Measuring Progress in International State Building and Reconstruction
A Paper for the Aspen European Strategy Forum

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Overview

Defining success has proven to be one of the toughest jobs in post conflict situations.

As the international community has grown more ambitious in its interventions, recurring weaknesses appear. The first section of the paper will review some of the challenges and responses. Among the shortcomings discussed are the failures to: establish baselines or set clear directions; understand the context or available resources; produce timely, independent and recurring reviews; and, change directions or plans throughout the operation. If we are unable to say where we started, where we are going, or how the journey is progressing, it is hard to claim success or failure. These chronic weaknesses undermine public support in the countries that we seek to help and with our taxpayers at home.

The second section will discuss some models that have been developed and that could show the way for measuring progress. The new approaches and experiences were tested in Iraq and Afghanistan, and reinforce the challenge of impact on policy and operations.

The final section offers some guiding principles to make the measurement of progress more effective and influential – so that international interventions might improve.

Three articles that address the issues in this paper are attached for further background and hyperlinks are also provided in the text. The author has been directly involved in most of the cases and examples that are discussed.

Part One
The Challenge

In early June of 2003, Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia[1] had just returned from a trip to Iraq and immediately contacted Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He was deeply concerned with what he saw and believed that a "second opinion" review of the early days of the reconstruction would be helpful to the United States' efforts. His request that CSIS be responsible for putting together a team in short order was accepted by the Secretary and the new head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad, Ambassador Jerry Bremer. On June 26, a team of five arrived in Iraq, and over the next two weeks traveled to 11 major cities and two ports, visited half of the country's 18 governorates, and met with over 250 people including Iraqis from all walks of life.

While two members of the team had done a substantial amount of prior work developing an "action strategy"[2] for Iraq (should there be a war there), all were visiting the country for the first time. A tremendous amount of international activity was already underway among the US, its allies the British and Danes, and the UN. The research approach was designed to be both independent and informative: by talking with a wide range of officials and citizens it was hoped that a "weight of the evidence" interpretation might result, thus better informing conclusions and recommendations.[3]

The CSIS team's dominant impression was that the enormity of the task was not appreciated. An international community that had struggled with the Balkans, Rwanda, and Haiti, and was feeling moderately competent in East Timor, was suddenly, with modest preparation, being thrust into a nation that was many times larger. Even without the additional complexity of Saddam Hussein's long, divisive and despotic rule, Iraq's geography and population of 25 million people alone were substantially greater challenges than had been faced in the prior decade.

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[1] A prominent member of the Appropriations Committee and also one of 27 distinguished public officials on the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Congressman Wolf had visited Iraq in May of 2003. His concerns at what he saw transpiring in the earliest days after the fighting led to the request to the Secretary of Defense.

[2] See *A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-Conflict Iraq*, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/wiserpeace.pdf; also

[3] This approach was heavily influenced by my private sector marketing work, political organizing, and the field-intensive research model of Bob Gersony, who did path-breaking work in Mozambique, Liberia, Nicaragua, Bosnia and Rwanda.

It was also clear that all of the US-led eagerness to get going and move on was producing dangerous blind spots. The July 17 report[4] cited "decades of severe degradation and under-investment" in infrastructure and service delivery, "a campaign of sabotage and ongoing resistance", and a "daunting array of needs and challenges". The need for commitment, the fragility of the coalition, and the high expectations of Iraqis were all mentioned, as were core operational weaknesses.

The report's seven major recommendations offered a strategy and a way forward and was well-received by Ambassador Bremer, top Pentagon officials, and the press. As the first independent review, the research model was seen as being thorough, and the suggested way forward was pragmatic. Yet, almost nothing changed.

Why would a review that enjoyed so many advantages, including independence, top-level buy-in and access, still fail to make a difference? The case of Iraq had many complicating factors, most notably the lack of agreement on direction, strategy, and leadership, but it is not unique in its failure to apply the insights and recommendations of a review.

In recent times, the most telling international evaluations have generally been post-mortems of disasters or of serious underperformance. Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, had encouraged independent reviews of the fall of Srebrenica and of the UN's actions during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and they set a higher standard of insight and disclosure.[5] While the reports helped to disclose the nature of the U.N.'s problem and served as catalysts for change, the institutional incapacity to make dramatic progress remained.

During my time at UNHCR several donor nations and High Commissioner Sadako Ogata initiated a full review of the agency's preparedness and response to the Kosovo crisis. The leader of that effort, Astri Suhrke insisted on the integrity of the process and succinctly stated to UNHCR's Executive Committee meeting that "In difficult circumstances, UNHCR did not do well." The report stated:

"As a result of the intense international interest in the Kosovo refugee crisis, many factors affecting UNHCR's performance were not under its own control. However, the agency was in some respects weaker than it needed to be by not optimally utilizing the resources which it did control, or could easily acquire. This applies particularly to management practices and staffing patterns, possibly also to diplomacy in the field during the initial phase. These weaknesses fuelled criticism over

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[4] *Iraq's Post-Conflict Reconstruction – A Field Review and Recommendations*, July 17, 2003 http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraqtrip.pdf

[5] Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 *The Fall of Srebrenica* http://www.un.org/peace/srebrenica.pdf ; *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?OpenElement

agency failures, further encouraging bilateralism and assertive behaviour of other organizations. The constraints on UNHCR operations were both external and internal.[6]"

The candor of the report and the value of their recommendations extended to the team's view of international evaluation methods:

"Most of the current evaluations of the Kosovo emergency are single-agency or single-organization focused, and therefore may not generate a comparative perspective and may lose cross-cutting issues. The evaluators would encourage joint evaluation of responses to major emergencies, including comparison of multilateral vs. bilateral approaches.[7]"

The report was enthusiastically received by UNHCR's Executive Committee and led to a more open sharing of all internal and external evaluations, but its many recommendations could have been more enthusiastically embraced by the leadership of UNHCR.
Less common, but of real value in terms of producing change, were efforts to alter current practices and set new directions in ongoing operations. As public opposition to the war in Afghanistan grew in Canada during 2007, the Prime Minister appointed an independent panel of respected public figures to review their country's role. The process was bipartisan and transparent, headed by an opposition figure, former Liberal Party cabinet member John Manley. Their report is a model for engaging the tough issues and bringing them to the public's attention with constructive steps.[8] As a result, Canada made important internal management changes, moving the leadership of its Afghanistan effort into the Prime Minister's office from its ministries. In addition, Canada made more explicit demands of its NATO allies, especially regarding the deployment of fighting forces, which helped to address one scandalous shortcoming.

During work in El Salvador in the 1980s, USAID initiated the practice of "concurrent audits" which provided early and actionable information to field operations that were managing significant amounts of money in difficult places. That became a standard at USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the 1990s confirming that early and frequent reviews could be used as a management tool to avoid mistakes and improve performance.

A telling example happened in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. The U.S. government was seized with the notion of "reconciliation" programming and OTI had initiated $800,000 of test projects in different parts of Bosnia. A simple criteria of four principles was developed but in none of the 25 or so initiatives were any of them being met – quite simply, the warring parties were in no mood to do anything

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[6] *The Kosovo Refugee Crisis* - An independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response. http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3ba0bbeb4.pdf

[7] Ibid

[8] *Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan*, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf

together. A thorough independent field review was initiated and undertaken by a talented researcher, Bob Gersony, who proceeded to report back that "he had never seen such honest reporting within the USG; but that nothing seemed to be working." On the other hand, he noticed one small initiative that was restoring a handful of homes on a Croat-Bosniak divide that he found promising. That $200,000 experiment with less than 10 homes became a highly successful $25 million USG program that allowed residents all over Bosnia to return to their partially restored houses.[9]

More recently, the work of America's Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has tried to reach beyond audits and nitpicking to highlight broader themes and opportunities for improved practices.[10] SIGIR's quarterly reports and the work of the Government Accountability Office[11] in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, make clear that current information can produce immediate opportunities for improvement.

From the earliest stages of an international intervention, there are always good ways to avoid mistakes. Prior to committing troops in Afghanistan, the Dutch parliament engaged in a full-scale review of the Netherlands' potential engagement. That debate produced one of the more fulsome discussions held in any of the NATO countries. The result: a more balanced approach with required and scheduled public updates. Such programmed oversight is more common after the fact.

In the late fall of 2004, the United States Institute of Peace began a process to "systematically address the causes of failure in specific areas in reconstruction and stabilization operations and to generate policy options for those in the U.S. government and elsewhere." One of the working groups of the "Filling the Gaps" project was dedicated to measuring progress.[12] After group meetings with 70 decision makers, practitioners and scholars and interviews, discussions, and research into existing models and more than 50 books, reports and articles, several conclusions were reached:

- "Faulty initial analysis" often leads to "unrealistic time frames, inadequate resources, and constrained authorities. Progress is judged on the basis of programs that have been implemented rather than on actual results."

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[9] Gersony spent several months conducting hundreds of in-depth interviews and collating the information into a compelling oral presentation.

[10] SIGIR website: http://www.sigir.mil/

[11] GAO website: http://www.gao.gov/

[12] Co-chaired by Rick Barton of CSIS and Mike Dziedzic of USIP with the final report written by Craig Cohen, Special Report #1, *Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction*, February 2006 http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srs/srs1.html

- Objective processes are essential for aligning goals and resources, including "midcourse corrections". Outcomes matter more than inputs or outputs.
- "The main barrier is political, not conceptual". Most organizations and individuals are inclined to report favorably on their own work without consideration of the greater good.
- Well-integrated goals and a clear baseline measure are essential building blocks.
- A key measure should be the reduction of violence and intimidation and the building of capacity to sustain peace.[13]

The USIP report is a valuable reference document of definitions, lead users, and recommendations. It suggests that: "the U.S. government should invest in developing the capacity to measure progress;" all measures should be "public and transparent" and independent in order to build public confidence; and each program should set aside resources to pursue this management tool.[14]

While there are many specific questions about measuring progress, a review of the challenges should focus on two major questions:

- How do we make it useful and relevant for decision makers?
- How do we make it trustworthy and credible for the public?

By answering these questions, it is possible to address the obstacles of recent decades, from the independence of the process to the timeliness and breadth of the research to the holistic view of the analysis.

In developing new models and approaches, the impact on people's lives should be elevated as the highest measure of progress. This approach accepts that in a post-colonial world the only way to achieve success is to engage local people and create a responsible citizenry. This can only be done if there is a strong belief in the process and a growth of trust across a society. Without these critical elements, any international intervention will begin to feel like an occupation or trusteeship – something that will not require a sophisticated system of measurement to show failure.

[13] Ibid

[14] Ibid; The USIP study offers a "cascading model" which the second section of this paper will review.

Part Two
New Models, Approaches and Experiences

A First Generation Model- Iraq

In late 2003, the Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS became concerned that the planned turnover of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to an interim Iraqi government might lead to another "mission accomplished" moment when advocates and critics would arbitrarily declare victory or disaster. It was our feeling that something of this importance, where thousands had lost their lives and billions had been spent, deserved an honest and independent review – and one that was anchored in the lives of Iraq's people rather than international expenditures.

"We set out to develop a broad-based, data-rich, multidisciplinary model for measuring progress in Iraq that has as its core the Iraqi perspective." The report, *Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction*[15] "assesses the readiness of Iraqis to take charge of their country, both in terms of actual progress on the ground in reconstruction efforts and the way Iraqis perceive current events. We blended several popular theories for methodology, diversified our research, and devised a system to evaluate information and progress in a quantifiable way."

The initial measurement model for Iraq started with some simple goals:

- Could we show the impact on people's lives?
- What information would make a result credible?
- Was there a way to collate a rich mix of data that could be easily digested by a busy and perhaps under informed decision maker at the highest levels of government?

In order to make sure that we were approaching the complexity of the exercise in an integrated and holistic way, we decided to build off the Four Pillars of Reconstruction that the Association of the US Army (AUSA) and CSIS had developed in May of 2002.[16] That framework addressed: security and public safety; justice and reconciliation; social and economic well-being; and governance and participation.

As firm believers in the need for integrated models in the complicated environment of conflict, we built upon the framework by using a multi-disciplinary approach including: Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, social capital theory, James Surowiecki's *The Wisdom of Crowds,* Michael Porter's *The Competitive Advantage of Nations,* and Malcolm Gladwell's *The Tipping Point.*

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[15] *Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction*
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0409_progressperil.pdf

[16] *Post-Conflict Reconstruction*: A joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Task Framework; May 2002
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/framework.pdf

The design process remained highly dynamic and was constantly informed by feedback from the field.

Based on the combination of prior research and the June/July 2003 field trip to Iraq, the pillars were modestly reconfigured and a common sense definition was developed for each:

- Security: I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities
- Governance and Participation: I have a say in how Iraq is run.
- Economic Opportunity: I have a means of income.
- Services: I have access to basic services, such as power, water, and sanitation.
- Social Well-Being: My family and I have access to health care and education.

Within each pillar a five-tiered hierarchy of human needs was developed so that our field interviewers would be able to translate what they heard onto a simple *x and y* grid. For example, the hierarchy for Economic Opportunity progressed from the lowest level, "I have no income" to "I don't have enough money to meet my basic needs", "I have enough money to meet only my basic needs", "I earn a consistent and sufficient income", and "My income exceeds my needs".[17] In turn, it became clear that a pragmatic series of goals was becoming apparent: the middle level statement ("I have enough money to meet only my basic needs") became the tipping point and the highest statement ("My income exceeds my needs") the ultimate direction or end state.

[17] *Progress or Peril*, page 5

CHART 2



In developing the model, we determined that the ambition of any intervening international party should be to reach the tipping point: in other words, to positively catalyze local improvements enough so that the people of the place have a fighting chance to make it on their own.

The statements could be changed from place to place, depending on the conditions on the ground and the ambitions and resources of the intervening parties, but recognizing limitations and the difficulty of the task are central to making and measuring progress. It is hubristic to think that foreigners can take a place to its end state.

Over a six month period data was collected from 60 media sources, 17 public and official sources, 16 polls, and close to 400 interviews with Iraqis in 15 cities. The data was cross-referenced with the statements in order to establish a baseline for the five areas of Iraq's reconstruction. A variety of indicators were tested and at the same time, "achievable goals" were being defined. Not only did this first model provide an initial measurement, but it was designed to "provide an index for future measurement of progress."[18]

[18] Ibid, page iii



As you can see from the graphic display, the design sought to present a vast amount of information in a readily digestible form. The depth of the research and the balance of the sources, combined with extensive field work, made the conclusions difficult to refute and easy to understand.

The flexibility of the format also allowed other useful insights. Data could be separated by source to see if there were inherent biases. Interviews could be divided by regions or gender. The impact of one issue could be measured on another. In particular we sought to compare whether press accounts were "overly negative" and concluded that "the media has not been significantly more negative than other sources."[19]

Even at that early date, there was troubling evidence of the insecurity felt by Iraqis – and of its huge influence on the other sectors. Initial progress on health and education had reversed by the end of the study, but a guarded optimism remained among Iraqis. Based on the trends, the report stated: "the optimism appears unrealistic and could dissipate rapidly."[20]

Forceful recommendations were a major part of the report as a way to apply the findings, look ahead and increase the relevance for policy makers. While written in the summer of 2004, the recommendations remain timely today – perhaps

[19] Ibid, page vii

[20] Ibid, p vii

another sign that measures of progress were not yet being taken seriously by decision makers.

Generation 2.0- Afghanistan

In late 2004 and through the first half of 2005, the PCR Project at CSIS sought to build upon the measure of progress model that had been tested in Iraq with a study of Afghanistan. *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*[21] was seen as an "effort to help international actors improve their understanding of and increase their effectiveness in Afghanistan and other post-conflict cases."

The study critiqued many efforts as being "mostly quantitative in nature" and questioned the reliability of data in most conflict settings. In a country such as Afghanistan, where there has been no census of the population in 30 years (and was seen as inadequate at the time), it is hard to have much confidence in other numbers.[22] *In the Balance* also conceded that "qualitative data is hard to measure over time" but reinforced its importance by stating that it "is often more illustrative of the impact of efforts on people's lives." The Afghanistan report sought to bridge the gap between the quantitative and the qualitative by "bringing together information from five sources, weighing them all equally to balance out potential biases."

The five sources included over 40 government and public organizations, nearly 50 daily news reports, 16 public opinion polls by 11 different groups, 112 interviews or meetings by CSIS staff with 662 Afghans and internationals, and over 1,000 structured conversations with 1,609 Afghans by 12 trained local staff in 20 of the 34 provinces. These produced over 7,000 pieces of information (statistics, anecdotes, and events) that were turned into data points – most of which described outcomes. Inputs, such as the amount of money spent or the stated priorities of a program, or outputs, the number of schools built for example, were only used when outcomes were unavailable.

While the early post conflict moments can offer a productive use of inputs and outputs, detailing the number of refugees returned, people fed, schools built or soldiers in a town, that data becomes stale quickly. What begins to matter most is the sense of conditions improving and the enterprise succeeding.

Several improvements were undertaken from the original Iraq model. Dissatisfaction with the absence of the justice pillar was corrected and infrastructure, health and education were merged into a social well-being pillar. New indicators were developed under each of the five pillars which allowed for more precise cross-tabulations of data. The results of the "structured

[21] *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/afghanistanbarton_smallsize.pdf

[22] Conversations with Afghans suggested that there may be as many as 40 million people living in the country, even though official figures are closer to 30 million.

conversations" with Afghans from around the country were also tabulated by region, gender, issue intensity and other ways.

Most importantly, the x and y axes began to take on a greater clarity, with the x-axis showing societal capacity and the y-axis representing the status of individual Afghans. This allowed for a more subtle analysis. For example, if an individual felt safe because of a local warlord, they would have a high y-axis rating and low x-axis rating – placing that data point in Risk Zone A (see table below).

While the data was entered onto an *x and y* graph that reflected individual Afghan progress in one direction and societal capacity progress in the other, the report was always intended to produce an impressionistic sense of developments in the nation.



Upon its completion, the report's findings received almost universal acceptance for its conclusions – but once again, there was scant evidence that the hard-hitting recommendations, all of which required significant changes, were being undertaken.

With a solid baseline established by the 2005 report, a follow-on study of Afghanistan was undertaken in 2006. Most importantly, it allowed a direct comparison between two time periods – thus offering a truer measure of progress. While improvements were made in the methodological approach that was used, the pillars, data elements, and extensive use of field interviews remained the same.[23]

[23] 6,000 qualitative data points were collected, including 1,000 structured conversations with Afghans in 13 provinces, and over 200 interviews with 27 U.S., 12 international, 20 multinational, and 55 Afghan sources

Despite some initial discomfort within the U.S. government, the results of *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*[24] were universally accepted as being a valid representation of the situation in Afghanistan:

Overall Findings



Security



Governance and Participation



Justice and Accountability



Economic Conditions

Social Services and Infrastructure

from 10 research institutions, 40 government agencies, 20 international organizations, 19 NGOs and civil society organizations, 15 private businesses and contractors, and various cross-sections of Afghan society.

[24] *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*, March 2007
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070329_breakingpoint.pdf





Troubling trends appeared in all five pillars, exposing an overall weakness in the reconstruction strategy, in the leadership model, and in the initiatives of the Afghan government, the U.S., NATO and its allies.

Once again, the conclusions foretold developments in Afghanistan:

- "Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation of violence;
- Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;
- Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development, except for the economy and women's rights."

The beauty of the model is that it provided a macro view of events and thousands of micro examples of successes and shortcomings. It also highlighted the overly complex design and non-integrated nature of the international effort, with dozens of priorities, the franchising of certain tasks to individual nations, and the presence of multiple leaders, in addition to the Afghan government.

In an effort to concentrate the coalition's thinking in a strategic direction, *Breaking Point* emphasized two specific areas for improvement: restoring public confidence in the plan for safety and mobilizing communities to contribute to the recovery. Detailed suggestions were made on how to achieve these results including:

- For security and public safety: "focus on Kandahar and Helmand provinces; treat the threat as an insurgency; concentrate on ways to counter the Taliban's tribal and charismatic appeal and tactics of intimidation; and restore confidence in the U.S. and international commitment." Specific suggestions that were offered included: a consistent Afghan-led security presence in half of the 26 districts of the two southern provinces that would be supported by a "rapid response protective umbrella" that would include an increase of helicopters from 35 to 70 or 100. Investing in cross-border human intelligence to improve the understanding of disenfranchised Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan was also seen as critical, along with a shift in the antidrug effort.

- For the expansion of community engagement: "Move away from overreliance on Kabul and centralized systems; diminish the role of middle men and corruption; and enhance local participation." Ideas that were offered included: the expansion of the National Solidarity Program, direct payments to Afghans, the incorporation of the informal justice sector, and a shifting of 50% of the development budget to the provincial level.

In a range of meetings and conversations[25] that followed the release of the report in early 2007 one dominant response materialized: "We agree with the findings and we like the boldness of the recommendations. Now, regarding our work in Afghanistan: that is going quite well and we don't see a need to make the changes you suggest. If only the others (Karzai, the U.S., the Germans, the Italians, etc.) would do what you suggest, we could turn this enterprise around."

The results of the Iraq and Afghan studies made clear that the single greatest obstacle to being able to measure progress is not the methodology or the commitment, but the inability to apply the results. The next section of this paper will offer some ways to challenge inertia in state building and reconstruction.

[25] These included representatives of many NATO and alliance countries (France, Germany, UK, Canada, Holland, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, etc), all parts of the U.S. government (including multiple meetings at DOD, State, and USAID, etc.), and multi-nationals.

Part Three
Generation Next - The Way Ahead

The PCR Project studies in Iraq and Afghanistan confirmed that trustworthy and credible information can be collected in a transparent fashion and presented to the public. While there are certainly outstanding issues and further refinements, a "weight of the evidence" approach can produce relatively objective and depoliticized data. But even when it is made eminently digestible and there is high level interest, how can measures of progress be more useful so that they actually lead to course corrections and improvements?

A few principles of management should be followed in all major reconstruction efforts:

1. Start with a baseline measurement, a clear sense of direction, and early, regular, independent, and public reviews of progress. It is inconceivable to think that massive multi-billion dollar efforts lack these simple ingredients – yet that is the case in most international interventions. A turn-around executive in any business enterprise is expected to produce decent budgeting, reliable quarterly numbers, and a clear sense of where effort and funds are being spent. These elements are considered lost arts in the reconstruction world – and lead to the loss of public confidence.[26]

2. Stop overselling the ambitions of the reconstruction effort/manage expectations. More modest claims in the designs of programs, in the reporting of results, and in appearances before regulators, will reinforce the enormity of the challenge and the erratic nature of progress. Even the phrase "state building" is grandiose. A more realistic description would be "jump starting" – helping a people, society and government to get going. Foolish overstatements of grand objectives and temporary improvements breed "gotcha" news stories and investigations. What must be established is a "get it started and establish responsible local ownership" attitude.

3. Make all information public and maximize two-way communications. Encourage open and regular exchanges with overseers and regulators, from legislative authorities, to auditors and the press. Let people know what expected resources will be needed and how to stay informed at

[26] When we began to analyze the U.S./Pakistan relationship, it became clear that there was no single place in the U.S. government that could account for the total amount of American assistance – not the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), nor Congressional appropriators, not even the Departments and Agencies that were responsible. As we collected the numbers, a much larger number emerged than any experts had imagined: almost $2 billion per year since 2001, not including intelligence spending. Our conclusion: if you don't even know what you are spending, what kind of strategy are you likely to have? Please see *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan*; http://www.csis.org/images/stories/pcr/070727_pakistan.pdf

every stage of the enterprise. Establish Internet exchanges, 800, 411, and 311 numbers, suggestion boxes, and other mechanisms for direct feedback from the public.[27] Produce television and radio commercials that put officials on record and that make clear projected achievements. Hire local people to serve as communicators, from students who will film videos of projects to attorneys and investigators who can help to challenge official corruption. These are tough places and all local resources must be engaged through the provision of constant, non-official information.

4. Insist on an integrated effort. State building and reconstruction are hugely complex and often chaotic undertakings. The international community often makes the situation even more difficult, as we follow our national, institutional, or organizational interests. It is not enough to "coordinate" or to devise "comprehensive plans" or to have "interagency meetings". Simplicity of design is mandatory as is a unity of purpose. Agreement on who is in charge and what is expected can only help.

If we build off these guidelines and apply the multi-disciplinary measure of progress approach that was modeled in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a real chance that improved performance will result in reconstruction cases.

The past two decades have confirmed that the international community will continue to face outsized challenges around conflict situations. Up to now, successes have been few. It is incumbent upon all who work in this growing field to take responsibility for constant improvement in the way reconstruction and stabilization is addressed. The expansion of global peace will be the reward.

[27] See *Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings*; http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/061018_pcr_creatingconnections.pdf. Also, the World Bank had a model program in rural Indonesia in the 1990's that made constructive use of citizen feedback with drop boxes in each community. The volume of messages was impressive, including regular tips about misuse of funds or poor implementation.