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“Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build:” The Uncertain Metrics of the Afghan War

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CSIS

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Burke Chair
in Strategy

December 2, 2009

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The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: \$35.B GDP, \$1,000 PC
- Budget: \$2.6; \$8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

IRAQ

- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: \$100.0B GDP, \$3,600 PCI
- Budget \$48.4 billion; \$33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved


IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000


Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to August 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month




A One Major Regional Contingency Capability: Priority to Iraq

Annual Total Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in \$US billions): FY2001-FY2010




Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 9.

Annual DoD Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in \$US billions): FY2001-FY2010




Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 13.

Average Monthly DoD Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in \$US billions): FY2001-FY2010




Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 20.

Annual Foreign Aid Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in \$US billions): FY2001-FY-2010




Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 12

Annual Spending on the Afghan Wars By Category (in \$US billions): FY2001-FY2010



Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 13.


Annual US Aid Spending Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces (in \$US billions): FY01-FY09



Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 28 September 2009, p. 13.

*Underresourcing a Coalition of the
Impossible and Eight Years of
Ceding the Initiative Without Unity
of Effort*

Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan



Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by JoAnne O'Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, *U.S. Forces in Iraq*, Congressional Research Service (14 December 2007); JoAnne O'Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, *U.S. Forces in Iraq*, Congressional Research Service (14 July 2008).

US troop levels in Iraq were approximately 124,000 in November 2009, and 66,500 in Afghanistan

US Troop Levels: Reacting and Losing


An Increasing Commitment

Number of American troops in Afghanistan, in thousands.

Source: U.S. Central Command



US Troop Levels: “Surge” During February and November 2009




GAO: “Afghanistan’s Security Environment,
November 5, 2009, GAO-10-178R, p.7.

Source: DOD and ISAF data.

A “Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area in October 2009




ISAF Troop Levels: 2007-2009



US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009


In \$ Millions




DOD Aid	0	12.7	176.2	403.9	1909.4	2231.2	7790.5	3320.7	6521.4
Stated Department Aid	192.2	903.9	779	1978.5	2838.5	1133.7	1843.8	2146.3	2694.7

US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009

In \$ Millions



Annual State Department Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in \$US billions)



Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Afghanistan, Iraq and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*. Congressional Research Services (RL33110). Updated, 15 May 2009.

US Aid to Afghanistan: 2001-2009

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan


(appropriations in \$ millions)

Fiscal Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2001-2009 Total
Economic Support Fund (ESF)	0.0	105.5	223.8	900.2	1,312.8	489.7	1,210.7	1,399.5	2,048.0	7,690.2
Development Assistance (DA)	0.0	18.3	35.4	152.0	165.8	187.6	166.8	148.7	0.0	874.6
Child Survival/Health (CSH)	0.0	7.5	49.7	31.0	38.0	41.5	100.8	63.5	58.2	390.2
Migration & Refugee Asst. (MRA)	32.6	135.5	61.5	63.3	47.1	36.0	16.0	42.1	7.0*	441.1
Food Aid ^a	133.6	207.2	71	88.3	108.6	109.6	60	154.7	47.5	980.5
Int'l Narcotics & Law Enforcement (INCLE)	0.0	66.0	0.0	220.0	706.3	232.7	251.7	307.6	484.0	2,268.3
Nonprolif, Anti-Terror, De-mining (NADR)	2.8	44.0	34.8	66.9	40.8	36.1	36.6	28.1	48.6*	338.7
Int'l Military Ed & Training (IMET)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.7	1.4	4.3
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)	0.0	57.3	191.0	413.7	396.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1,058.8
Other ^b	23.2	262.6	111.8	43.1	22.3	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	463.9
Total 150 Account	192.2	903.9	779.0	1,978.5	2,838.5	1,133.7	1,843.8	2,146.3	2,694.7	14,510.6
DOD—Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	995.0	1,908.1	7,406.4	2,750.0	5,606.9	18,666.4
DOD—CERP	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.7	136.0	215.0	206.0	486.0	726.5	1,809.2
DOD—Other ^c	0.0	12.7	176.2	364.2	778.4	108.1	178.1	84.7	188.0	1,890.4
Total DOD Account	0.0	12.7	176.2	403.9	1,909.4	2,231.2	7,790.5	3,320.7	6,521.4	22,366.0
Other Functional Accounts ^d	0.4	25.5	26.6	52.1	147.0	136.1	83.6	352.1	89.4	912.8
Total U.S. Assistance	192.6	942.1	981.8	2,434.5	4,894.9	3,501.0	9,717.9	5,819.1	9,305.5	37,789.4

Sources: SIGAR Report to Congress, April 30, 2009; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.

Notes: FY2009 figures are estimates. In some cases where funding level is not specified in appropriations language or explanatory statement, amount included is request level or final allocation when available. CERP level is reported allocation, except in FY2009 when it assumes half of appropriation (shared with Iraq) will be allocated to Afghanistan.


US Aid to Afghanistan by Activity: \$38.6 Billion in FY2002-FY2009



Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

***NATO/ISAF Fights an
Uncoordinated Tactical War,
Civilians Attempt Post Conflict
Reconstruction, and Jihadist
Insurgents Fight a War for Control
of Territory and the Population***


Number of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, January 2003-July 2009



Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security.


Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security


Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan May 2003 to August 2009




Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S. contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on attacks against the International Security Assistance Force and coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force military personnel. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 1 and 2 do not include violent incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation

The Insurgents Take Hold: UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007







Pakistan Becomes a Critical Problem: 2005-2007



Winning the Tactical Clashes & Losing 15-20% of the Country a Year: UN Accessibility Map 2008




2008: East Afghanistan - The US is No Longer “Winning” in the East



NATO/ISAF Ignores the Real War?

Security Summary 2008



DATA DERIVED FROM NATO/JOIS DATABASE

2008

24% Afghans perceive improvement,
19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)

70% of kinetic events continue to occur
in 10% of the districts

33% increase in Kinetic Events

IED events up 27%....single largest
cause of casualties

119% more attacks on GIRoA

5% less Suicide Attacks

50% more Kidnappings/Assassinations

ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%

Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*

Building Host Nation Capacity:

ANA: 13 more Kandak BNs formed


46 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD

13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs
fielded


ANA

Total Attacks: 1,277



ANP


Total Attacks: 2,839




SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 55 & 60.

Steadily Rising Problems in the South:

Average Daily Insurgent Initiated Attacks By Province, January 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009



Security and opium poppy cultivation 2009




Source: UNODC.

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Partial Denial: Security Summary (April 2009)

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks¹
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)¹
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)¹

- 28% increase in CF force strength⁵
- 38% increase in ANA force strength⁴
- 59% increase in CF offensive events¹

January to April 2009 Kinetic Activity Density Plot By District



Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)²

- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

Footnotes on Sources:

- ¹JOIIS, 4 May.
²ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.
³CJOC CivCas cell, 2 May.
⁴CSTC-A, 4 May.
⁵CJ1, 3 May.


- Civilian Deaths: down 44%³
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 55%¹
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%¹
(Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIRoA officials & district centers: up 90%¹
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%¹

ANSF⁴


- **ANA:** - 50 of 79 Kandak battalions capable of independent ops
- Average of 83 total deliberate ops per week in '09 (37 in '08)
- **ANP:** - Focused District Development: 52 districts completed training
- 14 of 20 Civil Order Police Battalions fielded
- **ABP:** - Focused Border Development: 2 cycles complete (20 companies)
- 3rd and 4th Cycles underway (14 companies programmed)

Attack Trends: Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

Suicide attacks were up 9%




Attacks on GIRoA officials were down 11%
Attacks on GIRoA infrastructure were up 156%
Attacks on ANA were down 18%
Attacks on ANP were up 15%




Complex attacks were up 152%.






Complex attacks include those involving more than one means of attack (i.e. small arms plus IED, small arms plus indirect fire, etc.) or more than 20 insurgents. Complex attack numbers do not include attacks against District Centers



Kidnappings were down 27%
The number of Assassinations did not change



Insurgent Attacks by RC




- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same period in '08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
- Up 78% in RC South
- Up 41% in RC East
- Up 29% in RC Capital
- Up 21% in RC North
- Up 73% in RC West

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED


Source: JOIIS, 2 Jun 09

5

IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009



Going South to Aid the Taliban: Opium poppy cultivation trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)




Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC

Allocation of U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) funds 2009


	FY 2009
NIU ¹⁸ /CNPA - Air Mobility (OCONUS)	43,053
NIU/CNPA - Air Mobility (CONUS)	6,000
NIU/CNPA - Training	19,417
NIU/CNPA - Equipment	0
NIU/CNPA - Facilities	14,000
CN Border Police - Facilities (BCPs)	7,635
CN Border Police - Training	20,809
Intelligence and Technology-MIP Efforts	38,750
Intelligence and Technology-Non MIP Efforts	7,000
Other Program Support	15,070
State Dept Helicopter Lease	0
TOTAL	\$171,734

Heroin retail prices in Europe (US\$) 1990-2006



Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)




Source: Afghanistan opium survey, 2009, UNODC.

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC

Losing the People:


*NATO/ISAF Fails to Provide
Security, GIRoA Fails to Provide
Governance and Justice; Aid Never
Reaches the People, and Casualties
Create a Critical Backlash*

Coalition, ANA, and ANP KIA, October 2008-May 2009



NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008



- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOIIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*



*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations

Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun)
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF




ISAF Responsible	
Jan 07 - May 09	20%
Jan 07 - Dec 07	19%
Jan 08 - Dec 08	21%
Jul 08 - May 09	29%
Sep 08 - May 09	22%
Jan 09 - May 09	21%

Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell Formed in CJOC
Standardized process to investigate incidents of reported civilian casualties

- Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED
Source: ISAF CJOC, CIVCAS Tracking Cell, As of 1 Jun 09

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009



Source: Gary Langer, Director of Polling, ABC News, "Afghanistan: Where Things Stand," Public Opinion Trends in Afghanistan, CSIS – Feb. 11, 2009

Can the New Strategy Work?

“Shape, clear, Hold, and Build”

Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build

- **Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.**
 - **Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;**
 - **Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,**
 - **Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.**
-

Afghanistan as A Host Country

- **Can influence, but not transform.**
- **Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.**
- **Need host country forces to become the face of operations as quickly as possible.**
- **Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.**
- **Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.**
- **Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.**
- **Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.**

Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

- **Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.**
- **Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.**
- **Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.**
- **Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.**
- **Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.**

Shape

In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), and the economic status of a given area.

- **Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.**
- **Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.**

“Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces




A ‘Dog’s Breakfast:’ NATO/ISAF Forces October 22, 2009

	Albania	250		Georgia	1		Portugal	145
	Armenia	0		Germany	4365		Romania	990
	Australia	1350		Greece	145		Singapore	9
	Austria	4		Hungary	360		Slovakia	245
	Azerbaijan	90		Iceland	2		Slovenia	130
	Belgium	530		Ireland	7		Spain	1000
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	10		Italy	2795		Sweden	430
	Bulgaria	460		Jordan	7		The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ^a	165
	Canada	2830		Latvia	175		Turkey	720
	Croatia	290		Lithuania	250		Ukraine	10
	Czech Republic	480		Luxembourg	8		United Arab Emirates	25
	Denmark	690		Netherlands	2160		United Kingdom	9000
	Estonia	150		New Zealand	300		United States	34800
	Finland	165		Norway	480			
	France	3095		Poland	1910		Total	71030

Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009



Engaged Troops by Nation: July 2009



Building on a Small Core of ANA Forces



In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.


Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations

Clear

In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.

Population Density of Afghanistan



Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan



Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar



Hold


In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.


Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014 (Authorized Personnel)



Source: Department of Defense, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan January 2009 Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)*, January 2009, pp.33.

ANA and ANP Casualties: 2006-2008


ANA CASUALTIES, 2007-2009



Note: ^a Numbers are as of 6/22/2009.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.

ANP CASUALTIES, 2007-2009




^a Numbers as of 6/22/2009.

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.

US Aid to Afghan Security Forces

FIGURE 3.3

ASFF AVAILABLE FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR (\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

FIGURE 3.4


ASFF FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 2/28/2009 and 7/10/2009.

ASFF DISBURSEMENTS BY BUDGET ACTIVITY, FY 2005–2009 (\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.


Progress in ANA Funding: As of 1 July 2009

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA INFRA-STRUCTURE, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of 6/30/2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANA EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION, FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.
Sources: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 54.

ANA Readiness: As of 1 July 2009

ANA CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS (ANA UNITS)




Note: May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.

Source: DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009. Numbers as of 5/23/2009.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 55.

Progress in ANP Funding: As of 1 July 2009

STATUS OF ASFF FUNDS FOR ANP
EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORTATION,
FY 2005-2009 (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding and are as of June 30, 2009. ASFF funding terms (available, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/10/2009.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 59.

ANP Readiness: As of 1 July 2009

ANP CAPABILITY MILESTONE RATINGS (ANP UNITS)




Source: DoD OSD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/8/2009. Numbers as of 5/23/2009.

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 54.

ANP Projects Cancelled Due to Security Concerns: As of 1 July 2009

ANP PROJECTS CANCELLED DUE TO SECURITY CONCERNS (\$ MILLIONS)

Total Contract Awards: \$33.53 Million



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.


Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 7/1/2009.

CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled \$33.53 million.¹³⁴ As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.


Public Perception of ANSF Propriety

ANA has a more positive image than the ANP. Perceptions of improper behaviors by the ANA have remained relatively low while those of the ANP have decreased.

"Have you seen or heard the police in your mantaqa doing anything improper?"




"Have you seen or heard the National Army doing anything improper lately?"



ANP "some"
 47% in Jul 07
 50% in Jul 08
 42% in Sep 08
 44% in Dec 08
 41% in Mar 09

Mar 09




Those saying "Some Improper"



Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

Mar 09



ANA "some"
 30% in Jul 07
 25% in Jul 08
 23% in Sep 08
 22% in Dec 08
 23% in Mar 09

Arrows indicates change, relative to Dec 08 survey, in percentage of people within the indicated province saying they've seen ANA or ANP doing something improper.

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

22

Build

In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.

A “Coalition of the Impossible:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:

- Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
- 43 Troop Contributing Nations
- ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
- ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
- 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (appx ISAF strength 6,130)

- HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
- HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
- KAIA (ESP)

Regional Command South: (appx ISAF strength 36,500)

- HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
- Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
- PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
- PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
- PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)
- PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command West: (appx ISAF strength 4,400)

- HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
- Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
- PRT HERAT (ITA)
- PRT FARAH (USA)
- PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
- PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)


Regional Command North: (appx ISAF strength 5,700)

- HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
- PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
- PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
- PRT KONDUZ (DEU)
- PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)
- PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (appx ISAF strength 18,300)

- HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
- Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT LOGAR (CZE)
- PRT SHARANA (USA)
- PRT KHOST (USA)
- PRT METHER LAM (USA)
- PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
- PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
- PRT JALALABAD (USA)
- PRT GHAZNI (POL,USA)
- PRT ASADABAD (USA)
- PRT BAGRAM (USA)
- PRT NURISTAN (USA)
- PRT WARDAK (TUR)
- PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Aid Spending on Afghanistan: As of 1 July 2009



AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)		
Security	Governance	Development
International Training Organizations Afghan National Army (ANA) Afghan National Police (ANP)	Elections Human Rights Judicial Reform and Prosecution Rule of Law Anticorruption	Essential Services Agriculture Industry Growth Banking Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009*, p. 33.

Cumulative US Civil Aid to Afghanistan: FY2002-FY2008

(\$ millions)

Sector	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007 (reg. + supp)	FY2008 (reg + supp)	FY2002- FY2008
Agriculture	27	56	50	77	27	67	31	335
Alternative Livelihoods	3	1	5	185	121	229	121	665
Roads	51	142	354	276	250	365	398	1836
Power	3		77	286	66	195	203	830
Water	2	1	27	21	1	2	1	54
Econ. Growth	21	12	84	91	46	69	61	383
Education	19	21	104	86	51	63	53	397
Health	8	56	83	111	52	113	66	489
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund	38	40	67	87	45	46	45	368
Support to Afghan Gov't	3		36	31	15	15	17	117
Democracy	22	34	132	88	17	134	17	444
Rule of Law	4	8	21	15	6	10	4	68
PRT Programs		11	56	85	20	126	30	328
Program Suppt	5	6	17	16	4	35	15	98
Internally Displaced Persons	108	23	10			-		141
Food Aid	159	51	49	57	60	-	10	386
Civilian Assistance						10		10
Totals	471	462	1171	1510	779	1478	1108	6979

Source: CRS.

International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan


	(\$ in millions)
Britain	2,897
World Bank	2,803
Asia Development Bank	2,200
Japan	1,900
European Commission (EC)	1,768
Netherlands	1,697
Canada	1,479
India	1,200
Iran	1,164
Germany	1,108
Norway	977
Denmark	683
Italy	637
Saudi Arabia	533
Total Non-U.S. Pledges (including donors not listed)	25,800 (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report. p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over \$500 million total.

US Economic (ESF) Aid to Afghanistan

ESF APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR

(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009.

ESF FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON

(\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Sources: USAID, responses to SIGAR data call, 2/28/2009 and 7/10/2009.

US Development Assistance Aid to Afghanistan


DA APPROPRIATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR
(\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. DA funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009.

DA FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON (\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. ESF funding terms (appropriated, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by USAID except as specified.

Source: USAID, response to SIGAR data call, 7/9/2009.

US Counter-Narcotics Spending on to Afghanistan


INL ALLOTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR (\$ MILLIONS)



Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. INL funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL except as specified.

Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2009 and 7/15/2009.

INL FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON (\$ BILLIONS)




Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. INL funding terms (allotted, obligated, liquidated) reported as provided by DoS and INL except as specified.

Sources: DoS, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/2/2009 and 7/15/2009.

US CERP Aid to Afghanistan

CERP FUNDING BY FISCAL YEAR

(\$ MILLIONS)




Notes: Data may include inter-agency transfers. Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Source: DoD, response to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009.

CERP FUNDS, PERIOD-TO-PERIOD COMPARISON

(\$ BILLIONS)



Notes: Numbers affected by rounding. CERP funding terms (funded, obligated, disbursed) reported as provided by DoD except as specified.

Sources: DoD, responses to SIGAR data call, 7/13/2009 and 7/14/2009.

Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

- *Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.*
 - *Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.*
 - *Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).*
 - *Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.*
 - *Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.*
 - *Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF's formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.*
-

Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

- 1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and**
- 2) training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.**

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.

Can the New Strategy Work?


Afghanistan and Pakistan

Official border crossing points between Afghanistan and its neighbors



Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Trafficking routes and unofficial border crossing points in Afghanistan 2008



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC.

22 Estimating and/or targeting processing laboratories is not an easy task, as they can function virtually anywhere, using a few metal drums and a press.

FATA's seven agencies and Balochistan




Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 124

Federally Administred Tribal Areas (FATA)

Agency	Area (km ²)	Population (1998 census)	Density (people/km ²)
Bajaur		595,227	
Khyber		546,730	
Kurram		448,310	
Mohmand		334,453	
North Waziristan		361,246	
Orakzai		225,441	
South Waziristan		429,841	
Six Frontier Regions combined		235,083	
FATA	27,220	3,176,331	117


Source: Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
<http://www.infopak.gov.pk/districtPK.aspx>.

Drug Trafficking routes in Pakistan




Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Afghanistan/Pakistan Border: Balochistan Province




Refugee camps and heroin seizure locations in Balochistan, 2002-2008



Source: UNODC individual drug seizure database.

Pashtun Tribes on the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border




Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY *The transnational threat of Afghan opium*, October 2009, UNODC, Page 19

Tribes and insurgent groups in Pakistan


Border agency/ province	Main tribes	Main AGE groups (non-exhaustive)	Cross-border representation and linkages in Afghanistan
Khyber	Shinwari, Afridi	Lashkar I-Islam, Ansar ul Islam, HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan	Shinwari
Kurram	Turi, Mangal, Bangash, Jaji, Moqbil	HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Jaji, Mangal, Moqbil
Bajaur	Mamunds, Salarzais, Uthman Khel	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al Qaeda, Jaish-e-Islami, Karwan-e-Niamatullah, HIG	Mamunds, Salarzais
North Waziristan	Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz	Al-Qaeda, IMU and Uzbek splinter groups (e.g. Islamic Jihad Union), Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz
South Waziristan	Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds	Al-Qaeda, IMU, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Ahmadzai Wazirs
Mohmand	Mohmand, Safis	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda	Mohmand, Safis
Orakzai	Orakzai, Afridi	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	
Balochistan province	Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch	Afghan Taliban, Balochi separatist groups, Jundullah	Ashaqzai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch

Source: UNAMA, UNODC, UNDSS, Jamestown Foundation, CTC Sentinel, The Long War Journal.

Tribal Connections at Afghanistan/FATA (Pakistan) Border



Average daily vehicle crossing in FATA 2007-2008



Source: Information provided by Pakistani embassy officials in Kabul.