The Afghan-Pakistan War: “Clear, Hold, Build”

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May 11, 2009
The Challenge: Six “Wars” in One

• Defeat the Taliban and other Jihadists in Afghanistan; move to Post Conflict Reconstruction

• Secure the AfPak Border area in NWFP/FATA and Baluchistan

• Defeat Al Qa’ida’s central structure as functioning, secure entity.

• Create a stable and secure Pakistan.

• Win sustained US Congressional and public support and trust for the war; create Allied trust, confidence, and commitment.

• Reshape US forces and US military culture; lay the ground work for an effective civil-military partnership; integrate grand strategy, strategy, and tactics for armed nation building.
Fighting Them as “Microwars”

• All counterinsurgency “is local,” and so are all near-term phases of “clear, hold, build”

• No near term prospect of covering entire country in either case; focus on most critical districts of and population centers.

• Must adapt to the individual village, valley, city, or region as necessary.

• Threat differs too at microlevel, as does penetration and popularity.

• Cannot tolerate local fracture lines at any phase of clear, hold, build that threaten overall strategy.

• Massive HUMINT, linguistic, cultural, and continuity/handover challenge.

• What is insecure at night or with armor is not “hold and build:” The Komar-Abrams challenge

• Lack of local governance, security/rule of law, civilian partners.

• Adapt locally or lose.
The Strategy: “Clear, Hold, Build”

In pursuit of the strategic goals, the U.S. and its Allies and partners are pursuing a comprehensive COIN strategy that brings together military, diplomatic, and economic assets of the U.S. and the international community. The key elements of the COIN strategy are sometimes described as “clear, hold, and build” The objective of these elements is to:

• Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
“Declared” and Overt Threats

- Traditional or “Southern” Taliban; Sheik Omar
- Eastern Taliban, Haqqani, Hekmatyar
- Narcotics, crime, corruption
- Al Qa’ida in Pakistan.
- Pakistani Taliban, Deobandi and other native Jihadists.
- Foreign volunteers.
- Extremist clerics and ideologues.
- Iranian uncertainty
“Undeclared” and Covert Threats

• *Partly* “failed or “broken” Afghan and Pakistani governments

• Uncertain Pakistani Army; public anger against the US.

• Afghan-Pakistani-Pashtun and India-Pakistan tensions.

• Kashmir

• Ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and regional divisions

• Allied uncertainties: NATO/ISAF issues, national caveats, length of allied commitments.

• Fractured, inefficient, and corrupt international aid efforts.

• Underresourcing, reactive resourcing.

• The struggle for the future of Islam.

• Rivalries and ambitions of neighboring states.
The American Threat

• The past failure to win broad Congressional and public support: Transparency and credibility.

• Reactive resourcing and putting Iraq first: Letting the enemy keep the initiative

• Fighting a war of enduring political attrition in short term, kinetic and tactical terms.

• Ethnocentricity and ideological arrogance.

• Inefficient divisions in dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan; failure to recognize Pakistan’s vulnerability.

• Lack of civil-military partnership and effective linkage between country teams and Washington.

• US military culture: “warrior mentality,” careerism, lack of continuity, cult of success
Generic Lessons

- Listen to the separate Afghan and Pakistani dialogue.
- Listen to the threat; Watch threat political, economic, security, social and religious behavior.
- React to local goals and values: Survival, family, and ambition are critical.
- Operate by local time and courtesy wherever possible.
- Rely on locals without playing favorites, do it their way, and help them grow.
- Make sure you really have solved the translation problem.
- Don’t go kinetic: Dollars are bullets, HUMINT is critical.
- Take continuity seriously in handovers, rotation, reporting.
“Clear”
“Clear:” Combat and Kinetics

Before initiating a COIN campaign, the U.S. and its Allies and partners must understand where to clear, how to hold, and what to build. Before starting the clearÓphase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribesÕ relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

In the clearÓphase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow. Carefully coordinated international forces and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti- government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan
May 2003 to March 2009

Number of average daily attacks per month

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction*

For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts

Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months’ Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09)

INS Initiated Attacks: +12% 

IED Events: -15% (57% of all casualties since Jan 07)

Attacks on GIRoA: -37%

Suicide Attacks: +3%

Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20%

ISAF Deaths: +21%

ANSF Deaths: -27%

Civilian Deaths: +9%

Building Host Nation Capacity:**

ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed 47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD 13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

* Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09.

** Source: CSTC-A.
Security Summary: Jan-April 2008 vs. Jan-April 2009

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks\(^1\)
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)\(^1\)
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)\(^1\)
- 28% increase in CF force strength\(^5\)
- 38% increase in ANA force strength\(^4\)
- 59% increase in CF offensive events\(^1\)

January to April 2009
Kinetic Activity Density Plot
By District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More Activity</th>
<th>Less Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)\(^2\)
- 36% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

Footnotes on Sources:
\(^1\)UOIS, 4 May.
\(^2\)ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.
\(^3\)CJOCS CivCas cell, 2 May.
\(^4\)CSTC-A, 4 May.
\(^5\)CJ1, 3 May.

- Civilian Deaths: down 44%\(^3\)
- ISAF/OFED Deaths: up 55%\(^1\)
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%\(^1\)
  (Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIROA officials & district centers: up 90%\(^1\)
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%\(^1\)

Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9, 2009
Insurgent Attacks

- Insurgent initiated attacks were up 64% overall (Jan/Apr 09 v. Jan/Apr 08):
  - Direct Fire attacks were up 57%
  - Indirect Fire attacks were up 44%
  - IEDs were up 81%
  - Surface to Air Fire was up 103%
  - Coalition Force offensive actions were up 59%

- Kinetic events increased substantially this year relative to the same period last year
  - Deliberate increase in operational tempo by ANSF and ISAF
  - Milder winter
  - Continued freedom of action for insurgents from sanctuaries across the border

Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9, 2009
UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:

2005 versus 2007

2008 most violent year in Afghanistan since 2001, with 31 per cent more incidents than in 2007.

Second half of 2008 saw an average of 857 incidents per month, against 625 per month during the first six months.

Mild winter provided an environment for high levels of violence. Specifically, there were 42 per cent more incidents in December 2008 than in December 2007, and 75 per cent more in January 2009 than in January 2008.

Two trends worsened: attempts by insurgents to destabilize previously stable areas and increased use by insurgents of more sophisticated asymmetric attacks, with an increasing disregard for the lives of civilians.

These attacks included assassinations, intimidation, abductions, stand-off attacks, use of improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, increasingly targeted civil servants, religious scholars, the aid community and road construction projects.

Direct targeting of international aid organizations by insurgents continued.

Insurgents continued to expand their presence in previously stable areas. The north-western province of Badghis and the neighbouring province of Faryab became a battleground through the winter, with a significant increase in insurgent action.

Increase in insurgent presence severely hampered humanitarian and development efforts in previously accessible areas. Freedom of movement of unarmed civil servants was reduced by the intensified fighting and the increased campaign of intimidation and assassination.

As of December 2008, 231 of the country’s approximately 400 districts continued to report near-total accessibility, while 10 were considered completely beyond the Government’s control and access to 165 remained difficult or problematic.

While the number of districts that are nearly or completely inaccessible to civil servants did not change significantly since 2007, about 30 districts are in danger of losing accessibility.

There are currently no indications that the security situation will improve before the summer of 2009.
Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Comparing Jan-Apr ‘09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 44%.
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths.

Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9, 2009

UNCLASSIFIED
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with US/NATO/ISAF Air Attacks in Past Year: 2009

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: US/NATO/ISAF Air Strikes: Acceptability & Blame

Military Deaths

- Comparing Jan-Apr ‘09 to the same time period in 2008:
  - Total military deaths were up 29%
  - ANSF deaths were up 24%
  - ISAF deaths were up 55%

*Attributed to insurgent initiated attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, and surface-to-air fire)

Source: NATO-ISAF, April 9, 2009
## Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Afghanistan: 2005-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping</th>
<th>People killed, injured, or kidnapped</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>1551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>3556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>4662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>5423</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Most Likely Outcome of War

Results from the last two surveys indicate a potential reversal in the downward trend of security perceptions. As of March, 85% say the security situation in their local area is good or fair.

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

UNCLASSIFIED
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll:
Afghan Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Positive Ratings of Local Security: Feb 09

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

Civilians hurt by (Net 38%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009-2</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suicide Attacks</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipers</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition bombings</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition forces</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA/ANP</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among other violence, a quarter report car bombs or suicide attacks in their area in the past year; three in 10, kidnappings for ransom. Thirty-eight percent report civilian casualties in the past year, attributed about equally either to U.S./NATO/ISAF or to anti-government forces, and somewhat less so to Afghan government forces. Given these and their many other challenges, the number of Afghans who expect their lives to improve in the year ahead has dropped from a peak of 67 percent in 2005 to 51 percent today. And just under half, 47 percent, expect a better life for their children, hardly a ringing endorsement of the country’s prospects. The resurgence of the Taliban is a key element of the public alarm: Fifty-eight percent of Afghans see the Taliban as the biggest danger to the country, measured against local warlords, drug traffickers or the U.S. or Afghan governments. And 43 percent say the Taliban have grown stronger in the past year, well more than the 24 percent who think the movement has weakened.


“How safe do you feel driving outside your Mantaqa during the day?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Dec 08</th>
<th>Mar 09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Safe</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Safe</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Little Safe</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Little Unsafe</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unsafe</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009

- Comparing Jan-Apr ’09 to the same time period in 2008, attacks within 500 meters of ISAF routes were up 36%

- Results of increased security measures (implemented Sep 08):
  - Fewer attacks on bridges
  - Less effective attacks

Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Experience with Taliban Violence by Province: 2009/2

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: At Least Some Support for the Taliban: 2007 versus 2009/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Taliban More Moderate?: 2009/2


One War in Two Countries:

Afghanistan versus “Pashtunistan”
Pakistan’s Strategic Position

Ethnic & Linguistic Diversity
Percent of Population and Language Speakers

80% Sunni, 19%

Source: CIA World Factbook 2007
The “Af-Pak” Border Area

Helmand: The Key Area of Cross Border Operations

Khyber: The Challenge to US and NATO/ISAF Supply Routes
“Hold”
“Hold:” Provide Security, Give Combat Meaning

In the “hold” phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return. Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population. Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghans Who Feel Attacks on Coalition Forces are Justified: 2-2009

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nationwide</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition Bombing in Area</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-conflict Provinces</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Coalition Bombing in</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-conflict Provinces</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public Perception: Who Provides Security
Overall, nearly one third of the population hold a positive opinion of ISAF, one third hold a fair opinion, and nearly one third hold a negative opinion.

“What is your opinion of ISAF?”

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.
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“What is your opinion of ISAF?”

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of April 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 82,780 personnel. This represents 62% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by the end of 2011.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Now, over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA.

Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014
(Authorized Personnel)

(Trained and Assigned Personnel)

Trained and assigned ANSF stand at 145,000 and will reach the current objective of 216,000 by the beginning of 2014.

In November 2008, the ANA stood at 79,068 (including 5,420 absent without leave- AWOL), composed of 78 kandaks (battalions) and five Commando (CDO) kandaks.

In summer 2008, the GIRoA sought agreement to further increase the ANA from 80,000 to 122,000 soldiers with an additional 12,000 trainee, transient, hospitalized, and student (TTHS) account (for a total authorized end strength of 134,000). On September 10th 2008, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved.

The GIRoA will reach its objective of 134,000 ANA personnel by the beginning of 2014.

The 134,000 force structure calls for 20 brigades, a new division headquarters in the capital, Corps-level artillery, engineer and Quick Reaction Force assets, as well as an increase in institutional support.

As of November 2008, the ANA had seven battalions and one brigade and one corps headquarters rated at Capability Milestone (CM)1: capable of operating independently.

Twenty-nine battalions/squadrons, six brigade headquarters, and three corps headquarters were reported at the CM2 level: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with international support.

Twenty-five battalions/squadrons, four brigade headquarters, one corps headquarters, and the ANAAC headquarters were reported at the CM3: partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations at the company level with support from international forces.

Six battalions/squadrons and one brigade headquarters are reported at CM4: formed but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. Finally, there are eighteen battalions/squadrons and two brigade headquarters that are still not formed or reporting.

Currently, two of the five corps can field nearly all of their subordinate units and join their international partners in some of the most contentious areas of RC East and South.
ANSF Deliberate Operations

- ANSF is demonstrating increased capacity and capability to lead Deliberate Operations.
- Increases in ANSF capability and end-strength should lead to further increases in ANSF led Deliberate Operations.
- A sharp increase in the number of coalition led operations beginning in the summer of 2008 led to a reduction in the percentage of operations the ANSF led.
- In spite of ANSF increased capacity and capabilities, any increase in Coalition Forces and their operations will result in the continued percentage decline of ANSF led operations.

**Summary of 2009 Deliberate Operations**
- ANSF has led an average of 44 Deliberate Operations per week.
- Average of 83 total deliberate operations conducted per week.
- On average, the ANSF has led 53% of Deliberate Operations conducted during a given week in 2009.

**Summary of 2008 Deliberate Operations**
- ANSF led an average of 22 Deliberate Operations per week.
- Average of 37 total Deliberate Operations conducted per week.
- On average, the ANSF led 61% of Deliberate Operations conducted during a given week in 2008.

Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
ANA Size and Capability 2009

ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (53% in last 120 days)
- 109 of 160 units fielded; 87,300 assigned (will grow to 134,000 by Dec 2011)
- ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08
  - Air Corps flying 90% of all Afghan missions

Source: NATO-ISAF, May 11, 2009
**ANA PROGRESS FROM JAN 08 TO DEC 08**

**Battalion / Kandak Level Capabilities**

**Key Points:**

**ANA fielding:** From Jan 08 to Dec 08, 13 new Battalions were fielded (Include Infantry, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Commando Bns)

**ANA manning:** ANA personnel assigned to ANA land combat forces increased from 31,342 in Jan08 to 44,051 in Dec08
ANA total personnel assigned increased from 49,452 in Jan08 to 67,263 in Dec08

**ANA capabilities:**
- 21 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 1, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with no external support for organic functions
- 23 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 2, being able to plan and execute operations at Battalion level with external support
- 22 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 3, being able to plan and execute operations at Coy level with external support
- 2 Battalions reached Capability Milestone Level 4, fielded but not capable to plan and lead operations
- ANA led operations increased from 49% in Jan08 to 62% in Dec08
Shortages in US and NATO Afghan Army Trainers: 2007-2013

Readiness of Afghan Police Units: Current and Projected by Readiness Category: 2008-2013
(District AUP and Specialized Unit CM levels, February-December 2008, with Projections for 2009-2013)

Table 6 - CM levels for ANP Units, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CM1</th>
<th>CM2</th>
<th>CM3</th>
<th>CM4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Impact of Afghan Police Reform: Casualties and Pay

Figure 17 Local Afghan Casualties, Pre- and Post-FDD by District, November 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cycle 1: Pre 6 Months, Post 6 Months</th>
<th>Cycle 2: Pre 6 Months, Post 6 Months</th>
<th>Cycle 3: Pre 4 Months, Post 4 Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-FDD</td>
<td>Post-FDD</td>
<td>Pre-FDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bala Buluk</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shah Joy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tag Ab</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zumal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjwai</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhurkan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhai</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gulaian</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lashkar Gai</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mata Khan</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nahrin Samay</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sar Hwaza</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NATO/ISAF: Afghan Public Protection Program

AP3 Overview
- District community councils select local protection forces
- Special Forces “train the trainers”
- ANSF train the Afghanistan Public Protection Force (APPF); Ministry of Interior provides oversight
- Amplified by Wardak Governor’s information and media campaign
- Deployment of AP3 assets is coordinated between the ANP and the District community council

Key Takeaway: AP3 is a pilot community engagement program that relies on civil participation to enhance local security, deny insurgent support, and extend government legitimacy to the district level

APPF – Jalreyz District
- 243 pax / 47 villages
- 46% Tajik
- 38% Pashtun
- 16% Hazara

- Class 2:
  - Phase 1 training began 25 Apr
  - 81 students from Jalreyz and Maydan Shahr
- Continuing to conduct shaping operations in Nerkh and clear/hold operations in Jalreyz
- Forming plans for Chak-e Vardak
- Conditions-based progression

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009
“Build”
“Build:” Create the Opportunity for Lasting Victory

In the “build” phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the “clear” and “hold” phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.
Afghan Conditions of Life

• While 62 percent of Afghans rate their overall living conditions positively, that’s declined steadily from 83 percent in 2005.

• There has been significant progress in some areas.
  • Seventy-two percent of Afghans say schools have been rebuilt or reopened in their area in the past five years (up 7 points from 2007); 53 percent, mosques; 47 percent, roads (up 12 points); 45 percent, health clinics (up 8 points); and 44 percent, police stations.
  • While fewer than half, 42 percent, say they have good roads, bridges and other infrastructure in their area, that’s up sharply from 24 percent in 2005.
  • Seventy-seven percent rate their local schools positively; 65 percent say they have clean water, up 12 points compared with 2007 and a new high.
  • And 73 percent support the presence of foreign aid organizations in Afghanistan.

• In other areas,
  • barely over half rate their access to medical care positively.
  Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.
  • Just under half positively rate their protection from the Taliban and other armed groups.
  • While 61 percent say they can move about safely, that’s down 10 points from 2007, and leaves four in 10 without such freedom of movement. And beyond food and fuel, in terms of prices overall, 58 percent report difficulty being able to afford things they want and need.
  • (Only) 51 percent, say foreign aid groups are making progress in providing a better life for Afghans. And fewer still, 30 percent of Afghans, say foreign development aid has benefited them personally. There’s also concern about its future: Nearly three-quarters are worried about the impact of the global financial crisis on aid to their country.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; , February 9, 2009
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces; February 9, 2009

National Solidarity Program

- Provides one-time block grants of $5,000 to $60,000 to local communities
- Reaches 68% of Afghanistan's 31,000+ communities
- Forms democratically elected Community Development Council (CDC)
- CDC conducts a reconstruction and development assessment for its village and identifies projects and activities (46k projects approved; 25k completed)

NSP Coverage, By District (Mar 09)

- Adapts to Afghan local cultural and political environments
- Provides broad coverage and good performance with low-leakage rates
- Engenders local buy-in (requires 10% community contribution); highly popular program
- Serves as a front-line mechanism for the Hold and Build phases of the overall COIN strategy

Source: ISAF; MRRD; as of 30 Mar 09.
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Reconstruction: Rebuilt or Reopened in Past Five Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008/09</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total funding</strong></td>
<td>7,400</td>
<td>6,064</td>
<td>6,165</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>31,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic revenue</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>6,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total donor assistance</td>
<td>6,513</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>4,398</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>24,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures</strong></td>
<td>7,903</td>
<td>9,286</td>
<td>10,236</td>
<td>11,038</td>
<td>11,637</td>
<td>50,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total shortfall</strong></td>
<td>503</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>5,029</td>
<td>5,818</td>
<td>18,643</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO/ISAF PRTs and RCs
(April 2009)

DISCLAIMER

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).
The ISAF mission consists of 42 Nations. The figures next to each country are based on global contributions to the entire ISAF Mission and do not reflect exact numbers on the ground at any one time. The boundaries representation on this map must not be considered authoritative.
The names shown on this map or chart do not necessarily indicate official recognition of the political status of the territories concerned.

NATO/ISAF: http://www.NATO.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/index.html
 Afghan Economic Realities

• More than half report incomes less than the equivalent of $100 a month; 93 percent, under $300.

• Fifty-nine percent have no formal education. Forty-eight percent cannot read.

• The affordability of food is worsening: Sixty-three percent of Afghans say they cannot afford to buy all or even some but not all of the food they need, up 9 points from late 2007. And while 63 percent report adequate availability of food (regardless of affordability), that’s down from 82 percent in 2006.

• Fuel prices, likewise, are a major problem; 68 percent say they can’t afford the fuel they need for cooking or heat, a serious issue in the cold Afghan winter.

• Just 29 percent say there’s a good supply of jobs or economic opportunities in their area.

• And the number who characterize their economic opportunities as “very bad” has doubled since 2006 -- from 17 percent then to 33 percent now, one in three Afghans.

• Electricity supply is steadily the single biggest complaint, along with economic opportunity and prices.

• Fifty-five percent have no electricity whatsoever in their homes; just one in 20 has power all day.

• Another poorly rated area is support for agriculture, such as the availability of seed, fertilizer and farm equipment, a central concern in a country that’s three-quarters rural, with food prices so problematic.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces;, February 9, 2009
• In the country as a whole, 63 percent of Afghans call raising opium poppy “unacceptable in all cases.”
• But in the six top-producing provinces that dives to 31 percent – and in Helmand, source of two-thirds of Afghanistan’s opium poppy, to just 12 percent.
• Instead, 66 percent in the top-producing provinces (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Nimroz and Zabul in the Southwest, and Farah in the West), call it acceptable to cultivate the crop. That peaks at 88 percent in Helmand.
• Most who say it’s acceptable say that’s the case only if there’s no other way to earn a living, suggesting openness to alternatives. But the high prices for opium poppy may make alternatives a hard sell.
• Another challenge: Even nationally, few Afghans, just 13 percent, support spraying pesticides as a way to eradicate the crop.

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces, February 9, 2009
Table 9 Prices of opium and food grains in 2009 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop name</th>
<th>ORA 2009</th>
<th>ORA 2008</th>
<th>% difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dry opium</td>
<td>85.16</td>
<td>112.87</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh opium</td>
<td>61.74</td>
<td>80.44</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Rising Opium Threat in the South: 2006-2008

Opium Trade: Financing the Taliban


Public Confidence and Local Support

ABC News/BBC/ARD poll

- Confident can provide security
- Strong local support

Source: ABC/BBC/ARD poll – Afghanistan: Where things stand, poll of a random sample 1,534 Afghans in all 34 of the country’s provinces
Do you agree/disagree that the Provincial Council makes a difference for the province?

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09

Economy & Essential Services

- Has your family's economic situation gotten better, stayed the same or gotten worse compared to 12 months ago?

- Gross Licit Domestic Product:
  - Source: IME
  - 2003 to 2008

- Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with the provision of services in the area?
  - Percent responding ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’

- Water, Healthcare, Electricity, Job/employment
ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Perceived Ability to Afford Food: 2007 vs. 2009-2

Afghan Agriculture: Output By Crop and Value of Exports

Figure 21 – Major Agricultural Products, Afghanistan, 2000/2001-2008/2009 (1,000 metric tons)

Figure 22 – Value of Exported Afghan Agricultural Produce, 2001-2007

Healthcare in 2009

Community Health Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WSSC WASH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Under five Mortality rate</th>
<th>Children % not growing normally</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nationwide Results

- No healthcare available in area: 14%
- Very bad: 16%
- Bad: 31%
- Fair: 23%
- Good: 11%
- Very good: 0%

Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08

How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area?

Results by Province

Day Kundi not sampled due to extremely poor security & high risk
Education 2009

**Number of Students in School**

- Boys
- Girls

**MINISTRY OF EDUCATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS**

- 9062 Schools in 2007; 10,998 in 2008
- 147,641 Teachers in 2007; 157,244 in 2008
- 26 million textbooks printed in 2008
- Adult literacy program will serve 1,300 communities 2008 – 2013
- Adult literacy rate is ~ 28% (women ~ 12%; men ~ 43%)

**Are 6 to 14 year old children in your household going to school?**

**Access to Schools (Boys)**

**Access to Schools (Girls)**

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

UNCLASSIFIED
NATO/ISAF Ring Road Map in 2008

154 kilometers constructed in 2008

75% of RING Road and 44% of International Links Completed

Completed
To be complete by Mar 09 (benchmark)
To be complete by Mar 10
To be complete after Mar 10
Unknown

Source: USAID 30 Nov 08
Impact of Road Programs as of March 2009

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the provision of roads?

- 943 kms of Regional, National and Provincial Roads assessed
- Traffic volumes up 58%
- Travel times decreased 74%
- No. of businesses increased 56%; Gross sales increased 400%
- Household Income up 39%
- Irrigated land increased 47%
- School attendance up 8%
- Health Clinic visits up 7%

Source: USAID, Roads Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, May 6 – August 8, 2008; compares information collected from Summer 2008 against baseline data collected in 2003.

Source: NATO/ISAF, April 9, 2009