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**Saudi Arabia Enter the 21st Century:
The Military and Internal Security Dimension**

**II. Saudi Military Leadership, Organization,
and Manpower**

Final Review

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Introduction

This analysis is being circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.

Those interested in commenting, or in participating in the project, should contact Anthony H. Cordesman at the address shown on the cover sheet at Acordesman@aol.com.

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The CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project”

The CSIS is undertaking a new project to examine the trends shaping the future of Saudi Arabia and its impact on the stability of the Gulf. This project is supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and builds on the work done for the CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative, the CSIS Net Assessment of the Middle East, and the Gulf in Transition Project. It is being conducted in conjunction with a separate – but closely related – study called the Middle East Energy and Security Project.

The project is being conducted by Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. It uses a net assessment approach that looks at all of the major factors affecting Saudi Arabia’s strategic, political, economic, and military position and future implications of current trends. It is examining the internal stability and security of Saudi Arabia, social and demographic trends, and the problem of Islamic extremism. It also examines the changes taking place in the Saudi economy and petroleum industries, the problems of Saudisation, changes in export and trade patterns, and Saudi Arabia’s new emphasis on foreign investment.

The assessment of Saudi Arabia’s strategic position includes a full-scale analysis of Saudi military forces, defense expenditures, arms imports, military modernization, readiness, and war fighting capability. It also, however, looks beyond the military dimension and a narrowly definition of political stability, and examine the implications of the shifts in the pattern of Gulf, changes in Saudi external relations such changes in Saudi policy towards Iran and Iraq. It examines the cooperation and tensions between Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states. It examines the implications of the conventional military build-up and creeping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Gulf, the resulting changes in Saudi Arabia’s security position. It also examines the security and strategic implications of the steady expansion of Saudi Arabia’s oil, gas, and petrochemical exports.

This project is examining the succession in the Royal Family, the immediate political probabilities, and the generational changes that are occurring in the royal family and Saudi Arabia’s technocrats. At the same time, it examines the future political, economic, and social trends in Saudi Arabia, and possible strategic futures for Saudi Arabia through the year 2010.

This examination of the strategic future of Saudi Arabia includes Saudi Arabia’s possible evolution in the face of different internal and external factors -- including changes in foreign and trade policies towards Saudi Arabia by the West, Japan, and the Gulf states. Key issues affecting Saudi Arabia’s future, including its economic development, relations with other states in the region, energy production and policies, and security relations with other states will be examined as well.

A central focus of this project is to examine the implications of change within Saudi Arabia, their probable mid and long-term impacts, and the most likely changes in the nature or behavior of

Saudi Arabia's current ruling elite, and to project the possible implications for both Gulf stability and the US position in the Gulf.

Work on the project will focus on the steady development of working documents that will be revised steadily during the coming months on the basis on outside comment. As a result, all of the material provided in this section of the CSIS web page should be regarded as working material that will change according to the comments received from policymakers and outside experts. To comment, provide suggestions, or provide corrections, please contact Anthony H. Cordesman at the CSIS at the address shown on each report, or e-mail him at Acordesman@aol.com.

Related material can be found in the "Gulf and Transition" and " Middle East Energy and Security" sections of the CSIS Web Page at CSIS.ORG.

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II. Saudi Military Leadership, Organization, and Manpower

The Kingdom's military forces are currently divided into five major branches: the Army, the National Guard, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Air Defense Force. Saudi Arabia also has large paramilitary and internal security forces, and a small strategic missile force. While the organization of Saudi forces is relatively modern, it does divide its land forces into two major branches under the control of two major princes. Saudi Arabia still faces major problems in the leadership of its armed forces at every level. It also has significant problems in manpower numbers, quality, and management.

The Leadership of Saudi Forces

Saudi military forces are formally under the direct control of King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud. King Fahd is the Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (since adopting the title in 1986 to substitute for "His Majesty") and the Commander-in-Chief of the Saudi Armed Forces. He is one of the sons of the Kingdom's founder, and assumed power of the Kingdom on June 13, 1982 after the death of King Khalid Bin Abdul Aziz. Prior to his current appointment, King Fahd became Saudi Arabia's first Minister of Education in 1953, he was appointed Minister of the Interior in 1962. He held this post until he became Heir Apparent in 1975.¹

The Minister of Defense takes most actual decision-making, that affects the regular armed forces. Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, has been the Minister of Defense and Aviation since 1962, and the Second Deputy Prime Minister since 1982. Prior to these positions, Prince Sultan held numerous government posts including; Governor of Riyadh, Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Communications. Prince Sultan has now spent four decades shaping and modernizing Saudi Arabia's armed forces, has made most policy decisions relating to military procurement, and has supervised the construction of modern military bases and cities throughout the Kingdom.²

The National Guard is under a separate chain of command. Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, the Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister, has commanded the National Guard since 1963.

Prince Naif bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud has been the Minister of the Interior since 1975. He effectively controls the Kingdom's paramilitary and internal security forces, including the Frontier Force, Civil Defense Force, Police, Fire Service, Passport Division and Special Security and Investigation Forces. Like the other senior princes, Prince Naif has held prior gubernatorial and ministerial posts such as: Governor of Riyadh, Deputy Minister of the Interior, Minister of State for Internal Affairs, and President of the Supreme Council for Internal Affairs.

Prince Turki bin Faisal was appointed Director-General of Intelligence by King Khalid bin Abdul Aziz in 1977. He held this position until he was replaced by Prince Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz on September 1, 2001. Prince Nawaf now monitors internal and external intelligence matters affecting Saudi Arabia. According to some reports, he has focused his mission on gaining a better understanding of the relationship between extremist groups in Saudi Arabia and the flow of currency both within the Kingdom and beyond its borders..³

A number of other members of the royal family also play key roles in the military. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Prince Sultan's son has recently become the assistant minister of the defense and aviation and the de facto senior administrator of the regular military service. Prince Abdul Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman is the Deputy Minister of Defense and Aviation; Prince Turki bin Nasr is the Deputy Commander of the Royal Saudi Air Force; Prince Badr bin Abd Al Aziz is the Deputy Commander of the National Guard. Other key officers included General Saleh Al-Mahya, the Chief of Staff; Lt. General Sultan Al-Motairy, the Deputy Chief of Staff; Prince Mitebibn Abdullah is Assistant Deputy Commander of the National Guard; Prince Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdulaziz is Assistant Minister of the Interior for Security Affairs.

Some aspects of this leadership have been consistently effective. Both Saudi experts and American military officers serving in Saudi Arabia have high praise for Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Miteb and the leadership of the National Guard. Observers inside the Ministry of Defense (MODA), as well as foreign advisors, praise Khalid bin Sultan for bringing a new degree of

leadership and initiative to the MODA, for revitalizing, and for trying to provide the level of maneuver skills and sustainability Saudi Arabia's military forces need.

There is little praise, however, for the recent leadership of Prince Sultan or Prince Naif. Many observers privately question Prince Sultan's effectiveness in shaping Saudi Arabia's military forces since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, and particularly in coping with the need to restructure Saudi forces to deal with the funding constraints that have affected Saudi forces since 1994. There has also been serious corruption, involving the royal family, in the Saudi Air Force—corruption that has not led to serious punishment and, which is a matter of common knowledge in the Saudi military, Prince Naif is seen as too conservative and slow moving, and Prince Nawaf bin Abdul is widely regarded as an incompetent replacement for Prince Turki.

Organization and Leadership

The Saudi command structure has slowly improved, but still lacks some of the elements necessary for a modern command structure. The Saudi command structure tends to be cautious and over-compartmented, and does not encourage combined arms operations or “jointness” or cooperation between the services. Command relationships are highly personal. Informal relationships often define real authority and promotion, and the Saudi royal family maintains tight control over operations, deployments, procurement, and all other aspects of Saudi military spending.

The role of the royal family in the command structure is a mixed blessing. Senior members of the royal family exert tight control over every important command activity, operation, promotion, planning, and procurement decision. There are Al Sauds in a number of senior command positions, although others have deliberately been given lower ranks to allow officers outside the royal family to hold command slots. Some of these officers have done very well indeed. Others, however, have been little more than place takers, and a few have been corrupt. The royal family does not yet seem to understand that its members must uniformly be judged by the highest standards, and that mediocre or corrupt members of the family are an unacceptable embarrassment.

Promotion and retention in the Saudi high command tends to reward longevity, conservatism, and personal loyalty rather than performance. Many senior commanders are from families with long ties to the Saudi royal family, and many mid-level officers come from families and tribes that are traditionally loyal to the Saud family. At the same time, the level of education and experience of Saudi officers has improved strikingly since the mid-1950s -- when most officers had a traditional background. The military forces are also less political. Some officers then supported Nasser and other Arab radicals while others were more interested in politics and careerism than military professionalism.

Saudi Arabia still makes many promotions for political reasons and because of nepotism. It has been slow to develop systems of rotation that retire senior officers and systems that modernize the higher levels of command. There are many good high-ranking officers, but there are also many mediocre and overcautious "loyalists." Senior officers often serve far too long, and block the promotion of younger and more capable officers below them. Some treat their positions as sinecures or positions they can exploit for profit.

Unless this situation changes, it may eventually produce significant unrest. There have been few signs of political activism in the Saudi military in recent years. Younger Saudi officer corps often still have a traditional cultural background, but they are increasingly well educated and often have considerable technical proficiency. The Saudi military services have also developed relatively modern headquarters and management systems, with the support of Western advisors and technicians. As a result, there is a relatively high degree of military proficiency in many areas. This is particularly true at the tactical level and in those junior to mid-level positions where professionalism is more important in defining power and status than political contacts and family or tribal background.

Management, Budgeting, and Leadership

Some of Saudi Arabia's leadership problems begin at the top. Prince Sultan, the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Aviation, has made a major and enduring contribution to the Kingdom's military development, but he has not always provided the kind of leadership Saudi Arabia needs. There is no doubt that he is active, intelligent, and has often supported the West. At the same time, he sometimes seems obsessed with new equipment

purchases, and to have insufficient patience to deal with the manpower management, operations and maintenance, and sustainability issues that shape real-world military effectiveness. In general, he seems to find it easier to make dramatic new arms buys, than take the kind of hard, consistent, and systematic decisions necessary to translate strategic ideas into operational and mission-oriented war fighting capability. The end result is that Saudi arms purchases have sometimes done more to disorganize the Saudi military, and create conversion problems, than they have done to improve it.

Prince Sultan has also failed to adequately recognize the manpower and financial constraints on the expansion of Saudi military forces. In a speech in 1996, he announced plans to modernize the Saudi armed forces: “We have great plans to modernize the armed forces during the next five-year plan. The broad headlines have been made starting with the training of the individual to securing modern equipment. The sixth plan for our armed forces, which may begin next year, will be, God willing, a plan of expansion not only in purchases but in men and attracting Saudi school and university graduates.”⁴

Perhaps fortunately, the financial constraints imposed by low oil revenues curbed such modernization plans. Unfortunately, Prince Sultan and the Ministry of Defense and Aviation failed to react to these constraints by adequately downsizing and slowing Saudi procurement plans, and by creating more realistic annual budgets and five year plans that stressed investing in balanced war fighting capabilities rather than procurement.

After 1995, key military activities like manpower quality, training and exercises, sustainment, and maintenance were underfunded. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation also failed to exert central management over the services to ensure that they maintained readiness and converted effectively to new equipment, and allowed each service to develop very different levels of capability by branch. Far too little effort was made to develop cohesive plans to ensure suitable progress in interservice cooperation or jointness, in combined arms, and in balancing the development of combat arms with suitable sustainment and support capabilities. Economies were made in many of these areas to fund equipment orders that should have been downsized and renegotiated, and when years of high oil revenues did occur, the Ministry sometimes sharply over spent its budget by making new arms purchases.

Prince Khalid bin Sultan's appointment may be a key first step in giving the MODA the leadership it has lacked since the end of the Gulf War, but he faces a series of difficult challenges. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation needs to shift from a focus on force build-up to a focus on force effectiveness, and introduce tight top-down budget and program management. The Ministry of has failed to develop effective planning, programming, and budgeting systems that ensure that there are effective fiscal controls, and procurement, manpower, and operating and maintenance systems. This makes it difficult to plan and control cash flow for major arms buys. It encourages "stovepiped" funding of different elements of the military forces, and makes it harder to control waste and corruption. There are no stable force modernization and force expansion goals or efforts to shape and fund balanced war fighting capabilities. There seems to be no centralized system to honestly assess the war fighting capability and readiness of Saudi forces and monitor measures of effectiveness. There also is no public transparency of the kind that ensures funds are spent effectively, or that allows Saudis inside and outside the Ministry of Defense and Aviation to assess what the five-year plan is, how the budget is allocated, or how money is actually spent.

In fairness, these same problems affect every military force in the Middle East to some degree, including Israel. A combination of outdated paternalism, exaggerated and pointless secrecy, and treating defense as a virtually fiefdom of the ruling elite is the rule in the region and not the exception. Nevertheless, there are a number of high level Saudis, including some junior members of the royal family, who hope that when Prince Abdullah becomes King, he will reduce Saudi new equipment buys, concentrate on military effectiveness, and fund the sustainment for the Army and Air Force so as to minimize waste. Prince Abdullah may find this difficult because of his natural rivalry with his half brother and putative successor. Saudi Arabia does, however, need to reshape its priorities and the planning and management of the National Guard has been significantly better than that of the Ministry of Defense.

There is a similar need for better direction and leadership in the upper echelons of the Saudi military in each military service, and for changes in command and doctrine that will make Saudi military thinking and operational plans less static, improve every aspect of force planning and management, and prune the upper levels of command. Saudi Arabia needs to move from a nation whose military forces are static and defensive in character to one with military forces that

are oriented towards maneuver and speed of concentration, and joint warfare. It also needs to match its close collective security ties to the United States with much more effective efforts to developing coalition war fighting capabilities with the other Southern Gulf states -- most notably Bahrain and Kuwait.

These problems in organization and high command are compounded by the fact that Saudi Arabia has one of the most complex force postures of any developing nation, while it operates some of the most advanced military technology in the world. In several cases, this technology is more advanced than that in many developed NATO countries. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has just completed the final stages of massive infrastructure programs that have created some of the world's most modern facilities out of empty desert. It is beginning to produce its second generation of ranks with modern military training. Only a little more than generation ago most of its troops were Bedouin with only limited education and technical background.

Still, all of these challenges and problems need to be kept in perspective. The Saudi military forces have often been criticized by those who have little appreciation of the challenges they face and how much they have already accomplished. Saudi Arabia's military planning and management may have been imperfect, but is that of every other country that has tried to cope with the on-going revolution in military affairs. Saudi Arabia has already overcome massive challenges in terms of manpower, infrastructure, and technology transfer. It has a very solid mix of infrastructure and existing equipment holdings to build upon, and relatively high level of overall tactical proficiency for a developing nation.

The Kingdom can draw on military support from the West, and Saudi Arabia has been fortunate in its potential enemies. Iran has never fully rebuilt its conventional forces since it experienced massive losses at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq suffered a devastating defeat in the Gulf, and UN sanctions have blocked any major arms imports since the summer of 1990. Yemen's forces have been weakened by civil war, and Yemen has had few major arms imports since the end of the Cold War. Saudi Arabia may have its military problems, but its most serious potential threats have had military disasters.

Military Manpower

The quality and quantity of military manpower has been one of the most important challenges that Saudi Arabia has faced since it first decided to create modern military forces in the 1960s, and it is a challenge that it will continue to face until well after the year 2010. Saudi Arabia can buy modern military equipment and infrastructure from other countries. However, it must rely on its own manpower base to make these assets effective and develop deterrent and war-fighting capabilities.

This manpower challenge is not easy to meet. The Saudi military faces all of the problems in recruiting a suitable manpower that are faced by the Saudi civil sector. Advanced military equipment requires steadily higher levels of education and experience, and military forces require tight discipline, a strong work ethic, merit-based promotion, training standards that reject those that fail, and modern, service-wide manpower management. Military forces that rely on civilian support for routine military tasks in peacetime have no capability to perform them in war. And, it is far easier to train soldiers at the tactical level than it is to develop suitable cadres of specialists and technicians and the kind of middle to senior officers that can lead in peacetime and command in war.

Manpower Pool and Manpower Problems

Saudi Arabia now has a manpower pool that can meet all of its needs, if it manages it effectively. In the past, Saudi Arabia's total population has been limited relative to that of Northern Gulf neighbor like Iran and Iraq, but this situation is changing. In 2002, Iran had a population of over 68 million. At the same time, Saudi Arabia's total population was over 22 million, and nearly equal to that of Iraq which had a population of 22.3 million. While Saudi population data are uncertain, and vary accordingly to source, Saudi Arabia had a male population of over 1.3 million in 2002 in the age group from 18-22 years of age, and the Saudi Central Department of Statistics reported that there were 1.93 million native Saudi males in the age group from 15-29 years in 1999.⁵

Regardless of exactly which population figures are correct, all sources now give Saudi Arabia a substantial pool of military age manpower to draw upon. For example, CIA estimates

indicate that Saudi Arabia's total pool was around 5.7 million men of military age in 2001. This compares with a pool of roughly 17.8 million males of military age in Iran, 5.6 million males of military age in Iraq, and 3.9 million males of military age in Yemen.⁶ No country, however, comes close to drawing on its total eligible manpower pool in peacetime.

Saudi Arabia has not, however, mobilized its manpower as effectively as Iran and Iraq, both of which were able to place nearly one million men under arms during the Iran-Iraq War. Saudi Arabia only had about 126,500 men in its regular forces in early 2002, plus 75,000-100,000 full time regulars in its National Guard.⁷ These totals compare with 513,000 actives for Iran, and with 424,000 for Iraq, which has a total population almost equal to that of Saudi Arabia.⁸ The broader trends in Gulf military manpower levels are shown in Chart 2.1, and it is clear that Iran and Iraq's regular forces have long had a much larger active strength than Saudi Arabia.⁹

Saudi Arabia does face several serious internal problems, in mobilizing its manpower resources. There were 942,000 foreign males in the age group from 15-29 years in 1999, out of a total of 2.87 million including Saudi males. Continuing tribal and regional rivalries have also affected the recruiting base. Saudi Arabia has had to be cautious about recruiting from regions, such as the Hijaz, that opposed the Saudi conquest in the 1920s and 1930s, and from rival tribes. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism among the poorer and more tribal Saudis, coupled with long-standing hostility among a number of tribes and the Hijaz, have placed additional limits on the Saudi recruiting base and the groups it can conscript from. As a result, the armed forces drew heavily on most of the tribal and regional groupings on which they can count for political support.

Past Methods of Reducing Dependence on Foreign Military Manpower

In the past, Saudi Arabia tried to compensate for its manpower problems by:

- Placing heavy dependence on foreign support and technicians (which reached a maximum of over 14,000 personnel);
- Using small elements of foreign forces in key specialty and technical areas--such as combat engineers--to "fill in" the gaps in Saudi land forces. It formerly had some 10,000 Pakistani troops to fill out one brigade (the 12th Armored Brigade) at Tabuk. These Pakistani forces have not been replaced, although some contingency arrangements may exist with Egypt.¹⁰

- Selectively undermanning its forces while it built up its training and manpower base;
- Concentrating on building a fully effective air force as a first line deterrent and defense; and,
- A de facto reliance on over-the-horizon reinforcement by the US and Western allies-to deal with high-level or enduring conflicts.

Some of these techniques are still useful, but they are now far less necessary because of the rapid growth of the Saudi population, and other factors have helped Saudi recruiting.

Current Manpower Quantity, and Quality Problem

Employment in military jobs has become steadily more important to the families of those who do serve. Some Saudi units estimate, for example, that every enlisted man now supports an average of 11 dependents. Although most Saudi recruits tend to make the military a career once they join (there is only about a 10-15% loss after the first full enlistment), urbanization, labor migration, and intermarriage have also done a great deal to break down traditional tribal and regional recruiting problems. Even the National Guard now mixes Saudis from a wide range of tribes and areas in the Kingdom.

At the same time, the Kingdom has not provided sufficient money to train, hire, and retain all of the regular and skilled manpower it needs. It has no conscription program, and recruiting has sometimes been erratic because money has been a problem -- recruiting had to be suspended during the worst moments in the "oil crash" in the late 1990s -- a time when Crown Prince Abdullah was also forced to freeze hiring for civil departments. As a result of funding constraints, many units are still well short of their authorized levels of manpower. The systematic underfunding of operations, maintenance, training equipment, and sustainment since the mid-1990s has also meant that Saudi officers and technicians have not gotten the exposure they need in the form of on-the-job training and work activity.


The armed forces face the same broader problems with manpower quality as Saudi society. Despite Saudi population growth and the expansion of Saudi educational facilities, skilled manpower with practical experience and a work ethic remains at a premium, far too much use is made of rote learning, far too little training stresses initiative and problem solving, foreign language and technical training are often inadequate, and men are passed or promoted who fail or fall short of the requires standard. The Kingdom has steadily tried to reduce its overall

dependence on foreign manpower as part of its “Saudisation” policy, and has accelerated this process since 1997. Saudisation, however, has been as much of a mixed blessing in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation as in the Saud civil economy as a whole. It has sometimes replaced competent foreign technicians and support personnel with Saudis who are not equally competent to do the job.

Reductions in the role of training and education abroad also affect the ability of the armed forces to reach the proper skill levels, and foreign language skills are becoming a problem. Saudi military training in the US, for example, now averages about 15% of the levels in the early 1990s. Senior US advisors feel this lack of training in the US is a particularly serious problem for the Saudi Air Force. Such advisors believe that the US needs to provide for more International Military Education and Training aid, and reduce the premiums it has charged Saudi military personnel training in the US. The appropriation for \$25,000 for such training in 2002 is at least a first step in reducing the added fees and surcharges the US has applied in the past, and which reflected a US priority for profiteering over partnership.

Chart 2.1

Trends in Total Gulf Military Manpower



Source: Estimated by Anthony H. Cordesman using data from various editions of the IISS Military Balance, Jane's Sentinel, and Military Technology. Note that Saudi includes full-time active National Guard, Oman includes Royal Guard, Iran includes Revolutionary Guards, and Iraq includes Republican Guards and Special Republican Guards.

Table 2.1Saudi Military Demographics Versus Those of Neighboring States in 2001

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Total Population</u> | <u>Males Reaching Military Age Each Year</u> | <u>Males Between the Ages of</u> | | | <u>Males Between 15 and 49</u> | |
|----------------|-------------------------|--|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| | | | <u>13 and 17</u> | <u>18 and 22</u> | <u>23 and 32</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Medically Fit</u> |
| Iran | 68,281,000 | 823,040 | 4,587,000 | 3,827,000 | 5,771,000 | 18,318,000 | 10,872,000 |
| Iraq | 22,300,000 | 274,035 | 1,498,000 | 1,281,000 | 1,894,000 | 5,902,000 | 3,302,000 |
| Bahrain | 626,000 | 5,926 | 33,000 | 26,000 | 40,000 | 222,000 | 122,000 |
| Kuwait | 2,065,000 | 18,309 | 120,000 | 103,000 | 147,000 | 781,000 | 466,000 |
| Oman | 2,674,000 | 26,469 | 131,000 | 106,000 | 154,000 | 771,000 | 430,000 |
| Qatar | 610,000 | 6,797 | 25,000 | 21,000 | 35,000 | 312,000 | 164,000 |
| Saudi Arabia | 22,205,000 | 233,402 | 1,348,000 | 1,133,000 | 1,670,000 | 5,894,000 | 3,291,000 |
| UAE | 2,571,000 | 25,482 | 86,000 | 84,000 | 143,000 | 778,000 | 420,000 |
| Yemen | 18,885,000 | 238,690 | 974,000 | 788,000 | 1,293,000 | 4,103,000 | 2,303,000 |
| Afghanistan | 22,567,000 | 252,869 | 1,451,000 | 1,178,000 | 2,014,000 | 6,645,000 | 3,562,000 |
| Djibouti | 783,000 | - | 41,000 | 34,000 | 55,000 | 108,000 | 64,000 |
| Eritrea | 3,905,000 | - | 246,000 | 205,000 | 311,000 | - | - |
| Ethiopia | 63,659,000 | 703,625 | 3,842,000 | 3,083,000 | 4,617,000 | 14,538,000 | 7,582,000 |
| Somalia | 10,317,000 | - | 607,000 | 494,000 | 707,000 | 1,825,000 | 1,011,000 |
| Sudan | 29,632,000 | 398,294 | 1,940,000 | 1,644,000 | 2,471,000 | 8,436,000 | 5,195,000 |
| Turkey | 67,652,000 | 674,805 | 3,266,000 | 3,254,000 | 6,098,000 | 18,882,000 | 11,432,000 |
| Egypt | 70,615,000 | 712,983 | 3,634,000 | 3,218,000 | 5,067,000 | 18,563,000 | 12,020,000 |
| Gaza | 1,132,000* | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Israel | 6,336,000 | 49,206 | 281,000 | 270,000 | 526,000 | 1,522,000 | 1,246,000 |
| Jordan | 6,869,000 | 57,131 | 274,000 | 245,000 | 444,000 | 1,459,000 | 1,034,000 |
| Lebanon | 3,578,000 | - | 213,000 | 195,000 | 391,000 | 980,000 | 605,000 |
| Palestinian | 3,000,000* | - | 163,000 | 140,000 | 233,000 | - | - |
| Syria | 16,493,000 | 200,859 | 1,042,000 | 853,000 | 1,210,000 | 4,385,000 | 2,449,000 |
| West Bank | 1,700,000* | - | - | - | - | - | - |

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman, CIA World Factbook, and IISS, Military Balance

Current and Future Saudi Military Manpower Levels

Comparative estimates of the build-up of Saudi active military manpower are shown in Chart 2.2. The build-up of total full time active manpower by service is shown in Chart 2.3. According to the IISS, Saudi Arabia had approximately 75,000 full time uniformed actives in its army in 2001, plus 15,500 in its navy, 20,000 in its air force, and 16,000 in its air defense force. It has 100,000 more full-time actives in its Royal Guards and National Guard, 10,500 in its Frontier Forces, 4,500 in its Coast Guard, and up to 500 more men in its Special Security Forces and other special units. These figures produce a maximum of about 178,000 active men, although Saudi Arabia reports another 20,000 part time levies in the National Guard – an estimate confirmed by US advisors in the Kingdom. The data in Charts 2.2 and 2.3 understates the true nature of the Saudi manpower build-up because Saudi regulars and National Guardsmen are now far more reliable and less likely to take unauthorized leave.¹¹

The US State Department has provided a somewhat different, if somewhat dated, estimate of Saudi military manning, including irregulars:¹²

- 191,500 uniformed troops in the armed forces, including:
 - Royal Saudi Navy (RSNF)(including Marines) --- 15,500
 - Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) --- 20,000
 - Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (RSADF) --- 16,000
 - Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) --- 75,000
 - Reservists --- None
- Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG):
 - Uniformed troops--- 65,000
 - Paramilitary/Irregular Troops --- 35,000
 - Total, Including Irregulars --- 226,500

Whatever the exact total may be, Saudi Arabia does maintain far larger forces than it did in the past. Its regular active forces only totaled 65,700 men before Iraq invaded Kuwait, with some 38,000 in the Army, 6,000 in the Navy, an additional 1,200 Marines, 16,500 in the Air Force, and 4,000 in the Air Defense Forces. The National Guard had a nominal strength of

56,000, but only 10,000 men were active, another 20,000 were assigned to the regular reserve, and 26,000 in the part-time tribal irregulars.¹³

Even today, however, the Saudi force of full time regulars remains under 130,000 men. This simply is not enough active manpower to meet the needs impossibly Saudi Arabia's current force structure, or to properly fight and sustain the equipment and weapons that Saudi Arabia has already purchased for its regular forces. Saudi Arabia has a force structure equivalent to about three divisions, a navy with some 17 major surface combatants plus seven mine countermeasure vessels, an air force with 417 combat aircraft on hand and 348 "active in combat units, and air defense forces with some 33 surface-to-air missile batteries.

There are no magic formulas that set the military manpower requirements for such a force structure and equipment strength, but Saudi Arabia probably needed some 200,000-250,000 actives to make its force structure fully effective. The alternatives are to (a) increase the manpower pool, (b) re-structure its National Guard to take over some of the functions of the army, (c) shift men from the National Guard into the Army, and/or (d) abolish many of its units with older equipment.

Saudi Arabia explored doubling its forces, and expanding its total regular military forces to 200,000 men, shortly after the Gulf War. Prince Sultan reiterated this goal in May 1996. He stated that, "The sixth plan for our armed forces, which may begin next year, will be, God willing, a plan of expansion not only in purchases but in men and attracting Saudi school and university graduates."¹⁴ It is far from clear, however, that Saudi Arabia can reach 200,000 full time actives of reasonable quality by the year 2005, and it is virtually certain that it cannot do so with men of the proper quality.

While Saudi Arabia certainly has a large enough manpower pool in its total population to draw upon, it has emphasized new equipment purchases over manpower, and its growing budgetary problems since 1991 have led it to sacrifice in manpower numbers and quality in order to pay for arms imports. As a result, the Saudi regular forces have serious problems. It is necessary for them to make reforms in their recruiting and training to compensate for past neglect and Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to deal with these problems before 2005-2010 unless it restructures its present pattern of defense investment.

Current Manpower Management Problems

Effective manpower management is also an issue. If there is also meaningful effort to create force-wide manpower management in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, it is certainly not apparent from the results. Each service seems to manage its own manpower intake, promotion, career development, and retention with little overall effort to manage military manpower resources and with insufficient supervision of the effectiveness of the result. These problems are then further complicated by the fact that the National Guard makes up about one-third of total full time active Saudi military manpower, and runs a totally separate recruiting, training, and retention system with little communication with the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and equally little effort to develop common policies or economies of scale in training, recruiting, and other military manpower activities.

The regular services need to refocus training and promotion on quality and performance. Nepotism, family contacts, and tribal status often still determine which men are selected for skilled positions, or appointments. Time in service determines many aspects of promotion, as does seniority within a given rank. Selection out is still rare and senior officers often stay in given positions far too long. There has been little incentive for middle grade officers to be innovative or take chances, and senior officers are often retained who show limited leadership capability. More effort needs to be made to aggressively promote high quality junior and middle ranking officers, to reward the best officers with top positions, or to prune mid-level and senior officers who fail to demonstrate outstanding performance.

There is a cultural reluctance to promote on the basis of merit. Saudi officers are the first to say that the quality of the officer corps suffers because “Saudis do not fail Saudis” in training programs, and promotion often comes through seniority. One officer made a comment about the promotion process which goes against the grain of much of the Western thinking on this issue, but which was supported by a number of other officers: “You (US observers) always ask if the royal family interferes in promotions. They are not the problem. In fact, they often force the promotion of younger and more competent officers. The problem is that no one is really selected out because they are not good enough, people stay far too long in positions at the top, and

promotion is a matter of age and seniority. Our problem is not interference from Princes or outsiders. It is what we do to ourselves.”

There is also a cultural unwillingness to insist on competence at the expense of social relations. As one Saudi general put it, “You have to understand that one of our most basic problems in training and promotion is that no Saudi officer will ever fail another Saudi officer, and that to reject the son or nephew of a friend is an insult.” This helps explain why “Saudisation” presents problems, why the regular military services remain over-dependent on foreign technicians and support personnel, and why fewer foreign support personnel are being asked to do more and more. One long-term British military advisor put it this way: “Saudi military forces have always threatened to become a static display. Now they are threatening to become a static display with rust.”

The Saudi National Guard faces fewer problems in these areas. The Guard does not use advanced weapons and requires less technical skills and ability to deal with advanced tactics, joint operations, and combined arms. Ironically, the Guard may be more traditional in some respects, but is more demanding in terms of performance in training and has a more merit-based promotion system. It probably has the basic manpower numbers it needs today, but it does need more trained manpower, and it will have problems obtaining all of the skilled career manpower necessary to make it fully effective as it becomes more technically sophisticated. Creating new National Guard brigades and filling out its support forces will require a further build-up of skilled manpower and any such effort would compete directly with recruiting for the regular armed forces.¹⁵

Most Saudi military manpower problems could be eliminated during the next decade *if* the Ministry of Defense and Aviation develops more effective military manpower and management capabilities and *if* the Ministry of Defense and Aviation and National Guard can do a better job in coordinating how the Kingdom uses its military manpower. Saudi Arabia's high population growth rate is rapidly increasing the number of eligible men, its educational system is becoming better, and younger Saudis now realize that the days of guaranteed jobs and high salaries in the civil sector are over. Military service is relatively popular, at least among young males with rural and tribal backgrounds. Saudi Arabia has begun to pay more for new entrants and the expectations of young Saudis are more modest than they were in the 1970s and 1980s.

During the late 1990s, for example, unemployment among Saudi men entering the working force began to approach or exceed 30% and recruiting and retention improved to the point that there were more qualified applicants than the National Guard could absorb. Nevertheless, it will take a sustained and expensive recruiting drive, better training and retention incentives and better education and manpower management, to give Saudi Arabia the military manpower it needs.

Much will depend on popular perceptions of the threats to the Kingdom, and of the real-world value of the Saudi military in defending it, but the Gulf War has already shown that Saudi Arabia could expand its manpower base when Saudis believe that military service is necessary. The Kingdom called for volunteers for the first time, expecting some 25,000 volunteers at most; it got 200,000 to 250,000. This shows that Saudi Arabia can probably expand its manpower significantly in future years if it can convince Saudi youth that a military career is rewarding and that military service is really necessary to defend and help the country.¹⁶ The situation will be very different, however, if young Saudis feel the military forces are sinecures, if they do not believe they are combat effective, and if they believe the Kingdom relies on US forces to defend it rather than on the US as a military partner.

Reliance on Western Forces and Reinforcements

Saudi Arabia relies heavily on the US, and to some extent Britain and France, to supplement its own military capabilities. This reliance on the US makes good strategic sense in many ways. Saudi Arabia cannot hope to develop anything approaching the US level of C⁴I/SR capability, or its ability to exploit the “revolution in military affairs” during the next decade. Saudi and US strategic interests coincide so closely in defending against any overt threat from the Northern Gulf that the Kingdom can count on massive US reinforcements from over-the-horizon capabilities if it, Kuwait, or Bahrain face any such threats as well as similar US efforts to check any overt aggression against any of the lower Gulf countries.

An ongoing US-British-Saudi partnership actively enforces Operation Southern Watch and the “no-fly zone” in southern Iraq. As has been discussed earlier, this partnership both contains Iraq and deters Iran. The Gulf War demonstrated that Saudi and US forces could fight well in coalition operations and the US has maintained a strong mix of F-15, F-16 and other combat, reconnaissance, intelligence, tanker, and support aircraft in Saudi Arabia ever since that

war. These US forces were originally concentrated in Dhahran on the Gulf coast, but were relocated to Prince Sultan Air Base, some 80 kilometers south of Riyadh, after the bombing of the USAF barracks in Al Khobar on June 25, 1996. The US also relocated much of the 25,000 short tons of air force equipment it had prepositioned in Saudi Arabia, although much of this stockpile may since have been reduced.

The US also deploys a Patriot PAC-2 anti-air/anti-tactical ballistic missile battery in Saudi Arabia, and is helping Saudi Arabia activate its own force as it grows to six PAC-2 battalions. Saudi air bases are sized to allow the US to rapidly reinforce the Kingdom, and its Air Defense forces and C⁴I system can rapidly integrate two further US Patriot battalions units into Saudi Arabia's land-based air defenses. The US has also reestablished its presence in the Saudi central air command and control facilities in Riyadh. (It temporarily withdrew this presence after the bombing of Al Khobar.) These arrangements allowed Saudi Arabia to give the US substantial -- if quiet -- tactical support during the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. In September 2002, Saudi Arabia also agreed to resume exercises with the US as well as to broaden the ability of Southern Watch forces to strike across the Iraqi border.

The US does not preposition any land force equipment in Saudi Arabia, aside from the equipment for its Patriot unit. The fact that the Saudi Army operates so much US equipment does, however, ensure that many of the support facilities the US Army would need are present in the Kingdom. Saudi holdings of US munitions would also allow the Kingdom to sustain intensive US air and land operations until the US could resupply by sea. The US Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy also conduct exercises and training with Saudi forces, as well as provide advisors serving with Saudi units.

The US presence in the rest of the Gulf varies with time, but the US has long prepositioned most of a US Army brigade set in Kuwait, another such set in Qatar, has a third brigade set at on ships at Diego Garcia. It is creating a prepositioning facility in the UAE. It has another brigade equivalent of Marine equipment deployed at sea, and usually has elements of this joint land-air Marine Expeditionary Force deployed on ships in the Gulf. The US can also move at least two light Army divisions to Saudi Arabia by air and deploy a third, heavier Army division and all of the elements of a Marine division by sea within 30 days. The US prepositions substantial war fighting supplies for land and air operations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. It has

port facilities in the UAE, and bases its 5th fleet in Bahrain, and has contingency arrangements to base air units in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. These arrangements now allow the US to keep its permanent presence in Saudi Arabia at levels around 5,000 men -- a token presence compared to the total forces deployed by Iran or Iraq --while minimizing the impact of a US military presence on Saudi society.

Nevertheless, Saudi dependence on US arms, advisors, and military support clearly presents problems for the Kingdom. As been touched upon earlier, these problems include the backlash from US ties to Israel and the Second Intifada, the opposition of some Saudi Islamists to a US presence on Saudi soil, and Saudi concern that a US presence in the Kingdom leads the US to use its forces to serve its own regional interests rather than those of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia faces other risks and problems because of its military ties to the West. It now depends on many joint command and C⁴I/SR functions being performed by the US in any major conflict. Saudi forces need better and integrated Saudi battle management capabilities to enable its Army, National Guard, Air Force, Air Defense Force, and Navy to conduct modern, high tempo operations against a large opponent like Iran and Iraq. It places de facto reliance on US C⁴I/SR capabilities to integrate and coordinate Saudi joint operations.

As a result, Saudi Arabia must both find ways to reshape its strategic dependence on the US to make it more politically acceptable, and to strengthen its own C⁴I/SR capabilities. "Reshaping," however, does not mean "abandoning" or "weakening." Saudi Arabia has no alternative to some degree of dependence, which does not weaken—particularly as the threat from weapons of mass destruction grows.

Europe's role in providing military support is limited. Britain is now the only European power truly capable of sustaining advanced air-land-naval combat in the Gulf. It cannot deploy anything like the forces the US can, but it does maintain a limited RAF strength in Saudi Arabia with a nominal average strength of 200 men, six Tornado GR. Mk 1 attack aircraft and two VC-10 K2/3 tankers. The Saudi Air Force also operates the Tornado and can support rapid RAF deployments to Saudi Arabia. The Royal Navy has deployed in the Gulf for well over a decade, and although the British Armilla Patrol only consists of a few combat ships, the Royal Navy plays a role in exercise training and improving Saudi and other Gulf naval performance out of

any proportion to the size of its normal deployments. Britain could quickly deploy light land forces to the region and up to one mechanized brigade in 30-days.

France does play a role in the Gulf region, and has a base in Djibouti on the southern coast of the Red Sea. It has maintained a limited air presence of Mirage 2000C fighters, tankers, and transport aircraft in Saudi Arabia, although it ceased to participate in Southern Watch and other operations against Iraq in 1998. The French Army, Air Force, and Navy could provide limited reinforcements in Saudi Arabia, and conduct training exercises with the Kingdom and other GCC forces, and some Saudis feel that Saudi Arabia should increase its reliance on France as a way of reducing its problems in dealing with the US in “9/11” and the Second Intifada.

France, however, has never funded the mix of C⁴I/SR, power projection, and sustainment capabilities that French forces would need for a major deployment and such French reinforcements would be far less effective in actual war fighting than their equipment and tactical readiness would indicate. Major French reinforcement would probably be so dependent on US and Saudi aid in C4I/SR and sustainment that they would have to take the place of substantially more effective US reinforcements.

As for the rest of Europe, more than three decades of European debates over creating effective European out of area power projection capabilities have created institutions but only token actual war fighting capabilities.

Limits to Islamic and Arab Reinforcements

While some Saudi, Arab, and Western analysts have argued that Saudi Arabia should use Arab forces to reduce or replace its dependence on US and other Western forces and reinforcements, this is not a practical option. There are no other Arab or Islamic countries which have effective power projection and sustainment capabilities, the ability to carry out the required C4I/SR activity, or anything approaching the advanced tactics and war fighting technology of the US. Aside from small elite elements, no such country could provide units with even a fifth of the ability to sustain joint or combined arms combat of their US or British counterparts. No such capability can handle the targeting and force management burdens of advanced, interoperable air and land combat or offer any hope of providing some degree of missile defense and ability to

suppress and destroy the weapons of mass destruction and major delivery systems of powers like Iran and Iraq.

Moreover, the Kingdom has not had good experiences in trying to use Arab and Islamic forces to supplement its own. The countries involved have invariably had political and economic agendas that have conflicted with those of Saudi Arabia and their forces have proved to be ineffective and/or unreliable. Efforts to use Jordanian contract officers led to defections and political problems in the 1950s and 1960s. Pakistani forces serving in the army refused to deploy as requested during the Iran-Iraq War, and no Pakistani battalion-level forces have existed in the Saudi army since that time.

Syria deployed divisions against Iraq in 1990, but they did not fight. Egyptian troops fought as well as they were allowed to, but were slow to advance for political reasons and showed they were weakly organized and lacked the technology and joint warfare capabilities need for such expeditionary missions.¹⁷ This explains why there has never been a serious Saudi attempt to follow-up on the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian “Damascus Accords” signed at the time of the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia saw such an “alliance” as involving an Egyptian-Syrian command presence in the Kingdom and as a largely political and cosmetic symbol of lasting solidarity against Iraq. Egypt and Syria saw it as involved the continued deployment of major combat units and as a way to obtain substantial military and economic aid as well as prestige.

Since 1991, Syria’s forces have steadily declined in modernization and relative war fighting capability and it no longer can be regarded as anything approaching a serious option. Egypt’s combat units have steadily improved, but still have limited power projection and sustainment capability. Saudi Arabia also still sees Egypt as something of a rival for power and prestige in the Arab world.

Progress in Obtaining Support from the GCC

The Gulf Cooperation Council has been discussing military cooperation since it was formed in May 1981, but it has made relatively limited real-world progress. As has been mentioned earlier, the GCC has deployed a Peninsula Shield Force in Hafr al Batin in northeastern Saudi Arabia since 1984. This force is deployed in a strategic area roughly 65

kilometers from the Kuwaiti border and has a nominal strength of 5,000 men. Leading Saudi commanders and members of the royal family make it clear that the only real war fighting capabilities of this force consist of a Saudi Army brigade that was deployed in the area long before the Peninsula Shield Force existed, that the so-called composite brigade with manpower and equipment from other GCC states is understrength and with only token defensive war fighting capability, and that the plans the GCC Ministers announced to strengthen the Peninsula Shield Force after their meeting in December 2000 are cosmetic rather than real. These problems have been compounded by reliance on GCC exercises that are largely unrealistic showpieces involving token reinforcements from other Southern Gulf states. Unfortunately, the only realistic joint warfare and combined arms exercises that bring even Saudi and Kuwait land and air forces together have been relatively low-level (battalion equivalent-sized) exercises led by the US.

The GCC does, however, have the potential to do far more in the future, and some progress is being made. Naval cooperation is improving faster than cooperation in air and land forces, with significant contributions from the British, French, and US navies. This involves steadily more realistic exercises in critical missions like mine warfare.

The GCC took 20 years to do it, but it put the first phase of a joint air defense command and control system into operation in early 2001 called Hizam Al Taaun (HAT-Belt of Cooperation). This system provides secure communications between the national air defense command and control centers of the GCC states rather than truly integrates air defense. However, it can provide early warning and some intercept and land-based air defense data in the event of an air attack by Iran or Iraq (It would not provide useful data in a ballistic missile low-altitude air, or cruise missile attack.). However, future plans call for a combination of a Raytheon-developed integrated air battle management system, and an Ericson secure optical fiber communications system, should allow the GCC to finally develop capabilities than should have been in place well over a decade ago.

Future Reliance on Foreign Manpower and Advisors

The Kingdom has cut back steadily on foreign manpower and contractor support since the early 1990s – both for cost reasons and as part of its Saudisation policies. As a result, it is difficult to make any estimate of the degree to which Saudi Arabia currently offsets its manpower shortages by the direct use of foreign troops and advisors. Further, the separation between formal military advisors and Western contractors is often more a matter of clothing than function. It is clear, however, that there are still significant numbers of US, British, and French military advisors serving with Saudi forces, and there are still significant numbers of Western contract personnel -- many handling critical service and support functions for Saudi Arabia's most modern weapons. There are small cadres from Brazil and other arms sellers, and at least several hundred PRC personnel servicing and operating Saudi Arabia's CSS-2 long- range surface-to-surface missiles.

At the same time, the Kingdom lacks the financial resources it had in the past to buy the level of Western foreign contractor support it needs to perform routine force-wide functions like maintenance and training. It has also found that using large numbers of foreign contract personnel to provide key skills leads to enduring dependence in areas where Saudi Arabia should have its own capabilities, and leads to problems in training personnel to work well with their Saudi counterparts and then stay in country.

Saudi planners have concluded that foreign contract manpower must be carefully chosen if it is expected to maintain and sustain combat forces in an actual war where Saudi bases and facilities are at risk. As a result, relatively small cadres of Western personnel with long experience in the Kingdom continue to provide critical support and expertise, but Saudi Arabia makes far less use of Western personnel than it did in the past. It does still use more substantial numbers of foreign contract personnel, and seconded or ex-military personnel. Saudi Arabia has found, however, that manpower from other Arab or Islamic states can be hard to train to the levels needed for skilled technical support jobs and hard to retain once it is trained.


As a result, Saudi Arabia has further reasons to carefully examine any future plans to expand its forces purchase large numbers of additional weapons systems. It is clear that simply creating units on paper, and buying large numbers of weapons, does not make the required

manpower quantity or quality appear. As is the case with training, sustainment, and maintenance, Saudi Arabia needs to concentrate on creating real-world war-fighting capability and not force numbers. This means focusing on a future force structure it can actually man with manpower with the right training and skills, giving the proper manning of support forces the same priority as combat arms.

Chart 2.2

Saudi Active Military Manning – 1980-2002

(1,000s of Personnel)




| | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | 93 | 94 | 95 | 96 | 97 | 98 | 99 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| ■ Air Defense | | | | | | | | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 16 | 16 |
| □ Navy | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 7.8 | 7.2 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 16 |
| ■ Air Force | 15 | 15 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 20 |
| ■ National Guard -Active | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 35 | 35 | 55 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 57 | 75 | 75 |
| ■ Army | 31 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 40 | 45 | 38 | 38 | 40 | 45 | 73 | 68 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 70 | 75 | 75 |
| ■ National Guard - Total | 20 | 30 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 50 | 56 | 56 | 55 | 55 | 75 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 77 | 100 | 100 |
| ■ Total IISS | 55 | 67 | 67 | 62 | 62 | 73 | 78 | 74 | 74 | 76 | 113 | 112 | 157 | 158 | 161 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 163 | 202 | 202 |
| ■ Total ACDA | 79 | 79 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 80 | 84 | 82 | 146 | 191 | 172 | 172 | 172 | 172 | 164 | 175 | - | - | - | | |

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman various editions of ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, ACDA/GPO, Washington, and US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Bureau of Arms Control, Washington; the IISS, Military Balance, the JCSS, Military Balance in the Middle East, and material provided by US experts.

Chart 2.3

Total Saudi Active Military Manning by Military Service – 1980-2002
(1,000s of Personnel)



Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from various editions of ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, ACDA/GPO, Washington, 1996 and US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Bureau of Arms Control, Washington, 1999; the IISS, Military Balance, the JCSS, Military Balance in the Middle East, and material provided by US experts.

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¹ David E. Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1997, University Press of Florida, pp. 35-38.

² Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, "Government Official's Biographies: His Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud," Available from: http://www.saudiembassy.net/gov_profile/bio_sultan.html. Accessed on May 30, 2002.

³ Joseph A. Kechichian, Succession in Saudi Arabia, New York, Palgrave, 2001. p. 79.

⁴ Reuters, May 14, 1996; Jane's Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996, p. 4.

⁵ IISS, Military Balance, 2001-2002, "Saudi Arabia"; SAMA, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, 1421H, Table 16.3

⁶ CIA, World Factbook, 2001, "Iran," "Iraq," "Saudi Arabia," and "Yemen."

⁷ Some estimates of National Guard regulars go as low as 75,000. Guard officials sometimes use a figure of 150,000, but this seems to include tribal irregulars.

⁸ IISS, Military Balance, 2001-2002.

⁹ Unless otherwise specified, the military data quoted here are taken from the relevant country sections of various annual editions of the IISS, Military Balance; CIA, The World Factbook; and The Middle East Military Balance, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv.)

¹⁰ These Pakistani forces left the Kingdom in 1988 and 1989.

¹¹ Based on interviews, IISS estimates, and the Jane's Sentinel series for 1999-2001.

¹² Department of State, Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1999, Submitted to the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives, July 27, 2000, in accordance with section 511(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993.

¹³ IISS, Military Balance, 1990-1991.

¹⁴ Jane's Defense Weekly, May 22, 1996, p. 4.

¹⁵ Jane's Pointer, September 1996, p. 5; Defense News, April 14, 1997, p. 3.

¹⁶ Saudi government officials again raised the possibility of instituting a draft in late 1994. See Reuters, 11-23-94 00:39 AET.

¹⁷ The data available to the author were so much in conflict that it proved impossible to provide even a useful range.