

THE ZEDILLO LEGACY IN MEXICO

Roderic Ai Camp
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Joyce Hoebing
CSIS Americas Program
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: (202) 775-3299
Fax: (202) 477-4739

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Executive Summary

An assessment of President Ernesto Zedillo's first two years in office suggests both the importance of the on-going political context in which he must operate and the difficulties raised by a political model in transition from strong, central, presidential authority to a more pluralist structure. A comprehensive analysis of many decisions taken by the president's administration reveals some serious deficiencies in implementation, policymaking, and communication. On the other hand, the president has implemented important policy decisions supportive of his general political goals, most of which have been overshadowed by responses to the economic crisis. An analysis of his cabinet changes and recent electoral trends at the local and state level indicate that the president is aware of some of his deficiencies, is attempting to correct some of the problems among his immediate collaborators, and is willing to suffer the consequences attributed to his personal leadership in order to achieve a broad decentralization of presidential authority. The prospects of his party are not as dim as media and popular print reports might suggest. Despite an extraordinarily difficult economic and political situation, the president has the potential to strengthen his presidency.

The General Context

Zedillo is approaching the two-year mark in his presidential administration—one-third of the way through his tenure in office. What can be said about the prospects of his presidency, the accomplishments and failures of his regime, and the internal political developments within the executive branch? No assessment of any presidential administration is feasible without understanding the larger political context in which it must operate, how it is viewed by public opinion, and the legitimacy it is given by political elites.

Although it should be obvious to even an occasional observer, it is often forgotten that Mexico is undergoing a tremendous political transition. Critics have charged throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and during the first two years of the Zedillo administration, that the pace and extent of these changes are insufficient and undramatic. While those assertions are understandable when comparing Mexican achievements to date with democratic political models presently operating elsewhere, such as in the United States, these criticisms ignore some fundamental alterations, or patterns in transition, *within* Mexico's own political context.

As far as assessing the political context generally, it makes little difference whether Zedillo or his predecessor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, initiated and completed these changes, or whether they occurred in spite of inadequate presidential leadership. It would be fair to say that as of 1996, Mexico can be described accurately as a political system in transition. It is a political model which strongly retains political elements from its recent and distant past

while at the same time presenting new structures and values that are confronting head on traditional rules of the political game. In short, the Mexican political situation is dynamic, fluid, and changing. Whether ultimately it will become more or less democratic than it is today remains in question. In the short term, it is likely to extend even further its new participatory context along the rocky road toward democratization, but future economic and social crises may make that goal difficult to sustain as a consistent pattern, perhaps following a proverbial two-step forward, one-step backward trajectory.

The larger political context today is one of crisis, muted though it may be. Media attention determines its intensity, which, as has been clearly demonstrated in that past several years, can change overnight. Zedillo, as would any other chief executive in his shoes, faces a monumental political challenge for the following reasons:

- His administration is coping with the most severe economic crisis facing Mexico since the 1930s, both in real economic terms and to the degree that public opinion places the blame on Zedillo and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for these conditions.
- Zedillo promised during his campaign and has attempted to implement, although haltingly and sometimes in contradictory fashion, a pattern of presidential decentralization.
- This administration inherited a political situation fraught with major, unresolved issues, including negotiations between the government and Chiapan rebels and political assassinations allegedly involving prominent political families, reaching to the presidency.
- The administration also inherited a political system already in transition, characterized by conflicting, emerging patterns, most of which were incomplete or tenuous at best.
- Zedillo found himself leading an administration which failed to perpetuate a newly composed political constituency crafted by Salinas or to establish his own alliance.
- Finally, Zedillo's administration faces a plethora of new and strengthened actors, increasing the complexity of the decision-making process.

Assessing Presidential Performance

The most important policy issues currently facing the president are: recovering from the economic crisis, continuing electoral reforms, resolving the outstanding political assassinations from the previous regime (Luis Donaldo Colosio and José Ruiz Massieu), responding to social insecurity (urban crime and drug trafficking), strengthening the judicial branch of government and the rule of law, and decentralizing the presidency. A case by case analysis of the decision-making process and its consequences is possible. Assessing commonalities among the various decisions and linking them together with the characteristics of the larger political context, however, is more useful because it reveals the broad characteristics of

Zedillo's presidency.

Presidential decision-making can be assessed from four distinct viewpoints:

- The process of making the decision itself.
- The manner in which the decision was communicated.
- The consistency with which the decision was implemented.
- The commitment to the administration's policy goals.

In Mexico, the decision-making process is the most difficult of the above to assess because it remains dominated by the executive branch, and in large part remains secretive. Only the most in-depth analysis, using information from actual actors in the process, would provide a complete, objective picture. The response of affected actors in Mexican society to a specific decision does suggest to some degree, however, an administration's level of success in making decisions.

Careful, objective analysis of Zedillo's economic policymaking, for example, suggests a remarkable level of consistency in his administration's goals and his willingness to pay a steep political price to achieve what he and his advisers believe are the appropriate, technical economic conditions conducive to an economic recovery. This consistency in itself, regardless of its policy merits, deserves considerable admiration. It is not our task to assess the merits of the regime's macroeconomic choices, but how those choices are accomplished and their political consequences. And yet, the president's very willingness to stay the course, and the ensuing political costs, make it difficult in the medium to long term to sustain both his economic policy goals and other, complementary political goals. Normally, business interests favor an austerity package in Mexico. But the severe weakness of the banking sector, the harsh, immediate consequences of the implementation of NAFTA despite the substantial short-term benefits to the export sector since the peso crisis, and the high rate of bankruptcies among numerous small- and medium-sized companies have generated vociferous, dissenting voices within the business community. Several decisions taken during the Zedillo administration exacerbated these dissenting voices, which represent some of the leading business interest organizations.

One of the unnoticed decisions by the Zedillo administration that had significant consequences for macroeconomic and other policy decisions is the reversal of the laws establishing business interest group membership. The corporatist, business relationship between the Mexican government and the private sector was built largely on the concept of requiring certain size businesses to join major organizations such as Concanaco and Concamin, the industrial and commercial interest group giants. Zedillo's administration eliminated compulsory membership, believing it contrary to the voluntary membership characterizing the private sector in participatory political models. They believed this marked another retreat from statism and paternalistic government supervision of the private sector. Less than a year after the regulations were redrawn, these organizations found themselves in serious financial straits because companies, no longer required by federal law to join their

respective organizations, were not paying their dues. This has practical political consequences, affecting the structure of business-government relations and placing in flux the way in which business groups relate to the executive branch.

Other administrative decisions have equally admirable goals, and their consequences may end up achieving far more positive results than the new business organization regulations, but the implementation process contradicts presidential intentions. For example, Zedillo's potentially most far-reaching decision is strengthening the judicial branch at the highest levels. It should be remembered in terms of the general political context that the judicial remained the weakest of the three branches, and that neither the judicial nor the legislative branches exercised much decision-making influence through 1994.

Zedillo promised throughout his campaign to reinforce the rule of law and strengthen the judicial process. The peso crisis in December, 1994, just days into his administration, subsumed practically every other decision he made. Analysts ignored the fact that Zedillo called for a complete revamping of the supreme court, not only removing all its justices and creating a future appointment process in which the legislative branch would have a larger voice, but, more importantly, changing the court's actual policymaking functions. Zedillo accomplished this fundamental change by giving the court the opportunity, for the first time, to rule on the constitutionality of new legislation, allowing members of congress, if they could gather a certain percentage of support among their peers, to request evaluation of new laws within a certain time period of their passage. This law strengthens both the judicial and legislative branches, involves the legal system directly in the policymaking arena, and contributes directly to the decentralization of presidential and executive authority. The goals of these decisions are consistent with increased political liberalization, but Zedillo unfortunately accomplished the changed composition of the supreme court through presidential fiat, a technique which he publicly disparages and promised to eliminate.

These and other decisions—minor and major—taken by the Zedillo administration suggest that the two weakest elements of his decision-making apparatus are communicating his decisions effectively and achieving consistency in the implementation process.

The broadest political mandate he inherited from the Salinas administration was a commitment to on-going electoral reform. As Zedillo took over the presidency, especially in light of the 1994 presidential elections, it became apparent that the larger electoral context needed further, even radical, revisions. The proposed reforms, to be negotiated among representatives of the leading opposition parties, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), focused on several essential features: stricter financial controls over campaign expenditures, full autonomy of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)—the agency in charge of administering the electoral process and counting the results—from the executive branch, and expansion of the electorate to include migrant workers in the United States.

These negotiations, which were achieving considerable progress

in 1996, came to a sudden halt in the spring when the PAN pulled out of the process (claiming electoral fraud in a single, local election), refused to participate further, and demanded that Zedillo's government alter the electoral outcome. This pattern is not new. As was true under his predecessor, Zedillo has allowed himself to become a victim of political blackmail, functioning as judge and jury over major political disputes among the parties. This is a natural consequence given the president's historic role in Mexico, and even Zedillo's own assertion that he wants to place himself, and therefore the presidency, above party politics, including his own and the opposition. Nevertheless, local and state political disputes among various parties and candidates too frequently reach the presidency.

Zedillo, in addition to strengthening the other branches of government, has both allowed and been forced to grant increased autonomy to the states, especially because the PAN has won five gubernatorial elections since 1989, three of them during the current administration (Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Baja California). The victory in Baja California is especially noteworthy because it is the first time an opposition party has controlled a governorship in succession (1989-1995, 1995-2001). Yet in those situations where state politics have become a national issue, Zedillo, as was true of Salinas, "persuaded" each governor to resign.

Presidential intervention has occurred successfully in Chiapas, Guerrero, and Nuevo León, and unsuccessfully in Tabasco. The reasons for a governor's actual or proposed resignation are different in each of the four cases, yet all demonstrate continued presidential involvement in resolving local political disputes to the detriment of decentralization, the legal process, and a mature democratic system. Zedillo failed to remove the embattled governor of Tabasco, Roberto Madrazo, who was charged with spending 30 times the legal amount during his gubernatorial campaign. While this may suggest presidential weakness, to Zedillo's credit his administration turned the case over to state legal authorities while the Supreme Court threw out Madrazo's appeal to block further investigation. In the case of Guerrero, however, the president used the Supreme Court initially to weigh in with a legal decision charging the governor with negligence in a state police massacre of peasants, thus supporting his government's political decision to remove the governor. It is also clear that Zedillo has intervened unwillingly; in the end, however, he has felt it necessary to respond to these specific crisis situations.

The most recent example of presidential intervention occurred in June, 1996, following a teachers' demonstration in Mexico City. Zedillo, personally angered by police mistreatment of the teachers, echoed a similar response in the media and requested the federal district's police chief's resignation. The resignation would also be a popular decision because of the rapid increase in crime in the capital (35 percent alone from 1994 to 1995). Again, this decision legally was in the province of one of his own cabinet members, the appointed head of the federal district, but required presidential intervention.

A final case in point, and much better known, is the back-and-

forth strategy characterizing the president's policy on Chiapas. Both at the beginning of his administration, and more recently in the spring of 1996, the president's collaborators have implemented inconsistently a negotiating as well as a hard-line policy. They have moved against the Zapatistas (EZLN) directly or, in the more recent case, arrested their representatives rather than negotiating in good faith in the context of a general amnesty. From a policy perspective, the prolonged negotiations, which were begun under the Salinas administration, have not resolved the differences between the government and the guerrillas, but, importantly, has succeeded in removing the EZLN from the political limelight and has reduced its influence.

Zedillo's decision-making style in these and many other cases suggests the following conclusions. First, although his macroeconomic policies generally have been implemented with more consistency than his political policies, implementation, particularly on the political agenda, has been anything but consistent. Second, the inconsistency in implementation has been very costly, both in terms of the public's perception of what the president is actually doing, and within his own party. Salinas first introduced the pattern of bowing to opposition pressures, even to the extent of eliminating PRI candidates who actually won highly disputed elections, but Zedillo has continued this practice, increasing the potential for disputes between his party and the executive branch and within the PRI.

Presidential political intervention does not always involve electoral disputes, but it demonstrates that the legal system is incapable of resolving contentious matters and that weak local authorities cannot cope with troublesome political issues. It also makes it difficult for the president to attract and retain support from within his administration and from other party leaders; for example, some members of the team negotiating with the EZLN have resigned in protest in recent months. Finally, it reinforces the conclusion that increasing local autonomy, unless structures are present that can serve as equal checks and balances over local executive authority, does not necessarily correspond to increasing pluralism and democratic practices.

These presidential decisions also suggest the inability of his collaborators to communicate administration policy effectively. Inconsistencies and competition within Zedillo's own policymaking teams are partly to blame for the poor communication, as well as his weakness and/or desire to allow his cabinet greater autonomy in decision-making. As Zedillo himself argued publicly in a televised address in June, 1996, his decision to practice the limits of his constitutional powers was perceived as a weakness. He recognized frankly that his new exercise of power "caused confusion among some actors on the political scene." An assessment of his collective decisions also demonstrates that Zedillo, compared to Salinas, has not achieved much success in the public relations element of policymaking, whether it is measured by public opinion generally or informed opinion in the media or abroad.

The Changing Cabinet

Zedillo has already shuffled his cabinet significantly several times, and has made a number of other major changes (see Appendix 1). These include:

- Guillermo Ortiz, who was tapped to replace finance secretary Jaime Serra Puche;
- Emilio Chuayffet, who was appointed to the government ministry to replace the president's close campaign adviser and political confidant, Esteban Moctezuma Barragán;
- Francisco Labastida Ochoa, secretary of agriculture, replaced Arturo Warman, who was moved to agrarian reform;
- Jesús Reyes Heróles became the new secretary of energy, taking over for outgoing secretary Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza;
- Miguel Limón Rojas replaced Fausto Alzati as secretary of public education;
- Arsenio Farell replaced Norma Santiago as controller general;
- Santiago Oñate was shifted from secretary of labor to PRI president, replacing María de los Angeles Moreno in this key party post; and
- Carlos Almada was brought in as Zedillo's new press secretary.

The reasons for these changes are varied. The change in the labor ministry reflected the president's desire to have Oñate head the PRI, while the cabinet change in public education was a response to a political crisis brought on by the media's discovery that Fausto Alzati fabricated his educational credentials, both undergraduate and graduate.¹

The new appointments suggest significant policy and personnel considerations. Chuayffet was brought in because of Moctezuma's inability to bring closure to the Chiapan negotiations and several on-going electoral disputes. Unlike Moctezuma, Chuayffet came to the government ministry with considerable first-hand experience in electoral politics and political matters, having served as mayor of Toluca, Mexico in 1982-1983, governor from 1993-1995, and as the secretary of government on the state level in Mexico in 1987. He directed the IFE in 1991-1993. Chuayffet also represented several important political groups, including Arturo Llorente González and more important, Alfredo del Mazo, a presidential contender against Salinas in 1987.²

The appointment of Carlos Almada as the new presidential press

¹ Ironically, Alzati claimed a Ph.D. which he did not have, a fact discovered by *Reforma* in their profiles of new cabinet members. Alzati also had never completed his undergraduate degree, although he did complete an M.A. and his studies toward a Ph.D.

² At the time of his appointment to the cabinet, Chuayffet was mistakenly seen as a protégé of Carlos Hank González. In reality, he owes part of his political career to Jorge Jiménez Cantú, who indeed was a significant disciple of Hank González.

secretary suggests the newly acquired influence of Chuayffet as well as an attempt to improve the president's weak communications skills. Almada, who worked under Alfredo del Mazo in the Workers Bank and throughout his administration as governor of Mexico (1981-1986), collaborated with Chuayffet during those same years, and afterward at the IFE. Zedillo also appointed Alfredo del Mazo, who performed minor tasks during the Salinas administration, head of the Federal Workers Housing Institute, reintroducing the possibility of a rising political career.

Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who owes his cabinet appointment to his disciple, Moctezuma, has been a close friend of ex-president Miguel de la Madrid since he worked under the president in the treasury ministry two decades ago. Like Chuayffet, he too has elective experience, although not nearly as extensive, having served as governor of Sinaloa for a full term from 1986-1992, and, immediately before that, as de la Madrid's secretary of energy.

Zedillo's selection of Arsenio Farell as controller general, replacing Farell's own disciple Norma Samaniego, suggests the degree to which the president wants to strengthen this agency, especially its ability to identify and prosecute cases of "illicit wealth" rising from increasing accusations of drug-related corruption among higher-level politicians. Farell, by far the most experienced member of the entire cabinet, is a contemporary and childhood friend of ex-presidents Luis Echeverría Alvarez and José López Portillo, having served in both of their cabinets. Farell has held cabinet-level positions since 1973, serving twice in the politically difficult post of secretary of labor under de la Madrid and Salinas from 1982-1993. He is perceived as tough, politically savvy, and a politician who can complete his assigned task. He is well-connected to the military, both personally through his brother, an air force general, and as the former coordinator of national security in 1994. Jesús Javier Bonilla García, who replaced Oñate as labor secretary, is also Farell's protégé. The departure of Norma Samaniego from the cabinet, and María de los Angeles Moreno from the PRI, marks a dramatic decline among women in first-ranked positions under Zedillo, leaving only two women in the cabinet, in fisheries and tourism.

The resignation of Ignacio Pichardo Pagaza in energy and his replacement with Jesús Reyes Heróles suggests the decreasing influence of Carlos Hank González on the administration and the rising influence of de la Madrid's group. Reyes Heróles, an activist among PRI party reformists, is well-connected to the intellectual community through his brother, who is editor of *Este País*, and to the political community through his father, a former secretary of government and PRI president, who served in de la Madrid's cabinet as secretary of public education. Reyes Heróles, Jr., is seen as someone who can reinforce continued privatization strategies and support Pemex leadership in carrying out internal structural reforms.

Oñate was selected to head the PRI to strengthen the party's showing in the electoral arena and to achieve greater unity among national factions and between national and local leadership. Although most of these differences are the product of the

president's own policy failures, especially his hard-line austerity program and his mediating of local political disputes at the national level, Oñate, a Colosio loyalist with long experience inside the party's national executive committee during Colosio's tenure as PRI president, is especially well-equipped and connected to revive party fortunes. Furthermore, he has unusual credentials rising from his family background; he is the son of a prominent PAN leader who died when Santiago was quite young, leaving him to be tutored by Adolfo Christlieb Ibarrola, a prominent *Panista* and mentor to many present PAN leaders.

An analysis of the political groups or *camarillas* that are now represented in Zedillo's cabinet suggests the strengthening position of three groups: (1) Alfredo del Mazo, who is a disciple of de la Madrid; (2) Miguel de la Madrid; and (3) the late Jesús Reyes Heróles, senior. Zedillo continues to separate himself from Salinas, whose image and prestige has been devastated since January, 1995.

Camarillas Represented in the 1996 Zedillo Cabinet

<u>Camarilla</u>	<u>Cabinet Member</u>
Pedro Aspe:	José Angel Gurría Treviño, Luis Téllez Kuenzler, Carlos Ruiz Sacristán, Guillermo Ortiz Martínez
Luis D. Colosio:	Santiago Oñate Laborde, Liébbano Sáenz
Alfredo Del Mazo:	Oscar Espinosa Villarreal, Emilio Chuayffet
Miguel de la Madrid:	Francisco Labastida Ochoa
Luis Echeverría:	Arsenio Farell
Arsenio Farell:	Javier Bonilla García
Félix Galván:	Enrique Cervantes Aguirre
David Ibarra:	José Angel Gurría Treviño, Hermino Blanco Mendoza
Miguel Mancera:	Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, Ernesto Zedillo
Andrés Oteyza:	Adrián Lajous Vargas ³
Jesús Reyes Heróles:	Miguel Limón Rojas, Jesús Reyes Heróles, Jr.
Carlos Salinas:	Carlos Rojas
Leopoldo Solís:	Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, Ernesto Zedillo
Abel Vicencio Tovar:	Fernando Antonio Lozano
Ernesto Zedillo:	Carlos Ruiz Sacristán

Zedillo Faces the Political Future

Zedillo's political future is difficult but not desperate. He faces a number of interesting challenges in overcoming some of the structural crises inherited, exacerbated, or introduced by his administration. These conditions are worth assessing in detail.

The most obvious political context in which Zedillo is operating is the growing success of the opposition, particularly at

³ Adrián Lajous is one of the most well-connected figures through family ties on the contemporary political scene. He is the son of the former director general of the Foreign Trade Bank, the brother-in-law of Fernando Solana, senator from the Federal District, Ignacio Madrazo Reynoso, subsecretary of the treasury, 1982-88, and Enrique Loaeza, director general of Aero Mexico. His two sisters are also active in politics, with Luz having been a PRD deputy and Roberta a prominent PRI figure.

the state level. The PAN is now governing millions of Mexicans on the local level, an amount 12 times greater than it controlled 8 years ago. That fact, combined with the belief that the PAN has a strong chance of winning the first mayoral elections in the Federal District in 1997—the single most populous entity in Mexico other than the nearby state of Mexico—indicates the continued decline of the PRI. This gloomy picture, however, ignores several important developments. While public opinion polls conducted in early 1996 imply that the PAN would narrowly defeat the PRI in mayoral elections in the Federal District if held at that time, those same polls show that a higher percentage of voters express a preference for some other alternative. In short, they found none of the three parties attractive, and would actually favor an independent candidate. These independent Mexican voters in the Federal District and elsewhere will continue to wield considerable influence.

A second, noteworthy development is that in the 1996 local and state elections the PRI has defeated the PAN and the PRD in competition for legislative seats or mayoral races in all four states: Baja California del Sur, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, and Quintana Roo. It has swept most of these races, although its state-wide percentage figures remain just slightly over half, equal to its totals in the highly competitive 1994 presidential elections held before the economic crisis. In short, in recent months the PRI has demonstrated an ability to capture the support of half the electorate, and may be able to improve its chances in the 1997 congressional, state, and local elections in many areas of the republic.

Zedillo's decision to remain aloof from national party affairs, and to persist with a politically unpopular economic austerity package, has led the PRI's leadership, including party president Oñate, to make public policy statements differentiating the party's position from that of the president. The degree to which the party can separate itself from unpopular presidential policies, thus giving its candidates a more popular platform to defend, may offer positive opportunities for the party and its representatives in 1997. Such a policy, however, further isolates Zedillo, creating a more difficult electoral context for the PRI in the 2000 presidential race.

The president's decision to pursue a strategy of government-party separation (although occasionally intervening in electoral disputes involving PRI) strengthens local party figures vis-a-vis national leadership. This is likely to lead to more numerous local and regional factions, and, possibly, eventually to new parties, accentuating pluralism while weakening presidential authority. This end result is consistent with Zedillo's stated personal goals.

Zedillo also confronts a more aggressive media, both domestic and international. Although much freer to criticize the president and his collaborators, the media is not necessarily more professional or objective in its assessments, as recent rumors of Zedillo's imminent departure illustrate. But the media's more active voice, and especially its posture in the United States where elite, political opinions may facilitate or complicate domestic Mexican policy decisions, make the president's task more challenging.

The increasing complexity of political actors also tests the president's skill. Perhaps the three most important of these are: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Catholic Church, and the United States. NGOs have dramatically increased their influence since 1988. The role of political umbrella groups on electoral reforms, such as the Civic Alliance, are obvious, but other organizations such as human rights groups have become a regular voice in the policy process. These organizations, which in turn are well-connected to domestic civic action groups and to peer organizations internationally, have the ability to generate almost instant media coverage. Their reactions to and involvement in policy choices must be anticipated during and after the policy process.

Not only do Mexican NGOs draw on U.S. affiliates, a characteristic which will become increasingly important as the NAFTA agreement provokes enforcement of some of the side agreements on labor and the environment, but the United States itself has become an increasingly significant participant in domestic policy issues, whether it is investors in Mexican stocks and financial instruments, Wall Street brokerage firms, or U.S. congressional critics. All of these foreign actors, who have access to international media coverage and a demonstrated ability to influence public opinion in both countries, create a more complex domestic political environment. This author suggested in the January, 1995 CSIS policy paper entitled *The Zedillo Cabinet: Continuity, Change, or Revolution* that the president would be likely to take a more nationalistic posture than his predecessor. This has already occurred. Whether it is the U.S. entanglement in Mexican financial affairs, as in the peso crisis, or its treatment of immigrants, these issues become part of Zedillo's domestic political agenda. Presidential manipulation of nationalistic issues might give Zedillo greater political capital in some policy arenas while limiting his abilities in other, equally important agendas.

Finally, the Catholic Church, somewhat freed from its restrictive constitutional binds as a consequence of reforms undertaken by Salinas, has persisted in raising its voice on political matters. Both the new archbishops of Mexico and Guadalajara have expressed dissatisfaction with the investigative efforts in the unsolved assassinations, as well as with the government version of events in the case of the late cardinal Juan Jesús Posadas. The archbishop of Mexico City has expressed criticism of the level of poverty faced by many working class Mexicans, a postured echoed in the provinces by other bishops.

Opposition victories on the local level, and the PAN's repeated victory at the state level in Baja California, have significantly altered the pattern between government and the private sector in these communities. In the past, many elements in the private sector remained committed to the PRI and its representatives, providing them with the financial and other resources necessary to obtain and remain in office. The PAN and the PRD have both demonstrated that no sector of society can any longer count on a single party's victory, and, consequently, must risk resources in support of one group versus another. Rather than relying on presidential prerogatives to help guarantee local political continuity, Zedillo has encouraged

the PRI, and therefore facilitated opposition parties, to accomplish these outcomes on their own.

One of the most intractable problems Zedillo faces is trying to balance his presidential attempts to encourage institutionalization of power among other institutions with the expectation on the part of the political culture that a president should act in a powerful—indeed, in some ways, almost in an authoritarian—fashion. In other words, Mexico is making the transition to a more pluralistic culture on the electoral level. But in the government's day-to-day behavior, citizens have not yet tempered their expectations of a strong president. As Zedillo himself understands, he suffers from a weak image precisely because he chooses not to exercise powers historically attributable to Mexico's president.

Conclusion

Zedillo's most important task, other than to overcome these obstacles and to mediate long-standing cultural expectations, is to identify more clearly his political constituency, and to then cultivate it. Both require considerable political skill and effective communication, private and public. Zedillo needs to make greater use of public forums and speak to the citizenry at large. He also needs to mandate stronger communication between his cabinet members and their constituencies. His other task is to further decrease public expressions of dissension within the executive branch, and to coordinate broadly policy on important political issues. His cabinet shifts in the past year reflect a realization of some of these deficiencies, and his choices have strengthened his ability to improve his administration's effectiveness and image. It remains to be seen whether the president will be more assertive and public in attacking these problems, while retooling the presidency as a democratic institution.

About the Author

Roderic Ai Camp joined the Tulane University faculty in 1991, and currently directs its Tinker Mexican Policy Studies Program. He has served as a visiting professor at the Colegio de Mexico and the Foreign Service Institute, and carried out research as a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, Smithsonian Institution. He has received a Fulbright Fellowship on three occasions, as well as a Howard Heinz Foundation fellowship for research on Mexico. He is a contributing editor to the *Library of Congress Handbook of Latin American Studies* and to the *World Book Encyclopedia*, and serves on the Editorial Board of *Mexican Studies*. The author of numerous articles and books on Mexico, his most recent publications include: *Politics in Mexico* (Oxford University Press, 1996), *The Zedillo Cabinet: Continuity, Change, or Revolution?* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), *Political Recruitment Across Two Centuries* (University of Texas Press, 1995).

Appendix 1
The Current Zedillo Cabinet

Government Barragán)	Emilio Chuayfett (replaced Esteban Moctezuma
Foreign Relations	José Angel Gurría Treviño
National Defense	Enrique Cervantes Aguirre
Treasury	Guillermo Ortiz Martínez
Agrarian Reform	Arturo Warman (replaced Miguel Limón Rojas)
Agriculture Warman)	Francisco Labastida Ochoa (replaced Arturo
Attorney General	Fernando Antonio Lozano Gracia
Commerce	Herminio Blanco
Communications	Carlos Ruiz Sacristán
Controller	Arsenio Farell (replaced Norma Samaniego)
Energy and Mines Pichardo Pagaza)	Jesús Reyes Heróles (replaced Ignacio
Federal District	Oscar Espinosa Villarreal
Fisheries	Julia Carabias
Health	Juan Ramón de la Fuente
Labor	Javier Bonilla García (replaced Santiago Oñate)
Navy	José Ramón Lorenzo Franco
Pemex	Adrián Lajous Vargas
Public Education Araiza)	Miguel Limón Rojas (replaced Fausto Alzati
Social Development	Carlos Rojas Gutiérrez
Tourism	Silvia Hernández Enríquez
Chief of Staff	Luis Téllez
Private Secretary	Liévano Sáenz
