

Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance

Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways

PROJECT DIRECTOR
Clark A. Murdock

PRINCIPAL AUTHORS
Clark A. Murdock
Jessica M. Yeats

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS
Linton F. Brooks
M. Elaine Bunn
Franklin C. Miller
James L. Schoff

PROJECT STAFF
Tara Murphy
L. Christian Pearson
John K. Warden

November 2009

About CSIS

In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world's preeminent public policy institutions.

Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world's regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2009 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

CIP Information available on request.

ISBN 978-0-89206-598-1

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 775-3119
Fax: (202) 775-3199
Web: www.csis.org

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
I. INTRODUCTION	7
II. EXTENDED DETERRENCE & ASSURANCE AT THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL.....	10
III. DETERRING POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS OF U.S. ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS	16
IV. ASSURING ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS.....	23
V. EUROPE	34
VI. NORTHEAST ASIA.....	44
VII. MIDDLE EAST	55
VIII. LONG TERM TRENDS AND CHALLENGES	66
APPENDIX A: ON SELF RESOLVE	69
APPENDIX B: PROTECTED COUNTRIES	71
APPENDIX C: WORKSHOP BRIEFS	72
APPENDIX D: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS	105
APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	106

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The emerging North Korean and Iranian nuclear capabilities, coupled with ongoing Chinese and Russian strategic modernization programs, have brought increased attention from both practitioners and strategists to extended deterrence (the so-called ‘U.S. nuclear umbrella’) and the role it plays in assurance (the ability of the United States to convince its allies that it is committed to protecting their security).

Despite a decade-long reassessment of deterrence in the policy community, there is still not a consensus among policy experts on the precise meaning of deterrence and associated concepts. Nevertheless, by analyzing the differences with which each critical ‘audience’ perceives and interprets U.S. force posture, the following report demonstrates that the nuclear posture requirements for deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance are largely additive and cumulative, despite some fungibility between them.

Extended Deterrence and Assurance at the Conceptual Level

To be able to extend deterrence requires that we can deter our allies’ adversaries; assurance requires that allies believe that we can and will do so. The credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence is a function of the perceptual lens of potential aggressors against the United States or its allies (the *deterree*), whereas the credibility of assurance is a function of the lens through which the state under the umbrella (the *assuree*) perceives and interprets U.S. capabilities and actions vis-à-vis the *deterree*. If the deterrent is not credible, assurance will not work, but a credible deterrent does not guarantee successful assurance. While neither extended deterrence nor assurance is a ‘lesser-included case’ of the other, the credibility of both relationships is highly symbiotic.

Moreover, from a practical perspective, the United States cannot ‘target’ the perception of a single adversary or ally without simultaneously shaping the perceptions of other audiences. The credibility of extended deterrence and assurance are *in the eyes of three beholders*: (1) U.S. allies and security partners; (2) potential aggressors against the United States or its allies; (3) the American public, the U.S. Congress, the military, and U.S. government officials. The perceptions of the ‘third audience’ are critically important to the credibility of both extended deterrence and assurance. U.S. policymakers must remember that they are speaking to all three audiences at the same time.

Since there is no agreed-upon, direct way to assess the impacts of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture upon the effectiveness of deterrence or assurance, this report takes a credibility-centric approach. Although still subjective, the impact of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture on the credibility of its deterrence and assurance commitments can be assessed: analyzing adversaries to determine what shapes their behavior, engaging allies to understand what affects their trust, and asking ourselves if we really mean what we say and if our actions will live up to our words.

The credibility of deterrence and extended deterrence depends on a spectrum of factors affecting adversary perceptions of U.S. *capabilities* and *intentions*. To some extent, intent and capability are fungible. Overwhelming capabilities can compensate for perceived weakness in the deterrer’s resolve, and strong resolve can substitute for a lack of capability (e.g., ‘asymmetries of stakes’ can flip the deterrence calculus in favor of the regional aggressor, depending on the action to be deterred). Perceived U.S. interests in what is to be defended and the ‘balance of stakes’ vis-à-vis the potential aggressor are

particularly important to adversary perceptions of U.S. *intent* to defend against aggression on allied territory. Within this typology, a number of capabilities blur the distinction between ‘intent’ and ‘capability.’ Effective defenses, for example, enhance deterrence credibility by demonstrating invulnerability to reprisal, thus rendering irrelevant otherwise salient questions about whether the United States has the resolve, for example, to trade Atlanta for Riyadh.

Linton Brooks suggests the following approach, which this report uses, for assessing the capability implications of extended deterrence:

[The] inherent force structure needs [of extended deterrence] are...U.S. strategic forces that are perceived as second to none...flexible...reliable and effective...and by effective defenses...[But the] force structure bottom line [is]: except for these inherent features, [the] U.S. should wean allies from the belief that a specific force structure is required for extended deterrence.

Assurance requires the state under the umbrella to be sufficiently convinced of U.S. extended deterrence commitments so it can (a) resist intimidation and (b) refrain from seeking its own nuclear capabilities (if it has the ability to do so). Accordingly, three principal factors explain why the requirements for assuring an ally can be distinct from (and, in some cases, greater than) the requirements for deterring the ally’s potential aggressors.

First, the degree to which assurance is affected by the elements of extended deterrence is a function of *how the ally perceives and interprets U.S. words and actions vis-à-vis the deteree*. Because allies’ defense planners may rely on less credible and/or open-source intelligence and have more limited analytic resources for assessing the implications of nuclear posture changes, certain allies can be particularly sensitive to visible and concrete ‘symbols’ of deterrence even if the symbol has little effect on adversary perceptions of overall capability. This underscores the value of strategic dialogues and joint defense activities that, in addition to demonstrating U.S. resolve, build confidence by enhancing transparency and expertise across the alliance.

Second, because assurance is a mutually beneficial relationship, it requires mechanisms – and, potentially, capabilities that underwrite those mechanisms – of participation and/or burden-sharing to bring the ally ‘into the act’ of extending deterrence. Policymakers and analysts should not lose sight of the ally’s mutual interest in credible assurance; framing assurance and extended deterrence exclusively in terms of U.S. nonproliferation objectives can undermine allied confidence in the genuineness of the U.S. commitment.

Third, because the choice to remain non-nuclear is based on the ally’s assessment of their security needs in a longer-term context, perceived challenges to the credibility of U.S. deterrence capabilities in the long-term could have shorter-term consequences for assurance. Perceptions of the long-term viability of the U.S. stockpile and infrastructure and of the prospects for a national consensus on the future of the U.S. deterrent are salient factors affecting allies’ confidence in the durability of the U.S. commitment. Allies are paying close attention to American nuclear policy debates. Arguments from both sides of the ideological divide can undermine assurance by skewing allies’ perceptions of U.S. intentions and capabilities.

The ‘Healey Theorem,’ which was formulated by Denis Healey, the U.K. Defence Minister during the late 1960s, postulated that it took “only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians,

but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.”¹ If the challenges of assurance often took center stage during the Cold War, when the U.S. and its allies were much more concerned about deterrence itself, it is not surprising that assurance could impose additive requirements today, when the United States must ‘fundamentally guarantee’ the sovereignty of some 30-plus allies against an increasingly diverse array of nuclear threats.

With respect to extended deterrence credibility, the ‘inherent’ force structure attributes probably have a greater impact on adversary perceptions than do specific systems. With respect to assurance, on the other hand, specific nuclear capabilities can serve as important political and psychological symbols of America’s commitment, particularly if the capability has been a regular feature of the relationship (e.g., the ‘wedding ring’ of the marriage). But because political and psychological symbolism is not an inherently nuclear role, those assurance functions can theoretically be provided in *other ways*. Allied perceptions of the relative importance of specific assurance mechanisms can change if the United States sufficiently explains the value of alternative mechanisms for ‘coupling’ American and allied security.

Consultations: Listening *and* Talking

In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance capabilities and communication strategies must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally. Consultations are essential in determining each ally’s unique security needs, but their value is a function of the manner in which they are conducted. Meaningful consultation means knowing more than what an ally *wants* –it means knowing *why they want it*. Briefings are insufficient; consultation requires time, attention, and sustained engagement. The dialogue should uncover allies’ underlying needs and interests and must avoid the tendency to ‘lead the witness’ by soliciting the views U.S. officials believe to be correct or want to hear.

Consultations are listening *and* talking. The bottom line is that assurance depends on what U.S. allies believe is needed for extended deterrence, not what U.S. policy makers or policy experts think is needed. The United States cannot dictate assurance requirements, but what allies believe about extended deterrence is not immutable. If an ally’s expressed needs and desires exceed the requirements of deterring their potential aggressors, intensive engagement can narrow the gap between what the United States and its allies respectively believe is necessary and sufficient. After all, if the United States can shape adversary perceptions (which is what deterrence is), it should also be able to influence the beliefs of the states to which it provides existential security. ‘De-linking’ assurance from specific types or numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons must not come at the expense of the broader need to provide nuclear capabilities sufficient to sustain allied confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments.

Europe

During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance established a robust political and military framework for U.S. extended deterrence and assurance commitments in Europe. U.S. extended deterrence commitments to NATO allies are accepted by the potential aggressor (historically, Russia), the protected states, and the American public. These commitments are buttressed by legal

¹ Denis Healey, *The time of my life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 243, quoted in David Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” *International Affairs* 85: 4 (2009), 768.

obligations (Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty), deployed U.S. troops, a long-standing consultative mechanism, consistent U.S. statements on the importance of Europe, and the presence of forward-deployed U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF).

Today, the alliance is still strongly influenced by the Cold War legacy, but serious fault lines could surface as the alliance conducts the first review of its Strategic Concept in the twenty-first century. The common threat that once coupled the allies' security interests and aligned their defense priorities has been replaced by a spectrum of less threatening but more complex security challenges and increasingly asymmetric stakes in responding to them. Options for strengthening extended deterrence and assurance in Europe must account for the values, history, and perceived vulnerabilities of each NATO ally.

Higher concern about the 'Russian threat' in new NATO member states has led to more pronounced interest in the importance of the nuclear component of Article V and heightened sensitivity to changes in NATO's nuclear posture. Despite the lack of a Cold War-era 'Soviet threat,' the United States must still balance its assurance requirements to Europe, particularly new NATO members, with its broader effort to engage Russia in a new, more cooperative relationship. Moreover, Turkey is 'uniquely concerned' about any prospective U.S. withdrawal of NSNF as long as the Iranian issue remains unresolved.

U.S. forward deployed NSNF should remain in Europe as long as allies want them, and any removal decisions should be made only in close consultation with allies. However, long-term arms control considerations are likely to increase pressure to withdraw NSNF. In negotiating the treaty after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) replacement, the Administration will likely attempt to include limitations on Russian NSNF, which would put U.S. forward deployed NSNF in Europe in play. U.S. officials should discuss this possibility with European allies well in advance, focusing on how to maintain extended deterrence if U.S. NSNF are withdrawn. This approach should stress in public and private the role of U.S. strategic forces as the 'supreme guarantor' of NATO security and the role of non-nuclear capabilities in providing credible extended deterrence.

Northeast Asia

While the security of all East Asian allies is important to the United States, this Northeast Asia chapter focuses on extended deterrence and assurance with respect to Japan.² Political sensitivity is highest in Tokyo and U.S. nuclear posture sufficient for credible assurance to Japan would likely meet the needs of other U.S. allies in East Asia.

² The workshop, briefings, and major reports upon which this study is based were held or prepared prior to the 30 August 2009 lower house elections in Japan in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for 60 years. References to 'Japan' throughout the report assume continuity between the former LDP government and the new DPJ government. While DPJ campaign promises of a dramatic break from LDP policy included greater independence from the United States, experts are divided on the extent to which the election will change the Government of Japan's security priorities 'once the dust settles.' One view is that the DPJ is only marginally less concerned with these issues and that the permanent civil service has far more authority over nuclear issues than we find in this country. Because the attitudes in the bureaucracy and the business community have not changed, these experts believe that any spike in regional tensions will bring these issues back to the fore. Others are more uncertain. Drawing upon a recent trip to Tokyo, one expert explained, "the election changed everything... And while it's still not clear what the DPJ views on security issues are and while there are still some bureaucrats that think like the old government... we can't assume that [the Government of Japan's] views are the same as they were pre-election."

Over the past few years, Japan's anxieties about the U.S. commitment have been driven by perceptions of increasing vulnerability and diminishing value to U.S. policymakers. Japan's sense of vulnerability reflects three principal developments: (1) Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) advancing missile and nuclear programs; (2) China's growing conventional and nuclear military power; and (3) perceived reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategy.

Strengthening U.S. assurance commitments to Japan will involve restoring Japan's perception of its regional security balance and sufficiently demonstrating U.S. interests in Japan's security. As part of this approach, the United States needs to engage Japan in an intensive strategic dialogue about deterrence in Northeast Asia as a part of a long-term process to redefine the requirements of credible assurance with respect to both the inherent characteristics of the U.S. nuclear posture and specific U.S. nuclear weapons systems. It will take considerable time and effort to convince Japan that extended deterrence does not depend on specific systems (e.g., Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N)) or specific numbers (e.g., a quantitative margin 'sufficient to dissuade' China).

The United States should engage Japan in an intensive strategic dialogue on deterrence issues as a critical means for both understanding Japanese security needs and strengthening confidence across the alliance.

Middle East

Existing and potential extended deterrence and assurance relationships fall along a spectrum, encompassing varying degrees of formality, transparency, clarity, and relevance to U.S. nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, these nuances are further complicated by diverging perceptions of the status of 'de-facto' U.S. security assurances, depending on the country and the audience. Public statements should be sensitive to these distinctions.

Some friendly Arab governments (namely, Saudi Arabia) perceive 'de-facto' U.S. assurances as credible, although it is unclear whether Iran believes those commitments. Israel, on the other hand, tends to eschew public acknowledgements of U.S. assurances because it likely does not need them to deter attacks and fears constraints on its freedom of action. Somewhat paradoxically, however, Iran perceives U.S. assurances to Israel as more credible than those to Saudi Arabia. Whereas de-facto U.S. commitments to friendly Arab governments are sufficient for assurance, but perhaps insufficiently credible for extended deterrence, U.S. commitments to Israel may provide extended deterrence without assurance.

With the possible exception of Israel, workshop participants did not believe that the American public would support explicit nuclear assurances to states in the Middle East. The lack of public support suggests that new or more explicit assurances would lack credibility; U.S. officials should avoid overly suggestive, high-level statements on extended nuclear deterrence in the Middle East. Whereas the formalization or explicit nature of an extended deterrence commitment has been identified elsewhere as a factor strengthening assurance, in this case, the unintended fallout may cause those reassurance mechanisms to backfire. Were such comments to provoke a prolonged domestic debate, the American public's lack of resolve would be projected internationally and the damage to America's credibility would exceed the value of the public reassurance.

With respect to Israel, U.S. statements and actions that strengthen Israel's confidence in U.S. assurances, both in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and coping with a nuclear Iran, will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran's nuclear facilities or to make an overt

declaration of its nuclear capability (which many believe could result in additional regional proliferation). Such statements should, however, not convey that the United States believes that a nuclear-armed Iran is either inevitable or acceptable.

With respect to friendly Arab governments, the United States should work toward creating the conditions (at home and abroad) in which explicit extended deterrence commitments would be politically viable (educate the public, etc.) and, in the meantime, take actions to strengthen the credibility of existing de-facto commitments in the eyes of Iran. Broad security assurances, not explicitly tied to U.S. nuclear capability, might be more feasible than any attempt to extend a nuclear umbrella over the region.

Long-Term Implications

Allies will be closely watching American efforts to balance the twin imperatives of pursuing global nuclear disarmament and maintaining effective deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. As long as this balance is managed effectively, these seemingly contradictory ‘twin objectives’ are actually mutually reinforcing since credible and effective extended deterrence and assurance commitments will provide stability at sharply reduced levels of nuclear weapons, a necessary waypoint on the path toward zero.

U.S. efforts to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons should not proceed ahead of pace of the allies that depend upon its extended deterrent. Intensive engagement may minimize the extent to which nuclear assurances obstruct the path toward zero by balancing U.S. and allied reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons. Achieving the appropriate balance between the ‘twin objectives’ also demands that the United States educate its public on the importance of extended deterrence, emphasizing that reducing reliance on nuclear weapons does not imply the de-legitimization of its security commitments.

The United States extends nuclear deterrence because of the role it plays as the underwriter of global stability. If the American people should ever decide that the United States no longer wants that responsibility, extended nuclear deterrence is likely to be one of the first policy casualties of that dramatic shift in world view. Putting Americans at risk for the security of its non-nuclear allies is not consistent with a more modest U.S. role on the world scene. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by more and/or less secure nuclear powers, as former U.S. allies would be forced to guarantee their sovereignty with means outside of U.S. control. The result would likely be a less secure world because of the increased risk that nuclear weapons would be used and the risk that non-state actors would gain access to nuclear weapons and material. Providing credible assurances will continue to impose burdens on the United States as long as U.S. allies perceive their security interests to depend on capabilities not otherwise necessary to defend the U.S. homeland. In the long run, however, withdrawing those commitments would impose more costly and less acceptable burdens to America and the international community.

I. INTRODUCTION

The emerging North Korean and Iranian nuclear capabilities, coupled with ongoing Chinese and Russian strategic modernization programs, have brought increased attention from both practitioners and strategists to extended deterrence (the so-called ‘U.S. nuclear umbrella’) and the role it plays in assurance (the ability of the United States to convince its allies that it is committed to protecting their security). A widespread concern that nuclear proliferation may be at a ‘tipping point’ and could lead to a ‘cascade’ of new nuclear powers has underscored the importance of U.S. extended deterrence as a nonproliferation instrument. Two recent bipartisan study reports make like judgments:

Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. extended deterrence strategy as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals.³

Interim Report, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the U.S.

[A]s US alliance partners face the possibility of nuclear threats, the United States will have to retain enough arms to deter such threats...The Task Force advises the Obama administration to:...reaffirm US commitment to security assurances, including extended nuclear deterrence, to allies...consult with allies to determine their views about the credibility of the nuclear role in security assurances to assess whether any adjustments in nuclear and conventional capabilities are necessary...keep the relatively small US nuclear stockpile in Europe as long as this force supports NATO political objectives...and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to build their own nuclear forces.⁴

CFR Task Force Report on Nuclear Weapons Policy

And because “these developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect U.S. allies and friends at least as much as they affect the United States,”⁵ allied sensitivities to extended deterrence have grown commensurately. Days following the CSIS workshop, President Barack Obama and Republic of Korea (ROK) President Lee Myung-bak issued the highest-level direct statement on extended nuclear deterrence in the history of the U.S.-ROK alliance, in large part because the South Korean government wished to codify the guarantee in writing.⁶ In a recent article that workshop participants found to be highly significant given Japan’s deep-rooted aversion to public statements about nuclear weapons, former Japanese Ambassador Yukio Satoh states positively that Japan’s non-nuclear status “depends largely, if not

³ Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. *Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 8.

⁴ William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, Charles D. Ferguson eds., *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Independent Task Force Report* (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), 91.

⁵ Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. *America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 16.

⁶ “The United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty...has guaranteed peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia for over fifty years...We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ security interests. The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance.” White House Press Office, *Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea* (July 16, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea/.

solely, upon the credibility of the...United States' commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats” and warns that the perceived credibility of that commitment could be jeopardized “if the US government would unilaterally move to redefine the concept of nuclear deterrence and to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in providing deterrence.”⁷

Based on extensive consultations with allies, the Strategic Posture Review Commission (SPRC) concluded in its final report (May 2009) that extended deterrence is so important to the United States and its allies that “assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers and types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”⁸ In testifying on behalf of the SPRC report, vice chair and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger went even further as he asserted to the Senate Armed Services that “both the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven *more by the need to reassure* those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone”⁹ [emphasis added]. By analyzing the differences with which each critical ‘audience’ perceives and interprets U.S. force posture, this report demonstrates that the nuclear posture requirements for deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance are largely additive and cumulative, despite some fungibility between them.

The growing importance of extended deterrence and assurance, as well as the recognition that the two are closely intertwined, has clearly been recognized by those working on the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 2009 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). An outline of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Brad Roberts’, the official who shares day-to-day responsibility for the NPR, remarks at the 28 July 2009 session of the “Deterrence Symposium,” hosted by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), states:

[E]xpect an increased focus on extended deterrence and its twin, assurance...[O]ver the last decade, the concerns of some allies have become much more pronounced...[T]he US – and its allies – face some choices about capabilities not on the agenda 8 years ago. Near-term aging out of dual-capable aircraft, cruise missiles, and the associated bombs and warheads. Indeed, here are some of the sharpest questions about how to balance the president’s twin objectives [of pursuing a long-term vision of a world without nuclear weapons, while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear capability].

As one element of its consideration of extended deterrence and assurance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD(P)) contracted (in March 2009) a CSIS study team led by Dr. Clark Murdock, CSIS senior adviser, to examine the implications of extended deterrence for U.S. nuclear posture in the post-9/11 era. The study set out to identify the characteristics of the U.S. nuclear force posture that support extended deterrence and analyze how changes (both positive and negative) in the force posture affect the credibility of U.S. assurance, paying particular attention to the competing needs and interests of U.S. allies.

On 3 June 2009, CSIS hosted a one-day workshop of policy community experts (see Appendix D for the list of workshop participants) that was held under Chatham House rules – attendees could be quoted, but

⁷ Yukio Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament” (2009), <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09018Satoh.html#sect3>.

⁸ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 13.

⁹ James Schlesinger, “Statement concerning the Commission on Strategic Posture,” Committee on Armed Services, 111th Cong., 1st sess., *Congressional Record* 155 (May 7, 2009), <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/May/Schlesinger%2005-07-09.pdf>.

no quotes could be attributed to a particular attendee. This workshop was convened to discuss briefs that had been commissioned from leading subject matter experts (SMEs):

- Linton Brooks, Independent Consultant and Non-resident Senior Adviser, CSIS
- Elaine Bunn, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), National Defense University (NDU)
- Franklin Miller, Independent Consultant and Non-resident Senior Adviser, CSIS
- Clark Murdock, Senior Adviser and Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI), CSIS
- James Schoff, Associate Director of Asia-Pacific, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)

With the exception of James Schoff, whose brief is dedicated to Northeast Asia, the SME briefs explore how extended deterrence and assurance function both generically and regionally (in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East) and the associated implications for U.S. nuclear posture. The authors were asked to develop their briefs independently of each other, both to foster a process of competitive analysis to avoid groupthink and to assess how much pre-workshop consensus existed among the SMEs. Indeed, as the following chapters will demonstrate, the workshop revealed significant and non-trivial areas of consensus among independent experts.

Subsequently, the CSIS study team, led by Clark Murdock and with support from Jessica Yeats and Tara Murphy, built a brief that synthesized the workshop results, with particular attention to identifying areas of agreement and disagreement among the SMEs. This brief was ‘vetted’ with the SMEs, the workshop participants, and key stakeholders and subsequently revised to reflect feedback.

This report follows the logic developed (and refined) during the vetting process and updates the analysis to account for current events and gaps in the workshop assessment. The report begins by addressing extended deterrence and assurance at the conceptual level and includes a summary chart that identifies the factors that affect the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance. Chapters III and IV then analyze how these factors affect the requirements, broadly defined, for extended deterrence and assurance, respectively. Despite the obvious overlap between extended deterrence and assurance requirements in practice, this analysis is done in separate chapters to highlight how different factors affect, in variable ways, both extended deterrence and assurance. The analysis of both relationships is then re-integrated in the regional chapters (Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East), a chapter on longer-term trends and challenges, and a concluding chapter of final thoughts.

II. EXTENDED DETERRENCE & ASSURANCE AT THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL

“Of course,” writes Elaine Bunn, “in order to *extend* deterrence, the United States must first be able to deter.” Any discussion of extended deterrence should begin with deterrence itself because the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. deterrence is the foundation on which extended deterrence rests. But for the most part, workshop participants did not challenge the theories of deterrence offered by the SMEs. According to Linton Brooks, “deterrence is when a state fails to take action that it might otherwise consider because it fears (a) unacceptable U.S. retaliation, and/or (b) that the United States can deny success.” “Extended deterrence,” he adds, “is when the action to be deterred is aimed at a third state.” The relative lack of workshop focus on deterrence in part reflects that despite the post-Cold War assessment of deterrence, there is still not a consensus among policy experts on the precise meaning of deterrence and associated concepts. According to Elaine Bunn:

Even with the ongoing and evolving reassessment of deterrence in the United States over the past decade or more, there is not yet complete consensus on what deterrence means, whom we are most concerned about deterring from doing what, what capabilities should be included in any examination of deterrence, and how to deter most effectively (recognizing that there is less confidence than during the Cold War that deterrence will always be successful)...But there is a widely-held recognition in the US of the need to adjust deterrence to each of a wide range of potential opponents, actions, and situations, and a wider range of capabilities that contribute to deterrence.

The increased focus on extended deterrence, however, clearly reflects the important role that extended deterrence plays in preventing nuclear proliferation.¹⁰ Frank Miller explains cogently that U.S. extended deterrent has always been an extraordinary commitment:

In its broadest form, extended deterrence involves the commitment of American military power in all of its forms to the defense of allied interests...[including] the pledge that – if deterrence provided by U.S. conventional military power fails to deter aggression or coercion – the U.S. will threaten to employ its nuclear forces and will, if necessary, use them in defense of allied vital interests...This puts the U.S. homeland directly at risk to a nuclear-armed aggressor in defense of our allies...really one of the most amazing acts of a nation state.

The recipient of the U.S. ‘nuclear guarantee’ is also making an extraordinary statement of faith. In his January 2006 speech announcing that France would modernize its deterrent, President Chirac stated its nuclear weapons were the “fundamental guarantee of [France’s] sovereignty.”¹¹ In his preface to the December 2006 White Paper on the British deterrent, Prime Minister Blair says that British nuclear

¹⁰ Preventing further nuclear proliferation was viewed by most as a means for countering nuclear terrorism, because an increase in the number of nuclear-armed states increases the risk that non-state actors would gain access to nuclear weapons or special nuclear material. It was also generally assumed that the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be employed increased in a more proliferated world. These assumptions do not seem unwarranted given the nature of the two states that are knocking on the door of the ‘nuclear club.’

¹¹ Jacques Chirac, “Speech by Jacques CHIRAC, President of the French Republic, during his visit to The Strategic Air and Maritime Forces at Landvisiau / L’Ile Longue” (speech, Landvisiau / L’Ile Longue / Brest /Finistère, January 16, 2006), http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2006/speech_by_the_president_during_his_visit_to_the_strategic_forces.38447.html.

weapons are the “ultimate assurance of [British] security.”¹² For 30-plus countries, the “fundamental guarantee of [their] sovereignty” and “ultimate assurance of [their] security” is entrusted to the U.S. deterrent and those that steward it.

The requirements of assuring an ally can be distinct from the requirements of deterring the ally’s potential aggressors. In a quite perceptive article, David Yost recalls the telling observation of a Cold War-era senior official:

Denis Healey, Britain’s defence minister in the late 1960s, formulated what he called ‘The Healey Theorem’ in order to underscore the difficulty of the assurance aspect of extended deterrence—that is, ‘it takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans.’¹³

Even during the Cold War, when the United States and its allies were much more concerned about deterrence itself (that is, how to deter the ‘Soviet threat’), the challenges of assurance often took center stage. It is therefore not surprising that assurance could impose additive requirements today, when the United States must ‘fundamentally guarantee’ the sovereignty of some 30-plus allies against an increasingly diverse array of nuclear threats.

Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance Are in the Eyes of Three Beholders

Deterrence theorists generally agree that credibility is in the ‘eye of the beholder’ – namely, does the target, or ‘object’ of deterrence/assurance believe that the deterrer/assurer has the capability and will to act on behalf of its expressed commitments? As the SPRC explains:

It is important to underscore that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder (as is assurance). Whether potential adversaries are deterred (and U.S. allies are assured) is a function of their understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions.¹⁴

The target of deterrence/extended deterrence is the potential aggressor of the United States or its allies (the *deterree*); the target of assurance is the state under the umbrella (the *assuree*). Linton Brooks writes: “The potential aggressor must be sufficiently convinced that the United States has both the capability and the will to act so as to make aggression not worth the risk.” Similarly, the target of assurance is the ally under the umbrella...[and] the state under the umbrella must be sufficiently convinced that the United States has both the capability and the will to act so as to (a) resist intimidation and (b) not seek nuclear capabilities of its own if it has the ability to do so.”

While different ‘targets,’ allow assurance and extended deterrence to be distinguished analytically, they are symbiotic relationships. Moreover, the United States cannot ‘target’ the perception of one adversary or ally without simultaneously shaping the perceptions of other audiences. The credibility of extended deterrence and assurance are *in the eyes of three beholders*: (1) U.S. allies and security partners; (2) potential aggressors against the United States or its allies; (3) the American public, the U.S. Congress, the military, and U.S. government officials.

¹² *The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent*, Cm. 6994 (December 2006), 5.

¹³ Denis Healey, *The time of my life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 243, quoted in David Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” *International Affairs*, 85: 4 (2009), 768.

¹⁴ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 22.

The formulation of deterrence and assurance strategies must account for how U.S. words and actions are perceived by each critical audience (the deteree, the assuree, and the American public) regardless of whom they were intended for. Brad Roberts illustrated this point at the 2009 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference:

[O]ur declaratory policy reaches a lot of different audiences. And we may have an intent to signal one message with no-first use and have it consumed in other ways...I was recently in a discussion with some Japanese experts...and when it came to no-first-use, they said – one individual...said—so what you want is for us to absorb the first blow before you’re obliged to do something about it. Then there was a Chinese participant in a related discussion who said, okay, what you’d like to do is draw another bright line for Kim Jong Il to understand and walk right across?...[W]hat we say about the role of nuclear weapons in our national military strategy is heard by different audiences, and we have to make a choice about which is the audience we most seek to influence with that policy.”¹⁵

In addition to allies and potential aggressors, policymakers must also consider how extended deterrence and assurance commitments will be perceived domestically (the ‘third audience’). **The credibility of U.S. security commitments depends heavily on how U.S. security commitments are perceived by the American public, Congress, the military, and U.S. government officials.** According to one participant, “experts unwisely forget that the public cares about the overall character of U.S. leadership and that perceptions of whether the administration has its act together is relevant even to nuclear policy.” According to Linton Brooks, “the American public...need not explicitly endorse the deterrent but must at least acquiesce sufficiently to make extending the U.S. deterrent politically possible.” Brooks makes a number of recommendations based on importance of a domestic consensus to the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance:

- The President and other senior leaders must constantly educate the public on the importance of extended deterrence. A 2008 Vic Utgoff and Dave Adesnik report notes that, “if the President and his political appointees and his advisors are seen as wise and prudent... the America public is more likely to be supportive.”¹⁶
- Nuclear reductions must be limited enough to still allow extended deterrence; the announcement of such reductions should make this clear.
- The United States must use great caution in ensuring that de-emphasis of nuclear weapons does not imply de-legitimization of extended deterrence.

Clark Murdock believes that impact of the ‘third audience’ on the credibility of U.S. security commitments is so important that it should be captured as a separate relationship (as illustrated in Figure 1) in the lexicon of deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance. Murdock coined this “self-resolve” (see Appendix A) on the basis that: “It’s not just how others perceive our resolve; it’s whether we are resolved.” Other SMEs affirm his belief that the seriousness with which the United States takes the nuclear mission affects the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance. For both Europe and Northeast Asia, Frank Miller cites “[U.S.] confidence in its nuclear forces” as a critical factor for both extended deterrence

¹⁵ Brad Roberts, “Remarks at the 2009 Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference” (speech, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2009).


¹⁶ Victor Utgoff and David Adesnik. *On Strengthening and Expanding the US Nuclear Umbrella to Dissuade Nuclear Proliferation* (Washington,DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, 2008), 53.

and assurance. Elaine Bunn highlights the importance of the seriousness with which the United States takes these commitments:

[P]erception of [U.S.] inattention to things nuclear – the cumulative effect of numerous individual events, incidents, decisions or lack of resolution over how to sustain U.S. nuclear infrastructure – may at some point add up to allied concern...In the end, if the US is comfortable with its own nuclear posture and can – and does – make the case to allies that its security commitments, including extended nuclear deterrence, remain strong, then allies are likely to be assured.

Identifying the three ‘audiences’ (or targets) of extended deterrence and assurance (see Figure 1) provides an analytic framework for analyzing the implications of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture.

Figure 1 Key Audiences & Associated Relationships for Deterrence, Extended Deterrence and Assurance



Assessing the Impact on Credibility Rather than the Direct Impact on Deterrence and Assurance

In an unpublished paper written in mid-2008, Linton Brooks observes astutely that:

There is no agreed way to relate [nuclear] force structure to specific military outcomes. The primary national security output of nuclear forces is deterrence, a widely accepted concept that has never been quantified. We know that doubling the number of infantry divisions increases the amount of terrain that can be defended...But we have no idea whether doubling the number of operationally deployed strategic offensive warheads has the slightest effect on deterrence or on any of the other policy goals often cited for nuclear weapons.


If the direct impact of changes in nuclear capabilities on deterrence and assurance cannot be measured, what can be? Although still subjective, the impact of changes in the U.S. nuclear posture on the credibility of its deterrence and assurance commitments can be assessed: analyzing adversaries to determine what shapes their behavior, engaging allies to understand what affects their trust, and asking ourselves if we really mean what we say and if our actions will live up to our words. This credibility-centric approach broadens the assessment to account for the full spectrum of factors that affect extended deterrence and assurance. In the words of one participant in a post-workshop email:

Explicitly framing extended deterrence and assurance in terms of perceptions of credibility and reputation enables one to build a narrative that highlights potential credibility issues an ally or security partner might

perceive – ‘nuclear erosion,’ moveable red lines vis-à-vis [the DPRK], a seeming inability to get a fix on the Iranian challenge...The question is the degree to which these undermine the more basic foundations of credibility. Allies take a lot of factors into account when assessing the strength of their deterrence relationship with the U.S. and the credibility of nuclear security guarantees. In discussions on this topic we tend to hear a lot of statements like ‘This factor is important, but that one is not;’ ‘Country X cares about this, but not about that;’ ‘That will never happen...’ These may, in the end, be correct judgments, but we should be a bit wary of overly definitive statements in looking at this issue. Reality inevitably is more complex, not least because opinion on these questions in allied governments is rarely monolithic. It may be more useful to think of these factors along a spectrum of concerns or ‘sources of anxiety’ from very discrete concerns about specific nuclear capabilities up to very broad geopolitical considerations, with a number of other factors in between...They’re all in play, though in different ways in each particular case.

To implement this credibility-centric approach to assessing impacts on extended deterrence and assurance, the CSIS study team developed an expansive list of the factors, which are grouped into statements of policy and strategy (‘intent’), nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, and activities that implemented the ‘intent’ policies and strategies. As portrayed in Figure 2, this list of factors was first vetted at the 3 June workshop and subsequently with workshop participants and stakeholders. Although the list is still a work in progress, these factors provide the framework for assessing how extended deterrence and assurance ‘work’ in the three regional contexts addressed in later chapters.

Figure 2 Factors Affecting the Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance



Neither Extended Deterrence nor Assurance are ‘Lesser-Included Cases’ of Each Other

The SMEs recognize that changes in nuclear capabilities can affect both extended deterrence and assurance, but the impacts can vary in degree and in how they are manifested. Frank Miller notes:

Successful assurance [is]...bolstered by the elements of credible extended deterrence...If the deterrent is not credible, assurance will not work but a credible deterrent does not guarantee successful assurance.

Similarly, an extended deterrent threat can be effective against a potential aggressor, but still not assure one’s ally. In his report, James Schoff notes the ‘fit’ between deterrence requirements and assurance requirements may be widening as the means by which deterrence is being provided change:


[A]s old symbols of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, because a potential adversary’s defense planners are paying perhaps the closest attention to the whole array of new capabilities. This helps explain why Tokyo can be underwhelmed with recent developments while at the same time Beijing is alarmed.¹⁷

The symbiotic nature of the relationship between extended deterrence and assurance, and between the perceptions of each of the critical audiences, makes it difficult to discern the relative influence of any given factor on extended deterrence or assurance. But despite the difficulty of separating the key factors in practice, expert insight into the decision-making of allies and potential aggressors enabled the SMEs to illuminate key characteristics of how each critical audience perceives and interprets U.S. words, actions and capabilities. This analysis enabled the CSIS study team to analyze separately the requirements and key factors affecting extended deterrence and assurance, the subject of the next two chapters. The analysis of both relationships is then re-integrated in the regional chapters on Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.

¹⁷ James L. Schoff, *Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence* (Washington, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009), 34.

III. DETERRING POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS OF U.S. ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS

Since the credibility of deterrence is determined by the perceptions of the target of deterrence, the analytic task of defining requirements can be no more precise or discriminate than the thought processes of those making decisions for the nation being deterred. In a deterrence theory classic that deserved more attention than it received at the time, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening argue convincingly that deterree perceptions of the will and capability of the deterrer blur:



The credibility of a deterrent threat depends on whether the challenger believes the deterrer *will* do what he says he will do, i.e., on his perception of the deterrer's intent (resolve and commitment are synonyms¹⁶)...For a threat to be credible, both intent and capability must be in evidence...To some extent, intent and capability are fungible. If the challenger believes the deterrer's intent or resolve is weak, a particularly clear and compelling capability to do what the deterrer says he will do can compensate, to some extent. Similarly, if the challenger believes the deterrer's capability is weak, a particularly strong resolve can make a deterrent threat appear credible.¹⁸

What a potential adversary finds credible depends on its perceptual lens, which does not draw clean boundaries between U.S. nuclear capability improvements and U.S. will and intent. For example, actions the United States takes to improve the effectiveness of its nuclear forces may impress the deterree because they demonstrate the 'seriousness' of the United States in maintaining a credible deterrent, which is an indicator of how 'serious' the United States may be in a crisis. In this instance, the capability improvement is less important than the message it conveys about U.S. will. Moreover, a number of capabilities blur the distinction between 'intent' and 'capability.' Effective defenses, for example, enhance deterrence credibility by demonstrating the U.S. invulnerability to reprisal, thus rendering irrelevant otherwise salient questions about whether the United States has the resolve, for example, to trade Atlanta for Riyadh. In its final report, the Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture clearly recognizes the subjective nature of the requirements for effective deterrence (and assurance):

Whether potential adversaries are deterred (and U.S. allies are assured) is a function of their understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions. Those capabilities must be sufficiently visible and sufficiently impressive. But deterrence is more than a summary calculation of cumulative target kill probabilities. And it is not simply a function of technical characteristics of the nuclear force. It derives also from perceptions of U.S. intent and credibility, and the declaratory policy that embodies these factors.¹⁹

¹⁸ Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, *Regional Deterrence: The Nuclear Dimension* (Washington, DC: RAND, 1995), 13-4.

¹⁹ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America's Strategic Posture*, 13.

Determining which nuclear force posture is ‘sufficiently visible’ and ‘sufficiently impressive’ depends on the object (sufficient to whom?) and the behavior (sufficient as to what?) that the force structure is intended to influence. To deter attacks on allies (extended deterrence), a potential aggressor against a state under the umbrella “must be sufficiently convinced that the United States has both the capability and the will to act so as to make aggression not worth the risk.”²⁰ As previously discussed, however, the potential aggressor’s perceptions are inextricably linked to how the capabilities are perceived by the two other critical ‘audiences’ – U.S. allies and friends and U.S. officials and the American people.

Thinking about the Requirements of Extended Deterrence

In much the same way that U.S. security policy is widely recognized to be a ‘whole of government,’ not just a DoD, policy, deterrence and extended deterrence are ‘whole of relationship’ phenomena. While this is certainly the case, the nuclear component of extended deterrence, as discussed previously, is critical because of the risks (to the United States) and the trust (from the allies) required for effectiveness and credibility. James Schoff observes in his notes to his workshop brief, “We often emphasize that we cannot look at the deterrence value of an alliance in a strictly military sense, let alone nuclear posture in isolation... The political, economic, historical, and cultural aspects are all important. But the deterrence power of nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attacks is unique and impossible to quantify.”

Compounding the analytic challenge of assessing the deterrence (and extended deterrence) impact of nuclear weapons is the dated nature of many of the deterrence concepts that are still being used two decades after the Cold War ended. The Defense Science Board notes that:

Most of the available thinking in the U.S. defense community about extended deterrence is deeply rooted in the requirements of strategic relationships constructed during the Cold War. Only sporadic efforts exist to engage in strategic dialogues with allies and friends that explore what they see as necessary and sufficient in the U.S. military posture for purposes of their security and assurance in the new era.²¹

As will be explored more fully in the regional chapters, the requirements of extended deterrence (as well as assurance) are likely to change to reflect new security conditions. Therefore, even valid deterrence concepts from the Cold War era must be adapted to a new era.

Watman and Wilkening argue that “the challenger’s perception of the deterrer’s intent” is a function of two factors: (1) “the challenger’s perception of the deterrer’s interests;” and (2) “his perception of the deterrer’s reputation for defending those interests.”²² At the workshop, Linton Brooks highlighted the importance of the U.S. ‘reputation for action’:

Extended deterrence, like all deterrence, exists in the mind. The single most important step the United States can take, therefore, is to cultivate the perception that we will act to meet our obligations. All other details, while important, are secondary.

What it takes to ‘cultivate’ that perception, of course, is much debated. For those in the actions-speak-louder-than-words camp (see Appendix A), it’s the pattern of actions the United States takes, including

²⁰ Linton Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence for the 2009-2010 Nuclear Posture Review” (PowerPoint, CSIS, Washington, DC, June 3, 2009), 3.

²¹ *Report of the Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study: Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests* (December 2008), 136.

²² Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, *Regional Deterrence*, 13-4.

steps to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear forces, that matter the most in the perceptions of those the United States desires to deter. Others, however, put more weight on what the United States says it will do (that is, U.S. declaratory policy with respect to nuclear weapons), on U.S. non-nuclear capabilities, or on U.S. defensive capabilities, especially ballistic missile defense.

Key Factors Affecting the Credibility of U.S. Extended Deterrence

Factors affecting perceptions of U.S. *capabilities and intent* can be distributed into three principal categories: (1) declaratory policy, (2) force structure, and (3) perceived U.S. interests and the ‘balance of stakes.’

Declaratory Policy

Deterrence practitioners and strategists have always stressed the importance of U.S. *declaratory policy* with respect to how it might employ nuclear weapons if deterrence or extended deterrence should fail. Over the past decade, the most senior-level U.S. officials have paid little attention to nuclear issues, much less spoken publicly about them. Many recent commissions and task forces have cited this indifference as a contributing factor in the loss of U.S. nuclear competence, as reflected in the August 2007 unauthorized movement of nuclear cruise missiles and the March 2008 discovery that missile warhead components had been shipped to Taiwan. The extent of U.S. indifference was underscored when the Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture had to remind the nation what declaratory policy was as the first of its “main points”: “*First*, to be effective, such policy must be understood to reflect the intentions of national leadership. The president must make clear his intent, and it must echo through the words and deeds of the appropriate cabinet officers.”²³ The Commission’s report makes a number of additional judgments concerning declaratory policy in the post-9/11 era:

Second, the United States should retain calculated ambiguity as an element of its nuclear declaratory policy. Potential aggressors should have to worry about the possibility that the United States might respond by overwhelming means at a time and in a manner of its choosing. Calculated ambiguity may not be wise in every instance, as deterrence in crisis may be better served by being explicit. But calculated ambiguity creates uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about just how the United States might respond to an act of aggression, and this ought to reinforce restraint and caution on the part of that potential aggressor. The threat to impose unacceptable consequences on an aggressor by any means of U.S. choosing remains credible. The Commission has considered whether the United States should adopt a policy of no-first-use, whereby the United States would forswear the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose other than in retaliation for attack by nuclear means on itself or its allies. But such a policy would be unsettling to some U.S. allies. It would also undermine the potential contributions of nuclear weapons to the deterrence of attack by biological weapons. The Commission recognizes that, so long as the United States maintains adequately strong conventional forces it no longer needs to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat of a major conventional attack. But long-term U.S. superiority in the conventional military domain cannot be taken for granted and requires continuing attention and investment.

Third, declaratory policy must reflect the central fact that the United States retains nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence — to help to create the conditions in which they are never used or even threatened. The

²³ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 36.

Commission conceives of deterrence in very broad terms, to include also assurance and dissuasion. Although the contemporary demands of deterrence are much different from those of the Cold War (and reliance on nuclear weapons has been appropriately reduced), the deterrence role of nuclear weapons remains crucial.

Fourth, it is important that the United States signal in its declaratory policy the fact that it relies less than ever on nuclear weapons for political and military purposes. The United States should underscore that it conceives of and prepares for the use of nuclear weapons only for protection of itself and its allies in extreme circumstances. The Commission believes that any president of the United States would avoid pushing a confrontation to the point of nuclear exchange.

Fifth, the implicit tension between U.S. declaratory policy and its commitments under the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] to negative and positive security assurances is long-lived and remains.

Although the workshop did not directly assess the Commission's "main points" concerning declaratory policy, it did discuss the first three – why declaratory policy is important, the need for continued 'calculated ambiguity,' and the broadened definition of deterrence – and was generally supportive of the Commission's conclusions.

The other side of declaratory policy is the intention (and ability) to follow through on it. U.S. threatened retaliation must be not only devastating, but also believable. In a reflection of the theme struck at the outset of this chapter, namely the fungibility of capability and intent when it comes to extended deterrence, workshop participants frequently turned to the issue of 'moving' or 'creeping' 'red lines.' The DPRK, which had been told repeatedly that testing a nuclear weapon was 'unacceptable,' drew particular attention. At a 2008 conference on "Tailored Deterrence and NATO," Elaine Bunn provided the following analysis:

U.S. officials tend to ad hoc it when it comes to [deterrence communications], addressing the issue of the moment without considering the message over time. For instance, take President Bush's statement after [the DPRK's] 2006 nuclear test: 'America's position is clear: The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by [the DPRK] to a state or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold [the DPRK] fully accountable for the consequences of such action.'...[After noting that U.S. presidents had repeatedly warned the DPRK about having nuclear weapons, 'the red line has moved over time.'] Now that they've tested, the focus is on transfer. So with a moving red line, it's hard to say what's credible, and whether Kim Jong Il believes he would have to pay a high price for transfer.²⁴

As he did so many times during the workshop, Linton Brooks summarized the issue succinctly:

Extended deterrence is enhanced by a record of U.S. action if threats are ignored. If the United States says something is unacceptable and it never-the-less happens, deterrence is strengthened if the United States responds to the event strongly. And strengthened even more if the response is perceived as effective. [And] the reverse is true. Drawing 'red lines' and then responding to their being crossed simply by drawing new red lines weakens deterrence.

What we say we will do with our nuclear capabilities (the subject of the next section) matters. But our adversaries and allies are influenced by more than our declaratory policy; they are also calculating what we will actually do if the situation arises.

²⁴ Elaine Bunn, "Remarks at the Wilton Park Conference on Tailored Deterrence and NATO" (speech, Wiston House, Sussex, UK, March 17, 2008).

Force Structure

Workshop participants largely agree with the approach that Linton Brooks suggests for thinking about the capability requirements for extended deterrence:

[Extended deterrence] is enhanced by U.S. strategic forces that are perceived as second to none...flexible...reliable and effective...and by effective defenses...[But the] force structure bottom line [is]: except for these inherent features, [the] U.S. should wean allies from the belief that a specific force structure is required for extended deterrence.

The briefers believe that it is the ‘inherent’ characteristics, or features, of nuclear capabilities, not specific weapon systems that provide those characteristics, that are needed for credibility. Extended deterrence is enhanced by the perception of:

- *Strategic forces that are ‘second to none.’* According to Linton Brooks, this is “especially true for those whom Russia is the plausible aggressor. But also appears important to Japan.” On Japan, James Schoff adds: “As the quantity of U.S. nuclear weapons decreases, it is only natural that the numbers of different types of warheads and delivery systems will be reduced as well. The Japanese will understand that, but we still must be able to explain with confidence how the remaining configuration still meets our collective deterrence needs.”
- *Weapons that are reliable and effective.* Frank Miller argues that “displayed competence in nuclear weapons stewardship” is critical to credibility in both Europe and Asia. While Linton Brooks believes that “excessive and overstated complaints about aging problems or the viability of U.S. weapons undercut extended deterrence.”
- *Flexible forces.* Linton Brooks says that this “implies single RV [reentry vehicle or warhead] missiles not requiring overflight of Russia.”
- *Forward-deployed forces, both nuclear and non-nuclear.* Elaine Bunn notes that “forward military presence and force projection capabilities continue to help the United States extend deterrence to allies.” Linton Brooks argues that such deployments are necessary so that “the host country cannot be attacked without attacking the United States.” And, Clark Murdock adds, “Actions that blur the distinction between ‘central’ deterrence (threats to the U.S. homeland/Americans) and ‘extended’ deterrence...[have] a powerful dissuasive effect.”
- *Conventional forces.* According to Elaine Bunn, “U.S. conventional capabilities play an important – and increasing – role in extended deterrence.” Discussing the importance of conventional forces shortly after the workshop, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright told a CSIS audience: “What should [deterrence] look like as we go to the 21st century? Is it credible that it is only nuclear? I don't believe that it is. So what...elements of global strike also significantly contribute to extended deterrence? What capabilities would...assure our allies that we would be there...it will be on time, it will be compelling to the adversary and therefore they don't need to go in that direction?”²⁵

²⁵ Gen. James Cartwright, “Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Military Strategy Forum” (speech, Washington, June 4, 2009).

- *Visible exercises.* According to Frank Miller, “Extended Deterrence involves...war plans/doctrine/visible exercises as a signal of readiness and credibility...extended deterrence can’t be based on a bluff; we must be able to show friends/allies and enemies alike that we’re capable by training, doing exercises, etc.”
- *Effective National and Theater Defenses.* Elaine Bunn explains that “defenses, particularly missile defenses, have gained acceptance, even enthusiasm, among some allies as a complementary part of extended deterrence.”

Perceived Interests and the Balance of ‘Stakes’

Perceived U.S. interests in what is to be deterred and the ‘balance of stakes’ vis-à-vis the potential aggressor are particularly important to adversary perceptions of U.S. *intent* to defend against aggression on allied territory. Factors affecting this perception include:

- *Vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to reprisal.* Linton Brooks argues that “extended deterrence is enhanced by the inability of the potential aggressor to threaten U.S. territory with nuclear weapons.” In other words of one workshop participant, “whether we would trade Atlanta for Riyadh is only important if Iran can hit Atlanta.” The implications are twofold. First, it is easier to extend deterrence against regional nuclear powers. According to Linton Brooks, for example, it “should be easier to deter North Korean military action against Japan than Chinese military action against Japan.” Second, the importance of the perceptions of homeland vulnerability explains why defenses – in the limited cases where they can be highly effective (i.e., not Russia or China) – can enhance extended deterrence (as well as assurance) credibility.
- *Perceived U.S. interests in what is to be deterred.* Linton Brooks explains that “extended deterrence is enhanced by the perception that what is to be deterred is a vital interest of the United States.” According to Brooks, this suggests that it is “easier to deter attacks on key allies than on other states [and] easier to deter military attacks than diplomatic or economic pressure.” This factor underscores the importance of Elaine Bunn’s point that “extended deterrence broadly understood rests on the overall health of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue, consultation, and coordinated defense planning.” In the words of another participant, “alignment of goals is very important...in the event that the United States should have to make good on its commitments.”
- *Balance of Stakes.* Concerns over ‘asymmetries in stakes’ between the United States and regional adversaries pose unique challenges to extended deterrence vis-à-vis the DPRK and to considerations of providing new forms of extended deterrence guarantees to deter a nuclear-armed Iran. In a 2008 report, David Ochmanek and Lowell Schwartz describe how this element complicates Cold War deterrence concepts:

[I]f deterrence ‘worked’ for 40 years against the Soviet Union (a powerful state with thousands of nuclear weapons that espoused a revisionist ideology deeply hostile to the United States) why would it not also work in the future against far less powerful regional adversaries? For every nuclear weapon that a country such as [the DPRK] or Iran can explode, the United States has 100 or more of much higher yield that it can use in retaliation...Can U.S. leaders not be confident of deterring regional adversaries from using their limited arsenals if the United States maintains its nuclear superiority? We judge that the answer, in certain circumstances, is ‘no.’ The reason lies in an examination of the asymmetries that exist in the stakes, commitment, and capabilities that each side is likely to bring to a prospective conflict...Profound

asymmetries in each side's perception of its position and of the potential costs and stakes associated with the conflict make Pyongyang's escalatory threats highly credible.²⁶

- *The 'acceptability of inaction.'* Paraphrasing the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Elaine Bunn notes that deterrence means shaping an adversary's perception of three primary elements: (1) the benefits of a course of action; (2) the costs of a course of action; (3) the consequences of restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter). Linton Brooks believes the third element, in particular, is important: "If an aggressor feels he has no choice, he can't be deterred (e.g., the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor)...The relevance for our effort comes in the need to avoid lose-lose options, especially by public espousal of compelling a regime change."

Developing, fielding, and exercising capabilities is critical to the intent/capability equation that underlies credibility, since the intent to take action or carry out a threat is empty without the requisite capabilities. But having the needed capabilities, particularly with respect to extended nuclear deterrence, is insufficient, unless the adversary believes that U.S. interests justify taking the actions being threatened.

²⁶ David Ochmanek and Lowell H. Schwartz, *The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2008), 41.

IV. ASSURING ALLIES: REQUIREMENTS & KEY FACTORS

To assure, according to Linton Brooks, “the state under the umbrella must be sufficiently convinced of United States [extended deterrence commitments] so as to (a) resist intimidation and (b) refrain from seeking nuclear capabilities of its own.” From this formulation, assurance relationships can be distinguished from extended deterrence relationships in three principal ways:

1. Because credibility depends on the perceptual lens of the ally, as opposed to the potential adversary, intensive consultations can be effective in determining assurance requirements.
2. Assurance is a mutually beneficial relationship (a ‘two-way street’);
3. In the near-term, assurance relationships seem more sensitive to long-term deterrence challenges than extended deterrence relationships.

The following chapter explores each distinction as it relates to the factors that affect the requirements of assurance.

The Perceptual Lens of the Ally

As Elaine Bunn writes, “to be able to extend deterrence requires that we can deter our allies’ adversaries; assurance requires that allies believe that we can and will do so.” The degree to which assurance is affected by the elements of extended deterrence is therefore a function of *how the ally perceives and interprets U.S. words and actions vis-à-vis the deteree*. In this regard, the ally’s calculations can be significantly different from those of the potential aggressor. In contrast to potential adversaries who follow U.S. nuclear posture issues closely and with considerable expertise, U.S. allies’ defense planners may rely on less credible intelligence sources (e.g., unclassified reports, media commentary, congressional hearings, informal track-2 dialogues, etc.) and have more limited analytic resources for assessing the deterrence effects from changes in force structure. Schoff notes that in Japan, for example, “the lead office at the foreign ministry following the RRW [Reliable Replacement Warhead] debate was the Disarmament and Nonproliferation department...even though they were essentially talking about modernizing Japan’s nuclear deterrent.”

This explains why assurance requirements, at least in the near-term, can exceed the requirements of deterring the ally’s potential aggressor. Depending on the differences in which they perceive and interpret force structure configurations, allies can be more sensitive to certain force structure attributes and less sensitive (than their potential aggressor) to others. For example, ‘symbols’ of deterrence can be important to the credibility of assurance even if they do not affect an adversary’s deterrence calculations. Likewise, the ability to rapidly deploy nuclear weapons to the theater may not significantly impact adversary perceptions because “the opponent will pay more attention to overall capability and reliability of its adversary,” even though nuclear availability can have a meaningful impact on assurance because, as Schoff argues, “an ally’s ability to understand and visualize the process can be reassuring.”

On the other hand, new capabilities with less concrete and visible deterrence effects may have less assurance value relative to their affect on the calculations of potential aggressors. Schoff explains:

[A]s old symbols of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, given the flexibility of use. The problem is that the relationship of these new assets to specific deterrence scenarios involving the alliance has not been explored adequately.²⁷

Of course, what each ally perceives to be significant is unique and determined by a web of historical, geographic, cultural, and political factors. And the dynamics are shifting. As certain allies' anxieties about extended deterrence have grown, so too has their demand for information about U.S. capabilities. And, as Bunn observes, the lens through which allies interpret this information is changing: "while U.S. views on deterrence are evolving, so are those of U.S. allies." This has resulted in pronounced, but uneven, beliefs about what is necessary to deter the same threats including, in some cases, unnecessary demands on U.S. capabilities. Extensive consultations held by the SPRC led them to observe:

[S]ome U.S. allies believe that extended deterrence requires little more than stability in the central balances of nuclear power among the major powers. But other allies believe their needs can only be met with very specific U.S. nuclear capabilities...One particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.²⁸

In the same way that deterrence must be tailored to each actor, situation, and form of warfare, assurance must be tailored to the strategic culture, threat perceptions, values, and specific concerns of each ally.²⁹

This requires more than tailoring deterrence to the allies' potential aggressors. Successful assurance involves tailoring communications and (in some cases) tailoring the mix of capabilities relevant to extended deterrence based on an ally's specific national concern (or two allies' competing concerns, etc.).

The Role of Consultations & Engagement: Determining & Strengthening Assurance Requirements

Tailoring assurance means more than understanding *what allies want* – it means knowing *why they want it*. In order to fully appreciate and influence each ally's beliefs about the credibility of extended deterrence within an evolving security environment, Elaine Bunn explains that "policymakers need mechanisms to assess how [U.S.] words and actions are perceived, how they affect the assurance of each ally, and how the US might mitigate misperceptions that undermine...assurance."

Expanding upon a list of key questions identified by Elaine Bunn, workshop participants identified several issues that need to be addressed in tailoring and strengthening assurance to a particular ally:

- *Threat Perceptions and National Objectives.* Who is the ally worried about? What is the ally worried about them doing? What does the ally see as key objectives?
- *Strategic Culture.* How is the ally making decisions? How are they influenced by domestic constituencies? History? How does the ally process information and receive communications

²⁷ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, xii.

²⁸ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America's Strategic Posture*, 20.

²⁹ Darci Bloyer and Zachariah M. Becker, "Building an Extended U.S. Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century," 2008 *PONI STRATCOM Journal* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2009).

pertaining to assurance? Who/what do they rely on for information and analysis of U.S. capabilities and credibility?

- *Perceptions of the United States.* What does the ally believe about U.S. capabilities? What/who is informing their judgments? What is the ally's perception of U.S. credibility? What factors affect that perception?
- *Philosophies on Deterrence.* How does the ally think about deterrence? How are those views evolving? What does the ally believe to be the correct division of labor with the United States when it comes to deterrence?

One way to answer these questions, of course, is to ask them. As Elaine Bunn puts it, we should consult our allies *because we can*:

Assurance – like deterrence – is in the eye of the beholder. A key difference though, is that with deterrence, we can't just go ask adversaries: 'what will it take to deter you?' — or at least if we did, we probably shouldn't believe the answers... But with assurance, we CAN, in essence ask allies and friends what reassures them, and what factors are most important in their remaining non-nuclear.

Workshop participants all supported the value of consultations, but also believed that the value of consultations depends significantly on how these consultations are conducted. **Consultations are essential in determining each ally's unique security needs, but their value is a function of the manner in which they are conducted. The dialogue should reveal allies underlying needs and interests and must avoid the tendency to 'lead the witness' by soliciting the views U.S. officials believe to be correct.** 'Consultation best practices' include:

- In order to fully understand how the ally *perceives and interprets U.S. words and actions vis-à-vis the deteree*, consultations must be extensive and sustained. Bunn writes that consultations "take time, attention, listening as well as talking, and sustained effort (often not U.S. strong suits) – not just flying in, giving a briefing and flying out."
- Questions must be open-ended and dispassionate. Consultations must be designed to solicit answers revealing what allies genuinely need instead of what allies have been told they need. Bunn explains that some Americans have a tendency to 'lead the witness' in the ways they talk to allies about extended deterrence by "soliciting the views they think are correct." Bunn identifies two examples of this tactic: "Wouldn't you [Japan] be concerned if the US gave up the TLAM-N?" or "Wouldn't you [NATO countries] be concerned if the US removed dual-capable aircraft (DCA) from Europe?" "Aren't you concerned about drastic US reductions?"³⁰
- Consultations require listening *and* talking. Of course, the United States cannot dictate assurance requirements. The bottom line for credible assurance is what U.S. allies believe is needed for extended deterrence, not what U.S. policy makers or policy experts think is needed. But what allies believe about extended deterrence is not immutable. In her paper, Bunn makes the keen observation that it is "interesting that we think about shaping adversaries' thinking (that's what deterrence is) but sometimes take our allies' views as immutable." The United States has a tremendous amount of influence over the lens through which allies *perceive and interpret* the design of the U.S. nuclear

³⁰ Elaine Bunn, "Implications of Extended Deterrence for the 2009-2010 Nuclear Posture Review" (discussion notes, CSIS, Washington, DC, June 3, 2009), 6.

posture. If U.S. policymakers choose to exercise that influence, they can play a significant role in driving and shaping assurance requirements.

With intensive engagement, it is possible to narrow the gap between what the United States and its allies believe is necessary for extended deterrence. But while it may be desirable to ‘de-link’ assurance from specific U.S. nuclear weapons, doing so must not be at the expense of the broader need to provide nuclear capabilities sufficient to sustain credible assurance about the U.S. extended deterrence commitments.

Moreover, shaping allies’ views can weaken as well as strengthen assurance. Elaine Bunn offers two cautionary tales that demonstrate, on one hand, the power of the United States in shaping allies’ views and, on the other, the consequences of U.S. messages ‘taking on a life of their own with allies:’

- 1994 NPR: In trying to reassure Japanese officials in the face of the ’94 decision to give up the U.S. capability to put nuclear weapons on surface ships, some U.S. officials noted that the U.S. retained the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on SSNs. This may be the source of some Japanese officials thinking TLAM-N is ‘their’ extended deterrent; makes it hard to give up, even if USG decided it wanted to do so instead of replacing/refurbishing.
- 2001 NPR: U.S. officials explicitly talked about supporting dissuasion by retaining a sufficient margin over countries with expanding nuclear arsenals such as China – and now some Japanese officials appear to take the ‘dissuasion’ goal more seriously than U.S. officials do. [They believe the United States] will need X times more than China, but [are] not sure what ‘X’ is.

With a “well-thought-out plan that carefully considers both long-term as well as expedient, short-term consequences,” Bunn believes that these mistakes can be corrected. She argues that “we may be able to shape how Japan thinks about TLAM/N or Europe about DCA.” But because of the in-depth, regular, and sustained consultations this would require, she concludes that it is not likely “in the near term to have done adequate consultations.”

Role of Engagement in Strengthening Assurance

In addition to determining how to assure, the process of consultation itself strengthens assurance by creating mechanisms and institutions that build trust and couple the alliance. More institutionalized and regularized exchanges of this nature will deepen and broaden the assurance relationship between the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, consultations should be treated as a means and not an end and should be conducted as a part of a broader engagement strategy.

The sensitivities that accompany the ally’s unique perceptual lens stress the importance of activities that improve U.S. allies’ understanding of deterrence concepts and the full spectrum of U.S. capabilities that could be leveraged in their defense. **Assurance is strengthened by mechanisms that enhance transparency and bring allies closer into the act of extending deterrence, including planning, exercises, joint assignments, and overall defense coordination.**

NATO, for example, is identified by the SMEs as the “most robust case” of assurance. Of course, many factors have contributed to the strength of the relationship - not least of which is the forward presence of U.S. nuclear weapons and military forces. But the value of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons is not derived from their military utility (NATO’s nuclear weapons have not been targeted at a specific threat since the end of the Cold War – see Chapter 5). Instead, they serve a vital political and strategic role as the foundation for NATO’s robust mechanisms of participation that, as Yost explains,

Reassure allies about their ability to monitor and influence U.S. decision-making as well as about the alliance's capacity to deal with external threats [and allow for] participation of non-nuclear-weapon states in the alliance's nuclear posture as well as ongoing analysis and planning forums to assure allies that they are partners in the formulation of a shared alliance strategy.³¹

Assurance to Japan, on the other hand, is identified as the most vulnerable, in large part because the alliance lacks the mechanisms to clarify misperceptions over U.S. policies and capabilities. Since Japan – or other non-NATO allies – does not share NATO's history or the responsibilities associated with hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, the solution is not as easy as 'picking up the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and putting it in Japan' or in other countries protected by the U.S. umbrella. But the assurance-strengthening *attributes* of the NATO mechanisms – namely monitoring and participating in U.S. analysis, planning, and decision-making as it relates to the ally's ability to resist intimidation – do not intrinsically depend on the forward presence of nuclear weapons and can be applied, with time and creativity, to new contexts.

There was broad agreement among workshop participants that “strong overall defense cooperation increases the credibility of the nuclear guarantee.”³² Miller advises policymakers to “seek ways for increased collaboration [and] exercises that demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.” One participant, drawing on his career in the Marine Corps, highlighted the value of “persistent engagement” in building trust with allies from the ground-up. The 2009 TRAC Panel on deterrence finds: “our military forces can be some of our best ambassadors...in peacetime exercises, planning for contingencies with allies, training of partner forces, and providing support to friends and flies in the wake of disasters.”³³ The importance of defense cooperation to building Assurance and Extended Deterrence is clearly recognized at the most senior levels of the U.S. military. A recent article on “Waging Deterrence” by STRATCOM Commander Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver expresses this eloquently:

US friends and allies share our interest in deterrence success. Because of their different perspectives, different military capabilities, and different means of communication at their disposal, they offer much that can refine and improve our deterrence strategies and enhance the effectiveness of our deterrence activities. It is to our advantage (and theirs) to involve them more actively in “waging deterrence” in the twenty-first century. One of the most important contributions that our friends and allies can make to our deterrence campaigns is to provide alternative assessments of competitors' perceptions. Allied insights into how American deterrence activities may be perceived by both intended and unintended audiences can help us formulate more effective plans. Allied suggestions for alternative approaches to achieving key deterrence effects, including actions they would take in support of — or instead of — US actions, may prove invaluable. As in the case of interagency collaboration, we need to develop innovative processes for collaborating with our friends and allies to enhance deterrence.³⁴

Assurance as a Mutually Beneficial Relationship

The second feature distinguishing assurance from extended deterrence is that assurance is premised upon mutually enhanced security (the inverse of deterrence). NATO allies have often characterized this

³¹ Yost, “Assurance,” 758.

³² Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 25.

³³ Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, “The Nuclear Component of the U.S. Strategic Deterrent: Meeting Our Responsibilities and Guidance for the Next Nuclear Posture Review” (panel discussion, January 27, 2009).

³⁴ Gen. Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 3:1 (2009), 36.

dynamic as a “two-way street.”³⁵ Both the United States and its allies want to strengthen the assurance relationship, even though they may differ on who has the greatest responsibility (and burden) in sustaining credible assurance.

For example, despite expressed concerns that U.S. extended deterrence might not be as credible tomorrow as it is now, the government of Japan by no means *wants* to develop a nuclear weapons capability. As Schoff’s report highlights, for example, Japan is deeply aware of the enormous domestic and international advantages at risk were they to end their reliance on the U.S. extended deterrent:

Maintaining the ability to resist coercive tactics and balance against potential threats can be accomplished externally, meaning through the alliance with the United States, or balancing internally by more assertively developing Japan’s independent capabilities...Pushing the envelope on internal balancing has never been attractive to Japanese policy makers in the post-World War II environment because it would involve a huge domestic political fight. Laws would have to be changed (possibly including the constitution, which has never been amended in over sixty years), Japan’s neighbors would object vehemently, and they would probably feel compelled to increase their own defense budgets in response.³⁶

Assurance, like any relationship, functions best when there is strong and mutual interest in maintaining it. U.S. allies understand that the United States must balance an overwhelming and complex set of national and international priorities (many of which they share), but, nevertheless, they still need to be assured (credibly) that the U.S. extended deterrent is credible.

Allied confidence in the genuineness of the U.S. commitment can be undermined if the United States frames assurance and extended deterrence exclusively in terms of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

According to Brooks, an important source of Japanese anxieties concerning the U.S. commitment is their perception that “in providing extended deterrence, the United States is less interested in Japan’s security and more concerned with preventing a Japanese decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons.” Criticizing the media’s paranoia over Japan “going nuclear,” he adds, “guys like me hear that and are not persuaded it’s the reason we should pay attention.” Murdock argues that Japan, for example “wants to know what we are doing for them...not just what we do for ourselves.” On the other hand, assurance is strengthened if Japan understands that they are a vital interest to the United States. According to one participant, “it’s a fine line to walk...and we have not been very careful.”

Assurance & Long-Term Challenges to Deterrence

Sustaining a credible deterrent and extended deterrent is usually assessed in a near-term context – is the potential aggressor dissuaded from taking the actions that the United States (and its allies) want to deter? An ally’s decision to remain non-nuclear, however, depends on an assessment of their security needs in a longer-term context. The decision to pursue an independent nuclear capability is a long-term investment made to hedge against long-term uncertainty. **Because developing a sufficient deterrent capability can take years, allied perceptions of long-term security uncertainties will affect their near-term views on the desirability of remaining under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.**

³⁵ Yost, “Assurance,” 769.

³⁶ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 23, xiii.

In Northeast Asia, this sensitivity has become increasingly evident as Japan's exposure to vulnerability has grown. In his report, Schoff argues:

Given that Japan's national security strategy depends so heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella...Japan will always be hyper-sensitive to the long-term implications of near-term trends regarding America's security commitments...and such concerns, however they arise, could prompt broader consideration of the nuclear option in Japan.³⁷

While statistics about laboratory recruitment challenges or the number of certification waivers granted are unlikely to alter the near-term deterrence calculus of potential aggressors, the perceived long-term dependability of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex could considerably influence an ally's assurance calculus to remain non-nuclear. An ally could not afford the window of vulnerability created by initiating a nuclear weapons program *after* the U.S. stockpile was determined to be ineffective. Long-term uncertainties concerning the 'fundamental guarantor of their sovereignty' could therefore trigger an ally's long-term investment to guarantee it themselves.

This conclusion was supported by both the SPRC³⁸ and the 2009 CFR Task Force.³⁹ In the NATO context, David Yost goes as far as to say that "the continued viability of what some Americans call the US nuclear 'enterprise' may be more reassuring to US allies than the overall size and specific characteristics of the nuclear force."⁴⁰ There is a high degree of convergence among the SMEs on this point:

"Budget limitations will force us to make tough choices. This can be okay if we maintain overall capability and communicate that capability to our allies...But if we reduce numbers and take out some of the redundancy from our arsenal, then we must still invest in modernizing all aspects of the nuclear infrastructure. In fact, this becomes increasingly important the lower we go." (James Schoff)

"I have to wonder what the role of the US nuclear infrastructure – both physical and human – will be over time in assuring allies about extended *nuclear* deterrence." (Elaine Bunn)

"To extend assurance and extended deterrence the US must display competence in nuclear weapons stewardship [and]...retain confidence in its nuclear forces, nuclear warheads, and nuclear weapons complex." (Frank Miller)

Because assurance is in the eye of the ally, it is not necessarily the technical characteristics of the stockpile that drive allied concern, but the way those characteristics are portrayed in the public debate on modernization. **The conduct of American policy debates is a key factor affecting assurance in each critical region.** As Frank Miller puts it, "nothing destroys assurance more than a dysfunctional public debate about modernization."

"Talk of the U.S. being 'self-deterred' – usually put forward by those who most support new nuclear weapons – is counterproductive from an assurance (and a deterrence) stand point. Public statements bemoaning the declining health of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure may evoke concern among U.S. allies about the long-term dependability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Granted, it is a catch-22 situation: in a democracy, changes one may think are needed will not be made unless there is public examination and debate; But unless the United

³⁷ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 3.

³⁸ "[M]odernization is essential to the nonproliferation benefits derived from the extended deterrent." Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America's Strategic Posture*, 4.

³⁹ "[E]nsuring a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear arsenal...provides...allies who depend on extended deterrence with high confidence in a credible nuclear deterrent...This pillar thus serves U.S. nonproliferation interests." Perry, *Nuclear Weapons Policy*, 67.

⁴⁰ Yost, "Assurance," 769.

States is able to come to a domestic consensus to fill the gaps identified, pointing out perceived gaps in U.S. nuclear capabilities and infrastructure can *undermine assurance* (as well as deterrence).” (Elaine Bunn)

“Excessive and overstated complaints about aging problems or the viability of U.S. weapons undercut extended deterrence” (Linton Brooks)

“[T]here are ways that U.S. policy makers can try to influence Japanese decision making... One key area [is] how the United States conducts its own policy debates regarding extended deterrence strategies and the country’s nuclear force posture. U.S. officials should keep in mind the signals they are sending through these discussions.”⁴¹ (James Schoff)

“European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies... have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the ‘bomber gap’ and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM [Intercontinental ballistic missile] vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Given this historical pattern, if a new debate emerged in the United States about the adequacy of the US nuclear force posture for national security, allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the implications for NATO.”⁴² (David Yost)

Similarly, some allies pay particularly close attention to the long-term implication of current trends in the strategic balance. The SPRC reaffirms the goal of ‘dissuasion of potential adversaries’ (China and Russia) as a driver of the size of the U.S. nuclear posture in large part due to the expressed desires of key U.S. allies.⁴³ Some SMEs call this the ‘alliance premium’ or the ‘X-times margin.’ While there was not a workshop consensus on the lexicon – or on the sustainability of the ‘dissuasion’ goal in sizing the arsenal (see, for example, ‘leading the witness’) – there was broad agreement that it will be difficult to convince allies that their long-term security does not depend on the U.S. retaining a ‘sufficient margin’ in capabilities to discourage military competition from potential aggressors. Schoff explains:

China will be increasingly important, because despite the big gap, we are moving in opposite directions, and it is the relative change in the nuclear balance that is impacting Japanese policy makers and the deterrence debate in Tokyo... We cannot approach parity with China, regardless of what Russia does, due to what I would call the ‘alliance premium’... [T]o some extent Beijing understands the need for an alliance premium in order to keep Japan non-nuclear.

For Europe, the SPRC concludes that “to assure its allies, the United States should not abandon strategic equivalency with Russia.” Miller echoes this judgment in his briefing:

The US must maintain strategic parity with Russia [and] US and Russian strategic force levels must not fall to a level where the size of the Russian [NSNF] stockpile is believed by NATO allies as affecting the US commitment.

⁴¹ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 34.

⁴² Yost, “Assurance,” 769.

⁴³ “The United States should so compose its nuclear force as to discourage Russia and China from trying to compete with the United States for some new advantage in the nuclear realm. The United States should retain enough capacity, whether in its existing delivery systems and supply of reserve warheads or in its infrastructure, to impress upon Russian leaders the impossibility of gaining a position of nuclear supremacy over the United States by breaking out of an arms control agreement. The United States (and Russia) should also retain a large enough force of nuclear weapons that China is not tempted to try to reach a posture of strategic equivalency with the United States or of strategic supremacy in the Asian theater.” Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 51.

How Important are Specific Nuclear Capabilities or Attributes to Assurance?

As previously illustrated, assurance can be sensitive to certain force structure attributes even if they do not have a significant effect on the perceptions and behavior of their adversaries. Reacting to the suggestion that forward-deployed NSNF in Europe no longer serve a deterrence function, the December 2008 Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management makes this point forcefully:

This attitude fails to comprehend—and therefore undermines—the political value our friends and allies place on these weapons...and the psychological impact of their visible presence...DCA fighters and nuclear weapons are visible, capable, recallable, reusable, and flexible and are a military statement of NATO and US political will. These NATO forces provide a number of advantages to the alliance that go far beyond USEUCOM's narrow perception of their military utility.”⁴⁴

Attributes with potentially higher salience to assurance include: visibility, deployability/availability, second-to-none, strategic equivalence, and long-term dependability. However, as Bunn explains, “the aspects of our ‘nuclear posture’ which reassure one ally may disturb (or even frighten...) another – whether that is nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, or U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons.” Even within the same region, allies’ expressed assurance requirements can vary dramatically (see Chapter 5 on NSNF in Europe).

While a specific nuclear weapons system may not *logically* be necessary for assurance, Linton Brooks and Elaine Bunn point to a number of historical and current cases of allies caring “greatly about the precise composition and disposition of U.S. nuclear forces.”⁴⁵ In the late 1970s, the land-based option for deploying nuclear-tipped cruise missiles in Europe (later named Ground-Launched Cruise Missile or GLCM) was chosen over the sea-based option (later named the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear or TLAM/N) because it more strongly ‘coupled’ U.S. strategic forces to the defense of Europe. Currently, “NATO allies (especially those who perceive themselves most threatened) value retention of [NSNF] in Europe [and] Japan appears to ascribe great importance to TLAM/N, even though it is not deployed.”⁴⁶

Specific nuclear capabilities can often serve as important political and psychological symbols of extended deterrence/assurance, but these perceptions are not immutable and can be shaped through intensive consultations and engagement. The importance of a specific capability to assurance is a function of the overall health of the relationship. As discussed, extensive and sustained consultations would be required for the U.S. to de-link allied perceptions of the credibility of U.S. assurances to a specific weapon system.

Elaine Bunn explains this phenomenon with a lucid analogy:

Nuclear weapons are kind of like the wedding ring of the marriage – there are those in cultures that don’t wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who don’t really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one.

⁴⁴ James R. Schlesinger, et. al., *Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of DoD Nuclear Mission* (special report prepared at the request of the Department of Defense, December 2008), 14-5, 59-60.

⁴⁵ Bunn, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 8.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 9.

How important is visibility and/or availability to assurance? Since the end of the Cold War, the forward-deployed U.S. nuclear force in Europe has been reduced by over 80 percent and the non-strategic⁴⁷ nuclear weapons deployed in the ROK have been removed completely.⁴⁸ The only remaining U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on allied territory are a few hundred B61s in a handful of NATO countries deliverable by dual-capable U.S. or allied aircraft. But despite the declining ability to deploy nuclear weapons to their theater, allies in both Europe and Northeast Asia still value residual capabilities or symbols of a forward U.S. presence.

If visibility is important to assurance, there may be ways other than forward deployment of nuclear weapons, to sufficiently demonstrate the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence in ways that assure its allies. Specific nuclear capabilities can serve as important political and psychological symbols of America's commitment, particularly if the capability has been a regular feature of the relationship (e.g., the 'wedding ring' of the marriage). But because political and psychological symbolism is not an inherently nuclear role, those assurance-strengthening attributes can theoretically be provided in *other ways*.

According to Elaine Bunn, other capabilities which can be made visible include:

The deployment of nuclear-capable B-2s to Guam or Diego Garcia...[and historically] even nuclear submarines can be made visible in order to send a deterrence and reassurance signal: when the US withdrew its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey in the 1960s as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, a Polaris strategic submarine, then deployed in the Mediterranean, made a port call to Izmir to demonstrate the continuing US nuclear presence in the region.

Bunn adds that options for other ways to demonstrate the U.S. commitment "range from additional affirmation of the U.S. nuclear guarantee; to the discussion of nuclear scenarios; to the institutionalization of exchanges on nuclear deterrence matters."

In addition to specific systems, certain 'inherent' force posture characteristics - such as 'second to none' - can impose assurance requirements on the U.S. nuclear posture that far exceed those needed for deterrence. For example, the United States has long accepted mutual vulnerability between itself and Russia as a fact of life. Even though a secure second strike capability might be acceptable for deterrence, the United States maintains a 'second to none' force structure posture with respect to Russia because not doing so would undermine allied perceptions (and thus assurance) about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Similarly, the United States maintains forces significantly larger than those of China because not doing so would undermine its assurances to its non-nuclear allies in Northeast Asia, even though the U.S. might need only some form 'essential equivalence' with the Chinese in order to sustain a credible deterrent.

⁴⁷ While the CSIS team recognizes that any use of a nuclear weapon would be a strategic event, the term 'non-strategic' is preferred to 'tactical' because the latter implies that they can be employed militarily without causing escalation and are more likely to be used. As Elaine Bunn noted in her workshop brief: "the term 'tactical' or 'non-strategic' nuclear weapons is oxymoronic: all nuclear weapons would be strategic in their effect; 'tactical' or 'non-strategic' nuclear weapons are really just differently-deployed. Nevertheless, the term 'non-strategic nuclear weapons' (NSNW) is still being used to cover nuclear weapons systems (e.g., the U.S. B-61s in Europe and the large inventory of 'Russian tacticals') not being covered by START, SORT or the to-be-negotiated START follow-on treaty."

⁴⁸ Yost, "Assurance," 756.

Elaine Bunn believes that “with proper consultation – it’s not the specific characteristics, composition or size of the US nuclear arsenal that are likely to impact allies’ views of credibility.” But workshop participants and SMEs added two important caveats: (1) forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in Europe for as long as NATO allies want them; (2) Japan *could* be reassured without TLAM/N, but only after sufficient consultations. **With intensive engagement, it is possible to narrow the gap between what the United States and its allies believe is necessary and sufficient for extended deterrence, but while it may be desirable to ‘de-link’ assurance from specific types or numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, doing so must not be at the expense of the broader need to provide nuclear capabilities sufficient to sustain credible assurance about the U.S. extended deterrence commitments.**

V. EUROPE

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁴⁹

Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949)

‘How We Did It in the Cold War’

Linton Brooks characterizes extended deterrence and assurance in NATO as the most robust case of such deterrence: “If extended deterrence is going to work anywhere, it ought to work in NATO.” U.S. extended deterrence commitments to European allies are accepted by the potential aggressor (Russia), the protected states, and the American public. These commitments are buttressed by legal obligations (NATO Article V), deployed U.S. troops, a long-standing consultative mechanism, consistent U.S. statements on the importance of Europe, and the presence of forward-deployed U.S. NSNF.

In Figure 3, Frank Miller contrasts ‘how we did it in Europe during the Cold War’ with assurance and extended deterrence in NATO today:

Figure 3 ‘How We Did It in the Cold War’ vs. Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe Today

Cold War	Today
Forward deployment of an ‘escalatory ladder’ of non-strategic nuclear systems of all ranges to complement conventional forces and meet the military and doctrinal requirements of MC 14/2 and 14/3	Residual deployment of [B61 gravity bombs] deliverable by Allied and US dual capable aircraft (DCA)
Exercises	Rare military exercises (Inter-Regional Deployment)
Allied involvement in nuclear programs of cooperation	Allied involvement in nuclear programs of cooperation
‘Risk sharing’ and ‘burden sharing’ arrangements	‘Risk sharing’ agreements.
NPG, NPG Staff Group, High Level Group (HLG)	NPG Staff Group and HLG
Extensive consultation arrangements	Annual consultation exercise at NATO headquarters
Carefully crafted NATO Declaratory Policy	

Today, extended deterrence in NATO is on a different footing. The common threat that once coupled the allies’ security interests and aligned their defense priorities has been replaced by a spectrum of less threatening, but more complex, security challenges and increasingly asymmetric stakes in responding to them. The alliance is still strongly influenced by a robust extended deterrence legacy from the Cold War, but serious fault lines could surface as the alliance conducts the first review of its Strategic Concept in the twenty-first century. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, NATO allies will be forced to answer important questions concerning NATO’s deterrence and assurance requirements and nuclear posture in the new Strategic Concept, to be prepared at the 2010 Lisbon Summit. The conduct and resolution of these

⁴⁹ *The North Atlantic Treaty* (Apr. 4, 1949), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>.

upcoming deliberations will be important tests not only to the durability of the NATO alliance, but also to the strength of U.S. security commitments around the globe, as “US security partners and interests elsewhere...see US decisions about NATO’s nuclear posture and policy as emblematic of the US extended deterrence commitments to their own security.”⁵⁰

Assuring Whom Against What?

Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty extends U.S. nuclear assurances to its 27 NATO allies, 25 of which lack independent nuclear capabilities. Since 1999, 12 countries in Central and Eastern Europe have joined NATO, including 10 former members of the Warsaw Pact. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO extended a conditional invitation to Macedonia “as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name [dispute with Greece] has been resolved.” The members also agreed that “Ukraine and Georgia...will become members of NATO” and welcomed progress by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia toward eventual NATO integration.⁵¹ NATO member states are identified in Figure 4.

Figure 4 United States NATO Allies

United States NATO Allies		
Original (1949-1982)	New (1999-2009)	Prospective
Belgium*(1949) Canada (1949) Denmark (1949) France** (1949) Iceland (1949) Italy* (1949) Luxembourg (1949) Netherlands* (1949) Norway (1949) Portugal (1949) U.K. ** (1949) Turkey* (1952) Greece (1952) Germany* (1955) Spain (1982)	Czech Rep (1999) Hungary (1999) Poland (1999) Bulgaria (2004) Estonia (2004) Latvia (2004) Lithuania (2004) Romania (2004) Slovakia (2004) Slovenia (2004) Albania (2009) Croatia (1999)	Macedonia Georgia Ukraine Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia
* Presumed host country for U.S. B61 Gravity Bombs and dual-capable aircraft ⁵²		
** Possesses an independent nuclear deterrent		

U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and assurance is provided to its NATO allies in two forms: (1) NATO’s nuclear posture, consisting of the residual forward deployment of U.S. B61 gravity bombs to support allied and U.S. dual-capable aircraft (DCA);⁵³ (2) U.S. ‘over-the-horizon’ strategic nuclear forces.

⁵⁰ Yost, “Assurance,” 778-89.

⁵¹ “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” (Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest, April 3, 2008), <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html#ukrgeo>.

⁵² Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” *National Resources Defense Council* (February 2005), <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf>.

⁵³ “[P]recise numbers for the U.S. deployments are classified but their total is only about five percent of the total at the height of the Cold War.” Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 21.

Although the alliance does not directly participate in decision-making regarding the latter, the 1999 Strategic Concept identified U.S. strategic forces as providing the “supreme guarantee of the security” of NATO allies.⁵⁴ British and French nuclear forces ‘contribute to’ extended deterrence but are not considered sufficient). In fact, since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s NSNF have not been “aimed at any concrete threat.”⁵⁵ Instead, they provide an essential ‘coupling link’ to U.S. strategic forces. According to the Strategic Concept:

NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces.⁵⁶

This suggests that U.S. strategic forces provide *deterrence* and *extended deterrence* (by affecting potential adversary calculations) while the forward-deployed U.S. NSNF provide a ‘coupling’ link between U.S. strategic forces and the security of its European allies, thereby contributing significantly to *assurance*. This impression is reinforced by the Strategic Concept’s requirements for a “credible Alliance nuclear posture,” which are not stated in military terms, but as the continued “widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements.”⁵⁷ Clearly, this is the language of assurance, not extended deterrence.

Diverging Threat Perceptions

Workshop SMEs identified Russia and Iran as the two potential ‘objects’ of U.S. extended deterrence to NATO. However, Elaine Bunn notes that, “extended deterrence is very different in different regions – and even in the same region – Germany is not Lithuania is not Turkey.” Perceptions of the natures of the Russian and Iranian threats vary greatly, as do member states’ beliefs about the role of nuclear weapons in responding to them. Frank Miller summarizes the diverging threat perceptions:

The Russian threat is discounted by most (non-MoD) elites and publics in ‘Old NATO’...but is felt keenly in ‘New NATO’ states...[The threat from Iran, on the other hand,] is discounted by most NATO nations (including the new members) but felt keenly in Turkey.

Options for strengthening extended deterrence and assurance in Europe must take into account the values, history, and perceived vulnerabilities of each NATO ally (or prospective ally). In this regard, the new NATO member states in Eastern and Central Europe and Turkey merit special consideration.

Russia: Balancing Extended Deterrence with Engagement. For historical and geopolitical reasons, a number of the new NATO member states (particularly Poland, Czech Republic, and the Baltic states) are especially concerned by Russia’s saber rattling and apparent increased reliance on nuclear weapons in its security policy. Elaine Bunn quotes an official from a Baltic country at a recent NATO conference: “I was in high school when I watched the Russians leave my country – I don’t want them ever to come back.”

⁵⁴ North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept* (art. 62-64, April 24, 1999), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm.

⁵⁵ Yost, “Assurance,” 756.

⁵⁶ North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept*.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

Of particular concern is the large Russian margin in deployed NSNF. According to the SPRC, “Russia...stores thousands of these weapons in apparent support of possible military operations west of the Urals. The United States deploys a small fraction of that number...[T]he current imbalance is stark and worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe.”⁵⁸

Higher concern about the ‘Russian threat’ in new NATO states has resulted in more pronounced interest in the importance of the nuclear component of Article V and heightened sensitivities to changes in NATO’s nuclear posture. Pursuant to the communiqué issued at the first round of NATO enlargement, new NATO members cannot host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory.⁵⁹ Bunn notes: “Ironically...it’s generally those who cannot have nuclear weapons on their territory who don’t want nuclear weapons removed from Europe, while basing countries would be generally more relaxed or even supportive of their removal.”

Eastern and Central European perceptions contrast sharply with those of the United States and Western Europe, whose overriding objective vis-à-vis Russia is to reset relations and broaden economic and security cooperation.⁶⁰ Lukasz Kulesa, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, acknowledges the demands of this balancing act: “you cannot at the same time ask for cooperation and – and slap a partner in the face.”⁶¹

The recent decision by the Obama administration to discard its predecessor’s plan for ten ground-based interceptors in Poland and European Mid-Course Radar (EMR) in the Czech Republic brought this tension to the surface. Although U.S. officials maintain that the proposed installments were never intended for, or capable of, intercepting Russian missiles, the Russian government “successfully transformed public perceptions of missile defense from strategy for countering rogue states into a bone of contention between Russia and the West.”⁶² Initial reaction to the Obama administration’s decision characterized the decision as one that elevated U.S. efforts to ‘reset’ U.S.-Russian relations at the expense of its security assurances to Eastern Europe. The Administration’s decision, however, to accelerate the deployment of defenses against shorter- and mid-range Iranian missiles and to move to actively engage Poland and the Czech Republic seem to have mitigated the damage to U.S. assurances. Vice President Joe Biden could not have been less equivocal when he told the Polish prime minister on 21 October 2009: “This strategic assurance is absolute, absolute, Mr. Prime Minister...[It is] a solemn obligation. Make no mistake about it: Our commitment [which he later described as “inviolable”] is unwavering.”⁶³ **Despite the lack of a Cold War-era ‘Soviet threat,’ the U.S. must still balance its assurance requirements to Europe,**

⁵⁸ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 21.

⁵⁹ “Enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current nuclear posture, and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.” *Final Communiqué* (Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (96)165, Brussels: December 10, 1996), <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm>.

⁶⁰ Lewis A. Dunn, *Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture – Insights, Issues, and Implications* (SAIC: Dec. 12, 2006).

⁶¹ Kulesa, “Requirements For Extended Deterrence.”

⁶² Christopher S. Chivvies, “The Right Move in Europe: Improved Opportunities with NATO, Russia,” *The Washington Times* (September 22, 2009).

⁶³ Peter Baker, “Mending Fences, Biden Assures Poland that U.S. is Watching Over It,” *The New York Times* (October 22, 2009), A14.

particularly as it relates to new NATO members, with its broader effort to engage Russia in a new, more cooperative relationship.

The Potential Emergence of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Many NATO members are concerned about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran for regional stability. Based on polling data, Bruno Tetrais reports that “Iran is unanimously perceived to be the most threatening country by the public opinion of NATO countries.”⁶⁴ But the geopolitical and sectarian concerns Iran poses to Turkey are unique. Expanding upon the list provided by Linton Brooks, workshop participants identified a number of converging factors contributing to Ankara’s sense of vulnerability:

- Continued rejection by the European Union, leading to sense of isolation
- Concern with Iran (Shia/Sunni issue; theocracy versus secular state); prospect of a fundamental shift in the balance of power
- Fear of additional regional proliferation resulting from an overt Israeli nuclear posture in response to a nuclear-armed Iran
- Proximity to potentially unstable areas seen by Russia as within their sphere of influence
- Shaken confidence in U.S. competence after the Iraq war
- Unwillingness of NATO allies to defend Turkey against Kurdish attacks
- Lack of clarity regarding the role of Article V in potential conflict with Greece (a fellow NATO ally) over disputed islands

Because of the unique security challenges it faces, Turkey is particularly concerned with any withdrawal of NSNF, especially while the Iran issue is unresolved. According to a report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Turkey’s perception of the reliability of the NATO and U.S. security guarantees will play a decisive role in Turkey’s response to an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons.”⁶⁵

A nuclear Iran may also precipitate a new debate within the alliance on the meaning of Article V, perhaps revealing to Ankara certain allies’ cold feet. In this sense, Iran is a key challenge facing the alliance at large, even if only territorially threatening Turkey. In Frank Miller’s judgment, “the eventual emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon will provide a critical test” of extended deterrence in NATO.

U.S. Strategic Nuclear Posture Requirements of Extended Deterrence and Assurance to Europe

The SPRC makes a number of bold statements about the importance of NATO allies, particularly NATO’s new members, in driving the overall size of the U.S. strategic forces arsenal and associated arms control decisions:

The sizing of U.S. forces remains overwhelmingly driven by Russia. This is not because we see it as an enemy; it is because some of our allies see Russia as a potential threat and also because it retains the ability to destroy the United States...Currently, no one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some U.S. allies are fearful of Russia, and look to the United States for reassurance.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Bruno Tetrais, “The Coming NATO Nuclear Debate”, *Real Instituto Elcano* (September 26, 2008), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI117-2008.

⁶⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Chain Reaction Avoiding A Nuclear Arms Race in The Middle East* (110th Cong., 2d sess., February 2008), 37.

⁶⁶ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 24.

As part of its strategy to assure its allies, the United States should not abandon strategic equivalency with Russia. Overall equivalence is important to many U.S. allies in Europe. The United States should not cede to Russia a posture of superiority in the name of deemphasizing nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy.⁶⁷

Specifically, the Commission argues that reductions in the number of operationally deployed strategic forces will shift focus to NSNF causing the U.S.-Russian imbalance to “become more apparent and allies less assured.”⁶⁸ Frank Miller agrees with this assessment and argues that “U.S. and Russian strategic force levels must not fall to a level where the size of the Russian [NSNF] stockpile is believed by NATO allies as affecting the US commitment.” Another workshop participant concluded that European allies should be given “veto power over President Obama’s vision of denuclearization — the benefits of zero don’t outweigh the negative consequences of ignoring their opposition.”

These concerns should not, however, be read as intractable obstacles to further progress in U.S. and Russian strategic arms reductions. As Yost points out, many NATO allies genuinely hope to see the alliance take a leading role in arms control and disarmament.⁶⁹ Moreover, Kulesa rejects the characterization of new NATO countries as “Cold War warrior[s] willing to settle old scores with Moscow.”

[D]espite the fact that we might not like certain aspects of the internal or foreign policies of Russia, the nuclear issues are approached with a very sober sense of realism...Russia is not that kind of...actor that in the present circumstances needs to be deterred. Of course, there are certain statements, certain actions that raise some concern. But...the alliance cannot overreact and on the contrary we should find ways to cooperate with Russia, to engage Russia in this quest of – of making the extended deterrence less salient.⁷⁰

Options for strengthening assurance of NATO as the United States reduces its arsenal of strategic forces include:

- *Extensive consultations with all European allies and within the NATO consultation mechanism.* Changes in the U.S. force posture should only be made once all allies are sufficiently assured that such changes “do not imply a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.”⁷¹
- *Negotiate reductions in Russian NSNF.* The SPRC recommends working to sustain the existing Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty against Russian pressures to redeploy banned nuclear systems while seeking substantial reductions in Russian NSNF not covered by the treaty.⁷² Participants agreed that Russia might be willing to reduce its levels of deployed NSNF in exchange for reductions in U.S. non-deployed strategic weapons, but were skeptical that Russia would ever give them up (“there won’t be a zero option”).

⁶⁷ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 21.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “The references to the objective of ‘raising NATO’s profile’ in both the April 2008 and April 2009 summit declarations demonstrate that it has gained acceptance throughout the alliance, despite the initial reservations of some allies,” Yost, “Assurance,” 777.

⁷⁰ Kulesa, “Requirements For Extended Deterrence.”

⁷¹ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 68.

⁷² Ibid.

NATO's NSNF Nuclear Force Posture & Assurance to Europe

As stated earlier, the 1999 Strategic Concept commits to maintaining NATO forces “at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence,” which are defined in the nuclear realm as “widespread participation in...collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements.”⁷³ Because there is no actual military contingency identified to govern the allies ‘widespread participation,’ translating those requirements into a concrete force posture is not straightforward. As Yost explains, “the minimum level may derive more from judgments about an appropriate level of risk- and responsibility-sharing among allies, and about what is necessary to demonstrate continuing US engagement and commitment.”⁷⁴

In Elaine Bunn’s previously-stated metaphor, DCA in Europe – and the associated role of U.S. human and physical infrastructure – are the ‘wedding ring’ of the U.S. commitment to NATO. According to another participant, “[NSNF] are not at all necessary...the Red Army is not going to storm across the border without them...but their political and strategic role within the NATO alliance is important.”

There was broad agreement among participants that U.S. forward-deployed systems play an important role in underwriting alliance cohesion. Frank Miller warns of the likely consequences of withdrawing these weapons:

- Reliance on conventional forces alone suggests a ‘war-fighting’ strategy anathema to Europeans;
- ‘New NATO’ will sense abandonment, particularly in light of a large stockpile of Russian NSNF
- French nuclear doctrine and policy do not allow France to provide adequate deterrence and assurance;
- Once withdrawn, weapons cannot be returned in a crisis despite assertions in a recent British Foreign Office white paper
- If the weapons are removed the consultation arrangements will wither;
- Both the US and NATO governments will eventually question the US guarantee.

Forward deployed U.S. NSNF should remain in Europe as long as allies want them and any removal decisions should be done only in close consultation with allies. SMEs agree that maintaining the status quo NATO nuclear posture requires:

- *Modernization of the B61 warhead.* The plan proposed by Secretary Gates will help signal intent to remain engaged, particularly to Turkey and Eastern Europe. However, B61 modernization is not exclusive with discussing long-term prospects for removal.
- *Equipping the Joint Strike Fighter/F-35 and Eurofighter with dual capability.* Although the United States has committed to its NATO allies that it will replace the current DCA with the F-35, the necessary funds have not been appropriated to provide the F-35 with a nuclear option.
- *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) exercising appropriate military skills.*

With regard to the allies’ DCA fleets, NATO members with basing responsibilities have failed to “fund or implement critical decisions relating to nuclear training, certification, and platform modernization.”⁷⁵

⁷³ North Atlantic Council, *Strategic Concept*.

⁷⁴ Yost, “Assurance,” 759.

⁷⁵ Jacquelyn Davis, et.al., *Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning: An IFPA White Paper* (2009), 8.

According to Miller, the allies will “seek to avoid this decision as long as possible,” but in 10-15 years will be forced to face these modernization decisions. These debates will be contentious – on both sides of the Atlantic – and will test the durability of the alliance nuclear posture. In the basing countries, resource limitations and domestic political resistance will constrain modernization options; in the United States, reluctance on the part of the allies will fuel growing resentment. American officials, as well as the American people, will come to believe that NATO ‘wants our protection without assuming risk themselves’ (something that has been suggested by some SHAPE officials). Miller concludes that weathering the inevitable European debate on modernization will require “close consultations (not notifications) and effective use of [and restoration of] bilateral and NATO mechanisms [e.g., HLG and NPG] will be essential.”

Arms Control and the Future of Forward-Deployed U.S. Non-strategic Nuclear Forces

Although currently there are no strong pressures in either Europe or the United States to remove U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons, Linton Brooks believes that “long term administration arms control plans could lead to pressure to remove these weapons in a few years” because “the treaty most assume the Administration will seek once the START replacement has been agreed to...will probably seek to capture Russian NSNF, inevitably putting U.S. weapons in Europe in play.” The pressure is reinforced by the fact, as previously discussed, that these weapons are not viewed as militarily useful, but as political elements of U.S. assurances to Europe. **To prepare for the long-term possibility that future arms control agreements put NSNF into play, the United States should begin – now – to discuss the long-term possibility of removal with NATO allies (particularly the concerned members), focusing on how to maintain extended deterrence if NSNF are withdrawn.**

“With proper consultation,” Elaine Bunn believes U.S. officials may be able to “shape how Europe thinks about DCA.” While he stressed that the United States should “not delay B61 modernization,” Brooks identified an approach for de-linking, over the long run, extended deterrence to NATO from the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons:

- *Starting now, stress that extended deterrence does not depend on the presence of NSNF in Europe.* Use existing NATO consultative mechanisms and public and private forums to underscore the role of strategic nuclear forces as the supreme guarantee of NATO security and reaffirm non-nuclear aspects of NATO deterrence, including a missile defense architecture covering all allied territory.
- *Consult with concerned European allies (individually and through NATO) on what steps would reassure them of the continued nuclear umbrella if NSNF were withdrawn.* Characterizing the belief that new NATO would strongly object to NSNF removal as an “oversimplification,” Lukasz Kulesa explains Poland’s underlying assurance requirements as the lens through which to assess the assurance value of potential alternative measures:

From the perspective of Central Europe’s, the greatest danger of any move to change the parameter of the extended deterrence...would be to create the impression that NATO has somehow gone soft where its primary function of defending the territories of the member states is concerned. Therefore...[removing NSNF]...would probably need to be somehow balanced by a set of decisions giving credible reassurances on the value of Article V...first and foremost the affirmation of the function of the strategic nuclear forces as the supreme guarantee of the security of the allies. Additionally, practical measures can be agreed and

should be agreed upon to strengthen the conventional defense potential and cohesion of the allies. This action could include the resumption of contingency planning for Article V scenarios...[and] more frequent exercises of NATO forces scripted to rehearse the in-area defense scenarios...Thirdly...putting the physical infrastructure [and]...the presence of the alliance in [the new] member states...I mean visits, I mean statements, also maybe putting various NATO agencies [and]...some of the allies would most probably expect the United States to increase its presence on their territory.⁷⁶

Despite advocating consultations, workshop participants believe that weapons should not be withdrawn from Europe without allied agreements. The long-term benefits of arms control with Russia should be balanced against the importance of continuing to provide assurance to NATO. Moreover, some participants believe that, because of the unique concerns of Turkey, withdrawal should not be contemplated while the Iranian nuclear situation remains unresolved.

Tripwires: U.S. Military Installations and the Supporting Human and Physical Infrastructure

Linton Brooks argues that the “presence of U.S. troops or facilities in the protected country” is an important factor strengthening the credibility of extended deterrence because “the host country cannot be attacked without attacking the United States.” Clark Murdock characterized the value of these deployments as “blurring the distinction between ‘central’ deterrence and ‘extended’ deterrence.” **In Eastern and Central Europe, in particular, the ‘tripwire’ function served by supporting infrastructure appears to eclipse the intended military value served by forward-based U.S. capabilities.**

In his remarks at the Atlantic Council in November 2008, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski expressed support for continuing the Bush administration’s proposed missile defense plan because the presence of U.S. bases “adds sinew” to the defense commitment, noting that “everyone agrees...that countries that have U.S. soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.”⁷⁷ Anticipating potential changes to the proposed installments, Yost concludes:

One of the main reasons given by Czech and Polish supporters of the deployment of US missile defence system elements has been to gain the presence of US troops on their soil. Whatever happens with the missile defence plans under the new US administration, these countries remain interested in hosting US or NATO facilities.⁷⁸

Accordingly, when the Obama administration changed the focus of European missile defense from defending against Iranian long-range missiles to the near-term threat of Iranian short- and mid-range missiles, the immediate deployment of a distributed network of sea-based SM-3 interceptors and radars was supplemented by plans to deploy the next-generation SM-3 missile on land and offered Poland (as well as the Czech Republic with respect to radar installations) the option of accepting these deployments, thus ensuring continued assurance through U.S. “tripwire” deployments. As Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher told the House Armed Service Committee, the U.S. plan to deploy a land-based Standard

⁷⁶ Lukasz Kulesa, “Are the Requirements For Extended Deterrence Changing?” (Panel Discussion took place at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009).

⁷⁷ Walter Pincus, “Poland won’t lobby Obama on missile defense”, *Washington Post* (November 20, 2008), cited in Yost, “Assurance,” 768.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 778-9.

Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor site and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptors in Poland would involve forward deployed U.S. troops, “which is what the Polish government really wants.”⁷⁹

On the other hand, overcompensating could “play into Russian attempts to portray reassurance as a sign of NATO hostility” and antagonize divisions between the Western and Eastern NATO allies.⁸⁰

Christopher Chivvies argues that “the challenge will lie in determining the minimum NATO must do to reassure Eastern European states about NATO's commitment to their security,” a balance that will be easier to strike if relations between the newer NATO members and Russia improve.⁸¹

Ultimately, the strength of the NATO mutual defense pledge is up to the alliance. While U.S. nuclear force posture decisions can buttress (or weaken) extended deterrence and assurance, the Alliance foundation that underwrites the security commitment ultimately depends on much broader security and political transatlantic commitments. Kulesa notes that if the function of forward-deployed weapons primarily serves “this insurance role within the alliance,” then the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately does not ultimately depend on NSNF, but “rather on the convergence of interests within the alliance and on the willingness of the nuclear weapons states to defend other members.”⁸² Yost summarizes the fundamental challenge – and promise – of the alliance:

[T]he conviction among the NATO allies as to their shared interests, values and purposes — a common ‘narrative’, as it is sometimes called — is the most fundamental factor in alliance cohesion and yet the most difficult to spell out. It encompasses the political foundations of the alliance, including the shared commitment to freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. It implies that the United States is prepared to uphold the security of its NATO allies for fundamental political reasons in addition to military security considerations.⁸³

⁷⁹ Martin Matishak, “Administration Defends Changes to European Missile Shield,” *Global Security Newswire* (October 2, 2009), http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20091002_8280.php.

⁸⁰ Chivvies, “The Right Move in Europe.”

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Kulesa, “Are the Requirements For Extended Deterrence Changing?”

⁸³ Yost, “Assurance,” 777-8.

VI. NORTHEAST ASIA

United States security commitments to Northeast Asia are, according to Frank Miller, “completely different,” than those to NATO in three critical respects:

- *No consultations.* The absence of NATO-like consultative mechanisms and a general nuclear allergy (particularly in Japan) has precluded any meaningful dialogue on extended deterrence.
- *No exercises.* With the exception of limited U.S.-ROK exercises during the Cold War, Northeast Asian allies have had no involvement with U.S. nuclear forces.
- *No forces.* Since the withdrawal of U.S. forward-deployed forces from the ROK in 1991, U.S. allies in East Asia have relied completely on U.S. strategic forces, although Japan places some weight on the non-deployed TLAM/N.

Assuring Whom Against What?

The United States has recognized extended nuclear deterrence commitments to three key allies in East Asia and an ambiguous extended deterrence commitment to Taiwan. Although the nature of each relationship is unique, workshop participants largely agreed that weakening any one of three alliance relationships would negatively affect the others, while the impact of changes in the ambiguous U.S.-China-Taiwan dynamic would have uncertain effects.

Australia

“[F]or so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia... That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.”⁸⁴ (Defence White Paper, Australian Government, 2009)

Despite broad recognition that Australia is a vital ally, the nuclear component of the relationship was not explored at the workshop because Australia does not face an acute nuclear threat or crisis of confidence.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

“The United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty remains the cornerstone of the U.S.-ROK security relationship... We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. The continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance.”⁸⁵ (Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak, July 2009)

U.S. extended deterrence commitments to the ROK are intended to deter an attack from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), though the probability of such an attack is remote. From a South

⁸⁴ Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2020* (2009), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.

⁸⁵ White House Press Office, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea” (July 16, 2009).

Korean perspective, U.S. nuclear weapons protect the ROK from a nuclear attack and also “could conceivably be used to compensate for potentially large, early conventional losses or in response to other WMD use by [the DPRK].”⁸⁶

Japan

“U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed the full range of U.S. military capabilities – both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defense capabilities form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.”⁸⁷ (Secretaries Rice and Gates and Ministers Aso and Kyama, May 2007)

U.S. commitments to Japan are intended to deter aggression or intimidation by China or the DPRK.⁸⁸ The Japanese conceive of the U.S. nuclear umbrella as “there only to protect Japan against nuclear attack.” Schoff clarifies that this does not necessarily imply ‘no-first-use’ because “Japan might consider the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons as justifiable if it prevented a certain nuclear attack.”

Japan is the focus of our assessment of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in the Pacific theater. All East Asian allies are vital interests to the United States, but because the “political sensitivity to extended deterrence” is highest in Japan, “a U.S. nuclear posture sufficient for deterrence and defense of Japan will also satisfy our other allies in the region, but the reverse is not necessarily true.” Schoff explains:

It takes more effort to reassure Tokyo. [The ROK] can ramp up defense spending more easily than Japan can, if it feels the need, and it has its own strike options. Contingencies involving nuclear weapons are more likely in the Japan case, and they could conceivably involve China or [the DPRK] (or even Russia). ROK scenarios most likely involve only [the DPRK], and there is an inherent reluctance in Seoul to use nuclear weapons on Korean soil...Because of the strategic flexibility of US forces in Japan, there are wedge strategy linkages, such as the use of air assets from Kadena for Taiwan contingencies.

A Caveat for our Discussion of Japan

The workshop, briefings, and major reports upon which this study is based were held or prepared prior to the August 30, 2009 lower house elections in Japan in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) defeated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for 60 years. References to ‘Japan’ throughout the report assume continuity between the former LDP government and the new DPJ government, although the experts are divided on the extent to which the election will change the Government of Japan’s security priorities. One view is that the DPJ is only marginally less concerned with these issues and that the permanent civil service has far more authority over nuclear issues than we find in this country. Because the attitudes in the bureaucracy and the business community have not changed, these experts believe that any spike in regional tensions will bring these issues back to the fore. Others are more uncertain. Drawing upon a recent trip to Tokyo, one expert explained, “the election changed everything...And while it’s still not clear what the DPJ views on security issues are and while there are still some bureaucrats that think like the old government...we can’t assume that [Government of Japan] views are the same as they were pre-election.”

Taiwan

⁸⁶ James Schoff, “Implications of Extended Deterrence for the 2009-2010 Nuclear Posture Review” (PowerPoint, CSIS, Washington, DC, June 3, 2009), 6.

⁸⁷ Condoleezza Rice, Robert Gates, Taro Aso, Fumio Kyuma, U.S.-Japan 2+2 Joint Press Availability (May 1, 2009).

⁸⁸ Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 12.

“It is the policy of the United States...to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”⁸⁹ (Taiwan Relations Act, 1979)

United States commitments to Taiwan are intended to deter attempts at forcible takeover by China (currently unlikely).⁹⁰ The U.S. has never explicitly affirmed a nuclear component to this guarantee, pursuing instead a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity.’ Due to public opposition (in both countries) and Taiwanese concerns over relations with China, workshop participants were skeptical that the United States would consider extending an explicit nuclear guarantee to Taiwan. In the words of Linton Brooks, “perhaps extended deterrence is not the right lens to look at our protection of Taiwan.”

Japan: Adapting Assurance to a New Context

The US must recognize the huge shift in Japanese political circles on nuclear weapons that has occurred as a result of generational change and Chinese and North Korean programs. Senior Japanese officials and politicians are uncertain whether the US has the political will and/or nuclear capability to extend deterrence. While the deterrent may be credible in aggressors’ eyes, we have a major assurance problem.

Frank Miller, Briefing to CSIS Workshop (June 2009)

After nearly 50 years of silence, Japan has opened a domestic and international debate on nuclear deterrence. For those who “know Japan” (the SMEs), this represents a dramatic turn in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In Track 2 dialogues and consultations conducted by the SPRC, Japan has expressed unusually strong and specific desires concerning the military characteristics of the U.S. arsenal. In private as well as public forums, senior Japanese officials are signaling growing concerns about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent.

Workshop SMEs point out a series of converging and interrelated factors driving a broad “decoupling fear emerging in Japan...that Washington will seek to avoid escalation out of theater at almost any cost.”⁹¹

These can be distributed into two broad categories, as they are perceived by Japan: (1) shifting regional security balance; (2) diminishing value to the United States. Alongside the evolution of Japan’s objective security context, generational change and domestic political transition are transforming the mechanisms by which these trends are perceived and interpreted by the Japanese government.

Each SME discussed Japan in some detail, but James Schoff, who had recently conducted a major study on the U.S.-Japan alliance and the future of extended deterrence, was asked to focus his brief on this issue, and much of the analysis in this chapter draws on his assessment.

Shifting Regional Security Balance

Japan’s growing sense of vulnerability and perception of adverse trends in its ‘security balance’ reflect three principal developments: (1) DPRK’s advancing missile and nuclear programs; (2) China’s growing conventional and strategic military power; (3) reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. deterrence strategy. In his report, Schoff uses the ‘security balance’ construct to illustrate the cumulative implications of these developments:

⁸⁹ “Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,” Public Law 96-8, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (April 10, 1979).

⁹⁰ Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 13.

⁹¹ Schoff, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 5.

For decades, Japan has enjoyed a favorable security balance or “surplus” in the region, thanks to America’s nuclear umbrella, U.S. forward-deployed forces, and the absence of a near peer...that could possibly threaten Japan...In the twenty-first century, Japan’s security surplus is slowly shifting toward a deficit, as [the DPRK] improves its missile capabilities (potentially mating them with WMDs and/or targeting both Japanese and U.S. territory). China’s...investments in “area denial” capabilities...are narrowing the gap in conventional-weapons strength...[and] China is modernizing its strategic nuclear forces at the same time that the United States is reducing its nuclear stockpile, likely resulting in a truly viable Chinese second-strike capability (possibly even nuclear balance someday).⁹²

The North Korean Threat. While international attention has been focused on the DPRK’s nuclear program, doubts concerning their technical competence in mating non-conventional warheads to the Taepo Dong lead Schoff to be “more concerned about the No Dong and Musadan missiles, which threaten Japan and possibly Guam, respectively, and which would be hard to locate and eliminate in a conflict.”⁹³ Retaliation for a North Korean attack on Japan was considered by participants to be the most likely scenario (though still very remote) to involve the actual use of a U.S. nuclear weapon in the East Asian theatre.

According to statements from Japanese officials, the North Korean threat is: (1) Japan’s foremost security concern;⁹⁴ (2) the most plausible catalyst were Japan to seek an independent nuclear deterrent;⁹⁵ and (3) the primary source of Japan’s concerns about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments. Ambassador Satoh explains:

Exposed to a series of threatening actions by Pyongyang, particularly its test-shooting of missiles over Japan...and its nuclear testing...the Japanese have come to realize anew how indispensable American deterrence is to their security...It is indeed difficult to judge whether and how the concept of nuclear deterrence would work vis-a-vis [the DPRK], whose unpredictability makes it difficult to exclude the possibility that Pyongyang might use nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction out of desperation.⁹⁶

Increasing Vulnerability to China. China’s growing military power is less sensational and less acute than the North Korean threat, but because of China’s implications for Japan’s long-term security and for Japan’s perceptions of U.S. interests, it may be a more significant source of the ‘assurance problem’ (despite public statements to the contrary). China dominates Japan’s long-term defense planning. This is not because Japan fears an attack but because current military and economic trends point towards the eventual emergence of a regional environment within which China can “effectively [impose] its will within the region...at seemingly low thresholds.”⁹⁷ Japan is highly sensitive to the long-term implications of these trends. Schoff believes, “Japan will pay close attention to the next NPR.”

⁹² Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, x.

⁹³ The estimated 200 No Dong medium range ballistic missiles have a one-ton payload and a 1500 km range, rendering any target on Japanese soil a viable target. DPRK is developing the Musadan intermediate range missile that could reach Okinawa and Guam.

⁹⁴ Koike Yuriko, Japanese National Security Advisor, discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (February 13, 2007).

⁹⁵ In 1993, the LA Times quoted Foreign Minister Muto Kabun: “[I]f [DPRK] develops nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, first there is the nuclear umbrella of the United States upon which we can rely. But if it comes down to a crunch, possessing the will that ‘we can do it ourselves’ is important.” quoted in Sam Jameson, “Foreign minister says Japan will need nuclear arms if North Korea threatens,” *Los Angeles Times* (July 29, 1993).

⁹⁶ Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence.”

⁹⁷ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 15.

In the nuclear realm, China is undergoing a broad modernization program that boasts the “world’s most active ballistic missile program” and a new, viable class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).⁹⁸ Schoff identifies the JIN-class submarines as “the most potentially important strategic upgrade” because they could establish a credible Chinese second-strike capability. China’s strategic modernization is particularly troubling to Japan because “despite the big gap, [the United States and China] are moving in opposite direction, and it is the relative change in the nuclear balance that is impacting Japanese policy makers.”⁹⁹

Of course, as Elaine Bunn stressed repeatedly throughout the workshop, “extended deterrence is more than just nuclear.” Some experts argue that the shrinking margin in conventional superiority, particularly from China’s investments in submarine, missile, and aircraft ‘area denial’ capabilities, contributes relatively more to Japan’s ‘decoupling fear’ because it eliminates U.S. control of the ‘escalation ladder.’¹⁰⁰ As a former Japanese diplomat explained, “the conventional superiority advantage is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los Angeles to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange.”¹⁰¹

Perceptions of U.S. Conventional and Strategic Reductions. On the other side of Japan’s security balance, Linton Brooks argues that “large reduction in U.S. nuclear forces or the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in U.S. military doctrine will reduce credibility of the threat of U.S. retaliation.” In particular, the perception that Washington is “eager to placate China and Russia on these issues in pursuit of the nonproliferation objective, and any significant narrowing of the U.S. nuclear advantage vis-à-vis China in particular could create unease among defense planners in Tokyo.”¹⁰² Ambassador Satoh explains the reasoning behind Japan’s concern:

[T]he argument made by the...four eminent strategists...that ‘the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete’, was received with mixed reactions in Japan...As depending upon the US’ extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be Japan’s only strategic option to neutralize potential or conceivable nuclear and other strategic threats, the Japanese are sensitive to any sign of increased uncertainties with regard to extended deterrence...Japanese concern about the credibility of American extended deterrence could increase if the US government would unilaterally move to redefine the concept of nuclear deterrence and to reduce dependence upon nuclear weapons in providing deterrence.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ The Jin-class SSBN will be equipped with the JL-2 SLBM (7,200 km-plus range) by 2010. The new SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles with 3 warheads each and will have the potential ability to target Guam, Alaska and Hawaii. China is modernizing its ICBM force with the solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 (7,200 km-plus range) and DF-31A (11,200 km-plus range). Ibid., 11.

⁹⁹ Schoff, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 6.

¹⁰⁰ Schoff’s report details some of the force structure developments driving shifting perceptions of the U.S.-China military balance: “As a consequence of significant new capabilities and the rapid improvement in Chinese air defenses, China’s airspace has become nearly impossible to penetrate with the type of U.S. fighters — F-15s and F-16s — now deployed in Japan...In another important development, China is acquiring several battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 extended-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems that reportedly provide ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities...Chinese naval modernization is occurring at a similar pace, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) has increased its procurement of advanced, increasingly stealthy submarines, many of which are armed with state-of-the-art torpedoes and anti-ship missiles...China is developing an impressive array of space-denial, satellite, and lift capabilities intended to undermine the present U.S. technological dominance of space.” Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 12.

¹⁰¹ Interview quoted in Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 31.

¹⁰² Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 40.

¹⁰³ Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence.”

Force reductions on Korea and Japan and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have provoked further concern that the U.S. is withdrawing from the Asia. However, Schoff argues, “the fact is that through new investments [e.g., SSGNs, UAVs] and rotational deployments [F-22s, B-2s, etc.], our conventional military capability has improved in recent years.” And while the modest buildups have generated attention in the capitals of Japan’s potential aggressors, they are “not very visible...and Japan does not understand well the scope and implications.”

Diminishing Perceived Value to the United States

“During the Cold War, Japan clearly understood that it was the anchor in America’s East Asian security strategy to counter Communism and regional Soviet influence.”¹⁰⁴ While the U.S.-Japan alliance is still rooted in strong mutual interests, the Japanese perception of its reduced value to the United States appears to be reducing the credibility of U.S. assurances to Japan. As Linton Brooks explains, “the end of Cold War lessened Japan’s perceived value to the United States” and he identifies three areas U.S. and Japanese interests appear to be diverging: (1) closer U.S.-China relations; (2) diverging security priorities; and (3) the U.S. focus on assurance as a nonproliferation tool.

Closer U.S.-China Relations. Apart from China’s military programs, closer U.S.-China ties raise serious questions about the U.S. tolerance for escalation. As Linton Brooks explains, “a closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japan’s security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment.” Japan is closely watching the Obama administration’s newly minted ‘strategic reassurance’ policy toward China, “which entails the U.S. government taking steps to convince China that it is not out to contain the emerging Asian power.”¹⁰⁵ Assuming this policy remains, it shifts the burden toward improving the Japan-China relationship because “the quality of the US-China relationship [is] limited by the quality of Japan-China relations.”¹⁰⁶

Diverging Security Priorities. Washington’s focus on asymmetric threats and democracy promotion is driving an expanding wedge between U.S. and Japanese security priorities. Schoff characterizes the situation as one in which “each country is providing minimal satisfaction to the other on issues of paramount importance in order to receive what it wants in return.” While not insurmountable, he describes it as an “inherently weak foundation for the alliance going forward, and greater attention and candor will be required in the future to stabilize it.”¹⁰⁷

U.S. Focus on Nonproliferation. According to Brooks in his workshop brief, there is a growing concern in Japan that “in providing extended deterrence, the United States is less interested in Japan’s security and more concerned with preventing a Japanese decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons.” Workshop participants agree that this perception heightens Japan’s anxieties about extended deterrence as it represents perhaps the most salient example of diverging security priorities forming “an inherently weak foundation for the alliance.”

¹⁰⁴ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 15.

¹⁰⁵ John Pomfret, “Obama’s Meeting With the Dalai Lama Is Delayed,” *Washington Post* (October 5, 2009).

¹⁰⁶ Schoff, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 13.

¹⁰⁷ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 19.

Requirements and Key Factors Affecting Assurance and Extended Deterrence to Japan

The aforementioned sources of Japan's anxieties suggest that strengthening U.S. assurance to Japan involves restoring Japan's perception of a regional security 'surplus' (namely, vis-à-vis the DPRK and China), and sufficiently demonstrating U.S. interests in Japan's security. In support of those objectives, workshop SMEs support a broad array of U.S. threat reduction, force structure, and communication tools that can be applied to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the Northeast Asian theater, U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence may be more credible (to China and the DPRK) than the credibility of its assurances to Japan. Frank Miller believes that the U.S. deterrent in the Asia-Pacific region is already "credible in the aggressors' eyes," but Japan underestimates its regional security balance because "neither our policies [nor] our capabilities are understood" in Japan. Citing increased troop deployments, upgrades in advanced air and sea assets, and forward-deployed cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) in the region, Schoff argues that "external balancing vis-à-vis [the DPRK] and China has actually been achieved to some degree," but "those in Japan who worry about America's security commitments do not realize it [because]...the assurance effect [of the capabilities] is less concrete and immediate."¹⁰⁸

A number of Japanese officials ascribe importance to the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N) as a symbol of the American commitment, although it has not been deployed for almost two decades, nor could it be without significant maintenance. While some in Japan see TLAM/N as a tool for the redeployment of extended deterrence, none of the workshop SMEs or participants identified it as a necessary capability to deter Japan's potential aggressors (e.g., China or the DPRK). While it may be desirable to narrow the gap between what Japanese and U.S. officials believe is necessary for deterrence, such efforts will require extensive consultations and the United States should not assume their ultimate success.

Importantly, the following set of military and political factors that affect assurance to Japan *assume Japan's threat perceptions remain roughly constant*. Improvements in Japan's threat perceptions, namely vis-à-vis China and the DPRK, could reduce the pressure on Japan's perceived extended deterrence requirements.

Are Specific Nuclear Capabilities Required to Assure Japan?

It will take time to convince Japan that extended deterrence does not depend on specific systems or specific numbers.

Elaine Bunn (2009)

"For a long time," Schoff explains, "the challenge for U.S. extended deterrence lay in its credibility, not its capability. This is beginning to change, and nowhere more so than in Japan." Linton Brooks identified the Japanese desired attributes for U.S. deterrent forces: flexible (hold variety of targets at risk); credible (including modernized warheads); prompt; discriminate (minimum collateral damage); able to be stealthy or visible; and sufficient for dissuasion. Meeting these 'assurance requirements' (as defined by the

¹⁰⁸ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, xii.

Japanese) could exceed significantly what is needed for deterrence/extended deterrence, because, in the collective judgment of workshop participants (including the SMEs), potential adversaries in region already believe that U.S. extended deterrence is credible.

While Japan seems to attach importance to TLAM/N, the United States, with intensive consultations, should be able to explain to Japan that TLAM/N is not critical to the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence vis-à-vis Japan's potential aggressors. According to Bunn, the Japanese interest in TLAM/N may be due to another case of 'leading the witness' during the 1994 NPR. In light of the decision to remove nuclear weapons from surface ships, "some US officials noted that the US retained the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on [attack submarines, which] may be source of some Japanese officials thinking TLAM-N is 'their' extended deterrent."

But by the same logic, "we may be able to shape how Japan thinks about TLAM/N" in today's environment. Elaine Bunn argues that "with proper consultations" Japan can be assured "through other means" without TLAM/N. However, because of the attention and sustained effort that this would call for, "there have not been sufficient consultations to make this change in the near-term." Several workshop SMEs and participants echoed this judgment:

"Non-strategic nuclear weapons [are not] necessary, and I believe that Japan can be 'coached' (persuaded, taught) to understand this... Some degree of nuclear availability will be important to Japan. For now, the TLAM/N fills that role, but some other kind of system could play that role in the future." (James Schoff)

"[The United States should] formally consult before any NPR decision to eliminate TLAM/N by explaining how that action does not weaken extended deterrence." (Linton Brooks)

"They're not uniformly in love with TLAM/N. But they see value in something that can deploy to provide capability close to them." (Workshop Participant #1)

"TLAM/N might satisfy [Japan's desired] criteria, but that is not the only thing that might do it." (Workshop Participant #2)

Because Japan values the retention of TLAM/N as a "tool for redeployment of extended deterrence," successfully reassuring Japan without TLAM/N would require that the United States satisfy that criteria with other "visible nuclear forces or forces deployable to the region [or] other ways to help demonstrate the credibility U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for the future security of Japan."¹⁰⁹ The SMEs made a variety of suggestions that could enhance visibility and/or availability of nuclear weapons if TLAM/N were to retire:

- *Deployment of B-2/B-52 to Guam/Diego Garcia.* "If a visible presence is important to the reassurance of allies, there may be other capabilities which can be made visible. The deployment of nuclear-capable B-2s to Guam or Diego Garcia have been covered in the news media at various times (probably not by accident)." (Elaine Bunn)
- *SSBN port-of-calls.* "[N]uclear submarines can be made visible in order to send a deterrence and reassurance signal: when the US withdrew its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey in the 1960s as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, a Polaris strategic submarine...made a port call to Izmir to demonstrate the continuing US nuclear presence in the region." (Elaine Bunn)

¹⁰⁹ Bunn, "Implications of Extended Deterrence," 4.

- *Exercises/Training/Joint Defense Activities*. “Bring them into the act of extending deterrence...Seek ways for increased collaboration...Develop an exercise program which demonstrates US nuclear deterrence interest in Northeast Asia.” (Frank Miller)
- *War Games & Joint Planning*. “[O]ther ways to help demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for the future security of Japan...include... the type of discussion of nuclear scenarios that Japanese defense officials have suggested.” (Elaine Bunn)

There were divergent views among workshop participants (including the SMEs) on how specific changes in the Sino-American nuclear balance affected the credibility of U.S. assurances to Japan. Frank Miller argues that “US strategic forces must not fall to a level where the Japanese come to believe that the PRC’s [theater nuclear forces – like Russia in Europe, China has a significant advantage in NSNF] will dominate US decision-making.” Others question the sustainability of “always maintaining some multiple of what the Chinese have.” Workshop participants also disagreed on how big the ‘multiple’ (for U.S. strategic forces vis-à-vis Chinese) should be for both credible dissuasion (to prevent a Chinese ‘sprint to parity’) and credible assurance (to the Japanese about U.S. extended deterrence):

“We cannot approach parity with China...due to what I would call the ‘alliance premium’...I don’t know exactly how large this ‘alliance premium’ needs to be...if relations are good amongst countries in the region, the premium can be rather small.” (James Schoff)

“[The Japanese believe the United States] will need X times more than China, but [are] not sure what ‘X’ is.” (Elaine Bunn)

The United States needs to engage Japan in an intensive strategic dialogue about the requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance in Northeast Asia in a long-term process of redefining their requirements, both with respect to the inherent characteristics (e.g., sizing) of the U.S. nuclear posture and with respect to specific U.S. nuclear weapons systems. As part of the approach to restoring Japan’s perception of its regional security balance, the United States needs to clearly explain why the future security and independence of Japan does not depend on the U.S. maintaining a certain margin over China. As Bunn notes, it was the 2001 NPR that triggered the Japanese interest in the ‘dissuasion’ sizing construct in the first place.

James Schoff suggests that the quantitative margin over China can be smaller “if relations are good amongst countries in the region.” Nonetheless, most participants agree that deep cuts should be avoided in the short term. The interviews he conducted with IFPA revealed “theoretical comfort with the U.S. at even 1,000 warheads...but below that psychological limit there were many more in Japan who began questioning the capability factor.” Making the Japanese comfortable about future U.S. nuclear reductions, however, seems to require much more clarity from the United States on how it defines its deterrence and extended deterrence requirements in Northeast Asia. As James Schoff explains in his SME brief:

As the quantity of US nuclear weapons decreases, it is only natural that the numbers of different types of warheads and delivery systems will be reduced as well. The Japanese will understand that, but we must be able to explain with confidence how the remaining configuration still meets our collective deterrence needs.

Consultations & Strategic Dialogue

Each of Japan’s specific fears concerning extended deterrence has been exacerbated by what Miller describes as “our continued refusal to begin a regular and meaningful consultation process with the Japanese government.” Because “neither our policies nor our capabilities are understood,” Japan is unable

to perceive the reassurance value of existing U.S. deterrence arrangements as they relate to Japan's emerging security environment. Expressing the collective views of workshop experts, Miller recommends that policymakers, "begin, promptly, a regular set of consultations...to restore assurance...the Nuclear Posture Review creates an early and essential opportunity."

In a statement that Elaine Bunn described as "significant because a former high-ranking Japanese official spoke publicly about the need for more in-depth bilateral discussions of nuclear deterrence issues," Ambassador Satoh argues "the time has come" for the allies to "create a mechanism for consultation through which Tokyo will be better informed of, and able to express its views on, the United States' nuclear strategy and planning."¹¹⁰ While there are many ongoing forums for U.S.-Japan dialogue, the important feature of the consultative mechanism proposed by the SMEs is the dedicated time and attention to deterrence issues incorporating "potential threats, common objectives, and the implications for roles, missions, and capabilities."¹¹¹

Institutionalizing the consultation mechanism could strengthen the credibility of the nuclear guarantee by providing Japan a mechanism by which they can monitor and participate in U.S. analysis, planning, and decision-making as it relates to the ally's ability to resist intimidation (see Chapter IV). Elaine Bunn identifies the "the institutionalization of exchanges on nuclear deterrence matters" as an option "besides visible [or deployable] nuclear forces...to help demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for the future security of Japan..."

Participants support Linton Brooks' recommendation that the United States should "establish a more regular, government forum for nuclear consultation [with Japan]," but disagree on what form the institution should take. Lew Dunn summarizes the concerns voiced by some that "the NATO model of extended deterrence...cannot be simply transferred from Cold War Europe to today's Asia" because the organizing principle of the NPG – the forward deployment of U.S. NSNF on European soil – is absent. "Over time," however, "[the] initial exploration of nuclear issues...could be made more formal...[and] future requirements for U.S. nuclear deployments in the region could be assessed."¹¹²

In considering the appropriate structure and forum for the U.S.-Japan deterrence dialogue, Schoff suggests using one of the latent consultative mechanisms already in place within the alliance. These include the director-general-level Security Sub-Committee (SSC) or the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC).¹¹³ Figure 5 contains a summary of the tentative agenda items provided by the participants for the strategic dialogue with Japan

¹¹⁰ Satoh, "Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence."

¹¹¹ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 61-2.

¹¹² Lewis A. Dunn, "Deterrence Today: Roles Challenges, and Responses," *Proliferation Papers* (Paris, France: Ifri, 2007).

¹¹³ The SSC "saw action in the 1980s, 1990s, the early 2000s during periods of intense bilateral consultations and negotiations." The SDC "officially assists the SCC [and] was used extensively when the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were developed in the 1970s (and revised in the 1990s), but it fell by the wayside each time after the guidelines were approved." Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, 61-2.

Figure 5 Tentative Agenda Items for the U.S.-Japan Dialogue on Deterrence Matters

- Explain the value of U.S. conventional investments and force posture changes to the future security of Japan
- Explain the value of PGS and address potential Japanese concerns
- Address NSNF concerns; explain the credibility of U.S. commitments even if TLAM/N is not deployable
- U.S.-Russia Arms Reductions
- Joint Threat Assessments (including cyber or space related threats)
- Assessments of Chinese and North Korean nuclear doctrine
- U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Planning (no need to discuss targets)
- Lower Threshold Conflict Scenarios and the ‘Middle Rungs’ of the Escalation Ladder
- Role, Method and Timing of Signaling; potential introduction scenarios
- Dealing with suspected missile or nuclear proliferation events
- Operationalizing ‘separable, but not separate;’ pros and cons of Japanese long-range strike

To reassure Japan about U.S. nuclear capabilities, Frank Miller explains that the dialogue must “address meaningfully the Japanese concern that the imbalance in regional nonstrategic nuclear forces undercuts our strategic nuclear guarantee.” The dialogue should repair the damage caused by the public debate on modernization and explain that U.S. warheads have sufficiently high margins of reliability for purposes of extended deterrence. Linton Brooks recommends that Japan be formally consulted on U.S.-Russian arms control because Japan is “worried that U.S.-Russian arms control will not take China into account.”

The dialogue needs to develop and integrate the alliance’s understanding of the escalation ladder and the role of signaling, particularly at lower levels, and “explain in depth and to a relatively wide audience the practical value of U.S. conventional investments and rotational deployments in the region.” For example, while many participants agree that Prompt Global Strike (PGS) is an effective deterrent against the DPRK, Japanese defense planners are more skeptical because “there has been little to no bilateral dialogue about how PGS might relate to the alliance.”¹¹⁴

According to Bunn, “there is a clear interest [within the Japanese defense community] in U.S.-Japan discussions of the types of conflict scenarios that could bring the American nuclear guarantee into play.” But workshop SMEs were hesitant to support the incorporation of nuclear scenarios or targeting plans into the dialogue. Elaine Bunn adds, “targeting plans are not where you start.” According to one participant, the dialogue needs to focus on broader strategic considerations because under the Atomic Energy Act “the United States cannot share Restricted Data with the Japanese.” Although Schoff does not see a “need to discuss U.S. nuclear doctrine in any detail,” he does suggest clarifying “if the nuclear umbrella is designed to deter a nuclear attack only (as the Japanese government suggests), or if it applies to other scenarios as well.”¹¹⁵ Frank Miller argues that nuclear scenarios should not be on the agenda: “the answer to ‘what-ifs’...depends on the President.” While there was not a firm consensus on the design of the agenda, there was broad agreement that the United States should engage Japan in an intensive strategic dialogue on deterrence in Northeast Asia as a critical means for strengthening assurance to Japan.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 37.

¹¹⁵ Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*, xiv.

VII. MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, various states depend on the United States as a security guarantor and question whether or how it might stand up to a nuclear-armed regional power.¹¹⁶

SPRC (May 2009)

Most participants support continued efforts to prevent Iran from ‘going nuclear,’ though there was little support for preventive U.S. or Israeli military action.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, workshop participants reject the view that continued pursuit of a diplomatic solution is inconsistent with discussing options for how the United States and its allies can cope with a nuclear-armed Iran. To the contrary, such discussions could bolster the international community’s negotiating leverage by shaping Iran’s cost-benefit calculations. Linton Brooks cites the words of the recently released Presidential Task Force on Preventing a Cascade of Instability (2009) as a “a caveat for all discussions” of extended deterrence and assurance in the Middle East:

U.S. officials should...[place] any discussion of deterring Iran within a framework of how to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear program as well as how to persuade Middle East states not to proliferate. Talk of deterrence should be used to make Iran’s nuclear program less attractive to its leaders. Through discussion of political and military countermeasures, the United States and its Middle East friends should sow doubts in Iranian minds — and those of others Iran may wish to intimidate — about whether Iran’s nuclear program will ever be militarily effective or politically useful.¹¹⁸

In line with this approach, a recent statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to “de-value” Iran’s pursuit of nuclear status by suggesting that U.S. responses would more than offset the security gains:

[W]e...have made it clear that we will take...crippling action, working to upgrade the defense of our partners in the region. We want Iran to calculate...that if the United States extends a defense umbrella over the region, if we do even more to support the military capacity of those in the Gulf, it’s unlikely that Iran will be any stronger or safer, because they won’t be able to intimidate and dominate, as they apparently believe they can, once they have a nuclear weapon.¹¹⁹

Workshop participants (and SMEs, with the exception of Linton Brooks) paid relatively less attention to the Middle East than to Northeast Asia and Europe, in part because of the pressure of time and the absence of any formal extended deterrence relationships in the region. But it also reflected considerable skepticism among the participants about the relevance and desirability of extended *nuclear* deterrence in the Middle East. Since the workshop, however, regional developments and statements by high-level officials have generated a flurry of interest in possible extended deterrence strategies vis-à-vis a nuclear

¹¹⁶ Commission on the Strategic Posture, *America’s Strategic Posture*, 10.

¹¹⁷ Military action against Iran’s nascent nuclear capabilities is not likely to work tactically because the Iranians likely have concealed much of their effort and the repercussions throughout the region would be severe. Lack of enthusiasm for this option also applied to an Israeli attack: the blowback would likely have considerable harm to U.S. interests and standing in the region. Especially since — whatever the facts — regional actors would assume the United States gave approval (and perhaps support) for the attack.

¹¹⁸ Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security and U.S. Policy, *Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress* (special report prepared at the request of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy 2009), 6.

¹¹⁹ Hillary Clinton, discussion with Suttichai Yoon and Veenarate Laohapakakul on World Beat (July 22, 2009).

Iran. As a result, the CSIS team went substantially beyond the results of the workshop in preparing the following chapter.

Emerging Security Environment & the Relevance of Extended Deterrence and Assurance

In his workshop brief, Linton Brooks identifies the threats from a nuclear Iran, roughly in order of severity:¹²⁰

1. An Iranian nuclear strike against a U.S. ally, U.S. installations abroad, or with improved delivery technology, the U.S. itself.
2. The transfer of a nuclear weapon by Iran to a non-state actor that then attacks a U.S. ally, U.S. installations abroad, or the U.S. homeland.
3. A nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel, either as a result of a deliberate first-strike by one side or as a result of miscalculation.
4. Increased Iranian conventional aggressiveness.
5. Further nuclear proliferation in the region and/or the breakdown of the NPT.
6. Economic repercussions resulting from increased instability in the Middle East and the concomitant rise in energy prices.
7. A general increase in Iran's willingness to throw its weight around (most likely result of a nuclear-armed Iran).

According to Brooks, "U.S. extended deterrence is almost certainly only applicable to the first three cases." Workshop participants agree that new or strengthened U.S. assurances may mitigate a portion of the strategic threats from a nuclear Iran but that the United States should only apply these tools (or some modification of them), in the words of Elaine Bunn, "after full consideration of pros and cons" and after "figuring out how it would do so," including a consideration of what capabilities the U.S. could bring to bear. Reflecting the prevailing attitude of many workshop participants, one participant scolds officials for making "too many flippant remarks" about extended deterrence in the Middle East, adding that "those who prepare statements need to be careful to keep in mind" the distinctions between the models and forms of assurances.

One participant said, "extended deterrence is not just extended nuclear deterrence, nor does it necessarily include nuclear deterrence." In the Middle East, these nuances are further complicated by diverging perceptions of the status of 'de-facto' U.S. security assurances, depending on the country and the audience. Mixed reactions to Secretary Clinton's recent (July 2009) suggestion that the United States would react to a nuclear Iran by casting "a defense umbrella over the region" and her subsequent clarification that she was not "suggesting a new policy"¹²¹ have brought some of these discrepancies to the surface.

With the possible exception of Israel, workshop participants did not believe that the American public would support explicit nuclear assurances to states in the Middle East. "It would be very difficult to convince the American public of the merit of extending the umbrella to a state with a despotic regime that stones women and has nationals responsible for September 11th." In the words of another participant, "It wouldn't happen in Congress...even extending deterrence to Europe wouldn't get 30 votes...you've got

¹²⁰ Brooks, "Implications of Extended Deterrence," 28. Brooks credits Ariel Ratner, a Project on Nuclear Issues Scholar, with devising the list.

¹²¹ Hillary Clinton, press availability at the Sheraton Grand Laguna in Laguna Phuket, Thailand (July 22, 2009).

two kinds of members: those who hate nuclear weapons and those who hate countries around the world...the Middle East is really dicey.”

The lack of public support also cautions against overly suggestive, high-level statements on extended nuclear deterrence in the Middle East. Whereas the formalization or explicit nature of an assurance commitment has been identified elsewhere as a factor strengthening assurance, in this case, the unintended fallout may cause those reassurance mechanisms to backfire. Were such comments to provoke a prolonged domestic debate, the American public’s lack of resolve would be projected internationally and the damage to U.S. security commitments globally would exceed the value of the public reassurance [see Chapter II on the importance of public support]. **Existing and potential extended deterrence and assurance relationships fall along a spectrum, encompassing varying degrees of formality, transparency, clarity, and relevance to U.S. nuclear weapons. Public statements should be sensitive to these distinctions.**

While there is no consensus among participants regarding *if* the United States ought to extend nuclear assurances to new states, participants agree that much more thinking is needed on the “hows and whys of extended deterrence for the Middle East.”¹²² Dialogues, both internally and with the allies in question, need to explore *if* the United States should extend deterrence, *who* it should extend it to, *when* it should do so, and *how* overtly nuclear it should be. In correspondence following the workshop, one participant notes:

[We] need to unpack this problem with rigor and creativity. If Iran going nuclear (especially in a splashy way) will be a transformative event, then our thinking on how to respond to the resultant deterrence challenge needs to be transformative as well. That means at least considering new approaches, alignments, relationships, even organizations.

Assuring Whom Against What?

This chapter explores the options for – and requirements of – new or strengthened security relationships with Middle Eastern governments that are considered to be security partners (*de-facto* or *de-jure*) with the United States (Turkey is considered in the previous chapter). While there are important unanswered questions about the enmity *between* some of these states, a nuclear-armed Iran is the potential aggressor that each existing or hypothetical security commitment is presumably designed to deter. The degree to which these commitments are strengthened by the inability of Iran to strike the U.S. homeland was not addressed at the workshop.

The following analysis considers options for new forms of assurance to: (1) Friendly Arab Governments (Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and potentially others) and (2) Israel. It then considers cross-cutting options for strengthening existing assurances and deterring Iranian aggression against U.S. allies.

Friendly Arab Governments: Assurance Without Extended Deterrence?

The Gulf Cooperation Council¹²³ – in particular Saudi Arabia – would like to be the ‘target’ of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance. According to Linton Brooks: “General stability in the Middle East is important, but Saudi Arabia (because of its oil reserves) is the only country whose independence and

¹²² Task Force, *Preventing a Cascade*, 6.

¹²³ Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates

survival is a vital U.S. interest.” Assurances to Egypt are often discussed, in part because Egypt has the most advanced civilian nuclear program among the potential Arab recipients, as are possible future arrangements with Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. But, because the political and credibility-related challenges would be amplified in each of the other cases, Saudi Arabia is the litmus test.

Saudi Arabia is the most widely acknowledged Arab recipient of a de-facto U.S. security guarantee, in part due to perceived U.S. interests, but also because it has the longest history with U.S. assurances in the region. An agreement in 1945 between President Roosevelt and the Kingdom’s founder, Ibn Abdul Aziz al-Saud, forged a strategic relationship that “revolved around a simple agreement: Saudi Arabia would provide the United States and the international community with a reliable source of oil, and in return, the United States would support the Saudi regime and guarantee Saudi Arabia’s security.”¹²⁴

Perceptions of the U.S. security guarantee have decisive influence over Saudi strategic thinking. This fact, coupled with Saudi Arabia’s marginal nuclear knowhow, led the SFRC (2008) report to conclude that “if Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States can not or will not protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the independent means to deter its enemies.”¹²⁵

Defense pacts, close economic ties, and the memory of the first Gulf war lead many other Gulf States to perceive their security to be assured by the United States. But according to the 2009 Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, “it is by no means clear that Tehran shares this perception and therefore feels deterred.”¹²⁶

While the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to friendly Arab governments is unclear, Saudi Arabia appears to perceive U.S. assurances as credible.¹²⁷

Israel: Extended Deterrence without Assurance?

The second condition of assurance, in Linton Brooks’ formulation, is that “the state under the umbrella... not seek nuclear capabilities of its own.” Accordingly, despite the U.S. de-facto security commitment, Israel by definition cannot be *assured*. But that does not mean the commitments lack credibility in the eyes of the potential aggressor. According to the 2009 Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation:

[T]he Iranians are keenly aware of the relationship between the United States and Israel. Right or wrong, many Iranian leaders believe that an attack on Israel would lead to US retaliation against Iran. This conclusion is occasionally reinforced by US political leaders. For example, in April 2008, then-Senator Hillary Clinton stated during the presidential campaign, “In the next ten years during which they [Iran] might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”¹²⁸

Whereas de-facto U.S. commitments to friendly Arab governments are sufficient for assurance, but perhaps insufficiently credible for extended deterrence, U.S. commitments to Israel may provide extended deterrence but are not sufficient for assurance.

¹²⁴ Senate, *Chain Reaction*, 17.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹²⁶ Task Force, *Preventing a Cascade*, 6.

¹²⁷ It is unclear the degree to which the inability of Iran to strike the U.S. homeland plays into this perception.

¹²⁸ Task Force, *Preventing a Cascade*, 6.

Thinking About the ‘Hows and Whys’ of Extended Deterrence and Assurance to Friendly Arab Governments

Expanding upon the list provided by Linton Brooks, Figure 6 lists the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ identified by the participants of providing new or strengthened extended deterrence guarantees.

Figure 6 ‘Pros and Cons’ of Providing New or Strengthened Extended Nuclear Deterrence Guarantees

Potential Advantages ¹²⁹	Potential Costs & Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deterring attacks or coercion against vital U.S. interests • Prevent new states from proliferating • U.S. nuclear umbrella safer than proliferation (avoids dangerous practices) • U.S. retains control • Depending on the state, could share risks and burdens • Dissuade the potential aggressor’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability • Depending on the state, dissuade unilateral action against the potential aggressor 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional political-diplomatic burdens and costs • ‘Commitment trap’ would put pressure on the U.S. to respond and/or be drawn into regional conflicts even if it were unwise¹³⁰ • May polarize relations with states that need not become adversaries • Political resistance in the United States and recipient state • Perceived as increasing reliance on nuclear weapons • No formal alliances or support for an American troop presence to symbolize the commitment¹³¹ • Asymmetry of stakes¹³² • Enmity between protected states

Preventing a ‘cascade’ of proliferation is the most frequently identified advantage to extending deterrence over Middle Eastern allies threatened by a nuclear Iran. According to a 2008 report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC):

[A] mounting threat perception accompanied by a simultaneous perceived deterioration in the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, creates the most intense incentive for a state to reassess its nuclear decision...In the eyes of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey in particular, Iran’s nuclear program has heightened threat perceptions, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq has damaged Arab and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. As a result of this dangerous synergy, these three states in particular appear to be moving deliberately in the direction of a nuclear hedging strategy that would position them to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout capability in the next two decades...The U.S. must take [action] in the next 2 to 3 years to reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee.¹³³

Workshop participants, on the other hand, were not convinced that U.S. extended deterrence guarantees could assure Middle Eastern allies “sufficiently to give up an indigenous nuclear option.” In a recent Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) report, Andrew Krepinevich identifies a number of the ‘stiff barriers’ to the nonproliferation benefits of assurance in the Middle East:

¹²⁹ Utgoff and Adesnik, *Expanding the US Nuclear Umbrella*, 53.

¹³⁰ Scott Sagin, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks,” *International Security* 24: 4 (Spring 2000), 85-115.

¹³¹ Dunn, “Deterrence Today,” 14.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Senate, *Chain Reaction*, 6-7.

In the multipolar world of the Middle East, would the United States be willing to extend a guarantee to Egypt or Saudi Arabia against an Israeli attack, as well as one emanating from Iran?...What will the US guarantee be worth if and when countries like Iran develop the capability to strike at the United States directly? While there were doubts during the Cold War that the United States might not risk Chicago to save Bonn, they would seem to pale in comparison regarding the American people's willingness to risk Atlanta to save, say, Riyadh.¹³⁴

Affecting both assurance and deterrence are questions concerning the perceived asymmetries in stakes (between the United States and Iran) in low-threshold regional conflicts and in risk (between the United States and its allies) posed by regional adversaries armed with medium-range missiles. In contrast to Krepinevich, who focuses on the willingness of the United States to accept nuclear risks, David Ochmanek and Lowell Schwartz (2008) question whether America's regional allies would accept it: "now, U.S. policymakers might wonder whether their South Korean, Japanese, or GCC counterparts would be willing to risk their capitals in order to confront an adversary that has been behaving recklessly."¹³⁵ Despite perceived asymmetries, however, the stakes for the United States in preventing nuclear use or nuclear blackmail by regional adversaries seem pretty high. Lew Dunn argues that "it is the very magnitude of those stakes which calls for actions to buttress or provide nuclear security assurances" and actions which more effectively communicate these high stakes to U.S. allies and potential aggressors.

How effective U.S. efforts to de-value the possession of nuclear weapons to Iran is, at a minimum, an open question. In clarifying her reference to a "defense umbrella," Secretary Clinton said she was "simply pointing out that Iran needs to understand that its pursuit of nuclear weapons will not advance its security or achieve its goals of enhancing its power."¹³⁶ On the one hand, Lew Dunn believes there is evidence supporting this tactic: "within the Iranian elite one of the questions now being debated is whether going all the way to the bomb ultimately would prove counter-productive, stimulating reactions by neighbors and other countries that would make Iran more insecure."¹³⁷ This was not the general view of workshop participants, as one (on conditions of anonymity) stated flatly: "the United States will likely not dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and they will likely develop them."

Credible extended nuclear deterrence to friendly Arab governments also faces obstacles in Arab publics (as well as the American public). Widespread anti-Americanism would make it difficult for an Arab government to enter a formal extended deterrent relationship. Lew Dunn observes that "Arab countries could well be reluctant" because "[a]ny such American nuclear security guarantee would be controversial domestically, while also exposing those governments to new terrorist threats."¹³⁸ This was reflected in President Mubarak's comments rebuking Secretary Clinton's 'defense umbrella' concept:

What the Middle East needs is peace, security, stability and development...Egypt will not be part of any American nuclear umbrella intended to protect the Gulf countries...[such a pact] would imply accepting foreign troops and experts on our land – and we do not accept that...[It would also] imply an implicit acceptance that there is a regional nuclear power – we do not accept that either.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Andrew F. Krepinevich, *U.S. Nuclear Forces, Meeting the Challenges of a Proliferated World* (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2009), 67.

¹³⁵ Ochmanek, *Nuclear Armed Regional Adversaries*, 44.

¹³⁶ Clinton, Laguna Phuket.

¹³⁷ Dunn, "Deterrence Today," 11.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³⁹ Fareed Mahdy, "Egypt Rules Out Joining U.S. Nuclear Umbrella," *Global Security Newswire* (August 25, 2009).

Exploring Options for Providing New Forms of Assurances to Friendly Arab Governments

Because NATO-like legally codified nuclear assurances are not viable options in the present political environment, U.S. policymakers will need to build on existing relationships or devise new mechanisms that offset the exclusive dependency on U.S. nuclear weapons.

Strategic Ambiguity: Reiterate the U.S. Commitment to Arab Security Partners. Linton Brooks argues that the best option is to take a position of strategic ambiguity, based on a modification of the U.S. approach to deterring the use of biological weapons, by “stat[ing] that a strike on Saudi Arabia would be a blow to the United States and the United States will not rule in or out any response...promis[ing] devastating but unspecified retaliation if Saudi is attacked or its oil flow is disrupted.” Likewise, the SPRC report concludes that the option most likely to dissuade Saudi Arabia from pursuing a nuclear weapon in response to the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran is “a strong and tangible reiteration of the U.S. security guarantee.”¹⁴⁰

But others argue that Iran is not likely to be influenced by U.S. ambiguity. According to the IFPA “White Paper” on deterrence concepts, deterring Iran requires that the threatened retaliation be perceived by Iranian leaders “as capable of destroying Iranian culture, Persian civilization, and key elements of the state’s power.”¹⁴¹ Discussions of deterrence should therefore “leave no doubt about American interests or intentions, including in a crisis, regarding our willingness to use nuclear weapons if circumstances dictate.”

Although there have been times when ambiguity has served us well, as in the case of how we might respond to non-nuclear WMD threats, countering Iran is a situation in which U.S. declaratory policy must be clear, concise, and leave no room for misinterpretation. By the same token, U.S. declaratory policy must not be unrealistic; in other words, we must be careful not to “promise” something that can not be delivered.¹⁴²

Lew Dunn argues that the ambiguous assurance commitments could be buttressed by “quiet assurances of U.S. readiness to bring its nuclear deterrent into play” potentially leading to more overt “public statements when or if sought by Arab governments.”¹⁴³

While ultimately “this may be a U.S.-only show,” one participant suggested that “we should be exploring whether there are solutions that might constructively engage NATO, the U.K., France, and maybe Russia or even the P-5 as a whole.” More specifically, Lew Dunn suggests a “joint U.S.-French-British declaration of a readiness to come to the support of countries threatened by a nuclear Iran...or should a tripartite declaration not be feasible, France and the UK still might consider providing their own independent assurances to countries with which close political-security ties exist.”¹⁴⁴

Israel: Thinking Beyond Extended Deterrence and Assurance

In the case of Israel, assurance is not (directly) a nonproliferation tool and the potential advantages are less about Israeli deterrence needs than they are about the requirements of regional stability. Linton

¹⁴⁰ Senate, *Chain Reaction*, 21.

¹⁴¹ Davis et. al, *Updating U.S. Deterrence*, 11.

¹⁴² Ibid., 12-3.

¹⁴³ Dunn, “Deterrence Today,” 12.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 13.

Brooks argues that “Israel’s own deterrent is probably sufficient to deter direct attack...but deterring Iran could require Israel to make their program overt, leading to a cascade of proliferation.” One participant explained that “for decades it’s been widely understood that if Israel were to formally acknowledge a weapons capability it would be politically impossible for Egypt to not go nuclear.” There was not a workshop consensus, however, that an overt Israeli posture would be required to deter Iran.

U.S. security assurances to Israel probably have their greatest impact on Israel’s calculus on whether it should act preventively (as it did in the past against Iraq and Syria) against Iran. Former Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Chuck Freilich argues that “Israel’s understanding of American strategy...would affect Israel’s determination to act unilaterally...[and] Israel’s willingness to discuss options for living with a nuclear Iran would be affected by a better appreciation of American strategy and of the deterrent options the United States would be willing to consider.”¹⁴⁵

In whatever form they may take, **U.S. statements and actions that strengthen Israel’s confidence in U.S. assurances, both in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and coping with a nuclear Iran, will make it less likely that Israel will feel compelled to preemptively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.** Recent developments – particularly in missile defense cooperation – appear to be helping in this regard. In a stark change of tone, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was recently quoted saying, “Israel is strong and I do not see anyone capable of representing a threat to our existence...right now is the moment for diplomacy.”¹⁴⁶ The Washington Post reported that this strength is derived from three parts: “its nuclear capabilities...the assumption that the United States would stand behind Israel if it came under attack...[and] the calculation that enough of the country’s air bases and military facilities would survive a first strike to retaliate effectively.”¹⁴⁷

Formal or Explicit U.S. Nuclear Guarantee to Israel? Linton Brooks suggests that, if and when Iran emerges as a nuclear power, the United States “consult with Israel and offer overt U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in return for Israel not conducting a nuclear strike and remaining ambiguous over its nuclear deterrent.” It is widely believed that public acknowledgement of an Israeli nuclear deterrent would make it politically difficult for Arab states to remain non-nuclear, thus unleashing a possible cascade of proliferation. Freilich argues that the actual formalization of the commitment could take a number of forms: “a bilateral defense treaty, a joint congressional resolution, an executive agreement...or a presidential declaration. The broader, more public, and formalized the security guarantee, the greater its deterrent value, but also the greater the obstacles to the two sides’ ability to reach agreement.”¹⁴⁸

Although the “U.S. public would probably support a commitment,” Israel is reluctant to discuss an extended deterrence arrangement (at this point) due to “fear it implies U.S. acceptance of an Iranian bomb [and] fear that the price will be constraints on Israel’s freedom of action.”¹⁴⁹ Israeli Intelligence

¹⁴⁵ Chuck Freilich, *Speaking about the Unspeakable: U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran’s Nuclear Program* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2007), viii.

¹⁴⁶ “Iran not an existential threat to Israel: Barak,” *AFP* (September 17, 2009).

¹⁴⁷ Howard Schneider, “Israel Finds Strength in Its Missile Defenses: Advanced System Could Alter Strategic Decisions in Region,” *Washington Post Foreign Service* (September 19, 2009).

¹⁴⁸ Freilich, *Speaking about the Unspeakable*, 15.

¹⁴⁹ Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 30.

Services Minister Dan Meridor called Secretary Clinton's suggestion "a mistake," adding that such proposals portray the U.S. "as if they were already resigned to such a possibility."¹⁵⁰

Other possible arrangements have also received attention, such as integrating Israel into NATO collective defense mechanisms or establishing a regional security architecture. These options deserve consideration, but were not sufficiently explored by the working group.

U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Deterrence Matters. If and when Iran emerges as a nuclear power, Linton Brooks recommends that the United States and Israel "conduct private strategic-level consultations on coordinated responses to Iranian use." Despite the strength of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, "a bilateral exchange does not appear to have taken place on the two paramount issues related to the Iranian nuclear threat: the possibility of military action...and, conversely, possible means of 'living with' a nuclear Iran."¹⁵¹ Chuck Freilich argues that an enhanced understanding of American deterrence strategy would improve "Israel's willingness to discuss options for living with a nuclear Iran," but that "in the absence of dialogue, Israel may be driven to avoidable measures."¹⁵²

According to Freilich, the agenda for the dialogue should be "tailored to each state of [Iran's] nuclear development process." As trust develops, the dialogue could gradually incorporate more sensitive topics, eventually enabling a joint assessment of "one of the most critical issues: whether Iran is indeed thought to be deterrable and, if so, the nature of the deterrent measures required."¹⁵³

Strengthening Existing Assurances & Deterring Iranian Aggression against U.S. Allies

As one participant characterized the security environment, "Iran is a regional concern, not a U.S. concern." Any discussion of deterring Iran is therefore inherently a discussion about extended deterrence. Whether and how the United States decides to extend nuclear assurances to new states to counter a nuclear-armed Iran, Linton Brooks believes that "the single most important step the United States can take...is to cultivate the perception that we will act" to defend U.S. vital interests in the Middle East. To cultivate such a perception, options deserving further consideration include:

Educate the Public and Congress on the Importance of Extended Deterrence. The lack of support from the American public limits the options available to policymakers now and would severely undermine the credibility of these commitments were they to be issued. This underscores the importance of Linton Brooks' recommendation that senior leaders constantly educate the public on the importance of extended deterrence. As the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation reported:

Extended deterrence is most effective and credible if there is a broad U.S. domestic consensus about the policies being adopted. The administration should engage Congress so that pledges offered by the executive branch can be promptly and fully delivered. Congressional endorsement of any U.S. security guarantees could do much to make those words more convincing.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ "U.S. Could Extend 'Defense Umbrella' Against Iran, Clinton Warns," *Global Security Newswire* (July 22, 2009).

¹⁵¹ Freilich, *Speaking about the Unspeakable*, vii-viii.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 25-6.

¹⁵⁴ Task Force, *Prevent a Cascade*, 6.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) for the United States and all Security Partners in the Middle East.

“Generally discarded halfway through the Cold War,” Andrew Krepinevich writes that “defenses may play an important role in preserving deterrence and terminating a conflict” in the emerging Middle Eastern theater.¹⁵⁵ There was broad agreement among workshop participants that the United States should supply TMD to all Middle East security partners. Low Dunn argues that missile defense cooperation is not only important for its “direct impact in reducing any Iranian missile threat,” but also “for its symbolic importance in building habits of cooperation, and for its role in signaling the U.S. commitment.”¹⁵⁶

Because of its lack of strategic depth, defenses are uniquely important to assuring Israel. Linton Brooks urged continued efforts to ensure that “Israel has strong theater missile defenses” and that the U.S. global antimissile system “reduces the chance that Iran can attack the United States.”¹⁵⁷ Israel’s Arrow missile defense program could be supplemented by integrating Israel into the U.S. global multi-layered missile defense system including deployments of the terminal high-altitude air defense (THAAD), the ground-based PAC-3 and the U.S. Navy Aegis system equipped with SM-3 interceptors. Like the situation in Eastern Europe, some within Israel argue that such systems could provide a “tripwire” mechanism to “further augment the guarantee.”¹⁵⁸ And according to Uzi Rubin, former director of Israel’s missile shield program, effective missile defenses give Israel “something to stabilize the situation: the knowledge that an attack will fail.”¹⁵⁹ The Obama administration seems to be moving aggressively in this direction, which is made apparent by the Administration’s new emphasis on defending against the near-term threat of short- and medium-range Iranian missiles and the October 2009 U.S.-Israeli ‘live fire’ exercises of integrated missile defenses.

Defense Cooperation. There appears to be broad support among Administration officials and outside experts for Linton Brooks’ recommendation that the United States “urge (and help) Middle East security partners to net their defense together.” In response to a question about regional approaches to deterring Iran, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen told a CSIS audience (July 2009), “we’ve worked with our Gulf partners to look at the development of regional defense capability.”¹⁶⁰ In a 2008 report on approaches to deterring Iran, Jackie Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff suggest measures to enhance maritime security cooperation with Gulf partners including “intelligence fusion and command and control interoperability” and “adapting the NATO Active Endeavor model to a Persian Gulf contingency” by using U.S. naval forces to protect critical infrastructure.¹⁶¹ Low Dunn identifies defense cooperation as a “key element that underpinned extended deterrence in Europe” that “could be applied to new partners in the Middle East:”

[T]he U.S. extended nuclear deterrent in Europe was part of the overall NATO alliance system – a formal treaty commitment by the NATO members’ to each other’s defense, political institutions, integrated military command and planning structures...Over the decades, critical habits of defense cooperation also grew up

¹⁵⁵ Krepinevich, *U.S. Nuclear Forces*, 76.

¹⁵⁶ Dunn, “Deterrence Today,” 12.

¹⁵⁷ Brooks, “Implications of Extended Deterrence,” 31.

¹⁵⁸ Freilich, *Speaking about the Unspeakable*, 17.

¹⁵⁹ Howard Schneider, “Israel Finds Strength.”

¹⁶⁰ Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 7, 2009).

¹⁶¹ Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Iran With Nuclear Weapons: Anticipating the Consequences for U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, September 2008), 68-9.

among the United States and its NATO allies...[W]ithin the Middle East...habits of defense cooperation exist and can be strengthened, e.g., as in the Gulf Cooperation Council or in the earlier U.S.-sponsored Cooperative Defense Initiative.¹⁶²

Visible Deployments. There is not a clear consensus on the viability or usefulness of expanding the U.S. presence in the Middle East. The Presidential Task Force is not certain that “this approach would apply to the Middle East [because] regional states are often unenthusiastic about the presence of large U.S. forces.”¹⁶³ At sea forces might be more acceptable, although there is already a substantial off-shore presence in the region.

Today, forward deployment of U.S. nuclear capabilities to the region is politically unthinkable (for both the *assurer* and *assuree*). If and when an Iranian breakout occurs, however, the realm of viable options for new guarantees and ways to buttress them could expand or change significantly. In a 2009 report on ‘Global Shocks,’ Lew Dunn writes:

U.S. policymakers likely would be grappling with how to put in place a credible U.S. (or multi-Great Power) nuclear security guarantee to contain proliferation in the Middle East...The prospect of a military confrontation with a newly-nuclear Iran would reinforce pursuit of usable advanced conventional and quite possibly nuclear options.¹⁶⁴

Restoring Perceptions of U.S. Competence and Reputation as a Security Guarantor. America’s eroding reputation for competence and judicious international behavior has significantly impacted allied confidence in U.S. assurances, particularly in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. As Elaine Bunn cogently states, the other side of the fear of abandonment is the fear of entanglement:

Historically many allies have been conflicted on this: On the one hand, fearing abandonment (illustrated by the age-old question, ‘Would the U.S. really trade New York for Berlin?’)...And on the other hand, fearing entrapment or entanglement (getting pulled into situations or conflicts against the ally’s interests)...To be assured, allies need to have confidence in American judgment and reliability; if not, specific capabilities – nuclear or otherwise – do not really matter.

The ‘bottom line’ for establishing credible extended deterrents and assurances to the many diverse actors in the Middle East comes down the ‘fundamentals’ – does the United States mean what it says? Does the United States do what it says it will? The consistency and reliability of U.S. actions as a provider of security will, in the end, drive how effectively it extends deterrence and assurance.

¹⁶² Dunn, “Deterrence Today,” 14.

¹⁶³ Task Force, *Prevent a Cascade*, 6.

¹⁶⁴ Lewis A. Dunn, *Global Shocks and Surprises: Shaping the 2030 Nuclear Future* (Prepared for the 2009 Sandia Conference on Pathways to Alternative Nuclear Futures, SAIC, September 2008), http://sandia.gov/nuclear_pathways/assets/documents/Dunn_Global_Shocks_Surprises.pdf.

VIII. LONG TERM TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

The Pursuit of a World without Nuclear Weapons

President Barack Obama stated on 5 April 2009:

[W]e will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies – including the Czech republic.¹⁶⁵

Striking a *credible* balance between the twin imperatives of pursuing a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons (which includes the commitment to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons) and of maintaining a credible extended deterrent in the eyes of U.S. allies will pose political challenges to this and subsequent administrations. Since credibility exists in the eye of the beholder, the credibility of the balance being struck will depend on the audience (to include non-nuclear states whose cooperation on nonproliferation issues is needed and the U.S. Congress who must support any refurbishment or updating of U.S. nuclear forces) and a changing international security environment (e.g., political support, both at home and abroad, for extended deterrence increases as the risk of nuclear proliferation increases).

Allies will be watching closely U.S. efforts to balance the twin imperatives of pursuing global nuclear disarmament and maintaining effective deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. As long as this balance is managed effectively, these seemingly contradictory ‘twin objectives’ are actually mutually reinforcing since credible and effective extended deterrence and assurance commitments will provide stability at sharply reduced levels of nuclear weapons, which is a necessary waypoint to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Striking this balance demands that the United States constantly educate its public (the ‘third audience’); **the American people must recognize the importance of extended deterrence if the United States is to maintain adequate support for the capabilities, actions, and statements of intent that are necessary for credibility.**

U.S. efforts to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons should not proceed ahead of pace of the allies that depend upon its extended deterrent. Intensive engagement, however, may minimize the extent to which nuclear assurances obstruct the path toward zero. The ability of the United States, over the long run, to shape allies’ beliefs about extended deterrence may provide a key tool for answering “some of the sharpest questions”¹⁶⁶ that DASD Roberts foresees in balancing the President’s twin objectives. During the Cold War, extended deterrence and assurance were strengthened by mechanisms to distribute the burden of deterrence (e.g., nuclear sharing). Perhaps similar approaches can guide the development of new mechanisms to distribute the burden of nuclear abolition as the United States leads the effort to pursue the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

¹⁶⁵ White House Press Office, *Remarks by President Barak Obama in Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic*, (April 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

¹⁶⁶ Roberts, “Remarks at STRATCOM.”

Requirements for Credible Extended Deterrence Could Change Significantly

Global shocks or ‘wildcards’ not addressed in this report – e.g., terrorist nuclear acquisition, the use of a nuclear weapon, a proliferated Middle East, nuclear assurances by Pakistan or Iran to non-nuclear Arab nations – could have profound consequences for the security needs of U.S. allies and on the political acceptability (at home and abroad) of visible U.S. deployments.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the demands on U.S. extended deterrence could increase sharply if relations with China, Russia, or a regional state of concern were to deteriorate greatly. In this (unfortunate) eventuality, it could be more difficult for U.S. allies that would like extended deterrence from the United States to be both invisible (to their domestic publics) and ironclad (that is, credible to potential aggressors). Under these more stressful circumstances, Murdock notes: “Strengthening nuclear extended deterrence to Japan, for example, might require a more visible ‘nuclear coupling’ that includes deployments of U.S. nuclear weapons to Japan.” Schoff, on the other hand, takes a more nuanced approach:

There are a variety of things we can do on the nuclear front...besides deploy weapons: supporting infrastructure, relevant training exercises, legal adjustments that facilitate deployments. Let’s be cautious, but let’s consider some of these moves and let Japan know that we’re open to talking about them, and perhaps we’ll hit a point when they indicate it’s important...and we’ll be ready to respond in incremental ways.

On the other hand, improvements in allied perceptions of their security environment could substantially relax the force structure demands on assurance. Specifically, the considerable demands that assurance imposes on the *size* of the arsenal could be relaxed if relations improve between Japan and China and between Eastern Europe and Russia. As Schoff told the workshop, “if relations are good amongst countries in the [Pacific] region, the [margin between U.S. and Chinese nuclear arsenals] can be rather small.” In the spirit of President Obama’s commitment to the ‘peace and security’ of a world in which nuclear weapons are unnecessary, Japan’s House of Representatives Speaker expressed his commitment to “a peaceful diplomatic environment in East Asia [to render] a large U.S. military presence at the current level unnecessary.”¹⁶⁸ Likewise, Lukasz Kulesa states that “we should find ways to cooperate with Russia, to engage Russia in this quest of – of making the extended deterrence less salient.”¹⁶⁹

Systemic uncertainty in the international security environment underscores the importance of continual and serious consultations. It also reinforces the recommendation from former Japanese ambassador Yukio Satoh of the need for consultations during the long-term pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons:

For obvious reasons, the Japanese are second to none in wishing for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, given Japan’s vulnerability to [the DPRK’s] progressing nuclear and missile programs and China’s growing military power, ensuring American commitment to deterring threats from nuclear and other weapons

¹⁶⁷ The implications for assurance requirements would depend on the nature of the ‘shock.’ The emergence of a new nuclear power could increase the requirements of assuring neighboring U.S. allies. On the other hand, nuclear use or terrorist nuclear acquisition could increase political pressure in NSNF host states to return them to the United States. Dunn, “Global Shocks and Surprises,” 38.

¹⁶⁸ Kono Yohei, “Fukuda vows to lessen Okinawa burden on 63rd anniversary of battle,” *Kyodo News* (May 31, 2008) cited in Schoff, *Realigning Priorities*.

¹⁶⁹ Kulesa, “Requirements For Extended Deterrence?”

of mass destruction is a matter of prior strategic importance for Tokyo. The time has come for the governments of Japan and the United States to articulate better the shared concept of extended deterrence, nuclear or otherwise, in order to assure the Japanese that deterrence will continue to function under changing strategic circumstances and with technological developments. Such initiatives designed to reinforce the concept of American extended deterrence for Japan should not be seen as retrogression in the context of efforts to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, it is an essential step in strengthening the efforts.¹⁷⁰

Even though the need for credible extended deterrence and assurance could become more Cold War-like in nature, the 21st century emphasis on assurance as seen through the eyes of U.S. allies is not likely to change. During the Cold War, the United States sometimes argued with its allies over what was required for extended deterrence (e.g., modernization of forward-deployed, long-range theater nuclear forces in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s) and found itself in the position of ‘caring’ more about the security needs of its allies than allies themselves did. The United States should engage its allies about the requirements of extended deterrence, but should not, as the SPRC cautions, “prejudge the conclusion.” Assurance requires acceptance of increased *risk* from the provider and *trust* from those who receive it; it also requires the recipient take responsibility, particularly with its own publics, for the political risks associated with strengthening it if changing security circumstances warrant it.

In her workshop paper, Elaine Bunn put the issue of extended deterrence in an even broader context:

In the longer term, there may be a larger question: Will the United States continue to play a major role in the world in underpinning global stability, and specifically in extending nuclear deterrence to others? But in the nearer term – as long as there are nuclear weapons in the hands of others – the United States will need to sustain a safe and effective nuclear weapons capability; and as long as the United States plays a leading role in the world, its nuclear weapons will be about more than its own security.

If the American people should ever decide that the United States no longer wants that responsibility, extended nuclear deterrence is likely to be one of the first policy casualties of that dramatic shift in world view. Putting Americans at risk for the security of its non-nuclear allies is not consistent with a more modest U.S. role on the world scene. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by more and/or less secure nuclear powers, as former U.S. allies would be forced to guarantee their sovereignty with means outside of U.S. control. The result would likely be a less secure world because of the increased risk that nuclear weapons would be used and the risk that non-state actors would gain access to nuclear weapons and material. Providing credible assurances will continue to impose burdens on the United States as long as U.S. allies perceive their security interests to depend on capabilities and actions not otherwise necessary to defend the U.S. homeland. In the long run, however, withdrawing those commitments would impose more costly and less acceptable burdens to America and the international community.

¹⁷⁰ Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence.”

APPENDIX A: ON SELF RESOLVE

By Clark Murdock

As discussed in chapter II, workshop attendees strongly supported adding the American public and U.S. Government (USG) officials as the ‘third audience’ for U.S. deterrence/extended deterrence and assurance because of their importance to the credibility of U.S. commitments. The USG, of course, has always recognized that what it says to audiences abroad is also heard at home. And in an omnipresent, 24/7 media environment, USG officials understand that now more than ever they must ‘talk’ to multiple audiences simultaneously. In its October 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the United States said:

Altering the calculus of our terrorist enemies – including all elements of the terrorist network – so that they fear the consequences of their actions requires credibility. We will continue to communicate and demonstrate our will to take action, both to our enemies and to the American people so that they remain confident in our resolve.¹⁷¹

This ‘third audience’ not only *affects* deterrence and assurance relationships, it is the audience of its *own* relationship that I’ve coined “self-resolve.” This relationship is so important that the concept of ‘self resolve’ should be added to the deterrence lexicon (deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance and dissuasion).

U.S. focus on the nuclear mission precipitously declined for nearly two decades following the end of the Cold War and its nuclear competence eroded. We ‘talked the talk’ but failed to ‘walk the walk.’


- The pre-Gulf War deterrent threat (by Secretary Baker to FM Aziz) was later belied by memoirs from Bush, Scowcroft, Baker and Powell that no consideration had really been given to the nuclear option.
- With its huge margin in conventional power, the U.S. military often behaves as if it doesn’t need nuclear capabilities and that its political leaders would never authorize their use even if it did.
- The SPRC noted the lack of attention of senior-level USG officials to the U.S. nuclear mission and felt it necessary to recommend that U.S. declaratory policy for employment of its nuclear forces should “be understood to reflect the intention of national leadership.” The recent high level attention given to nuclear issues within DoD has been a positive and noteworthy development in this regard.

Self-resolve could thus be defined as ‘the extent to which the United States takes the actions called for by its expressed statements of intent.’ As opposed to the traditional conflation of ‘reputation for action’ with ‘intervention,’ ‘action’ in this sense is about more than military action; it’s also about the things we do and say at home. ‘Self-resolve’ captures the extent to which we really mean what we say and that our intent (as reflected in what we say) is (and will be) expressed in our actions: it’s not just how others *perceive* our resolve; it’s whether we *are* resolved.

¹⁷¹ Homeland Security Council, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: 2007), 27.

As displayed in Figure 7 (drawn from ‘Capability Implications of Key Relationships as Seen by Their Effects on Credibility,’ Figure 1 in Chapter 2), attention should be paid to the credibility of U.S. deterrence/extended deterrence, assurance and self-resolve.

Figure 7 Adding ‘Self Resolve’ to Deterrence/Extended Deterrence and Assurance



By explicitly assessing – and thereby bringing attention to – the seriousness with which we take our statements of expressed intent, the distance between what we say and what we mean could narrow – and the political conditions that led to the gradual decay in U.S. nuclear competence could be reversed. In her workshop paper, Elaine Bunn observed:

In the end, if the US is comfortable with its own nuclear posture and can – and does – make the case to allies that its security commitments, including extended nuclear deterrence, remain strong, then allies are likely to be assured.

No U.S. government, of course, could explicitly state that it was looking critically at its own resolve, because that would undercut the credibility (in the eyes of external audiences) of its deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance. But what the United States says and does at home is projected internationally. A core theme running throughout the workshop discussions of assurance in Europe, Northeast Asia and the Middle East was the closeness with which key allies are watching the American debate on the future of its nuclear weapons complex. Perceptions of America as the “gang that couldn’t shoot straight” (as one European analyst observed of the United States), will undermine the credibility of its security commitments. Deterrent strategists have always recognized that a nation’s “reputation for action” is an important determinant of credibility; what is less often recognized is that a nation’s actions are the most important determinant of its reputation for action.

APPENDIX B: PROTECTED COUNTRIES

Figure 8 Visualizing U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence




Figure 9 Recipients of United States Extended Nuclear Deterrence Guarantees

	Europe		East Asia	Middle East
	Original NATO Allies	New NATO Allies		
Recipients of Explicit or Recognized U.S. Nuclear Assurances	Belgium*(1949) Canada (1949) Denmark (1949) France** (1949) Iceland (1949) Italy* (1949) Luxembourg (1949) Netherlands* (1949) Norway (1949) Portugal (1949) U.K.** (1949) Turkey* (1952) Greece (1952) Germany* (1955) Spain (1982)	Croatia (1999) Czech Rep (1999) Hungary (1999) Poland (1999) Bulgaria (2004) Estonia (2004) Latvia (2004) Lithuania (2004) Romania (2004) Slovakia (2004) Slovenia (2004) Albania (2009)	Australia (1951) Japan (1951) ROK (1954)	Turkey* (1952)
De-Facto, Ambiguous or Prospective Recipients of U.S. Nuclear Assurances		Georgia Ukraine Macedonia Bosnia & Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia	Taiwan Thailand Philippines	Afghanistan Bahrain Israel** Iraq Kuwait Saudi Arabia UAE

* Presumed host country for U.S. B61 gravity bombs and DCA (See Figure 4 and note 52)

** Possesses or is believed to possess an independent nuclear deterrent.

APPENDIX C: WORKSHOP BRIEFS

Contents

EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY.....73

The Honorable Franklin C. Miller, CSIS

THOUGHTS ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE 78

Ambassador Linton Brooks, CSIS

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND ASSURANCE..... 87

Ms. Elaine Bunn, NDU

DEFINING CAPABILITY NEEDS IN TERMS OF CREDIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE/EXTENDED
DETERRENCE, ASSURANCE AND SELF-RESOLVE..... 95

Dr. Clark Murdock, CSIS

U.S. EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMITMENTS IN EAST ASIA AND U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE 100

Mr. James Schoff, IFPA

Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

The Honorable Franklin C. Miller, CSIS

Briefing to CSIS Workshop, 3 June 2009

Schlesinger Task Force, Phase II Report, December 2008

- ...the United States has extended its nuclear protective umbrella to 30-plus friends and allies as an expression of commitment and common purpose as well as a disincentive for proliferation
...the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe remains a pillar of NATO unity
The United States should recognize the importance NATO allies place on extended deterrence represented by the forward basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe and should take all necessary steps to support the coupling effects the weapons provide

Council on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons Task Force, May 2009

- Council on Foreign Relations, Nuclear Weapons Task Force May 2009
 - The Task Force believes that as long as US alliance partners face the possibility of nuclear threats, the United States will have to retain enough nuclear arms to deter such threats.
 - The United States has the responsibility to assure allies through extended deterrent commitments
 - The Task Force advises the Obama administration to:
 - reaffirm US commitment to security assurances, including extended nuclear deterrence, to allies,
 - consult with allies to determine their views about the credibility of the nuclear role in security assurances to assess whether any adjustments in nuclear and conventional capabilities are necessary,
 - keep the relatively small US nuclear stockpile in Europe as long as this force supports NATO political objectives...and acts as a disincentive for NATO allies to build their own nuclear forces.

Congressional Commission on Strategic Posture May 2009

- ...assurance remains a top US priority in the current security environment and there are some important new challenges to extended deterrence associated with Russia, China, and proliferation
- Whether potential adversaries are deterred (and US allies are assured) is a function of their understanding of US capabilities and intentions. Those capabilities must be sufficiently visible and sufficiently impressive.
- The United States should also retain capabilities for the delivery of NSNF and proceed in close consultation with allies in Europe and Asia in doing so.
- All allies depending on the US nuclear umbrella should be assured that any changes in [US] forces do not imply a weakening of the US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees.
- In particular, now is the time to establish a much more extensive dialogue with Japan on nuclear issues...

Extended Deterrence: What are we talking about?

- In its broadest form, extended deterrence involves the commitment of American military power in all of its forms to the defense of allied interests. Importantly, extended deterrence includes the pledge that if deterrence provided by US conventional military power fails to deter aggression or coercion the United States will threaten to employ its nuclear forces and will, if necessary, use them in defense of allied vital interests. This puts the US homeland directly at risk to a nuclear-armed aggressor in defense of our allies

Extended Deterrence and Assurance

- Extended Deterrence is aimed at potential aggressors
- Assurance is aimed at allies
- Assurance is a sub-set of Deterrence
- If the deterrent is not credible, assurance will not work but a credible deterrent does not guarantee successful assurance

Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Why do we do it?

- To protect the vital interests of Allies whose national security is judged vital to our own
- To moderate Great Power behavior in regions of potential conflict
- To affect rogue nation behavior in regions of potential conflict
- To serve as an “anti-proliferant” for allies capable of developing their own nuclear weapons

Extended Deterrence: How do we do it?

- Successful and credible extended deterrence involves a seamless mix of:
 - declaratory policy,
 - force posture,
 - war plans
 - doctrine
 - visible exercises as a signal of readiness and credibility
- All of the above are affected by Geography and History

Assurance: How do we do it?

- Successful assurance involves a seamless mix of, confidence, inclusion, and consultation bolstered by the elements of credible extended deterrence. All of the aforementioned are affected by geography and history.

Extended Deterrence and Assurance: How we did it in Europe during the Cold War

- Forward deployment of an “escalatory ladder” of non-strategic nuclear systems of all ranges to complement conventional forces and meet the military and doctrinal requirements of MC 14/2 and 14/3
- Exercises
- Allied involvement in nuclear programs of cooperation
- “risk sharing” and “burden sharing” arrangements
- NPG, NPG Staff Group, HLG, extensive consultation arrangements
- Carefully crafted NATO Declaratory Policy

Extended Deterrence and Assurance: How we did it in Asia during the Cold War

- Forward deployment of selected non-strategic nuclear weapons in RoK to augment US and RoK conventional forces and afloat

- Some exercises in RoK; periodic forward deployment to Guam of strategic forces
- No allied involvement in nuclear forces
- No “NATO-like” consultations
- Unilateral US declaratory policy
 - Including public commitment of US conventional and nuclear forces to the defense of Japan

Extended Deterrence and Assurance Today

- NATO
 - Residual deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to support Allied and US dual capable aircraft (DCA)
 - Annual Consultation exercise at NATO headquarters
 - Rare military exercises (Inter-Regional Deployment) and
 - NPG Staff Group and HLG
- NorthEast Asia
 - Complete reliance on US strategic forces
 - No exercises
 - No regular consultations with Japan; no consultations with RoK

Are Extended Deterrence and Assurance still necessary?

- Europe/NATO
 - The Objective threats to NATO are Russia and Iran. The perceived threat from Russia is discounted by most [non-MoD] elites and publics in “Old NATO” but felt keenly in “New NATO” states. The Iran threat is discounted by most NATO nations but felt keenly in Turkey.
- East Asia
 - Objective and Perceived threats to Japan:
 - China
 - North Korea
- Objective and Perceived threat to RoK:
 - North Korea
 - Japan and Turkey could proceed with weapons program if they believed themselves at risk

NATO: How to Extend Deterrence and Assurance in 2009?

- There is no substitute for maintaining a forward based nuclear capability in Europe
 - Reliance on conventional forces alone suggests a “war-fighting” strategy anathema to Europeans
 - “New NATO” will sense abandonment, particularly in light of large Russian TNF stockpile
 - French nuclear doctrine and policy do not allow France to provide adequate deterrence and assurance
 - Weapons cannot be returned in a crisis (viz UK FCO paper)
 - If the weapons are removed the consultation arrangements will wither
 - Both the US and NATO governments will eventually question the US guarantee
 - Drafting the new Alliance Strategic Concept will put this to the test
- For the next 5 – 10 years, NATO’s deterrent can be maintained IF
 - (1) the US takes the necessary steps to modernize the B 61 bomb and to equip the JSF/F-35 with a nuclear capability and
 - (2) SHAPE ensures that the military skills are exercised
- Beyond ~2020 Allies will have to face modernizing their DCA fleets
 - Allies will seek to avoid this decision as long as possible

- A contentious debate could cause US elites to believe allies “want our protection without assuming risk themselves”
- Close consultations (not notifications) and effective use of bilateral and NATO mechanisms will be essential
- The eventual emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon will provide a critical test
- Non-European factors:
 - The US must maintain strategic parity with Russia [and] US and Russian strategic force levels must not fall to a level where the size of the Russian TNF stockpile is believed by NATO allies as affecting the US commitment
 - The US must display competence in nuclear weapons stewardship and leadership in Alliance nuclear affairs
 - The US must retain confidence in its nuclear forces

Northeast Asia: How to Extend Deterrence and Assurance in 2009?

- “US extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The US reaffirmed that the full range of US military capabilities – both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities form the core of extended deterrence and support US commitments to the defense of Japan”
 - --- Gates, Rice, Kyuma, Aso May 2007
- “How does the US carry through on this pledge?
 - The US must recognize the huge shift in Japanese political circles on nuclear weapons that has occurred as a result of generational change and Chinese and North Korean programs
 - Senior Japanese officials and politicians are uncertain whether the US has the political will and/or nuclear capability to extend deterrence
 - While the deterrent may be credible in aggressors’ eyes, we have a major assurance problem
 - We have hurt ourselves by our continued refusal to begin a regular and meaningful consultation process with the Japanese government
 - Neither our policies nor our capabilities are understood
- To restore assurance, we need to return to first principles:
 - Begin, promptly, a regular set of consultations
 - The Nuclear Posture Review creates an early and essential opportunity
 - Address meaningfully the Japanese concern (cf NATO 1976-1979) that the imbalance in regional TNF undercuts our strategic nuclear guarantee
 - Seek ways for increased collaboration
 - Develop an exercise program which demonstrates US nuclear deterrence interest in NorthEast Asia
 - Non-Asian factors:
 - The US must maintain strategic parity with Russia
 - US and Russian strategic force levels must not fall to a level where the size of the Russian TNF stockpile is believed by allies as affecting the US commitment
 - US strategic forces must not fall to a level where the Japanese come to believe that the PRC’s TNF will dominate US decision-making
 - The US must display competence in nuclear weapons stewardship and leadership in US-Japanese nuclear affairs
 - The US must retain confidence in its nuclear forces
- Unanswered Questions: NorthEast Asia
 - What assurance does the RoK want/need in light of past and recent DPRK activity?
 - How seriously does USFK consider nuclear deterrence?
 - What arrangements will govern nuclear planning once the RoK assumes command of the CFC?
 - What exercise profile should PACOM/USFK assume to enhance deterrence of Pyongyang?
 - What force deployments should PACOM/USFK assume to enhance deterrence of Pyongyang?

How to Extend Deterrence and Assurance in 2009?: The Middle East

- Unanswered Questions: the MidEast

- Under what circumstances might the United States be willing to extend its nuclear deterrent to Middle Eastern states?
- Will the Congress/American people be willing to place America at risk to protect a Middle Eastern state?
- Would the US deterrent assure a Middle Eastern state threatened by a nuclear armed aggressor sufficiently to give up an indigenous nuclear option?
- What combination of US force deployments, exercises, declaratory statements and consultations would be necessary to provide credible deterrence and assurance?

Thoughts on Extended Deterrence

Ambassador Linton Brooks, CSIS

Briefing to CSIS Workshop, 3 June 2009

Some simplistic definitions for purposes of this brief

- “Deterrence” is when a state fails to take action that it might otherwise consider because it fears either (a) unacceptable U.S. retaliation, (b) that the United States can deny success, or (c) some mix of the two.
- “Extended deterrence” is when the action to be deterred is aimed at a third state.

Limitations of this briefing

- Considers only deterrence of state actors (including deterrence of transfer of WMD to terrorist groups or other non-state actors)
- Considers only cases where there is a nuclear component to extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella in some form)
- Ignores states nominally under the nuclear umbrella that face no real threat (e.g., Australia) or that perceive no real threat (e.g. that part of NATO that constitutes “old Europe”)
- Does not consider implications of a regime change in Pakistan (except in the context of deterring transfer to terrorists)

Three audiences for extended deterrence

- The potential aggressor
 - Must be sufficiently convinced that the United States has both the capability and the will to act so as to make aggression not worth the risk
- The state under the umbrella
 - Must be sufficiently convinced that the United States has both the capability and the will to act so as to (a) resist intimidation and (b) not seek nuclear capabilities of its own if it has the ability to do so
- The American public
 - Need not explicitly endorse the deterrent but must at least acquiesce sufficiently to make extending the U.S. deterrent politically possible

Factors strengthening extended deterrence

- A record of U.S. action if threats are ignored
 - If the United States says something is unacceptable and it never-the-less happens, deterrence is strengthened if the United States responds to the event strongly
 - And strengthened even more if the response is perceived as effective
 - The reverse is true. Drawing “red lines” and then responding to their being crossed simply by drawing new red lines weakens deterrence
- The presence of U.S. troops or facilities in the protected country
 - So that the host country cannot be attacked without attacking the United States
- Inability of the potential aggressor to threaten U.S. territory with nuclear weapons
 - E.g., should be easier to deter North Korean military action against Japan than Chinese military action against Japan

- Perceptions that what is to be deterred is a vital interest of the United States
 - Easier to deter attacks on key allies than on other states
 - Easier to deter military attack than diplomatic or economic pressure
- A clear declaratory policy on what is unacceptable
 - Must take into account the strategic culture of the potential aggressor, including how it processes information, receives communications and makes decisions
 - Also needs to consider value system (e.g., some Japanese militarists thought destruction was preferable to surrender) and prospect that decision maker will be sheltered from unwelcome truths (e.g, Saddam Hussein)

Inherent force structure needs

- Extended deterrence is enhanced by the perception that U.S. strategic forces are second to none
 - Especially true for those for whom Russia is the plausible aggressor
 - But also appears important to Japan
- Extended deterrence is enhanced by flexible forces
 - Implies single RV missiles not requiring overflight of Russia
- Extended deterrence is enhanced by the perception that U.S. weapons are reliable and effective
 - Excessive and overstated complaints about aging problems or the viability of U.S. weapons undercut extended deterrence
- Extended deterrence is enhanced by effective defenses against theater ballistic missiles
 - What is “theater” for us is “strategic” for the states under our nuclear umbrella

Are specific force structures necessary for extended deterrence?

- Logically, no
- But
- During the INF deployments in the 1980s, offshore systems (TLAMN) were seen as an insufficient response to Soviet SS-20s
- NATO allies (especially those who perceive themselves most threatened) value retention of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
- Japan appears to ascribe great importance to TLAM/N, even though it is not deployed

Force structure bottom line

- Except for these inherent features, the United States should wean allies from the belief that a specific force structure is required for extended deterrence
 - Requires significant discussion and formal consultation (HLG or similar approach)
 - Pending this process, however, B61 bombs should remain in Europe as long as the allies want them
 - Currently, removal of these weapons would weaken extended deterrence and harm the Alliance

The importance of public support within the United States

“Extended deterrence is most effective and credible if there is a broad U.S. domestic consensus about the policies being adopted. The administration should engage Congress so that pledges offered by the executive branch can be promptly and fully delivered. Congressional endorsement of any U.S. security guarantees could do much to make those words more convincing.” (Preventing a Cascade of Instability, p.6)

- History:

- Extensive polling during the Cold War showed general support for extended deterrence but a reluctance to actually employ nuclear weapons to defend allies
- No recent polling, so current attitudes unclear

(Cited in Utgoff and Adesnik, p51)

- Public attitudes - implications
 - The President and other senior leaders must constantly educate the public on the importance of extended deterrence; today most Americans are ignoring the issue
 - Nuclear reductions must be limited enough to still allow extended deterrence; announcement of such reductions should make this clear
 - The United States must use great caution that de-emphasis of nuclear weapons does not imply de-legitimization of extended deterrence
 - “If the President and his political appointees and advisors are seen as wise and prudent...the American public is more likely to be supportive.” (Utgoff and Adesnik, p53)

Cases to consider

- NATO
 - Deterrence of Russian aggression or intimidation
- Turkey
 - Deter both Russia and Iran
 - Preventing Turkey from seeking nuclear weapons
- Japan
 - Deterrence of aggression or intimidation by China or North Korea
- Middle East
 - Deterrence of a nuclear armed Iran
 - Preventing a nuclear arms race if Iran acquires nuclear weapons

Other, less relevant, cases

- South Korea
 - In theory, must deter North Korea, but chances of a North Korean attack very low
 - Conditions for extended deterrence are good (U.S. troops, legal obligation, no ability by North Korea to strike U.S. homeland)
 - Until recently, limited concern in the south; it is unclear how May 25 North Korean test will play
- Taiwan
 - Deter attempt at forcible takeover by China (currently unlikely)
 - Not really about U.S. extended nuclear deterrence of China, but rather Chinese attempt to deter U.S. intervention
 - Taiwan of two minds on U.S. nuclear umbrella: Strengthens deterrence but could complicate relations with China
 - Public opinion in Taiwan by a large margin opposes use of U.S. nuclear weapons in a conflict with the mainland*

(*) Dunn, et al, p 186 ff

Extended Deterrence in NATO

Current situation

- Extended deterrence in NATO is the most robust case of such deterrence
- Accepted by the potential aggressor (Russia), the protected states and the American public

- Legal obligations (NATO Article V), deployed U.S. troops, long-standing consultative mechanism, consistent U.S. statements on the importance of Europe and presence of tactical weapons all reinforce extended deterrence
 - Carefully crafted NATO declaratory policy including stress on U.S. strategic forces as the ultimate underpinning of the Alliance also helps

The future of tactical nuclear weapons

- NATO allies (especially East European allies and Turkey) value retention of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
- There are no current strong pressures either in Europe or the United States to remove them
- Wide acceptance of the view that removal should only be done in consultation with allies
- Long term Administration arms control plans, however, could lead to pressure to remove these weapons in a few years

Arms control and extended deterrence

- Some see a conflict between extended deterrence and the move toward elimination the President has called for
 - Fear is that U.S. forces will drop below the level needed to provide a nuclear umbrella
 - This conflict will exist at some time in the (distant) future, but not for the next several years
 - U.S. officials should avoid raising fears
- There is a potential problem with the treaty most assume the Administration will seek once the START replacement has been agreed to
 - The United States will probably seek to capture Russian tactical weapons, inevitably putting U.S. weapons in Europe in play
 - To avoid conflicts within NATO, the United States should discuss this possibility well in advance, focusing on how to maintain extended deterrence if U.S. tactical weapons are withdrawn
 - Withdrawal should only take place if allies agree

The NATO issue in Central Europe

“From the perspective of Central Europe’s, the greatest danger of any move to change the parameter of the extended deterrence – for example, of making the decision to eliminate the U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe – would be to create the impression that NATO has somehow gone soft where its primary function of defending the territories of the member states is concerned.”(Lukasz Kulesa, 2009 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference)

- Decision to modernize the B61 and make F-35 dual capable will help signal intent to remain engaged.
 - But need to begin to discuss long-term prospects for removal

Turkey

- Turkey faces unique challenges:
- Continued rejection by European Union, leading to sense of isolation
- Concern with Iran (Shia/Sunni issue; theocracy versus secular state)
- Proximity to potentially unstable areas seen by Russia as within their sphere of influence
- Thus Turkey uniquely concerned with any withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, especially while Iran issue is unresolved

An approach

- Starting now, use existing NATO consultative mechanisms to stress that extended deterrence does not depend on the presence of tactical weapons in Europe
- Do not, however, delay B61 modernization
- Consult with concerned European allies (individually and through NATO) on what steps would reassure them of the continued nuclear umbrella if tactical weapons were withdrawn
- Stress in public and private the role of strategic nuclear forces as the supreme guarantee of NATO security
- Reaffirm non-nuclear aspects of NATO deterrence, including a Missile Defence architecture covering all allied territory
- If (when?) withdrawals are contemplated, consult extensively prior to acting
- Do not withdraw weapons over allied opposition
- Do not withdraw weapons from Europe if the Iranian situation is unresolved or if Iran becomes an overt nuclear power

Japan and extended deterrence

- Japan's broad strategic concerns
 - End of Cold War lessened Japan's perceived value to the United States
 - Three potentially hostile nuclear states near Japan
 - United States is Japan's only significant military ally
- IMPLICATION: In some sense Japan is permanently insecure
- Japan's specific fears concerning extended deterrence
 - Large reduction in U.S. nuclear forces or the de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in U.S. military doctrine will reduce credibility of the threat of U.S. retaliation
 - Closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japan's security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment
 - In providing extended deterrence, the United States is less interested in Japan's security and more concerned with preventing a Japanese decision to acquire its own nuclear weapons
- Japanese desired attributes for deterrent forces - -
 - U.S. forces should be
 - Flexible (hold variety of targets at risk)
 - Credible (including modernized warheads)
 - Able to respond to contingencies promptly
 - Discriminate (minimum collateral damage)
 - Able to be stealthy (e.g., SSBN regional deployment) or visible (B-2/B-52 deployment to Guam)
 - Sufficient for dissuasion
- Attitudes on specific topics
 - See TLAM/N as a tool for redeployment to extend deterrence
 - Want consultations if it is to be eliminated
 - Worry that U.S. – Russia arms control will not take China into account (e.g., no deep cuts)
 - Once again, want consultations
 - Missile defenses essential for extended deterrence
 - Strong overall defense cooperation increases credibility of the nuclear guarantee

Approach

- Consultation is key to maintaining deterrence credible
 - Establish a more regular, government forum for nuclear consultation

- Include discussion of nuclear scenarios
- Formally consult before any NPR decision to eliminate TLAM/N by explaining how that action does not weaken deterrence
- Formally consult on U.S.-Russian arms control
- Do not alter force structure/infrastructure outcomes of NPR based on Japan
 - Ideas like nuclear storage sites in Japan are premature and not needed for reassurance

Extended Deterrence in the Middle East in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran

- Strategic threats from a nuclear Iran (rough order of severity)
 1. An Iranian nuclear strike against a U.S. ally, U.S. installations abroad, or with improved delivery technology, the U.S. itself.
 2. The transfer of a nuclear weapon by Iran to a non-state actor that then attacks a U.S. ally, U.S. installations abroad, or the U.S. homeland.
 3. A nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel, either as a result of a deliberate first-strike by one side or as a result of miscalculation.
 4. Increased Iranian conventional aggressiveness.
 5. Further nuclear proliferation in the region and/or the breakdown of the NPT.
 6. Economic repercussions resulting from increased instability in the Middle East and the concomitant rise in energy prices.*
 7. A general increase in Iran's willingness to throw its weight around
- U.S. extended deterrent is almost certainly only applicable to the first three cases; item 7 is the most likely result of a nuclear-armed Iran

Items 1-6 drawn from Ariel Ratner, CSIS PONI program research proposal

Pros and cons of extending deterrence to new states*

PROS

- Recipients presumably will not proliferate
- U.S. nuclear umbrella safer for United States than proliferation
- U.S. retains control (NATO somewhat of an exception)
- Depending on the state, could share risks and burdens
- Presumably only offered to states whose security is important to the United States

CONS

- Additional risks, costs, and political-diplomatic burdens
 - Costs are financial but also keeping burden of escalation on adversary
- “Commitment trap” if aggression occurs**
 - Pressure on United States to respond even if unwise

*See Utgoff and Adnesnik, 2008)

**“Commitment trap” from Scott Sagan)

Extending deterrence to Israel: situation

- Historically United States regards Israel’s security as a vital interest
- Israel’s own deterrent probably sufficient to deter direct attack; thus Israel may not need U.S. extended deterrent
 - But deterring Iran could require Israel to make their program overt, leading to a cascade of proliferation
- U.S. public would probably support a commitment to Israel
- Israel probably unwilling to discuss now
 - Fear it implies U.S. acceptance of an Iranian bomb
 - Fear the price will be constraints on Israel’s freedom of action

Extending deterrence to Israel: approach

- Before Iran obtains nuclear weapons
 - Continue to ensure Israel has strong missile defenses and that U.S. missile defenses reduce the chance that Iran can attack the United States
 - Continue to make it clear in public and private that Israel’s security is a U.S. vital interest
- If Iran goes nuclear
 - Consult with Israel and offer overt U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in return for Israel not conducting a nuclear strike and remaining ambiguous over its nuclear deterrent
 - Conduct private strategic-level consultations on coordinated responses to Iranian use

Extending deterrence: Other Mideast States

- Situation
 - General stability in the Middle East is important, but Saudi Arabia (oil) is the only country whose independence and survival is a vital U.S. interest
 - U.S. public and Congressional support for a nuclear umbrella over a despotic, theocratic regime from which the 9/11 attackers came is exceptionally unlikely
- Approach
 - Use a modification of the U.S. strategic ambiguity (based on the approach to deterring BW use): promise devastating but unspecified retaliation if Saudi is attacked or its oil flow is disrupted
 - Supply missile defenses to all Gulf states; urge (and help) them to net their defense together

A caveat for all discussions

U.S. officials should ... [place] any discussion of deterring Iran within a framework of how to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear program as well as how to persuade Middle East states not to proliferate. Talk of deterrence should be used to make Iran's nuclear program less attractive to its leaders. Through discussion of political and military countermeasures, the United States and its Middle East friends should sow doubts in Iranian minds—and those of others Iran may wish to intimidate—about whether Iran's nuclear program will ever be militarily effective or politically useful.*

(*) Preventing a Cascade of Instability

A special case for deterrence: Transfer to terrorists

- Transfer to terrorists
- Only remotely plausible cases (although unlikely):
 - North Korea (financial motivation)
 - Iran or a Taliban-dominated Pakistan (ideological or religious motivation)
- This is not primarily a question of extended deterrence
 - Terrorist target would probably be the United States or, perhaps, Israel
 - For both states, deterrence of the terrorists by denial (border security) is the main defense
 - Israel particularly strong here

Approach

- Improve attribution capabilities
 - Including the ability to conduct attribution of detonations outside the United States
- Reaffirm Bush Administration declaratory policy:
 - “The United States has made clear for many years that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our people, our forces, and our friends and allies. Today we also make clear that the United States will hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor or individual fully accountable for supporting or enabling terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction...” (National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, May 28, 2008)
- Stress in public and private that this policy applies to threats against those allies under our nuclear umbrella

Concluding thought

- Extended deterrence, like all deterrence, exists in the mind

- The single most important step the United States can take, therefore, is to cultivate the perception that we will act to meet our obligations.
- Crucial to avoid public statements by any level of government that could undermine this perception
- All other details, while important, are secondary

References used in this analysis

- America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, May 2009
- Bloyer, Darci and Zachariah M. Becker, "Building an Extended U.S. Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century," *A Collection of Papers from the 2008 PONI Conference Series*. Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008
- Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debates, Prospects and U.S. Interests*, Congressional Research Service, February 19, 2009
- Dunn, Lewis, et al, Foreign Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy and Posture: Insights, Issues and Implications, SAIC Report TI-18-05-21, 12 December 2006
- Kulesa, Lukasz, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, April 6, 2009, Panel Discussion, "Are the Requirements For Extended Deterrence Changing?"
- National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, Remarks at the Proliferation Security Initiative Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting, Washington, D.C., May 28, 2008
- Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, December 2008
- Roberts, Brad, "On the U.S. Posture in Asia in 2009 and Beyond, discussion paper prepared for the U.S. Japan Strategic Dialogue, Pacific Forum, CSIS, February 2009 (with Japanese responses)
- "Sagan, Scott, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks," *International Security*, Summer 2000
- Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, *Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 2009
- Utgoff, Victor and David Adesnik, *On Strengthening and Expanding the US Nuclear Umbrella to Dissuade Nuclear Proliferation*, Washington DC, Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-4356, Draft Final, July 2008
- Yaphe, Judith S. and Charles D. Lutes, *Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran*, McNair Paper 69, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2005

Extended Deterrence and Assurance

Ms. Elaine Bunn, NDU

Briefing to CSIS Workshop, 3 June 2009

- After almost two decades in the shadows, extended deterrence is back in the spotlight. You can actually get numerous hits when you google the term – some of them articles, testimony, and speeches given by people in this room. Not surprising, given:
 - North Korea's nuclear test last week, as well as their original nuclear test in 2006, and the series of missile tests in April and May this year
 - Iran's ongoing quest for nuclear weapons which can rattle the Middle East;
 - China's ongoing military modernization; and
 - Russia reasserting itself.
- The May 6 report of Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission pointed out that,
 - “...developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect allies and friends at least as much as they affect the United States. Their particular views of the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in an evolving security environment must be understood and addressed by the United States.”
- We can debate whether the world is on the brink of a nuclear tipping point-- where a combination of changes in the international environment could set off a domino effect –
 - with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons so as not to be left behind -- or to develop nuclear "hedge" capacities that would allow them to build nuclear arsenals relatively quickly, if necessary.
- But in such a circumstance, some who have previously renounced nuclear weapons could reconsider, including US allies such as Japan, South Korea and Turkey.
 - U.S. security guarantees – including extended deterrence **broadly** and extended *nuclear* deterrence specifically – are clearly topics that will be addressed in current reviews – QDR, NPR, and BMD review
- Of course, in order to *extend* deterrence, the United States must first be able to deter.
 - Even with the ongoing and evolving reassessment of deterrence in the United States over the past decade or more, there is not yet complete consensus on what deterrence means, whom we are most concerned about deterring from doing what, what capabilities should be included in any examination of deterrence, and how to deter most effectively (recognizing that there is less confidence than during the Cold War that deterrence will always be successful) .
 - But there is a widely-held recognition in the US of the need to adjust deterrence to each of a wide range of potential opponents, actions, and situations, and a wider range of capabilities that contribute to deterrence.
 - As the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept puts it, the objective of deterrence operations is “to decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against US vital interests...An adversary’s deterrence decision calculus focuses on their perception of three primary elements”: the benefits of a course of action; the costs of a course of action; and the consequences of restraint (i.e., costs and benefits of not taking the course of action we seek to deter).

Tailoring Extended Deterrence

- It's not clear whether the “tailored deterrence” terminology of the last administration will survive;
 - Last fall I predicted it would not, since one thing new administrations normally do is change terminology to distance themselves from the previous administration;
 - Now I think it might -- partly because, with Gates remaining at DoD, the 2008 National Defense Strategy appears to be the foundation of the QDR.
 - Whether the “tailored” term survives or not, I’m going to use it for illustrative purposes today and apply it to the issue of extended deterrence.

- The challenges of tailoring **extended** deterrence (broadly defined -- not just nuclear deterrence) can be examined by looking at three aspects: tailoring to specific allies; tailoring capabilities; and tailoring communications

First, extended deterrence and assurance require tailoring for each ally– for example, understanding:

- Whom allies are worried about, and what those allies are worried about their doing;
- how they think about deterrence; and how their views of it are evolving;
 - To be able to extend deterrence requires that we can deter our allies' adversaries;
 - And assurance requires that allies believe that we can and will do so
 - [note difference between extended deterrence and assurance: the former focuses on influencing adversaries' calculations; the latter focuses on our allies' calculations. Related but distinct concepts.]
- what they see as key objectives;
- how they're influenced by domestic constituencies, politics, and history;
- what they believe about the extended deterrer—in this case, the US; and
- What they think the correct division of labor is between them and us when it comes to deterrence.
- Who's on the list of allies? And what is the nature of the US extended deterrence commitment to them?
 - Now, there may be a different number for extended deterrence *broadly* speaking, and extended *nuclear* deterrence.
 - Not sure whether others are including perhaps Taiwan, or Israel, or Thailand and Philippines, or Saudi Arabia or just whom.
 - A number of analysts have talked about extending deterrence in Middle East if Iran gets nuclear weapons.
 - The US may want to *consider* extending deterrence – either broadly defined, or specifically nuclear deterrence – to others, but it should do so only after full consideration of pros and cons, and only after figuring out how it would do so.

Second is tailoring the mix of capabilities relevant to extended deterrence, based on the specific allies and the specific threats they face.

- While U.S. views on deterrence are evolving, so may those of U.S. allies—including the role of offenses and defenses, and the role of U.S. capabilities versus their own capabilities to underpin deterrence.
- To be sure, extended deterrence is more than just extended *nuclear* deterrence.
 - U.S. conventional capabilities play an important – and increasing – role in extended deterrence.
 - And some allies have debated improving their own conventional strike capabilities – evidenced by the 2003 Diet debate over whether Japan should pursue conventional Tomahawk capability, as well as their later request for the F-22 (the recent F-22 turndown for Japan probably won't seriously damage the alliance -- unless we sell it to someone else-- like Australia)
 - Defenses, particularly missile defenses, have gained acceptance, even enthusiasm, among some allies as a complementary part of extended deterrence. Look at the Emphasis and resources Japan is putting into Aegis and Patriot.
 - Forward military presence and force projection capabilities continue to help the United States extend deterrence to allies.
- Beyond military capabilities, extended deterrence broadly understood rests on the overall health of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue, consultation, and coordinated defense planning.
- In addition, the United States' reputation as a security guarantor is shaped by trends in US behavior, in the international arena.
 - Historically many allies have been conflicted on this–

- on the one hand, fearing abandonment (wondering if the United States will really be there when needed, illustrated by the age-old question, “Would the U.S. really trade New York for Berlin (or Los Angeles for Tokyo, or Chicago for Ankara)?”);
 - and on the other hand, fearing entrapment or entanglement (getting pulled into situations or conflicts against the ally’s interests).
- To be assured, allies need to have confidence in American judgment and reliability; if not, specific capabilities -- nuclear or otherwise -- do not really matter.
- However, focusing specifically on extended *nuclear* deterrence, what characteristics do U.S. nuclear forces need in order to assure allies?
- Do U.S. nuclear weapons need to be deployed or deployable to the region in question in order to reassure allies? And how visible do they need to be?
 - At present, the only U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on allied territory are the remaining air-delivered bombs in several NATO countries that could be delivered by dual-capable U.S. or allied aircraft.
 - While the United States at one time deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea, they were removed almost two decades ago, and the extension of nuclear deterrence to allies in the Asia-Pacific region has since then been by offshore nuclear forces.
 - The ability to deploy nuclear weapons to a region to deter or assure has declined over the years.
 - In 1991 and 1992, President George H.W. Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives eliminated most so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons.¹⁷²
 - In 1994, the United States announced its decision to permanently give up the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers or other surface ships.
 - While the decision in 1994 was to retain the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on attack submarines, there has been a budget battle nearly every year since over whether to retain TLAM-N. The TLAM-N is a system that has not been updated with all the modern improvements made to the conventional version, and may atrophy soon.
 - However, Japan (or at least some Japanese officials) is said to place importance on retention of nuclear Tomahawk missiles, even if in a reserve status, as evidence of the credibility of US security guarantees.
 - The question is whether or not Japan could be reassured about the US nuclear guarantee through other means.
- *If a visible presence is important to the reassurance of allies, there may be other capabilities which can be made visible.*
 - The deployment of nuclear-capable B-2s to Guam or Diego Garcia have been covered in the news media at various times (probably not by accident);
 - and looking to historical precedents, even nuclear submarines can be made visible in order to send a deterrence and reassurance signal: when the US withdrew its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey in the 1960s as a consequence of the Cuban missile crisis, a *Polaris* strategic submarine, then deployed in the Mediterranean, made a port call to Izmir to demonstrate the continuing US nuclear presence in the region.
- The question is, how much does visibility really matter to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence?
- Besides visible nuclear forces or forces deployable to the region, there may be *other ways* to help demonstrate the credibility U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for the future security of Japan, South Korea, Turkey and others.
- Options range from additional affirmation of the U.S. nuclear guarantee; to the type of discussion of nuclear scenarios that Japanese defense officials have suggested; to the institutionalization of exchanges on nuclear deterrence matters.

¹⁷² The term “tactical” or “non-strategic” nuclear weapons is oxymoronic: all nuclear weapons would be strategic in their effect; “tactical” or “non-strategic nuclear weapons are really just differently-deployed. This is leftover terminology, meaning nuclear weapons not covered by START, SORT or other arms control agreements

- Similarly, in light of the perceived importance of a U.S.-NATO nuclear tie in the thinking of “new” NATO members, how best to provide that tie in a changed environment also merits further examination.
- As officials in NPR think about numbers and characteristics of nuclear forces they will need to consciously address the issue of how to reassure allies that the extended nuclear pledge is still viable-- and consider whether it will be extended to others who face newly-nuclear neighbors (if Iran continues down the nuclear path, and others follow).
- But one should recognize that aspects of “nuclear posture” which reassure one ally may disturb (or even frighten the bejeezus out of) another – whether that is nuclear weapons deployed on their territory, or U.S. modernization of its nuclear weapons.
- Extended D is very different in different regions (NE Asia is not Europe) -- and even in the same region (Germany is not Lithuania is not Turkey).
 - (While some in Europe might be happy to see DCA nuclear weapons leave Europe, others would not. To quote an official from a Baltic country at a recent NATO conference, “I was in high school when I watched the Russians leave my country – I don’t want them ever to come back.” But ironically, it’s generally those who cannot have nuclear weapons on their territory who don’t want nuclear weapons removed from Europe, while basing countries would be generally more relaxed or even supportive of their removal.)
- Nuclear weapons are kind of like the wedding ring of the marriage – there are those in cultures that don’t wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who don’t really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one.
- I also have to wonder what the role of the US nuclear infrastructure – both physical and human – will be over time in assuring allies about extended *nuclear* deterrence.
- I believe that – with proper consultation – it’s not the specific characteristics, composition or size of the US nuclear arsenal that are likely to impact allies’ views of the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence.
- However, the perception of **inattention** to things nuclear – the cumulative effect of numerous individual events, incidents, decisions or lack of resolution over how to sustain US nuclear infrastructure - may at some point add up to allied concern.

Third, Tailoring Communication and Consultation

- The clarity and credibility of American messages (words and deeds) in the mind of the *assuree* are critical.
 - U.S. policymakers need mechanisms to assess how their words and actions are perceived, how they affect the assurance of each ally, and how the US might mitigate misperceptions that undermine extended deterrence and assurance.
- Assurance –like deterrence – is in the eye of the beholder.
 - A key difference though, is that with deterrence, we can’t just go ask adversaries:, “what will it take to deter you?”—or at least if we did, we probably shouldn’t believe the answers.
 - But with assurance, we CAN, in essence ask allies and friends what reassures them, and what factors are most important in their remaining non-nuclear
- However, a few cautions:
- Some Americans have a tendency to “lead the witness” in the ways we talk to allies about extended deterrence – soliciting the views we think are correct. (e.g., asking the Japanese, “Would you be concerned if the US gave up the TLAM-N”? or asking NATO countries, “Would you be concerned if the US removed DCA bombs in Europe?” or “Aren’t you concerned about drastic US reductions?”)
 - It may be that someone from an allied country – in track 1, 1.5 or 2 discussions – has indicated such concerns.
 - But I find it interesting that we think about shaping *adversaries’* thinking (that’s what deterrence is) but sometimes take our *allies’* views as immutable.

- I think we may be able to shape how Japan thinks about TLAM-N, or Europe about DCA, or other allies about other aspects of extended deterrence.
- It would take time, attention, listening as well as talking, and sustained effort (often not US strong suits)
- It would take in-depth, regular and sustained consultations – not just flying in, giving a briefing and flying out --so not likely in the near term to have done adequate consultations
- It would also take a well-thought-out plan that carefully considered both long-term as well as expedient, short-term consequences.
- Caution for 2009 NPR: Be careful what you say – takes on a life of its own with allies
 - Two cautionary tales on assurance
 - 1994 NPR and the Japanese: In trying to reassure Japanese officials (the handful who “spoke nuclear” at the time) in the face of the ’94 decision to give up the US capability to put NW on surface ships, some US officials noted that the US retained the capability to redeploy TLAM-N on SSNs
 - May be source of some Japanese officials thinking TLAM-N is “their” extended deterrent; makes it hard to give up, even if USG decided it wanted to do so instead of replacing/refurbishing
 - 2001 NPR: Explicitly talked about supporting dissuasion by retaining a sufficient margin over countries with expanding nuclear arsenals such as China -- and now some Japanese officials appear to take the ‘dissuasion’ goal more seriously than U.S. officials do.– will need X times more than China, but not sure what “X” is
 - But it will take time to convince Japan that extended deterrence does not depend on specific systems or specific numbers
- Within the Japanese defense community, there is a clear interest in U.S.-Japan discussions of the types of conflict scenarios that could bring the American nuclear guarantee into play as one means to demonstrate and buttress the credibility of extended deterrence.
 - Ambassador Yukio Satoh’s article in Feb. 09 – significant because a former high-ranking Japanese official spoke publicly about the need for more in-depth bilateral discussions of nuclear deterrence issues
- For all allies – but with special focus on Japan, SK, Turkey, new Europe: need better discussions – in track 1, 1.5, track 2 -- about whom we’re worried about, what worried about their doing, and how to deal with it—as well as nature of deterrence, dissuasion, assurance.
- In his Singapore speech on Saturday, Sec Gates noted that the QDR and NPR will at times be “a messy process,” but it will be an open and transparent exercise -- so that no one will get the wrong idea about our intentions.” . “We will consult with key allies and partners. And we will articulate our strategy clearly. It is our hope that this effort can be an example of the power of openness and its ability to reduce miscommunication.”

Conclusion

- In the end, if the US is comfortable with its own nuclear posture and can – and **does** – make the case to allies that its security commitments, including extended nuclear deterrence, remain strong, then allies are likely to be assured.
- In the longer term, there may be a larger question: Will the United States continue to play a major role in the world, in underpinning global stability, and specifically in extending nuclear deterrence to others?
- But in the nearer term-- as long as there are nuclear weapons in the hands of others --the United States will need to sustain a safe and effective nuclear weapons capability; and as long as the United States plays a leading role in the world, its nuclear weapons will be about more than its own security.

Backup:

- It is not impossible that allies could get to the point where they are insufficiently reassured because of the details of the size or composition or basing of our nuclear arsenal.

- This occurred in the late 1970's, when West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt voiced concerns shared by other European NATO nations that the Soviets' SS-20 could 'decouple' the US strategic nuclear force from the defense of Europe.
- This led to the dual-track decision and the basing of Pershing IIs and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe – because nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM-N) off the coast of Europe was insufficiently "coupling" to reassure NATO allies.
- So there have been times in history when allies did care greatly about the precise composition and disposition of U.S. nuclear forces.
- But at this point, there is nothing to indicate that allies are insufficiently reassured about the U.S. nuclear arsenal because of any specific technical characteristics of it.
- Of course, they can be talked into it by *self*-denigration of U.S. nuclear capability.
 - In particular, talk of the US being "self-deterred" -- usually put forward by those who most support new nuclear weapons – is counterproductive from an assurance (and a deterrence) stand point.
 - By the same logic, although it is unlikely that allies will no longer be assured if the United States fails to adopt specific modernization programs for its nuclear arsenal, public statements by U.S. officials bemoaning the declining health of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure may evoke concern among U.S. allies about the long-term dependability of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence.
 - Granted, it is a catch-22 situation: in a democracy, changes one may think are needed will not be made unless there is public examination and debate;
 - but unless the United States is able to come to a domestic consensus to fill the gaps identified, pointing out perceived gaps in U.S. nuclear capabilities and infrastructure can **undermine assurance** (as well as deterrence).

ZERO

- How to assess the goal of zero –an idea which has seen a renaissance following the editorials of Perry, Nunn, Schulz and Kissinger– and what practical steps can be taken along that path
- In that regard, I'd like to quote Sir Michael Quinlan, the former British Permanent Under Secretary who died three weeks ago.
 - Sir Michael was a mentor and role model to me, and I suspect to a number of people in this room.
 - He always wrote about nuclear issues and deterrence with eloquence and clear-eyed vision.
 - In what is likely one of his last writings --a short piece on preventing nuclear proliferation, which we at the Institute for National Strategic Studies commissioned for our upcoming volume, Global Strategic Assessment--Sir Michael wrote:
 - "There remains the idea of eventually abolishing all nuclear armories. That goal was agreed at the 2000 NPT review conference, and though at the 2005 conference the United States and France declined to reaffirm it, the aspiration has attracted growing attention in the past few years. However skeptical the nuclear weapons states' governments may be, there is a good case that they should be prepared to engage—as the United Kingdom has already proposed—in serious exploration of the concept, if only to ensure that its formidable difficulties and potential drawbacks, both political and technical, are adequately understood and exposed."

SPC Findings and Recommendations relevant to extended deterrence/assurance:

Chapter I: On Challenges and Opportunities

- Finding: 8. "…developments in major power nuclear relations and proliferation affect allies and friends at least as much as they affect the United States. Their particular views of the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in an evolving security environment must be understood and addressed by the United States."

- Recommendation: 4. “The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence and assurance. As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps to increase allied consultations should be expanded.”

Chapter 2 – On the Nuclear Posture

- Finding 3: “In formulating an overall posture, the United States should employ a broad concept of deterrence. Extended deterrence and dissuasion and the need to hedge against uncertainty have certain design implications.”
- Finding 4: “Currently, no one seriously contemplates a direct Russian attack on the United States. Some US allies located closer to Russia are fearful of Russia and look to the United States for reassurance.”
- Recommendation 4: “The United States should also retain capabilities for the delivery on non-strategic nuclear weapons and proceed in close consultation with allies in Europe and Asia in doing so.”

Chapter 4 –On Declaratory Policy

- Recommendation 1: “The United States should reaffirm that the purpose of its nuclear force is deterrence, as broadly defined to include also assurance of its allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries.”

Chapter 7: On Arms Control

- Finding 3: “The imbalance of non-strategic weapons will become more prominent and worrisome as strategic reductions continue and will require new arms control approaches that are also reassuring to U.S. allies.”
- Recommendation 4: “Sustain the commitment to the INF Treaty and commit to new efforts to work in partnership with Russian and NATO allies to negotiate reductions in non-strategic nuclear forces.”
Recommendation 6: Take the lead in renewing strategic dialogue with a broad set of states interested in strategic stability, including not just Russia and China, but also U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia.”

2008 National Defense Strategy

“In the contemporary strategic environment, the challenge is one of deterring or dissuading a range of potential adversaries from taking a variety of actions against the U.S. and our allies and interests. These adversaries could be states or non-state actors; they could use nuclear, conventional, or unconventional weapons; and they could exploit terrorism, electronic, cyber and other forms of warfare. Economic interdependence and the growth of global communications further complicate the situation. Not only do they blur the types of threats, they also exacerbate sensitivity to the effects of attacks and in some cases make it more difficult to attribute or trace them. Finally, the number of potential adversaries, the breadth of their capabilities, and the need to design approaches to deterrence for each, create new challenges.

We must tailor deterrence to fit particular actors, situations, and forms of warfare. The same developments that add to the complexity of the challenge also offer us a greater variety of capabilities and methods to deter or dissuade adversaries. This diversity of tools, military and non-military, allows us to create more plausible reactions to attacks in the eyes of opponents and a more credible deterrence to them. In addition, changes in capabilities, especially new technologies, permit us to create increasingly credible defenses to convince would-be attackers that their efforts are ultimately futile.

Our ability to deter attack credibly also reassures the American people and our allies of our commitment to defend them. For this reason, deterrence must remain grounded in demonstrated military capabilities that can respond to a broad array of challenges to international security. For example, the United States will maintain its nuclear arsenal as

a primary deterrent to nuclear attack, and the New Triad remains a cornerstone of strategic deterrence. We must also continue to field conventional capabilities to augment or even replace nuclear weapons in order to provide our leaders a greater range of credible responses. Missile defenses not only deter an attack, but can defend against such an attack should deterrence fail. Precision-guided munitions allow us great flexibility not only to react to attacks, but also to strike preemptively when necessary to defend ourselves and our allies.

Yet we must also recognize that deterrence has its limits, especially where our interests are ill-defined or the targets of our deterrence are difficult to influence. Deterrence may be impossible in cases where the value is not in the destruction of a target, but the attack and the very means of attack, as in terrorism. We must build both our ability to withstand attack – a fundamental and defensive aspect of deterrence – and improve our resiliency beyond an attack. An important change in planning for the myriad of future potential threats must be post-attack recovery and operational capacity. This, too, helps demonstrate that such attacks are futile, as does our ability to respond with strength and effectiveness to attack. For the future, the global scope of problems, and the growing complexity of deterrence in new domains of conflict, will require an integrated interagency and international approach if we are to make use of all the tools available to us. We must consider which non-lethal actions constitute an attack on our sovereignty, and which may require the use of force in response. We must understand the potential for escalation from non-lethal to lethal confrontation, and learn to calculate and manage the associated risks.”

Defining Capability Needs in Terms of Credibility Requirements for Deterrence/Extended Deterrence, Assurance and Self-Resolve

Dr. Clark Murdock, CSIS

Briefing to CSIS Workshop, 3 June 2009

Growing Importance of Extended Deterrence (ExD)

- Increasing contributions to Post-9/11 International Security
 - **DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities (Dec 2006):** [A]llied confidence in U.S. nuclear capabilities has been at the heart of the extended “nuclear umbrella.” An enduring, reliable U.S. capability enhances assurance to allies reducing their motivation to acquire or expand their nuclear weapons capabilities. A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent capability contributes significantly to global non-proliferation.
 - **Strategic Posture Review Commission (SPRC) (Dec 2008):** Our non-proliferation strategy will continue to depend upon U.S. *extended deterrence strategy* [no emphasis added] as one of its pillars. Our military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, underwrite U.S. security guarantees to our allies, without which many of them would feel enormous pressures to create their own nuclear arsenals.
- Increasing importance to the design of the U.S. Nuclear Posture
 - **SPRC (April 2009):** [A]ssurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers and types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.
 - **In his May 2009 testimony to the HASC, Dr. Schlesinger took this further:** [B]oth the size and the specific elements of our forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U. S. requirements alone.

Assessing the impact of U.S. capabilities on Deterrence/ Extended Deterrence

- The requirements are evolving
 - **SPRC (April 2009):** The requirements of extended deterrence in Europe are evolving, given the changing relationship with Russia, the perception of some allies that they are keenly vulnerable to Russian military coercion, and the perception of others of a rising nuclear threat from the Middle East. The requirements of extended deterrence in Asia are also evolving, as North Korea has crossed the nuclear threshold and China modernizes its strategic forces. In the Middle East, various states depend on the United States as a security guarantor and question whether or how it might stand up to a nuclear-armed regional power.
- But, as Linton Brooks recently observed, “there is no agreed way to relate [nuclear] force structure to specific military outcomes:”
 - The primary national security output of nuclear forces is deterrence, a widely accepted concept that has never been quantified. We know that doubling the number of infantry divisions increases the amount of terrain that can be defended... But we have no idea whether doubling the number of operationally deployed strategic offensive warheads has the slightest effect on deterrence or on any of the other policy goals often cited for nuclear weapons.
- These complexities are exacerbated in the ExD context
 - **SPRC (April 2009):** Some U.S. allies believe that extended deterrence requires little more than stability in the central balances of nuclear power among the major powers. But other allies believe their needs can only be met with very specific U.S. nuclear capabilities. This point was brought home vividly in our work as a Commission. [Examples: modernization of U.S. NSNF deployed in Europe, specific capabilities to hold a variety of targets at risk, ability to deploy them either visibly or stealthy]

- **Defense Science Board (December 2008):** Most of the available thinking in the U.S. defense community about extended deterrence is deeply rooted in the requirements of strategic relationships constructed during the Cold War. Only sporadic efforts exist to engage in strategic dialogues with allies and friends that explore what they see as necessary and sufficient...

Instead, Focus on Credibility

[Figure: Watman and Wilkening Components of Credibility Diagram – See Chapter 3]

- The credibility of a deterrent threat depends on whether the challenger believes the deterrer will do what he says he will do, i.e., on his perception of the deterrer's intent (resolve and commitment are synonyms)... For a threat to be credible, both intent and capability must be in evidence.
- ...To some extent, intent and capability are fungible. If the challenger believes the deterrer's intent or resolve is weak, a particularly clear and compelling capability to do what the deterrer says he will do can compensate, to some extent. Similarly, if the challenger believes the deterrer's capability is weak, a particularly strong resolve can make a deterrent threat appear credible."
- Credibility is in the "eye of the beholder." While still subjective, we can analyze adversary behavior to assess what is believable to him or ask allies what assurances are credible to them. SPRC (2009):
 - [T]he U.S. nuclear force posture should not be re-designed without substantive and high-level consultations with U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia and we cannot prejudge the conclusions of such consultations here. The Commission's own consultations on this topic have brought home to us that U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia are not all of a single mind concerning the requirements for deterrence and assurance. These have also brought home the fact that the requirement to extend assurance and deterrence to others may well impose on the United States an obligation to retain numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it might not otherwise deem essential to its own defense.

Adding "Self-Resolve" to Deterrence/ExD & Assurance

- Watman & Wilkening stress "reputation for action" as a key element of credibility.
 - The challenger's perception of the deterrer's intent, in turn, depends on two main factors; the challenger's perception of the deterrer's interests in the conflict and his perception of the deterrer's reputation for defending those interests. A defender's reputation may also refer to the capability to carry out specific threats – hence, the dashed line between reputation and capability" in the figure on Slide 6.
- As chronicled in many reports, the U.S. has lost focus on the nuclear mission and its nuclear competence has eroded. We "talk the talk" but have failed to "walk the walk."
 - The pre-Gulf War deterrent threat (by Secretary Baker to FM Aziz) was later belied by memoirs from Bush, Scowcroft, Baker and Powell that no consideration had really been given to the nuclear option.
 - The U.S. is the only nuclear power that has failed to modernize its nuclear arsenal and retain a healthy infrastructure.
 - With its huge margin in conventional power, the U.S. military often behaves as if it doesn't need nuclear capabilities and that its political leaders would never authorize their use even if it did.
 - The SPRC noted the lack of attention of senior-level USG officials to the U.S. nuclear mission and felt it necessary to recommend that U.S. declaratory policy for employment of its nuclear forces should "be understood to reflect the intention of national leadership."
- "Self-resolve" captures the extent to which we really mean what we say and that our intent (as reflected in what we say) is (and will be) expressed in our actions.
 - Self-Resolve – The extent to which the United States takes the actions called for by its expressed statements of intent.
 - It's not just how others perceive our resolve; its whether we are resolved.

Capability Implications of Key Relationships as Seen by Their Effect on Credibility

[Figure: Implications of Key Relationships – See Appendix A]

Why Self-Resolve Matters

- U.S. “audiences” for U.S. nuclear issues have been indifferent, neglectful, ignorant, etc., beginning at the very top:
 - *Senior political officials* rarely talk about them. Long interval between President George W. Bush in March 2001 (NDU speech) and President Barack Obama in April 2009. Even longer pre-Bush 43.
 - *Uninformed military* consumed by the post-CW (particularly since 9/11) OPTEMPO and has lost interest in a mission whose intent is to prevent capabilities from being used.
 - *Congress*. Those members of Congress that know anything about nuclear issues number in the single-digits. Politics of nuclear modernization driven by the views & constituency interests of a few individuals.
 - *American Public*. Not a salient issue for the American people, who believe that the U.S. is a nuclear power second to none, but has less than 500 warheads.
- Extending deterrence, particularly nuclear deterrence, to prevent further nuclear proliferation will require strong domestic political support.
 - The political basis for deterring new nuclear powers and preventing them from exercising nuclear coercion over regional allies has not been built.
- The gap between what the U.S. says it will do (e.g., the U.S. assurances to Japan and the ROK after the first DPRK nuclear test) and what it would actually do is growing.
 - Including maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile and a responsive infrastructure.
- Weak resolve becomes even more pressing when U.S. policy is to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons and to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as long as they exist.
 - Prague speech includes a firm nuclear guarantee to the CZE but nothing about how to make it credible.

Testing the Utility of a Credibility-Centric Approach

- Develop a generic list of the factors affecting credibility as seen by adversaries (deterrence/extended deterrence), allies (assurance) and ourselves (self-resolve).
 - Develop separate charts for two key regions:
 - Europe (NATO)
 - East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan?)
 - Assurance of vital U.S. security partners in the Middle East (Israel, KSA, GCC) will be a key challenge facing decision makers as the Iranian nuclear program matures. Because the region lacks a baseline (existing formal assurances), however, it is not analyzed in the following charts.
 - Apply the generic credibility factors to both regions
- Use Cold War as a base line case to identify the capability elements that comprised an “effective and credible deterrent” and select future security contexts (“alternative futures”) that will put more stress on D/ExD, A & S-R
- Europe with a hostile and bellicose Russia;
 - NEA with a nuclear North Korea and a China striving for regional hegemony;
- For both regions, identify (by columns) the following:
 - Existing capabilities that contribute to the credibility of D/ExD, A & S-R, Peacetime options that could be taken to improve credibility. Additional options for strengthening credibility in the stressing scenarios

Factors Affecting Credibility to Adversaries, Allies & Ourselves

[See Factors Affecting Credibility Chart in Chapter II]

Europe			
	Cold War	Status Quo	Actions to Bolster/Strengthen ExD for a Bellicose Russia
Intent	High Saliency of Nuclear Weapons Core of U.S.-Soviet Competition Robust Security Arrangements Article V First Use Declaratory Policy Implied by Flexible Response	U.S. policy is to reduce reliance on NWs but sustain a strong deterrent as long as NWs exist	Stronger declaratory policy
Capabilities (Nuclear)	Survivable Nuclear Forces Capable of Overwhelming Retaliation U.S. Nuclear Forces Up to 2000 Warheads Independent UK & Fr Deterrents	U.S.-Russian essential equivalence at much lower #s Russia has much larger arsenal of non-strategic NWs than U.S. Independent UK & Fr nuclear deterrents	Increase U.S. NSNFs in Europe FDOs Dual-capable F-35
Capabilities (Non-Nuclear)	U.S. Troop Presence 300,000 Troops Deployed	100,000 U.S. personnel deployed in Europe	Improved NATO conventional forces Missile defenses
Actions	NATO Nuclear Planning Group Nuclear Burden Sharing Historic and Cultural Ties		Revitalize NATO NPG

East Asia			
	Cold War	Status Quo	Actions to Strengthen ExD with a hegemonic China/ nuclear DPRK
Intent	High saliency of nuclear weapons in the United States First Use Declaratory Policy Implied by Flexible Response	US Policy is to reduce reliance on NWs but sustain a strong deterrent as long as NWs exist Strong Security Commitments, Japan is “indispensible Ally”	Taiwan – formal assurance
Capabilities (Nuclear)	U.S. nuclear weapons and NSNFs deployed in South Korea (900+ at peak), Taiwan, Philippines and likely Japan	US TLAM/N In Subs until 2013	FDOs Sub Patrol in Region NWs in Guam NWs on Japanese Soil Sizing: China
Capabilities (Non-Nuclear)	Nuclear anti-submarine	Missile Defense (DPRK) US Troops in Region US Carrier in Japan	
Actions	Nuclear strike exercises; joint air defense exercises Strategic and theater nuclear planning		Establish a US-Japan Nuclear Planning Group

Some Initial Observations

- Actions that blur the distinction between “central” deterrence (threats to the U.S. homeland/Americans) and “extended” deterrence significantly strengthen credibility
 - The “trip wire” provided by over 300K American forces was clearly important.
- Deploying U.S. nuclear forces on allied territory also has a powerful dissuasive effect
 - Hard for Soviets to imagine that a Warsaw Pact-NATO conflict would remain conventional when the U.S. had about 7K NSNF deployed in Europe.
- Steps taken to bolster deterrence credibility will still be perceived as “warfighting” options that lower the nuclear threshold.
 - **DSB Task Force (2006):** “The nature of the debate over RNEP tends to ignore a fundamental truth with respect to deterrence that is worth repeating: weapons that are not seen as useable and effective by potential adversaries cannot be an effective, reliable deterrent.
 - **SPRC (2009):** “So long as the nation continues to require a nuclear deterrent, these weapons should meet the highest standards of safety, security, and reliability. The threat to use these weapons must also be seen as credible, meaning (in part) that they must be operationally effective for the intended military purpose.”
- Future stressful contexts could make it more difficult for allies that want its ExD from the U.S. to be both invisible and ironclad
 - In his 27 April 09 speech on “11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament”, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Nakasone slipped in the following: “In light of the situation in East Asia that I mentioned earlier [namely North Korea], it goes without saying that the extended deterrent including nuclear deterrence under the Japan-U.S. security arrangements is of critical importance to Japan.”

Final Questions

- How useful is it to focus on credibility as the prism for assessing the implications of changes in U.S. capabilities?
- Should “self-resolve” be added to the accepted pantheon of Deterrence/Extended Deterrence and Assurance?
 - **SPRC (2009):** “The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps to increased allied consultations should be expanded.”
 - In addition to retaining nuclear capabilities for ExD and A that are beyond what is required for direct (or central) deterrence, U.S. may need to modernize its nuclear arsenal to demonstrate its own seriousness about its nuclear missions.

U.S. Extended Deterrence Commitments in East Asia and U.S. Nuclear Posture

Mr. James Schoff, IFPA

Briefing to CSIS Workshop, 3 June 2009

Key Points for Analysis

- The nature and extent of U.S. security commitments in Asia
- The tools at our disposal vs. potential threats
- Analysis of current trends and possible outcomes
- The psychodynamics of assurance and deterrence
- Implications for U.S. posture

U.S. Commitments / Allies' Views

- Explicit “nuclear umbrella” commitments to three allies
 - Australia
 - Japan
 - Republic of Korea
- Other possible nuclear situations: Taiwan
- Potential (nuclear) adversaries
 - North Korea
 - China
 - Russia
- Terrorist group?
- Japan is the critical path

Japan as Critical Path


- More work required to hold up “nuclear umbrella”
- “Rain” more likely, legal restrictions more limiting
- North Korea and China scenarios
- ROK reluctance to devastate “its own” country
- Wedge strategy linkages
- What works for Japan should work for ROK and Taiwan

Japanese Views

- Saw need for nuclear umbrella early on, but lack expertise
- Excited about disarmament potential (split bureaucracy)
- Wary of argument that US BMD and counterforce strategy drive Chinese modernization
- Concerned about NK extortion and Chinese bullying/US abandonment

Threats & Capabilities

Figure 10: Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads



- China
 - JIN-class subs (4?) w/ JL-2 SLBMs
 - DF-31(A) w/ MaRV and MIRV
 - Sizzler ASCM, etc.
 - Su-30MKK2 fighter, etc.
- North Korea
 - NBC weapons
 - No Dong, Musadan, Taepo Dong
- Russia
 - *Borei*-class subs w/ *Bulava* SLBMs
 - Pacific fleet modernization

Trends: The Danger in Success

- U.S. conventional dominance prompts asymmetric or “modernization” response
- U.S. economic behavior enriches others and funds modernization
- Relative wealth and strength of China and Russia will grow
- Allied air and sea dominance vis-à-vis China will diminish


Trends: U.S. “Buildup” in the Pacific

Figure 11 U.S. Military Personnel in Asia before and after the Global Force Posture Review

Location	Air	Sea	Other
Alaska	Stryker, F-22		BMD
Guam	KC-135, B-1, B-2, F-22, UAV	SSGN	Marines
Hawaii	F-22	SSGN, <i>Virginia</i> Class subs	
Japan	Air defense, F-22	New carrier, SSGN	I-Corps forward; BMD
South Korea	F-16, <i>Apache</i> , JDAMs, UAV		OPCON; BMD
Pacific Overall	F-35 coming	60% of US subs; 6 carriers	New access agreements
Strategic	Global Strike	Global Strike	C4SIR


U.S. military personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific Region

Figure 12: U.S. Military Personnel Deployed in the Asia-Pacific Region



US-Japan Alliance: notional conflict escalation ladder

Figure 13: U.S.-Japan Alliance: A Notion Conflict Escalation Ladder



Psychodynamics

- New sense of vulnerability in Japan (old sense in DPRK)
- US and China wary, but closer; Japan-China relations are key
- Can't look at security ties (let alone nuclear posture) in isolation. It's political, economic, historical, and cultural...but nuclear is special.
- Deterrence vs. assurance (different audiences)

Relative Importance: Past

Figure 14: Relative Importance: Past

	Assure	Deter
Alliance strength	X	X
Nuke quantity	=	=
Nuke type	=	X
Nuke location	=	=
Nuke reliability	=	=
Nuke policy (e.g. declaratory)	X	=
** = is marginal, X is important		

Relative Importance: Future

Figure 15: Relative Importance: Future

	Assure	Deter
Alliance strength	X	X
Nuke quantity	X	=
Nuke type	=	X
Nuke location	X	=
Nuke reliability	=	X
Nuke policy (e.g. declaratory)	=	=
** Yellow = Change		

Psychodynamics (cont)

- Relative size of U.S. arsenal is important for assurance
- Triad vs. dyad method of delivery not so important
- Ability to introduce nukes to the region might be useful
- Opponent will pay attention to capability and reliability
- If we address the first points (esp. alliance), no-first-use may be possible

DPRK Scenarios

- Retaliation for nuclear attack
 - Prevent further WMD use
 - Wipe out regime
- Prevent "use-it-or-lose-it"
 - Intel must be undisputable
 - Even then, ROK approval unlikely
- Repel surprising DPRK attack
 - Very high ROK casualty estimates
 - US forces occupied elsewhere
- In all cases, small # of quickly targetable nukes (or powerful conventional PGS) are sufficient

China Scenarios

- Less threatening posture, but growing capability
- U.S. retaliation for nuclear attack
 - Degrade China's nuclear capability
 - Attack political control and military & industrial power centers
- U.S. nuclear dominance still feasible and desirable (alliance premium)
- Availability of Kadena is critical for Taiwan scenarios; likely target
- Unlike North Korea, hard to imagine a first-use scenario

Implications for U.S. Posture

- *Credibility* still trumps *capability*, but capability is an increasingly important component (among others)
 - Overall numbers below 2,000 possible, depending on Russia and eventually China (keep alliance premium)
- Near/medium-term minimum of 1,000 reasonable. Below that, assurance is undermined.
 - Step up MD focused on *No Dong* & *Musadan* ; protect Japan & Guam

Implications for U.S. Posture

- Dyad possible, but small # of quickly targetable precision munitions useful (PGS, TLAM/N, ALCM, B61-3?)
- Shift some infra to Pacific (e.g., Strategic Systems Program (SSP) capabilities
- Reliability and infra questions (incl. delivery) need to be addressed, but choices have to be made
- Reduce warhead types and delivery systems? Delivery system co-development w/ allies?

Possible Deterrence Policy Group Agenda

- joint threat assessments (incl cyber & space)
- joint studies of NK/Chinese deterrence doctrines
- missile launch and maritime conflict scenarios
- suspected missile or nuclear prolif events
- use of economic sanctions or diplomatic steps
- the role, method, and timing of signaling

Signs of Change in Tokyo?

- Alliance supporting
 - accelerated RMC progress
 - improve protection of classified information
 - permit nukes in territorial waters
- Hedging for show / hedging for substance
 - pass Ippan-Ho
 - increased defense spending
 - scientific and defense community relations
 - security coop with other U.S. partners
 - relax on collective self-defense
- Autonomy
 - new info gathering sats or C2 assets
 - research/pursuit of long-range strike capability
 - develop nuclear-powered ships and subs

APPENDIX D: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Richard Benson	<i>HQ USAF/A5XP</i>
Mr. Paul Bernstein	<i>Science Applications International Corporation</i>
Ms. Darci Bloyer	<i>Science Applications International Corporation</i>
Mr. Samuel Brannen	<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense</i>
Ambassador Linton Brooks	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Ms. Elaine Bunn	<i>National Defense University</i>
Ms. Laura Cooper	<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense</i>
Ms. Amanda Dory	<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense</i>
Mr. David Dowley	<i>National Nuclear Security Administration</i>
Ms. Bonnie Glaser	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Mr. Kurt Guthe	<i>National Institute for Public Policy</i>
Dr. Bob Haffa	<i>Northrop Grumman</i>
Mr. Hans Kristensen	<i>Federation of American Scientists</i>
Dr. Alex Lennon	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
The Honorable Franklin Miller	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Mr. David Mosher	<i>RAND Corporation</i>
Dr. Clark Murdock	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Ms. Tara Murphy	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Ms. Mary Beth Nikitin	<i>Congressional Research Service</i>
Mr. Tom Scheber	<i>National Institute for Public Policy</i>
Mr. James Schoff	<i>Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis</i>
LtCol Robert Scott	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>
Mr. David Stein	<i>Office of the Secretary of Defense</i>
Dr. Victor Utgoff	<i>Institute for Defense Analyses</i>
Ms. Amy Woolf	<i>Congressional Research Service</i>
Ms. Jessica Yeats	<i>Center for Strategic and International Studies</i>

APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCA	Dual-Capable Aircraft
DoD	Department of Defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EMR	European Mid-Course Radar
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
HLG	High Level Group
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IFPA	Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INSS	Institute for National Security Studies
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSNF	Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAC-3	Patriot Advanced Capability-3
PGS	Prompt Global Strike
PLAN	PLA Navy
PONI	Project on Nuclear Issues
ROK	Republic of Korea
RRW	Reliable Replacement Warhead
RV	Reentry Vehicle
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SM-3	Standard Missile-3
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
SPRC	Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
SSBN	Nuclear-Powered, Ballistic Nuclear Missile-Carrying Submarine
SSGN	Cruise Missile Submarine
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
STRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TLAM/N	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

