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Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century:

IX. Saudi Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces

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Revised December 19, 2002

Introduction

This analysis is being circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.

Those interested in commenting, or in participating in the project, should contact Anthony H. Cordesman at the address shown on the cover sheet at Acordesman@aol.com.

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The CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project”

The CSIS is undertaking a new project to examine the trends shaping the future of Saudi Arabia and its impact on the stability of the Gulf. This project is supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and builds on the work done for the CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative, the CSIS Net Assessment of the Middle East, and the Gulf in Transition Project. It is being conducted in conjunction with a separate – but closely related – study called the Middle East Energy and Security Project.

The project is being conducted by Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. It uses a net assessment approach that looks at all of the major factors affecting Saudi Arabia’s strategic, political, economic, and military position and future implications of current trends. It is examining the internal stability and security of Saudi Arabia, social and demographic trends, and the problem of Islamic extremism. It also examines the changes taking place in the Saudi economy and petroleum industries, the problems of Saudisation, changes in export and trade patterns, and Saudi Arabia’s new emphasis on foreign investment.

The assessment of Saudi Arabia’s strategic position includes a full-scale analysis of Saudi military forces, defense expenditures, arms imports, military modernization, readiness, and war fighting capability. It also, however, looks beyond the military dimension and a narrowly definition of political stability, and examine the implications of the shifts in the pattern of Gulf, changes in Saudi external relations such changes in Saudi policy towards Iran and Iraq. It examines the cooperation and tensions between Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states. It examines the implications of the conventional military build-up and creeping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf, the resulting changes in Saudi Arabia’s security position. It also examines the security and strategic implications of the steady expansion of Saudi Arabia’s oil, gas, and petrochemical exports.

This project is examining the succession in the Royal Family, the immediate political probabilities, and the generational changes that are occurring in the royal family and Saudi Arabia’s technocrats. At the same time, it examines the future political, economic, and social trends in Saudi Arabia, and possible strategic futures for Saudi Arabia through the year 2010.

This examination of the strategic future of Saudi Arabia includes Saudi Arabia’s possible evolution in the face of different internal and external factors -- including changes in foreign and trade policies towards Saudi Arabia by the West, Japan, and the Gulf states. Key issues affecting Saudi Arabia’s future, including its economic development, relations with other states in the region, energy production and policies, and security relations with other states will be examined as well.

A central focus of this project is to examine the implications of change within Saudi Arabia, their probable mid and long-term impacts, and the most likely changes in the nature or behavior of

Saudi Arabia's current ruling elite, and to project the possible implications for both Gulf stability and the US position in the Gulf.

Work on the project will focus on the steady development of working documents that will be revised steadily during the coming months on the basis on outside comment. As a result, all of the material provided in this section of the CSIS web page should be regarded as working material that will change according to the comments received from policymakers and outside experts. To comment, provide suggestions, or provide corrections, please contact Anthony H. Cordesman at the CSIS at the address shown on each report, or e-mail him at Acordesman@aol.com.

Related material can be found in the "Gulf and Transition" and " Middle East Energy and Security" sections of the CSIS Web Page at CSIS.ORG.

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IX. Saudi Paramilitary and Internal Security Forces

Saudi Arabia has long fought its own battles against internal and external extremist movements. In fact, the Saudi regime has had to deal with a long series of internal challenges from Islamic extremists since the time of the Ikhwan in the 1920s, as well as from more secular movements supported by other Arab states. These struggles were particularly serious during the peak of Nasserism and Pan Arabism in the 1950s, and the first major Islamic backlash from oil wealth and modernization in the late 1970s. They have been a continuing problem since 1990 because of conservative Wahhabi hostility to a US and Western military presence on Saudi soil.

During these battles, the Saudi government has quietly put pressure on the Saudi Ulema, and has arrested a wide range of extremists, and publicly condemned terrorism. It cooperated with the US in a number of cases, including the attack on the USS Cole. It also was careful to exploit the fact that the Saudi clergy is paid by the government, and there are no Madrassas in Saudi Arabia that provide religious education that are separate from the state educational system. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs is primarily organized for the purpose of religious administration, but it has always had an internal security element as well, and has been used to provide both carrots and sticks for internal security purposes. This role was given a higher profile during the Gulf War, when it became apparent that many hard-line Islamists opposed any Western presence on Saudi soil, and was slowly stepped up in the 1990s when Islamic extremists became more active. The Ministry of Interior and Saudi intelligence took similar steps, particularly after Osama Bin Laden emerged as an open opponent of the regime.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that senior members of the Saudi royal family immediately expressed their sympathy for the US after September 11th, and condemned the terrorist attacks on the US after the strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The

Saudi government issued a statement condemning the "regrettable and inhuman bombings and attacks" which took place at the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, and the Pentagon building in Washington DC, and strongly condemned such acts, "which contravene all religious values and human civilized concepts; and extended sincere condolences to the families of the victims, to U.S. President George W. Bush and to the U.S. people in general." The Saudi statement reiterated the Kingdom's position condemning all forms of terrorism, and its ongoing cooperation with the international community to combat it.

The Saudi Foreign Minister attacked terrorism in more depth in an interview in Okaz on September 16, 2001. The Minister of the Interior made similar statements on September 23rd. Saudi Arabia strongly condemned the terrorism Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting on October 11th, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Saud Al-Faisal issued a separate statement stressing that that terrorism harmed the Islamic world and just Islamic causes. He also stated that terrorist acts have, for example, never advanced the Palestinian cause.

Senior Saudi religious and legal figures condemned the attacks with equal speed. The Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, Sheikh Salih Al-Luheidan, stated on September 14th that "As a human community we must be vigilant and careful to oppose these pernicious and shameless evils, which are not justified by any sane logic, nor by the religion of Islam." Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Sheikh, the Chairman of the Senior Ulema and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, reemphasized Sheikh Al-Luheidan's statements on September 15th, stating that, "The recent developments in the United States constitute a form of injustice that is not tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes and sinful acts." Since that time, leading Saudi officials and clerics have repeatedly condemned the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and other terrorist activities.²

The Saudi Failures that Helped Lead to September 11, 2001

Nevertheless, the events of September 11th dramatized the fact the Saudi Arabia not only faces serious internal security issues but must now play a major role in the global struggle on terrorism. It not only must take new internal measures to deal with Islamic extremism and terrorism, it must act to deal with a wide range of other internal security issues. In fact, the Saudi

government has had to make repeated efforts since September 11, 2001 to tighten its control over the Saudi clergy, and deal with issues like sermons and literature that still contain anti-Semitic and anti-Christian content as well as potential incitements to extremist or terrorist action.

Crown Prince Abdullah has repeatedly stated that Islam must be treated as a religion of tolerance and peace. On December 7, 2002, Sheik Saleh Al-Sheikh, a descendent of Muhammad Abd Al-Wahhab and Minister of Islamic affairs, announced new restrictions had been put in place to prohibit “unauthorized persons” from making speeches at mosques and warning the speakers at mosques against “making provocative speeches and inciting people.” The letter containing these instructions said that, “mosques are meant only for prayer, guidance, and other pious activities and should not be used as political platforms...to make provocative speeches or incite people or exploit mosques by reciting poems in praise of some misguided people.” The Minister commended those imams and khatibs who fulfilled their religious duties in prayers and providing advice and guidance, and called upon them to “serve as models for others by spreading love and brotherhood.” At the same time, he warned that violators of the new order would be subject to severe punishment, including removal from office.”³

The fact that so many young Saudis were directly involved in “9/11,” as well as in the overall membership of Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaida, reflects the fact that Saudi security efforts still have major weaknesses. Saudi Arabia has failed to come firmly to grips with its Islamic extremists at many levels. The Saudi government has tolerated problems and ultra-conservative forms of Wahhabi and Islamist teaching and text books in its educational system that encourages extremism. It has failed to properly track young Saudis who became involved with extremist movements outside the country. It has carelessly provided funds and support for Wahhabi and other ultraconservative movements and activities outside Saudi Arabia that encouraged violence and extremism, and has failed to properly distinguish between support of legitimate Islamic causes and charities and involvement with violent movements.

The Saudi government has generally been careful to monitor the activities of Islamic groups that directly criticize the Saudi government and Royal family, but failed to monitor the flow of money to causes and groups outside the Kingdom with anything like the care and depth required until September 11, 2001 and was then slow to correct the situation. It has often felt that it could export its problems to “safe” countries like Afghanistan and then buy off a regime

like the Taliban to control Saudi dissidents. Saudi intelligence and diplomacy failed badly in dealing with Al Qaida and Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and the security services failed to monitor the degree to which Saudis and Saudi money became involved in supporting Al Qaida and other extremist causes in Central Asia, Pakistan, Germany, and elsewhere long after incidents of terrorism reached a level in the mid-1990s that showed this should be a subject of serious concern.

These failures were compounded by other actions. The regime tolerated sermons, teaching, and textbooks with a strong xenophobic character—sometimes attacking Christians, Jews and other religions—as long as they did not attack specific political targets in Saudi Arabia or call for specific violent actions. It made relatively little effort to monitor the activities of “Islamic” groups in secondary schools and colleges if they did not directly oppose the regime, and made far too little effort to evaluate what Saudi and many foreign contract teachers were actually teaching their students. It did not oppose foreign and domestic efforts to raise money and obtain support for “pro-Islamic” movements in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Central Asia even when these represented extreme and sometimes violent causes. Little or no effort was made to monitor the extent to which foreign “charities” raised money for political movements in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, that were far more extreme (and sometimes violent) than would have been tolerated in Saudi Arabia. The regime turned a blind eye to the flow of funds to movements like Hamas which mixed charitable activity with terrorist activities in Israel.

Somewhat ironically, Saudi Arabia’s deep concern with religion and charity, and lack of an income tax compounded its problems. Islam calls for all those who can to give a religious donation of roughly 2.5% of their income – called Zakat – to charity. It also calls for those with land to give as much as 5% to 10%, depending on the quality of their land. The fact there is no Saudi income tax and Saudi Arabia is still a highly patriarchal, tribal, and clan oriented society, dependent on personal patronage and charity, makes Saudi Arabia a nation that places a heavy reliance on voluntary Islamic charity. As a result, large amounts of money have flowed out of the Kingdom from the King, other senior princes, and wealthy Saudis to groups and causes that would never have received the money if those asking for it had received even cursory review of what they were actually doing and saying. Senior members of the Royal family, and wealthy Saudis, have given as if they had to meet a quota rather than care about a cause. They also often

left the task of allocated funds to younger princes who either cared nothing about where the money actually went or had far too little political sophistication to evaluate the groups asking for money.

Extremists and terrorisms learned to exploit this situation, using formal charities or personal requests for charitable aid to obtain money they would never have gotten if they announced their real purpose in seeking funds. At the same time, some real charities had a strong political orientation and often supported extremist movements and some donors knowingly gave money to “charities” that were extremist fronts. This was particularly true in the case of money going to Palestinian causes, after the beginning of the Second Intifada in the fall of 2000. Most Saudis saw Israel as an occupying nation constantly using excessive force against Palestinian freedom fighters – virtually the opposite image from Americans who saw them as terrorists. The end result was that massive amounts of money flowed out to extremists, and sometimes terrorist movements, through sheer negligence, fraud, or under the guise of charity.

In retrospect, both the Ministry of Interior and Saudi intelligence failed to pay attention to the “youth explosion” caused by Saudi Arabia’s high birth rate. They were slow to monitor the movement and activities of young Saudis outside the Kingdom, and to closely to examine those Saudis that became involved in paramilitary training and movements in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. They paid too little attention to organizations like Al Qaida even though it took action against Osama Bin Laden as early as 1994, and they failed to distinguish between conservative Wahhabi teaching and the kind of extremist teaching and preaching that could lead to violence.

These failures were scarcely inevitable. While the exact organizations and chains of responsibility involved are unclear, Saudi Arabia learned just how threatening such developments could be during the Islamist extremist seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979. Since that time, the security services have often been effective in monitoring the activities of those hard-line Saudi opposition groups overseas that attacked the regime, exploiting divisions within them, co-opting or bribing elements within them, and putting pressure on foreign governments to end their activities. They have been equally affective when it dealt with Iranian, Yemeni, Iraqi, and Palestinian efforts to support Saudi opposition groups in Saudi Arabia.

One key problem is that Saudi intelligence activity has relied too much on human and communications intelligence. It has been weak in dealing with the financial aspects of intelligence and internal security, which helps explain why it failed to properly monitor the flow of money to Saudi charities, religious organizations, and individuals in financing extremist groups – other than those that posed a direct threat to the rule of the Saudi royal family.

In fairness, such monitoring is not easy. Saudi banking rules are relatively strict in terms of tracking and identifying individual accounts, but little effort was made before September 11th to track the flow of money inside or outside the country to extremist causes and factions. It should be noted however, that Saudi organizations and individuals have billions of dollars of privately held money in Western and other foreign banks and individuals. Effective surveillance of such holdings is difficult, if not impossible. The problem is further compounded by easy access to the financial institutions of other GCC countries, like the UAE. Many Gulf countries have financial institutions that make cash transfers extremely easy, which tolerate high levels of money laundering, smuggling, and narcotrafficking, and which have often been far more careless in allowing the flow of money to extremist causes than Saudi Arabia. The leaders and citizens of countries like Kuwait and the UAE have also been as careless in their donations to “charities” as Saudis.

More generally, Saudi Arabia has consistently failed in another major area of internal security. The level of corruption in Saudi Arabia is often exaggerated and used to make broad, undocumented charges against the government and royal family. Corruption is, however, a very real problem. Exaggerated perceptions of corruption can be as important as reality. Saudi Arabia has been slow to reform civil law and regulation to create the legal basis for large-scale private and foreign investment and commercial operations that can be based on secure rights to property, conducting business without interference or reliance on agents, and revolving commercial disputes. There has been steady progress in these areas, but there has not been enough and Saudi internal security is growing increasingly dependent on the broad public and international perception that Saudi Arabia will reign in corruption, that members of the royal family and senior officials cannot intervene improperly in business affairs, and that investments and business activities are safe.

The Role of the Ministry of the Interior

Saudi Arabia has a complex mix of paramilitary and internal security forces, and an equally complex legal system for dealing with civil and security cases. There is no doubt that the Saudi security and criminal justice systems differ sharply from those in the West, and involve human rights abuses. At the same time, the Kingdom's internal security system is less repressive than many developing states, and relies more on detention than the physical punishment or exile of its opponents.⁴ Cooption is used more than repression, and the security services rely more on family and tribal ties to pressure opponents than on direct arrests or punishments. While Saudi Arabia does not make use of formal exile procedures, it does force extremist and hostile elements out of the country, and deprives some security suspects of their citizenship.

As has already been noted, a number of civil ministries like the Ministry of Islamic Affairs Guidance) play at least an indirect role in internal security because of their political impact. Others include the Ministry of Communications; the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the Ministry of Information; the Ministry of Education; Ministry of Higher Education; Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources; Ministry of Pilgrimage and Islamic Trusts; and Ministry of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph. This kind of indirect role in internal security is typical of similar ministries in virtually every country in the developing world, as well as a number of countries in Europe.

The formal Saudi security forces involve a mix of elements in the regular armed forces, and the National Guard, and a range of internal security and intelligence services most of which are under the Ministry of Interior. As has been discussed in previous chapters, the regular army provides external security, but is kept away from urban areas. The National Guard provides internal security under a different chain of command using both its regular forces and elements from the National Guard loyal tribes. It protects the territory of the Kingdom and the approaches to its cities and critical facilities, acts as reinforcements for the regular forces, can serve as an urban security force in an emergency. It does, however, have an Intelligence Directorate that serves a broader purpose and which Crown Prince Abdullah uses for a variety of broader intelligence and internal security purposes.

The rest of the internal security forces and intelligence services are centralized under Prince Nayef (Naif) Bin Abd al-Aziz, the Minister of the Interior.⁵ Prince Nayef is a major political power in the Kingdom,. He is one of the strongest figures in the Royal family and has long played a critical role in Saudi security. According to some reports, all of the security services report first to Prince Nayef, and even Crown Prince Abdallah must give his orders to the security services through Prince Nayef or his deputy Prince Ahmad.

As will be touched upon later, Prince Nayef is also a controversial figure. Some Saudis feel he is extremely conservative, and has become out of touch with the Kingdom's current security problems. They feel he was far too slow to react to the growth of Islamic extremist movements outside the Kingdom, and the role the Kingdom played in supporting such movements with money and Saudi volunteers, and saw outside pressure from the US to crackdown on such activities as the result of exaggerated US fears that were at least partly the result of pressure from Israel.

These views have at least some support from Prince Nayef's own words. Since September 11, 2001, Prince Nayef has made several political statements implying that the attacks were the product of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood and/or Israel. For example, he made such statements in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al Siyasa* on November 29, 2002. In fairness, Prince Nayef did so in a long interview stressing the need to crack down on terrorism, that the government was putting pressure on Saudi religious figures and mosques, that the Kingdom has made numerous arrests, and that terrorism was fundamentally anti-Islamic. He was also reacting to a flood of poorly founded US and Western press criticism of Saudi Arabia, linked the possibility that the wife of the Saudi Ambassador to the US gave money to a family that *might* have been linked to terrorists.⁶

Nevertheless, Prince Nayef did say, "we put big question marks and ask who committed to the events of September 11 and who benefited from them. Who benefited from the event of September 11? I think they (the Zionists) are behind these events." He expressed the view that it was "impossible" that Al Qaida alone, or that 19 youths of which 17 were Saudi, could have acted alone. He then went on to attack the Moslem Brotherhood by saying "All our problems come from the Moslem brotherhood. We have given too much support to this group...The

Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab world.” He attacked a multinational spectrum of Islamic Politicians for turning their backs on Saudi Arabia, forgetting the favors it had given them, and launching attacks on the Kingdom. He singled out Hassan Al Turabi of the Sudan as a case in point. He also mentioned Hamas, the Jordan’s parliamentary opposition and the Islamic Action Front for there attacks on the Kingdom, and attacked Islamic scholars like Abdul Rahman Khalifa, Rashid Ghannouchi, Abdul Majeed Al-Zidani, and Necmettin Erbakan for supporting the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. He stated there were no dormant Al Qaida cells remaining in Saudi Arabia and that this threat no longer existed.⁷

Some Saudi sources estimate the total internal security budget as high as \$6 to \$7 billion annually, with a virtually open-ended capability to spend on any internal security purpose. Prince Nayef and Prince Ahmad are reported to pay massive bonuses to successful security officers, but also have a reputation for honesty and using the security budget only for the mission and not to enrich themselves.

The Vice Minister is the youngest full brother of the King. The Assistant Minister for Security Affairs is Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, Prince Nayef’s son and the third ranking individual in the Ministry. The Deputy positions include Dr. Ahmad Al Salem, the Deputy Minister of the Interior who effectively runs the Ministry and is the fourth ranking individual The Deputy Minister for Security Affairs in Saudi Arabia is General Al Robayaan. He was formerly head of the Minister’s Research & Studies Bureau, and who effectively reports to Mohammad bin Nayef. There is also a Deputy Minister for Regions Dr. Al Mazroe. There are also a couple of advisors to the Minister of the Interior who are part of the Office of the Minister of Interior.

The Director Generals of the respective services all report to the Minister and Vice Minister and are directly responsible to the Minister. They include the Director Generals of GSS (General Security Service), Public Security Administration (all police forces fall under this service), Passports & Immigration Department, Frontier Guard, Coast Guard and the Special Security Service. The security colleges fall under the Deputy Minister Al Salem who runs the administration and management of the Ministry. Prince Nayef also has hired the former heads of a number of Arab security services (Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Egypt) as personal consultants and pays them large retainers to remain at his disposal.

The Coast Guard, Civil Defense Administration, and Frontier Force are under one chain of command in the Ministry of the Interior. The Public Security, Special Security, Mujahideen, and General Security Service (GSS) branches are under a separate chain of command. These latter organizations provide internal security at the political and intelligence levels, security inside cities and deal with limited problems that require crowd control and SWAT like operations, and counter-terrorist capabilities. They also provide the Kingdom's primary counter-terrorist force and played a major role in dealing with the bombings of the SANG headquarters and the USAF barracks at Al Khobar.

The Police and Security Services

The police and security forces are still somewhat traditional in character, but they have been steadily modernized over the years. Early in Saudi Arabia's history, there were no formal police and local and tribal authorities administered justice. During the reign of Abd al Aziz, more modern police, justice, and internal security organizations were developed. In 1950, He created a "general directorate" to supervise all police functions. He established the Ministry of Interior in 1951, which has since controlled police matters.

Saudi Arabia has received substantial technical advice from British, French, German, Jordanian, Pakistani, and US experts. Substantial numbers of British and French advisors served in Saudi Arabia in the past, including seconded ex-government and military personnel, but it is unclear how many have continued to serve since the early 1990s.

The police security forces are now divided into regular police and special investigative police of the General Security Service (GSS), which are called the *mubahith* (secret police). The GSS conducts criminal investigations in addition to performing the domestic security and counterintelligence functions of the Ministry of Interior. The GSS has a large special investigation force, something like the British CID, but with political as well as criminal justice functions. The US State Department reports that political detainees arrested by the GSS are often held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GSS allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or lawyers.

There are approximately 35,000 paramilitary policemen in the Public Security Police equipped with small arms and some automatic weapons. They are assigned to Provincial Governors, and are under the Minister of the Interior. The main Public Security College is in Riyadh. The Public Security Police have a police college in Mecca. Police uniforms are similar to the khaki and olive drab worn by the army except for the distinctive red beret. Policemen usually wear side arms while on duty.

The Special Security Force is the Saudi equivalent of a special weapons assault team (SWAT). It reports directly to the Minister of Interior. It was organized in response to the poor performance of the National Guard during the revolt in 1979 at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The force is equipped with light armored vehicles, automatic weapons, and nonlethal chemical weapons. Its exact strength is unclear and its antiterrorism units have been steadily expanded since 1990. It is designed to deal with terrorism and hijacking and has SWAT capabilities and detachments in every major Saudi city and province. Saudi Special Forces include a regular Army airborne brigade, a Royal Guard Brigade, and a Marine Regiment.

The public security forces are recruited from all areas of the country, maintained police directorates at provincial and local levels. These forces, particularly the centralized Public Security Police, can be reinforced by the National Guard in an emergency or can get support from the regular armed forces. The Public Security Police, recruited from all areas of the country, maintained police directorates at provincial and local levels. The director general for public security retained responsibility for police units but, in practice, provincial governors exercised considerable autonomy.

The focus of police and security activity has also changed over the years. Saudi Arabia is now a highly urbanized society and these formal state institutions carry out most internal security and criminal justice activity in urban areas. This has helped drive the effort to modernize the police and security forces. For example, new vehicles and radio communications equipment have enabled police directorates to operate sophisticated mobile units, particularly in the principal cities. Helicopters have been acquired for use in urban areas.

The Ministry of Interior now maintains a centralized computer system at the National Information Center in Riyadh. This computer network, links some 1,100 terminals, and

maintains records on citizens' identity numbers and passports, foreigners' residence and work permits, hajj visas, vehicle registrations, and criminal records. Reports from agents and from the large number of informants employed by the security services are also entered. Officials of the Directorate of Intelligence have authority to carry out wiretaps and mail surveillance. The Ministry of the Interior has a large electronic intelligence and surveillance effort, with a budget well in excess of a billion Riyals a year.

Some security activities do, however, continue to be enforced on a tribal level in tribal areas. The King provides payments or subsidies to key Sheiks and they are largely in charge of tribal affairs. Offenses and many crimes are still punished by the responsible Sheik. The National Guard acts as a support force to deal with problems that cannot be settled or controlled by the tribal authorities.

Border and coastline control have long been an important aspect of security operations. The paramilitary Frontier Force and Coastguard are security forces with dedicated missions that can perform light combat functions. The 10,500 man Frontier Force covers Saudi Arabia's land and sea borders. It performs a host of patrol and surveillance missions, and can act as a light defensive screen. It is equipped with four-wheel drive vehicles and automatic weapons. The Frontier Force did much of the fighting with Yemen in the past, and took casualties in doing so. It still must deal with the problem of smuggling and infiltration across the Saudi border. The 4,500 men in the Coast Guard are primarily concerned with smuggling, but do have a limited internal security mission.⁸

Saudi Arabia has considered building a border surveillance system that would use patrol aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and early warning systems to detect intruders and border crossings. This would have involved a 12 kilometer-deep security zone around all 6,500 kilometers of the land and sea borders, with a mix of acoustic, seismic, radar, magnetic, and infrared sensors to detect movements of men and vehicles in the border area. It would have been supported by small manned patrol aircraft, and unmanned remotely piloted vehicles, wherever some threat from an intruder might exist. Thomson CSF completed a \$5 million feasibility study for this system in early 1990, and two consortiums—one led by E Systems and the other by Thomson CSF -- submitted bids to Saudi Arabia in May 1991. The system was not funded in part because of its cost, and in part because of the ease with which given sections could be

penetrated before an effective response would be possible. Its estimated cost was around \$3 billion and it would have taken several years to complete.⁹

The General Intelligence Directorate

Saudi Arabia has a General Intelligence Directorate (GID), with security, anti-terrorism, and foreign liaison functions. The Directorate of Intelligence reports directly to the King, is part of the Royal Diwan, and has extensive funding. According to some sources, it is the most funded intelligence service in the Middle East, and has a larger budget than the Foreign Ministry and either the British SIS or French DGSE.

In theory, the General Intelligence Directorate is responsible for intelligence collection and analysis, and for the coordination of intelligence tasks and reporting by *all* intelligence agencies, including those of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and the National Guard. In practice, there is no real Saudi intelligence “community.” Intelligence sharing -- or “fusion” -- is weak, coordination is poor, and Saudi intelligence is filled with personal and bureaucratic rivalries and tensions. The problems are compounded by the fact that the research department of the General Intelligence Directorate is very weak, and Saudi intelligence relies too heavily on personal contacts and briefings, rather than systematic and structured analysis.

The General Intelligence Directorate has, however, been successful in dealing with many internal and foreign threats that have posed a direct threat to the region. It has a long history of cooperation with the CIA and other US intelligence services although it has generally opposed any Western efforts to introduce law enforcement organizations like the FBI into Saudi security issues in ways that could embarrass the Saudi government. This led to acute tensions between the General Intelligence Directorate and the FBI over the investigation like the Al Khobar bombing, and helped lead to the charges that the Saudi government covered up Iranian involvement in the bombing.

In fairness to Saudi Arabia, however, the US, Britain, and other Western countries have failed to cooperate with Saudi intelligence in a number of past cases because they felt that this might violate the rights of legitimate opposition movements or raise human rights issues. The US and other Western intelligence services also turned a blind eye, or at least tolerated, Islamic

extremist activity when it seemed to serve their interests in Afghanistan and Bosnia, or acted as a counter balance to Russian influence in Central Asia and paid little attention to the potential threat posed by funds and manpower coming out of the Kingdom. If Saudi Arabia was slow to see the threat of extremism and terrorism and sometimes “exported” its problems, the US, Britain, and other European intelligence and security services made equally serious mistakes in monitoring and characterizing “Islamic” movements.

The Operations of the Saudi Security and Intelligence Services

Saudi Arabia has tended to deal with its security problems by trying to conceal them and a series of public denials. A number of members of the royal family do admit in retrospect, however, that the Saudi intelligence and security services, failed to come to grips with the problems of Islamic extremism—although some believe the Foreign Ministry, Office of the King, and Office of the Crown Prince should have to accept equal or greater blame. Warning occurred at least half a decade before September 11, 2001. The General Intelligence Directorate to discovered after the National Guard and Al Khobar bombings that approximately 8,000-15,000 young Saudi men had some kind of contact with Islamic extremist groups, Afghanis, and paramilitary training facilities between 1979 and the mid-1990s.¹⁰ While this represented a small fraction of young Saudi males, it was scarcely insignificant given the generally small size of Islamic extremist groups and terrorist cells in general.

The Saudi intelligence and the Saudi internal security services paid far too little attention to the growing and highly visible ties between hard-line Pakistani extremists in the Pakistani ISI and religious schools, and the impact of Saudi-financed activities in Pakistan and Central Asia and the number of young Saudi men associated with Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida. Discussions with Saudi officials indicate that they had surprisingly little understanding of the difference between legitimate Islamic organizations in Central Asia, China, and the Far East and highly political action groups that used Islam as an ideological weapon. They paid little attention to the fact that such groups were committed to the violent overthrow of governments in their region, which strongly opposed both modernization and reform, and which were broadly anti-Western in character. They also failed to monitor Wahhabi “missionary” and charity groups operating in Europe. Even though such “Wahhabi” groups showed little of the pragmatic

tolerance and moderation common to mainstream Wahhabi practices in the Kingdom, they often took on an extremist character particularly in Germany.

As has been touched upon earlier, they showed an equal tendency to turn a blind eye towards the flow of Saudi money to Palestinian groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other hardline or violent Islamic elements in countries like Egypt. Furthermore, Saudi officials felt that Saudi support and financing of the Taliban and other governments acted as a way of containing Saudi extremists overseas with the somewhat naive expectation that such governments would really reign in their activity or stay “bought.”

Saudi Arabia has begun to make significant changes in its approach to these problems since September 11th. It has quietly made significant arrests, and is making far more of an effort to understand the nature of Saudi activity in extremist groups and the flow of money outside of the Kingdom. It is now making a major effort to track the activities of Saudi religious and charitable groups inside and outside the Kingdom, and is now giving special attention to Pakistan and Central Asia. It is tightening security inside the Kingdom, and surveillance over young men with ties to extremist groups, as was surveillance and over religious figures that made hard-line or extremist statements. Surveillance has also been increased over the activities of religious schools and teachers.

Changes in the General Intelligence Directorate

Developments have taken place within the GID since September 11th, which are difficult to interpret. The GID had long been led by Prince Turki al-Faisal before he was replaced in 2001 by Crown Prince Abdullah's half-brother, Prince Nawwaf bin Abdul-Aziz.¹¹ This development was particularly striking because Prince Turki al-Faisal, was a son of King Faisal and a nephew of Nawwaf, and had spent some 30 years in intelligence. He began his career as deputy director at the age of 23, and was promoted to the top job in 1977. Prince Turki had long been the main contact point for the CIA, British Secret Intelligence Service, French intelligence and security services, among others. He had also been responsible for dealing with operations in Afghanistan and Central Asia since the Soviet invasion in 1979. He had also been a key point of contact with the CIA-backed Mujahideen and Pakistani Intelligence, with the various warring Afghan factions after the Soviet withdrawal, and with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden.¹²

The Saudi explanation for the change was that Prince Turki had resigned "at his own request." There are many different rumors and interpretations of what happened, and the very different views of Simon Henderson and John Duke Anthony illustrate the range of views involved.

Some views emphasize a conspiratorial explanation. For example, Simon Henderson explains the change as follows:¹³

Washington has been at a loss to explain what caused Turki to resign. One theory was that his wife was ill, and that he wanted more time for himself and his family. Another suggested that he had never completely recovered from an accident while camping in the desert in the mid-1980s, when he inhaled carbon monoxide from a defective heater. But these are just theories. He was sacked, and we don't know why, an indicator of how little is known about the closed Saudi society.

But Saudi watchers tend to be a diligent bunch. The involvement of Saudi-born terrorist bin Laden in the events of Sept. 11 made the resignation of Turki an issue that had to be resolved. The version now accepted as most likely is a baroque tale, combining dynastic tensions within the 30,000-strong royal family, Saudi relations with the Taliban, Saudi relations with the U.S., and the implication that the Saudis knew or suspected that bin Laden might carry out his hijacking outrages somewhere in the world in September.

The *dramatis personae* also include Prince Nayef, the interior minister...The succession struggle, particularly fraught since late 1995 -- when King Fahd had the first in a series of strokes—has been played out against a background of internal political opposition, caused by poor government revenues from oil and resentment about princely corruption. There has also been long-standing tension between Turki and his uncle, Nayef, the interior minister, who was in charge of the domestic intelligence service. Theoretically, Turki answered to Nayef, but he had preserved a degree of independence.

The two men had a major falling out after the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, attributed to minority Saudi Shiites with the backing of Iran. Turki had wanted full co-operation for the investigation with the FBI and the CIA; Nayef had refused, considering such co-operation an infringement of Saudi sovereignty. Turki's handling of the Afghanistan file was also judged faulty. Although the Taliban, like the Saudis, were Wahhabis, a puritanical interpretation of Sunni Islam, their support for bin Laden had clearly begun to harm the kingdom's best interests. The regime had made a strategic mistake in backing the Taliban—their fellow Wahhabis—but now Turki was going to be the fall guy.

Nayef took the issue of his differences with Turki to Crown Prince Abdullah, the kingdom's *de facto* ruler, who could not ignore the complaint. Along with Fahd, Abdullah and Sultan, Nayef is one of the four most powerful men in Saudi Arabia. Abdullah proposed a compromise...Turki, he agreed, would go, but would be replaced by Abdullah's confidante and constant companion, Prince Nawwaf.

The timing of Turki's removal—Aug. 31 -- and his Taliban connection raise the question: Did the Saudi regime know that bin Laden was planning his attack against the U.S.? The current view among Saudi-watchers is probably not, but that the House of Saud might have heard rumors that something was planned, although they did not know what or when. (An interesting and possibly significant detail: Prince Sultan, the defense minister, had been due to visit Japan in early September, but canceled his trip for no apparent reason less than two days before his planned departure.)

For Western diplomats and intelligence officers trying to achieve international co-operation in the hunt for bin Laden, Turki's forced departure seems like a cruel farce. The close personal relations they had developed over the years with a key player in Saudi Arabia are now worthless. U.S. officials find themselves dealing with Nayef, who doesn't want to co-operate, and Nawwaf, the new intelligence chief,

who is quite out of his depth. And it doesn't help that Crown Prince Abdullah is in a huff over President Bush's determination to wage war in Afghanistan.

As has been touched upon earlier, Saudis have divided views over both what happened and the respective roles of Prince Nayef and Prince Turki. Many Saudis feel that Henderson's reporting is typical of the negative analysis that has come coming from outside analysts since September 11, 2001. A number of Saudis with good knowledge of Saudi counterterrorism and internal security do feel that Prince Nayef has been too conservative in dealing with the threat of Islamic extremism, has been slow to come to grips with the threat of extremism, and has overreacted to legitimate dissent.

Few Saudis, however, seem to support Henderson's analysis of the facts, and many share the views of John Duke Anthony, who provides an explanation of why Prince Nawwaf bin Abdalaziz Al Sa'ud may have been chosen as Prince Turki's successor that involves far less internal division within the royal family:¹⁴

The resignation this week of longtime Saudi Arabian Director of the General Intelligence Directorate HRH Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Sa'ud came to some as a surprise. Others familiar with the Minister's situation expected the resignation at some point—it was not a question of whether the Minister, who had served in his post for more than a quarter of a century, would step down, but when.

The timing was rooted in circumstances pertaining to the Minister's immediate family - and nothing more...Despite rumors and speculations to the contrary, the resignation was not prompted, let alone validated, by the numerous ill-informed media reports that have appeared to date.

These include perceived intra-ruling family differences over the Ministry's handling of such matters as the June 1996 Al-Khobar Towers bombing investigations and the November 1995 explosions in Riyadh – phenomena dealt with more directly by other government agencies than the one that Prince Turki headed – and equally unfounded reports of squabbles pertaining to the Afghan Taliban, and/or potential scenarios related to succession.

In any case, many may ask, "What does the resignation mean? Does it signify that a policy change of some kind is imminent?" "If so, will our interests be affected?" Helping to assuage such anxieties is the following.

Prince Turki's successor, HRH Prince Nawwaf bin Abdalaziz Al Sa'ud, could hardly be closer to Heir Apparent Prince Abdallah bin Abdalaziz Al Sa'ud. The latter is known to have an exceptional measure of trust and confidence in this senior member of the ruling family.

...Among the new minister's challenges are those that pertain to establishing not so much credibility but as smooth a working relationship with other ministers as possible. Of greatest importance will be the need to forge effective inter-ministerial cooperation on matters that pertain to his portfolio and those that in some cases parallel or overlap with the portfolios of others.

In the latter instance, there will need for closest collaboration with the Ministry of Interior, especially on matters pertaining to security. But this should not be difficult. Prince Nawwaf, like Minister of Interior, Prince Nayif, share the same father, and he is nearer in age to Nayif than Prince Turki.

...On the external front, some of the more difficult challenges that the Kingdom faced during the long tenure of Prince Turki have either been settled, substantially modified, or become different and in some ways less arduous or complex than before.

Two examples are the ending of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the termination of the Iran-Iraq war. Two more are the successful achievement of independence by the states along the Kingdom's eastern littoral, and the ending of the country's border disputes with virtually all of its neighbors.

There has also been a significant diminution of the kinds of threats to domestic security—the odd aircraft hijacking, Iranian-inspired disruptions during the annual Islamic pilgrimage, cross border forays from the south, and the occasional demonstration by religious minorities—that posed daunting challenges in years gone by.

...As for how quickly and easily the new Minister can be expected to settle into the day-to-day workings of his directorate, this will of course take time. Such things always do. But the process should prove to be less daunting and time-consuming than many unfamiliar with his background and previous experience might imagine.

The reasons are several. For nearly forty years, Prince Nawwaf has frequently been entrusted with exceptionally difficult challenges to the Kingdom's foreign policy objectives.

A case in point was during the period 1968-1971, when the British proceeded to abrogate the treaties by which, for more than a century, they had administered nine east Arabian principalities' defense and foreign relations. Throughout most of that period, it was Prince Nawwaf that the late King Faisal sent to work with these soon-to-be-independent rulers in pursuit of what he hoped would emerge as the most inclusive new Arab state possible. In the end, instead of a single federation, three states - Bahrain, Qatar, and the (seven-member) United Arab Emirates—were established.

Although many had wished for a larger union, such an outcome reflected accurately the then prevailing political realities. Since then, the results have proved to be positive. Compared to how most other Arab countries have fared over the same length of time, these three entities have survived and thrived. And this was not all. Much of the earlier distrust and suspicion between the Kingdom and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi was vitiated in the course of Prince Nawwaf's indefatigable efforts to help smooth the way to independence for these British-protected states.

In the process, Prince Nawwaf became exceptionally knowledgeable of the limits as well as the possibilities of Arab inter-state cooperation, coordination, and integration.

Certainly, few outside the Gulf sheikhdoms had more direct exposure to the steps that led to the formation of the United Arab Emirates in December 1971. And from that experience, no one in Saudi Arabia had more first hand awareness of the relevance of what the UAE represented for what would be the next successful effort in Arab intra-regional cooperation ten years later: namely, the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council that was formed in May 1981.

...Nor, with the exception of Princes Sa'ud and Turki, does any senior member of the ruling family have anywhere near as much direct experience in representing the Kingdom's interests within the 22-member League of Arab States, of which it was a co-founder in September 1944.

Prince Nawwaf's previous experience with Arab League issues is likely to prove propitious. Three reasons come to mind. One is the Kingdom's strong support for former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, who became the League's new Secretary-General this past April. The second is the resulting dynamism that has marked the League's deliberations from then until now. The third is Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud's completion in the past two weeks of visits to numerous League members. The goal of the

latter exercise: to present a more united Arab front at the meetings of the UN General Assembly scheduled to begin next week in New York.

...In sum, the new Minister would be the first to agree with the observation that all in public life do little more than stand upon the shoulders of those that went before. In this instance, the shoulders of his predecessor were by all accounts exceptionally strong and broad. But, in their own way, the ones that Prince Nawwaf brings to the task of heading the Kingdom's intelligence directorate are also impressive.

Regardless of the exact explanation, Prince Nawwaf has since had a stroke, and is regarded as little more than an ineffective figurehead. Without far stronger, more modern, and more independent leadership, the future of Saudi internal security will not shaped by the leadership of the General Intelligence Directorate alone, but rather by the overall effectiveness of the government and the royal family in dealing with the broader mix of political, economic, social, and demographic issues that threaten Saudi Arabia's internal security.

Saudi Arabia clearly needs to do more to expand and modernize some aspects of its intelligence operations. In the past, Saudi intelligence has tended to rely heavily on interpersonal relations and human intelligence (HUMINT), supplemented by limited usage of surveillance equipment and computerized records. It has worked closely with the CIA, British, and French intelligence in some areas, and has had access to more advanced imagery and signal intelligence through such sources. Saudi intelligence has not, however, organized the kind of domestic and foreign surveillance efforts necessary to provide adequate coverage of small, dispersed Islamic terrorist groups and individual movements. It has tended to rely on information from traditional elites, and to have limited data on urbanized Saudis and Saudi young males that become affiliated with extremist movements inside and especially outside of Saudi Arabia. Surveillance of financial transfers, charitable organizations, and activities like money laundering has been particularly weak.

Saudi Security Procedures

Saudi internal security efforts present broader problems than preserving internal stability and dealing with terrorism. They also affect the Kingdom's political evolution. Saudi security procedures vary according to the case and perceived threat to the government and state security. The application of such procedures can still be harsh but enforcement has steadily eased over time and improved further during the 1990s. For example, Royal decrees were announced in 1992 that included provisions calling for the Saudi government to defend the home from

unlawful intrusions on the ground that the sanctity of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most fundamental of Islamic precepts. The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain permission from the provincial governor before searching a private home; however, warrants are not required.

The security forces have also been made more subject to the rule of law. King Fahd established Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a regional basis, in 1993. The members of these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners' files, and hear their complaints. It is unclear that they can deal with security cases, however, the government does not permit visits to jails or prisons by human rights monitors. Some diplomats have been granted regular access to incarcerated foreign citizens, although the US State Department reports that impartial observers are not allowed access to specialized Ministry of Interior prisons where the government detains persons accused of political subversion, such as Al-Hair Prison south of Riyadh.

Problems in Saudi Security Procedures

Saudi Arabia is still a closed society in many ways, and there are clear boundaries as to what levels of political activity are permitted and what can and cannot be said. In broad terms, however, the Saudi government is now more tolerant of criticism and allows more dissent and media criticism. Saudis openly criticize members of the royal family in social situations with little regard to the security services. Individual religious figures and clerics often make criticisms of the government and even members of the royal family, and sometimes do so in sermons and public forums. Nevertheless, the Saudi government still reacts sharply to direct criticism of the royal family, and does not allow direct public criticism of the government's integrity and religious legitimacy.

There are both formal and unwritten "rules" that limit the scope of open criticism of the regime, and organized opposition is suppressed, but there are also many anonymous or indirect ways to criticize the government that range from religious poems to the use of faxes and the Internet.¹⁸ Saudi technocrats, scholars, businessmen, religious figures, and even princes have to be careful of what they say in formal public forums, although they often are openly critical of various aspects of the government's behavior, organization, and use of money. The Saudi media

is subject to strict censorship, although they have more latitude in publishing broad criticism of government activities than the media in many other Middle Eastern states.

A Saudi poet was arrested in 2002, for example, for publishing a poem in *Al-Madina* called "The Corruption on Earth" which referred to Islamic judges as corrupt and acting as tyrants who only cared about their bank accounts and the views of their rulers: "How many sacred verses and sayings you have slaughtered...Your beards are smeared with blood...You indulge a thousand tyrants and only the tyrant do you obey." Prince Nayef, the Minister of the Interior, also ordered that the editor be fired, and then censored another paper, *Al Hayat*, for publishing an article that dared to criticize such censorship.¹⁹

The US State Department reports that there are few protections from government interference in privacy, family, home, or correspondence. Saudi Arabia shows little tolerance for hard-line or potentially violent opposition to the government, major deviations from Wahhabi orthodoxy, or any form of actual violence. The State Department report on human rights indicates that,²⁰

The Government commits and tolerates serious human rights abuses. Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change their government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate incommunicado detention; in addition there were allegations that security forces committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge is a problem. Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction to the law, but with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawaa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners. The Government infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government prohibits or restricts freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, religion, and movement. Other continuing problems included discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker rights. The Government disagrees with internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its interpretation of Islamic law as its sole source of guidance on human rights.

The State Department also reports that Saudi security forces detain prisoners for more than 24 hours without charge, conduct their own investigations, and fail to notify the public prosecutor. Security suspects can be held incommunicado for weeks or even months. Authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than three days before charging them, in accordance with a regulation issued by the Ministry of Interior in 1983, although serious exceptions have been reported. The regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also, detainees are sometimes released on the recognizance of a patron or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If not released, the accused are detained an average of one to two months before going to trial.

The State Department report on human rights is particularly critical of the Ministry of the Interior,²²

There were credible reports that the authorities abused detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture. Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to investigate alleged abuses. In April 1998, the Government pledged to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. However, although the Government asks for details of reports of torture and other human rights abuses made by international human rights groups, it does not permit international observers to investigate them. The Government's general refusal to grant members of diplomatic missions access to the Ministry of Interior detention facilities, or allow members of international human rights groups into the country, hinders efforts to confirm or discount reports of abuses. The Government's past failure to criticize human rights abuses has contributed to the public perception that security forces can commit abuses with impunity.

Prison Conditions and Numbers of Detainees

Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. The State Department reports that prisons generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are overcrowded and unsanitary. The authorities generally allow family members access to detainees. The State Department also reports that the Saudi government conducts closed trials for persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation. Although it rarely executes prisoners, charges of torture or poor prison conditions are much more rare than in many developing countries. The State Department also reports that the authorities often detain people who publicly criticize the Government without charge, or charge them with attempting to destabilize the Government. The State Department human rights report notes that,²³

Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service, commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or lawyers.

The total number of political detainees is impossible to determine because the Government does not provide information on such persons or respond to inquiries about them. The NGO estimates that there are about 200, however, and the Government regularly releases prisoners, under its annual Ramadan amnesty, and some seem to have a political background. In

January 1999, it released over 7,000 prisoners and detainees, including over 3,000 foreigners convicted or held for minor offenses.²⁴

Dealing with Internal Opposition and Terrorism

Saudi Arabia may have made serious mistakes in dealing with the past, but its support for Islamic fundamentalism has never meant it is tolerant of domestic movements that openly criticize the government or violent forms of Wahhabi or Shi'ite extremism. The Saudi government has recognized the threat posed by independent religious groups ever since the time when King Abd al' Aziz was forced to use his troops to suppress the Ikhwan during the formation of Saudi Arabia as a modern state. It has taken repeated actions to suppress extremism and violence since the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, in 1979, and the Shi'ite uprising in the Eastern Province in the early 1980s exposed the fact that Sunni and Shi'ite Islamic extremism remain a major internal threat.

The Saudi government has developed powerful tools to use in limiting the actions of the Saudi clergy. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs directly supervises, and is a major source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer leaders) and others that work in the mosques. A governmental committee is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. It has repeatedly used these tools to put pressure on the clergy to limit their political statements, condemn extremism, and support reform.

The Saudi government has tightened its control over the Ulema since September 11, 2001. Crown Prince Abdullah made it very clear to Saudi clerics after September 11, 2001 that the government would not tolerate even the indirect support of terrorism and extremism.²⁵ Leading Saudi clerics also strongly condemned such activity. For example, the Imam of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, Sheikh Abdulrahman Al-Sideis preached a sermon on September 28, 2001 explicitly condemning terrorism as disavowed by Islam and contrary to the ways of true Muslims.²⁶

Nevertheless, Saudi Islamic extremists and terrorist remains a problem both inside and outside the country. The suppression of leading Islamic extremists inside Saudi Arabia does not

mean that the Ulema still does not still have advocates of such positions or that they do not have strong popular support in some areas. Saudis participated in four major terrorist attacks on US targets in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen during 1995-2001, and Saudis receive terrorist and paramilitary training in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Those involved in such attacks included four Saudis arrested in the bombing of the National Guard training center in November 1995, Saudi Shi'ites arrested for the bombing the Al Khobar barracks in June 1996, a Saudi arrested for the bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya, and what seems to have been the leader of the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.²⁸

Fifteen of the men directly involved in the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 held Saudi passports and the Saudi government has slowly acknowledged that they seem to have been Saudi citizens. As of early February 2002, it had also arrested at least 30 Saudis in Saudi Arabia with possible ties to the attacks, although some have already been released.²⁹ A large numbers of the volunteers fighting with Al Qaida in Afghanistan were Saudi. At least 600-1,000 Saudis were present in Al Qaida forces in Afghanistan in late December 2001, and Pakistani border forces captured some 40 Saudis fleeing the battle over the Tora Bora caves in one day in January 2002.³⁰

Since September 11, 2001, the Saudi government has arrested several Taliban fighters, and these arrests are evidence of the potential magnitude of future operations and the continuing problem the Saudi government will face regarding terrorism. At the same time some reports are exaggerated. For example, some sources reported that Young Saudis carried out Islamic extremist attacks on women and Saudi families in Jeddah and Dammam during the Id in December 2001.³¹ In practice, they were a group of youths using drugs and alcohol, and were captured and imprisoned for only a few weeks – although some seem to have been flogged in front of their families.

On June 18, 2002 Saudi Arabia announced the arrests of eleven Saudis, a Sudanese man, and an Iraqi for their attempts to carry out terrorist attacks on vital centers within the Kingdom. Evidence revealed that these operatives were linked to Bin Laden and the Al Qaida network and were planning to target US installations and forces in the region. One Saudi security source told officials that the Saudi operatives were given direct orders from Al Qaida to destroy all US

military targets in Saudi Arabia, as well as the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry. An unsuccessful attack against US warplanes revealed Al Qaida's plans to use ground-to-air missiles as a tactic. The security source told the Saudi government that the operatives had smuggled two SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and munitions into the Kingdom. The arrests also revealed that these Saudi citizens were planning an attack on US warships in the Strait of Gibraltar.³²

The basic causes of tension and extremism also remain. Direct and indirect unemployment among native young Saudi males consistently averages between 20% and 30%. The Saudi educational system and economy still need deep and fundamental reform. As Crown Prince Abdullah and other Saudi officials have repeatedly stated, these problems are reinforced by the broad conviction throughout Saudi Arabia that the US is responsible for much of the suffering of the Palestinians in the Second Intifada. There is also a broad popular feeling in Saudi Arabia that the US has shown far too little concern for the Iraqi people and has been more willing to use force against Islamic elements and states than it should be. These forms of anti-Americanism have no clear ties to Islamic extremism per se, but it does strengthen the hand of Islamic extremists in the Kingdom and gives Islamic terrorists far more popular sympathy than would otherwise be the case.

Saudi Treatment of Internal Extremist Movements

The fact that the intelligence and security services were slow to deal with the flow of funds and volunteers to extremist causes outside Saudi Arabia does not mean they have been slow to deal with overt opposition to the regime. The Saudi security forces cracked down on opposition movements like the CDLR and Al Qaida long before the events of September 11th. It took action against and leading clerical critics. For example, Salman Al-Awdah and Safar Al-Hawali are Muslim clerics who were arrested in September 1994 for publicly criticizing the Government. Their detention that year sparked protest demonstrations that resulted in the arrest of 157 persons for antigovernment activities. At the end of 1996, at least nine persons were serving prison terms for their connections to the rigidly fundamentalist Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR). All the prisoners have now been released, but Salman Al-Awdah and Safar Al-Hawali were not released until June 1999. The government only released Al-Adwah after he moderated his views to support the Saudi government position. Even then, he was prohibited from preaching, lecturing at the university, and traveling abroad, although some

sources indicate he has become considerably more moderate and may soon get his teaching job back.³³

The government of Saudi Arabia has arrested and convicted many other Saudi and foreign terrorists when they committed acts of violence in Saudi Arabia. These include terrorists associated with the bombing of the Saudi National Guard Training Center and of the Al Khobar Towers housing facility near Dhahran in June 1996. While Saudi authorities have arrested and detained several persons in connection with the attacks, they have reached no conclusions as to whether these bombings were solely the work of independent Islamic extremists or had some form of Iranian support. The US and Saudi governments have cooperated in these investigations to the extent that the US expelled Hani al-Sayegh – a Saudi national to Saudi Arabia on October 11, 1999. Al-Sayegh originally was detained in Canada in March 1997, and documents submitted to the Canadian court alleged al-Sayegh, as a member of the Saudi Hezbollah, had participated in the Al Khobar Towers bombing.

The Saudi government has rarely used forced exile, or revoked citizenship for political purposes, but it did revoke the citizenship of hard-line advocates of the overthrow of the government residing outside the country, such as Mohammed Al-Masari. Long before September 11th, it also revoked the citizenship of Osama Bin Ladin, because of his role in organizing terrorist activities, and as a suspect in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.³⁴

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has tended to ignore Islamic extremist activity when it did not seem to pose a direct threat to the regime. Saudi Arabia has often issued large-scale amnesties. At the end of January 1999, for example, the government issued its annual Ramadan amnesty, and released over 7,000 prisoners and detainees, including over 3,000 foreigners convicted or held for minor offenses. At least some of those released were Islamic extremists, some senior Saudi Ulema, such as Sheik Saleh al-Sadiaan, a preacher in the Princess Zohra Mosque, remain ambivalent about the support of Islamic violence and some, like Sheik Hamoud a-Shuaibi, have endorsed the September 11, 2001 attacks.³⁵

Saudi Arabia chose rapprochement with Iran over dealing with Iranian ties to those involved in the bombing on the National Guard Training Center bombing in 1995, and the Al

Khobar Towers housing facility near Dhahran in June 1996.³⁶ Saudi Arabia maintained a dialogue with Libya while it was still under UN sanctions, and permitted Libyan aircraft to fly pilgrims to the Haj. Saudi Arabia conspicuously failed to cooperate with the US in arresting Imad Mughniyah on April 7, 1995. Mughniyah was a suspect in the killing of 241 US Marines in a barracks in Lebanon in 1983, and the hijacking of an airliner in 1985 that resulted in the death of a US Navy diver. The Kingdom did so in part because the US attempted to have FBI agents arrest Mughniyah on Saudi soil, and did so with minimal notice and in spite of the fact that the US and Saudi Arabia have no extradition treaty..³⁸

Saudi Support of the Taliban and Islamic Extremists Outside Saudi Arabia

Although the Saudi government began to crack down on Osama Bin Laden in 1994, it continued to provide worldwide support for Islamic fundamentalist causes and has played its own "Great Game" in Central Asia in an effort to transform the Asiatic republics of the FSU into Islamic state. In the process it provided aid to Islamic movements and charities without properly examining their true character and then funneled the money into extremist causes or attempted to buy off movements like the Taliban in ways that ultimately led to the money being used in extremist causes. It also provided broader funding to elements of foreign governments like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the ISI in Pakistan which then use the money to support Islamic extremist and violent movements.

Prince Turki has provided an important Saudi perspective on these issues in interviews he has given to *Arab News* and MBC television since he left the General Intelligence Directorate. He stated that the Saudi governments efforts to assist Afghanistan were designed "to help them to help themselves as far as possible. We provided them with financial, military and moral support during their struggle against the Soviets." He stated that Saudi Arabia had been worried that the Afghans would fight among themselves once Russia withdrew, and that King Fahd had directed him to try to put an end to this fighting between Afghan factions. He cites peace initiatives made by various leading Muslims, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Muslim World League and Pakistani government.³⁹

When he addressed the subject of the Taliban, which Saudi Arabia had recognized and given aid, Prince Turki said that, "At that time, (when Saudi Arabia recognized the Taliban), the

Taliban had not created any controversy. It was controlling 95 percent of the territory when the Kingdom recognized the regime in 1997. It was also providing security and stability in the regions. We recognized them several months after they captured Kabul. He said that another reason why the Kingdom recognized the Taliban regime was the prevailing agreement between the Kingdom and Pakistan since the time of President Zia ul-Haq to consult and coordinate on all matters concerning Afghanistan. It was as a result of this agreement and "the advice of our Pakistani brothers" that we recognized the Taliban.

As for the relationship between the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, Prince Turki said that, "The Taliban ...put themselves in a quandary. When they occupied the eastern city of Jalalabad in 1996, Bin Laden was there, being sheltered by Sheikh Yunus Khales, a former Mujahideen leader. The Taliban pledged that they would not allow Bin Laden to harm the Kingdom's interests, either in words or deeds, and they seemed to take their pledge seriously...but they failed to pressure Bin Laden into stopping certain of his activities that endangered security. If the Taliban were a sovereign government controlling the areas they allegedly ruled, we wanted to know how it exercised that control and sovereignty. If they were unable to exercise control and sovereignty, then they should have yielded to those who could." ⁴⁰

Prince Turki made it clear during these interviews that he did not see Islamic extremism as the only source of the problems the Kingdom faced with terrorism and hostility to the United States. He focused on Arab-Israeli issues and the backlash from the Second Intifada. He dismissed charges from that Wahhabism fostered violent extremism. He said: "It is an unacceptable proposition invented by the smear-campaigners who seek to serve the Zionist cause. The Zionists would like to see, as would the perpetrators of the terror attacks in New York and Washington, the relationship between the United States and Arabs and Muslims severed. Each of them — the Zionists and the terrorist attackers — serves the interests of the other...The very name of "Wahhabism" has been fabricated since Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab launched a reformist movement, which expanded during the time of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud. It was even charged that Ibn Abdul Wahhab and Ibn Saud invented a new school of thought in the religion."

When Prince Turki other regional problems such as the Chechen issue and the breeding grounds for terrorism, he said that, "Wherever Muslims are oppressed and ill-treated, we stand

by them. The Chechens are an oppressed people.” He also said, however, that people affiliated to the Al-Qaida and Bin Laden launched terrorist acts in Russia and, “gave the Russian forces a pretext to launch a ferocious war on an innocent people, estimated at 2.5 million. The Russians employed weapons of massive destruction and killed 100,000 people and made a larger number of people refugees.”

Osama Bin Laden as a Case Study

Prince Turki has also provided insights into the Saudi regime’s treatment of Osama Bin Laden that make it a case study of the problems Saudi Arabia has had in dealing with terrorism and extremism. Osama Bin Laden is the seventeenth son of construction magnate Muhammad Bin Ladin, who is a Saudi citizen of Yemeni origin. Osama Bin Laden joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately after the Soviet invasion in December 1979, and played a significant role in financing, recruiting, transporting, and training Arab nationals who volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. During the war, Bin Ladin founded al-Qaida (the Base) to serve as an operational organization under his control, recruited Islamic extremists, and used his wealth to fund other hard-line Islamic extremist and terrorist groups.

After the end of the Afghan conflict, Bin Laden directed his energy towards Islamic extremist causes in other countries, and increasingly turned towards terrorism. He also issued “fatwas” calling for terrorism using a front organization called the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders. The Saudi government reacted by revoking his citizenship in 1994, and his family officially disowned him that same year. Osama Bin Laden had already relocated his operations to Yemen. He moved to Sudan in 1991, and international pressure on the Sudanese government forced him to move to Afghanistan in 1996.⁴¹

Bin Ladin’s ties to the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 17, 1998; do not seem to have involved any links to operations centered in Saudi Arabia. Like some other Islamic extremist movements, Bin Laden and al-Qaida did receive some private financing from within Saudi Arabia, and there were extremist groups inside the Kingdom that supported him. Some of these groups continue to pose a threat to US officials, military, and businessmen in Saudi Arabia. US analysts and British analysts estimate, however that Bin Laden and al-Qaida received at least as much support from Egyptian

and South Asian groups as from Saudi ones. Al-Qaida also has contacts and subgroups in Afghanistan as well Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. It has also trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea.⁴²

Prince Turki Saudi efforts to deal with Bin Laden as follows: "The statements and fatwas he [Bin Laden] has issued over the past seven years give a good idea of how he thinks. In short, Bin Laden wants to fight the whole world because he sees dishonesty and corruption in it." Prince Turki stated that Bin Laden at first appeared to be an Islamist resisting the Soviets and not a threat. When he did emerge as a threat, Saudi Arabia had made repeated attempts to deal with him, forced him to leave the country, and revoked his Saudi citizenship.

"When jihad started in Afghanistan, I used to travel to Pakistan and sometimes to Afghanistan to follow up on the developments. It was there that I met him. Once or twice he was invited to the Saudi Embassy (in Islamabad). The first time I met him was during one of these occasions. He was in the area supporting jihad."

Prince Turki said they talked "about the condition of the Mujahideen and what he (Bin Laden) was doing to help them." He said neither Bin Laden nor he had presented the other with any demands. "I did not know him thoroughly enough to judge him or expect any other thing from him. His behavior at that time left no impression that he would become what he has become." He said Bin Ladin's activities were welcomed at that time but denied Bin Laden had ever enjoyed any official status or support.

He said that Saudi intelligence monitored Bin Ladin's activities, as it did with "jihad" activities in general. "As you know, at that time there were many volunteers, Saudis and non-Saudis, and he was one of them. He did not enjoy special status that made us focus on him." Prince Turki ruled out rumors that possibility that Bin Laden had links with the CIA, as rumored, or any other American agency. "His presence in the area and his activities did not call on him to have contacts with these bodies. We had no information that he had contacts with any foreign government agencies, except the Pakistanis...From what was heard about him from those who went to join the jihad and met him in Afghanistan and Pakistan and then returned home, there were no fears regarding his conduct."

Prince Turki said that Saudi intelligence did focus on the Arab Afghan Mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. "We were concerned with the return of Saudi citizens. Indeed, large numbers of Saudis returned. Attention was directed at those who stayed behind, including Bin Laden, and why they'd stayed. A number of organizations have been monitored trying to recruit these youths."

The prince said the Bin Laden founded the Al-Qaida Organization Bin Laden in 1989 for the defense of Muslims world over against injustice. "There was no goal for this organization after the end of the jihad in Afghanistan...Bin Laden was not the sole leader of the Afghan Arabs, who were spread out in various parties in the region. The man was in constant contact with Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, as well as with Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Afghan leader who is currently the minister of tribal affairs in the Taliban government."⁴³

Prince Turki said that Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia shortly before the breakout of the Kuwait war. In August 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and Osama Bin Laden met with a top Saudi official and offered to fight Saddam with a group of Arab volunteers. "It was not he (Bin Laden) alone who offered their services. Other personalities in the Arab world did the same, some with good and others with bad intentions. They wanted to show that there are Arabs capable of fighting and defeating Saddam, especially after the Kingdom took the bold decision to bring together an international alliance to flush out the Iraqi forces."⁴⁴

Prince Turki felt that it was at this time that there began to be signs of major changes in Bin Ladin's personality. "Firstly, he believed that he was capable of preparing an army to challenge Saddam's forces. Secondly, he opposed the Kingdom's decision to call friendly forces. By doing so, he disobeyed the ruler and violated the fatwa of senior Islamic scholars, who had endorsed the plan as an essential move to fight injustice and aggression...I saw radical changes in his personality as he changed from a calm, peaceful and gentle man interested in helping Muslims into a person who believed that he would be able to amass and command an army to liberate Kuwait. It revealed his arrogance and his haughtiness."⁴⁵

"Bin Laden does not have a strong reason to raise the issue (of US and non-Islamic forces in the Kingdom). We remember the hue and cry created by opponents of the move. They said the foreign forces would remain and become an occupying and colonizing force that would desecrate

the Two Holy Mosques. Saddam used the same idea to try and foil the efforts to drive him out of Kuwait. People with subversive ideas also said that the move was against the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), who had said that two religions could not meet in the Arabian Peninsula. I still remember, when I met a group of the so-called leaders of the Islamic work, who came to learn the Kingdom's stand before heading to Baghdad for mediation, that they also raised the same issue. Dr. Abdullah Al-Turki, who is now secretary-general of the Muslim World League, was present in that meeting. He explained to them that the Prophet had meant that no religion except Islam could dominate the Peninsula. The Jews and Christians were constantly coming to and leaving the region. Even after the Prophet had driven out the Jews from Medina and Khaiber some of them remained in the Peninsula, moving from one place to another. Those who have visited the Holy Places will find that Osama's claim was false."

Prince Turki stated that Bin Laden started making public speeches without prior approval of the government agencies, and spoke at schools without the knowledge of the school authorities. When he was asked about these activities, Bin Laden said that he was only discussing jihad and was campaigning for Afghans. Prince Turki said that, "Bin Laden did not undertake any subversive activities in the Kingdom at that time."⁴⁶

Bin Laden was allowed to travel again in March 1992, because he was never banned from traveling and he was only required to get permission. He needed such permission because he had tried to engage in political activities in (what was then) South Yemen during that period and was told that he should inform officials when he wanted to leave the Kingdom. Ever since 1989, he had tried launch a jihad in South Yemen. He had attempted to lure Yemeni youths into training camps in Afghanistan, and had begun campaigning with the tribal leaders in southern Yemen.

Prince Turki denied that the Kingdom supported Bin Laden in any of these activities: "It was not possible for the Kingdom to assign any person to undermine any government...The Kingdom's authorities warned him against doing such things and that he should desist from such acts. His role in Afghanistan was only aid supplies and nothing more...The Kingdom will not try to topple any government or trigger any conflict or wars in any other country. And we expect the same from other countries in their dealings with Saudi Arabia."

In March 1992, Osama Bin Laden was given permission to visit Pakistan. "He went there to work with other Islamic personalities who were trying to reconcile the Afghan Mujahideen, who differed on the setting up of a government. I saw him among those personalities," said Prince Turki, who was then making strenuous efforts with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to unify Mujahideen ranks and bring them to an agreement before they entered Kabul.

He stated that Sudanese President Gen. Omar Al-Bashir made a "conditional offer" to hand over Bin Laden before Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan for the second time in 1996 after the Sudanese government asked him to leave, on condition that no legal action should be taken against him. However, the Saudis rejected the offer. "President Bashir asked for guarantees regarding Bin Ladin's prosecution. That he would not be tried by any legal authority in the Kingdom. He said that Bashir was told that no one is above the law and that we could not give such guarantees."⁴⁷

Prince Turki said that that he had made two secret visits to Kandahar, the first one in June 1998. "King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah sent me to meet Mullah Omar to persuade him to hand Bin Laden over to the Kingdom. This was because of some of his acts and statements and the Saudi move grew out of the Taliban's promise not to allow Bin Laden to harm the Kingdom's interests. I asked Mullah Omar to hand him over and he agreed. I was told their interests were with us and not with any individual. Mullah Omar asked me to inform the king and the crown prince that he wanted to set up a joint Saudi-Afghan committee to arrange procedures for the handover."⁴⁸

The Prince described a visit to Saudi Arabia by Abdul Wakeel, an adviser to Mullah Omar who later became the Taliban foreign minister. "He came to tell the Crown Prince that the Kingdom's request for Bin Laden had been approved and that a joint committee to oversee the handover was being set up." This visit came a few weeks before the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Des-Salaam, and stated that, "One of the perpetrators of the attacks, a Bin Laden supporter, confessed during interrogation in Pakistan that Bin Laden had given the orders for the bombings and that the plans were made with his support and guidance."

Prince Turki said that he went to Kandahar again in September 1998, but that the Taliban were no longer cooperative: "I wished I had not gone. After previously agreeing to hand the man

over, I discovered Mullah Omar had reversed his decision and he was abusive about the Kingdom and its people. Under those circumstances, I had no choice but to break off negotiations. I still remember, however, that as I was leaving, I told Mullah Omar that one day he would regret his decision and that the unfortunate Afghan people would pay the price...I saw that Mullah Omar made decisions arbitrarily and capriciously and once made, he was not interested in revising them. The decision to ban women's education is an example of what I am talking about. At first, we were told that the decision was made because of a lack of facilities but even after the United Nations and other organizations promised money for building schools, the ban was not lifted...The Taliban were always the first to withdraw from the talks."⁴⁹

Prince Turki said that, "I met him (Mullah Omar) on two occasions. The first meeting lasted an hour, while the second ended after just half an hour. It was hard to understand a person in such a short time. I heard from his associates that he was very brave, fought against the Russians and was deeply religious. On the other hand, his opponents said he was an introvert who holds extreme religious views. He never tolerated any criticism of his decisions and never swerved from a decision under any circumstances, whatever risks it involved. This is what I learned about him from both his friends and foes."⁵⁰

"In my first meeting with Mullah Omar, he was very cordial, but in the second meeting he turned hysterical in his attacks on the Kingdom." In the first meeting, Prince Turki was accompanied by Dr. Abdullah Al-Turki, present secretary-general of the Muslim World League. "Mullah Omar did not object to Sheikh Al-Turki's arguments on the extradition of the Al-Qaida chief to the Kingdom and I thought he agreed with Al-Turki's arguments on the basis of Shariah law. In the second meeting Mullah Omar was not in a mood to listen to anyone."⁵¹

Prince Turki also stated that Bin Laden used someone else to issue edicts for him. "Some may say that if you don't commit the act yourself, you are innocent. You may not have crashed the plane into the building or put the bomb into the car but you are responsible for those who did. And those people who follow this line of reasoning think Bin Laden has a way out. But he doesn't; God will punish him."

Prince Turki stated that: "The presence of international terrorism which affects everyone plus an organization such as Al-Qaida which threatens the entire world undoubtedly demands a

response from the Kingdom. It must offer all its resources and whatever information it has to control the cancer which will spiral out of control if left unchallenged.” At the same time, Prince Turki reacted angrily to claims by American analysts that Saudi Arabia breeds terrorism. “This is totally unacceptable. Let them look at what they have, at the terrorist organizations in their own country. In the United States there are 200 terrorist organizations, targeting not only domestic interests, but those of the entire world. Instead of highlighting a very small minority of bad people, they should look at the thousands of others who are the peaceable and peace-loving majority.”⁵²

Putting the Issue in Perspective

Some of Prince Turki’s remarks have considerable justification. Saudis have reason to criticize the extent to which the US and other Western media have exaggerated Saudi Arabia’s role in supporting terrorism since September 11, 2001. Western media have often ignored the role of other countries and their citizens in focusing on Saudi Arabia, and ignored the importance of US domestic terrorists in spite of indications that the anthrax attacks that followed September 11th were the work of US terrorists. There has often been a broad anti-Islamic and anti-Arab character to such reporting, and many editorials have been as ethnocentric and prejudiced in their own way as sermons and writings of the more extreme Saudi preachers.

At the same time, the fact remains that the Saudi government did provide funding for Islamic education without carefully monitoring how the money was used or paying proper attention to educational material and what was being taught. It allowed funds to go to many groups that were Islamic extremist rather than fundamentalist -- such as Madrassas in Pakistan that educate their students to carry out violent acts and to hate non-Muslims and even members of non-Sunni sects of Islam.⁵³ Thousands of young Saudi men became involved in terrorist and military elements of Al Qaida and other organizations, and in cells scattered throughout Europe, the Middle East, and United States.

The costs of these failures became all too clear after September 11th. NATO security officers raided the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, which is under the patronage of King Fahd and which was founded by Prince Alman bin Abdul-Aziz in October 2001, and found maps of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as maps of US facilities and

equipment for forging false IDs. The Saudi-sponsored Mercy International Relief Organization was used as a front in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies, as was the International Islamic Relief Organization and Muslim World League. The al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization was a major source of funds for Al Qaida, and organizations like the Muwafaq Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, World Assembly of Muslim Youth and Quranic Literacy Organization may also have been used as fronts.⁵⁴

Controlling the Flow of Saudi Funds

Serious questions exist about the activities of other major Saudi charities like the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, which the US Treasury has treated as an active supporter of Islamic extremism and terrorism, and whose funds the US blocked on March 11, 2002.⁵⁵ It should be noted, however, that charities like the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation had some 40-field offices and may not have understood where all of its funding was going.

Once again, such Saudi activity must be kept in perspective, as well as the Saudi government's ability to control it. As has been touched upon earlier, Saudi funding for such activities was only part of a much broader flow of funds from within the Arab and Islamic world. Funds from non-Saudi individuals, non-Saudi Islamic charities, and from other governments like those of Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq have all played a major role in the flow of financial support to extremist causes. The flow of most private Saudi money is beyond the control of the Saudi government. Many private organizations are largely self-financing, and the real-world costs of extremism and terrorism are relatively low. The vast amount of private Saudi capital outside the Kingdom is outside the government's control, as is the capital of non-Saudis funding such groups in Kuwait, the UAE, and many other countries -- including the US. In broad terms, controlling or preventing movements of capital and individuals is impossible for Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, the Kingdom must come to grips with its internal and external problems in dealing with Islamic extremists with far more firmness than in the past. It should not have taken nearly four months for the Saudi government to freeze the assets of some 150 suspected terrorist accounts after the September 11th attacks, if only because the same organizations that attacked the US also opposed the Saudi government. Similarly, it should not have taken until March 2002

for Saudi Arabia to order all charity organizations to inform the authorities of their overseas projects and take steps to ensure that funds did not flow to terrorist causes.⁵⁶

Controlling the Activities of Young Saudis

The problem raised by the training and participation of young Saudis in terrorist and extremist groups is far from over. Many of the Al Qaida activists captured in Afghanistan have been Saudi. There have been significant arrests of Saudis in Europe, the US, Middle Eastern countries, and in Saudi Arabia. A number of European intelligence services, notably Germany, are deeply concerned about the extremist character, sermons, and publications of Wahhabi activities in their countries that cannot be tied to terrorist activities per se. As of July 2002, however, far more young Saudi males that are part of Al Qaida have escaped into Pakistan or are dispersed in other countries; also many Saudi extremists have ties to other movements.

New, largely Saudi-manned, terrorist plots to attack US and British ships involving at least five Saudis were detected in Morocco in June 2002.⁵⁷ Attempts were made to use SA-7 man portable surface-to-air missiles to shoot down US fighters operating out of Prince Sultan Air Base,⁵⁸ that were carried out by a Sudanese but planned and managed by Saudis in an Al Qaida cell in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁹ This led to the arrest of 13 Saudis in Saudi Arabia, although Saudi intelligence did not allow them to be interrogated by US or other intelligence services.⁶⁰ Significant numbers of young Saudis still operate in Al Qaida cells that fled into Afghanistan and at least seem to have ties to attacks on Western targets in Pakistan.⁶¹

There have been several bombing attacks that may be related to Islamic extremism. For example, a package bomb gravely injured Gary Hatch, an American physical therapist in May 2001.⁶² Other attacks have since taken place. The Kingdom also has never fully explained a series of bomb plot arrests following bombings that struck at British and Irish workers in the Kingdom on November 17, 2000 and November 22, 2000. It claims these were related to purely Western alcohol smuggling, however, and has arrested a Belgian, Briton, and Canadian for the crimes.⁶³ The five Britons arrested for the bombings have retracted their confessions, however, and the facts remain uncertain.⁶⁴

It is important, however, that the West understand that some aspects of progress will not be quick. A large part of Al Qaida remained intact after the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan. There is a legacy of young Saudi men with military and terrorist training. The broad process of Islamic extremism in Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere is also driven by forces that have nothing to do with developments inside Saudi Arabia. The resentments inside the Islamic and Arab worlds that come from the rapid pace of global secularization, the backlash from the Second Intifada, and problems like the suffering of the Iraqi people will continue to present problems for the West regardless of any actions by Saudi Arabia, and can only be addressed in very different ways.

There is also certain irony to Western calls for tight Saudi government control of students who may be radical. To begin with, it is far from clear that some of the most anti-US students are Islamists, as distinguished from anti-Israel because of the Second Intifada, and anti-US because of its support of Israel. Like most of the Saudi population, Saudi students have been heavily polarized by constant broadcasts of Palestinian suffering that come from outside the Kingdom, and by US and other Western media and politicians which have launched broad attacks on the Kingdom's politics, social customs, and the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, rather than actually focused on violent extremists. Such critics often seem to be deliberately dodging the massive political backlash against Israel and the US arising from the Second Intifada, and grossly exaggerating a very real – but relatively limited – threat from actual Islamic extremists.

There is also a danger in pressing for control without considering the impact on internal reform. While the government does carry out surveillance over teachers and students, it has become increasingly tolerant in ways that encourage reform. No political science professor has been called in for questioning in a decade regarding what he teaches in his classes. Extremely sensitive subjects for Islamists, like the writings of Freud, have quietly been introduced in some courses in institutions like King Saud University. Some courses actually teach the pros and cons for democracy versus monarchy – with term papers evidently even split on the subject. Counterterrorism must never become anti-freedom and civil liberties, or be used as an excuse to condemn different social and religious practices as distinguished from terrorism per se.

Saudi Shi'ites

There are other significant security problems in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Shi'a Muslim minority (which the US Embassy estimates at roughly 500,000 of nearly 14 million actual citizens) presents special security and legal problems. The Shi'ites live mostly in the Eastern Province. The Saudi government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.

The US State Department has long reported, however, that Shi'ites remain the objects of officially sanctioned political and economic discrimination. The Saudi government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a mosques. The Shi'a have also declined government offers to build state-supported mosques because the government would prohibit the incorporation and display of Shi'a motifs in any such mosques. The State Department reports that Saudi security forces arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation.

In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a traditional Shi'a practice). The government still punishes Shi'a who travel to Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to two years.

The State Department does report, however, the Saudi discrimination against Shi'ites seems to be easing in some respects, in part because of actions by King Khalid, the governor of the Eastern Province, and Crown Prince Abdullah. More Shi'ites are being allowed into government jobs and some areas in the military. There is one Shi'a on the Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, and the government has appointed its first Shi'a ambassador. Prior to 1990, the Government prohibited Shi'a public processions during the Islamic month of Muharram and restricted other processions and congregations to designated areas in the major Shi'a cities. Since 1990 the authorities have permitted marches on the Shi'a holiday of Ashura, provided that the marchers do not display banners or engage in self-flagellation. Ashura commemorations take place during the year, generally without incident.

Open acts of Shi'ite terrorism receive serious punishments, although the Kingdom has never publicly discussed the extent to which Iran provided support for terrorist acts by Saudi Shi'ites. The 1996 bombing of the USAF barracks at Al-Khobar, which killed 19 U.S.

servicemen that led to a major series of arrests of Saudi Shi'ites. These arrests did lead to formal Saudi government denials that Bin Laden and Al Qaida were involved, but never led to any disclosure of the extent to which Iranian officials were involved.⁶⁵ Many, including some senior Saudis, believe Iran did play a role in the Al Khobar bombings and several other successful and failed attacks, and that the Saudi government and Saudi intelligence covered this up because of Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran and desire to use Iran as a counterbalance to Iraq.

The State Department reports that the Saudi government still holds an unknown number of Shi'a in jail that were arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing. It also reports that the Saudi internal security services continue to detain, interrogate, and confiscate the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies.

Non-Muslims

Non-Muslims have not presented a security threat in the past but Saudi insistence on religious conformity has serious security implications. The Saudi government does not permit public non-Muslim religious activities, and it has little choice. Saudi politics do not permit such tolerance, and it might provoke extensive violence by the religious police and Saudi traditionalists. While the government discourages the most extreme sermons and religious writings, some Wahhabi ulema and teachers show little tolerance of other religions or even other Islamic practices. Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and deportation for engaging in overt religious activity that attracts official attention.

The State Department reports that the government's tolerance of private worship is uncertain. High-level Saudi authorities have stated that the government's policy allows for private non-Muslim worship and that the government does not sanction investigation or harassment of such private worship services. A senior Saudi leader stated publicly in 1997 that the government does not "prevent" private non-Muslim religious worship in the home and such private non-Muslim worship occurs on a wide scale through the country, including on the premises of several embassies. However, there have been arrests and deportations for private worship. The government ascribes some of this harassment of private worship services to individuals and organizations acting on their own authority and in contradiction of government

policy. Representatives of many Christian denominations present in the country report that the Government is not interfering with their private worship services.

Treatment of Foreign Workers

While foreign labor has not been a source of significant political unrest to date, the security services closely monitor the activities and movements of foreign workers. State Department reports that foreigners are normally allowed to reside or work in Saudi Arabia only under the sponsorship of a Saudi national or business. The Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of permission from their employer or sponsor.

Saudi Arabia does not tolerate political activity by foreign nationals. It is tolerant of casual social criticism, but generally expels activities almost immediately and provides tight surveillance of known foreign intelligence operatives in embassies and consulates.

The security forces have never shown any tolerance for any hostile political activity by foreign labor whether Islamic or secular, and many labor brokers providing labor from developing countries are ex-military or have some ties to the security services in their countries. The Saudi military justice system also does not tolerate political or Islamic extremist activity by Saudi military personnel, who are tried by court-martials.⁶⁶

There is no established procedure for providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest. The authorities may take as long as several months to provide official notification of the arrest of foreigners, if at all. If asked, the authorities usually confirm the arrest of foreigners to their country's diplomats. In general, foreign diplomats only learn about such arrests through informal channels. Foreigners have been tried and executed in the past in both civil and security cases without notification of their arrest ever having been given to their government's representatives.

The State Department reports that such measures also lead to significant human rights abuses. Employers have significant control over the movements of foreign employees, which

gives rise to situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work. Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against their employers for unpaid salary. In another pressure tactic, some sponsors refused to provide foreign workers with a "letter of no objection" that would allow them to be employed by another sponsor.

Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted. Some female domestic servants often were subjected to abuse.

The labor laws do not protect domestic servants. There are credible reports that female domestic servants sometimes were forced to work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. There were numerous confirmed reports of runaway maids. The authorities often returned runaway maids to their employers against the maids' wishes. There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other promised benefits. Non-domestic workers with such grievances have the right to complain before the labor courts, but few do so because of fear of deportation.

The enforcement of work contracts is difficult and generally favors employers. Labor courts, while fair, can take months or over a year to reach a final appellate ruling, during which time the employer may prevent the foreign laborer from leaving the country. An employer also may delay a case until a worker's funds are exhausted and the worker is forced to return to his home country.

The State Department reports that sponsors have additional leverage because they generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports. Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or

labor dispute with foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved. Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was resolved. The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy periods against their will.

Treatment of Iraqi Exiles and Prisoners of War

The Saudi 1992 Basic Law provides that “the state will grant political asylum if the public interest mitigates” in favor of it. The language does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general, the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other foreign workers: they must have sponsors for employment or risk expulsion.

The State Department reports that none of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war allowed refuge in Saudi Arabia at the end of the Gulf War has been granted permanent asylum in the country. The Saudi government has, however, paid the entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi refugees, and it continues to provide excellent logistical and administrative support to the UNHCR and other resettlement agencies. In early 2000, approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi refugees had been resettled in other countries or voluntarily repatriated to Iraq. Most of the approximately 6,000 remaining refugees are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The UNHCR has monitored over 3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq from Rafha since December 1991 and found no evidence of forcible repatriation.

Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there was no systematic abuse of refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have surfaced in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing to investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The State Department reports that the camp receives a high level of material assistance and is comparatively comfortable and well run.

Border and Coastal Security

Saudi Arabia has dealt with foreign threats to its internal security in a relatively sophisticated manner. It has taken diplomatic steps to greatly reduce its problems and tensions with Iran and Yemen, and particularly to reduce Iranian efforts to exploit Saudi Arabia's problems with its Shi'ites and use the Haj as a propaganda forum. It has steadily improved its monitoring of foreign nationals and ability to track their movements and activities. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia does face major challenges in providing security for its borders and coastlines.

Smuggling is endemic, even across the Saudi border with Iraq. Saudi border guards arrested 777 smugglers crossing the border during 2001, and seized nearly three tons of hashish, more than 5,700 bottles of alcohol, more than 450 weapons, and 43,680 rounds of ammunition.⁶⁷ While Saudi Arabia does not announce the fact publicly, it regularly has to deal with Iraqi patrols that cross into Saudi territory, and it is clear that some Iraqi intelligence officers have entered the Kingdom.

It is virtually impossible for Saudi Arabia to secure either its Gulf or Red Sea coast against smuggling and infiltration by small craft. The traffic is simply too high in both areas, the coasts are too long, and sensors cannot track movements by dhows and small craft. The Saudi navy, coastguard, and National Guard might be able to provide adequate security screening for key ports, desalination facilities, and petroleum export facilities with roughly two weeks of warning. Coverage is generally very limited in peacetime. At least some smuggling by sea occurs in areas where it seems doubtful that this could occur without the knowledge and tolerance of some elements of the Saudi security forces.

Saudi Arabia had serious problems with Iranian intelligence agents and support of Shi'ite extremists the fall of the Shah in 1979 until it reached an accommodation with the Iranian government in the late 1990s. Weapons and explosives were intercepted in the Eastern Province and there were numerous small acts of sabotage related to Iranian-sponsored activities. Iran trained a number of Saudi Shi'ites in low intensity warfare and covert operations in Iran and Lebanon, and regularly disrupted the Haj to make political protests. As has been mentioned earlier, the most serious case of Iranian related activity seems to be the Al Khobar bombing,

although the exact level of Iranian involvement remains unknown. Iranian activity seems to have sharply diminished since the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, but Saudi intelligence officials note that Iran still maintains a significant intelligence presence in the Kingdom, that it continues to provide surveillance of US military activity in the Kingdom, and still provides political, paramilitary, and religious training for at least some Saudi Shi'ites.

Similar problems exist along the border with Yemen, although the border clashes that used to take place between Yemeni and Saudi security forces seem to have largely ended following the settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni border. The main problems are now smuggling and inter-tribal violence, which are still endemic. The Saudi borders with Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman are stable and secure except for smuggling. The movement of alcohol and narcotics is still a problem.

Security and the Role of the Judicial System

The Saudi civil and criminal legal system has slowly been modernized, but presents problems both in terms of both efficient internal security operations and human rights. It is traditional, religious in character, and is based on Shari'a as interpreted by Islamic practice under the Wahhabi order, which adheres to the Hanbali School of the Sunni branch of Islam. The Shari'a courts exercise jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base judgments largely on the Koran and on the Sunna, another Islamic text. Cases involving relatively small penalties are tried in Shari'a summary courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in Shari'a courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to the courts of appeal. The Saudi government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community. Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.⁶⁸

Human rights groups and the media often are harsh critics with regards to the operations of the Saudi judicial system and exaggerate its failings and use of harsh punishments, including executions. Once again, the US State Department provides a more balanced set of criticism. It

reports that the independence of the judiciary is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however, judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch, particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are not required to appear before the courts. In general, members of the royal family, and other powerful families, are not subject to the same rule of law as ordinary citizens. For example, judges do not have the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of the courts.⁶⁹

The Operation of the Judicial System in Ordinary Civil Cases

Civil and criminal trial procedures are very different than in the West. Defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge, who determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards. Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before trial or may attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with Arabic. The courts do not provide foreign defendants with translators. Public defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any person to represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court and the Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed. However, in a highly publicized 1997 case involving two foreign women charged with murder, the Saudi court conducted preliminary matters with relatively open and transparent procedures, including more effective use of counsel, increased consular presence, and increased family access.

The State Department reports that a woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for criminal conviction—a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse.

Criminal penalties and sentencing are not uniform. Foreign residents sometimes receive harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a, as interpreted and applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive harsher penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of wrongful death, the amount of indemnity or "blood money" awarded to relatives varies with the nationality, religion, and sex of the victim.

A sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for punishments stipulated by the Koran. In a case that was known widely but was not reported in the press, a member of the royal family, who shot and killed two Mutawaa'in who had entered his property without permission in October 1998, was allowed to pay "blood money" to the family members of the Mutawaa'in instead of being charged with murder.

The Judicial System and Internal Security

The judicial system works differently when it deals with internal security issues. The Saudi government is still deeply concerned about the security of the military forces – although there have been almost no recent cases of active opposition within either the regular military forces or the paramilitary and security forces. The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed personnel and civil servants that are charged with violations of military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King review the decisions of courts-martial and it is clear that serious cases get the direct attention of the royal family. Similarly, the Saudi government conducts closed trials for persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation.

The State Department reports that there are several bodies that perform higher legal review functions:

- The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
- The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of 20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in deciding cases.
- Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and reduce a judge's sentence.
- The King and his advisors review cases involving capital punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals. In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the murderer—usually in return for compensation from the family or the King.

Saudi Enforcement of Islamic Justice

One of the ironies in Saudi Arabia is that the security services are often more humane in dealing with the opposition than those in most other Middle Eastern states, but the criminal justice system practices the severe physical punishment of criminals. Western human rights groups often strongly object to such traditional punishments, and the State Department reports that,⁷⁰

The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation of Islamic law, or Shari'a. Punishments include flogging, amputation, and execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities acknowledged 100 executions during the year, a substantial increase from 25 in 1998, but less than the 134 reported in 1997. Executions included 36 men for murder (29 Saudis and 7 foreigners), 40 men for narcotics-related offenses (2 Saudis and 38 foreigners), 3 men for gang-related activities (2 Saudis and 1 foreigner), 8 men for rape (7 Saudis and 1 foreigner), 10 men for armed robbery (7 Saudis and 3 foreigners), and 3 women for narcotics-related offenses (all foreigners). The men were executed by beheading and the women were executed by firing squad. There were no executions by stoning. In accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish repeated thievery by amputation of the right hand. There were two reports of multiple amputations (right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery during the year. The amputations were carried out against two Saudi men. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.

Western critics of this aspect of Saudi justice should, however, keep three factors in mind. First, the percentage of the Saudi population tried or convicted of crimes is probably less than 10% of that subject to trial or conviction in the US. Second, Saudi prison sentences are generally much shorter and Saudi prison conditions are usually substantially better. Whether Saudi draconian punishments are cumulatively harsher than the treatment of US prisoners over time is questionable. Third, at least some Saudi government officials point out that giving "traditionalists" power over criminal punishment is both popular with the vast majority of Saudis and an area where the government can make concessions with the least damage to the modernization of the Kingdom.

The "Mutawwa'in" or Religious Police

Saudi Arabia has a religious police called the "Mutawwa'in," which is a semi-autonomous force organized under the King in conjunction with the Islamic "clergy" or Ulema. It is known in English as the Organization to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue or Committees for Public Morality and part of the governments Department of Virtue Propagation and Vice

Prevention. It is primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the precepts of Wahhabism, but performs some security functions in dealing with religious extremists.⁷¹ The Mutawwa'in enforce the public observances of religious practices, such as the closure of public establishments during prayer times. They have been known to exceed their authority with both Saudi and expatriate alike by undue harassment of both men and women in public places and the trespassing into private homes.

The Mutawaa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress and behavior. However, they sometimes exceed this limit before delivering detainees to the police. Current procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawaa'in at the time of an arrest. The Mutawaa'in generally comply with this requirement. In the more conservative Riyadh district, however, there are continuing reports received of Mutawaa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards.

The State Department reports that,

Mutawaa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in different regions of the country, but were most numerous in the central Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawaa'in and religious vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested, and detained citizens and foreigners. The Government requires the Mutawaa'in to follow established procedures and to offer instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawaa'in did not always comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized publicly abuses by Mutawaa'in and religious vigilantes, but has sought to curtail these abuses.

It also reports that the Mutawaa'in enforce strict standards of social behavior, including the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places. The Mutawaa'in frequently reproach Saudi and foreign women for failure to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found together who were not married or closely related. In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a traditional Shi'a practice). Mutawaa'in attempts to cover up the killing were unsuccessful. The State Department reports that the government reportedly investigated the incident; but does not make public the results of any investigations involving Mutawaa'in personnel.

The level of Mutawwa'in activity has varied over time, and is difficult to predict. The government appointed a new and more compliant leader of the religious police after a series of raids on rich and influential Saudis in 1990, but their power grew strikingly after the Gulf War, as Saudi traditionalists reacted to the presence of US and other Western forces, but seems to have peaked in the mid-1990s. The number of reports of harassment by the Mutawaa'in during the late 1990s remained relatively low in comparison with previous years, but the Mutawaa'in continue to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners of both sexes.

Some Saudi officials go so far as to describe the Mutawwa'in as a form of disguised unemployment for religious Saudis, and state it is sharply overstaffed in some areas. One senior Saudi official went so far as to refer to the Mutawwa'in as a "religious labor union more interested in their benefits than anything else." Other Saudis are more divided in their reaction. Some feel the Mutawwa'in perform a useful function in limiting the secularization of the Kingdom. Others see it as an outdated and over-conservative annoyance.⁷² Serious questions also remain about the degree to which the attitudes of organizations like the "Mutawwa'in" affected the safety of Saudi girls schools and did or did not interfere in a school fire that killed 15 Saudi girls in March 2002. Certainly, religious conservatism was a factor that led to the gross over-crowding of some aspects of the school, which allowed 800 students to occupy a space designed for 300.⁷³

In late November 2002, Prince Nayef was sufficiently disturbed over continuing problems with the Mutawwa'in so that he publicly took action to try to improve the conduct of the Department of Virtue Propagation and Vice Prevention. He called upon the Department to, "hire well qualified people and people of limited qualifications who act recklessly," "gently deal with the people and avoid harshness, especially with young people." He announced a training institute was being set up, and that the Mutawwa'in would operate with better training and discipline.⁷⁴

In general, the "Mutawwa'in" seem to be more of a Saudi internal security problem than part of the solution. Saudis do not seem to be able to cite any examples of cases where the "Mutawwa'in" have played a role in limiting the activities of Islamic extremists and defending the core values of Islam against extremism. They cannot cite cases in which the "Mutawwa'in" played a role in defending religious values while aiding modernization and reform. To be blunt,

they have been a “gentler and kinder” Taliban. They have carried out rote enforcement of Saudi religious practices while acting as a tacit endorsement of efforts to force compliance with Islam rather than persuade. As such, they of ten at least indirectly endorse Islamic extremism while lacking the intellectual depth, training, and experience to truly defend one of the world’s great religions.

It should be noted, however, that there is another force called the “Mujahideen,” whose operations are centered in Riyadh, and largely patrol it at night as a kind of religious vice squad. This force is much more professional than the “Mutawwa’in,” and is rarely seen or talked about. It reports directly to Prince Naif, the Minister of the Interior.

Enforcement of Islamic Norms, Censorship, and Control of the Media

The State Department reports that Saudi government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms, which are matters of law. The authorities do not tolerate criticism of Islam, the ruling family, or the Government. However, the authorities allow the press some freedom to criticize governmental bodies and social policies through editorial comments and cartoons. Persons whose criticisms align them with an organized political opposition are subject to arrest and detention until they confess to a crime or sign a statement promising not to resume such criticisms, which is tantamount to a confession.

Internal Security and Surveillance of Ordinary Citizens

While the Saudi government may have failed to come to grips with Islamic extremism and terrorism, the State Department reports that there are few barriers to religious censorship and the security force’s access to private communications. The Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim religious material. Customs officials’ confiscated censored materials considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious videotapes. The authorities also open mail and use informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters.

The Saudi internal security forces rarely visibly intrude in day-to-day life but they do use wiretaps against both Saudi citizens and foreigners and they do so even for relatively limited

crimes such as alcohol-related offenses. Informants (known as “umdas”) report “seditious ideas” or antigovernment activity in their neighborhoods to the Ministry of the Interior. The State Department reports that some Saudi professors believe that informers monitor comments made in university classrooms.

The State Department reports that academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and report to government and religious authorities. Others, however, comment that they have comparative freedom to hold private discussion sessions, and that the restrictions on formal teaching activity do not apply to criticisms of the way in which the government operates, the allocation of budget resources, the value of government programs or other kinds of criticism that are not directed specifically at the legitimacy of the regime.

The State Department reports that the Saudi government strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations as a means of political expression. For example, the Saudi government arrested several clergymen and 97 other Saudis for protesting against the US military presence in Saudi Arabia in 1994. It stopped public protests in Riyadh supporting the Palestinians in October 2000, and arrested several of those who participated. The Ministry of the Interior issued a public warning in April 2002 that such meetings were forbidden after another spontaneous protest against Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians by some 150 Saudi citizens in Northern Saudi Arabia.⁷⁵ Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold nonsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation.

The State Department reports that the Saudi authorities monitor large gatherings of persons, especially of women. The Mutawaa’in disperse groups of women found in public places, such as restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if a father, brother, or husband accompanies them. The State Department reports, however, that the Saudi police implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events and lectures.

However, in May 2001, for the second year in a row, authorities allowed unescorted Saudi women to attend a women-only cultural event hosted at a diplomatic mission.

Even so, Saudis do routinely hold large social gatherings, and frank – if not brutal criticism – of the government is almost a social sport. While Saudis generally seem to avoid criticism of the legitimacy of the regime, they can be very critical of members of the royal family even when other members of the royal family are present, and criticism of ministers is common. Few educated Saudis seem to exhibit any concern about monitoring by the security services at social events.

Internal Security and Control of the Media

The government uses censorship as another way of strengthening internal censorship. The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982 media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the dissemination of criticism of the Saudi government. The media policy statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of Saudi Arabia. The State Department reports that the Ministry of Information appoints, and may remove, the editors in chief. It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The Saudi government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official government views.

The State Department reports that newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when a senior government official has authorized it. Two Saudi-owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are widely distributed and read in Saudi Arabia. Both newspapers tend to practice self-censorship in order to comply with government restrictions on sensitive issues. However, any reader of these publications, and other Saudi newspapers, will recognize, however, that they still can be highly critical of Saudi government activities. The Ministry of Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are prohibited from being sold in the country.

The Saudi government normally tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists into the Kingdom and uses visas to select the reporters it admits and tries to influence their coverage. It often provides escorts and monitors the movements of foreign journalists. The State Department reports that the Saudi authorities also continue to censor stories about Saudi Arabia in the foreign

press. Censors may remove or blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain issues of foreign publications from entering the market. The Saudi government owns and operates the television and radio companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics, religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign programs and songs. The Ministry of Information has, however, continued to relax its blackout policy regarding politically sensitive news concerning Saudi Arabia reported in the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of domestic news remain very stringent.

The State Department reports that the Saudi government's policy is motivated in part by pragmatic considerations: Saudi access to outside sources of information, especially the Cable News Network (CNN), Al Jahzirha, and other satellite television channels, is increasingly widespread. The State Department estimates that there are well over one million satellites receiving dishes in the country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts, although the legal status of these devices is ambiguous. The government ordered a halt to their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders who objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite channels. In 1994 the government banned the sale, installation, and maintenance of dishes and supporting devices, but the number of dishes continues to increase and residents legally may subscribe to satellite decoding services that require a dish.

Other changes in technology, however, are making censorship less and less effective. Access to the Internet is available through Saudi servers or through servers in other Gulf countries. The Government attempts to block all web sites that it views as presenting hostile opposition views, and which have sexual, pornographic, or otherwise offensive or un-Islamic content. However, visits to Saudi Arabia confirm the State Department judgment that web sites are readily accessible from within the country. Public access to the Internet is expanding at a geometric rate, and Saudi attempts to limit access to various sections of the net as largely ineffective. Saudi students find it easy to work around government controls, as do any groups seeking to use the Internet for political purposes or communication.

Looking towards the Future

As has been discussed earlier, Saudi Arabia has taken a number of steps to improve its internal security and support the war on terrorism since September 11th. Saudi intelligence and the Saudi foreign ministry have conducted a detailed review of Saudi companies and charities operating in Pakistan and Central Asia. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Council countries agreed to take new steps to control the flow of funds and money laundering at the GCC summit meeting on December 31, 2001.⁷⁶ Saudi Arabia has made the Combined Aerospace Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Airbase available for US use in supporting the war in Afghanistan.⁷⁷

The Saudi government has arrested a number of individuals the US suspects of supporting Osama Bin Laden, as well as cracked down on its more extreme Islamists. While it has acted slowly because of the sensitivity Saudis show to any outside pressure, and rising public anger over the Second Intifada, it issued orders blocking the assets of 66 persons, companies, groups, and charities on the US watch list for entities linked to global terrorism in late October, 2001.⁷⁸ Saudi Arabia agreed to sign the 1999 UN anti-terrorism convention aimed at blocking the financial support of terrorists in early November 2001.⁷⁹ The Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Faisal, promised to punish Saudis criminally involved in al Qaida terrorism in December 2001.⁸⁰

The government has acted to freeze bank accounts linked to suspected terrorists, and Saudi intelligence is now monitoring at least 150 accounts for terrorist activity. The Saudi Chamber of Commerce established a task force in January 2002 to develop a financial and administrative system for Saudi charities to ensure that their funds would not go to extremist causes, and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency is assisting Saudi banks to develop and computerize systems to track money laundering. The Saudi government is also drafting new laws to limit money-laundering activity.⁸¹

Saudi Arabia issued a full list of such actions in early December 2002, and US officials have officially confirmed the validity of this list. These measures are summarized in Table 9-1:⁸²

Table 9-1Saudi Measures to Fight Terrorism and Improve Internal Security Since September 11, 2001**International Cooperation**

- Supporting and implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1267 by freezing the funds and financial assets of the Taliban. Freezing the funds of the individuals listed in Security Council Resolution 1333. Signing the International Convention for Suppression and Financing of Terrorism based on Security Council Resolution 1373 and reporting on the implementation of the rules and procedures pertaining to this resolution; reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of Resolution 1390. Supporting and implementing Security Council Resolution 1368, of September 12, 2001, limiting the financing of terrorist activities.
- Maintaining a Counter-Terrorism committee with the United States comprised of intelligence and law enforcement personnel who meet regularly to share information and resources and to develop action plans to root out terrorist networks. Saudi Arabia has sought to strengthen cooperation between the Kingdom and the United States through reciprocal visits.
- Encouraging Saudi government departments and banks to participate in international seminars, conferences and symposia on combating terrorist financing activities. Saudi Arabia has hosted seminars, conferences and symposia on combating terrorism and is a member of the GCC Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
- Completing and submitting the Self-Assessment Questionnaire regarding the 40 recommendation of the FATF. Saudi Arabia has also submitted the Self Assessment Questionnaire regarding the 8 Special Recommendations of the FATF.
- Having the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) exchange information on money laundering related activities with other banking supervisory authorities and with law enforcement agencies. SAMA has created a Committee to carry out a self-assessment for compliance with the recommendations of the FATF and these self-assessment questionnaires have been submitted. Saudi Arabia has invited the FATF to conduct a Mutual Evaluation in April 2003.
- Signing a multilateral agreement under the auspices of the Arab League to fight terrorism.
- Submitting a report every 90 days on the initiatives and actions the Kingdom has taken to fight terrorism to the UN Security Council committees dealing with terrorism.
- Establishing formal communication points between the Ministry of foreign affairs and the Permanent Representative to the UN.

Arrests and Questioning of Suspects

- Saudi Arabia has questioned over 2,000 individuals for possible ties to Al Qaida. Many of these people fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion as well as in Bosnia and Chechnya.
- Detaining up to 200 suspects out of this total for questioning and interrogation. Well over 100 were still held in detention in December 2002.
- Saudi intelligence and law enforcement agencies identified and arrested a cell composed of seven individuals linked to Al Qaida who were planning to carry out terrorist attacks against vital sites in the Kingdom. The cell leader was extradited from the Sudan. This cell was responsible for the attempt to shoot down American military planes at Prince Sultan Airbase using a shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile.

- Saudi Arabia successfully negotiated with Iran for the extradition of 16 suspected Al Qaida members.
- Successfully negotiating with Iran for the extradition of 16 suspected Al Qaida members. These individuals are now in Saudi custody and are being questioned. The Iranian authorities handed over the Al Qaida fugitives, all Saudis, knowing that whatever intelligence was obtained from them during interrogation in Saudi Arabia would be passed on to the United States for use in the war against terrorism.
- Asking Interpol to arrest 750 people, many of whom are suspected of money laundering, drug trafficking, and terror-related activities. This figure includes 214 Saudis whose names appear in Interpol's database and expatriated who fled Saudi Arabia.
- Helping to identify a network of more than 50 shell companies that Osama Bin Laden used to move money around the world. The companies were located in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Caribbean. A sophisticated financial network that weaved through more than 25 nations was uncovered and virtually shut down.

Legal and Regulatory Actions and Freezing Terrorist Assets and Combating Money Laundering

- Signing and joining the United Nations Convention against Illicit Trafficking of Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances in 1988.
- Freezing assets of Osama Bin Laden in 1994.
- Establishing Anti-Money Laundering Units at the Ministry of Interior, SAMA and Commercial Banks in 1995.
- Having SAMA issue "Guidelines for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering Activities" to Saudi Banks to implement "Know your Customer Rules," maintain records of suspicious transactions, and report then to law enforcement officials in SAMA in 1995.
- Adopting 40 recommendations of the Financial Task force relating to banking control of money laundering that grew out of the G-7 meeting in 1988.
- Saudi banks to identify and freeze all assets relating to terrorist suspects and entities per the list issued by the United States government on September 23, 2001. Saudi banks have complied with the freeze requirements and have initiated investigation of transaction that suspects linked to Al Qaida may have undertaken in the past.
- Investigating bank accounts suspected to have been linked to terrorism. Saudi Arabia froze 33 accounts belonging to 3 individuals that total about \$5,574,196.
- Establishing a Special Committee with personnel from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Intelligence Agency and the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to deal with requests from international bodies and countries with regards to combating terrorist financing.
- Reorienting the activities of the GCC Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to deal with terrorism and creating a Committee to carry out a self-assessment for compliance with the recommendations of the FATF.
- Joining Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G-20 in order to develop an aggressive action plan directed at the routing out and freezing of terrorist assets worldwide.
- Having the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) instruct Saudi banks to promptly establish a Supervisory Committee to closely monitor the threat posed by terrorism and to coordinate all efforts to freeze the assets of potential terrorists. The Committee is composed of senior officers from banks responsible for Risk Control, Audit, Money-Laundering Units, Legal and Operations. The committee meets regularly in the presence of SAMA officials.

- Requiring Saudi banks to put in place mechanisms to respond to all relevant inquiries, both domestically and internationally, at the level of their Chief Executive Officers, as well as at the level of the Supervisory Committee. To ensure proper coordination and effective response, all Saudi banks route their responses and relevant information via SAMA.
- Having the Ministry of Commerce issue Regulation #1312 aimed at preventing and combating money laundering in the non-financial sector. These regulations are aimed at manufacturing and trading sectors and also cover professional services such as accounting, legal and consultancy services.
- Creating an institutional framework for combating money laundering, including the establishment of Anti-Money Laundering units, with a trained and dedicated specialist staff. These units work with SAMA and law enforcement agencies. The government has also encouraged banks to bring Money-Laundering related experiences to the notice of various bank committees (Chief Operations Officers, Managing Directors, Fraud Committee, etc.) for exchange of information and joint actions.
- Creating specialized Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in the Security and Drug Control Department of the Ministry of Interior. This unit is specially tasked with handling money-laundering cases. A new liaison group dealing with terrorist finances has been established between SAMA and the Ministry of the Interior.
- Carrying out regular inspection of banks to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Any violation or non-compliance is cause for serious actions and is referred to a bank's senior management and the Board. Furthermore, the government has created a permanent Committee of Banks' compliance officers to review regulations and guidelines and recommend improvements, and to ensure all implementation issues are resolved.
- Freezing bank accounts suspected of links to terrorists.
- Use of the interbanking system in Saudi Arabia to identify possible sources of funding of terrorism,
- Supporting UN resolutions, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1368 to limit the financing of terrorist activities.
- Working with the US and other countries to block more than \$70 million in possible terrorist assets in Saudi Arabia and other countries.
- Quietly providing data on suspect private Saudi accounts in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Sweden.
- Directing SAMA to issue rules "Governing the Opening of Bank Accounts" and "General Operational Guidelines" in order to protect banks against money laundering activities in May 2002. For instance, Saudi banks are not permitted to open bank accounts for non-resident individuals without specific approval from SAMA. Banks are required to apply strict rules and any non-customer business has to be fully documented.
- Carrying out regular inspection of banks to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Any violation or non-compliance is cause for serious actions and is referred to a bank's senior management and the Board. Creating a Permanent Committee of Banks' compliance officers to review regulation and guidelines and recommend improvements, and to ensure all implementation issues are resolved.
- Making significant new efforts to train staff in financial institutions and the Security and Investigation departments in the Ministry of Interior as well as others involved in compliance and law. Special training programs have been developed for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers and other officials from government departments and agencies. Furthermore, training programs are offered by the Prince Naif Security Academy, King Fahd Security Faculty and Public Security Training City.

- Establishing a Permanent Committee of representatives of seven ministries and government agencies to manage all legal and other issues related to money laundering activities.
- Directing SAMA to organize a conference with the Riyadh Interpol for the First Asian Regional meeting in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and financial institutions on January 28-30, 2002.
- Having the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry in cooperation with SAMA conduct and International Conference on Prevention and Detection of Fraud, Economic Crimes and Money Laundering on May 13-14, 2002.
- Directing Saudi banks and SAMA to computerize reported cases to identify trends in money laundering activities to assist in policymaking and other initiatives.

Actions Taken in regard to Charitable Organizations

- Creating a High Commission for the Oversight of Charities to look at ways to regulate charities, help them put financial control mechanisms and procedures in place, require that charities conduct audits, and review them. A Department will be set up that will grow out of the High Commission for the Oversight of Charities to maintain suitable review and controls. This will compensate for the fact that Saudi Arabia does not have an income tax and does not have the same tax-related review of expenditures common in the West.
- Requiring that charitable activities that extend outside Saudi Arabia be reported to the Saudi government and are routinely monitored, and that charitable activities outside Saudi Arabia be reported to the Foreign Ministry.
- Taking joint action with the United States to freeze the assets of, Wa'el Hamza Julaidan, a Saudi fugitive and a close aide of Bin Laden, who is believed to have funneled money to Al Qaida. Julaidan served as the director of the Rabita Trust and other organizations.
- Establishing a High Commission for oversights of all charities, contributions and donations is in the final process of setting up Operational Procedures to manage Contributions, Donations to and from the Charities.
- Auditing all charitable groups to ensure there are no links to suspected organizations since September 11, 2001.
- Issuing new guidelines and regulations, including financial control mechanisms to make sure terrorist and extremist organizations cannot take advantage of legitimate charities.
- Setting up the Higher Saudi Association for Relief and Charity to oversee the distribution of donations and guarantee they are channeled to the needy.
- Strengthening the role of the Saudi Arabia and US counter-terrorism committee comprised of intelligence and law enforcement personnel who meet regularly to share information and resources on the misuse of charities and charitable funds and develop plans of action to root out terrorist networks.
- Freezing bank accounts involving the flow of charitable funds that are suspected of being linked to terrorism.
- Working with the US Treasury Department to block the accounts of the Somalia and Bosnia branched of the Saudi Arabia-based Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation in March 2002. While the Saudi headquarters for this private charitable entity is dedicated to helping those in need, the US and Saudi Arabia determined that the Somalia and Bosnia branched of Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation engaged in supporting terrorist activities and terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida, AIAI (Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya), and others.

Other Initiatives Related to Fighting Terrorism

- Signing a multilateral agreement under the auspices of the Arab League to fight terrorism.
- Participating in G-20 meetings and signing various bilateral agreements with non-Arab countries.

- Preparing and submitting a report on the initiatives and actions taken by the Kingdom, with respect to the fight against terrorism, to the UN Security Council Committees every 90 days.
- Establishing communication points between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
- Supporting and meeting the requirements of various UN resolutions related to combating terrorism:
- Freezing funds and other financial assets of the Taliban regime based on UN Security Resolution 1267.
- Freezing funds of listed individuals based on UN Security Council Resolution 1333.
- Signing the International Convention for Suppression and Financing of Terrorism based on UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on reporting to the UN Security Council's committee regarding the implementation of the Rules and Procedures pertaining to 1373.
- Reporting to the UN Security Council the implementation of Resolution 1390.
- Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Financial Area to Combat Terrorism, December 3, 2002.

These are important steps in coming to grips with both the problems exposed by the events of September 11th, and the long-standing struggle between the Saudi government and Islamic extremists. It is clear, however, that the Saudi government must do more if it is to ensure its own internal security as well as fight global terrorism. It is equally clear that the government must now take much broader steps in areas like education and expanding employment opportunities for young Saudis to come to grips with security problems like Islamic extremism while it simultaneously continues to liberalize its overall internal security arrangements and create and enforce a more modern version of the rule of law.

There is no reason that Saudi Arabia should always copy Western approaches to internal security and law enforcement as it makes these changes. The Kingdom can preserve its Islamic character and still take the necessary steps to end support for violent Islamic extremism both within and outside Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Saudi Arabia can also do much to liberalize and improve human rights without giving up its own national cultural traditions and still act to suppress terrorist and extremist activity.

Nevertheless, Saudi economic and political reform cannot take place without sufficient social and religious reform, and without sufficient tolerance of modern media and communications, to allow Saudi Arabia to compete in global economic terms. Saudi Arabia must become a more open society and one where its young men and women are fully prepared to compete in the market place with global efficiency. This is not a need based on the moral and ethical need to improve human rights – valid as such issues are -- it is a pragmatic need that is vital to Saudi Arabia's future development and growth.

The dividing line between Islam and terrorism is clear, and one that has already been publicly stated by Crown Prince Abdullah, many other senior Saudi officials, and many senior members of the Saudi clergy. No one can argue with Saudi advocacy of Islam and the conservative practices of the Wahhabi sect when these are so clearly the choice of the Saudi people. Everyone can argue with the thesis that extremists can use God to advocate violence, terrorism and actions that kill innocent civilians. The same is true of halting religious practices that teach intolerance and hatred, regardless of whether such practices are defended in the name

of Islam, Judaism, Christianity or any other faith. The Saudi government needs to aggressively and consistently enforce its own policies in those areas.

There is no dilemma between improving intelligence and the security services and liberalization. More modern security and legal procedures can improve the quality of investigations, intelligence gather, and warning without preventing reductions in censorship and government controls, more tolerance of the Saudi Shi'ite and practices of foreigner on Saudi soil, and methods of arrest and trial that guarantee more rights. Past progress in these areas has also shown that the necessary rate of progress can be made on Saudi terms and in ways that preserve Saudi custom.

Most importantly, Saudi security is best preserved by progress and reform, and not by the activities of the internal security and intelligence services. The state of the Saudi economy, and coming to grips with the Kingdom's problems with education, Saudisation, youth employment, and demographics, are the true keys to internal security. So is a level of political progress that expands the role ordinary Saudis can play in government, and making further reductions in sources of social unrest like corruption. Even the best counterterrorist operations can only deal with the small fraction of the Saudi population that are violent extremists. True internal security is based upon popular support.

¹ Some elements of the report are paraphrased from reporting in the US State Department report on Human Right, particularly the 1999 edition: 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000 http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The author looked extensively at various NGO reports on human rights in the Kingdom, but does not believe that they have the objectivity or reliability of the State Department report. He did, however, ask a wide range of Saudis, inside and outside Saudi Arabia, and Western legal and internal security experts, to review his extensive restructuring of the State Department report, and the text has sometimes been modified accordingly. The reader should be fully aware that the credit for most of the analysis of Saudi legal, censorship, and human rights development in this analysis belongs to State Department personnel, and that no outside analyst can report as reliably on these aspects of developments in the Kingdom.

² Associated Press, NY, December 30, 2001, 1928; Reuters, December 29, 2001, 1802; Saudi Arabia, Vol. 18, No 10, October 2001, pp. 1-4.

³ Press release, "Mosques Not to Be Used as Political Platforms," Embassy of Saudi Arabia, December 7, 2002.

⁴ Some elements of the report are paraphrased from reporting in the US State Department report on Human Right, particularly the 1999 edition: 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000 http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The author looked extensively at various NGO reports on human rights in the Kingdom, but does not believe that they have the objectivity or reliability of the State Department report. He did, however, ask a wide range of Saudis, inside and outside Saudi Arabia, and Western legal and internal security experts, to review his extensive restructuring of the State Department report, and the text has sometimes been modified accordingly. The reader should be fully aware that the credit for most of the analysis of Saudi legal, censorship, and human rights development in this analysis belongs to State Department personnel, and that no outside analyst can report as reliably on these aspects of developments in the Kingdom.

⁵ Prince Naif is 68 years old. Like Fahd, Abdullah and Nawwaf, he is a son of King Abdul Aziz.

⁶ These comments are based on an English transcript and summary provided in e-mail form by the Saudi Embassy in Washington on December 5, 2002.

⁷ These comments are based on an English transcript and summary provided in e-mail form by the Saudi Embassy in Washington on December 5, 2002.

⁸ This analysis draws heavily on interviews, various annual editions of the IISS, Military Balance; and Jane's Sentinel: The Gulf States, 1997; London, Jane's Publishing 1997..

⁹ Defense News, November 11, 1991, p. 36; Washington Technology, September 24, 1992, p. 1.

¹⁰ Interviews in Saudi Arabia in 2000.

¹¹ Prince Nawwaf is a son of King Abd al-Aziz. Prince Turki is brother of Prince Saud al-Faisal, the foreign minister and a brother of Turki and son of the late King Faisal.

¹² See Simon Henderson, "The Saudis: Friend or Foe?," Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2001, as provided by e-mail in publications@washingtoninstitute.org. Also see The Estimate, Vol. XIII, No. 16, September 7, 2001, p. 1.

¹³ Simon Henderson, "The Saudis: Friend or Foe?," Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2001, p. A18 and similar article provided by e-mail in publications@washingtoninstitute.org; Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, New York, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 9, 30, 52, 75, 111.

¹⁴ John Duke Anthony, "A Changing of the Guard in Saudi Arabia, A Personal Perspective," Gulf Wire – Perspectives, September 3-9, 2001, <http://arabialink.com/GulfWire/GULFWIRE.htm>.

¹⁵ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, various editions, especially US State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Saudi Arabia", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

¹⁶ The Ministry of Islamic Affairs funds the Mutawaa'in, and the general president of the Mutawaa'in holds the rank of cabinet minister. The Ministry also pays the salaries of imams (prayer leaders) and others who work in the mosques. During 1999, foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The Government claims that its actions were part of its Saudisation plan to replace foreign workers with citizens.

¹⁷ Associated Press, NY, March 18, 2002, 0650, March 25, 2002, 1225; Reuters, March 12, 2002, 0430.

¹⁸ The historical data draw on work by the Congressional Research Service, specifically by Helen Chapin Metz in "Saudi Arabia, A Country Study, Washington. Congressional Research Service. December 1992, [http://leweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+sa0000\)](http://leweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sa0000)), and the US State Department report on Human Rights, particularly the 2000 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000 http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/2000_hrp_report/saudiara.html, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

¹⁹ Associated Press, March 20, 2002, 1013; March 23, 2002, 1418.

²⁰ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html, and US State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Saudi Arabia", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

²¹ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, various editions.

²² US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html, and US State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Saudi Arabia", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

²³ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, various editions.

²⁴ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, various editions, especially US State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Saudi Arabia", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

²⁵ The Estimate, December 28, 2001, p. 9;

²⁶ Saudi Arabia, Vol. 18, No. 10, October 2001, p. 3.

²⁷ The Estimate, December 28, 2001, p. 9.

²⁸ Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

²⁹ Washington Times, February 7, 2002.

³⁰ Reuters, January 3, 2002, 0731; New York Times, December 27, 2001, p. A-1.

³¹ The Estimate, December 28, 2001, p. 9.

³² Schneider Howard, "Saudis Suspect Al Qaida Plot Against US Military, Arrest 13," The Washington Post, June 19, 2002, pp. A15

³³ Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

³⁴ Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

³⁵ Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

³⁶ For additional sources, see Washington Times, July 14, 1996, p. A-4, June 16, 1997, p. A-11; Washington Post, January 26, 1997, p. A-22, January 23, 1997, p. A-8, March 23, 1997, p. A-28, May 9, 1997, p. A-31; Reuters, November 1, 1996, 1635, February 20, 1997, 0143; Baltimore Sun, February 28, 1997, p. 1A, June 16, 1997, p. 7A; Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1997, p. 4; USA Today, June 16, 1997, p. 12A.

³⁷ For another perspective, see the discussion in Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

³⁸ New York Times, April 22, 1995, p. A-5; Los Angeles Times, April 21, 1995, pp. A-9, A-26; USA Today, April 26, 1995, p. 11A; Washington Post, April 22, 1995, p. A-24; Washington Times, April 22, 1995, p. A-8, April 24, 1995, p. A-11, May 3, 1995, p. A-12.

³⁹ Jamal Khashoggi, Deputy Editor in Chief, "Kingdom has a Big Role to Play in Afghanistan," Arab News, Jeddah, November 4, 2001.

⁴⁰ Jamal Khashoggi, Deputy Editor in Chief, "Kingdom has a Big Role to Play in Afghanistan," Arab News, Jeddah, November 4, 2001.

⁴¹ US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, "Middle East Overview," <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/mideast.html#Arabia>.

⁴² US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, "Middle East Overview," <http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/mideast.html#Arabia>; Triffin J. Roule, Jeremy Kinsell, and Brian Joyce, "Investigators seek to break up Al-Qaida's financial structure," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2001, pp. 8-11.

⁴³ Jamal Khashoggi, Deputy Editor in Chief, "Kingdom has a Big Role to Play in Afghanistan," Arab News, Jeddah, November 6, 2001. Similar interviews and reports have appeared in a number of sources, including the New York Times and Washington Post. Also see Reuters transcript of interview on Middle East Broadcasting network, November 6, 2001, 1556 and Reuters, November 3, 2001, 1609; Scott Macleod, "The Near Misses," Time, November 12, 2001, p. 45; Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away, New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

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⁴⁵ Jamal Khashoggi, Deputy Editor in Chief, "Kingdom has a Big Role to Play in Afghanistan," Arab News, Jeddah, November 6, 2001.

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⁴⁸ Jamal Khashoggi, Deputy Editor in Chief, "Kingdom has a Big Role to Play in Afghanistan," Arab News, Jeddah, November 4, 2001.

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⁵³ Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Bullets of Saudi Gold," Washington Times, October 22, 2001, p. A-18; Triffin J. Roule, Jeremy Kinsell, and Brian Joyce, "Investigators seek to break up Al-Qaeda's financial structure," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2001, pp. 8-11; Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2002; Washington Times, February 5, 2002, pp. 18-19; The Washington Post, December 8, 2001, p. A-3; Douglas Farah, "Al Qaeda's Road Paved with Gold," The Washington Post, February 17, 2002, p. A-1 and A-32; Reuters, November 29, 2001, 1219; Reuters, January 23, 2002, January 23, 2002, 1016; Reuters, January 31, 2002, 0704; Bruce Crumley, "Follow the Money," Time, November 19, 2001, p. 47; "Bin Laden Wealth Overestimated," CNN.com, November 5, 2001; Associated Press, NY, October 28, 2001, 1559; Douglas Jehl, "Holy War Lured Saudis as Rulers Look Away," New York Times, December 27, 2001, pp. A-1 and B-4 to B-5.

⁵⁴ Matthew Levitt, "Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia," Policywatch #609, March 11, 2002.

⁵⁵ Reuters, March 11, 2002, 1745, March 12, 2002, 1310; Matthew Levitt, "Saudi Financial Counterterrorism Measures, Smokescreen or Substance," Policywatch #687, December 10, 2002; Simon Henderson, "Saudi Financial Counterterrorism Measures, the Impact in the Kingdom," Policywatch #686, December 9, 2002.

⁵⁶ Reuters, March 20, 2002, 0520.

⁵⁷ International Herald Tribune, June 25, 2002, p. 3; Time, June 15, 2002.

⁵⁸ New York Times, June 14, 2002.

⁵⁹ Washington Post, June 14, 2002, p. 11.

⁶⁰ Washington Post, June 19, 2002, p. 15; Baltimore Sun, June 20, 2002.

⁶¹ New York Times, web edition, June 14, 2002; Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2002, p. 1; Washington Post, June 18, 2002, p. 1.

⁶² Associated Press, 1852, May 6, 2001; The London Times, May 3, 2001, p. 14.

⁶³ The Estimate, February 9, 2001, p. 9.

⁶⁴ Reuters, March 14, 2002, 1649.

⁶⁵ Associated Press, NY, October 29, 2001, 0747.

⁶⁶ US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, various editions.

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⁶⁸ This text is modified from text provided in the US State Department, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html, and US State Department, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, "Saudi Arabia", Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000.

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⁷² The Ministry of Islamic Affairs funds the Mutawaa'in, and the general president of the Mutawaa'in holds the rank of cabinet minister. The Ministry also pays the salaries of imams (prayer leaders) and others who work in the mosques. During 1999, foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The Government claims that its actions were part of its Saudisation plan to replace foreign workers with citizens.

⁷³ Associated Press, NY, March 18, 2002, 0650, March 25, 2002, 1225; Reuters, March 12, 2002, 0430.

⁷⁴ These comments are based on an English transcript and summary provided in e-mail form by the Saudi Embassy in Washington on December 5, 2002.

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⁷⁶ Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2002.

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