

Canada and the Future of Continental Defense

A View from Washington

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Contents

Executive Summary	1
Origins of the Existing Canada–U.S. Defense Relationship	1
Architecture of the Canada–U.S. Defense Relationship.....	2
The Significance of the Events of September 11, 2001.....	5
The Future of U.S.–Canadian Cooperation in the Defense of North America	6
A Way Ahead	8
<i>About the Author</i>	13

Canada and the Future of Continental Defense: A View from Washington

Dwight N. Mason

Executive Summary

The United States and Canada have had a long and successful defense relationship. This relationship is based on a shared understanding that North America is a single military theater and that each country has an obligation to the other for its defense. Over time this basic understanding had led to a steady expansion and deepening of our defense relationship and the creation of a number of institutional arrangements to manage it. One product of these arrangements has been a partnership style of continental defense management that has proved to be successful despite the disparities in resources and responsibilities and, sometimes, the policy differences between our two countries. This structure is now beginning to be threatened by the decline in the resources and capabilities of the Canadian Forces. Nevertheless, there are things that both countries separately and together could do to improve the situation.

Origins of the Existing Canada–U.S. Defense Relationship

The modern defense relationship between the United States and Canada dates from 1938 and is a result of anxiety created by the situation in Europe in the run-up to World War II. The precipitating event was a speech delivered by President Franklin Roosevelt at Queens University in 1938. The president announced (and without having consulted with Prime Minister Mackenzie King) that “the people of the United States would not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire.”¹

This text is adapted from a presentation on June 20, 2003, by the author to Seapower Conference 2003, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada.

The prime minister replied a few days later: “We, too have our obligations as a good friendly neighbor, and one of them is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea, or air to the United States from Canadian territory.”²

These statements are the basis of the defense relationship the two countries share today.³ The central points are still the notion that North America is a single military theater, that each country has a duty to the other to defend it, and that this will be accomplished together. As John McCallum, the Canadian minister of defense, put it in Parliament on May 29, 2003, “At least since 1940, Canada has entered into a solemn covenant with the United States to jointly defend our shared continent.”⁴

Architecture of the Canada–U.S. Defense Relationship

The principles set out by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King in 1938 rapidly took on form and substance as the war began.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense

The process began with the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) by the president and the prime minister in August 1940 at a meeting in Ogdensburg, New York. The vehicle for the board’s establishment was a press release that has come to be known as the Ogdensburg agreement or statement. In this statement, the two leaders announced that the board was to “consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.”⁵ It is interesting that the president and prime minister chose to create an institution to guide this effort and that it was intended to be a permanent arrangement. It is also interesting that they did not find it necessary to resort to the traditional diplomatic forms of agreement such as a treaty or an exchange of notes.

The board has Canadian and United States “sections,” each led by a chairman appointed by the prime minister and the president respectively. Representatives of the several U.S. armed services, the U.S. Department of State, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and their Canadian counterparts make up

¹ James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), pp. 177–183.

² Ibid.

³ J. L. Granatstein, “A Friendly Agreement in Advance: Canada—U.S. Defence Relations Past, Present and Future,” *Commentary: The Border Papers* (Toronto: The C.D. Howe Institute, June 2002), p. 3.

⁴ John McCallum, Minister of National Defence, 37th Parliament, 2nd session, Hansard no. 108, May 29, 2003, at 1100, accessed at www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/108_2003-05-29/HAN108-E.htm.

⁵ Sean M. Maloney, “Our Defended Borders: A Short History of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Military Cooperation Committee, 1940 to the Present,” *The 200th Meeting of the Canada–United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence* (Ottawa, Canadian Section, PJBD, 1997), p. 5.

the rest of the membership. In other words, the board is an inside organization rather than an outside “blue ribbon” group. It frequently invites other military and civilian officials to meet with it, depending on the issues at hand, and makes informal and formal recommendations to elements of the two governments if requested (very rarely now) or on its own initiative (frequently). The board operates informally and on an equal partner basis. It has been particularly useful in examining matters before they become problems, in testing ideas about agreements before actual negotiations, in fostering imaginative thinking, and in creating strong personal and professional relationships among its members, which have developed into paths for informal advice, influence, and at times rapid action.

Whatever the president and prime minister had in mind when they created the board, one result was the early development of a style and pattern for future U.S.–Canadian defense cooperation. The pattern is the creation and use of institutional arrangements; and the style is one of formal equality, partnership, and a great deal of informal contact.

In 1952 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had been the second chairman of the U.S. section of the PJBD, characterized the style and practices of the board in remarks to the Canadian Club in Ottawa this way:

[The Permanent Joint Board is] a particularly significant expression of the entirely unique relationship between our countries....[It is] not founded on any treaty or legislative act. It is an organization made up of equal numbers of Americans and Canadians, who consider defense questions and make joint recommendations to their two governments....Colleagues work over a problem continuously and exhaustively until, through the pressure of good will and hard work, the solution is forced out.⁶

Note the terms “unique relationship,” “colleagues,” “good will,” “joint recommendations, and “equal.” These attitudes, the PJBD work style, and the idea of using carefully structured bilateral institutions are now deeply ingrained in the defense relationship of our two countries.

One of the first things that the board did was to call for a joint plan for the defense of North America. The work has continued to the present and is reflected in the Basic Security Document and the Combined Defense Plan. This decision of the board also began a process of ever more joint planning and related joint efforts, including regular intelligence estimates of threats to North America. The key element of this process, beyond the expanding scope of cooperation, is that these were joint efforts. This is one way in which the relationship became a partnership.

⁶ Dean Acheson, “Chief Imperatives Bearing upon the Atlantic Coalition,” *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, December 1, 1952), p. 848.

The Military Cooperation Committee

By the end of World War II, these joint efforts had become a large number of often-complex projects. At the same time, the postwar situation presented new threats requiring even more work. The board recommended in 1946 that a new organization be formed at a less senior level to take on this work. This new group was named the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). It resembles the PJBD and operates in much the same manner. Its core members are the assistant PJBD members. The major difference is that its two chairmen report respectively to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States and to the Chief of the Defence Staff in Canada. Despite this reporting arrangement, the two groups work so closely together that they are hard to distinguish. The MCC frequently examines issues at the request of the PJBD or presents matters to the board on its own initiative.

The work of the PJBD and the MCC and the culture of partnership that those groups have engendered have led to the extraordinarily dense and successful defense relationship Canada and the United States enjoy today. The Canadian Department of National Defence estimates that there are about 142 bilateral forums in which we discuss defense matters and that Canadian government and industry personnel make more than 20,000 visits annually to the United States on defense matters.⁷ In fact, no one knows the full extent of the relationship. But again, the Department of National Defence estimates that there are about 330 bilateral defense agreements and arrangements between us.⁸ These include matters such as refueling, officer exchanges, communications, intelligence, base agreements, logistics, information technology, air defense, rules of engagement, maritime operations, joint testing facilities and procedures, cooperative research and development, space activities, search and rescue, and a range of defense production sharing arrangements. The latter have allowed Canadian companies to compete with their U.S. counterparts for American defense contracts. They have also allowed Canadian firms access to advanced U.S. technologies and have been an important factor in the creation of high-technology jobs in Canada.⁹

The North American Aerospace Defense Agreement and Command

The conditions that led to the establishment of the Military Cooperation Committee in 1946 had evolved by 1958 to the point where very rapid air defense capability was needed because of the lethality of the weapons available to the Soviet Union and the speed at which they could be delivered. This situation led the United States and Canada to create a new bilateral organization—the North American Air (and later Aerospace) Command, or NORAD. NORAD is a joint and integrated North American air warning and defense (and later space warning) system capable of warning the national command authorities of both Canada and the United States of a threat from the air or space in a timely manner,

⁷ “Canada–United States Defence Relations,” ADM (POL), Directorate of Western Hemisphere Policy (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2002), p. 1.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ 1994 *Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1994), p. 24.

characterizing the threat, and, if necessary, mounting an air (but not space) defense.

As the threat to North America continued to develop after the creation of NORAD, space systems became more important as did missile warning and ultimately missile defense. The movement toward space systems diminished the importance to the United States of Canadian geography and air space, and the focus of the United States began to shift from NORAD and air defense to space defense possibilities. U.S. and Canadian policy about space defense also began to diverge. The future of NORAD began to look uncertain.

The Significance of the Events of September 11, 2001

A New Threat

This situation changed after September 11. The threat to North America suddenly looked more complicated (for example, the United States and Canada now had to be concerned about air threats originating within their borders) and included a number of additional nonmilitary aspects such as the newly understood vulnerabilities of the two countries' economic infrastructure, itself a number of shared systems. Security became a larger concept: it included the military but went well beyond it. As a result, Canadian geography and cooperation once again became important to the defense of the United States. The same is true for Canada. Neither country can escape geography and our interdependence. We necessarily share what threats there are to each of us: an attack on one will almost certainly affect the other, and neither country can fully secure itself from attack independently. North America remains a single theater.

Finally, September 11 taught us that the new threats can present themselves very quickly. There may be very little preventive response time, possibly none at all. Yet the effects of such an attack can be enormous. This situation demands new thinking and new arrangements. For example, consequence management and emergency preparedness take on new importance and entail additional potential military requirements for both countries, principally aid to civil powers on either or both sides of the border acting separately or together.

U.S. Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security

The United States created U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security in response to this new threat situation as it applied to the United States. In both cases, the idea is to rationalize a large number of separate programs and responsibilities, some of which focus primarily, and some tangentially, on the security of the United States. When considered from the perspective of national security, these programs lacked coherence and prioritization.

The commander of NORTHCOM has a presidential mandate to direct, plan, and conduct defense (including land, sea, and air forces) and civil military support operations within the United States. This had not been done before. The commander of NORTHCOM assumes the continental defense planning

responsibilities formerly exercised by the U.S. Joint Forces Command. It was clear that there had to be a close relationship between NORAD and NORTHCOM in view of NORAD's continental aerospace responsibilities and the interdependent relationship between our two countries, not to mention our traditional approach to North American defense. Thus the president appointed the U.S. general officer who is the commander of NORAD to be the commander of NORTHCOM as well.

The joint continental defense planning that the PJBD had started and that the MCC continued had, before September 11, been done at NORAD for air defense and at Joint Forces Command for land and sea. This was a disjointed process that suffered from a lack of attention and resources.

The idea of creating NORTHCOM as a unified command and of assigning the commander of NORAD to also be the commander of NORTHCOM stimulated considerable discussion and thought in the U.S. section of the PJBD. Therefore when NORTHCOM began to take shape, members of the U.S. section suggested informally to the Canadian section at the PJBD meeting in October 2001 that NORAD be expanded to include land and sea forces and that North American defense planning be centralized at NORAD.

Soon thereafter, Canada and the United States began talks on how to strengthen North American defense, and on December 5, 2002, they agreed to combine and to strengthen existing planning and related activities and to collocate them with NORTHCOM and NORAD under the direction of the deputy commander of NORAD (a Canadian officer) who would operate under the authority of the commander of NORAD.¹⁰ Canada did not agree to an expansion of NORAD itself to include this function. This did not matter to the United States, however, as it expected that the logic of the arrangement would in time lead to the formal inclusion of the new planning group in NORAD. Moreover, it was the improved planning that mattered. The two countries decided not to expand NORAD to include land and sea elements, believing that, for the moment at least, the new planning group would be sufficient.

The Future of U.S.–Canadian Cooperation in the Defense of North America

The structure for the defense of North America that has grown up over the last 63 years is probably the deepest and most elaborate bilateral defense system in the world, and arguably the most successful. There is some doubt, however, that this system can continue as successfully as it has in the past. This is because Canada has been unable or unwilling to provide its military with the resources necessary for it to hold up the Canadian end of the continental bargain. Although Canada responded rapidly and effectively to the new situation posed by the September 11

¹⁰ “U.S. and Canada Sign Bi-National Agreement on Military Planning,” U.S. Embassy Press Release, Ottawa, December 9, 2002; “Enhanced Canada–United States Security Cooperation,” News Room, Department of National Defence BG-02.241, December 9, 2002; and *Exchange of Notes*, December 5, 2002 (U.S. Note). The text can be found at the DFAIT Web site: <http://www.dfaidmaec.gc.ca/canam/menuen.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=1026&did=1966>.

attacks when it came to tightening border controls and security, “that firmness was missing...when it came to beefing up the only Canadian agency capable of patrolling the littoral waters and the air over Canada, or making any significant contribution not only to the war on terrorism at home but to the attack on terrorism abroad.”¹¹

The Decline of Canadian Forces Capabilities

The Canadian Forces and their capabilities have been a low priority for the government of Canada for many years. The defense budget has been too small to sustain basic capabilities, and no serious thought has been given to significantly increased military spending.¹²

The dangerous resource situation of the Canadian Forces is beyond dispute. Its implications have been set out in great and painful detail in a number of reports and studies, including those by the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, the Conference of Defence Associations, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington.

The conclusions of these studies are that the Canadian Forces cannot meet the missions assigned them in a 1994 white paper—namely, to maintain combat-capable forces able to protect Canada, to cooperate with the United States in the defense of North America, and to contribute to international security.¹³

There seems little prospect of serious improvement in the forces’ situation while the present government is in office. Initially the prime minister simply

¹¹ David Bercuson, “Canada–US Defence Relations Post–11 September,” *Canada among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus*, (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 133.

¹² Chris Sands, “Canada and the War on Terrorism,” *Canada Focus* 2, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, October 2002), p. 1.

¹³ See *Facing our Responsibilities: The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces, Fourth Report*, Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (Ottawa: House of Commons, May 30, 2002), chapter 2, p. 2; *Making Sense out of Dollars 2001–2002* (Ottawa: Finance and Corporate Services, Department of National Defence, April 2002), pp. 10, 16, and 18; Jim Fergusson, Frank Harvey, and Rob Huebert, *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper* (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, November 9, 2001), p. 19; *Canadian Security and Preparedness*, Report of the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (Ottawa: Senate, February 2002), p. 85; *Canadian Security and Military Preparedness*, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (Ottawa: House of Commons, February 2002), chapter 2, pp. 2–3; Doug Bland, “Funding Canada’s Defence Policy,” Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century, undated research paper; R. R. Henault, *At a Crossroads, Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2001–2002* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, July 2002), p. ii; Colin Kenny, chairman, Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, “Imagine If We Had Real Armed Forces,” *Globe and Mail*, November 13, 2002, sec. A, p. 29; Judy Monchuk, “Military Report Says Canada’s Emergency System Can’t Cope with Large Disaster,” Canadian press in the *Ottawa Citizen*, November 14, 2002.

dismissed the issue, remarking that “everybody would like us to spend more money.”¹⁴ After considerable pressure, he eventually relented slightly in November 2002, saying that some new funding would be added to the defense budget but revealingly adding that “[defence] is not our highest priority.”¹⁵ The government announced that it would add C\$2.4 billion to the defense budget at the rate of C\$800 million per year over three years while the minister of defense agreed to find C\$200 million of cuts.¹⁶ This increase, while important, does not appear sufficient to provide for existing needs, much less future ones.¹⁷

There is more cause for concern in the future. This is because of the serious structural budgetary problems that appear to be arising from demographics combined with commitments to health care and pensions. This means that there may not be enough money to significantly improve the capabilities of the Canadian Forces in the anticipated future no matter who is prime minister.

Implications for the U.S.–Canadian Defense Relationship

The decline in the capabilities of the Canadian Forces threatens the current U.S.–Canadian defense relationship for the most elementary of reasons: The less Canadian military there is and the less capability it has, the less military cooperation there can be with the United States (and other allies). Yet Canadian help and cooperation looks more important to the United States than it did before September 11, as it is clear that a threat to the United States can come from across or from within Canadian land, air, and sea space.

The new joint planning group at NORAD will bring high-level U.S. attention to both the planning for North American defense and the application of both countries’ resources to the requirements identified by the planners. Thus Canada may expect increased but more focused interest and pressure from the United States in this area in the future.

A Way Ahead

Although it appears that Canada and the United States would prefer to maintain their traditional partnership in the defense of North America, the prospects for this are not promising, principally because the resource problems of the Canadian Forces and their reduced capability will push the United States to act to defend itself and North America with less regard to Canada. The U.S. missile defense program is one example of this kind of future.

Is there a way ahead? Possibly. There are several things both countries could do to improve the future of the relationship.

¹⁴ Randall Palmer, “Canada PM Doubtful on Defence Spending Hikes,” *Ottawa Citizen*, May 30, 2002.

¹⁵ Robert Fife and Mike Trickey, “PM Vows to Raise Military Spending,” *Ottawa Citizen*, November 17, 2002.

¹⁶ Shawn McCarthy and Simon Tuck, “Overstretched Military Likely to Get \$2.4–Billion,” *Globe and Mail*, February 8, 2003 (online edition).

¹⁷ David Pugliese, “Forces’ Funding Far Short of Needs,” *Ottawa Citizen*, June 17, 2003.

The United States: Specifics

On the U.S. side, when it comes to defense we could, and should, be more specific in our suggestions about what we would like to see Canada do, and why. It is not enough to criticize the levels of defense spending. Clearly, specificity would be more helpful to Canada no matter what the Canadian government decides to do about particular matters.

It is possible that specificity will be a byproduct of the work of the new joint planning group. After all, when there is a plan it is possible and appropriate to assign resources to it and to cost them out. That process ought to identify specific steps both governments should take and their costs. It has the added political advantage of being a bilateral process.

Canada: Missile Defense

On the Canadian side, Canada has a chance to reinvigorate its defense partnership with the United States by finally agreeing to participate in the American program to defend North America from missile attack.

The U.S. missile defense program is not dependent upon Canada for interceptor or radar sites. The system has been planned without Canadian participation and without specific regard to Canadian defense. But it clearly will be capable of defending nearly all of Canada if it should ultimately be successful. It is moving ahead independently of Canada, and although the program is still in development, the first interceptors will be deployed in the fall of 2004. The further the system progresses without Canada, the less scope there will be for Canadian participation and influence, whether in system design (to take Canadian defense concerns into account) or in access to the research and development opportunities associated with the program.

This was the situation on May 29, 2003, when the Canadian minister of defense announced in Parliament that “the Government has decided to enter into discussions with the United States on Canada’s participation in ballistic missile defence.”¹⁸

The minister explained that the government had decided to seek these negotiations for several reasons, among which were the wish to preserve sovereignty by not delegating Canadian defense responsibilities to another country and to maintain the traditional defense relationship with the United States, in particular the Roosevelt-King principles. The minister said:

I can think of no responsibility for a government more fundamental than the protection of the lives of its citizens. And so I think that the Government of Canada will be better placed to protect the lives of Canadians if we are inside this tent rather than outside this tent. I think it is the responsibility of government to do its due diligence to ensure that the system is set up and that the system will operate in such a way as to afford Canadians equal protection from such a threat as the protection that is

¹⁸ McCallum, Hansard, no. 108, May 29, 2003.

afforded to Americans....The second reason has to do with the continuity and change in the joint defence of North America. At least since 1940 Canada has entered into a solemn covenant with the United States to jointly defend our shared continent. The enemies and the risks and the threats have changed in the more than 60 years since 1940. That is the element of change. But there is a fundamental continuity in that for more than half a century we have worked with the United States to co-defend this continent of ours and at the same time to ensure to our American friends that their northern flank, the Canada–U.S. border, will not pose a security risk for the people of the United States....Canada and the United States over the decades have disagreed many times on many matters. We've disagreed on Vietnam, on Iraq. We've disagreed on softwood lumber, on the Kyoto Accord. But never have we disagreed, never have we parted company with the United States on this agreement of more than 50 years that we are in this together in co-defending our continent. And we are not about to do that today, Mr. Speaker.

This is an encouraging statement. The outcome of these negotiations, and, if they are successful (as seems likely), the ultimate decision of the Canadian government on participation in the missile defense program, will have an important impact on the future of U.S.–Canadian defense relations and on the larger relationship. Either the traditional partnership relationship will be affirmed or it will not.

Obviously, if the decision is not to participate (or to defer a decision indefinitely), the relationship will change. For the first time in more than 60 years, Canada would have excluded itself from an important aspect of North American defense. Such a decision would change the mission of NORAD. Space and missile warning functions would move elsewhere. Canadian access to U.S. military space programs and activities and related information would diminish or vanish. Fortunately, this is not the result desired by the government of Canada.

Canada and the United States: Expand NORAD to Include Land and Sea Forces

As noted above, Canada and the United States created NORAD in 1958 in recognition of the fact that an integrated air defense system was required because of the nature of the threat including atomic weapons, the speed with which those weapons could be delivered by bombers and later missiles, and likely attack routes. The essence of NORAD is planning, exercising, and the ability to act swiftly.

In the post–September 11, 2001 world, land and sea forces assigned to the defense of North America are facing a contraction of warning time and a requirement for increased joint planning, exercising, and swift action analogous to that faced earlier by our air forces. After all, there may be no warning whatever of a chemical or biological attack other than the observed effects some time after the actual attack.

Also as noted earlier, in recognition of this new situation, the U.S. established the U.S. Northern Command to unify the command of U.S. military resources for the defense of the continental United States. In view of NORCOM's responsibilities and in recognition of the fact that cooperation with Canada is essential to the defense of the United States, the president designated the U.S. general officer who is the commander of NORAD to also be the commander of NORCOM.

In the same vein, Canada and the United States agreed to concentrate, focus, and strengthen previously dispersed resources in a new, upgraded joint planning group and to place that group within NORAD and NORCOM.

The logic of these developments strongly suggests that the NORAD agreement should be expanded to include land and sea forces, provided that Canada does join the missile defense effort. At the moment, we have a unified U.S. command at NORCOM and a binational air defense and space warning command at NORAD, both sharing a commander, as well as a combined planning group led by the deputy commander of NORAD and operating under the authority of the NORAD commander. It seems sensible (and far more manageable) to complete and simplify this picture by adding land and sea elements to NORAD and thus achieve for all elements what both countries have already achieved for air defense and space warning.

Such a change would not place Canadian land and sea forces under permanent American command or control. That is not the NORAD way. Forces are not assigned permanently to NORAD but are assigned for specific purposes by agreement. Only then do they come under the operational control of NORAD. Given the structure of NORAD, the officer actually exercising that control might well be a Canadian. But command remains with the assigning country.

An additional reason why Canada ought to examine this idea is its potential to increase the resources available to the Canadian Forces. Much as NORAD has extended the reach and effectiveness of the Canadian Air Force because NORAD resources are available to it, the inclusion of land and sea forces in NORAD might have the same effect for them.

Canada: Financial Situation of the Canadian Forces

Even though the new joint planning group may produce specific requirements and costs that both governments can use for budgetary and other planning purposes, the fact remains that the resources allocated to the Canadian Forces for the last several years have consistently been inadequate. Planning, or new white papers for that matter, will not increase resources.

Over the last two years, the situation of the Canadian Forces has become a public issue. Numerous reports were published; hearings were held; and conferences took place.

This commotion had an effect. As General R. R. Henault noted in his recent *Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2002–2003*:

In my first annual report, I argued quite emphatically that the Canadian Forces were at a crossroads, that the status quo was not sustainable, and that urgent action was needed to ensure that the Forces were both affordable and sustainable....My concerns, and those of the senior military leadership, were echoed by parliamentarians, defence academics, defence stakeholders, defence journalists, and thousands of Canadians who supported our efforts in a variety of ways and added their voices to the call to do more to support our military and national security partners. I want to take this opportunity to thank all of you for your support and your efforts in this regard....Our Defence Minister, the Honourable John McCallum, listened to us, consulted defence experts across the country, engaged his Parliamentary colleagues, and acted decisively to convince Government to support us where it matters most—with hard, stable funding.¹⁹

The point here is that the supporters of a strong Canadian defense capability have influenced the government. If they keep the pressure up, they have reason to hope.

¹⁹ R. R. Henault, *Annual Report of the Chief of the Defence Staff, 2002–2003* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2003, p. ii).

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