

USCENTCOM and its Area of Operations

Cooperation, Burden Sharing, Arms Sales, and Centcom's Analysis by Country and Subregion

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April, 1998

THE SIZE OF US FORCES IN THE GULF AND REGIONAL BURDEN SHARING

- The US permanently deploys about 7,500-12,000 Americans deployed in the Southern Gulf countries and at sea
- The has the ability to rapidly deploy some 30,000-35,000 in an emergency.
- These deployments compare with a total 1.4 million men and women in US active forces, and the US presence in the Gulf is only equal to about one to two percent of its total force strength.
- It compares with potential threats from an Iraq with some 400,000 men in its military forces and an Iran with over 500,000 active men in its military, and 350,000 reserves.
- The offset payments the US receive from Southern Gulf states do not begin to pay for the recurrent process of challenge and response the US faces in dealing with potential threats.
 - Gulf states pay a much smaller proportion of the incremental cost of deploying US forces forward to the Gulf that Germany or Japan have paid under similar conditions.
 - It cost the US \$607 million to deal with Iraq during 1997, and its costs about \$67 million a month just to enforce the no fly zones.

- The surge into the Gulf in January and February of 1998 cost about \$725 million in unprogrammed dollars, and it costs about \$230 million in unprogrammed dollars to keep our forces there.
- In 1997, the US received \$200-\$300 million worth of offsets from Saudi Arabia.
- The size of the offset from Kuwait is politically sensitive,
- The US Department of Defense had to ask for a \$1.36 billion supplement to pay for unexpected costs in the Gulf during 1998.
- Such a supplemental budget request is not a major burden, or add-on, to a \$255 billion defense budget, but it is also not small change. It should also be clear that we in the Gulf as a partner and not as "mercenaries."

US COOPERATION WITH BAHRAIN

- Bahrain has maintained close military relations with the US since Britain departed the Gulf. On December 31, 1971, the US and Bahrain signed a leasing agreement allowing the US to use 10 acres at Jufair to support its Middle East Force (MEF) in the Gulf -- this included US use of a transmitter and antennae, priority use of Berth 1 at the port, waterfront ship repair facilities, and land rights, and hangar and office space at Muharraq Airfield.¹
- As a result of the tensions following the October War, Bahrain officially terminated this arrangement on October 20, 1973, but this termination had no practical effect, and Bahrain quietly reinstated the lease in July, 1975 -- expanding its scope on August 12, 1975, and June 30, 1977. The agreement of June 30, 1977, is typical of many aspects of the informal cooperation between the US and Gulf states before the Gulf War. Officially, the US Navy no longer homeported the MEF in Bahrain, but maintained a "temporary duty administrative unit." In practice, the US continued to "homeport" its Gulf naval forces (Middle East Force) in Manama and use the port facility at Mina Al-Sulman.²
- Bahrain provided extensive support, basing, and repair support to the US during "Operation Earnest Will" in the tanker war with Iran in 1987-1988. This US operation required extensive support from friendly Gulf states. The US used a total of 27 warships, which conducted 127 missions from July, 1987 to December, 1988. Bahrain played a critical role in helping the US recover the USS Stark after it hit a mine in the Gulf, and also supported the US during Operation Praying Mantis -- when the US attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf.
- Bahrain furnished extensive naval and air facilities to the US and Britain during the Gulf War. In September, 1990, Bahrain accepted US F/A-18, A-6, EA-6 and AV-8B air units, and British Tornado units. Bahrain provided a 200-man infantry company to Joint Forces Command (East). Bahrain's air force was relatively new and just absorbed deliveries of F-16s. Nevertheless, the Bahrain Air Force flew a total of 266 combat sorties. It used its new F-16s to fly 166 defensive and offensive counter-air sorties, averaging 4-6 sorties per day. It used its F-5s to fly

122 interdiction sorties, averaging about 3-4 sorties per day. It attacked targets like radar sites, Silkworm sites, and artillery positions³

- Bahrain deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994.⁴
- On October 22, 1991, Bahrain signed a ten year bilateral agreement, expanding the US military presence in Bahrain. The agreement expanded US prepositioning in Bahrain, called for expanded joint exercises and training, allowed the US to set up a JTME (USCENTCOM headquarters), and increased US access to Bahraini ports and airfields. The US now has several warehouses of prepositioned equipment and supplies at Sheik Isa Air Base.
- On July 1, 1995, Bahrain agreed to allow the US to create the headquarters for its new 5th Fleet in Bahrain, with an Admiral and a headquarters contingent. This headquarters commands a force that now averages 15 vessels, including a carrier. There are now roughly 1,500 US military personnel based in Bahrain. The fleet is now officially based at Mina Sulman.
- In November, 1995, Bahrain agreed to allow the US to temporarily deploy 18 additional US combat aircraft in Bahrain to make up for the "gap" created by the need to withdraw a US carrier from the Gulf before a new one could be deployed.⁵
- Joint exercises between Bahraini and US forces have increased from two per year after the Gulf War to nearly eight.
- There is a US Office of Military Cooperation in Bahrain with six military officers, and one civilian.
- Bahrain purchases large amounts of US military equipment. Between FY1950 and FY1990, it purchased \$874.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$545.2 million worth.⁶ Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$197.9 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$239.6 million worth.⁷ Bahrain also receives about \$200,000-\$400,000 a year worth of IMET military training assistance from the US.⁸

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

US COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT

- Until the tanker war of 1987-1988, Kuwait attempted to maintain its security by balancing the competing political and military interests of its neighbors in ways where it could obtain support from a wide range of countries and defuse potential threats through financial aid or political accommodation. Kuwait then obtained the reflagging of its tankers from the US during the tanker war, cooperated closely with the US to ensure its security against Iran, and bought US F/A-18 aircraft to modernize its air force.
- The US and Kuwait cooperated closely after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and Kuwait provided the US with \$16.056 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$44 million in goods and services, for a total of \$16.059 billion.⁹ The US played a key role in helping Kuwait to rebuild its military forces before the

liberation of Kuwait, and this help enabled Kuwait to deploy some 7,000 troops and 60 tanks as part of the Saudi-led Joint Force Command (East).¹⁰

- Less than 200 trained Kuwaiti Air Force personnel were in service at the start of Desert Storm, but Kuwait used French Air Force and US contract personnel to support its 15 operational Mirage F-1s, and 19 A-4s. The Kuwaiti Air Force also had 12 armed helicopters. Kuwaiti units flew 568 interdiction missions and 212 battlefield interdiction missions for a total of 780 sorties. About 650 of these sorties were A-4 sorties, and Kuwaiti A-4s flew an average of about 18-20 sorties per day. Kuwaiti Mirage F-1s flew the remaining 130 sorties, flying 4 to 10 sorties per day. Operational availability rates averaged 80-85% per day. Kuwait lost one A-4 on the first day of fighting, but attacked Iraqi artillery and infantry locations, and some Iraqi air defense positions throughout the war.
- The US Fifth Special Forces trained some 6,300 Kuwaitis for the Free Kuwait Forces, and the US Navy Special Forces Command trained 224 Kuwait marines and sailors.
- Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait has signed security agreements with Britain, France, Russia, and the US. Kuwait signed a 10 year bilateral agreement with the US on September 19, 1991. This agreement provided for \$35 million per year in Kuwaiti payments to offset the cost of US military support.¹¹
- Kuwait now relies heavily on the US to help it in rebuilding and expanding its military forces, and its military facilities are being sized and redesigned to support the rapid deployment, support, and sustainment of US land and air units. A US-Kuwait Defense Review Group helps coordinate these efforts.
- Kuwait is equipping much of its force structure with US Army and US aircraft, and has bought 40 F/A-18s and M-1A2 tanks, M-2/M-3 armored fighting vehicles, and US artillery, and Kuwait has support contracts with US defense contractors that provide it with increased sustainability as well as increased capability to support the deployment of US forces. Between FY1950 and FY1990, Kuwait purchased \$3,541.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$1,089.0 million worth.¹² Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$3,495.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$1,721.6 million worth.¹³ The US has an Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait, with a Brigadier General, eleven military personnel, two civilians, and one local employee.
- Kuwait supports the US in maintaining USAF combat aircraft on Kuwaiti soil -- including 24 USAF A-10 attack aircraft based at Ahmed Al-Jaber air base. It is creating a new air base in southern Kuwait to facilitate rapid US air deployments in the most defensible part of Kuwaiti air space.¹⁴ Kuwait has bought \$145.6 million worth of US military construction services since the Gulf War.¹⁵
- Kuwait allows a cadre of US Army personnel to be stationed in Kuwait, and is paying \$215 million to finance the prepositioning of the combat equipment of one US Army mechanized brigade (three armored companies and three mechanized companies) -- including 58 M-1A2 tanks, M-2A2 Bradleys, and M-109A6 Paladin artillery weapons. A company of US Army military police provides security for the equipment and 600 employees of the DynCorp are responsible for its maintenance.

- The Kuwaiti C4I system is now interoperable with that of US forces. The C4I links for the US-operated Patriot units in Kuwait are linked to those for Patriot units in Saudi Arabia and to US satellite warning systems that detect the nature and vector of missile launches.
- Kuwaiti land, air, and naval forces now conduct extensive combined training with the US. Kuwait and the US held at least eight major exercises between November, 1991 and January, 1995, including "Eager Mace," "Intrinsic Action," and "Native Fury." These exercises include practicing the unloading of tanks from prepositioning ships and the defense of Kuwait City from an Iraqi invasion.
- Kuwait and the US conducted Operation Vigilant Warrior in early October, 1994, in response to the build-up of 70,000-80,000 Iraqi troops, 1,100 tanks, 1,000 AFVs, and 700 artillery pieces in the border area. Kuwait provided major offset aid, air and kind, and facility support as the US began supplementing the 13,000 troops already deployed in Kuwait with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 24th Infantry Division, and added Patriot forces.

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

US COOPERATION WITH OMAN

- The US has cooperated with Oman since the time of the Dhofar Rebellion and the US provided informal assistance to Oman, Britain, and Iran during their campaigns against the Dhofar rebels. The US supported Oman in its long confrontation with the PDRY, and in dealing with the potential threat posed by Iran after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Oman has long permitted USCENTCOM to conduct exercises in Oman, and US Navy ships to use Omani facilities. Oman has provided data on tanker and other ship transits of the Straits of Hormuz to the US and UK from its base on Goat Island since the early 1980s.
- Oman and the US signed a military access agreement in July, 1981, which provided US access to building cantonments, hardened shelters, warehouses, and other facilities at Seeb, Masirah, Khasab, and Thumrait air bases, and ports at Muscat and Salalah, in return for \$320 million in US funds to build-up these facilities.¹⁶ The US provided over \$199.1 million in FMS credits to Oman between FY1980 and FY1990, and about \$853,000 in IMET assistance. During FY1981-FY1985, the US provided support to Oman for the construction of four air bases at Masirah, Seeb, Khasab, and Thumrait that could be used by US air units in rapid deployment to the Gulf.
- This construction included facilities for rear-area staging and forward deployment, and included improved operations, personnel, storage, and maintenance facilities. The US Navy developed an aircraft maintenance facility, ground support equipment shop, warehouse facility, and ammunition storage facility. The US Army created a staging base at Masirah to support the forward deployment of US Army forces. The US helped provide hardened shelters, dispersal and access pavements, environmentally controlled warehouses, transient

- billeting, and cantonment support areas at Seeb and Thumrait. The US access agreement is reviewed every five years, and the latest review was due in 1995.
- Oman allowed the US and Britain to use Oman as a staging base and to deploy reconnaissance aircraft during the tanker war, and Gulf Wars, and allowed the US to stage reconnaissance and air-control flights out of Oman during Operation Praying Mantis -- when the US attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf. Oman provided about 950 troops to the Arab Joint Forces Command (East) during the Gulf War.
 - Oman has regularly renewed its 1981 access agreement with the US. Oman deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994.¹⁷ Many of Oman's arms are British-supplied, and Oman lacks the funds to make major military purchases. Oman did, however, purchase \$163.3 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) between FY1950 and FY1990, and took delivery on \$91.8 million worth.¹⁸
 - Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$13.2 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$56.6 million worth.¹⁹ Oman also receives about \$110,000 a year worth of IMET military training assistance from the US, that trains about 16 Omani officers per year. A total of 80 Omani personnel were trained as part of the IMET program during 1990-1994.²⁰ The US maintains an Office of Military Cooperation in Oman, with five military, one civilian, and one local employee.
 - Oman works closely with Britain, and there are roughly 200 British soldiers training the Omani Army. There are British officers and NCOs seconded to the Omani Navy, and some 80 British officers seconded to the Omani air force. British SAS personnel have trained the Omani anti-terrorist force and assist in surveillance of the border with Yemen. France provides a limited amount of training for Omani officers.

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

US COOPERATION WITH QATAR

- The US did not begin to develop security arrangements with Qatar until the tanker war of 1987-1988, and only began to develop close security arrangements during the Gulf War. Considerable tension existed over Qatar's purchase of smuggled Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during March, 1988 to November, 1990. Since that time, however, relations have steadily improved.
- Qatar permitted US air units to stage out of Qatar during the Gulf War. Qatar provided a 1,600-man mechanized battalion with 25 tanks, 60 other armored vehicles, and 3-5 artillery weapons. This force fought well at the Battle of Khafji, and in Joint Forces Command (East). Qatar also committed 700 men, 21 fighters, and 12 armed helicopters from its small air force. Qatari Mirage F-1s flew 41 interdiction sorties, with a maximum of about 5 sorties per day. Qatari Alphajets

- flew two sorties. The Qatari Air Force was forced to cancel or abort 22 sorties, but 16 of these cancellations were due to weather. ²¹
- On June 22, 1992, Qatar negotiated a bilateral security arrangement with the US that offers the US access to Qatari air and naval facilities. Since that time Qatar has conducted an increasing number of exercises with US forces.
 - In March, 1995, Qatar formally agreed to the prepositioning of the heavy equipment for one US Army mechanized brigade in Qatar -- including up to 110 US M-1A2 tanks. Warehouses are now under construction in Doha to preposition US equipment. The Qatari air force has also begun to conduct combined air exercises with the US, and may acquire a site in Qatar.²²
 - Qatari forces are largely French-equipped and only have limited interoperability and sustainability with US forces. Qatar only purchased \$1.9 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) between FY1950 and FY1990, and took delivery on \$1.9 million worth.²³ A US Military Liaison Office opened in Doha in 1991. Since the Gulf War, Qatar has purchased \$2.7 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$1.4 million worth.²⁴

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

US COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA

- Although the US does not have a formal status of forces agreement with Saudi Arabia, it has long had close military ties to Saudi Arabia. The US first leased port and air base facilities in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1943. It renewed these leases on April 22, 1957 and maintained them until April 2, 1962 -- when they were canceled both for political reasons and because the US Strategic Air Command ceased to forward deploy the B-47. Saudi Arabia renewed its US Military Training Mission Agreement with the US in June, 1992.²⁵
- During the late 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia increased the size of its air bases and port facilities to aid in US power projection to Saudi Arabia, and created massive stockpiles of munitions and equipment, and support facilities, that could be used by US forces deploying to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia purchased \$16 billion worth of US military construction services during this period, and supervised military construction worth billions of dollars more. ²⁶
- The US and Saudi Arabia cooperated closely in setting up combined air and naval defenses against Iran beginning in 1983, when Iraq came under serious military pressure from Iran. The two countries conducted combined exercises, and cooperated in establishing the "Fahd Line," which created an Air Defense Identification Zone and forward air defense system off the Saudi coast. This cooperation helped Saudi Arabia defend its air space and shoot down an Iranian F-4 which tested Saudi defenses on June 5, 1984. The US and Saudi Arabia have jointly operated E-3A AWACS units in Saudi Arabia ever since. The US and Saudi Arabia also cooperated closely during the tanker war of 1987-1988.

- The US deployed massive land and air units to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and jointly commanded UN Coalition forces with Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm. Saudi forces played a major role in the air and land campaigns. Saudi Arabia also provided the US with \$12.809 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$4.045 billion in goods and services, for a total of \$16.854 billion.²⁷
- Saudi Arabia commanded both Arab task forces -- Joint Forces Command (East) and Joint Forces Command (North).²⁸ Saudi forces were organized under the command of Lt. General Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud. The Arab task forces reported to Prince Khalid through a Joint Forces Command in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, and were divided into a Joint Forces Command (North), a Joint Forces Command (East), and a Joint Forward Forces Command Ar'Ar (the command of the Arab defensive forces screening the border area). The Ar'Ar command was subordinated to the Joint Forces Command (North). It included two Saudi National Guard battalions, a Saudi Army airborne battalion, and a Pakistani armored brigade with about 5,500 men, over 100 tanks, and about 90 other additional armored vehicles and artillery weapons. These forces did not play an offensive role in Desert Storm.²⁹ By the time the AirLand phase of the war began, the Saudi ground forces in the theater totaled nearly 50,000 men, with about 270 main battle tanks, 930 other armored fighting vehicles, 115 artillery weapons, and over 400 anti-tank weapons.³⁰
- The Saudi Air Force flew a total of 6,852 sorties between January 17, 1991 and February 28 -- ranking second after the US in total air activity during the Gulf War, and flying about 6% of all sorties flown. These sorties included 1,133 interdiction missions, and 523 battlefield air interdiction missions, for a total of 1,656 offensive missions. The RSAF flew 2,050 defensive counter-air missions, 129 offensive counter-air missions, and 102 escort missions for a total of 2,281 air defense sorties. The RSAF flew 118 reconnaissance sorties, 85 E3-A AWACS sorties, 485 refueling sorties, and 1,829 airlift sorties.³¹ During the slightly longer period of January 16 to February 28, Saudi Air Force F-15C units flew 2,088 sorties (over one-third the total F-15C sorties flown by the USAF) and 451 Tornado ADV sorties. Saudi pilots were as capable in these air defense sorties as most pilots in NATO. The RSAF also flew 665 Tornado GR1/IDS strike sorties, 1,129 F-5 sorties, and 118 RF-5 sorties. Saudi F-15Cs shot down three Iraqi Mirage F-1s with air-to-air missiles -- including the only double kill by a single fighter in the war on January 24, 1991. The RSAF lost only two aircraft -- one Tornado GR1 to anti-aircraft fire and one F-5 to unknown causes.³²
- Since the Gulf War, the US has expanded its security arrangements with Saudi Arabia. Although no formal status of forces agreements exist, the US and Saudi Arabia have expanded the USMTM agreement to increase US access to Saudi air and seaports, including Jubail, and have improved the capabilities of the combined AWACS force. The US deploys a wing of aircraft in southern Saudi Arabia, including F-117 and U-2 aircraft. Saudi Arabia has increased stocks of selected spares and electronics to support US forces in deploying -- including enough parts and supplies to support 15 USAF tactical fighter equivalents -- and has increased the number of combined exercises with US forces.³³ It is standardizing key aspects of its C4I system to make them interoperable with US

- C4I systems, including theater missile defense arrangements for Saudi Arabia's Patriot missiles. Saudi Arabia has provided the US with additional facilities, and has ordered \$1.6 billion worth of US military construction services since the Gulf War -- \$610,8 million of which has been delivered.³⁴
- Saudi Arabia has long been one of the largest single customers for US military exports -- and Saudi purchases have both increased interoperability and sustainability with US forces, and have reduced the unit cost of equipment purchased by US forces. Between FY1950 and FY1990, Saudi Arabia purchased \$35,876.0 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$23,799.4 million worth.³⁵ Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$24,835.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$8,818 million worth.³⁶
 - Since the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia has made major purchases of US M-1 tanks, M-2/M-3 armored vehicles, and US artillery and related support systems which increase both Saudi interoperability with US forces and Saudi capability to support the rapid deployment of heavy US ground forces to Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia has not agreed to formal prepositioning of US Army combat unit equipment in Saudi Arabia, it has carried out combined exercises with US land forces since 1991, and is considering storage of selected US Army heavy combat equipment. The US maintains a US Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia with 69 military four civilians, and nine local personnel.
 - The Saudi National Guard has long relied largely on US equipment, and on training support by the US Vinnell Corporation.

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

US COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

- The US did not begin to develop close security arrangements with the UAE until the tanker war of 1987-1988, but the US and UAE cooperated closely during both the tanker war and Gulf War. The UAE provided port call facilities and support during Operation Earnest Will. The US Navy and MEF conducted a combined exercise with UAE in July, 1990, after Saddam Hussein began to threaten the UAE.
- The UAE provided the US with \$6.572 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$218 million in goods and services, for a total of \$6.455 billion.³⁷ The UAE committed a Motorized Infantry Battalion to Joint Forces Command (East) and created a combined aviation battalion with Kuwait. It used its 7,000-man air force to fly 109 sorties, including 58 Mirage 2000 interdiction sorties, 45 C-212 and C-130 airlift sorties, and six Mirage 2000 reconnaissance sorties. The UAE Air Force had reasonable readiness. It canceled or aborted 18 sorties, but only two due to maintenance reasons. Its Mirage 2000 fighters attacked targets like Iraqi infantry and mechanized forces, artillery positions, and supply areas.³⁸

- The UAE negotiated a security arrangement with the US in 1992 that offered the US access to UAE air and naval facilities. The UAE and US signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement on July 23, 1994.³⁹
- A small amount of US Navy equipment is prepositioned at Jebel Ali and a small US Navy support facility exists in Fujirah. US Navy ships make regular port calls to the UAE -- Jebel Ali is one of the most frequent port calls in the world for the US Navy. Fujirah, on the Gulf of Oman, also allows the US to provide logistic support to reach destinations in the Gulf without going through the Straits of Hormuz by moving from ports in Fujirah along a modern highway to locations in the Southern Gulf.
- In 1995, the UAE agreed to host a US Army prepositioned brigade with 120 tanks and 70 AIFVs. An agreement in principle has already been signed and negotiations are underway over cost-sharing.
- UAE forces have conducted combined air exercises with the US. The UAE deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994.
- UAE forces have increasing amounts of US equipment, including IHawk missiles and AH-64 attack helicopters. Between FY1950 and FY1990, the UAE purchased \$1,048.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$313.2 million worth.⁴⁰ Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$592.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$586.6 million worth.⁴¹ UAE forces are, however, equipped with weapons from a wide range of sources, and only have moderate interoperability and sustainability with US forces. The US has a military liaison office in the UAE with six military, one civilian, and two local personnel to manage military programs in the country.

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF US ARMS SALES TO THE GULF

- The US has strong strategic interest in ensuring that Southern Gulf arms purchases are standardized with the US, that military facilities and infrastructure be equipped to support US power projection capabilities.
- From a narrow commercial viewpoint, it has the same selfish interest in selling arms as everyone else.
- However, the US now has a GNP approaching \$8 trillion dollars, and total exports well in excess of \$600 billion.
- In a good year, it exports about \$16 billion worth of arms to the entire world.
- The US averaged only \$2.4 billion worth of arms deliveries a year to the Gulf during 1993-1995,.

- If military aid to Bahrain and Oman are excluded, this total included an average of \$5 million a year to Qatar, \$2.2 billion a year to Saudi Arabia, and around \$150 million to the UAE.

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman

USCENTCOM DESCRIPTION OF ITS AREA ROLE AND KEY COUNTRIES

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

USCENTCOM oversees a very diverse region with 20 different nations in three different sub-regions: South Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan), the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan), and the Red Sea/Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and the Seychelle Islands).

SOUTH ASIA SUB-REGION:

The South Asia Sub-Region of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains an area of instability with implications that extend beyond the Central Region. Political upheaval and armed conflict continue to plague Afghanistan. Interposed between Pakistan and Central Asia, an unstable Afghanistan inhibits efforts to reopen traditional trade routes providing Central Asian states with access to the warm-water ports on the Arabian Sea. The historical animosity between Pakistan and India, dating from the partition of British India into Muslim and Hindu nations, is reflected in the ongoing dispute over the Kashmir region. The deep-rooted hostility and mistrust between the two countries undermines efforts to promote non-proliferation and regional security. Pakistan's strategic location, with India to the east, Central Asia to the north and Iran and Afghanistan to the west, makes it a key regional power. A responsible international actor, Pakistan remains actively involved in the UN, through membership on the Security Council and major commitments to peacekeeping operations such as UNOSOM. Moreover, the Pakistani armed forces were a model of military restraint, demonstrating unwavering support for democracy during the last national elections. Pakistan exerts considerable influence upon Afghanistan as a result of geographic, religious, and ethnic linkages. It supports over 1.3 million Afghan refugees of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Clearly, Pakistan will play a major role in international efforts to assist in stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan.

The issue of Kashmir is the focal point of Pakistan's foreign policy. This issue has led to two major Indo-Pak conflicts and continues to be the major source of confrontation

between the two nations. Deep-rooted hostility, along with fear of India's nuclear weapons capability and overwhelming conventional forces, has propelled Pakistan toward construction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means. We support a regional agreement to cap WMD efforts with an objective of eventual program roll-back and elimination. Similar regional arms control with regard to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles would further reduce tensions. Pakistan's desire to maintain close ties to the U.S. has resulted in continued cooperative bilateral relations. Though limited by Pressler Amendment constraints, our military-to-military relationship consists of limited exercises, senior officer visits, and combined peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts under the auspices of the UN. A balanced approach toward India and Pakistan is essential to promoting regional stability, economic growth, and the furtherance of democracy.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan's juxtaposition with Pakistan, Iran and the new countries of Central Asia, increases the importance of returning peace and stability to this war-torn country. Political consensus remains elusive as factional fighting persists throughout the country, hampering national and international reconstruction efforts.

The success of a consolidated central government hinges on ethnic, religious and tribal accommodation. The Peshawar, Islamabad and Jalalabad accords have each sought to eliminate factional infighting and provide a rudimentary framework for a transition to representative government. However, pursuit of personal power by the country's most prominent leaders has precluded such a transition, and the outlook remains bleak.

The chaotic political situation provides ample opportunity for neighboring countries to take advantage of the ineffectiveness of the consolidation process. In particular, Iran is exploiting tribal and ethnic rivalries to help pro- Iranian and Shia factions secure a disproportionate share of political power. Iran also exploits Afghanistan's precarious situation by funneling resources and ideology through its territory to opposition forces on the Afghan- Tajik border as well as to groups within Tajikistan. This Iranian interference further impedes the consolidation process in Afghanistan by driving a wedge between radical and moderate political factions.

Political stability is a prerequisite to rebuilding this country. Failure of Afghanistan's political leaders to reach accommodation will perpetuate insecurity, delay refugee repatriation, stall national reconstruction efforts, and cause reluctance on the part of the international community to increase assistance to meet other than essential humanitarian needs. We support efforts to encourage the Afghans to reach political consensus and to ensure the international community remains engaged despite a less than optimistic outlook for a near-term political solution.

Source: Adapted from USCENTCOM Internet data base. 4/98

USCENTCOM -ARABIAN GULF/ARABIAN PENINSULA SUB-REGION:

Bahrain-Kuwait-Oman-Quatar-Saudi Arabia-United Arab Emirates-Iran-Iraq-Jordan-Yemen

OVERVIEW

The countries of the Arabian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula Sub-Region can be broadly grouped into two categories. The first are those states comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Members of the GCC - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - share many common goals with the United States, and have been active partners in support of regional objectives. GCC states actively supported Operations EARNEST WILL, DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, SOUTHERN WATCH, RESTORE HOPE, UNOSOM II and, most recently, VIGILANT WARRIOR. These countries continue to make constructive contributions in support of the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and Middle East peace initiatives. The U.S. has bilateral defense cooperation and access agreements with nearly all of the GCC states. In our efforts to improve regional collective defense capabilities, we also continue to encourage multilateral exercises among the Damascus Declaration Countries (GCC plus Egypt and Syria).

Non-GCC countries within the sub-region include Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen. Regimes in two of these countries, Iran and Iraq, continue to threaten the security of the region. Iran, in particular, is rebuilding military capabilities at a rate exceeding that required for defensive purposes. The U.S. and members of the GCC find this pattern alarming. Despite recognizing Kuwait and grudgingly complying with portions of UN Security Council Resolutions, Iraq has remained generally uncooperative. By promoting anti-GCC, anti-Middle East Peace Process, and anti-U.S. postures, Iran and Iraq are the greatest threats to regional peace and stability. The other two non-GCC states, Jordan and Yemen, still feel lingering effects of their pro-Saddam stances during the Gulf War. Jordan has been able to make progress in rebuilding military-to-military relationships with the U.S., and, in its conclusion of a treaty with Israel, has taken a great step toward achieving a lasting regional peace. Despite these efforts, Jordan remains distanced from some GCC states. The government of the unified Republic of Yemen continues to struggle to reestablish relationships with its Arab neighbors while continuing its experimentation with democratic processes. Efforts to transition to democratic institutions have proved challenging, resulting in ongoing internal struggle and the threat of dissolution.

BAHRAIN

Moderate and pro-Western, Bahrain shares U.S. goals for regional peace and stability. The country has a prominent commercial role in the Gulf as a regional financial and service center. Faced with diminishing petroleum resources, Bahrain has diversified in the manufacturing, finance, and service fields to reduce its dependence on oil revenues. The Government of Bahrain has moved cautiously since the Gulf War, charting a steady course on economic and social policies. Bahrain established a Majlis al-Shura (consultative council) in December 1992. The U.S.-Bahraini relationship has traditionally been close and cooperative. The de facto home port for Commander, Middle East Force since 1949, Bahrain has also been host to the Administrative Support Unit since 1971 and Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) since 1993. Our mature bilateral relationship has included the establishment of an Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) in 1986, the signing of a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in

1991, and recurring meetings of the Military Consultative Committee (MCC). Most recently, Bahrain came to the aid of Kuwait in Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR and offered support to U.S. forces brought into the region to restore stability.

Bahrain relies heavily on the U.S. for military training and security assistance. It is a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash customer, purchasing 98% of its weapons, training, and spare parts from the United States. Our already robust combined exercise program has recently been expanded to include trilateral exercises.

KUWAIT

Kuwait has made significant progress rebuilding its country since the end of the Gulf War. Economically, the production of oil has been restored to pre-war levels. Politically, the success of the National Assembly serves as a model for other states in the area. Security, however, remains a major concern because of Iraqi belligerence and threatening activity, such as Iraq's movement of troops to the Kuwaiti border in October 1994, and failure to comply completely with UN resolutions.

The Kuwaitis are restructuring their military using the recommendations of the joint U.S.-Kuwait Defense Review Group as a guide. Improvements include implementation of a new training program and acquisition of modern systems such as the Patriot missile and the M1A2 tank. To maximize readiness, Kuwait participates fully in joint and combined exercises, and has hosted the first two events in a new series of multilateral annual regional exercises. The deployment of forces during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR provided an excellent vehicle for Kuwait to validate its military restructuring progress and conduct additional coalition training with forces from the United States, United Kingdom, Bahrain, and the UAE. Kuwait has sought to further reinforce its security by entering into defense agreements with several major world powers. Internationally, Kuwait was among the first to send forces to Somalia in support of Operation RESTORE HOPE. The Kuwaiti contingent, a company-sized element, remained in Somalia until April 1994.

OMAN

Oman's strategic location at the Strait of Hormuz, and active cooperation in regional security initiatives, make it a significant partner in the protection of U.S. and Western interests in Southwest Asia. Because of its position, a stable Oman is essential to protecting and maintaining the free flow of oil and other trade through the Arabian Gulf. With a moderate political stance on key issues, Oman is an important regional friend. Long a supporter of our presence in the region, Oman was the first of the Gulf countries to conclude an access agreement with the United States. Additionally, Oman has long provided valuable support to U.S. maritime and air operations in the region, enhancing our ability to respond to contingencies that may arise in the Middle East and Africa. U.S.-Omani security cooperation continues to grow, fostered by Omani support for U.S. regional initiatives and a combined exercise program. In January 1994, Oman assumed a seat on the UN Security Council, where it plays an important role as a world leader and a moderate Arab voice on the Council. The Government of Oman, which has had a Majlis since 1991, continues to support the Peace Process through participation in various regional working groups.

QATAR

The Government of Qatar is a traditional monarchy governed by constitutional law which institutionalizes the customs and social mores of Qatar's conservative Wahhabi Muslim heritage. A small but wealthy Gulf nation, Qatar has a per capita income among the highest in the region. Yet with oil reserves dwindling, Qatar's economic future is largely dependent on the vast North Dome natural gas field which lies off its northern coast. This field is now under development, but may become a source of conflict because this shared natural resource underlies territorial waters of both Qatar and Iran.

There has been a significant improvement in the U.S.-Qatari military relationship since the Gulf war. In 1991, the U.S. Military Liaison Office opened in Doha, and in June 1992 the U.S. and Qatar signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Additionally, we have built a very successful bilateral exercise program which continues to grow. Our relationship is underpinned by regular bilateral military cooperation meetings, and steady progress toward greater cooperation is evidenced by ongoing DCA implementation meetings.

SAUDI ARABIA

The largest and most influential nation on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is strategically located between the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. It contains Islam's two most holy sites and the world's largest petroleum producing infrastructure. A stalwart friend and long-time ally of the United States, the Kingdom is recognized as the key to regional security. This relationship was underlined once again in October 1994, when U.S. forces deployed to the Kingdom in response to threatening moves by Iraq. The Saudis are now assuming an expanded, more active role in world affairs, evidenced by their contributions to the international relief effort in Somalia and their continuing financial support for rebuilding the infrastructure in Lebanon following the Taif agreement. A traditional leader in the region, Saudi Arabia strives to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East, and contributes much to the well-being of fellow Arab countries by underwriting the annual Haj and financing other Arab initiatives. Looking outside the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is cautiously establishing diplomatic relations with the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia and the newly created democratic states of Eastern Europe.

The U.S.-Saudi military-to-military relationship continues to mature, and includes the largest Foreign Military Sales program in the world, financed by the Kingdom. Legitimate defense requirements of the Saudis are being met, U.S. national interests supported, and regional security enhanced, through these necessary arms sales. We continue military-to-military discussions with the Saudis in our ongoing effort to solidify our security arrangements.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is becoming increasingly important to the USCENTCOM regional strategy. The country, which borders both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, is actually an oil-rich federation of seven sheikdoms. A supporter of U.S. naval presence in the region, the Government of the UAE hosts an extensive port visit program. Its strategic geographic location and excellent facilities make seaports such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and most frequently Jebel Ali ideal destinations for regular U.S.

Navy ship visits. Fujairah, on the Gulf of Oman, offers the unique quality of allowing logistical support to reach destinations on the Arabian Gulf by modern highway without requiring a transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

The UAE is a key supporter of U.S. actions in the region, our relationship having matured significantly during the Gulf War. An appreciation for U.S. efforts to maintain stability in the Gulf has translated into closer military ties and a recognition of the value of U.S. presence as a deterrent to aggression. On 23 July, 1994 the U.S. and the UAE signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement, and in October UAE troops deployed to Kuwait during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in response to the deployment of Iraqi Republican Guard forces along the Kuwaiti border. The UAE continues to support the Peace Process, and contributes financially to improving the life of Palestinians.

In response to potential external threats such as Iranian attempts at intimidation, the UAE is seeking to improve its defensive capabilities. The UAE continues to pursue peaceful resolution of its dispute with Iran over the issue of Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands, seeking an International Court of Justice ruling on the issue as Iran continues to improve its military position on the islands. Continued support by the U.S. is needed to help the UAE meet its legitimate defense needs.

IRAN

Iran dominates the Strait of Hormuz and the entire north shore of the Arabian Gulf, and possesses the ability to threaten Gulf oil transit routes. It is, by virtue of its culture, population, and geostrategic position, an important player in the Central Region. Additionally, its border with Central Asia and the Transcaucasus provides the access necessary for Iran to expand its influence with the emerging nations of this region in direct competition with the Turks and Russians. Iran's hostility towards the United States, combined with its proximity to our interests in the Gulf, its growing military might, economic potential, and demographic composition make Iran the greatest long-term threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. The United States is the focal point for a bellicose campaign against what the Mullahs consider to be the polluting influence of Western culture and thought. Iran's ethno-centric national ego and self-image as the champion of Islam, compel it to seek a return to its historic position as the regional hegemonic power. To this end, it systematically opposes U.S. objectives (actively campaigning against Gulf security arrangements), and undermines the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accords through its surrogate forces in Palestine. The reintroduction of U.S. forces into Kuwait in October 1994, and the visible GCC security cooperation have limited Iran's activities to consolidating its position in such already occupied areas as Abu Musa and the Tunbs, rather than pressing any new land or sea claims in the Gulf region.

IRAQ

Iraq, under the current regime, remains an implacable obstacle to peace and stability in the Arabian Gulf region. It continues to ignore provisions of numerous UN resolutions, complying only grudgingly with others. Examples of President Saddam Hussein's intransigence include: government repression of Iraqi citizens (both in the north with an internal blockade on the Kurds, and in the south with frequent military operations against the Marsh Arabs), reluctant acceptance of the newly demarcated border with Kuwait, selective cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, lack of accountability for Kuwaiti

MIA/POW's, and refusal to pay for damages incurred by the victims of Iraqi aggression. Iraq's belligerent statements and its October 1994 redeployment towards Kuwait, have resurrected concerns among its neighbors, and highlight the fact that the current regime is not ready to adhere to accepted norms of international behavior. Attempts by Iraq to convince the world that it is a victim of Western aggression, and that continued sanctions are a vindictive U.S. campaign to destroy the Iraqi people have met with some success in undermining European support for continued sanctions, but has found little support among regional nations that sit in Iraq's shadow. Until Iraq fully complies with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, Saddam will remain a renegade whose actions must be closely monitored.

JORDAN

Jordan's moderate, pro-Western orientation remains important to U.S. strategy in the region. Bilateral relations with the U.S. have steadily improved since the Gulf War when Jordan took an unpopular pro-Iraqi stance. On 26 October 1994, King Hussein signed a peace treaty with Israel, formally ending over four decades of war. Jordan has also encouraged the Palestinians to continue negotiations with Israel. Jordan has made a significant military contribution to the international peacekeeping effort in the former Yugoslavia, and has largely regained its position as a voice of moderation and reason in the region. In addition, Jordan has posted an excellent human rights record, and is one of the few countries in the region willing to grant expatriate Palestinians the full rights of citizens.

Although it has proved to be financially and logistically difficult, Jordan is attempting to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq, formerly its largest trading partner. The U.S. continues to work closely with Jordanian officials to devise procedures to minimize the adverse effects the inspection process has on the Jordanian economy.

As a result of improved relations, our security assistance relationship with Jordan has been expanded. The program's hiatus had seriously degraded Jordan's military capability, and we are working to help them achieve an improved state of readiness. An important component of this program is the renewal of our combined exercise program, which has returned to pre-Gulf War levels.

YEMEN

The Republic of Yemen (united since 1990) occupies a strategic position on the eastern side of the Bab el Mandeb waterway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Yemen's quest for democracy remains unique in the region and multiparty parliamentary elections were held in April 1993. However, serious internal struggles ensued, culminating in the outbreak of civil war in May 1994. Hostilities between the North and South continued for several months, further weakening the already fragile government. Eventual victory by the northern forces ended hopes for an effective coalition government.

Because of lingering connections to Saddam Hussein's regime, Yemen remains relatively isolated from its Gulf neighbors. The country's economic situation remains unstable and prospects for expanding its commerce in the region are slim until it can normalize relations with its neighbors. Long-term prospects for development are directly tied to President Saleh's ability to reconcile differences between factions in the wake of the recent civil war. A stable domestic environment is a prerequisite to much needed foreign

investment. Because of limited resources, Yemen's armed forces are dependent on financial aid, equipment, and advice from abroad. However, U.S. security assistance remains suspended since January 1991 for Yemen's support of Iraqi aggression.

Source: Adapted from USCENTCOM Internet data base. 4/98

USCENTCOM RED SEA/HORN OF AFRICA SUB-REGION:

Egypt-Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia-Djibouti-Kenya-Somalia

OVERVIEW

The Red Sea/Horn of Africa Sub-region includes the African countries on the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and Bab el Mandeb. Close ties with countries in the Horn allow access to these critical sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for transit from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean beyond. Egypt, one of our closest allies in the region, is a pivotal link between the Middle East and Africa and was an invaluable supporter of U.S. political initiatives, such as the Middle East Peace Process and coalition military operations in Somalia. The Horn of Africa continues to suffer from decades of economic chaos and political instability. In Somalia, international humanitarian relief efforts slowed the effects of the recent famine, but these results are only temporary without political reconciliation by the Somalis themselves. Similarly, a decade of civil discord in Sudan produced a level of suffering in the southern portion of that country which may be worse than was seen in Somalia. While international relief organizations attempt to ease this suffering, Sudan's central government continues its efforts to suppress the population in the south and support global terrorism at the expense of working toward reconciliation. Elsewhere in the Horn, Eritrea continues to progress as an independent nation developing close ties to the West, while Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya are also making progress in development despite trying conditions.

EGYPT

A recognized political leader in both the Arab world and Africa, Egypt remains one of our closest allies in the region. As an important member of the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Egypt played a key role in facilitating the Middle East Peace process. By supporting nuclear non-proliferation and contributing military forces to the UN operations in Somalia, Egypt has demonstrated a firm commitment to the long term stability of the region.

Domestic economics, demographics, and an increasing reliance on the Nile River for water mean that Egypt will continue to face serious difficulties in internal development and require significant financial assistance from abroad. Radical Islamic elements seek to capitalize on Egypt's internal problems to incite dissension while engaging in a campaign of terrorism and assassination. Notwithstanding this armed threat, the Egyptian government appears able to manage the domestic situation in the face of the radical Islamic challenge.

Our security assistance and military-to-military relations are close and continue to improve through combined operations and an extensive exercise program which both

focus on expanded interoperability. A key factor in our Red Sea Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) was the use of Egyptian facilities for logistics support. Similarly, Egyptian air base support has been essential to our ability to support humanitarian relief operations and numerous exercises throughout the AOR. Our exercise program with Egypt is among the largest in the region, spanning the spectrum from large force maneuvers to Special Operations Forces (SOF) exercises.

SUDAN

Sudan, the largest country in Africa, continues to experience profound economic and political difficulties. The central government's inability to establish peace with the several separatist movements in the South, its support of global terrorism, its strong ties with Iran and Iraq, and a persistent pattern of fiscal and political mismanagement have led to internal chaos and the diplomatic isolation of Sudan by the world community. These internal problems adversely affect the ability of the OAU and the International Governmental Authority for Drought and Development (IGADD) to effectively solve the many humanitarian issues facing the region.

The civil war raging in southern Sudan has devastated the country's economy and is responsible for repeated famines and widespread dislocation in the South. Although international groups work to facilitate an agreement between separatist movements and the central government, intransigence on the part of all parties makes accommodation in the near term impossible.

ERITREA

Eritrea's proximity to the critical Bab el Mandeb makes it strategically important. Its close political ties with other countries in the Horn of Africa also make it a valuable partner in the mediation of regional disputes. Since emerging as Africa's newest country upon secession from Ethiopia in 1993, Eritrea has made significant progress. It enhanced its reconstruction efforts and economic recovery through international ties, a focus on infrastructure, and the development of national security measures.

Eritrea's prospects for the future seem bright, but the country still faces many challenges, including rebuilding and providing government services for its own population and over half a million Eritrean refugees returning from Sudan. The level of prosperity for this fledgling democracy is largely dependent on how much foreign assistance is received. USCENTCOM efforts to establish a solid military-to-military relations program have met with great success. Development of a combined exercise program, an active ship visit program, and an Eritrean-led humanitarian demining program are underway. Plans for demining were completed in 1994 and operations are scheduled to commence in 1995. Efforts to build a professional military through general/flag officer visits and the IMET Program, and the establishment of a permanent USCENTCOM liaison office will also enhance U.S military relations with Eritrea.

ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia is an East African melting pot of over 50 million people from several different ethno-linguistic groups. The capital, Addis Ababa, serves as home for the Organization of African Unity, and is a frequent meeting place for African heads of state to address

regional issues. Though diplomatically influential in the Horn, Ethiopia has an economy strained by the refugee influx from Somalia and Sudan.

President Meles has played an important role in international efforts to resolve disputes between the various warring factions in neighboring Somalia, and maintains close political ties to Eritrea. Additionally, Ethiopia expanded its role in UN humanitarian operations in 1994 by providing an 800-man battalion to conduct relief operations during the crisis in Rwanda.

The U.S encourages Ethiopia to continue its move toward full democracy, and is optimistic that the parliamentary elections in 1995 will seat a unified government. Economic prospects continue to improve, but Ethiopia remains one of the poorest and least developed countries in Africa and will require assistance into the foreseeable future. Military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia continued to grow in 1994 with a low-level combined exercise designed to assist in the disposal of ordnance from years of civil war. This humanitarian demining program, an ongoing IMET program, general/flag officer visits, and excess defense articles acquired through foreign military funding will support our military-to military relations with Ethiopia in future years.

DJIBOUTI

Djibouti's importance stems from its strategic location at the entrance to the Bab el Mandeb. The country's airfield served as part of a strategic air bridge for operations in Somalia, and we have an ongoing ship visit program. Djibouti's pro-Western orientation and longstanding French presence afford the U.S. important access to support facilities for crisis response.

Tribal friction continues between the Afar rebels in the north and the Issas who largely control the government. Although civil war brought increased lawlessness to the country, conditions are now returning to normal. In addition to domestic problems, Djibouti (like Ethiopia) serves as a safe haven for Somalis fleeing violence and anarchy to the south. The government has continuing requirements for international aid organizations to assist in temporary relief and shelter for these refugees. The historic instability of Djibouti's neighboring countries continues to place an increased burden on its ability to develop economically and politically.

While the Djiboutian military continues its demobilization efforts and the government strives to improve its economic outlook, the U.S. continues to maintain a modest security assistance program aimed at complementing France's leading role. Current assistance is limited to spare parts for vehicles, limited engineer equipment, and a modest IMET program. In FY95 the U.S. will begin a military civic action program designed to "train the trainer" in basic skills.

KENYA

Kenya retains its position as an important friend in East Africa. The country provides valuable access to intermediate staging bases. The U.S. extensively used Kenyan facilities at Mombasa and Nairobi to support U.S. and UN operations in Somalia and Rwanda. In spite of slow progress in adopting certain economic reforms, Kenya currently maintains an active private sector and an extensive agricultural economic base. The productive private sector is offset by a large and inefficient public sector which significantly drains the country's treasury. However, this and many other economic

problems are now being positively addressed by the government. We support efforts by the international community to promote these economic and democratic reforms. A long history of excellent military-to-military relations has been challenged by suspension of U.S. aid. Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program for Kenya was suspended by Congress in 1991 for human rights abuses. The U.S., however, released \$3.7M in FMF money in late FY93 to support Kenya's efforts to secure its border with troubled Somalia. The U.S. continues to press the Government of Kenya to move forward on human rights, economic reform, and debt payment. A limited combined exercise program will resume in FY95, emphasizing low-level humanitarian/civic action projects with host-nation forces in rural areas.

SOMALIA

The humanitarian tragedy in Somalia resulted from protracted, near-civil war conditions. The unprecedented UN international humanitarian relief effort reduced the suffering and famine experienced by the Somali people, and undoubtedly saved hundreds of thousands of lives. This effort, though initially successful, failed to motivate the Somali people to establish a central democratic government or mechanism for infrastructure development. Political chaos therefore continues in Somalia with no end in sight.

Though outside assistance remains essential for stability in Somalia, the United Nations may soon terminate its formal commitment to the country. In 1992 Operation PROVIDE RELIEF reduced the effects of famine through the introduction of UN forces and arrival of relief supplies, and Operation RESTORE HOPE brought an improved state of security to the nation. However, neither brought any real progress in the way of political reform. In May 1993 all foreign forces operating in the country were brought under UNOSOM II. After months of a steadily deteriorating security situation, additional U.S. forces arrived to provide added protection to UNOSOM forces. Upon determining that the situation in Somalia was no longer tenable, the U.S. withdrew its forces in March 1994 and subsequently moved the U.S. Liaison Office to Nairobi in September 1994. As the political chaos in Somalia worsens, the requirement for a legitimate democratic government becomes even more imperative.

Source: Adapted from USCENCOM Internet data base. 4/98

¹The US Senate approved this agreement on June 29, 1972. Dale Bruner, "US Military and Security Relations with the Southern Gulf States," Washington, NSSP, Georgetown University, May 8, 1995; Michael A. Palmer, *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992*, New York, The Free Press, 1992, p. 93.

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⁵Jane's Defense Weekly, November 4, 1995, p. 25.

⁶Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts As of September 30, 1993, Washington, DC; FMS Control and Reports Division, Comptroller, DSAA, 1994, pp. 2-3, 16-17.

⁷Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction

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- ¹⁰Rosemary Hollis, *Gulf Security: No Consensus*, London, RUSI, 1993.
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Force/Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 232 and 279-287. Note that these data are not consistent from table to table.

³²Cohen, Dr. Eliot A, Director, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Volume V, Washington, US Air Force/Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 316-317, 335, 340, 343, 641, 653-654.

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³⁴Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts As of September 30, 1993, Washington, DC, pp. 10-11.

³⁵Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts As of September 30, 1993, Washington, DC; FMS Control and Reports Division, Comptroller, DSAA, 1994, pp. 2-3, 16-17. Covers FY1991-FY1993.

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⁴¹Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts As of September 30, 1993, Washington, DC; FMS Control and Reports Division, Comptroller, DSAA, 1994, pp. 2-3, 16-17.