Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
and Adam C. Seitz

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Key Issues Addressed

• Terrorism
• Asymmetric Warfare;
• Maritime and Border Security;
• Combating Piracy;
• Critical facilities and Infrastructure;
• Role of Chokepoints; and
• Role of State and Non-State Actors
Key Solutions

• Prepare for all types of threats, and full spectrum of terrorism and asymmetric warfare;

• Jointness and inter-ministry cooperation;

• Regional and international cooperation

• Focus on both active and passive defense;

• Broad, non-compartmented situational awareness with real world operational response - critical value of IS&R and C4I;

• Intelligence Cooperation

• Gaming and “red teaming”

• Design civil and commercial facilities and infrastructure for deterrence and defense.
Iran and the Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare
Most Likely Foreign Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts

- Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation)
- Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks.
- Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions.
- Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force.
- Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents.
- Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation.
- Strike at critical node or infrastructure.
Comparative Major Naval Combat Ships, 2009

Key Ships for Asymmetric Warfare

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts
Gulf Warships with Anti-Ship Missiles, 2009

Amphibious Ships & Landing Craft, 2009

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from IISS, *The Military Balance*, various editions, Jane’s Sentinel series, and material provided by US and Saudi experts. Estimates differ on Saudi landing craft, because of different ways to count operational status. Some experts put the figure at 6 LCMs and 2 LCUs.
Air/Missile Threats

• Precision air strikes on critical facilities: Raid or mass attack.
• Terror missile strikes on area targets; some chance of smart, more accurate kills.
• Growing use of UAVs; possibility of use for unconventional strikes.
• Variation on 1987-1988 “Tanker War”
• Raids on offshore and critical shore facilities.
• Strikes against tankers or naval targets.
• Attacks on US-allied facilities

But:

• Low near-term probability.
• High risk of US and allied intervention.
• Limited threat power projection and sustainability.
• Unclear strategic goal.
Comparative Gulf Total & High Quality Combat Air Strength By Type

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<th>Total</th>
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40-60% of Iran’s Total holdings are not Operational

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2008; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts
Comparative High Quality Fighter/Attack, 2009

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various sources and IISS, The Military Balance, various editions.
Comparative High Quality Combat Air Strength By Type

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Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2008; Jane’s Sentinel series; Saudi experts
Planning for Asymmetric Warfare

• Deterrence and conflict prevention as critical as defense.

• Need integrated GCC force planning and war planning efforts.

• Must show GCC will act together. Threats cannot divide or exploit weakest link.

• Exercise realistic “red-blue” war games to determine common options and requirements.

• Follow-up with realistic CPXs and FTXs.

• Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces.

• Demonstrate have exercised a retaliatory capability.

• Interoperability with other Gulf states and with US, UK, France.

• Defend against strikes at critical nodes and infrastructure.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

• 125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij.

• Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines.
  • Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and 40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns.
  • Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial boats.
  • Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Halul, Sirri.

• IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and control Iran’s strategic missile force.
  • 1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers, 1 Shahab 3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and 4 missiles each.
IRGC Key Assets and Capabilities

• The IRGC has a wide variety of assets at its disposal to threaten shipping lanes in the Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and the Caspian Sea.

• 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and smart mine capability.

• Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, commercial boats.

• Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval guards.

• Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft with anti-ship missiles(C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and others).

• Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.

• Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land, islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others. Sunburn?).

• Forces whose exercises demonstrate the capability to raid or attack key export and infrastructure facilities.
IRGC Naval Branch Modernization

• Large numbers of anti-ship missiles on various types of launch platforms.
• Small fast-attack craft, heavily armed with rockets or anti-ship missiles.
• More fast mine-laying platforms.
• Enhanced subsurface warfare capability with various types of submarines and sensors.
• More small, mobile, hard-to-detect platforms, such as semi-submersibles and unmanned aerial vehicles.
• More specialized training.
• More customized or purpose-built high-tech equipment.
• Better communications and coordination between fighting units.
• More timely intelligence and effective counterintelligence/deception.
• Enhanced ability to disrupt the enemies command, control, communications, and intelligence capability.
• The importance of initiative, and the avoidance of frontal engagements with large U.S. naval surface warfare elements.
• Means to mitigate the vulnerability of even small naval units to air and missile attack.
IRGC Naval Branch

- The IRGC has a naval branch consists of approximately 20,000 men, including marine units of around 5,000 men.
- The IRGC is now reported to operate all mobile land-based anti-ship missile batteries and has an array of missile boats; torpedo boats; catamaran patrol boats with rocket launchers; motor boats with heavy machine guns; mines as well as Yono (Qadir)-class midget submarines; and a number of swimmer delivery vehicles.
- The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 anti-ship missiles.
- The IRGC controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-2 Seersucker land-based anti-ship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast.
- The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.
- IRGC put in charge of defending Iran's Gulf coast in September 2008 and is operational in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and could potentially operate elsewhere if given suitable sealift or facilities.
- Can deliver conventional weapons, bombs, mines, and CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities.
- Force consists of six elements: surface vessels, midget and unconventional submarines, missiles and rockets, naval mines, aviation, and military industries.
IRGC Naval Branch Facilities

• The IRGC has numerous staging areas in such places and has organized its Basij militia among the local inhabitants to undertake support operations.

• The naval branch has bases and contingency facilities in the Gulf, many near key shipping channels and some near the Strait of Hormuz.

  • These include facilities at Al-Farsiyah, Halul (an oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Bandaer-e Abbas, Khorramshahr, and Larak.

• Iran recently started constructing new naval bases along the coasts of the Gulf and the Sea of Oman for an “impenetrable line of defense.”

• On October 27, 2008, Iran opened a new naval base at Jask, located at the southern mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for Persian Gulf oil.
Expanding Mission

• Iran's Deputy Army Commander Brigadier General Abdolrahim Moussavi has announced that Iran is commitment to expanding its strategic reach, arguing that, "In the past, our military had to brace itself for countering regional enemies. This is while today we are faced with extra-regional threats."

• Iran upgraded a naval base at Assalouyeh in Iran's southern Bushehr province.

  • This base is the fourth in a string of IRGC bases along the waterway that will extend from Bandar Abbas to Pasa Bandar near the Pakistan border.

• Part of, what IRGC's Navy Commander Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari describes as a new mission to establish an impenetrable line of defense at the entrance to the Sea of Oman.
Expanding Capabilities

• Forces can carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping, carry out regular amphibious exercises with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like the islands in the Gulf, and could conduct raids against countries on the southern Gulf coast.

• Iran could launch a coordinated attack involving explosives-laden remote-controlled boats, swarming speedboats, semi-submersible torpedo boats, FACs, kamikaze UAVs, midget and attack submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missile and artillery fire.

• Could “swarm” a U.S.-escorted convoy or surface action group transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and barrages of rockets with cluster warheads could be used to suppress enemy defensive fire and carrier air operations.

• Naval Guards work closely with Iranian intelligence and appear to be represented unofficially in some embassies, Iranian businesses and purchasing offices, and other foreign fronts.

• Iran has launched a domestic weapons procurement campaign aimed at improving its defense capabilities and has announced the development of 109 types of advanced military equipment over the past two years.
  • In December 2008 Iranian Navy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari confirmed the delivery of two new domestically-built missile boats, Kalat (Fortress) and Derafsh (Flag), as well as a Ghadir-class light submarine to the Iranian navy.
  • The deputy commander of the IRGC's navy, Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi, told the Fars News Agency on 11 November 2008 that both unmanned speedboats and UAVs are now mass-produced in the country.
  • On December 6, 2008 the Iranian Navy test-fired a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship as part of exercises along a strategic shipping route. "The Nasr-2 was fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it," Iranian state run radio reported.
Iranian Asymmetric Doctrine

• Iran sends signals about its use of asymmetric warfare through its military parades and exercises.

• The IRGC often claims to conduct very large exercises, sometimes with 100,000 men or more. The exact size of such exercises is unclear, but they are often a small fraction of IRGC claims.

• One important aspect of the exercise was the almost total absence of the regular Iranian navy, whose functions are more oriented towards the classical tasks of sea denial and power projection ashore in the Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz.

• By displaying both its real and virtual military (e.g. naval) fighting capabilities through electronic, printed and network media, and through endless official statements, Iran tends to achieve the following politico-diplomatic and propaganda ends (4Ds):
  • Defiance (to maintain a course of resistance, targeting primarily the Western political will and system).
  • Deception (on the real state of Iranian warfighting capabilities, targeting the Western military establishments).
  • Deterrence (with the IRI military “might”, targeting Western public opinion, delivered through the media).
  • Demonstration (of the outreach of its own power, targeting the Iranian people and the Moslem world).

IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - I

• On September 1, 2007, Khamenei promoted Mohammad Ali Jafari, then coordinator of the IRGC Research and Command Center, to the rank of major general and the post of commander in chief of the IRGC.

• Throughout his military career Jafari has emphasized asymmetrical warfare and developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities throughout his military career.

• In 1992, he was appointed commander of the ground forces. One of the tasks he carried out in this capacity was "to study and assess the strengths and weaknesses of America [as reflected] in its attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq."

• Jafari has outlined the strategy he means to promote as IRGC commander, reiterating his commitment to developing Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and the asymmetrical warfare capacities of the IRGC:

  • Asymmetrical warfare... is [our] strategy for dealing with the considerable capabilities of the enemy. A prominent example of this kind of warfare was [the tactics employed by Hizbullah during] the Lebanon war in 2006... Since the enemy has considerable technological abilities, and since we are still at a disadvantage in comparison, despite the progress we have made in the area of equipment, [our only] way to confront [the enemy] successfully is to adopt the strategy [of asymmetric warfare] and to employ various methods of this kind."

Sources multiple media outlets including: Rooz, Sharq, Baztab, Sobh-e Sadeq, Mehr, Aftab, Fars News Agency, MEMRI, Reuters, Associated Press, etc.
IRGC Commander and Asymmetric Strategy - II

• IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Aziz Jafari statements on asymmetric strategy continued:

  • Jafari has said in the past that, in the case of a confrontation with the West, Iran will be willing to employ the organizations under its influence. In a January 2005 speech to intelligence commanders from the Basij and IRGC, Jafari - then commander of the ground forces - stated: "In addition to its own capabilities, Iran also has excellent deterrence capabilities outside its [own borders], and if necessary it will utilize them."

  • "the Revolutionary Guards [Corps] will invest efforts in strengthening its asymmetrical warfare capabilities, with the aim of successfully confronting the enemies."

  • "After September 11, [2001], all [IRGC] forces changed their [mode of] operation, placing emphasis on attaining combat readiness. The first step [towards achieving] this goal was to develop [a strategy] of asymmetrical warfare and to hold maneuvers [in order to practice it]."

Sources multiple media outlets including: Rooz, Sharq, Baztab, Sobh-e Sadeq, Mehr, Aftab, Fars News Agency, MEMRI, Reuters, Associated Press, etc.
Some Tangible Examples

- Iranian tanker war with Iraq
- Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf.
- Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea.
- Use of Quds force in Iraq.
- Iranian use of UAVs in Iraq.
- “Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah.
- Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain.
- Missile and space tests; expanding range of missile programs (future nuclear test?).
- Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf.
- Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability.
- Flow of illegal's and smuggling across Yemeni border.
January 27, 2006: Iran completes major military exercise that tests Teheran's ability to attack Gulf shipping and Arab oil facilities. Sources said the exercise was designed to test capabilities to strike U.S. and Arab targets throughout the area of the Gulf. According to a diplomatic source, the exercise was meant to show the West that Iran could stop all oil shipments in the Gulf and destroy numerous oil facilities in Gulf Arab countries," and included a range of fighter-jets and helicopters from the Iranian Air Force, with the Iranian navy contributed surface vessels and submarines.

August 19, 2006: Iran launches a series of large-scale military exercises aimed at introducing the country's new defensive doctrine, state-run television reported. The television report said the military exercise would occur in 14 of the country's 30 provinces and could last as long as five weeks. The first stage of the maneuvers began with air strikes in the southeastern province of Sistan va Baluchistan,. The military exercise, is said to involve 12 infantry regiments, and is called "The Blow of Zolfaghhar," in reference to a sword that belonged to Imam Ali, one of the most revered figures for Shi'ite Muslims.

November 3, 2006: Iran's Revolutionary Guards began another series exercises on days after a United States-led naval exercise began in the Gulf. Iran began the 10 days of maneuvers in the Gulf by test firing dozens of missiles, including the long-range Shahab-3 (estimated range: 2000 km or 1,240 miles), and the Shahab-2, which Iran says can carry a cluster warhead that can deliver 1,400 bomblets at once. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, leader of the Revolutionary Guards, says on television that Iran's military exercises were not meant to threaten neighboring countries. "We want to show our deterrent and defensive power to trans-regional enemies, and we hope they will understand the message of the maneuvers," he said. "The first and main goal is to demonstrate the power and national determination to defend the country against possible threat." General Safavi said the exercises would last 10 days and would take place in the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and several Iranian provinces.
**Iranian Military Exercises: 2006-2009 - II**

**March 23-30 2007:** Iran’s regular Navy launches week-long war-games on its southern shores. The military exercises are being carried out in the Gulf by Iran's regular Navy, the report said, adding that they would continue until March 30.

**January 7, 2008:** US ships harassed by Iran. Iranian boats approach three U.S. Navy ships in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, threatening to explode the American vessels. U.S. forces are reported to be on the verge of firing on the Iranian boats, when the boats - believed to be from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's navy - turn and move away. A Pentagon official say. "It is the most serious provocation of this sort that we've seen yet," He says the incident occurs at about 5 a.m. local time Sunday as Navy cruiser USS Port Royal, destroyer USS Hopper and frigate USS Ingraham were on their way into the Gulf and passing through the strait - a major oil shipping route. to take evasive maneuvers. There were no injuries but the official said there could have been, because the Iranian boats turned away "literally at the very moment that U.S. forces were preparing to open fire" in self defense.

**July 7, 2008:** Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch large-scale, five-day war-games, dubbed “Exercise Stake Net”, was carried out in the Straits of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman, where an assortment of new weapons were brought into play. The Iranian military maneuvers take place on the same day the United States announces it too will holding naval exercises in the Gulf.

Iranian state media say that the military maneuvers by the IRGC's Navy and Air Force missiles unit are aimed at improving the force's military abilities. Separately, Brigadier General Mahmoud Chaharbaghi, commander of the IRGC Ground Forces artillery and missiles unit, announces that 50 of his unit’s brigades are being armed with smart weapons and cluster bombs. Iran later test-fires nine missiles including what is claims is an upgraded version of Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a one-ton warhead capable of destroying targets within a 2,000-kilometer (1,245-mile) range.

Sources multiple media outlets including: Iranian State Radio, IRNA, Rooz, Sharq, Baztab, Sobh-e Sadeq, Mehr, Aftab, Fars News Agency, MEMRI, Reuters, Associated Press, etc.
September 7, 2008: Iran's armed forces test the country's new weapons systems and defense plans in a three-day military maneuver. Iran's naval forces claim to have made a breakthrough in building various types of "radar evading" submarines to guard its territorial waters. The IRGC says it successfully test-fired advanced shore-to-sea, surface-to-surface and sea-to-air missiles. The Islamic Revolution Guards Corp (IRGC) and the Army take part in drills involving anti-aircraft defense systems. The main purpose of the maneuvers is to maintain and promote the combat readiness of relevant units and to test new weapons and defense plans. Iran’s Chief Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, said Iran is upgrading its naval fleet with a new generation of domestically-built submarines.

September 15, 2008: The Islamic Republic Air Force tests Iran's domestic-made warfare in a joint military exercise with the IRGC, the Defense Ministry says. The joint aerial maneuver is aimed at boosting Iran's defensive capabilities and operational tactics, Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar say. The military exercise, which involves The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), comes in the wake of escalating US and Israeli threats to strike the country's nuclear facilities.

October 10, 2008: Islamist militiamen affiliated to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) stage military exercises in the suburbs of Tehran on Friday to defend the Iranian capital against "natural disasters" and "enemy assaults". Members of the paramilitary Basij take part in military drills under the command of the Tharallah Garrison in Tehran. Similar war games are held in Karaj, Islamshahr, Shahre Rey, Rabat Karim, and Varamin, said the acting deputy commandant of the IRGC, Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi, who also commands the Tharallah Garrison. The maneuvers last for 48 hours. Meanwhile another senior Basij leader announces that the paramilitary force is giving specialized training" to its units across Iran."These units are receiving specialized air, sea and ground training to be prepared for defending the country, the ruling establishment, and the revolution", said Brigadier General Ahmad Zolqadr on the sidelines of a military parade in Zanjan, north-west Iran. Zolqadr is the operational commander of the Basij.
November 12, 2008: Iran launches a “new” type of long-range ballistic missile dubbed "Sajeel," but its general layout was indistinguishable from the description of the "Ashura," which was flight-tested about one year ago.

December 2-7, 2008: Iran announces recent upgrades to the Naval Base in Asalouyeh and the now online base facilities in the port of Jask. Iranian officers state that long range tactical missile silos and shore based anti-ship missiles have long been key aspects of planning of potential military operations in the event of an open conflict. Top Iranian Army commander Major General Ayatollah Saleh is quoted in PressTV Nov 30 as saying "the heavy weight of the enemy warships provides the Iranian side with an ideal opportunity for launching successful counter-attacks" Iran announces that it is in the final stages of planning an extensive naval and military exercise 'Unity 87' due to commence in December 2008. Iran says it will seek to accomplish objectives that include include defense against a Israeli and US threat, closing the Strait of Hormuz to local and international shipping, and the testing new and improved military equipment and tactics.

Admiral Qasem Rostamabadi tells states radio that "The aim of this maneuver is to increase the level of readiness of Iran's naval forces and also to test and to use domestically-made naval weaponry." He says the naval maneuvers cover an area of 50,000 square miles, including the Sea of Oman off Iran's southern coast. "In this six-day long maneuver there will be more than 60 combat vessel units," Kayhan quotes Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the navy as saying it will include destroyers, missile-equipped battleships, submarines, special-operations teams, helicopters, and fighter planes. Iran has previously claimed it could close the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, through which about 40 percent of the world's globally traded oil passes. The United States has pledged to protect shipping routes. An Iranian naval commander says a week earlier that the country's navy could strike an enemy well beyond its shores and as far away as Bab al-Mandab, the southern entrance to the Red Sea that leads to the Suez Canal. Iran test-fires a new surface-to-surface missile from a warship in a strategic shipping route, as part of the war games in the Sea of Oman and the Gulf region: State radio reports, "The surface-to-surface Nasr-2 missile was tested in the (Sea of) Oman operational region,". IRNA reports that, "The Nasr-2 was fired from a warship and hit its target at a distance of 30 km (19 miles) and destroyed it," adding it was the first test of the new, medium-range missile.
### The Broader Patterns in Iranian Activity

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The Al Quds Force - I

- Comprised of 5,000 - 15,000 members of the IRGC (Increased size of force in 2007)
- Equivalent of one Special Forces division, plus additional smaller units
- Special priority in terms of training and equipment
- Plays a major role in giving Iran the ability to conduct unconventional warfare overseas using various foreign movements as proxies
- Specialize in unconventional warfare mission
- Control many of Iran’s training camps for unconventional warfare, extremists, and terrorists
- Has offices or “sections” in many Iranian embassies throughout the world

Through its Quds Force, Iran provides aid to Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq-based militants, and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, Iranian authorities continued to provide lethal support, including weapons, training, funding, and guidance through its Quds Force.

General David H. Petraeus has stressed the growing role of the Quds force and IRGC in statements and testimony to Congress.

Source: various news outlets, CRS reports, Congressional testimony, Intelligence assessments and official statements.
The Al Quds Force - II

• Quds Force continue to provide Iraqi and Afghani militants with:
  • specialized training,
  • funding,
  • Iranian-produced advanced rockets,
  • sniper rifles,
  • automatic weapons,
  • mortars,
  • Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
  • and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) that have a higher lethality rate than other types of IEDs

• Since 2006, Iran has arranged a number of shipments of small arms and associated ammunition, rocket propelled grenades, mortar rounds, 107mm rockets, and plastic explosives, possibly including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), to the Taliban.

• Israeli defense experts continue to state that they believe the IRGC and Quds force not only played a major role in training and equipping Hezbollah, but may have assisted it during the Israeli-Hezbollah War in 2006, and played a major role in the Hezbollah anti-ship missile attack on an Israeli Navy Sa’ar-class missile patrol boat.

Source: various news outlets, CRS reports, Congressional testimony, Intelligence assessments and official statements.
Iran and Hezbollah - I

- Hezbollah was originally formed in 1982 by Iranian seminarians.

- Iran’s aid packages (arms and money) to Hezbollah are said to exceed $100 million per year.

- Iran has gone from supplying small arms, short-range missiles and training to providing more sophisticated long-range missiles and other higher-end weaponry

  - Iran exported thousands of 122-mm rockets and Fajr-4 and Fajr-5 long-range rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including the Arash with a range of 21–29 kilometers.

  - Between 1992 and 2005, Hezbollah received approximately 11,500 missiles and rockets; 400 short- and medium-range pieces of artillery; and Aresh, Nuri, and Hadid rockets and transporters/launchers from Iran.

  - In 2005, Iran sent Hezbollah a shipment of large Uqab missiles with 333-millimeter warheads and an enormous supply of SA-7 and C-802 missiles, two of which were used in an attack on an Israeli ship.

- Iran also supplied Hezbollah with an unknown number of UAV’s, the Mirsad, that Hezbollah briefly flew over the Israel-Lebanon border on November 7, 2004, and April 11, 2005; at least three were shot down by Israel during the summer 2006 war.

- Iran supplied Hezbollah advanced surface-to-air missiles, including Strela-2/2M, Strela-3, Igla-1E, and the Mithaq-1. The same missiles were reported to have been used to target Israeli helicopters.
Iran and Hezbollah - II

• During Hezbollah’s summer 2006 war with Israel, Iran resupplied the group’s depleted weapons stocks.

• Hezbollah has recovered from its 2006 confrontation with Israel and has been able to rearm and regroup, and Iran has been an important part of that recovery.
  • Various Types of Rockets, reportedly increasing its stockpile to 27,000 rockets, more than double what Hezbollah had at the start of the 2006 war.
  • Among the deliveries were 500 Iranian-made “Zelzal” (Earthquake) missiles with a range of 186 miles, enough to reach Tel Aviv from south Lebanon.

• Fighting in Lebanon in 2006 seems to have increased Hezbollah’s dependence on Iran. Both Hezbollah’s loss of weapons and fighters in the conflict with Israel and the resulting damage to its reputation and position within Lebanon made it more reliant upon Iran.

• Elements of Hezbollah planned attacks in Egyptian Sinai; operate in Iraq

Iran and Hamas

• Iran openly supported Hamas and spoke out against the lack of support for Hamas by Arab regimes throughout the Middle East during engagements between the IAF and Hamas in late 2008 and early 2009 in Gaza.

• Iran provided training, arms and logistical support to Hamas during the fighting in Gaza between Israeli forces and Hamas militants in late December 2008 and early January 2009.

• Israeli intelligence sources continued to report Iranian efforts to rearm Hamas after a ceasefire agreement was reached in January 2009.

• Arms transfers come through Sudan and Sinai.

• Level of Iranian financial support uncertain.

Securing the Gulf, Petroleum Exports, Key Infrastructure, and Key Imports
The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008
Vulnerability of Gulf Oil Fields

Energy Infrastructure is Critical, *But*

- Steadily rising global demand for Gulf crude, product, and gas
- Rising Asian demand (much exported indirectly to the West)
- Heavy concentrations in facilities designed to economies of scale, not redundancy.
- Poor response planning, and long-lead time replacement for critical key components.
- Day-to-day use often near limits of capacity
- Lack of systems integration and bypass capability at national and GCC level
- Improving lethality and range of precision strike systems.
- Smarter saboteurs and terrorists.
# Key Gulf-Related Chokepoints - I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>2006E oil flow (bbl/d)</th>
<th>Width at Narrowest Point</th>
<th>Oil Source Origin</th>
<th>Primary Destination</th>
<th>Past Disturbances</th>
<th>Alternative Routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Strait of Hormuz</td>
<td>16.5-17 million</td>
<td>21 miles</td>
<td>Persian Gulf Nations including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and UAE</td>
<td>Japan, The United States, Western Europe, other Asian countries</td>
<td>Sea mines were installed during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Terrorists threats post September 11, 2001.</td>
<td>745-mile long East-West Pipeline through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
<td>1,000 feet</td>
<td>Persian Gulf Nations, especially Saudi Arabia, and Asia</td>
<td>Europe and The United States</td>
<td>Suez Canal was closed for eight years after the Six-Day War in 1967. Two large oil tankers ran aground in 2007 suspending traffic.</td>
<td>Reroute around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope); additional 6,000 miles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008
### Important World Oil Transit Chokepoints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>2006E oil flow (bbl/d)</th>
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<th>Alternative Routes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bab el-Mandab</td>
<td>3.3 million</td>
<td>18 miles</td>
<td>The Persian Gulf, Europe</td>
<td>Europe and United States</td>
<td>USS Cole attack in 2000; French oil tanker in 2002, both attacks off the coast of Aden, Yemen.</td>
<td>Northbound traffic can use the East-West oil pipeline through Saudi Arabia; Reroute around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope); additional 6,000 miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Turkish Straits</td>
<td>2.4 million</td>
<td>0.5 mile</td>
<td>Caspian Sea Region</td>
<td>Western and Southern Europe</td>
<td>Numerous past shipping accidents due to the strait's sinuous geography. Some terrorist threats were made after September 11, 2001.</td>
<td>No clear alternative; potential pipelines discussed; including a 173-mile pipeline between Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008
Abu Musa, Tumbs, Hormuz: Factoids

• 34 miles (55 KM) wide at narrowest part.

• Channels consist of 2-mile (3.2 km) navigable channels for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by 2-mile wide buffer zone.

• 40% of all globally traded oil supply.

• 75%-plus of Japan’s oil/

• 13.4 MMBD of crude through Strait in May 2007

• Additional 2 MMBD of products and over 31 million tons of LNG.

• 90% of all Gulf exports go through Strait.

• EIA predicts exports will double to 30-34 MMBD by 2020

• Gulf will export 40% of world’s LNG by 2015.

Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck

- 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point.
- Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median.
- Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km.
- Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes.
- Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment.
- Covert as well as overt sensors.

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg
“Closing the Gulf”

• 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS-3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and smart mine capability.

• Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, commercial boats.

• Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval guards.

• Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft with anti-ship missiles: (C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and others).

• Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills.

• Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land, islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others).

• IRGC raids on key export facility(ties).

• Iranian built Nasr-2 ship based SSM.
The Bab El Mandab

- 3.3 MMBD per day with 25%+ growth over next decade.
- 2.1 MMBD flows northbound through Suez Complex.
- 18 miles wide with two 2 mile channels going each way.
- Only major bypass is Saudi East-West pipeline at 4.4 MMBD, but now fully used.

Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008
An estimated 3.9 million bbl/d of oil flows northbound through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, while 0.6 million bbl/d travels southbound into the Red Sea.

Over 3,000 oil tankers pass through the Suez Canal annually. With only 1,000 feet at its narrowest point, the Canal is unable to handle large tankers.

Suez Canal Authority (SCA) has discussed widening and deepening to accommodate VLCCs and ULCCs.

200-mile long Sumed Pipeline, or Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline also provides a route by crossing the northern region of Egypt from the Ain Sukhna to the Sidi Kerir Terminal.

The pipeline can transport 3.1 million bbl/d of crude oil. Nearly all of Saudi Arabia’s northbound shipments (approximately 2.3 million bbl/d of crude) are transported through the Sumed pipeline.

Closure would divert tankers around the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, adding 6,000 miles to transit time.
The Threat of Piracy in the Gulf Region
The Shifting Threat of Piracy

• In 2008 there were 293 incidents of piracy against ships worldwide -- 11 percent up on the year before. Attacks off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden increased nearly 200 percent.

• Nearly 20,000 ships pass through the Gulf of Aden each year, heading to and from the Suez Canal.

• Organizations tracking global piracy trends said Somalia recorded the highest number of attacks in recent years in 2008.

• Experts estimate that ransoms during 2008, when 42 vessels were captured, ranged from $500,000 to $2 million, but some were as high as $6 million.

• So far in 2009 there have been 74 attacks with 15 hijackings as compared to 111 attacks for all of 2008.

• In 2008 alone, experts estimates vary, but indicate that that merchant shipping companies paid between $40 million and $150 million to the Somali pirates.

• According to data from the IMB Piracy Reporting Center the number of worldwide piracy incidents was close to a 3 year high in September 2008.

• In 2009 Pirates have attacked at least 15 vessels off the coast of Somalia in March, after only two in January and February.

• On April 8, 2009, The International Maritime Bureau reported that 260 crew on 14 hijacked ships were, at that time, being held off the coast of Somalia.

• All types of vessels have been targeted. The pirates boarding the vessels were also better armed than in previous years and prepared to assault and injure the crew.

• No direct ties between pirates looking for a fast buck and the Islamic extremists looking to attack America or her allies. But informal links are there, mired in Somalia's complex and combative clans.

Pirates Evolving Tactics:

- With foreign naval patrols focused on the Gulf of Aden, pirates have moved hundreds of miles off the coast into the Indian Ocean.

- Becoming increasingly more sophisticated, using mother ships in many cases, from which they send out the small speedboats out to both track and assault tankers and container ships in the gulf.

- Now firing rocket propelled grenades directly into the crew quarters. Idea being to start a fire so the crew has to stop the defense of the ship (deploying fire hoses) and put the fire out. When focus changes to getting fire out the pirates board the vessel.

- According to naval and security risk management sources, pirates are getting increasingly vicious, no longer just firing warning shots into the air.
  - Pirates are now targeting the bridges and deliberately shooting out the windows in an attempt to intimidate the crew.

- The fact pirates are now boarding container ships, which are fast, over 20 knots, and they have a high freeboard, indicates that the Somali pirate capability and competence are increasing.
  - Container ships are fast and they have a high freeboard.
  - The bigger the freeboard, the more difficult it is for pirates to get on board.
  - When those boats are moving and the vessels are bucking in the water, it's extremely difficult to get on board.

Confronting the Threat:

• Many analysts agree that the best way to suppress piracy off Somalia is to achieve stability onshore, where civil conflict has raged for the last 18 years.

• Many major merchant lines with ships transiting the Gulf of Aden have contracts with professional crisis teams that are called when hijackings occur.
  
  • Teams include former Special Forces commandos and trained hostage negotiators who deal with the hijackers and their ransom demands, as well as with deliveries of supplies to ships during lengthy negotiations.

• More than a dozen countries have provided ships for naval patrols off Somalia since the end of 2008.
  
  • Brought an initial dip in the number of attacks, especially in the Gulf of Aden, where the patrols were concentrated.
  
  • But some pirates have simply moved their operations further out into the Indian Ocean.
  
  • Sixteen nations have warships in the Indian Ocean region off the Somali coast, which covers 1.1 million square miles and difficult to patrol

• Pentagon planners are beginning to adjust the American arsenal to deal with the threat posed by pirates and other stateless, low-tech foes.
  
  • Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently announced plans to outfit the Navy with more combat vessels for patrolling coastlines and to slash programs building ships designed for open sea battles against traditional rivals.

• Some experts have proposed that the U.N. Security Council should prohibit all ransom payments to pirates others have proposed a naval blockade of Somalia.

Petraeus on Piracy:

"We need the maritime shipping companies to do more than they have. We started off by saying that if you would just speed up when the pirates approach you, that will help. If you take evasive action, that's even better. And if you unbolt the ladder that allows the pirates to climb onto your ship before you set sail, you get extra credit for that. These were not being taken before. This was strictly viewed as a business proposition up until recently. And they figured, well, we'll go park -- if the ship -- you know, you only get 1 percent -- less than 1 percent gets pirated anyway. If it is, we have insurance, and it just goes, parks off Somalia; they'd negotiate.

Well, that price is going up, and, of course, the violence is going up. And the pirates have moved farther and farther and farther out. As you know, originally it was in the Gulf of Aden, just south of Yemen and between the Horn of Africa. Now they're as far out as 450 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia proper.

And so I think that they are going to have to take a very hard look at not just taking additional defensive preparations, in terms of just simple things like concertina wire to make it harder to climb over the side or, again, up over a railing, but also looking at the employment of armed guards or security forces on those. We put them on many of the ships that have our equipment on them, and, again, I think that's something that they're going to have to look hard at.

There is no way that the limited number of vessels from the U.S., the coalition maritime force that we have, NATO, EU, and even others is going to be enough, given the thousands of vessels that transit that area and the vast size of it. You know, it -- there's disputes about how many times the size of Texas that actually is. I'd ask the chair -- I'd defer to the chairman on that. But again, this is a problem that we have to get much more seized with.

We also -- you can do a risk analysis. I mean, you can look at the ship, and there are certain characteristics of ship -- that make them more vulnerable to piracy. And again, I think the maritime shipping industry is going to have to look very hard at whether they keep those ships going through these particular waters. And there's a variety of others. We are going to do a review of this with the leadership in the Pentagon over the course of the next couple weeks, and with the interagency. And then we will propose going back.

Source: ABC News, April 24, 2009

Source: UNOSAT, April 21, 2009

Source: UNOSAT, April 21, 2009

Total of 115 known hijackings in 2008, not counting 65 more suspect ship movements. Overall success rate: 40%

Source: UNOSAT, April 21, 2009


Distance of Piracy From Somalia Coast: 2008-2009

Security Challenges of Weak Somali Governance

• Fourteen attempts to restore central government have failed since 1991, and a 15th one is in its infancy.

  • International officials are hopeful that the administration of President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, set up earlier this year, is the best chance in recent times of bringing peace to Somalia.

  • Ahmed is a moderate Islamist with widespread support inside and outside Somalia.

    • But he faces an insurgency by pro-al Qaeda militant Islamists;

    • His government controls little but a few parts of the capital Mogadishu.

• Weapons are cheap, easy to obtain, and there is no functioning authority to stop them.

  • Yemen is reportedly where the pirates get most of their weapons from.

• On again-off again regional and civil conflict and Islamic fundamentalist groups have hindered government efforts to effectively govern many regions leaving niches for clans, terrorists and pirates to fill.

Security Challenges of Weak Somali Governance: Pirates

• Piracy initially started along Somalia's southern coast but began shifting north in 2007 - and as a result, the pirate gangs in the Gulf of Aden are now multi-clan operations.

• Most Somali pirates are based in villages and small towns along Somalia's long coast, in lairs like Eyl, Hobyo and Haradheere.

• Local rulers take a share to allow the pirates to operate unchecked out of their territories.

• Piracy has become a mainstay of the Puntland economy where the Pirate population is greatest.
  • Number of pirates who actually take part in a hijacking is relatively small, but the whole industry of piracy involves many more people.
  • Businessmen and former fighters for the Somali warlords moved in when they saw how lucrative piracy could be.
  • Many officials believe that the Puntland administration and beyond have links with piracy.

Security Challenges of Weak Somali Governance: Terrorists

• In 2006, Al-Shabaab, a Somalia based Islamic Terrorist Group, had around 600 fighters. Today, intelligence sources suggest they number between 2,000 and 3,000.

• Many officials believe small groups of al-Qaeda militants, including foreigners, have been operating unchecked in Somalia.

• Since 2006 there have been at least four attacks on US and Israeli targets in East Africa linked in some way to Somalia.

• No direct ties between pirates looking for a fast buck and the Islamic extremists looking to attack America or her allies. But informal links are there, mired in Somalia's complex and combative clans.

• Officials report that Terrorists in many regions of Somalia openly tax the population with tolls on aid groups, the general population and other organizations moving through the region.

• The government has been unwilling and/or unable to provide effective governance in many regions leaving a niche for terrorists, extremists and pirates to fill.

Al Qa’ida in the Peninsula and the Threat of Terrorism
The Scale of the Threat

• In May 2003, suicide bombers kill 34 people, including eight Americans, at a housing compound for Westerners. A year later, the organization attacked oil installations taking hostage foreign workers and leaving 22 people dead, including an American. In June 2004, three American nationals were killed during one week. And in December that year, terrorists stormed the American consulate, killing five staff members.

• Attacks by Al Qa’ida in Peninsula have continued. More than 2,200 suspects arrested, and more than 120 militants killed, in ongoing activity during 2003-2008.

• As of May 2008, 18 of the 36 suspects on the most-wanted list issued by the Ministry of Interior on June 28, 2005 had been killed or captured as had 24 of the 26 suspects on the most-wanted list issued on December 6, 2003.

• In December 2007, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz announced that Saudi security forces foiled 180 planned terrorist plots within the Kingdom.

• During 2007-2008 more than 90 security officers killed and more than 200 wounded while carrying out their duties.

Source: Saudi Embassy,, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Initiatives and Actions to Combat Terrorism, May 2008
Yemen and Saudi al-Qaeda branches merge: January 2009

- Al-Qaeda groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have announced they are merging their operations, and their that the joint forces would carry out operations across the Arabian peninsula and beyond.
- Nasir Wuhaishi was named as the head of the new combined al-Qaeda unit. Wuhaishi's appointment was confirmed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, key deputy in al-Qaeda. His deputy was named as Said Ali al-Shihri, a former prisoner at the United States' Guantanamo Bay detention facility, released from Saudi custody in 2007.
- Yemeni authorities said they had stepped up security following the announcement.
- The announcement follows a number of attacks by al-Qaeda in Yemen. An attack outside the US embassy in Sanaa that week is believed to have been carried out by the group. Yemeni police arrested three men on Monday after they fired on security forces near the embassy. No one was hurt in the incident. Nineteen people died in an attack targeting the US embassy last September for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility.

Saudi Arabia issues list of 83 wanted militants living overseas, calling on them to return and resume normal life. All are Saudis, except for two from Yemen. Kingdom has put many militants through rehabilitation programs. But officials have acknowledged recently that some of these have rejoined armed groups.
March 2008 Saudi authorities arrest 28 suspected Al-Qaeda militants of different nationalities. Evidence revealed the militants were attempting to rebuild the Al-Qaeda network and launch a terror campaign in Saudi Arabia.

- January 2008, new law states anyone convicted of setting up a website supporting terrorism will be sentenced to 10 years in prison and fined five million riyals (about $1.3 million).

- December 2, 2007 press conference at King Saud University, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif bin 'Abd Al-'Aziz criticized mosque preachers who call for jihad, saying: "The efforts on the ideological front still leave much to be desired. Security measures in themselves are not sufficient [to stop terrorism] - it is mainly action on the ideological [front] that prevents extremist ideas from infiltrating the minds of the youth."

- November 2007 – Saudi security forces arrested 208 suspected militants planning a series of attacks within the Kingdom, the Ministry of Interior said. Of the 208 captured, eight were plotting an attack on an auxiliary oil installation in the Eastern Province, 22 promoted terrorism and had planned assassinations of Muslim scholars and security forces, 18 plotted to smuggle rockets into Saudi Arabia with the intention of carrying out terrorist operations, 112 were suspected of associating with terrorist cells abroad, 32 provided financial support to terrorists and 16 were arrested in Madinah for promoting and supporting terrorism.

- October 14, 2007 Saudi authorities arrested Abdullah Al-Mohammadi, the fourth and final suspect wanted in the April 27, 2007, Ministry of Interior announced the arrests of 172 militants who were planning major terrorist attacks both in Saudi Arabia and abroad. The massive security sweep resulted in the seizure of weapons, more than $5 million in cash, documents and computers.
Coasts, Border Threats, and the Periphery
Large Territory: Threatened Periphery

- Iraq and Yemen create major land border issues.
- Coastal defense affects Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea.
- Nearly 4,000 kilometers of coastline.
- Coast vital to exports, water (desalination & power) and food.
- Air transport and ships also critical.
- Defense in depth difficult given dependence on coasts; population distribution.
- Security of Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Bab el Mandab, Red Sea critical. Threat of Piracy as well as hostile forces.
Gulf Periphery & Oil Infrastructure
Yemen

• Massive population for small country, constant inflow into Saudi Arabia because of poverty. (23 million with per capita income of only $2,300 ppp.)

• 1,458 kilometer border with Saudi Arabia, 288 kilometer with Oman.

• Saudi border seen as key:

• Uncertain 1,458 kilometer border demarcation; past tensions over claims to Asir in Saudi Arabia

• Has reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the now fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities. Poor border security in spite of fence; smuggling, illegal immigration, etc.

• Infiltration: Base for Al Qa’ida in the Peninsula; history of Marxism, Dhofar Rebellion in Oman, PDRY radicalism.

• Ongoing struggle for tribal influence in border area; Shi’ia-Sunni tribal tensions. Large land forces;

• Kingdom must disperse land forces to different border areas.
The “Vulnerable” State?

• Can Saleh govern forever? 31 years in office. First electoral challenge in 2006, but won new seven year term.

• De Facto “sanctuary” for AQIP: Al-Qa’ida groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia merge operations in January 2009.
  • Nasir Wuhaishi named head and confirmed by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the deputy chief of al-Qa’ida chief. Deputy is Said Ali al-Shihri – a Saudi national.

• Lingering North-South tension from YAR and PDRY merger in 1990, fighting in 1994: Significant radical legacy.

• Flow of illegals, smuggled goods. across Saudi-Yemeni border.

• Zaidi sect uprising in Northwest.

• 23 million people; 3.5% population growth, 46% 14 or younger, 526,000 (268,000 male) enter labor force each year.

• Economy of Qat, expatriate payments, token petroleum. World Bank says per capita income is $870. (2.91% of land is arable, 0.25% has permanent crops.)
The Yemeni Border Issue - I

• Saudi Arabia started construction of separation barrier along border with Yemen began in the fall of 2003, after terrorist infiltration and attacks, and problems with smuggling and illegal labor migration.
• The border demarcation treaty signed in Jeddah in 2000 included a 20 kilometer-wide neutral zone as grazing land whose use was permitted to both sides.
• Saudi Arabia constructed, variously reported as 75 and 95 km-long, in an open area between two mountains along its 1,800 kilometer (1,100 mile) border with Yemen to block smugglers in cars from infiltrating Saudi lands. It was north of the region of the agreed upon 20 km-wide strip.
• The barrier consisted of a network of sandbags and pipelines, three metres (10ft) high, filled with concrete and fitted with electronic detection equipment.
• Saudi Arabia indicated it would construct a more sophisticated set of barriers and sensors.
• Yemeni government objected as did a heavily armed Shi’ite tribe, the Wayilah, which has been a source of violence in the area.
• Saudi officials told the London Arabic-language daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat that the "barrier of pipes and concrete" could in no way be called a "separation fence." Saudi Border Police Commander Talal 'Anqawi said: "What is being built within our borders is a barrier of pipes full of concrete, aimed at deterring infiltration and smuggling… This barrier does not in any way resemble a fence. The site chosen to establish it is located within sovereign Saudi territory."
• Saudi government promised to finish construction in co-operation with Yemen in February 2004, after extensive US and Egyptian mediation., Yemen agreed that the two sides would conduct joint patrols and set up security watch towers along the frontier to curb cross-border smuggling and infiltration.
• October 2006, reports were made of Saudi plans to build improved security barriers to cut down on the 400,000 illegal immigrants who cross it every year
The Yemeni Border Issue - II

• In February 2007, Saudi and Yemeni security officers met in Jeddah to discuss measures to improve security.
• Lt. Gen. Talal Mohsen Angawi, director general of the border guards the largest number of smuggling operations was taking place through the Kingdom’s southern border. Border guards recently foiled the smuggling of four anti-tank missiles, one rocket propelled grenade, 390 bombs, 3,190 dynamite sticks and 819 kg of explosives into the Kingdom.
• An annual report issued by the border guards said they had stopped 344,781 intruders and 2,894 smugglers and confiscated 12,000 kg of hashish, 32 kg of opium, 10,000 narcotic tablets and more than five million kg of qat.
• “The foiling of large-scale operations to smuggle weapons and drugs reflects the vigilance of our officers along the Kingdom’s vast borders,” Angawi said. “We, the border guards are considered the first defense line of the country,” he said, and emphasized the need for protecting young Saudi men and women from the influence of drug mafias.
• Angawi said he had noticed a considerable rise in the smuggling of weapons, drugs, cattle and foodstuffs though number of intruders from Iraq through the Kingdom’s northeastern border had declined considerably. “But the number of intruders through the southern border is increasing and they include Eritreans, Somalis and other Africans,” he said.
• In July 2008, the Saudi border guards reported that they had seized a ton of explosives and large quantities of arms and drugs on Yemen’s border over the past three months, making hundreds of arrests. Okaz newspaper reported that the guards had said these include 13 hand- and rocket-propelled grenades, 99 sticks of dynamite, 100 fuses, 12 detonators, more than 100 guns and 15,000 cartridges figured in the seizures. As many as 800 suspected arms and drugs dealers were arrested over the same period, along with 83 illegal immigrants, the report said. The seizures also included 1,600 kilograms (2,640 pounds) of hashish, two million amphetamine pills and 280 bottles of alcohol.

Source: MEMRI, Wikipedia, AFP, Al Hayat, Reuters
Iraq : The Saudi Case

• 1981 border treaty “resolved” the last uncertainty over the Saudi-Iraqi border and neutral zone issues but was never fully registered with UN.
• Fence would run for approximately 900 kilometers (560 miles), and add to an 7-meter high sand berm that runs along the border, and is in front of which there is a 8 kilometer stretch of no-mans-land that is regularly swept smooth, and patrolled so that infiltrators can be detected and tracked.
• In 2004, the Saudis invited 8 countries to nominate "national champion" companies to compete on the border guard development program. Raytheon undertook a huge border security survey in 2004 and gave the results to MoI.
• In 2006 the MoI hired Bearing Point to draft a comprehensive RFP for the 8 countries to respond to. In 2006 Saudi Arabia issued an RFP for construction of a separation barrier along its border with Iraq – partly because of infiltration, partly because of smuggling, and fear young Saudis were going to Iraq as volunteers for extremist groups.
• The RFP was issued to the 8 in mid 2007 and in early 2008, only 5 companies responded. The USG gave official advocacy to Raytheon.
• Also in 2007 The MoI split the project into two parts, separating out the Northern Border Fence project as an open tender. 14 companies responded, and in September of 2008, the $1.3 billion project was awarded to al-Rashed and EADS. The remainder of the BGDP was rebid in August 2008 with only Thales, EADS and Raytheon being invited to rebid on the $3 billion, 5 year project. The contract would create a sensor fence combining pressure sensors, razor-wire fence, and thermal imaging and radar equipment.
• Interior Minister Prince Naif Bin Abdul Aziz announced on 24 August 2008 that a contract would soon be issued.
• Project part of a wider defense plan to secure the country's 6,500 km (4,000 miles) borders, which could add hundreds of radar facilities, coastal detection centers, telecommunications networks and reconnaissance aircraft/UAVs.

Source: Saudi Gazette, Reuters, Wikepedia, Saudi experts
Iraqi Terrorism and Instability
Global Patterns in Terrorism versus Terrorism in Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in 2008

• Approximately 11,800 terrorist attacks against noncombatants occurred in various countries during 2008, resulting in over 54,000 deaths, injuries and kidnappings.

• Compared to 2007, attacks decreased by 2,700, or 18 percent, in 2008 while deaths due to terrorism decreased by 6,700, or 30 percent.

• As was the case last year, the largest number of reported terrorist attacks occurred in the Near East, but unlike previous years, South Asia had the greater number of fatalities. These two regions were the locations for 75 percent of the 235 high-casualty attacks (those that killed 10 or more people) in 2008.

• Attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan accounted for about 55 percent of all attacks

• Of the 11,770 reported attacks, about 4,600, or nearly 40 percent, occurred in the Near East where approximately 5,500 fatalities, or 35 percent of the worldwide total, were reported for 2008.

• Attacks in Iraq have continued to decline since 2007.

• Another 35 percent of the attacks occurred in South Asia with Afghanistan and Pakistan registering increased attacks.

• Attacks in Pakistan more than doubled in 2008.

Comparison of High-Fatality Sunni Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan versus Rest of World from 2004 to 2008

Terrorism Related Deaths: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq & Rest of World:

Terrorism Related Kidnappings: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq & Rest of World: 2008

Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Iraq: 2005-2008


High-Profile Attacks (Explosions)
May 2006 – February 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of February 28, 2009. Does not include found and cleared.

Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- Winter 2006 vs. Winter 2008-2009

Source: MNF-, April 29, 2009
Key Areas of Jaysh Al Mahdi and Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter 2007 vs. Fall 2008

Source: MNF-, April 29, 2009
Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province
December 1, 2008 – February 28, 2009

Iraq: Civilian Deaths: Jan 2006-Apr 2009

Source: MNF-I, April 2009
Ethno-Sectarian Deaths
January 2006 – February 2009

Source: MNF-I CJ5 Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of February 28, 2009.

Ethno-Sectarian Attacks: May 2006-Feb 2009

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October 2008

Government Security Efforts are Effective

Iraq is Stable

Nationwide average = 46%

Nationwide average = 51%

Percent who Agree

Source: January 2009 Nationwide Research

Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: January 2009

Source: January 2009 Nationwide Research

Iraqi Stability vs. Instability

• Internal divisions:
  • Sunni vs. Arab: Baghdad and Diyala
  • Arab vs. Kurd vs. Turcoman vs. Minority: Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah al Din, Diyala: Kurdish “federalism”
  • Sunni on Sunni: Tribal vs. parties vs. national.
  • Shi’ite on Shiite: Dawa vs. ISCI vs. Fadhila vs. Sadr vs. local: Three and Nine Province “federalism.”
  • Secular vs. religion

• 2009 Elections and referendums

• Problems in governance and corruption

• Al Qa’ida in Iraq: Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa

• Outside pressure: Iran and Turkey

• Budget and economic crisis; slow pace of petroleum development, industrial & agricultural failures.

• ISF development vs. pace of US withdrawals.
Figure 9: Iraqi Estimate of Civilian Deaths in Iraq, Less Kurdistan: July 2007-Apr 2009

Source: An Iraqi government official and ABC News, May 1, 2009
Figure 10: Iraqi Estimate of Patterns of Violence in Baghdad: Feb 2007-Apr 2009

Source: An Iraqi government official and ABC News, May 1, 2009
Figure 11: Iraqi Estimate of Killed in Baghdad: Feb 2007-Apr 2009

Source: An Iraqi government official and ABC News, May 1, 2009
Figure 12: Iraqi Estimate of Killed, Wounded, and Bodies Found in Baghdad: Feb 2007-Apr 2009

Source: An Iraqi government official and ABC News, May 1, 2009