the tactical level
- AQ provides facilitation , training and some funding while relying on insurgent safe havens in Pakistan


IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009



JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
 Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)

Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)


Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)




Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2009, UNODC.

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC

The Need for Unity of Effort: ISAF in a “Nationwide” War



The Problem of “Stand Aside” Forces: ISAF Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: June 21, 2010



At least 4,715 of 18,835 fully committed allied forces leave in 2011

Campaign Strategy

Protect the Population.

- Prioritize effort in high-density population areas where insurgent groups operate primarily with disaffected Pashtun populations. Reduce civilian casualties.

Enable Afghan National Security Forces.

- Accelerate and expand indigenous security force capacity and capability. Partner at every echelon.

Neutralize malign influence.

- Identify and report corruption; forge responsible and accountable governance.

Support extension of governance.

- Gain active support of the population by empowering legitimate sub-national leaders with effective population security measures.

Support socio-economic development.

- Gain active support of the population by creating security conditions that provide space for community-based development opportunities. Connect econ corridors.

ISAF Campaign Plan – June 2010

Strategic Main Effort:
Grow the ANSF

Operational Main Effort

Shaping/Supporting Effort

Economy of Force

Badghis-
Ghormach

Kunduz-Baghlan

#6 – Shayr Khan Bandar
#3 – Hairatan

#7 – Torah Ghundey

#4 – Islam Qal'eh

#1 – Tor Kham

Nangahar, Kunar,
Laghman

Paktika, Paktiya, Khost
and Ghazni




#8 – Ghulum Khan

#5 – Zaranj

#2 – Wesh (Chaman)


Central Helmand

Kandahar

Key Terrain District (81) 
Area of Interest Districts (41) 
Border Crossing Point 

Must Show Can Reverse Insurgent Momentum at a Broader Level: Struggle for the Rest of the Population

Most Threatened Population Areas




*Prevent GIRoA development and influence
Limit population ability to choose*

Elements of Insurgent Influence

- Shadow governance
- Population intimidated and/or coerced
- Insurgents have Freedom of Movement
- Friendly Freedom of Movement limited
- Infrastructure development disrupted
- Economic capacity truncated

Essential Security Influence




*Create time and space
Enable population opportunity to choose*

Elements of Security Influence

- National thru local governance improved
- Security in key population centers
- Security connected between regions
- Friendly Freedom of Movement assured
- Major infrastructure projects ongoing
- Economic corridor sustainable

Campaign Design




UNCLASSIFIED

Governance is a Main Effort: A Real Campaign Plan or An Empty Slogan?

- Commitment from the Afghan government
Reinforce key CIVMIL partnerships with GIRoA at all levels
- GIRoA capacity to deliver services
Channel International Community resources through GIRoA ministries
- Contracting and corruption
Scrutinize new contracts and broaden range of beneficiaries
- Ability to mitigate malign powerbrokers
Strengthen legitimate political bodies; reduce informal influences

The Low Quality of District Government is a Critical Issue




Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

In March 2010, 30% of Afghans believed that the government was less corrupt than one year prior while only 24% believed that it was more corrupt. Eighty-three percent of Afghans stated that government corruption affected their daily lives --a 1% decrease from December 2009 but still 4% higher than September 2009. Twenty-nine percent of Afghans believed their president to be corrupt, while 33% believed their provincial governor to be corrupt, and 34% believed their district governor to be corrupt. These results actually represent drops of 5% from the previous quarter (a positive indicator).


Despite their feelings about government corruption, Afghans confidence in their government reached a new high (since polling started in September 2008). Between September and March of 2009, Afghan confidence in the national administration increased by six percentage points to 45%, confidence in the provincial governor increased by five percentage points to 47%, and confidence in the district governors increased by six percentage points to 44%. When asked if the government was heading in the right direction, 59% of Afghans responded “yes” This represents an increase of eight percent over the previous September 2009.

Winning Popular Support is As Much a Challenge as the Threat




Data Source: IJC, 18 March 2010

ANSF Historical and Future Growth



• Growth accelerating
 • Challenged by attrition and retention



Promising Growth, Challenges Remain


- Growth on track for 2010;
 - ANCOP attrition enduring concern
 - Entering historical summer lull

- ANA quality improving, however;
 - Leader development lagging
 - Officer & NCO shortages persist

- Keys to arresting ANP attrition:
 - Recruit-Train-Assign Model
 - Pay-Partner-Predictable Cycle
 - Leader Development & Literacy


- Ministerial capacity improving – projecting self sustaining in 2012

Setting a Realistic Campaign Timeline: Success Requires a Sustained Effort Long Beyond 2010 or 2011




- Proof that new strategy and tactics work is possible by mid-2011
- Major transition to ANSF should not begin until force is ready -- probably late 2012 at earliest.
- Slow phase down of US troops must be conditions based.
- Foreign aid and continued funding of most ANSF costs probably needed well beyond 2015.


Progress Toward Stability



Beyond the South: A National Campaign







SOF Effects: Degrading the Insurgency




Effects on the Insurgency

- > In the Last 90 Days:
 - > 121 Insurgent Leaders Removed
 - > 505 Insurgents Detained
- > Instability among leadership is degrading insurgent operations
- > Reduced efficacy of Taliban "shadow governance"
- > IED networks being degraded



Operational Main Effort: RC-South


- Most significant Taliban influence over the population
- Protect the population in threatened or key areas
- Create time and space for governance to improve
- Create conditions for development, with freedom of movement and security along contiguous economic corridor




Demonstrable, near-term stabilization of the south is critical to success

Central Helmand Update

Jun 2009



Jun 2010




- Central Helmand under insurgent control; Marjah insurgent-narco hub
- Restricted freedom of movement; Illegal checkpoints and IEDs
- Negative perception of GIRoA

- Initiative shifting to Coalition; presence in every major village
- Increased freedom of movement; IED threat remains
- Attitude of population trending positive


Moshtarak Update (Marjah and Nad' Ali)

1 February 2010



ANSF
2,734 +60% Increase
ISAF
2,107

1 June 2010



ANSF
4,794
ISAF
3,157



Governance

- Limited access by GIRoA officials
- Activities limited to provincial center

- District Governors in place
- Councils functioning; limited by tashkil growth

Basic Services

- Schools: Limited or no attendance; madrasses open
- Clinics: Limited access; open only in Provincial Center

- Schools: 81 teachers available; students returning to school
- Clinics: Many opening; two new clinics under construction


Commerce

- Few bazaars open in Marjah and Nad' Ali
- Limited access to goods


- Four major bazaars open in Marjah; 100 new shops
- Expanding availability of goods

Kandahar: Plan Overview

June 2009




Rising Tide of Security



- City – Expanded, partnered ANP

August 2010



- Gradual increase of GIROA influence in surrounding districts

Political Reform

- Manage relationships: Powerbrokers and Political elite
- Protect, resource and empower District Governors, khans, maliks, mullahs
- Use the shura to gain trust and confidence of local communities

Economic Opportunity

- Address principal sources of corruption and grievance: contracting, private security companies, land disputes
- Significantly expand electrical supply to meet rising demand


Progress over months; process not an event

Kandahar: Complex and Unique Challenge

- Heart of Pashtun south
- Historic Taliban capitol
- Hub of trade and commerce routes

Weak Government and Strong Powerbrokers

Economic Inequity



Multiple contested surrounding districts




Highly populated (850K) city center

Complex Damaged Tribal Structure


Resilient and Complex Insurgency

Each is difficult; collectively a unique challenge


Resilient and Complex Insurgency



Tribes, Power Brokers, and Fragmentation



Afghan-Pakistan Military Operations: March 2010



Largest deployment of PAKMIL forces on the western border of Pakistan in the nation’s history, with over 130,000 PAKMIL deployed to the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). More than 100,000 PAKMIL troops were moved from the eastern border with India.