



DIRECTOR OF STUDIES STRATEGY REPORT

April 2004

Strategy Report No. 4

UPCOMING EVENTS

April 5: CSIS will host a policy forum with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, in the B1 conference center at 5:30 p.m.

April 12: Former Secretaries of Defense William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger will discuss the “Geopolitical Implications of the New Global Economy” at noon in the 4th floor conference room.

April 19: The International Security Program will host the second in a series of seminars forging a “Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism.” The seminar will be held from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. in the 4th floor conference room.

April 21: The Hills Program on Governance will hold a seminar on “Making the Business Case for Governance Reform” at the St. Regis Hotel from 12:30 p.m. to 4 p.m.

April 23: CSIS will host a conference on economic growth for development: “A New Vision for International Development.” The conference will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. in the B1 conference center.

The Director of Studies Strategy Report is produced by CSIS, a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER THE MADRID BOMBING

The March 11 terrorist bombings in Madrid, and the rejection of the ruling conservative party's candidate in the general election in Spain three days later, raises new questions about the strength of transatlantic relations. Perceptions of the alliance have vacillated widely in the past three years: from the famous *Le Monde* editorial after September 11, 2001 (“We are all Americans now”) to the depths of the dispute with France, Germany and Russia over the use of force in Iraq.

Dr. Simon Serfaty, one of the foremost experts on U.S.-European relations on either side of the Atlantic Ocean, and CSIS Europe Program Director and holder of the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, recently led an internal Strategy Hour discussion on these issues.

The rejection of Prime Minister Aznar's Popular Party was more than just a rebuke to U.S. policy. The defining event was not the attack only, but the subsequent handling of the information about who was behind the terror assault; many Spaniards felt the government was too quick to blame the Basque separatists movement ETA and too slow to recognize the mounting evidence of Al Qaeda linkages. The lack of credibility—coming in the context of perceived false pretenses with respect to weapons of mass destruction and the attack on Iraq—manifested itself in the fact that the socialists gained 3 million votes and the ruling party lost about 900,000 votes since the last election.

Dr. Serfaty pointed out that the election in Spain marks a dramatic shift in the balance of political forces across Europe and within the European Union (EU), with “the arc of discontent on Europe's periphery” now weakened and divided, in contrast to the newly rejuvenated continental forces that are more unified in ambivalence to US policies—especially if and as Poland, too, pursues an “agonizing reappraisal” of its own after Spain withdraws its forces in Iraq on June 30th. Spain had sought to rely on its special relationship with the United States as a counterweight to French-German dominance within the EU to redirect economic and institutional issues. An ironic consequence of the attack of March 11 may well be to relaunch the constitutional debate that the EU had found impossible to conclude in the midst of the divisions that erupted in 2003 between “old” and “new” Europe.

Next, Dr. Serfaty turned his attention to the impact of the events in Spain on enlargement, and more specifically on Poland. Relations between the Polish government and some of the EU states will be tested over the constitution as well as over the post-June 30 developments in Iraq. The stakes are high. EU membership, unlike NATO membership, is a matter of time, not a matter of fact (now you're in, now you're not). For time is needed before the gains of membership become

tangible facts. Spain, for example, took 20 years to achieve sufficiency relative to its EU partners, and Ireland took 30 years to achieve economic parity. While the Spanish or Irish “model” is the model Poland envisions, there is also another model, which is one of pain, as happened with the UK, which experienced negative economic growth during 4 of the first 8 years of its membership, and increased unemployment every year during those years. Poland will find it difficult to endure the same difficulties as post-1973 UK, and it may be the first EU member to test the notion that “once in, never out.”

Finally, a more fearful Europe is now more likely to understand the urgency of the security normalcy unveiled on 9/11, according to Dr. Serfaty. Europe has always been more vulnerable to global terrorism, if only because of its geographic proximity to the Middle East. There is also the fact that Europeans take bricks and mortar more seriously than Americans, because often there are hundreds of years of history behind them and they cannot be rebuilt.

Dr. Serfaty added that the European reactions to 3/11 may now be driven by new urgency. The sense of threat was never lacking. The question was only the urgency relative to what was known before 9/11. Madrid now indicates not only that Paris could be next, as President Chirac suggested in the fall of 2001; it could also be soon. The long run has run out of time – it is here. The fragility and ill ease of the European nation state is palpable.

Notwithstanding these observations, Dr. Serfaty remains an optimist. Indeed, he believes the alliance can and must be reengaged again, and as it will surely be in January 2005 regardless of the outcome of the U.S. election. The chief question is whether the U.S. can muster the will to strengthen the consensus and common purpose in a post-9/11 world.



Patrick M. Cronin
March 24, 2004

THE USE OF FORCE IN IRAQ

The Transatlantic Divide Widens

One year after the start of the war in Iraq, how has public opinion toward the use of force changed? The Pew Global Attitudes Project released a new poll gauging international sentiment toward the United States, the war on terrorism, the future of Iraq and related topics one year after the start of the Iraq war at a CSIS briefing on Tuesday, March 16. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, chair of the project, introduced the survey. Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, Patrick Cronin, CSIS director of studies, and Kurt Campbell, director of the CSIS International Security Program, joined her in a discussion of the poll’s results.

Among the “willing” – countries that supported the use of force – the number of people who believe that was the right decision has dropped but remains higher than among the “unwilling” – those who did not support the use of force. Among the “unwilling,” the number who believe their government made the right decision has risen, except in Russia. Responding to this transatlantic divide will be a critical challenge in the months and years ahead.



For more on the CSIS briefing, including audio of the event, please visit www.csis.org. For the results of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, please see <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206>