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# **The “Other Side” of Globalization**

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## What Is Globalization?

- Globalization is as complex as the world we live in and includes any significant global trend.
- There are major new trends in the world, as well as older trends -- some dating back several centuries.
- Globalization is an ongoing process of global interactions dating back near half a millennium:
  - The crusaders, and their extermination of the Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem, set the pattern for global cultural shifts and “ethnic cleansing.”
  - Radical new technologies like the celestial navigation, compass, and chronometer led to Di Gama, Magellan, etc.
  - “Globalism” shaped the Age of Empire: Columbus, Pizzaro, etc. We still live with the aftermath.
  - Slavery, spices, tea, indentured labor and force labor migration and colonization began the global economy.
  - The era of Queen Anne’s War marked the first “world war” linking intense conflict in the West to global fighting for empire (1750s-1780)
- There is no coherent pattern of new trends ending in convergence
- No set of trends is likely to overcome power regional, national, and ethnic centrifugal forces.
- The complexity of trends means the need to focus on issues of key importance to the Navy and Marine Corps.

## **Those Who Forget the Past are Condemned to Repeat It**

“A group of the nation’s leading security experts meet in the capital of the most powerful nation in the world. They discuss the powerful political and economic forces that are uniting the different cultures of the world, the impact of dramatic new technologies that are speeding up communications and forces that can change the entire structure of global power projection. They note the new world created by the virtual implosion of their peer competitor and the changing nature of military missions and the difficulties of dealing with contingencies in the developing world. At the same time they see a possible convergence on a new set of Western driven values.

“Here’s the practical problem. The meeting is taking place in 1899, in London. Imperialism is the uniting force. The dramatic new technologies are the telegraph, train, and steam ship. The emergence of Britain as the world’s only superpower is the result of France’s defeat in 1870. The key event in the new strategic environment is the Boer War. Convergence is driven by the expanding rule of law enforced by imperialism and by Christian missionary efforts. Oh yes, there was a “revolution in military affairs” going on in 1899, but there was little real fear of new major wars because recent studies had shown that no major Western power can now benefit economically from going to war.”

## **Convergence vs. Chaos Theory: Aristotle and Condorcet vs. Dialectics and Jurassic Park**

- Globalization is as complex as the world we live in and includes any significant global trend.
- History is not political fashion and buzzwords.
- Some trends are always visible; History warns that many are not.
- Both complexity theory and history warn of the risks of prediction, over-simplification, and a belief in the creation of “order”
- In any case, entropy is a state of physics in which we are all dead.
- History will not end on our watch.

## **The Beginning Point: The World's Only Marginal Superpower**

- No peer threat likely during the time frame of this study; in any case have 5-10 years of warning.
- Cannot, however, handle two-near simultaneous MRC case.
- Peacetime dynamic: Only major new threat or near catastrophe will lead to major increases in military spending and force structure.
- Overdeployed, overcommitted, and over there versus underfunded, underpaid, and undersupported.
  - Procurement problems: Major dropout rate and slippage in programmed QDR force improvements.
  - Prolonged readiness problems.
  - RMA is unaffordable; the question is whether we can fund an “evolution in military affairs.”
- Major advantages in current conventional warfare capability and nuclear power.
- Offset by:
  - Growing global political constraints on the ways we can use force.
  - Global proliferation.
  - Globalization of asymmetric warfare.
- Uncertainty and insufficient resources combine to force a reactive, event-driven strategy.
- Put differently, forces and resources are insufficient to support a consistent global policy. The US must often say “no,” and make hard decisions about its priorities and interests.

## Global Challenges: Uncertain Threats

- No emerging peer enemy or superpower during time frame of study?
  - No peer in terms of RMA/EMA and conventional warfighting technology.
- Major regional threats do exist:
  - Iran and Iraq
  - China and North Korea.
  - Case X?
  - Sanctions and economic problems confront these threats with greater resource and modernization problems than the problems faced by US.
- Humanitarian/Peacemaking crises
  - No increase in violence since World War II
  - 25-30 ongoing crises every day since end of World War II.
  - NIC estimates 23 ongoing cases with 200,000 or more people at hazard and eight more potential cases: 35 million people at risk.
- Low to mid-level contingencies cannot be predicted:
  - Well over 240 cases where US used force since WWII. US rarely predicted crisis, or its timing, character, level of escalation.
  - Global policeman, peacemaker/keeper, neoimperialist, reluctant ally, or hired gunfighter/mercenary?

## The Past is Prologue: Patterns in World Conflict: 1945-1994

	<u>Number of Wars</u>	<u>Number of Wars Involving Over 10,000 Dead</u>	<u>Number of Wars Involving US Military Action*</u>	<u>Total Dead</u>
Caribbean and Latin America	19	6	8	477,000
Middle East and North Africa	19	11	9	993,000
Sub-Saharan Africa	26	15	5	4,177,000
Europe	6	0	0	186,000
Central and South Asia	10	6	1	2,857,000
East Asia	34	17	6	10,396,000
Total	114	55	29	19,086,000

\* Includes significant US military assistance, covert action, demonstrative action, occupation, humanitarian efforts, combat, and emergency evacuations.

## Frequency, Duration, and Intensity of Recent Peacekeeping Operations

- The US has deployed troops 36 times since 1989 – largely in peacekeeping missions. This compares with 10 times during the previous 40 years of the Cold War, including deployments for Korea and Vietnam.
- Peacekeeping may be a new paradigm, but when, where, why, and how? (And with whom?)

<u>Peacekeeping Activity</u>	<u>Number of Activities</u>	<u>Duration in Years</u>		<u>More than 10,000 Peacekeepers Involved</u>	<u>Some Combat Activity*</u>	<u>US Involvement</u>
		<u>Over Two</u>	<u>Over Five</u>			
Current UN Operations	17	14	11	0	3	5
Past UN Operations	27	23	6	5	7	7
Current Non-UN Operations	6	5	1	1	3	2
Past Non-UN Operations	5	2	1	1	4	1
Total	55	44	19	7	17	15

\* Generally very low-level or indirect involvement during fighting between principals.

## **Global Challenges: Regionalization and Uncertain Global Stability**

- The uncertain outcome of regionalization:
  - EC and Europe versus NATO and Atlanticism.
  - The Middle East and Gulf
  - Divided Asia
  - Unstable Africa
  - Unstable Latin America
- Unlikely any other regional group will equal unity and influence of EC. Unlikely EC will succeed in matching its political and economic strength with effective military strength.
  - Europe: Atlantic security dependence? EC versus multinationals?
  - Is there an “Asia?” in any sense beyond geography?
  - Failure of Pan Arabism.
- Major population, development, and technology diffusion challenges exist within regions.
  - Regionalism or regions with deep national divisions?
  - Will military globalism extend beyond the US?
  - A divided UN may be neither global nor regional in peacemaking and humanitarian crises. Ad hoc and case-driven responses.
- Problem of self-determination and ethnic conflict in many states.
  - Nations too can remain divided along religious and ethnic lines.

## **Global Challenges: Population and Demographics**

- Population challenge.
  - World is now 6 billion.
  - During 1990s, the number of countries with life expectancies over 70 has increased from 55 to 84.
  - Even so, more than 1.5 billion people will not live to be 60.
- Growth rate is dropping more rapidly than expected but will be 7.1 billion in 2015. 8.1 billion by 2030.
- Demographic explosion: 40% under 15 in developing world; developed world becoming geriatric.
- The problem of self-determination and ethnic conflict in many states.
- The uncertain outcome of regionalization:
  - EC and Europe versus NATO and Atlanticism.
  - The Middle East and Gulf
  - Divided Asia
  - Unstable Africa
  - Unstable Latin America

## **Global Challenges: Rich versus Poor, “North versus South”**

- **Growing “north-south” challenge: Developed nations still greatly outpacing developing nations in growth of wealth.**
  - **World is filled with “young” nations. About 80% have emerged since WWII.**
  - **About half of emerging nations have serious ethnic and religious divisions or instability.**
  - **About 40% of emerging nations have disputed borders.**
- **Growing global disparity of income between rich and poor.**
  - **1.3 billion people live on less than \$1 a day.**
  - **Assets of the top three billionaires are equal to the GNP of all the “least developed” countries – with a population of 600 million.**
  - **Richest 20% of population controls 86% of world output, and 82% of all world exports.**
  - **Sustained growth out of poverty sector uncertain.**
- **Uncertain impact of global health:**
  - **High infant survival. Mortality rate reduced from 76 per 1,000 births to 58 during 1990s. Percent of 1 year olds immunized rose from 70% to 89%.**
  - **Access to safe water up from 40% to 72%.**
  - **However, 160 million children remain severely undernourished and 250 million working in child labor.**
  - **More than two-thirds of developing world cannot afford to sustain health programs to deal with endemic diseases like AIDS and malaria.**
  - **850 million lack access to any health services, and 2.6 billion do not have access to basic sanitation.**

## **Global Challenges: Uncertain Nature of Coalition Warfare**

- Core partners: Britain and who? Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia?
  - Something of a race to cut capabilities; take a peace dividend.
- NATO: Evolving or devolving – Ministers adopt new defense initiatives on same day France announced procurement cuts. Force improvements and interoperability versus budgets.
- Semi-alliances are not growing stronger even on a regional level: E.g. GCC and ASEAN.
- The UN is a forum, not a coalition. Future “globalism” may do as much to paralyze it as unite it.
- We talk about coalition warfare, but current global trends warn that:
  - They will be contingency driven.
  - They can just as easily be entangling and ally driven; rather than serve US policy.
  - They will be regional and involve very disparate forces.
  - The nature and cost of interoperability will present major problems.
  - Access to bases will always be an issue.

## Global Challenges: Global Integration and Technology Diffusion

- Trade is 39% of PPP GNP in high income states, 19% in middle income, and 8% in low income.
  - Regional trade blocs show a sharp growth in intraregional exports, relative to global markets. EU exports within bloc rose from \$76.5 billion in 1970 to \$1,867.8 billion in 1997. NAFTA from \$22 billion to \$496 billion.
- Global capital flows aren't truly global:
  - Foreign direct investment in 1997 totaled \$10.6 billion in low income countries, \$160.6 billion in middle income countries, and \$233.9 billion in high income countries.
  - Private capital flows in 1997 totaled \$17 billion in low income countries, and \$268.9 billion in middle income countries.
- Technology diffusion is a major challenge:
  - Richest 20% controls 74% of all telephone lines, 91% of all Internet users.
  - Top 10 telecommunications firms control 86% of the \$262 billion global telecommunications market.


<u>Total Per 1,000 People</u>	<u>Low Income</u>	<u>Middle Income</u>	<u>High Income</u>
Television sets	56	256	647
Telephone mainlines	16	87	506
Mobile phones	1	15	189
Fax machines	0.2	0.9	49.7
Personal computers	2.2	15.8	264.4
Internet hosts (per 10,000)	0.10	3.96	374.89

## **Global Challenges: Arms Transfers and Transfer of Technology**

- Decentralized: Rogue sellers and rogue buyers.
- End of Cold War sometimes means first line technologies go directly to world market: F-16 Block 60.
- “Dual use” technologies aid in proliferation and the C<sup>4</sup>I/BM/SR side of the “RMA.”
- Patterns in conventional arms sales down:
  - World sales drop from \$72.5 billion in 1985 to \$31.9 billion in 1995, in constant 1995 US dollars.
  - Sales to developing world drop from \$51.9 billion in 1985 to \$30.1 billion in 1995, in constant 1995 US dollars.
- May not be a stable form of “globalism”:
  - Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have all faced critical economic problems and/or sanctions.
  - Russia may rebuild sales of FSU.
  - Proliferation and asymmetric warfare are key alternatives.
- Relative free transfer of new weapons for new types of wars and battles: Information warfare.

# Global Challenges: Decline in Arms Deliveries to Developing World

(\$US1996 Billions)



	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96
Developed	22.7	26.3	27.9	23.9	23.2	25.2	22.5	20.7	18.4	15.9	19
Middle East	27.4	31.6	26.1	20.8	21.3	17.3	16.2	15.8	13.4	15.9	16.2
Developing	53.1	58.3	52.7	44.1	40.7	27.4	23	21.1	20.3	24.9	23.7
World	75.9	84.4	80.6	67.7	63.4	52.5	45.5	42.1	38.5	40.6	42.6

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## **Global Challenges: Asymmetric Warfare**

- Ranges from proliferation to use of media.
- Globalization is occurring:
  - Iraq helps Serbia.
  - Iran's focused use of Guards and naval power near Strait of Hormuz.
  - New Chinese book on modern methods to defeat Western conventional advantage.
- Proliferation most threatening, but includes information warfare, terrorism, human shields, guerrilla warfare, use of media.
  - Few rules and little practical experience.
  - Can use many types of asymmetric warfare simultaneously.
- Iraq and now Serbia show that can continue to fight asymmetric warfare even if formally accept defeat

## **Global Challenges: Proliferation**

- Genocide is cheaper than war.
- A wide range options:
  - Chemical weapons
  - Biological weapons
  - Nuclear weapons
  - Ballistic and cruise missiles
  - Superterrorism and covert warfare.
- Missile defense: A useful option, but
  - Selling what we don't have at a price we do not know with unestablished effectiveness and no clear timelines to resolve uncertainties.
  - Many alternative delivery methods.
- The race in biotechnology is globalizing capability and presents key uncertainties:
  - Advanced research and genetic engineering to microbreweries and dry storable food powders.
  - Offense now leading defense, but outcome hard to determine.
  - Full spectrum of warfighting capabilities from local incidents to city-busting.

## **Global Challenges: Arms Control**

- Arms control remains an extension of diplomacy and war by other means.
- A wide range of global agreements both support and bind US interests and create a form of “globalization”
  - NNPT/Start I & II/CTBT/INF
  - BWC
  - CWC
  - MTCR
  - ABM Treaty
- Agreements affecting conventional arms have been discussed, but have shown little practice; controls on conventional technologies are uncertain.
- Regional agreements present added complications.
- The CNN Factor, the Geneva convention, and impact of international law:
  - Bind the good guys; leave the bad guys free?

## **Immediate Global Challenges: Shifts in Maritime Traffic and Power**

- Decline in British, French, and European seapower.
- Rising regional powers: Japan, China.
- Globalization of:
  - Longer-range sensors.
  - Strike aircraft.
  - Anti-ship missiles, mine warfare (& submarines?)
- Steadily growing volumes of trade and economic interdependence.
  - US trade volumes steadily up. \$822 billion in 1996 versus \$352 billion in 1985.
  - US increasingly dependent on time-sensitive deliveries, and certain heavy industrial activities.
  - Our trading partners also need trading partners.
- Massive projected growth in oil flows: 37.1 MMBD in 1995 to 66 MMBD in 2020.
  - Flows shift from 60% to West to 60%+ to Asia.
  - US energy imports include the energy supplied to other states to make US imports.
- Sea lanes change radically in traffic density; strike systems extend range and number of chokepoints.