

CSIS-IND TASK FORCE

Supporting Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship



ABOUT THE PROJECT

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Institute for New Democracies (IND) are supporting Kazakhstan's OSCE chairmanship by providing expert advice and policy recommendations generated by the U.S.-Kazakhstan OSCE Task Force. The initiative is supported through a grant from the government of Kazakhstan. The Task Force aims to bring together policymakers, regional specialists, representatives of non-governmental organizations, representatives of former OSCE chairing countries, and business leaders to offer implementable recommendations for effective and successful OSCE chairmanship. The CSIS-IND Task Force consists of two working groups based in Washington, D.C. and Astana. This Policy Brief is issued by the project's Washington Task Force. The paper does not represent the views of the government of Kazakhstan.

**Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS)**

1800 K Street, NW
Washington DC 20006
Phone: 202.887.0200

**Institute for New
Democracies (IND)**

1228 ½ 31st Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
Phone: 202.471.1164
Email: IND@ind-dc.org

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Formulating an OSCE Summit Agenda:
The Security Dimension

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Executive Summary

The last OSCE summit, at which key decisions on pan-European security were adopted, took place in Istanbul in November 1999. These decisions included the Agreement of Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and associated political commitments, the Charter for European Security, and the revised Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures. The Adapted CFE Treaty has yet to enter into force and the original CFE Treaty of 1990 is at risk of becoming irrelevant following Russia's unilateral suspension of its implementation in December 2007. The Vienna Document is showing its age and requires revisions and amendments to increase and improve transparency and confidence in the contemporary OSCE security environment.

Under the Charter for European Security, the OSCE envisioned developing conflict prevention tools and an OSCE role in peacekeeping operations. Recent events in Kyrgyzstan and the 2008 Russia-Georgia war demonstrated that OSCE is far from being effective in crisis prevention. Moreover, since the Istanbul summit and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, new security threats have emerged. NATO's military operations in Afghanistan in order to quell terrorist threats emanating from the country have impacted on security in the OSCE region bordering Afghanistan. Furthermore, in 2008, Russia offered a proposed treaty on European security, which in turn led to the OSCE Corfu Process focused on updating the OSCE's mechanisms and activities in all three dimensions: military, economic and human.

OSCE heads of states need to convene for a new summit to make important strategic decisions for the future of the OSCE and the broader Europe. They need to develop a comprehensive strategy to address contemporary security challenges, including a multitude of cross-border threats, failing states, ethnic conflicts, and insufficient

democratic mechanisms throughout the OSCE region. While security in most of Europe is largely ensured through NATO and EU membership, the Eurasian region remains unstable due to the situation in Afghanistan and what can be seen as the ongoing disintegration of the former Soviet Union. In such conditions, the OSCE needs vision, leadership, political will, and a mandate to address emerging challenges that might prove even more serious than the West Balkan wars in the 1990s.

Introduction

The 2008 Russia-Georgia war demonstrated that the OSCE had limited capabilities to prevent a war between two of its member states and resulted in further marginalization of the OSCE in the South Caucasus. The Kyrgyz crisis in June 2010, which resulted in a deadly pogrom against the local Uzbek minority, raised critical questions about the OSCE's ability to prevent or respond to serious conflicts. The conclusion is that fifteen years after the Bosnian war, the OSCE is unprepared to react adequately to grave crimes against humanity. While the Kyrgyz political conflict in April 2010 was quickly resolved through effective diplomacy and cooperation between the U.S., Russian, and Kazakh Presidents, the subsequent ethnic violence paralyzed the OSCE which was unable to reach consensus on rapid reaction measures to stop the slaughters and expulsions.

As the UN failed to send peacekeepers to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan as the OSCE chair proposed that the organization send international police to the troubled southern part of the country. Russia insisted that such an important political decision, which also involves budget allocations, could only be made by the OSCE Permanent Council (PC) where consensus between 56 states is required. Meanwhile, Moscow failed to send its own unilateral peacekeeping mission as requested by the interim government in Bishkek. The cumbersome OSCE decision-making mechanism, often blocked by one capital, once again prevented the organization from becoming involved and from increasing its profile in the Central Asian region that

is becoming critically important both for European security and NATO's efforts in Afghanistan.

Thirty five years after the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE must take a somber look at its effectiveness and responsiveness not only as a venue for dialogue, but as an organization that can successfully intervene when peace is at risk and human lives are in danger. With the security situation in Central Asia's Ferghana Valley extremely tense, the perpetuation of four unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova, and the extensive insurgency in Afghanistan, the largest pan-European security organization must develop reliable and effective mechanisms to turn dialogue into action in enhancing security in the OSCE region. To achieve such goals, the heads of OSCE participating states should convene to charter a new strategy for the Organization. Kazakhstan's chairmanship broached the idea of a summit at the end of 2010 as a way to make the organization more relevant. An OSCE Summit of Heads of State and Government could focus on the following topics:

1. Central Asian Security

- Decisions should be made regarding effective early warning, monitoring, and protection of this broad security region. Proximity to Afghanistan – as three OSCE member states border Afghanistan and most of them have ethnic minorities in that country – remains a potential threat to regional stability.
- OSCE should prioritize and dedicate more resources to border protection training programs, counter narcotics trafficking, anti-corruption and good governance initiatives, and inter-ethnic tolerance programs.

2. Effective Crisis Prevention Mechanism

- The OSCE should develop an effective Crisis Prevention Mechanism to include tools for conflict prevention, conflict management, and crisis resolution.



- The decision-making process in times of crisis should be simplified to enable an executive body constituted by the OSCE troika and the Chair of the OSCE Security Forum to respond quickly. A standing agreement with other international security bodies and their police programs, including the EU, NATO, and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) should be developed for the dispatch and funding of military monitors, international police units, and peacekeepers.
- The Crisis Prevention Mechanism should address both inter-state and intra-state conflicts, including inter-ethnic violence and secessionist movements.

3. Revision of the Vienna Document 1999 and Progress on Renewing the CFE Regime

- The OSCE should fulfill the 2009 Athens Ministerial Decision to strengthen the Vienna Document of 1999. This revision must include steps to improve the implementation of the document's confidence and security building measures.

- Parties to the CFE treaty need to recommit their compliance with the document that Russia unilaterally suspended in 2007 and commit to the guiding principles of the 1999 Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

4. The Corfu Process and Russia's Proposal for a New European Security Treaty

- The OSCE should make formal decisions on the future of the Corfu Process. The summit can answer Moscow's call for a new European security treaty by updating and amending the 1999 OSCE Charter on European Security and reinforcing the security dialogue within the Corfu Process.
- Amendments to the Charter should reflect the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century adopted in Maastricht in 2003 and the new Crisis Prevention Mechanism.

5. OSCE and Afghanistan

- The OSCE can play a role in stabilizing Afghanistan by implementing border security and anti-narcotics programs, developing democratic processes and effective government institutions, and funding educational projects. The Central Asian countries are interested in participating in the process as continuing instability in Afghanistan affects their own security.
- The OSCE can propose the establishment of a Stability Pact for Afghanistan to unite and coordinate the development efforts of various interested parties in and around the country.
- The integration of Afghanistan into the Central Asian region should be given special consideration. OSCE efforts should involve multi-national diplomacy and working with other donors on development projects, particularly in transport and transit.

Central Asian Security

After the conflicts in the West Balkans subsided, security in the post-Soviet region became the number one priority in the OSCE zone. The unresolved disputes in the Caucasus disrupt transportation and energy supplies to Europe. The political crisis and violence in Kyrgyzstan has plunged the country into turmoil, crisis, and lawlessness, threatened U.S. and Russian military installations, and disrupted the supply lines and transfer of troops to Afghanistan. Instability of one state in the region creates fertile ground for political or religious extremism, organized crime, and drug trafficking, thereby proliferating security threats far beyond the area of conflict. The violence against ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 reminded the world of the complex ethnic map of Central Asia, and particularly of the Ferghana Valley. As the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s demonstrated, ethnic fault lines are easily exploitable for political or criminal purposes. The current security challenges in Eurasia require serious analysis that would take into account the interests of all OSCE states in that region, as well as those of the OSCE's Asian partners.

OSCE as the largest pan-European security organization has a well-established presence in all five Central Asian countries. The OSCE field missions should be at the forefront of the organization's crisis-prevention efforts. Enhancing the Organization's security dimension in Central Asia will increase the stature of the OSCE in the region and will ultimately boost its human dimension efforts. At the next OSCE summit, participating states need to adopt a declaration on enhancing security in Central Asia including efforts on conflict prevention, inter-ethnic tolerance, border security, and anti-narcotics programs. The increased profile of the security dimension in the region should be combined with robust human dimension programs focusing particularly on good governance, anti-corruption, and human rights.

Crisis Prevention Mechanism

For the past 20 years, the OSCE has been unable to resolve the protracted conflicts in the Caucasus. The Organization is stalled by the consensus principle that allows it little maneuverability in quickly responding to conflicts. The ongoing crisis in Kyrgyzstan highlights the limitations of OSCE capabilities to deal with conflict:

- The OSCE has been successful in establishing confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBM) through the Vienna Document's exchange of information on military forces, risk reduction and compliance and verification measures. However, these measures were insufficient to prevent or respond to the August 2008 Russo-Georgia war. These problems threaten the core purpose of the organization that was founded to protect European security through transparency and cooperation on hard security matters.
- The OSCE has served as the custodian organization of the CFE Treaty and the 1999 Adapted Treaty, which is implemented through the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) based at the OSCE Vienna headquarters. However, the treaty is practically ineffective after Russia unilaterally suspended its overall compliance with its provisions in December 2007.
- Moscow has vetoed the continuation of OSCE and other international missions and field presences, by either forcing their closure (Georgia Border Monitoring Mission in 2005, OSCE Mission in Georgia with field presences in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2009, UNOMIG in Abkhazia in 2009) or reducing them to irrelevance (Moldova/Transnistria from 2006 to date). As a result, the OSCE has been marginalized in South Caucasus and Moldova.

- The Georgian war underscored that the OSCE could not ultimately prevent a conflict between two of its member states.
- The Kyrgyz crisis showed that OSCE does not have a mechanism for rapid deployment of peacekeepers or international police in areas where conflict and ethnic expulsions were taking place.
- Nonetheless, the OSCE has proven to be an effective facilitator of conflict resolution negotiations (where there is political will on the side of the major players). OSCE has also been successful in post-conflict mediation and reconciliation, monitoring human rights, and fostering dialogue between concerned parties in conflict and post-conflict zones.
- These strengths are being used in the protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus, but they can only lead to marginal improvements, not to a lasting solution, unless the OSCE manages to couple its lengthy process of negotiations with powerful incentives to entice the parties to forge a durable peace.


In 1992, OSCE adopted a decision on “Early Warning, Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management (Including Fact-Finding and Rapporteur Missions and CSCE Peacekeeping), Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.” In the *Charter for European Security* (Istanbul Summit, November 1999), the participating states agreed to make increased use of OSCE instruments, to develop the OSCE’s role in peacekeeping operations, and to create Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT). These measures would enable the OSCE to respond quickly to requests from participating states for civilian and police expertise in conflict situations; to expand the OSCE’s ability to carry out police related activities; and to work more closely with the Partners for Cooperation.

According to the Athens Ministerial Decision of December 2009, the OSCE Forum on Security

Cooperation should contribute to improving OSCE procedures and mechanisms in the area of crisis management. The OSCE toolbox for conflict prevention and crisis management has been discussed during meetings of the Corfu Process. It became clear that this toolbox, despite its large size, has proven either too cumbersome or insufficient to cope with existing challenges as the Georgian crisis of August 2008 demonstrated.

During the Corfu discussions under the Greek Chairmanship, OSCE states concluded that the comparative advantage of the OSCE in handling a crisis vis-à-vis other international actors is its comprehensive approach to security that combines soft power with hard security measures. However, the Organization needs to examine why OSCE mechanisms remain dormant or unutilized when crises erupt or why the activation of early warning mechanisms is not followed by the prompt employment of conflict prevention mechanisms.

The OSCE needs a new summit of heads of state and government to reevaluate the effectiveness of the organization in conflict prevention and crisis intervention and to develop a new strategy to deal with contemporary security threats in the OSCE region. The OSCE needs to develop a ***Crisis Prevention Mechanism*** that would include both crisis prevention and crisis management tools. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden has proposed such an idea to prevent conflicts



between two OSCE member states and in the case of conflict, empower the organization to offer rapid humanitarian relief, help negotiate a cease-fire, and provide impartial monitoring. He also proposed that OSCE should facilitate consultations in the case of serious energy and environmental disruption and dispatch special representatives to investigate reports of egregious human rights violations. (Joe Biden, “Advancing Europe’s Security,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, 2010) The events in Kyrgyzstan once again illustrated the need for the OSCE to have an effective mechanism for swiftly making and implementing decisions on deployment of military observers, peacekeeping forces, or international police units to prevent massive loss of human life. OSCE should seek partnerships to fulfill such missions with NATO, the EU, and the CSTO. An important part of such an agreement could be through combining resources, including financial means, to successfully complete joint peacekeeping missions.

Vienna Document 1999 and CFE

Adopted on 16 November 1999 and entered into force the following January, the Vienna Document 1999 is the latest version of a package of measures that first took shape in the Stockholm Document of 1986. Its purpose is to increase military transparency and predictability. The original intent of the military confidence and security building measures was to increase transparency concerning the activities of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The particular concern was the large-scale exercises and manoeuvres both blocs routinely conducted that could have been inadvertently misinterpreted as a cover for attack. The Vienna Document 1990 which was followed by the Vienna Documents of 1992, 1994 and 1999, built upon those confidence and security building measures and were revised to incorporate implementation lessons learned as well as the changing political-military context of the OSCE region.

The Vienna Document 1999 contains a number of measures “designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament.” These measures include an annual

exchange of military information; mechanisms for risk reduction; activities to encourage greater contacts among the participating states militaries; notification and observation of “certain military activities;” and, verification and compliance measures. However, unlike the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document is not a legally-binding treaty but a political document that lacks the full force of internationally agreed norms. Nonetheless, the Vienna Document has been generally successful in both its mechanical implementation and its ability to achieve the stated aims.

Despite its general success, the Vienna Document 1999 requires revision. The 2009 OSCE Athens Ministerial asked the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) to, “Explore ways to strengthen the OSCE’s politico-military toolbox, with particular attention to strengthening current arms control and CSBM instruments, including strengthening the Vienna Document.” Throughout 2010 the FSC held several discussions on revising the Vienna Document and is working on procedures for a “Vienna Document Plus” that will reflect changes to the existing document. A great deal of work needs to be completed in order for the OSCE to issue a revised Vienna Document. Some participating states want naval forces, heretofore not part of the Vienna Document regime, included in the document. Others desire that the numerical thresholds for notification of “certain military activities” be reduced to reflect the ongoing military transformation from large and heavy formations to smaller and lighter units. There are also calls from some states to modify the exchange of information to include multinational rapid reaction forces.

Beyond the military-technical aspects, there are broader political provisions that require consideration by OSCE states. Key among them are risk reduction measures. Any revised Vienna Document will have to incorporate the lessons learned from the Russo-Georgia war in order for it to be useful and effective in strengthening security and confidence for all OSCE states.

The original CFE Treaty was negotiated and concluded during the last years of the Cold War. It established comprehensive limits on key categories of conventional armaments in Europe and mandated the destruction of excess weaponry. The treaty established limits of conventional weaponry for the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It was signed in November 1990 and came into force in July 1992. The treaty included provisions for information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of weapons destruction. The treaty facilitated a transparent, large-scale reduction of conventional military equipment in Europe by the end of 1995. The CFE Treaty is not formally part of the OSCE and not all OSCE states are party to it. However, at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, the heads of state and government of the CFE parties signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Adapted CFE Treaty reflected the changed political-military situation in the CFE area of application by setting national and territorial instead of bloc-based limits on conventional armaments.

Concurrent to signing the legally-binding Adapted CFE Treaty, summit participants agreed to a set of political commitments connected to the Adapted CFE Treaty. These Istanbul Commitments have been at the heart of why the ten-year old adapted treaty has not entered in force. NATO members refused to ratify the adapted treaty until Russia complied with its commitments to respect the sovereignty of Georgia and Moldova by removing its troops from their territories. While Russia implemented some of its commitments, the remaining Russian military presence in the separatist regions of Transnistria (Moldova) and Abkhazia (Georgia) were obstacles to NATO states in ratifying the adapted treaty. In 2007, Moscow unilaterally suspended its compliance obligations under the original CFE Treaty because of its alleged frustration with NATO capitals unwilling to ratify the adapted treaty and because it did not want limitations on its troop numbers as it prepared for war with Georgia.

Currently, the CFE regime is in a state of political limbo and at risk of total collapse. The NATO allies

proposed in 2007 a package of parallel actions that if accepted would move them toward ratification of the adapted treaty if Russia would take actions toward meeting its remaining Istanbul commitments. This package became a victim of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. During 2010, some diplomatic activity on the CFE Treaty became visible. In January, the United States appointed a special envoy for the CFE treaty and the joint statement released after the June 2010 Obama-Medvedev meeting had a reference to CFE: “The United States of America and the Russian Federation are also committed to working with all our partners this year to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe, and modernize it for the 21st century.” It appears that the U.S. and Russia, after achieving a new strategic arms reduction (START) treaty, are now considering reexamining both the existing CFE Treaty and its 1999 adapted version.

A new process to modernize the CFE regime will have several tough issues to work through including the sub-zone numerical limitations (so-called flank limits) and the issue of host nation consent of foreign troops on the territory of a party to the CFE, an issue particularly acute in Georgia and Moldova. Given that there are 30 state parties to the CFE Treaty and six more states that will have to enter the adapted or new treaty regime (the newer NATO members from the Baltics and the western Balkans) much time will be required to obtain a revised treaty to which all state parties can agree. However, the OSCE heads of state and government could issue a statement of principles at the OSCE Summit to guide the treaty negotiations in a similar way that was done for the START negotiations when Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued START negotiating principles at their first summit in July 2009.

OSCE and Afghanistan

The Kazakhstan OSCE Chair will need to address the issue of how cooperation with a post-war Afghanistan might be organized institutionally by international players, including the involvement of the OSCE. As the situation in Afghanistan affects directly the security of all five Central Asian states, they have

sought involvement in Afghanistan's stabilization and reconstruction for several years. An OSCE heads of states summit can adopt a strategy for enhancing security in the OSCE region by engaging the organization in security and development programs in Afghanistan and the wider region. As a current OSCE partner, Afghanistan should be invited to participate in a potential OSCE summit as a special guest.

Afghanistan is already a full member of a number of regional and global organizations beyond the UN family. These include:

- The Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC), founded in 1969, now with 57 member states. Its achievements include the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights, which is a version of the Universal declaration designed to be compatible with the Sharia;
- The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was initiated in 1985 with Afghanistan acceding in 2007 as the 8th member state, and whose main recent achievement is a framework agreement for achieving free trade by 2012;
- The Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), founded in 1996, now with 17 member states including India, China, Russia, Egypt and all but Turkmenistan among the Central Asian states. Kazakhstan has played a leading role in CICA, first proposing its creation in 1992 and chairing the organization until June 2010. Its activities have included efforts to mediate between India and Pakistan.

Each of these institutions has its particular merits. However, their roles are not entirely suited for the needs of Afghanistan, since their memberships and functions tend to be too extensive and insufficient. An initial idea would be an association agreement between Afghanistan and the OSCE, with graduated possibilities: invitation to participate in the work of the OSCE as observer, participant in some special

programs, associate membership, and future full membership. The OSCE has several advantages. It has a well developed structure of cooperation in three "dimensions:" security, economics and the human dimension, with a set of normative principles that have proved acceptable to all members. While not all the political norms of OSCE are fully implemented by Russia and the Central Asian states, the OSCE nonetheless provides a structure within which work toward these norms can be pursued. Two specialized instruments of the OSCE would be highly relevant for Afghanistan: the office of the High Commissioner for National Minorities and the Office for Democracy and Human Rights (ODHR), both of which might be invited to undertake specific programs in Afghanistan.

Regional cooperation between Afghanistan and the five Central Asian states can also be pursued. The Central Asian capitals seek a constructive relationship with Afghanistan, both to combat common security threats and to foster cultural and social cooperation. The cultural aspect is of special relevance in view of the importance of the co-ethnic Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek communities in Afghanistan. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation projects across these borders will be of high importance and could be underpinned by the formation of a special regional forum.

Even wider regional cooperation can be initiated with all of Afghanistan's nearby neighbors, including all the Central Asian states together with Pakistan, China, Iran, and India. Such a grouping could be valuable in planning infrastructure projects extending in all geographic directions from Afghanistan and crossing the country. The Central Asian states have a keen interest in overcoming the disadvantages of their land-locked geography and securing access to the open seas of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Additionally, India, China, and Russia all have an interest in transport corridors linking them to other parts of Eurasia. Major investments are currently being made by the Asian Development Bank in consortium with other international financial institutions (IFIs) in road and rail corridors from Western China and across Central Asia under the Central Asia Regional Economic

Cooperation (CAREC) program, which includes Afghanistan. The EU's Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) is also contributing to this infrastructure effort. These corridors will include links with both the Pan-European transport corridors developed mainly by the EU and the corridors of the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) led by Russia and Kazakhstan.

There are also major projects in the nexus of water management and security, hydroelectric power generation and long distance high voltage power transmission that will merit urgent attention as soon as security conditions in Afghanistan permit. In particular, the difficult issues of water management and hydroelectric power between Central Asian upstream and downstream countries could be eased by inclusion of Afghanistan and South Asia into the equation. In particular South Asia has large needs for electricity imports during the hot summer months at a time when the downstream Central Asian states need water for irrigation. Projects concepts have been pursued by the World Bank such as the 'CASA 2000' project for linking Central and South Asia with 2000 megawatt power transmission lines.

Such major economic projects would be implemented with the IFIs and the OSCE would not play a leading role. However, the OSCE, whose

economic dimension is largely dormant, could add political impetus for these initiatives in declarations adopted at both summit and foreign minister level, drawing attention to key projects involving EU-Russia-China coordination of intercontinental transport corridors and signaling the security risks inherent in the lack of cooperative solutions over water management and hydroelectric investments. Afghanistan is significantly relevant to both, and so should be involved when these issues are addressed in the OSCE.

A Stability Pact for Afghanistan can also be developed. Participants would include Afghanistan's regional neighbors as well as important external actors (U.S., EU, NATO, Russia, China, Japan, Turkey) and international organizations and financial institutions (UN, UNDP, IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank). One model to bear in mind here is the Stability Pact for South East Europe, initiated in the aftermath of the Kosova war in 1999, and which had a ten year lifespan until 2009 when it was transformed into a purely regional cooperative structure, the Regional Cooperation Council. In its thematic structure, this Stability Pact followed the architecture of the OSCE with security, economic and human dimensions and Regional Working Tables. Kabul would be the obvious location for the secretariat of a Stability Pact for Afghanistan.

The prospect of international cooperation over post-war Afghanistan will have strategic significance. No single major power will have a predominant role in Afghanistan after NATO's withdrawal. However, China, India and Russia, as well as the U.S. and Europe, will have a strategic interest in Afghanistan's stability and in ensuring that Afghanistan remains inaccessible to Al Qaeda as its base of operations. There will also be widespread concern that Afghanistan should not become dominated by Pakistan, which is itself highly unstable and vulnerable to radical Islamist forces. Such multi-national cooperation will undermine the potential for "great games" among the major powers to attain spheres of influence in the region. If Afghanistan becomes an arena of cooperation between the major powers this would be an achievement of wider global significance.



Conclusion

The Corfu Process has proven to be a useful platform for discussions on the OSCE's goals, strategies, and tools for ensuring cooperative security in Europe. The forum should continue working as a brainstorming and negotiations laboratory that can produce innovative ideas and concrete proposals for the future of the OSCE. However, the long overdue OSCE Summit of heads of state and government must make the important decisions on these and other proposals. The Summit will have the important task of overcoming the stalemate in decision-making within the OSCE, pursue the implementation of important agreements and treaties such as the CFE and the Vienna Document, and prepare substantively for dealing with existing conflicts and emerging security crises. The logical focus of the Summit will be on Eurasia and specifically on Central and South Asia. Therefore the Kazakh Chairmanship of the OSCE offers an ideal opportunity for enhancing the OSCE's relevance throughout Eurasia.

ABOUT CISIS AND IND

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CSIS-IND Taskforce Policy Brief team: Margarita Assenova, IND Director; Natalie Zajicova, Senior Program Officer (IND); Janusz Bugajski, CSIS NEDP Director; Ilona Teleki, Deputy Director and Fellow (CSIS); Besian Boçka, Program Coordinator and Research Associate (CSIS)