

A Guide to the
1997 Mexico City
Mayoral Election

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An Election Studies Report of
the CSIS Americas Program,
Mexico Project

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CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies

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Introduction

Mexico City is a political universe unto itself. These first direct elections for mayor in Mexico's capital city, to be held July 6, 1997, more than justify a special edition of the CSIS Mexico Project's *Election Study Series*.

Mexico City has a history of volatile voting. The city delivered a resounding defeat to the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 1988 elections for president and Congress. The PRI won only 27.6 percent of Mexico City's vote in 1988, with the Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD, registering 46.0 percent. Indeed, it was the early Mexico City returns in 1988 that left an enduring belief in the minds of Mexicans everywhere that the PRI and Carlos Salinas de Gortari had lost in the rest of the country.

Those figures were reversed only three years later in Mexico's 1991 midterm elections, when the PRI won 46.2 percent of the vote in Mexico City, compared to the PRD's 12.9 percent. The PRI vote in Mexico City remained strong at 43.4 percent during the presidential race. But recent polls for the 1997 mayor's race give the PRD's Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas a 15 point lead over his nearest competitor (37 percent versus 22 percent), suggesting that Mexico City's volatile voter has returned. It is far from clear whether the Mexico City vote will provide an indication of the direction of opposition voting nationwide given the wide regional variations in opposition party presence (with the center right National Action Party—PAN—predominant in the North and the PRD strong in rural areas and the South). It may, however, deal a blow to the PRI in the nation's most visible urban platform.

The CSIS Mexico Project has covered every significant Mexican election since the 1985 midterm election, and is pleased to publish George Grayson's *A Guide to the 1997 Mexico City Mayoral Elections*. Dr. Grayson has given us a delightful collection of essential facts, sound commentary, and fanciful asides that will make useful and pleasurable reading. The *Guide* offers the most salient features of Mexico's new electoral reform and presents the candidates and parties. Dr. Grayson also provides a mosaic look at Mexico City life through statistics, ranging from the tons of garbage collected daily in the world's largest city to the number of movie houses and theaters. In all, the *Guide* is an excellent introduction to an historic Mexican election, presented in an accessible fashion for layman and expert alike.

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The Political Context of the 1997 Mayoral Election

Mexico City voters will elect their mayor, officially known as the "Chief of Government of the Federal District," on July 6, 1997. This will be the first time in more than 70 years that the mayor will assume office through popular vote rather than appointment. The winner will administer a city of 8.5 million people with 120,000 public employees, and will immediately find himself on short lists of candidates for the 2000 presidential election, just in time for the end of his three-year term.¹

This election of Mexico City's mayor—in contrast to the office's history as a presidential selection—represents one of a series of late-1996 changes to the Federal Electoral Code (COFIPE) approved by Mexico's Congress exclusively with votes of the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which had attenuated the reform to the point that other parties refused to support it. Even more important, the legislators bolstered the power of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the highly professional agency charged to organize, conduct, and supervise federal elections.

Specifically, the reforms shifted the presidency of IFE's General Council—composed of eight politically independent councillors—from the secretary of government (*Gobernación*) to a respected figure with no partisan ties, named by Congress. In November 1996, the lawmakers chose the eminent legal scholar José Woldenberg to fill this important post. Although representatives of major political parties take part in IFE proceedings, they have no vote on matters considered by the council. Aggrieved parties can appeal council decisions, including certification of vote tallies, to the Federal Electoral Judicial Tribunal (TEPJF), whose findings may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico's ultimate judicial organ.

Last year's modifications of COFIPE significantly enhanced the IFE's autonomy and authority in preparation for the 1997 elections. To carry out its functions, the Institute will create and oversee 32 local councils—one for each state and the Federal District (D.F.)—as well as 300 district councils established specifically for the upcoming contests. Although the IFE will take

¹ After 2000, mayoral terms will last for six years.

responsibility for the July elections in the D.F., Mexico City will fashion its own electoral institute along the lines of the state institutes to conduct the elections in 2000.

In the past, critics charged that the PRI government engineered fraud-marred voter registration lists and the voter identification process. Cynics often note that "democracy exists 364 days a year in Mexico—it's only missing on election day." To counter this perception, the IFE undertook an enormous drive to update voter rolls and to give each voter a counterfeit-resistant registration card by January 15 of this year. The new ID document bears the holder's registration number, signature, holograph-protected photograph, thumbprint, and a machine-readable magnetic strip. The Institute conducted an extensive advertising campaign to boost voter registration. On April 10, the IFE reported that 98.35 percent of Mexicans eligible to vote had signed up and that voter lists meet or surpass international standards for precision. The IFE has also computerized and otherwise modernized the procedure for tallying and publicizing results as part of a Herculean initiative to achieve fair and accurate outcomes. In fact, authorities will post vote totals on the Internet every few minutes to discourage any finagling with the count.

The new laws guarantee access for all political parties to regulated amounts of publicly-financed broadcasting on radio and television, with free air time increasing during electoral campaigns. Thirty percent of the budget for publicly sponsored advertising disburses equally to the parties, while the remaining 70 percent flows in proportion to the number of votes garnered by each party in the last election. Parties also receive public funds for their general operations. The new provisions tighten reporting requirements and auditing procedures to ensure the legal use of public monies as well as the parties' adherence to spending limits. The statutes also allow private individuals to contribute to political parties but expand reporting requirements and other controls on such donations. Under the new election code, businesses, other organizations, and foreigners may not financially assist Mexican parties or candidates.

The IFE, which may refer alleged criminal violations of COFIPE to a special prosecutor, can impose fines or other administrative penalties for noncriminal infractions; state electoral institutes have similar authority at that level. In addition, the 1996 reform package amplified the role of federal and state courts in civil-rights cases springing from elections. The law entitles political parties to place representatives at polling stations and allows them to protest any voting-related irregularities.

The news media play a crucial, if informal, role in analyzing elections and publicizing charges of wrongdoing. Due to Mexico's history of electoral disputes, a variety of other private organizations also conduct sophisticated monitoring, including "quick counts." Only Mexican citizens have legal status as observers, which invests them with the right to report irregularities. As occurred in the 1994 federal elections, however, the Mexican political parties, private civic organizations, and the IFE encourage foreign visitors to watch any stage of the electoral process.

Such safeguards notwithstanding, three out of four respondents told pollsters they doubted the fairness of Mexico City's elections while 66 percent indicated their belief that the government would block an opposition victory.² The government nurtured this skepticism when it

² Survey conducted in mid-April by the Mexican Institute of Public Opinion (IMOP), *Reforma*, May 1, 1997,

mounted a diplomatic effort to stymie the European Union's contributing \$460,000 to the Mexican Academy of Human Rights to scrutinize campaign activities.

Even in the face of such cynicism, eight parties have fielded candidates for an elective office destined—after the presidency—as the most visible and important in this country of 95 million people. The nominees of three parties—the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the National Action Party (PAN), and the PRI—lead the pack.

Public-opinion surveys indicate that the issues foremost in the minds of "*chilangos*," the nickname for D.F. residents, include crime, unemployment, corruption, pollution, and traffic. Its long tenure in city hall makes the PRI an inviting target for disgruntled citizens and political adversaries alike.

Among the factors that have diminished the PRI's standing is the peso crisis, which afflicted Mexico three weeks after Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León's inauguration as president on December 1, 1994. The debacle precipitated a 6.9 percent fall in gross domestic product (GDP) during 1995, attended by soaring rates of unemployment, inflation, and street crime. In a series of developments suited to tragicomedy, ex-president Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) departed the country in disgrace three months after the end of his term, while authorities arrested his brother Raúl as the "intellectual author" of the murder of their former brother-in-law, an ex-governor and PRI grandee.

These events contributed to 1995 PAN victories in gubernatorial elections in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Baja California. The PAN also holds the state house in Chihuahua, captured in 1992. In November 1996, the PAN and the PRD registered impressive gains against the PRI in municipal contests in the states of México, Coahuila, and Hidalgo. The Mexico state results particularly vexed President Zedillo and his party: the state wraps around three-fourths of the capital city; its denizens share the same problems and media market as those in the D.F.; and the PRI boasts one of its best organizations in the state, where Emilio Chuayffet Chemor served as governor before Zedillo named him to the powerful post of government secretary in 1995. Since then the chief executive has concentrated on Mexico's economic recovery, allowing the shrewd, ambitious Chuayffet to emerge as *de facto* prime minister.

By the spring of 1997, the PAN asserted that its governors and mayors presided over jurisdictions comprising 38 percent of the population, while PRD officials governed 13 percent, consigning the deeply divided PRI to minority status in state and municipal government for the first time since its founding in 1929—an assessment embellished by double counting.

In addition to choosing a mayor in mid-year, Mexico city residents will also select 30 members to the Federal Chamber of Deputies and 66 representatives to the Federal District Legislative Assembly (ALDF), the capital's version of a city council.

Nationwide, 32 seats in the 128-member Senate will be filled, along with all 500 places in Mexico's lower house—300 by direct election and 200 by proportional representation. Moreover, voters will cast ballots for governors, state legislators, and/or mayors in six states: Campeche, Colima, Nuevo León, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, and Sonora. Several other states will hold local elections during the year.

The mayoral candidates have fashioned ambitious platforms embracing their views on issues confronting the Federal District. Many feel that this "country within a country" faces such a daunting set of problems that the parties' positions coincide more than diverge, especially on the

imperatives of fighting crime, combating corruption, creating employment, raising salaries, diminishing pollution, improving housing, modernizing public transportation, and generally enhancing the citizens' quality of life. The documents do not lack for promises of a better life for every segment of society, but generally fail to specify achievable responses or the source of revenues to fund them. In fact, any elected mayor will inherit prickly issues on relations between the D.F. and the federal government and neighboring states.

Consensus on objectives has led the parties to seek other ways of differentiating each standard-bearer from his competition. By late spring, personal attacks on opponents had eclipsed serious discussions of policy, at least for the three major parties.

PAN nominee Carlos Castillo Peraza branded both his adversaries as *priístas*: Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (who had been a member of the PRI in the 1970s) and Alfredo del Mazo, the formal PRI candidate. In addition, the feisty National Action candidate claimed that the already wealthy Cárdenas—when he had served as the PRI governor of Michoacán state—had transferred public lands to his mother for a pittance in 1983, a "clear indication" of how he would misappropriate the assets of Mexico City. Cárdenas replied that the transaction constituted only one of many initiatives to "regularize" clouded property titles and that he treated his family like other citizens. Besides, alleged the PRD candidate, Castillo Peraza obtained his information from José "Pepe" Córdoba Montoya, Carlos Salinas's Machiavellian former chief of staff. Cárdenas asserted that this link further demonstrated the collaboration between Salinas and Castillo Peraza that enabled the latter's party to obtain three governorships between 1988 and 1994, after the PRI allegedly stole the presidential election from Cárdenas. For his part, Del Mazo has concentrated on keeping above the fray, avuncularly urging his foes to stop slinging mud and start concentrating on issues. When during a two-man debate on May 25, Del Mazo went on the attack against Cárdenas, the more composed and self-confident PRD nominee got the best of him, according to public opinion polls. Even as Del Mazo generally plays the "good cop," PRI president and "bad cop" Humberto Roque Villanueva warns that a PAN or PRD triumph would chill investment, spark massive firings of public workers, and precipitate more marches, protests, and other street-clogging demonstrations detested by most city residents. Meanwhile, the PRI newspaper *La República* has linked the "ultraright" PAN to Holocaust victims (by using photographs of the World War II death camps when talking about the PAN); pictured Castillo Peraza holding his nose to show his "disdain" for Mexico City, which appears in the background; and lambasted Cárdenas for opportunism, corruption, and a penchant for inciting violence.³

³ In early June, the IFE penalized the PRI 10,500 pesos (U.S.\$1,312) for publishing in its official newspaper a cartoon figure of the PAN's president wearing a Nazi uniform; the PAN was also fined 10,500 pesos for publicly accusing the PRI and its candidates of financial improprieties.

In response, challengers excoriate the PRI's "legacy of corruption," deplore Zedillo's muscular involvement in the campaign, and decry the party's "old politics," embodied by outgoing mayor Oscar Espinosa Villarreal's announcements of pay hikes and expensive public works during the run-up to balloting.

A medley of reasons magnify the importance of the mid-summer contests: (1) they will mark the first elections conducted by an independent IFE; (2) the outcome of the Mexico City mayor's race will affect maneuvering for the presidency three years later; and (3) the performance of the PRI—which now holds 300 seats in the Chamber of Deputies—will bear on President Zedillo's ability to pass legislation designed to privatize more economic sectors, broaden Mexico's role in the global economy, and shift greater power to other branches of the federal government and to states and localities. More important, Mexico City dominates the country politically, economically, and socially more than—or, at least, as much as—the capital of any other major nation in the world.

Given the connection between the mayor's race and the last half of his presidency, Zedillo has abandoned his pre-1994 election pledges to maintain a "healthy distance" from the PRI and, as a "passive militant," to follow a hands-off policy with respect to intra-party affairs. Since early 1996, the president—lacking an independent power base, notable political team, or strong cabinet—has increasingly identified with his party. Indeed, he played an active role, along with the PRI hierarchy and the government ministry, in selecting the PRI's candidates for the July contests. On April 12, he gave a pep talk to all of his party's legislative aspirants. Two days later, he slammed the opposition parties as champions of "destructive" change, "hypocrisy," "intolerance," and "vindictive aggression," warmly endorsing Del Mazo, the PRI's choice for mayor of Mexico City. In fact, PRI Secretary General Juan S. Millán, a senator from Sinaloa, prominent labor leader, and prospective governor of his state, has labeled the upcoming elections a referendum on the Zedillo administration. Other observers have identified the contest as a "parting of the waters in Mexican politics," either introducing a "new era" in the nation's development or sounding the "last hurrah" for the PRI.

CHAPTER 2

1997 Election Timetable

<i>January 15</i>	Deadline for voter registration for the July 6 elections
<i>February 15-March 7</i>	Publication of registered voter lists (for public review and corrections)
<i>February 15-March 14</i>	Parties seeking to form coalitions for the Senate election submit applications to IFE
<i>March 1-March 15</i>	Registration for candidates for mayor of Mexico City
<i>March 2-March 31</i>	Parties seeking to form coalitions for Chamber of Deputies or ALDF elections by direct vote (<i>Mayoría Relativa</i>) submit applications to IFE
<i>March 15-March 30</i>	Registration period for Senate candidates
<i>March 16-April 14</i>	Parties proposing to form coalitions for Chamber of Deputies or ALDF elections via proportional representation submit applications to IFE
<i>March 31-April 2</i>	IFE approves official list of Senate candidates
<i>April 1-April 15</i>	Registration of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies or ALDF via direct vote
<i>April 3-July 3</i>	Senate campaign season
<i>April 15-April 30</i>	Registration of candidates for Chamber of Deputies or ALDF via proportional representation
<i>April 16-April 18</i>	IFE approves candidacies for Chamber of Deputies or ALDF by direct vote
<i>April 19</i>	Start of campaign season for Chamber of Deputies and ALDF candidates via direct vote
<i>May 1-3</i>	IFE approves candidacies for Chamber of Deputies or ALDF via proportional representation
<i>June 2-June 9 (tentative)</i>	IFE General Council session for registration of applications for foreign election observer accreditation
<i>July 3</i>	Campaign season ends
<i>July 6</i>	Election day

CHAPTER 3

Mexican Electoral Contests in 1997

Election Day is July 6, unless otherwise noted. Some dates may be subject to change.

Federal Elections

300 Seats in the Chamber of Deputies (by direct vote)
200 Seats in the Chamber of Deputies (by proportional representation)
32 Senators (by proportional representation)

Federal District

Mayor
40 Assemblymen (by direct vote)
26 Assemblymen (by proportional representation)

Campeche

Governor
21 Deputies (by direct vote)
14 Deputies (by proportional representation)
9 Mayors

Colima

Governor
12 Deputies (by direct vote)
8 Deputies (by proportional representation)

10 Mayors

Guanajuato

22 Deputies (by direct vote)
14 Deputies (by proportional representation)
46 Mayors

Querétaro

Governor
25 Deputies (by direct vote)
9 Deputies (by proportional representation)
18 Mayors

Sonora

Governor
21 Deputies (by direct vote)
12 Deputies (by proportional representation)
76 Mayors

San Luis Potosí

Governor
15 Deputies (by direct vote)
12 Deputies (by proportional representation)
56 Mayors

Nuevo León

Governor
22 Deputies (by direct vote)
20 Deputies (by proportional representation)
51 Mayors

Morelos (March 16)

15 Deputies (by direct vote)
10 Deputies (by proportional representation)
33 Mayors

Veracruz (November 9)

208 Mayors

Jalisco (November 16)

20 Deputies (by direct vote)
17 Deputies (by proportional representation)
124 Mayors

Tabasco (November 16)

17 Deputies (by direct vote)
12 Deputies (by proportional representation)
17 Mayors

Source: Political Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, "Mexico: Roadmap to the 1997 Election."

CHAPTER 4

Some Background on Mexico City

A Brief Chronology

Approximately 1325

Aztecs founded Tenochtitlán or the "Place of the High Priest Tenoch," the site of today's Mexico City, on the main island of the largest of lakes in what is commonly called the Valley of Mexico.

1521

Hernán Cortés, who arrived in 1519, razed Tenochtitlán and constructed a Spanish city on its ruins.

1522

Spain gave the city its charter and recognized its *cabildo*, or town council, which—13 years later—was given leadership over the other cities of New Spain, as Mexico was known. The jurisdiction of the city, the most important in the Americas, jutted deeply into the present United States and as far south as Panama.

1821

Mexico gained independence from Spain.

1824

Republican constitution created the Federal District to centralize the country's government in Mexico City.

1847

Mexico City captured by U.S. troops.

1850s

Liberal regime destroyed all convents or put these buildings to other uses.

1865

Archduke Maximilian—then Mexico's emperor—expanded the city and constructed what is now the Paseo de la Reforma to connect his palace with Chapultepec Castle.

1876-1911

President/dictator Porfirio Díaz modernized the capital in the style of Baron Haussmann's

1910-1917 1928	Paris. Revolution convulsed the city. Department of the federal district, headed by a presidentially appointed mayor (<i>regente</i>) replaced an elected municipal council (<i>ayuntamiento</i>).
July 17, 1928	An assassin took the life of the revolutionary hero and former president, Alvaro Obregón, after he won reelection but before he assumed office.
October 2, 1968	"Tlatelolco Massacre" in which army and police units killed an estimated 400 protestors in downtown Mexico City.
September 19-20, 1985	<i>El Grande</i> earthquakes left more than 8,000 people dead and damage estimated at U.S.\$4 billion.
1988	The 66-member Representative Assembly of the Federal District (ARDF) began functioning as a city council with limited authority. The ARDF, which was transformed into the Legislative Assembly of the D.F. (ALDF) in 1997, enabled city residents to vote in a nonfederal election for the first time in six decades.
July 6, 1997	First elected mayor in modern history.

Demographics

<i>Population</i>	8,489,007 (projected to reach 9.7 million in 2020)
<i>Births per year</i>	219,877
<i>Deaths per year</i>	45,686
<i>Annual population growth</i>	0.50 percent
<i>Portion female</i>	52 percent
<i>Portion under age 24</i>	53 percent
<i>Portion above age 60</i>	6.11 percent
<i>Population living in poverty</i>	60 percent (middle class, 20 percent; rich, 3 percent)
<i>Area of city</i>	463.3 sq. miles
<i>Population density</i>	18,347 (per sq. mile)
<i>Population of metropolitan area</i>	18.8 million (projected to reach 26 million in 2020)

Economics

<i>Gross city income (GCI)</i>	\$33,908,991,620
<i>Contribution of economic sectors to GCI:</i>	
<i>Petroleum</i>	21.57 percent
<i>Commerce, restaurants, and hotels</i>	21.36 percent
<i>Social, personal, and community services</i>	28.71 percent
<i>Financial services, securities, and real estate</i>	16.73 percent
<i>Other activities</i>	11.63 percent
<i>City's portion of national GNP</i>	26.1 percent
<i>City's portion of national energy consumption</i>	17 percent
<i>Industrial plants</i>	32,456
<i>Service-providing businesses</i>	108,054
<i>Banks and brokerage houses</i>	1,200
<i>Seven-11-style convenience stores</i>	162
<i>Hotels</i>	565 (25,000 rooms)
<i>Portion of female heads of households</i>	25 percent
<i>Economically active population</i>	3,644,000
<i>Rate of open unemployment</i>	5.1 percent (March 1997)

Education and Health

<i>Schools</i>	9,140
<i>Teachers</i>	173,670
<i>Illiterates</i>	208,000
<i>Universities</i>	41
<i>Hospitals</i>	344 (public and private)
<i>Doctors</i>	25,000
<i>Nurses</i>	40,000
<i>Pharmacies</i>	3,493
<i>Abortions per year</i>	25,000
<i>Blood banks</i>	36

Public Safety

<i>Crimes reported daily</i>	560
<i>Bank robberies</i>	70 (1996)

<i>Police officers</i>	27,500 ¹
<i>Jail and prison inmates</i>	11,697 in March 1997 (7,245 in 1994)
<i>Autopsies performed</i>	6,178
<i>Demonstrations, marches, sit-ins</i>	2,431 (September 1995-August 1996)

Public Services

<i>City employees</i>	120,000 ²
<i>Tons of garbage collected daily</i>	12,000
<i>Public telephones</i>	2,560,000

Pollution

<i>Unsatisfactory air quality (days)</i>	324 (1995)
<i>Private automobiles as source of pollution</i>	60 percent
<i>Industrial plants as a source of pollution</i>	15 percent

Transportation

<i>Private automobiles</i>	3.5 million
<i>Taxis</i>	83,305 ³
<i>Minibuses (peseros)</i>	25,697
<i>Major streets (miles)</i>	192.2
<i>Conflictive intersections</i>	2,546
<i>Street lights</i>	450,000
<i>Speed bumps</i>	12,517 (5,486 officially authorized)

¹ "Preventive" police; in addition, there are "auxiliary" and "banking and industrial" forces.

² Of these workers, 6,000 hold *confianza* or management status, exempting them from the necessity to join a labor union.

³ Newcomers to Mexico City are advised to avoid taxis, especially the green Volkswagens, that display figures of the Virgin of Guadalupe on the dashboard—not because of any disrespect to the blessed Virgin, but because these *taxistas* are convinced of their immortality and drive even more audaciously than their counterparts.

<i>Gasoline stations</i>	240
<i>Metro:</i>	
<i>lines</i>	10
<i>stations</i>	154
<i>riders per weekday</i>	4.6 million
<i>price per ticket</i>	1 peso and 30 centavos (16¢U.S.)

Entertainment

<i>Museums</i>	161
<i>Concert halls</i>	30
<i>Art galleries</i>	340
<i>Movie houses and theaters</i>	287
<i>Bars</i>	5,690
<i>Restaurants, bars, and night clubs</i>	30,708
<i>Health clubs</i>	1,200
<i>Sports clubs and fields</i>	1,103

Social Factors

<i>Portion of residents with plumbing</i>	85 percent
<i>Per capita consumption of water (daily)</i>	79.26 gallons
<i>Housing units</i>	1.8 million
<i>Street people</i>	12,941
<i>Prostitutes</i>	8,000
<i>Condoms used (daily)</i>	25,000

Political Factors

<i>Eligible voters</i>	5,999,344
<i>Political jurisdictions (delegaciones)</i>	16
<i>Members of federal Congress</i>	30
<i>Members of Senate</i>	4

Religious Data

<i>Churches</i>	24,500
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<i>Catholics</i>	92.42 percent
<i>Pilgrims to Basilica of Virgin of Guadalupe</i>	4 million (each December)
<i>Believers in Satan</i>	23 percent

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática; and "Ciudad de México: Los numbers de Caos," *Reforma* ("Enfoque" supplement), June 8, 1997.

CHAPTER 5

Voting Procedures and Trends in Mexico City

Campaign Logistics

Eligible voters	5,999,344 (April 10, 1997)
Registered voters	5,897,464 (98.30 percent)
Polling places	10,585 ¹
Voting hours	8 a.m. to 6 p.m.
Identification	Photo-ID voter card

Elective Positions to be Filled on July 6, 1997

Chief of Government of the Federal District	1
Deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, ALDF (40 by direct election, 26 by proportional representation)	66
Deputies directly elected to the Chamber of Deputies	30

¹ These facilities require: 5,380 canvas covers, 13,596 stakes, 3,001 tables, 126,995 chairs, 2,725 portable
johns, 24,532 trash bags, 3,857 lamps, 6,387 extension cords, and 251,582 containers of drinking water. See *Reforma*,
April 30, 1997, 4B.

Public Funds Available to Parties to Finance 1997 Campaigns in D.F.

See table 5.1.

Number of Eligible Voters in each *delegación*

Azcapotzalco	353,145
Coyoacán	471,922
Cuajimalpa de Morelos	83,635
Gustavo A. Madero	928,648
Iztacalco	320,521
Iztapalapa	1,078,104
Magdalena Contreras	145,451
Milta Alta	48,455
Alvaro Obregón	461,319
Tlahuac	155,541
Tlalpan	367,140
Xochimilco	207,281
Benito Juárez	296,736
Cuauhtémoc	421,688
Miguel Hidalgo	284,455
Venustiano Carranza	375,331
TOTAL	5,999,372

Voting Patterns by Party in D.F.

See table 5.2.

Mexico City Citizens Registered to Vote on July 6, 1997:
Delegación by Delegación

P: Number of potentially eligible voters

LN: "Nominal list," namely individuals who, having completed all registration requirements, have their photo-identity voter's card.

Source: *Excelsior*, May 3, 1997, p.1-A

CHAPTER 6

Mayors of Mexico City: 1929-Present

Mexico City Mayors, 1929-present

Name	Date Sworn in	President
José Manuel Puig Casauranc	January 1, 1929	Emilio Portes Gil (Nov. 30, 1928-Feb. 5, 1930) Pascual Ortiz Rubio Feb. 5, 1930 - Sept. 4, 1932)
Crisóforo Ibañez	July 3, 1930	
Lamberto Hernández	October 8, 1930	
Vicente Estrada Cajigal	January 25, 1932	
Enrique Romero Courtade	August 18, 1932	
Manuel Padilla	August 26, 1932	Abelardo L. Rodríguez (Sept. 4, 1932-Nov. 30, 1934)
Juan G. Cabral	September 5, 1932	
Aarón Sáenz	December 15, 1932	
Cosme R. Hinojosa Jr. (1879-1965)	June 17, 1935	Lázaro Cárdenas del Río (Dec. 1, 1934-Nov. 30, 1940)
José Siurob Ramírez	January 3, 1938	

(1886-1965)

Raúl Castellanos

January 23, 1939

Javier Rojo Gómez
(1896-1930)

December 1, 1940

Manuel Avila Camacho
(Dec. 1, 1940-Nov. 30, 1946)

Fernando Casas Alemán
(1905-1968)

December 1, 1946

Miguel Alemán Valdés
(Dec. 1, 1946-Nov. 30, 1952)

Ernesto Peralta Uruchurtu
(1906-

December 1, 1952

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
(Dec. 1, 1952-Nov. 30, 1958)
Adolfo López Mateos
(Dec. 1, 1958-Nov. 30, 1964)

Alfonso Corona del Rosal
(1908-

September 1, 1966

Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
(Dec. 1, 1964-Nov. 30, 1970)

Alfonso Martínez Domínguez
(1922-

December 1, 1970

Luis Echeverría Alvarez
(Dec. 1, 1970-Nov. 30, 1976)

Octavio Senties Gómez
(1915-1997)

June 15, 1971

Carlos Hank González
(1927-

December 1, 1976

José López Portillo
(Dec. 1, 1976-Nov. 30, 1982)

Ramón Aguirre Velázquez
(1935-

December 1, 1982

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
(Dec. 1, 1982-Nov. 30, 1988)

Manuel Camacho Solís
(1946-

December 1, 1988

Carlos Salinas de Gortari
(Dec. 1, 1988-Nov. 30, 1994)

Manuel Aguilera Gómez
(1936-

November 30, 1993

Oscar Espinosa Villarreal
(1953-

December 1, 1994

Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León
(Dec. 1, 1994-present)

The Office of Mayor

Qualifications

- Born in Mexico
- Mexican citizen who enjoys full rights of citizenship
- If born in Mexico City, must have maintained a residence in the city for at least three years before the day he is elected
- If born outside Mexico City, must have lived continuously in the city for at least five years before the day he is elected
- Residency requirements must not have been interrupted by federal service in any other part of the country
- At least 30 years of age by election day
- Must never previously have held the post of "Chief of Government of the Federal District," even on a temporary or interim basis¹

Formal Functions²

- **Serve as chief executive.** Comply with and execute laws enacted by Congress that relate to the D.F.; promulgate, publicize, and execute statutes passed by the ALDF, ensuring their "exact" implementation through regulations, decrees, and accords.
- **Serve as chief legislator.** Introduce bills or decrees in the ALDF.
- **Serve as chief administrator.** Administer city agencies, appoint and remove public

¹ Although this prohibition affects eight politicians, it was aimed at precluding Manuel Camacho Solís from running. Camacho Solís broke the PRI's unwritten rules by publicly grouching when Salinas passed over him for their party's presidential nomination in late 1993; the spurned politician subsequently bolted the PRI and explored running for mayor as the nominee of an anti-PRI alliance. Camacho challenged the ban in court, but few observers expect a decision before the July 1997 elections.

² The next Congress may revise substantially the mayor's powers.

servants.

- **Serve as overseer of public safety.** Ensure public safety, although the president appoints the city's attorney general.

Informal Duties

- **National opinion leader.** While occupying a bully pulpit even as a presidential appointee, the mayor of Mexico City as an elected officeholder will become, after the president, the most significant politician in the country.
- **Serve as presidential confidant and negotiator.** Manuel Camacho Solís (1988-1993) played this role for President Carlos Salinas—in addition to meeting frequently with Salinas in Los Pinos, Camacho involved himself deeply in labor politics, even advancing the careers of younger trade union leaders who might compete for power with labor patriarch Fidel Velázquez Sánchez. A PRI president would be unlikely to invite an opposition party mayor to perform this role.
- **Serve as city builder.** Multimillionaire entrepreneur and ex-governor of Mexico state Carlos Hank González (1976-1982)—one of the party's wealthiest "dinosaurs"—gained fame for his public works, including the construction of major road arteries and bridges, as well as the extension of the metro.
- **Strongman of the regime.** Ernesto Peralta Uruchurtu (1952-1966) became known as the "iron mayor" because of his suppression of criminals and political dissidents.
- **Serve as "fall guy" for the chief executive.** Alfonso Martínez Domínguez (1970-1971) was forced to resign by President Echeverría after a Mexico City police unit killed protesting students in the June 1971 "Corpus Christi" massacre.
- **Serve as fund-raiser.** All mayors encourage corporations, trade unions, and the affluent to spearhead or join campaigns to assist schools, hospitals, parks, the homeless, or other pet projects. In essence, contributors fork over a voluntary tax to propitiate the mayor. While volunteerism is stressed, failure to help His Honor's worthy cause may find city workmen "repairing" the street in front of the nongiver's factory, thereby halting the entry or exit of trucks from production facilities until the spirit of generosity flows into his heart.

Pay and Perquisites

- Annual salary of approximately U.S.\$75,000
- Expense account paid out of the city budget but not listed as a line item
- Six-member security detachment
- Chauffeur
- Four secretaries: (a) personal, (b) assistant personal, (c) private, and (d) appointments
- Access to 120,000 city employees

CHAPTER 8

Budget of Mexico City

Sources of Funds, Mexico City

Sources of Funds	Millions of Pesos*	
	1995	1996
Tax Collections**	9,337	11,488
Federal Government**	7,392	10,603
Entities and businesses controlled by the government of the D.F.	1,805	3,006
Financing	1,091	5,100
TOTAL	19,625	30,197

* The peso fluctuated between 4.875 to the dollar (January 1, 1995) to 7.665 to the dollar (January 2, 1996) to 7.854 to the dollar (December 30, 1996).

** Congress may extensively revise taxing powers and federal revenue sharing after the election of a new mayor.

Sources: Government of the D.F.; *Wall Street Journal*.

Major Party Candidates

The following summaries provide background information on the three major-party candidates running for the officer of mayor of Mexico City.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano

Party	Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) <i>El Partido de la Revolución Democrática</i> Manuel Andrés López Obrador, president Monterrey 50, Col. Roma 06700 México, D.F Tel. 264-3919, 286-11-14
Party history	Former PRI officeholders Cárdenas and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo spearheaded the PRD's creation in 1989 to institutionalize the substantial support garnered by the National Democratic Front (FDN) that nominated Cárdenas for president in 1988. The "Democratic Current," the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), and an amalgam of communist, socialist, and ex-guerrilla organizations constituted the PRD in 1989.
Orientation	Leftist-nationalist
Date/place of birth	May 1, 1934; Mexico City in Los Pinos presidential palace where his father and chief executive Lázaro Cárdenas lived
Education	Secondary school: Colegio de San Nicolás, Morelia Michoacán; civil engineering degree, National Autonomous University of Mexico

Additional studies	Studied in France under a scholarship awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Relations; worked with German firms Krupp, Sremena, and GHH on projects pertaining to the underdeveloped regions of Italy
Profession	Civil engineer
Elective office	Federal senator for the PRI (1976-1982); governor Michoacán state (1980-1986)
Key positions held	President and founder of the Mexican Planning Society (1962-1964); subdirector general of the Lázaro Cárdenas Commission (1973-1976); subsecretary for forestry and fauna, Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (1976-1980)
Important political/campaign activities	Headed national protest of Mexican students against the U.S.-backed intervention in Guatemala (1954); member of the National Committee of the Movement of National Liberation (1961-1968); precandidate for governor of Michoacán (1973); head of the breakaway "Democratic Current" within the PRI (1986-1987); presidential candidate of the National Democratic Front, with the backing of the PARM, PFCRN, PPS, and PMS (1987-1988); a founder of the PRD (1989); president of the PRD (1990); candidate for president of Mexico for the PRD and the National Democrat Alliance (1994)
Nominating process	On March 2, 1997, the PRD held an open primary in which 90,000 Mexico City residents participated—with the greatest number of ballots cast in the delegations of Iztapalapa, Gustavo A. Madero, Alvaro Obregón, Cuauhtémoc, and Venustiano Carranza. Delegations registering the lowest turnouts were Milpa Alta, Xochimilco, Iztacalco, and Tláhuac. Voters chose between Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 62, and Cárdenas. Both men had grown up in the PRI, held key party posts (Muñoz Ledo as party president; Cárdenas as governor), organized the dissident "Democratic Current," founded the PRD in 1989, and served as president of the new party. In addition, Muñoz Ledo had served as labor secretary (1972-1975), education secretary (1976-1977), Mexico's ambassador to the UN (1979-1982), and a senator from the D.F. (1991-1994). Analysts viewed Muñoz Ledo as a centrist, skilled at

negotiating with politicians from across the spectrum as demonstrated by his helping to craft the Electoral Reform Law of 1996. In contrast, the dour Cárdenas tended to advocate a harder line with both opposition parties and the government.

Seventy percent of the primary voters backed Cárdenas, whom the disappointed Muñoz Ledo pledged to support enthusiastically even as he sought a congressional seat.

Platform

Crime: (1) opposes using military in police functions, while favoring (2) greater citizen involvement in combating crime, (3) enhancing police professionalism, (4) energetically combating narcotrafficking, (5) improving the judiciary, (6) reforming the prison system, and (7) strengthening independence of the Human Rights Commission of the D.F.

Economic Development: (1) emergency jobs program in *delegaciones* with highest unemployment rates, focusing on the construction, maintenance, and repair of public works and public housing; (2) ensure that federal agencies award training scholarships on objective rather than political criteria; (3) gradual incorporation of street vendors into formal economy; (4) tax incentives to small- and medium-sized businesses to create jobs; (5) extend social security benefits one year after an individual loses his job; and (6) discourage speculative investment.

Environment: (1) establish "ecological reserves"; (2) impose an "ecological tax" to ensure that "he who pollutes pays"; (3) expand and improve air monitoring; (4) encourage the use of alternative fuels; (5) improve control over industrial emissions; and (6) design an "integral program" of environmental protection—with a view to expanding popular participation in the crafting of environmental policy.

Women: (1) equal access to education and employment; (2) crackdown on both sexual harassment in the workplace and spouse abuse in homes; (3) additional benefits to the 15 to 20 percent of women who head households; (4) retirement after 25 years of work; (5) increased penalty for rape; (6) ensure that women affected—not public-health

authorities—make decisions related to tubal ligations and other contraceptive procedures; and (7) stimulate greater political participation by females, as the PRD has done by requiring that women constitute at least 30 percent of its candidates for legislative posts—a goal the party has failed to attain.

Transportation: (1) encourage public over private transportation; (2) construct a rail system that can transport passengers from metro stations to their homes outside the city; (3) carefully supervise the granting of concessions to companies owning buses and other means of mass transit; (4) emphasize new, less polluting technologies; and (5) maintain the current subsidies for buses, metro, and trolleys.

Political Reform: (1) transform the D.F. into a 32nd state, possessing its own governor, judicial system, legislature, and municipal administration; (2) elect all officials who govern Mexico City; (3) create a strong "authentic legislative power" to make laws for the city; (4) stimulate pluralism and a "new political culture" by involving NGOs, professionals, grassroots movements, and other groups in decision making; and (5) employ referenda on key policy questions.

Education: (1) eradicate illiteracy and school dropouts; (2) provide free education and free textbooks until ninth grade; (3) impart objective sex education related to public health; (4) eliminate the single admissions examination, giving universities the right to establish their own admissions criteria; (5) create a University of the D.F., presumably to broaden access to higher education; (6) take advantage of the capital's network of research centers and educational institutions to spur economic development; (7) democratize the formulation of education policies by establishing a broad-based Educational Council, with members drawn from all *delegaciones*; (8) encourage students in a school district to move "fluidly" from school to school, taking full advantage of libraries, workshops, laboratories, and sports facilities; (9) integrate street children and Indian children into the educational system; (10) improve teacher pay and training; (11) promote the transfer of schools and operating

resources from the federal government to the D.F.; and (12) create a Ministry of Education and Culture of the D.F. to operate the capital's educational system.

Campaign strategy

1. Presents a gentler, kinder Cárdenas who occasionally smiles, looks directly into television cameras to connect with his viewers, delivers briefer speeches, dresses more conservatively, and employs less aggressive language in his oratory.

2. Depicts Cárdenas as a mainstream candidate—countering his image as a radical firebrand within a party devoted to "mass mobilization"—by having him meet with women, business leaders, members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and the New York financial community.

3. Stresses that Cárdenas will be mayor of "all" capital residents by his inclination to invite opposition-party leaders and independents into his administration. In mid-April, the PRD nominee lunched with a millionaire entrepreneur, church leaders, and longtime *priísta* Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, a hardliner who served as Salinas's first government secretary. Cárdenas indicated that Gutiérrez Barrios was the kind of individual he would like to recruit to help him run the city.

4. Nominates moderate PRD activists, nonparty members, and even an ex-PRI governor for legislative positions to reinforce an image of moderation and inclusiveness. Among the 50 percent of the PRD's "external candidates" are ex-editor of *La Jornada* Carlos Payán Vélver, actress María Rojo, Olympic medalist Bernardo Segura, and former Tabasco governor Enrique González Pedrero.

5. Drums up grassroots' support by allying itself with, and selecting candidates from, El Barzón debtors' organization and the Assembly of Neighborhoods (*la Asamblea de Barrios*).

6. Seeks to mobilize votes to win through 6,000 "Sun Brigades" members (*Brigadistas del Sol*)—chiefly students who will undertake a house-to-house canvass of the city;

plan to select and train 20,000 militants who will represent the PRD at each polling place.

7. Accentuates Cárdenas's unflinching opposition to Salinas, even when the now-despised ex-president enjoyed national and international approval. Cárdenas condemns Del Mazo as the legatee of PRI- and Salinas-style corruption, while lambasting Castillo Peraza as an architect of the PAN's collaboration (*concertación*) with Salinas during whose administration the PAN attained the governorships of Baja California, Guanajuato, and Chihuahua.

8. The PRD responds to Castillo Peraza's accusation of shady land dealings that enriched Cárdenas's family when the latter served as governor of Michoacán by (a) citing Salinas confidant José "Pepe" Córdoba Montoya as the instigator of the "dirty war" against Cárdenas, (b) suggesting that the PAN and PRI have forged an alliance to defeat the PRD's mayoral candidate, and (c) implying Castillo Peraza is a homosexual.

9. Favored the inclusion of all eight candidates in any televised debate to diminish attacks that Castillo Peraza or Del Mazo could make on Cárdenas, the front-runner as of mid-June. Failing an all-parties' forum, backed a debate with only PRI nominee Del Mazo, excluding the PAN's Castillo Peraza.

Carlos Castillo Peraza

Party

National Action Party (PAN)
El Partido Acción Nacional
 Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, president
 Angel Urza 812, Col. De Valle
 03109 México, D.F.
 Tel. 559-63-00 (20 lines)
 Fax 559-09-25, 559-01-59

Party history

Founded in 1939 as a pro-Catholic, pro-business party opposed to the nationalization, land distribution, and "socialist" educational policies of then-president Lázaro Cárdenas. Its greatest influence lies in the north, where it

	holds the governorships of Baja California, Chihuahua, and Guanajuato, as well as the central "Bajío" region and in cities. Although Salinas preempted much of its market-oriented program, the PAN leadership frequently worked hand-in-glove with the PRI-dominated government on such major issues as reprivatizing the banks, approving NAFTA, attenuating the constitution's anticlerical provisions, altering the status of <i>ejido</i> communal farms, and revamping electoral statutes. Such cooperation prompted the " <i>Foro Democrático y Doctrinario</i> " composed of conservative Christian Democrats to break with the party in 1993 and form the National Opposition Union (UNO).
Orientation	Center-right; social Christian; pro-small business
Candidate's date/place of birth	April 17, 1947; Mérida, Yucatán
Education	Political philosophy degree from the University of Fribourg, Switzerland
Additional studies	None
Profession	Professor, author, politician
Elective offices	Federal deputy (1979-1982; 1988-1991); PAN national president (1993-1996)
Key positions held	Secretary of international relations of the PAN's executive committee; founder and director of the Institute of Study and Training of PAN; secretary of public education in the shadow cabinet of Ing. Manuel Clouthier del Rincón, PAN's presidential candidate in 1988; secretary of international relations of PAN; and president of the PAN's foundation "Rafael Preciado Hernández, A.C."
Important political/campaign activities	Candidate for governor of Yucatán (1981); candidate for mayor of Mérida (1984); author of "Our PAN" and "Anthology of the Yucatán"; coauthor of "The Future of the Left in Mexico," "Religion and Culture," and "Church and Culture in Latin America"
Nominating process	The PAN held a regional convention on March 2, 1997, for

Mexico City in which Francisco José Paoli Bolio, a member of the ALDF and a cofounder of the leftist Mexican Workers' Party (PMT) vied for the nomination against Castillo Peraza. Despite his having campaigned actively for the nomination for a year with the blessing of Diego Fernández de Cevallos—the party's 1994 presidential standard-bearer—Paoli captured only 25.46 percent of the votes cast by the 700 delegates compared to 74.54 percent for the much better-known Castillo Peraza. The latter's supporters circulated a 1991 newspaper article in which Paoli criticized the PAN's conservatism and defense of capitalism. The same flyer carried a picture of Paoli with PRD leader Heberto Castillo, with whom he had organized the PMT and coauthored several books. The PAN awarded Paoli, who had only joined the party in 1993, the consolation prize by placing him at the top of the list of their candidates seeking the 200 seats (of 500) in the Chamber of Deputies allocated by proportional representation.

Platform

Crime: (1) amend the constitution to vest the ALDF with full authority over public safety, including the selection of the city's police chief; (2) participation of D.F.—under ALDF's supervision—in the National System of Police Information; (3) carefully monitor and evaluate police activities; (4) provide police with technologically advanced arms and equipment; (5) improve the training, salaries, and benefits of law-enforcement personnel; (6) involve citizens in law-and-order issues via a Public Safety Council of the D.F.; (7) encourage the public's participation in crime prevention; (8) improve emergency telephone service, analogous to 911 in the United States; (9) oversee more rigorously public officials and their budgets to combat corruption; and (10) reform, modernize, and "de-federalize" the city attorney general's office, the courts, and the prison system.

Economic Development: (1) focus job-creation initiatives on such relatively labor-intensive, low-polluting sectors as construction, manufacturing, tourism, and textiles; (2) reduce red tape and regulations to spur the creation of small- and medium-sized enterprises, including opening a single office in each *delegación* where an entrepreneur can

complete all of the paperwork required to launch a business; (3) introduce absolute transparency in the awarding of all city contracts, long the source of graft and favoritism; (4) foster cooperation between research centers and businesses so that the latter obtain access to the most advanced technology; (5) increase public safety to recover the confidence of Mexican and foreign investors; and (6) re-evaluate the performance of all concessionaires who have contracts with the city—with a view to replacing those who perform poorly with efficient providers of goods and services.

Environment: (1) impose harsh penalties on those who invade, sell, or construct houses in the city's "ecological reserves"; (2) crack down on the destruction, burning, or buying and selling of fauna; (3) stimulate the reforestation and cleanup of woods in conservation zones; (4) encourage school children and others to plant trees; (5) promote the use of alternative, nonpolluting fuels in homes and industries; (6) continue the "Day without Driving" program (*Hoy No Circula*)—with a view to stricter enforcement, the gradual elimination of highly polluting vehicles, and the exemption of clean cars; (7) in the context of a metropolitan plan, furnish incentives for industries to introduce low-polluting technology, undertake "exhaustive inspections" of effluents, and impose severe penalties on lawbreakers; (8) stress recycling; (9) control pollution and runoff to protect aquifers; and (10) construct and improve additional waste- and water-treatment plants.

Women: (1) promote human rights of women as specified in international treaties ratified by Mexico; (2) impose penalties on those committing intrafamily violence and provide assistance to victims of abuse; (3) combat discrimination against women while "accelerating their integration into the social, economic, and political life of the city"; (4) encourage literacy campaigns and educational opportunities for girls and women; (5) forbid public and private employers from insisting that females avoid pregnancy as a condition of being hired; and (6) ensure that women affected—not public health authorities—make decisions related to tubal ligation and other contraceptive

procedures.

Transportation: (1) modernize the city's fleet of vehicles; (2) encourage the use of electric-powered cars and those that burn natural gas or otherwise emit few pollutants; (3) create HOV lanes for buses; (4) implement a rigorous inspection program to ensure the safety and quality of vehicles operating on the capital's streets; (5) maintain the metro as the "backbone" of public transportation, while speeding the completion of line B and modernizing the system's infrastructure, trains, and equipment; (6) preserve metro stations as "high security zones" by increasing security and prohibiting the entry of street vendors; (7) renovate and expand the trolley bus system, introducing gasoline-powered vehicles on appropriate lines; (8) encourage light rail; (9) seek private investment to develop train service between Mexico City and Cuernavaca; and (10) review the rate structure of public transportation, ensuring preferential ticket prices for senior citizens, retirees, and the disabled.

Education: (1) promote a holistic, participative education that embraces science, the arts, politics, and morals; (2) enhance the training, salaries, and status of teachers; (3) undertake periodic evaluations of students to ensure they have mastered the basics at each stage of their education; (4) take maximum advantage of computers and other technological advances; (5) stress the role of students as apprentices to stimulate independent learning and decision making; (6) guarantee and strengthen parents' participation in their children's educations; (7) recognize the validity of both public and private education, provided all schools comply with established criteria; (8) coordinate efforts to diminish high dropout rates; (9) make available physical education to all sectors of society; (10) promote adult education; (11) fortify the linkage between university studies and the labor market; (12) charge tuition at public universities based on the ability of students to pay.

Political Reform: (1) convert D.F. into a "free and sovereign state"; (2) ensure that this new state—along with the other 31—receives its fair share of national tax funds; (3)

Campaign strategy

guarantee federal jurisdiction over all federal agencies located within the D.F.; (4) transfer from the Congress to the ALDF full authority to amend the constitution of the D.F., to control its budget, and to accomplish political and administrative changes; (5) create an autonomous judiciary for the city; and (6) establish a Metropolitan Coordination body to stimulate collaboration among the D.F. and surrounding states.

1. Offers the PAN as the democratic alternative to the "Old PRI" (PRD) and the "New PRI," both deemed corrupt, authoritarian offspring of the same mother.

2. Sought a debate among the three major-party candidates, because Castillo Peraza would have liked to skewer the "two *priistas*."

3. Condemns Cárdenas, when governor of Michoacán, for selling valuable oceanfront property to his mother for a small fraction of its value, while criticizing Del Mazo—who like Cárdenas possesses a vast fortune—of using public office to amass wealth.

4. Attempts to repair relations with the media, which Castillo Peraza has often snubbed, denigrated, or barbed with a swear word.

5. In the aftermath of late May criticism of his performance by PAN legislative chief Ricardo García Cervantes, Guanajuato governor Vicente Fox Quesada, and D.F. party president Gonzalo Altamirano, Castillo Peraza agrees to revise his strategy by (a) avoiding hostile audiences, (b) delivering positive speeches, (c) avoiding criticism of opponents, (d) increasing his presence on TV "so that the people see how he really is and not as journalists portray hm," (e) reaching out to columnists and other opinion leaders, and (f) involving the PAN's national and D.F. leadership more actively in decision making.³

Alfredo del Mazo González

³ "Elecciones '97/Rediseña Castillo Estrategia," *Reforma*, May 23, 1997, 1A.

Party	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) <i>El Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> (PRI) Humberto Roque Villanueva, president Insurgentes Norte No. 9, Col. Buenavista 06359 México, D.F. Tel. 592-28-72, 535-87-87, 546-6649 Fax 592-53-18
Party history	Created as the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 to promote unity among regional military, political, and economic leaders in the aftermath of President-elect Alvaro Obregón's assassination; in 1938 President Lázaro Cárdenas renamed it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) and gave it a corporatist organization, with four sectors: (1) agrarian/peasant, (2) labor, (3) "popular"/white collar, which includes teachers and other public employees, and (4) military, which was abolished after the 1940 presidential election; in 1946 the PRI was established and, despite various reforms, retains its corporatist structure, even as technocrats such as Salinas, Zedillo, Finance Secretary Guillermo Ortiz Martínez, and the party's technical secretary and Senate candidate Esteban Moctezuma Barragán have championed political and economic openings.
Orientation	Centrist, nationalistic—with the degree of support for market-oriented reforms and political liberalization dividing technocrats from old-guard politicians, derisively called "dinosaurs"
Candidate's date/birth place	December 31, 1943; Toluca, Mexico state
Education	Business administration degree, National Autonomous University of Mexico
Additional studies	Specialized studies in economics, finance, and foreign trade in England, Argentina, Chile, and the United States
Profession	Banker-businessman, politician, university professor
Elective offices	Governor of Mexico state (1981-1986)
Key positions held	Vice president of the National Institute of Public

	Administration (INAP); president of the Commission to Reform Finance and Programs of the PRI (1994-1995); Secretary of Energy, Mines, and Industry; ambassador to Belgium and Luxembourg (1988); ambassador to the European Community (1988-1990); manager and assistant manager of the Mexican Commercial Bank; general director of the Mineral Bank; director of public debt; director of the National Credit Institute; general director of the Worker's Bank
Important political/campaign activities	Coordinator of town meetings for President Zedillo's campaign (1994); member of the PRI's National Political Council (1996)
Nominating process	<p>In late 1996, the PRI decided that its Political Council in Mexico City would nominate its mayoral candidate on February 19, 1997. The Council consists of 200 members, the majority of whom are political activists. In a controversial, 11th-hour move, former mayors, including multimillionaire power broker Carlos Hank González, were added to the Council.</p> <p>Three PRI leaders threw their hats in the ring: Del Mazo, the capital's attorney general José Antonio González Fernández, and ARDF leader and former PRI president in the D.F. Manuel Jiménez Guzmán. Each made speeches, met with members of the Council, and gave interviews. Meanwhile, the PRI shared the results of extensive public opinion surveys revealing Del Mazo's greater strength with the Political Council. For his part González Fernández emphasized his greater standing in polls conducted among <i>priistas</i>.</p> <p>Four days before the vote, nonagenarian labor leader Fidel Velázquez announced that Del Mazo was his man or "<i>gallo</i>"—a view shared by the vast majority of Council members. Del Mazo gained 141 votes (74.6 percent) to 26 (13.8 percent) for Jimenez Guzmán and 22 (11.6 percent) for González Fernández. González Fernández backed Del Mazo publicly, but privately groused about losing the nomination. He has disappeared from the campaign scene to become director of the State Employees Social Security Institute. The president named the more gracious Jiménez Guzmán to the post of director of the Administrative Committee for the Federal School Construction Program.</p>

Platform

Crime: (1) continue current policy of deploying military police in *delegaciones* suffering high crime rates, while civilian police undergo rigorous training by the army; (2) set forth incentives for good behavior by the police and penalties for corruption, negligence, and dereliction of duty; (3) enhance the quality of the Police Academy and other training institutions, linking their activities with universities in the capital; (4) give citizens a mechanism to make complaints about police conduct directly to the mayor; (5) create "citizen committees of public safety" in zones, neighborhoods, housing projects, and schools to work with authorities in the fight against crime; (6) introduce crime-prevention classes in schools; (7) initiate conciliation mechanisms for minor crimes and disputes; (8) modernize and professionalize the city's courts; (9) intensify cooperation in law-enforcement matters between the D.F. and Mexico state; and (10) employ more computer data bases and advanced laboratory tests in the war against crime.

Economic Development: (1) focus public and private investment on nonpolluting, job-creating, small- and medium-sized industries, tourism, and commerce; (2) reduce red tape and simplify administrative regulations, while encouraging technological advances and improved worker training; (3) increase investment in public works, including the establishment of a fund to back private infrastructure and social services; (4) foster greater coordination between businesses and technical schools and universities; (5) encourage the financial sector to furnish credits and "manageable interest rates" so that business can construct more housing; and (6) stimulate agriculture in rural zones within the D.F., concentrating on increasing productivity, jobs, and income levels.

Environment: (1) move more industry out of the capital; (2) improve environmental monitoring, (3) encourage the use of cleaner-burning fuels and impose a heavier tax on polluters; (4) channel tax incentives and financing to businesses that purchase antipollution equipment, while increasing penalties on polluters; (5) stimulate ecotourism and organic farming;

(6) strengthen and expand existing reforestation programs and combat erosion; (7) include ecological education in schools; and (8) take steps to phase out old, polluting cars and trucks.

Women: (1) eliminate laws, regulations, and practices that discriminate against women; (2) strictly enforce the law against intrafamily violence and provide psychological and legal assistance to victims of rape and other crimes; (3) disseminate via the mass media information about legal services, family planning, and other programs for women, and undertake educational campaigns to prevent teenage pregnancies while expanding medical care for women having babies; (4) increase childcare opportunities for single working mothers; and (5) ensure the faithful implementation of Article 4 of the Constitution that pertains to equality.

Transportation: (1) encourage the use of public over private transportation; (2) levy stiffer fines on the owners of polluting vehicles; (3) require all trucks entering the city to do so outside of rush hours and to be equipped with catalytic converters; (4) promote the expansion of the metro and electric transport throughout densely populated areas of the capital; (5) involve citizens in the designation of public-transportation routes and stops; (6) revise the use of transportation infrastructure with respect to the placement of stoplights and signals, speed bumps, and vehicular and pedestrian bridges; (7) stress the construction of transfer stations with advantageous fares to stimulate the use of mass transit; and (8) improve the efficiency of traffic police.

Education: (1) achieve a "real and effective decentralization" of education; (2) promote an "integral and quality education," embracing academics, sports, culture, and extracurricular activities for all children; (3) reinforce literacy programs; (4) improve the salaries, training, and status of teachers; (5) broaden opportunities for technical training, continuing education, and night classes; (6) base university scholarships on merit rather than political favoritism; (7) introduce a program of "social service" in which qualified graduates assist the poor, small businesses, and micro- and medium-sized businesses; (8) establish in

institutions of higher learning a curriculum that concentrates on problems confronting Mexico City.

Political Reform: (1) invite greater citizen participation in the city's governance; (2) promote "a new civic culture" that recognizes the presence of many countervailing interests; (3) preserve the city's Federal District status rather than converting it into the 32nd state.

Political strategy

1. Emphasizes Del Mazo's maturity, leadership, and experience—especially as governor of Mexico state whose interests and problems intertwine with those of the D.F. The slogan "Del Mazo—Decisive Government" (*Del Mazo—Gobierno Con Decisión*) epitomizes this approach.

2. Stresses Del Mazo's statesmanship in remaining above the fray while Castillo Peraza and Cárdenas exchange attacks.

3. Underlines the "chaos" that will beset the capital if either the allegedly radical Cárdenas, whose PRD has a history of staging marches, accomplishing sit-ins, and nominating leftists, or the inexperienced, dirt-throwing Castillo Peraza wins. Indeed, the PRI blames the PRD for the traffic jams, pollution, and incivility now besetting the D.F. in a strategy known as the "fear vote."

4. Confesses that PRI has made mistakes in the past but that it has also accomplished many good things, and that it will not make utopian promises á la Cárdenas in the mayoral campaign.

5. Organizes PRI canvassing street-by-street, block-by-block, neighborhood-by-neighborhood, district-by-district, and *delegación-by-delegación* with a view to mobilizing the 1.8 million votes that would guarantee victory.

6. Heavily emphasizes "get out the vote" drives among PRI-dominated labor unions and professional associations, while courting selected social groups such as the elderly and disabled with promises of more attractive public benefits.

7. Deplores the PAN's alleged sexism, homophobia, and antinationalism, which has found National Action officials—particularly the mayor of Guadalajara—decrying miniskirts, harassing gays, and changing street names from those of Juárez and other acclaimed presidents to those of PAN luminaries.

8. Takes advantage of "public-service" TV spots prepared by government ministries that laud the country's accomplishments in industry, agriculture, tourism, and other economic sectors.

9. Disparages Castillo Peraza as a native of far-away Yucatán state. Even though few mayors of the D.F. have been born in the capital, some *chilangos* view Yucatán as a hotbed of nineteenth-century secessionism and a home to rubes.

10. Highlights Del Mazo's good looks to woo distaff voters, who—17 years ago when the 38-year-old *priísta* ran for governor of Mexico state—sometimes chanted: "*Con Del Mazo hasta el embarazo*" (With Del Mazo to pregnancy) or "*Esta noche no me caso hasta no ver a Del Mazo*" (Tonight doesn't matter to me unless I see Del Mazo). Few such exclamations have punctuated rallies of the mature PRI candidate this year.

CHAPTER 10

Minor Party Candidates: *La Chiquillería*

The following summaries provide background information on the five minor-party candidates running for the officer of mayor of Mexico City.

Pedro Ferriz Santacruz

Party	Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction (founded 1978) <i>Partido Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional</i> (PFCRN) México 199 06170 México, D.F. Tel. 574-43-66
Orientation	Marxist-Leninist inspiration; long regarded as manipulated by the PRI through its wily leader Rafael Aguilar Talamantes; backed Cárdenas in 1988
Date/place of birth	March 17, 1921; Piedras Negras, Coahuila
Education	Degree in law, philosophy, and literature
Additional studies	M.A. in history
Profession	TV announcer and personality; featured in such programs as "El Club del Hogar," "Noticiero General Motors," "El Estudio de Pedro Vargas," "Mi Primera Fila," and "El Gran Premio de los 64 Millones"; also director of the Colegio Columbia, Escuela de Locutores in Mexico City

Elective offices	None
Key positions held	President of the Mexican Association of Mass Media; former president of the National Association of Announcers
Important political/campaign activities	Covered the Mexican Senate for <i>Radio Educación</i> for six years; director of NOTIMEX; during his heyday, the rotund announcer counted Presidents Ruiz Cortines and López Mateos as friends, as well as Ernesto P. Uruchurtu, the "iron mayor" of the D.F., whom Ferriz greatly admires; although shunned by Echeverría, López Portillo appointed him to head NOTIMEX and Channel 13
Policy priorities	Environment; water and other services; combating crime

Francisco González Gómez

Party	Workers' Party (founded 1990) <i>Partido del Trabajo</i> (PT) Av. Cuauhtémoc 47-3 06700 México, D.F. Tel. 525-14-96 Fax 525-27-27
Orientation	Leftist, reformist, with a strong feminist plank in platform; widely alleged that Salinas family helped finance campaign of PT's presidential nominee in 1994 to siphon votes from PRD's Cárdenas; while rejecting the rumor that he would withdraw from the mayoral campaign in favor of Cárdenas, González Gómez has expressed a willingness to explore PT-PRD alliances
Date/place of birth	March 25, 1941; Mexico City
Education	Degree in engineering and architecture, National Polytechnic Institute
Additional studies	M.A. in political science
Profession	Architect; university professor
Elective office	Member ARDF (1991-present)
Key positions held	Coordinator of the PT faction in ARDF

Important political/campaign activities	Joined Spartacus Leninist League (1960); participated in 1968 student movement; established links with guerrilla leader Lucio Cabañas in Guerrero; affiliated with Maoist <i>Organización de Izquierda Revolucionaria Linea de Masas</i> ; founder and member of the Communist Coalition; founder and leader of the Ho Chi Minh group; founder and member of the Revolutionary Left Organization
Policy priorities	Economic development; job creation; combating pollution; water; housing; transport

Jorge González Torres

Party	Green Party of Mexico (founded 1991) <i>Partido Verde Ecologista de México</i> (PVEM) Facultad de Medicina 74 04340 México, D.F.
Orientation	Strongly pro-environmental and anti-NAFTA; close ties to former Mexico City mayor Manuel Camacho Solís
Date/place of birth	September 7, 1942, Mexico City; claims he was "spiritually born" in remote Quitana Roo state where he has purchased 74 acres as a natural preserve
Education	Degree in industrial relations, Iberoamericana University, Mexico City
Additional studies	M.A. in public administration, UNAM
Profession	Ex-construction company entrepreneur
Elective offices	None
Key positions held	Founder of the Center of Agrarian Studies (1979-1981); founder and director of the Brigade of Democratic Work and Social Justice (1970-1980); founder and coordinator of the Ecological Alliance (1980-1986)
Important political/campaign activities	Founder and president of the PVEM; party's presidential candidate in 1994

Policy goals	Environmental protection; combating corruption; assisting the poor (the PVEM has used a portion of its public campaign funds to distribute food, clothing, and health services in poor neighborhoods)
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NB. Polls in early June showed the "greens" heading the field of small parties. Explanations for the PVEM's relatively strong showing vary from: (1) a PRI subsidy, which both parties deny, (2) the resonance of environmental issues in the D.F., and (3) the party's attracting protest votes against the traditional "Big Three," just as the *Partido del Trabajo* did in the 1994 presidential contest.

Manuel Hernández Flores

Party	Popular Socialist Party (founded 1960) <i>Partido Popular Socialista</i> (PPS) Alvaro Obregón 187 06700 México, D.F. Tels. 525-10-47, 584-01-08, 525-71-31
Orientation	Socialist, anti-U.S.; long a subsidized satellite of PRI
Date/place of birth	September 16, 1933; Nogales, Veracruz
Education	Degree in law
Additional studies	None
Profession	Retired electrical worker; politician
Elective offices	Federal deputy (1985-1988); local deputy in Veracruz (1992-1995)
Important political/campaign activities	Current PPS secretary general; member of Electrical Workers' Union (SME) since 1952; SME secretary general (1979-1982); devotee of Socialist leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano; precandidate for presidency in 1988; secretary general of National Alliance of Workers; attended congresses in Russia, Bulgaria, Cuba, and Syria
Policy goals	Economic growth; jobs; public safety; water; education; culture

Baltázar Ignacio Valadez Montoya

Party	Mexican Democratic Party (founded 1972) <i>Partido Demócrata Mexicano</i> (PDM) Edison 89, Col. Polanco 06030 México, D.F. Tels. 566-17-08, 566-17-58, 566-53-61 Fax 566-16-65
Orientation	Conservative social-Christian; espouses Pope John Paul II's view of the social obligations of property owners
Date/place of birth	June 2, 1944; Puebla, Puebla
Education	Studied communications and technical sciences at the Carlos Septién García School of Communications
Additional studies	None
Profession	Journalist and politician
Elective offices	Alternate federal deputy (1982-1985)
Key positions held	See "important political/campaign activities"
Important political/campaign activities	Imprisoned three times for political activities as a member of the right wing Unión Nacional Sinarquista; national PDM president (1988-1991; 1994-present); edited the party's publication <i>El Demócrata</i> (1991-1994); campaign manager for party's presidential nominee in 1982 and 1988; headed the party's national committee (1971)
Policy goals	Public safety; fiscal equality between federal, state, and city governments; education; "negotiated cancellation" of foreign debt; integrate D.F. into the process of equitable national development

Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion polling enjoys widespread use in Mexico and exhibits notable advances in quality. Nevertheless, surveys in Mexico, like those in other countries, may be contaminated by sample bias, loaded questions, the inclusion of two questions in one, or question order effects (i.e., responses to one item influence responses to another that is further down the questionnaire). Other problems include inept questioners, eliciting spur-of-the moment responses that may be unrelated to behavior, and the timing of the survey. For example, the PRI enjoyed a "bounce" in the polls immediately after presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio's assassination in March 1994. Polls represent only a snapshot of opinions and, unless a series of surveys are taken, they fail to show the dynamics of political opinions. Polls may fail to measure the intensity of answers or to differentiate between the answers of elites (who may influence other voters) and masses (who may not even vote). The race, sex, or age of an interviewer can sometimes influence positions on racial, gender, or generational issues. High nonresponse rates can also affect poll results. For example, in state-of-the-art academic surveys in the United States, response rates can sometimes dip to 50 percent; often they fail to exceed 70 percent.

Several additional problems loom large in Mexico. One difficulty is a basic distrust of the political system. In the past, some people were reluctant to answer questions lest there be some official reprisal against those who criticized the government. For this reason, pollsters seldom conducted interviews by telephone or in the respondents' homes because the loss of anonymity could have exacerbated fear of retribution. In fact, analysts found that the PRI scored up to 10 points higher in home interviews compared to those carried out in the street. In addition to the measurement error attributed to anxiety, analysts suggested that Mexicans like to be "agreeable" when questioned. That is, they tended to offer opinions that conformed to the perceived positions of the interviewer. Other challenges included (1) difficulties in determining who will vote, (2) low education levels, and (3) the tendency of pollsters to conduct most surveys in and around urban centers, largely ignoring rural areas.

The situation appears quite different in 1997. Not only have polling techniques improved dramatically, but Mexicans evince little reluctance to castigate the PRI and government in particular and politicians in general. One survey-research firm obtained more negative responses in home interviews compared with those conducted in the streets and other anonymous public places—an outcome that sharply contradicts the "anxiety" thesis propounded by many scholars.

The increasingly independent Mexican mass media—especially television—still shows sensitivity to the ruling party. This condition could complicate Mexicans' obtaining accurate political information and may thereby increase the measurement error of polls. Just as in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, there are nonpartisan funds available to conduct and archive professional, politically neutral, and scientifically reliable surveys.

Major Pollsters in Mexico

Although many magazines and newspapers publish polls, the most respected polling organizations are listed below. Other firms include Opinión Profesional, *Reforma*, Gabinete de Estudios de Opinión, S.C., and Pearson (marketing research and public opinion). The United States Information Agency (USIA) has also polled in Mexico for many years.

MORI de México

Employs man-in-the street interviews; national quota sample of around 1,500; plus or minus two to three percent margin of error usually claimed. MORI conducted many polls in the 1980s that were much larger. One 1982 study of the nationalization of banks included 5,418 people; another survey conducted in 1987 had more than 9,000 respondents. MORI is criticized for the small sample, averaging between 300 and 320 respondents, used in its weekly polls.

IMOP Gallup

Employs man-in-the street interviews; national quota sample of 3,000; plus or minus 1.5 to 2 percent margin of error; conducted large preelection polls in 1988 (presidential election) and 1991 (congressional election), including exit polling in 1991 that involved more than 25,000 respondents.

Indemerc Louis Harris

In a poll several months ago, Indemerc employed a "stratified multistage clustering scheme." This involved taking municipalities from Mexico's three major metropolitan areas as sampling units; stratifying their "units" on the basis of previous partisan leanings; and, finally, randomly sampling within each strata. Indemerc interviewers actually went to specific houses within their sampling units to obtain 6,000 respondents.

Centro de Estudios de Opinión Pública (CEOP) at the University of Guadalajara

Sample sizes tend to range between 800 and 1,000, with interviewing concentrated in the Mexico City area. CEOP's "World Values Survey" (1990) has attracted international attention.

Metofsky International

This New York-based firm, which specializes in exit polling and quick tabulations for television in the United States, has in the past worked with Mexican commercial polling firms. Metofsky bases its findings on exit interviews and poll tallies in 1,300 precincts throughout Mexico chosen on the basis of a stratified-probability sample. The Mexican national networks, Multivision, Televisa, Television Azteca, along with many radio broadcasting stations and two newspaper dailies, supported Metofsky's work in the 1994 presidential contest.

Table 11.1 carries the results of surveys conducted by *Reforma*, which benefit from the application of consistent techniques over nearly a year.

Table 11.1. Party Preference for D.F. Mayor

Date Conducted	PAN/CCP %	PRD/CCS %	PRI/ADG %	Undecided/ No Response
1997				
May 26*	18	37	22	10
May 22-23	19	39	19	15
April 18-20	24	35	20	7
March 20-25	27	29	23	12
March 1-3	27	30	22	4
February	34	26	18	7
January	28	21	21	6
1996				
December	35	23	20	7
November	37	21	21	4
October	36	23	23	7
September	32	21	24	4
August	30	22	22	4
July	20	19	20	1

* Conducted among 800 respondents in their homes in the wake of Cárdenas-Del Mazo TV debate, from which the PRD standard-bearer emerged victorious, in the view of most viewers polled. A late-May IMOP quota sample of 600 likely D.F. voters also found Cárdenas (37 percent) leading Castillo Peraza (26 percent) and Del Mazo (21 percent).

Source: *Reforma*. Polls conducted July 1996-May 1997.

Note: *Reforma's* pollsters ask 1,000 interviewees randomly selected from a stratified sample: "If the mayoral election were held today, which party would you support?" The responses of individuals unlikely to vote are discarded. The margin of error is +/- 3.1 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. Rafael Giménez and Vidal Romero of the newspaper's research department coordinate the survey.

CHAPTER 12

The Media in Mexico City

Newspapers and Television

Tables 12.1 and 12.2 provide information about the major daily newspapers and television stations. The government privatized two of the country's four state-owned stations (Canal 7 and Canal 13) in 1993. Most Mexican cable systems carry U.S.-originated programming.

Table 12.1. Mexico City's Major Daily Newspapers

Name	Political Orientation	Reported Circulation	Editions	Year Founded	Address	Telephone
<i>La Afición</i>	sports	98,500a 20,000b	morning	1930	Ignacio Mariscal 23 Apdo. 64 bis 06030 México, D.F.	546-47-80 255-52-16 (Fax)
<i>La Crónica de Hoy</i>	independent of government; caters to university students	--	morning	1996	Rio Hudson 25 Col. Cuauhtémoc 06500 México, D.F. http://www.cronica.com.mx/cronica/	286-13-78 286-42-77 286-45-13 211-73-89 (Fax)
<i>Cuestión</i>	left-of-center cheesecake	60,000a <10,000b	midday	1980	Laguna de Mayrán 410 Col. Anáhuac 11320 México, D.F.	260-04-99 260-86-98 260-20-20 260-36-45
<i>El Día</i>	left-of-center stridently anti-U.S.	75,000a 3,000- 4,000b	morning	1962	Avda. Insurgentes Norte 1210 Col. Capultitlán 07370 México, D.F.	759-21-55 759-29-37 537-66-29 (Fax) 537-52-83 (Fax)
<i>Diario de México</i>	centrist	63,000a 5,000b	morning	1948	Chimalpopoca 38 Col. Obrera 06800 México, D.F.	578-84-37 578-76-50 (Fax)

Table 12.1. Mexico City's Major Daily Newspapers (continued)

Name	Political Orientation	Reported Circulation	Editions	Year Founded	Address	Telephone
<i>Esto</i>	sports	400,200a 450,000 (Monday) 300,000b	morning	1941	Guillermo Prieto 9 1 st Floor 06470 México, D.F. http://www.dem.com.mx	591-08-66 566-15-11 535-55-60 (Fax)
<i>El Economista</i>	right-of-center pro-government	28,000a 5,000- 7,000b	morning	1988	Avda. Cayacán 515 Col. de Valle 03100 México, D.F. http://www.economista.com.mx	326-54-54 687-38-21 (Fax)
<i>Excélsior</i>	centrist	200,000a 80,000- 100,000b	morning	1917	Avda. Reforma 18 Apdo. 120 06600 México, D.F. http://www.excelsior.com.mx	546-19-47 566-02-23 (Fax)
<i>El Financiero</i>	independent	35,000a 60,000- 70,000b	morning	1981	Lago Bolsena 176 Col. Anahuac 11320 México, D.F. http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx	227-76-00 255-17-99 (Fax) 257-19-34 (Fax)
<i>El Heraldo de México</i>	rightist; pro-business; anti- communist	209,600a 7,000- 8,000b	morning	1965	Dr. Carmona y Valle 150 Col. Doctores 06720 México, D.F. http://www.heraldo.com.mx	578-70-22 578-98-24 (Fax)
<i>El Nacional</i>	government	120,000a 10,000b	morning	1929	Ignacio Mariscal 25, 3 rd Fl., Col. Tabacalera 06030 México, D.F.	628-87-04 705-56-15 (Fax)
Mexico City Times	independent/ objective	10,000	morning	1994	Avda. Juárez 100 06040 México, D.F. E-mail: mexcittm@infosel.net.mx	518-42-62 518-66-39 (Fax)
The News	centrist; pro-government	40,000a 5,000b	morning	1950	Balderas 87 06040 México, D.F. http://www.novedades.com/	510-96-23 512-50-44 (Fax) 521-85-50 (Fax)
<i>Novedades</i>	pro-government	210,000a 240,000a (Monday) 5,000b	morning	1936	Balderas 87 06040 México, D.F. http://www.novedades.com/	510-97-07 521-45-05 (Fax)
<i>Ovaciones</i>	sports; cheesecake	205,000a(m) 220,000a(e) 100,000b	morning/ evening	1947	Lago Zirahuén 279 20 th floor, Col. Anáhuac 11320 México, D.F.	328-07-00 531-99-19 (Fax)
<i>La Jornada</i>	left-of-center; independent	75,000a 40,000b	morning	1984	Balderas 68, 2 nd floor 06050 México, D.F. http://serpiente.dgsca.unam.mx/jornada/index.html	728-29-00 521-27-63 (Fax)

Table 12.1. Mexico City's Major Daily Newspapers (continued)

Name	Political Orientation	Reported Circulation	Editions	Year Founded	Address	Telephone
<i>La Prensa</i>	sensationalist; pro-government	300,000a 200,000-240,000b	morning	1928	Basilio Badillo 40 Col. Tabacalera 06030 México, D.F.	521-09-77 512-92-62 (Fax)
<i>Reforma</i>	independent of government; sensitive to interests of big business, esp. in Monterrey, home to the owners, who also publish the highly-respected <i>El Norte</i>	100,000	morning	1993	Avda. México, Coyoacán 40 Col. Santa Cruz de Atoyac 03310 México, D.F. http://www.infosel.com.mx	628-71-00 628-71-19 (Fax)
<i>El Sol de México</i>	centrist; pro-government	110,000a 5,000-10,000b	morning/ midday	1965	Guillermo Prieto 7, 2 nd floor Col. San Rafael 06470 México, D.F.	546-95-13 546-95-13 (Fax)
<i>El Universal</i>	independent	121,968a	morning	1916	Iturbide 7 y Bucareli 8 Apdo. 909 06040, México, D.F. http://www.el-universal.com.mx	709-13-13 310-91-06 (Fax)
<i>El Universal Gráfico</i>	sensationalist; center-left	119,837a (Sunday)	evening	N.A.	Iturbide 7 y Bucareli 8 Apdo. 909 06040 México, D.F.	709-13-13
<i>Unomásuno</i>	left-of-center; muckraking	90,000a <10,000b	morning	1977	Retorno de Corregio 12 Col. Nochebuena 03720 México, D.F.	563-99-11 563-97-81 598-89-83 (Fax) 598-88-21 (Fax)

a circulation claimed by newspaper (only *El Universal* submits itself to an independent audit)

b estimate by leading journalist, Sergio Sarmiento, a columnist at *Reforma*

Sources: *Europa World Yearbook* 1995, vol. 2 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1996); and Presidencia de la República, *1992 Agenda de la comunicación social* (Mexico City: Presidencia, 1992).

Table 12.2. Major Television Stations

Station	Address	Telephone	Director General/ President	Comments
Multivision (MVS)	Blvd. Puerto Aéreo 486 15500 México, D.F.		Joaquin Vargas	
Televisa, S.A.	Avda. Chapultepec 28 Col. Doctores 06724 México, D.F.	709-12-22	Emilio Azcárraga Jean	406 affiliated stations; broadcasts, via satellite, to Latin America, Europe, and the United States; news president is Miguel Alemán Velasco
TV Azteca	Periférico Sur 4121 Col. Fuentes de Pedregal 14141 México, D.F.	645-00-80 645-40-80	Ricardo B. Salinas Pliego	200 stations
Canal 11 (Instituto Politécnico Nacional)	Carpio 475 Co. Santo Tomás 11340 México, D.F.	341-34-09 341-33-55	Alejandro Lajous	

Sources: *Europa World Yearbook*, 1995, vol. 2 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1996), and *Presidencia de la República, 1992 Agenda de comunicación social* (Mexico City: Presidencia, 1992), 260-61.

Electoral Observation in Mexico¹

The IFE had advised foreigners who wish to monitor the July 6 contests as "official visitors" to submit their applications to the Institute by June 21.² Neither international groups nor individuals will be required to partner with a Mexican counterpart to register. By early June, the IFE had received approximately 5,500 applications for foreign-visitor credentials. This document permits the holder to attend special IFE-sponsored information sessions, as well as to gain improved access to political parties and polling places.

The United States Agency for International Development (AID) and the U.S. Congress's National Endowment for Democracy (NED) have funded the "AHORA SI" national voter information campaign, sponsored in Mexico by the Citizen Movement for Democracy. In addition, the NED has assisted the Civic Alliance—one of Mexico's best known NGOs—to train observers and analyze campaign finances. Meanwhile, NED funds will enable the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) to take part in preelection media monitoring and other activities, including the sponsorship of 23 international visitors who will cooperate with the National Feminine Civic Association. IRI will also send an observer team to the elections.

Only Mexicans can act as campaign "observers." With less than one month to go before the election, IFE had approved 1,229 applications of 2,946 submitted from local NGOs and individuals seeking observer status.

At the request of the Zedillo administration, the United Nations Development Program will coordinate the funding of national observers to furnish technical expertise and to depoliticize the process. The Mexican government, which donated U.S.\$1.5 million to defray start-up costs, has pledged to match peso-for-peso every contribution from the private sector up to an additional

¹ The Political Section of the U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, provided much of the following information.

² The IFE's incredibly professional, efficient, and helpful International Affairs Section is located at Viaducto Tlalpan 100, Building D, First Floor, Col. Arenal Tepepan, México D.F., 14610. Telephone: (011-525) 628-42-33 and 628-42-34; Fax: 655-64-02 and 655-70-12. The main number for Mexico's embassy in Washington, D.C., is (202) 728-1600; in Ottawa, (613) 233-8988.

U.S.\$1.5 million. At the same time, the IFE has urged Mexican NGOs to solicit private monies at home and abroad to enhance their observation capability. Although parties and candidates cannot legally accept contributions from foreign sources, NGOs can.

Election of the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF)

Origin and Evolution

In 1988, the federal Congress created the Representative Assembly of the Federal District (ARDF), with 66 elected members, to debate issues of concern to residents of the capital whose fate was really controlled by the federal government. Constitutional reforms accomplished in December 1994 enabled the ARDF to evolve from a debating society to a limited city council empowered to pass ordinances related to local issues. In May 1997, Víctor Orduña Muñoz, the presiding officer, self-servingly praised the body for the leadership and collegiality displayed in enacting 70 statutes over a two and one-half year period.¹ The ARDF legislated in such areas as women's rights, intrafamily violence, environmental protection, and parking fees. In addition, the ARDF has performed watchdog functions. For example, in mid-1995, Assemblyman Salvador Abascal Carranza, chairman of the Human Rights Committee, charged that 20 million pesos had vanished from the D.F.'s coffers. These funds, Abascal Carranza asserted, constituted a special trust fund for acquiring environmentally friendly technologies for gas stations in the city.²

The Legislative Assembly of the D.F. (ALDF), to be elected on July 6, 1997, will boast even broader powers than the ARDF, which it replaces.

Powers

- Annually approves, discusses, and examines the D.F.'s budget, concentrating first on the taxes needed to balance the budget. No debts contracted may exceed the ceiling

¹ Adolfo Sánchez Venegas, "Lega la aldf a los capitalinos 70 ordenamientos jurídicos: pri y pan," *Excélsior*, May 3, 1997, 4A.

² Cynthia Barrera Díaz, "Tax Proceeds Missing, Assemblyman Says," *The News*, July 18, 1995, 5.

established by Congress. The authority to initiate revenue bills lies exclusively with the mayor, although the ALDF may make budgetary recommendations to him.

- Examines the public accounts of the previous year through a specialized standing committee.
- Names a substitute mayor in the case of an inability to discharge duties (*falta absoluta*) by the incumbent.
- Passes ordinances organizing the city's tax collections, accounting and budgetary practices, and public expenditures.
- Establishes norms for the protection of citizens, including the proper conduct of police and private-security forces, as well as agencies responsible for welfare, rehabilitation, and health.
- Legislates in such areas as (a) urban planning, (b) environmental protection, (c) housing, (d) construction of buildings and public works, (e) transportation, and (f) stewardship of the D.F.'s resources.
- Regulates public services, including urban transport, trash collection, tourism and hotels, markets, and cemeteries.
- Adopts regulations with respect to (a) economic development and workers' rights, (b) agricultural and livestock activities, (c) the establishment of markets, (d) public entertainment, (e) promotion of civic culture and sports, and (f) social education as permitted under the constitution.
- Promulgates the "Organic Law" for courts having local jurisdiction, specifying the responsibilities of the public servants employed in these bodies.
- Proposes bills or decrees on matters affecting the D.F. to the Congress.

Previous Assembly Elections

Tables 14.1. and 14.2 show the results of previous assembly elections.

Table 14.1. Results of 1988 ARDF Election

Party	Seats	Percent
PRI	34	25.72
PAN	18	22.67
PPS	6	14.93
PFCRN	3	13.14
PMS	3	8.27
PARM	2	7.13
TOTAL	66	100.00

Source: IFE

Table 14.2. Results of 1994 ARDF Election

Party	Seats won via Direct Election	Seats won via Proportional Election	Percent	Total
PRI	38	0	57.57	38
PAN	2	12	21.21	14
PRD	0	10	15.15	10
PT	0	2	3.03	2
PVEM	0	2	3.03	2
TOTAL	40	26	100.00	66

Source: IFE

CHAPTER 15

The July 6, 1997 Gubernatorial Elections¹

Campeche

Facts

<i>Population</i>	642,516
<i>Size</i>	20,008 sq. miles
<i>Gross state income</i>	\$2,366,900,769
<i>Current governor</i>	José Salomón Azar (PRI)
<i>Most important municipalities</i>	Campeche, Ciudad del Carmen, Champotón, Escárcega, Calkini

Eligible voters 343,726 (April 10, 1997)

Registered voters 337,037 (98.05 percent)

Major candidates

Antonio González Curi (PRI)

M.A. in public administration from Florida International University; official in finance ministry (1980-1985); party activist; federal deputy (1991-1994); president of state party (1990-1991); mayor of Campeche. PRI's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (78.70 percent); 1994 (55.96 percent).

¹ This section relies heavily on superb articles in *Voz y voto* (April 1997), pp. 4-21; material supplied by IFE; and features in *Reforma* about the gubernatorial contests in Campeche (April 30, 1997, p. 6A) and Querétaro (May 2, 1997, p. 4A).

Layda Sansores (PRD)

Born August 7, 1945; UNAM (psychology); daughter of PRI party president; worked in government of D.F.; served as PRI federal deputy (1991-1994) and senator (1994-1997); left PRI when denied gubernatorial nomination from her home state. PRD's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (3.54 percent); 1994 (21.23 percent).

Guillermo del Río Ortegón (PT)

Born July 26, 1942; served as PRI local and federal deputy; elected to Senate as member of PRD; active in SNTE teachers' union. PT's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (.23 percent); 1994 (1.22 percent).

Minor candidates

Miguel Montejó González (PAN)

PAN's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (3.54 percent); 1994 (16.39 percent)

Alvaro del Río (PC)

Delio Alberto Barrera Rosada (PPS)

Colima

Facts

Population

488,028

Size

2,106 sq. miles

Gross state income

\$910,819,872

Current governor

Carlos de la Madrid Virgen (PRI)

Most important municipalities

Colima, Manzanillo Tecomán, Villa de Alvarez, Cuauhtémoc

Eligible voters

298,134 (April 10, 1997)

Registered voters

293,837 (98.56 percent)

Major candidates

Fernando Moreno Peña (PRI)

Born June 30, 1953; degrees in law and political science; federal deputy (1976-1979); member of the party's State Political Council; university professor; rector, University of Colima (1989-1997). PRI's

share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (65.75 percent); 1994 (55.26 percent).

Enrique Michel Ruiz (PAN)

Born July 15, 1951; degree in engineering, University of Guadalajara; president of the Regional Agricultural Union of Vegetable Producers (1994); member of the State Agrobusiness Council (1955); joined the PAN in 1995. PAN's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (14.17 percent); 1994 (25.91 percent).

Gonzalo Castañeda Basavilvazo (PRD)

Born January 10, 1946; farmer, livestock producer, and businessman; founder and president of the Civic Union of Colima; active in campaigns of PRI candidates Carlos Salinas and Carlos de la Madrid Virgen; agricultural adviser to state (1992). PRD's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (9.99 percent); 1994 (12.63 percent).

Minor candidates

Ricardo Manuel Ante Villalobos (PT)
Manuel González Chacón (PDM)
José Ramón Vargas Valle (PPS)

Nuevo León

Facts

<i>Population</i>	3,550,114
<i>Size</i>	24,925 sq. miles
<i>Gross state income</i>	\$9,348,229,358
<i>Current governor</i>	Benjamín Clarion Reyes (PRI/interim)
<i>Most important municipalities</i>	Monterrey, Santa Catarina, Guadalupe, Apodaca, San Nicolás de los Garza

Eligible voters 2,176,089 (April 10, 1997)

Registered voters 2,162,972 (99.40 percent)

Major candidates **Natividad González Parás (PRI)**

Born March 30, 1949; degree in law and social sciences, Autonomous University of Nuevo León; M.A. in public administration, International Institute of Public Administration in France (1996); served in federal government, including Office of the President and Ministry of Government where—as an undersecretary—he developed close ties to Government Secretary Chuayffet; federal deputy (1994-1997). PRI's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (68.46 percent); 1994 (49.10 percent).

Fernando Canales Clariond (PAN)

Born July 21, 1947; degree in law; M.A. in business administration, Technical Institute of Advanced Studies of Monterrey (ITESM); joined the PAN in 1978; served in various party posts; federal deputy (1979-1982); gubernatorial candidate (1985); former head of Grupo IMSA; has headed the Nuevo León Federation of Chambers of Commerce and held the position of vice president of the National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce. PAN's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (26.00 percent); 1994 (41.46 percent).

Luis Eugenio Todd Pérez (PRD)

Born October 22, 1935; degree in medicine, Autonomous University of Nuevo León; rector of the University of Nuevo León (1985-1988); federal deputy (1982-1985); Mexico's ambassador to UNESCO (1992-1995); left PRI—to which he had belonged for 36 years—to run for governor on the PRD ticket. PRD's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (1.33 percent); 1994 (2.29 percent).

Minor candidates

Liliana Flores Benavides (Coalición Democrática composed of PRD-PVEM).

Querétaro

Facts

<i>Population</i>	1,250,476
<i>Size</i>	4,544 sq. miles
<i>Gross state income</i>	\$2,034,324,230
<i>Current governor</i>	Enrique Burgos García (PRI)
<i>Most important municipalities</i>	Querétaro, Villa Corregidora, San Juan del Río, Villa del Marqués, Tequisquiapan

Eligible voters 702,705 (April 10, 1997)

Registered voters 687,622 (97.85 percent)

Major candidates

Fernando Ortiz Arana (PRI)

Born October 26, 1944; law degree, Autonomous University of Querétaro; secretary general of government of state (1976-1979); served as federal deputy three times; president of Chamber of Deputies (1984); president of the PRI (1994); president of the Senate (1991-1997). Possible PRI presidential candidate in 2000. PRI's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (69.77 percent); 1994 (59.14 percent).

Ignacio Loyola Vera (PAN)

Born September 10, 1954; degree in agricultural engineering from ITESM; general manager of Comercial Agropecuaria de Querétaro, S.A. de C.V.; active in Conaco and president of Coparmex (1994); vice president of the Sociedad de Ingenieros Agrónomos Parasitólogos (1993-1995); writes for the newspaper *El Observador*. PAN share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (21.10 percent); 1994 (30.04 percent).

Carlos Saint-Martín Caballero (PRD)

Born October 11, 1945; degree in psychology, UNAM; Involved in leftist politics since 1968

student movement; member of the Corriente Socialista; participated in the CNTE dissident teachers' faction (1980); moved to state in 1985 and worked in the National Revolutionary Civic Association, the FDN, and the PRD. Currently the PRD's secretary of organization in Querétaro. PRD share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (2.43 percent); 1994 (5.11 percent).

Minor candidates

Eduardo Jean Chain (PT)
 Enrique Pozos Tolentino (PPS)
 Rosendo De la Rosa (PDM)
 Aline Albert Pradas (PVEM)
 José Ortiz Arana (PFCRN)²

San Luis Potosí

Facts

<i>Population</i>	2,200,763
<i>Size</i>	24,266 sq. miles
<i>Gross state income</i>	\$2,558,494,743
<i>Current governor</i>	Horacio Sánchez Unzueta (PRI)
<i>Most important municipalities</i>	San Luis Potosí, Matehuala, Ciudad Valles, Ebano, Soledad de Graciano Sánchez

Eligible voters 1,190,789 (April 10, 1997)

Registered voters 1,179,573 (99.06 percent)

Major candidates

Fernando Silva Nieto (PRI)
 Born in November 1950; degree in law and M.A. in political science, El Colegio de México; served in Ministry of Ecology and Urban Development (1989) and National Solidarity Program (1993); senator

² In a local soap opera played out before a national audience, José Ortiz Arana bolted the PRI after failing to gain the party's nomination to run against his better-known, more-electable brother, one of the country's most prominent politicians. Upon being asked if José was *medio-loco*, a former employer resisted applying the adjective *medio*.

(1988-1994); positions in government of SLP include: secretaries of finance and planning (1994), public education (1995), and government (1996). PRI's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (63.88 percent); 1994 (61.03 percent).

Marcelo de los Santos Fraga (PAN)

Born December 15, 1940; degree in public accounting, Autonomous University of SLP; business consultant; advisor to the National Chamber of Commerce, the National Chamber of the Construction Industry, and the state tourist agency; president and vice president of the Mexican Institute of Public Accountants. PAN share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (30.38 percent); 1994 (25.07 percent).

Salvador Nava Calvillo (PRD and Nava Partido Político, NPP)

Born March 21, 1941; degree in business administration, Iberoamerican University; worked with Chrysler of Mexico, La Laguna, S.A.; participated in political campaigns of his father, Salvador Nava (1958, 1961, and 1991); coordinated his mother's campaign (1993); PRD candidate for senator (1994); state president of PRD (1995). PRD share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (1.31 percent); 1994 (8.80 percent).

Minor candidates

Epifanio Sánchez Silva (PT)

Clara Margarita Pérez Guerrero (PVEM)

Gerardo Lomelí Contreras (PDM)

José Santos Leijo (PPS)

Javier Muñoz González (PFCRN)

Sonora

Facts

Population

2,085,536

Size

71,403 sq. miles

<i>Gross state income</i>	\$3,813,356,410
<i>Current governor</i>	Manlio Fabio Beltrones (PRI)
<i>Most important municipalities</i>	Hermosillo, Cajeme, Guaymas, San Luis Río Colorado, Navojoa
<i>Eligible voters</i>	1,256,180 (April 10, 1997)
<i>Registered voters</i>	1,218,540 (97.00 percent)
<i>Major candidates</i>	<p>Armando López Nogales (PRD) Born September 1, 1950; degrees in law from University of Sonora and UNAM; joined PRI in 1968; active in party's National Campesinos Confederation; held state and national party leadership posts; worked in Ministries of Government and Agrarian Reform; state deputy; federal deputy (1988-1991); senator (1994-). PRI's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (68.51 percent); 1994 (48.31 percent).</p> <p>Enrique Salgado (PAN) Born April 29, 1945; degree in economics, UNAM; M.S. in administration, University of Michigan; secretary of Canacintra in Hermosillo (1984-1985); director of Unibanco in Mexicali, BCN; president of Centro Empresarial del Norte de Sonora (1993-1995); joined the PAN during Clouthier's presidential campaign (1988); member, party's State Central Committee; coordinated gubernatorial campaign of Moisés Canales (1991). PAN's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (24.22 percent); 1994 (32.75 percent).</p> <p>J. Jesús Zambrano Gijalva (PRD) Born October 1, 1953; degree in economics; participated in the guerrilla campaign of the Communist League of September 23 (1972); founding member of "Socialist Current," later the Patriotic Revolutionary Party (PPR); founder of the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS); active in PMS and PRD (1988-1997); party representative to National Committee to Oversee the Federal Electoral</p>

Registry; alternative representative to IFE; and federal deputy (1994-). PRD's share of state vote in recent federal deputy elections: 1991 (3.30 percent); 1994 (13.43 percent).

Minor candidates

Erasmus Fierro (PT)
Candelario Núñez Zazueta (PPS)
Gustavo López Vázquez (PDM)
Ignacio Soto Blancarte (PCFCN)

Significance of Mayoral Election on National Politics

The winner of the mayor's race will soon find himself targeted as a possible presidential candidate for the 2000 election. The mayor will become a public figure second only to the president, in terms of the attention attracted by his activities, ideas, and public pronouncements. If either the PRD's Cárdenas or the PAN's Castillo Peraza win, that development will enhance President Zedillo's image as the leader who steered Mexican politics onto a course of fair elections and pluralism.

On the other hand, should Del Mazo (PRI) triumph, veteran politicians within the increasingly divided PRI will grow stronger at the expense of the party's reformist technocratic wing. In addition, the election of Cárdenas or Castillo Peraza will certainly affect intra-party jockeying for the PRI's presidential nomination in 2000. The current list of *presidenciables* includes Del Mazo; Government Secretary Chuayffet; Senator and Querétaro gubernatorial candidate Francisco Ortiz Arana; Finance Secretary Guillermo Ortiz Martínez; shoo-in Senate candidate and Zedillo confidant Esteban Moctezuma; Agricultural Minister Francisco Labastida; outgoing Mexico City mayor Oscar Espinosa Villarreal; and PRI president Humberto Roque.¹

Above and beyond the D.F.'s mayoral election, the state of Mexico's economy and Zedillo's popularity—among other concerns—will affect the succession. In mid-1997, however, Chuayffet appeared as the PRI office-holder with the most to gain from an opposition victory. The outcome would:

- demonstrate his commitment to democracy,
- eliminate Del Mazo as a competitor in 2000,
- discredit Roque as the party president who "lost" Mexico City,
- deliver a blow to Ortiz Martínez and Moctezuma—whose neoliberal policies have weakened the PRI among rank-and-file voters, and
- assuming that demonstrations, strikes, and acts of violence mount under an opposition mayor, Chuayffet could then present himself as a seasoned but tough-minded leader capable of maintaining stability.

¹ Currently, the PRI could not nominate Ortiz Martínez because the finance secretary has never held an elective post; however, the governing party may change its internal rules before the presidential campaign season.

Under these circumstances, Senator Ortiz Arana—the odds-on favorite to capture the Querétaro statehouse—would remain as Chuayffet's principal opponent for the nomination.

A loss by Castillo Peraza would weaken the PAN's traditional wing, from which he and party president Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, 34, receive firm support. His loss might bolster the prospects of Guanajuato Governor Vicente Fox Quesada, 53. Diego Fernández de Cevallos, who still registers high ratings in public opinion polls, could seek the PAN's presidential nomination for a second time. Still, detractors claim that his refusal to run for mayor of Mexico City betrays an unwillingness to expose his business transactions to public scrutiny (in 1996, the PRI accused him of evading taxes on valuable oceanfront property in Guerrero state's "Punta Diamante"). Others say that he passed up the mayor's race to avoid being tarred with the city's problems.

After losing presidential bids in 1988 and 1994, an unsuccessful mayoral race for Cárdenas would effectively foreclose his making a third try for the nation's highest office. If Cárdenas stepped aside—albeit reluctantly—this would open the door for Porfirio Muñoz Ledo and/or party president Andrés Manuel López Obrador to throw their hats in the ring. For a decade, Cárdenas has provided the glue for the PRD's motley coalition. His moving from center stage to the wings could spur defections from the party, particularly by radical ideologues, leading to yet another fragmentation of the Left and in the end boosting the chances of the PRI's Chuayffet and the PAN's Fox.

Critics remain convinced that Cárdenas harbors a "messiah complex" that compels him to seek the presidential office formerly occupied by his widely-beloved father. As a result, they contend, a driven "Mayor Cárdenas"—once sworn-in—would throw himself body and soul into capturing the country's top political prize for which he has continuously campaigned for a decade. Although Del Mazo and Castillo Peraza might well follow the same course, both men could assemble competent administrative teams to grapple with the capital's mounting challenges. In view of his eclectic, politically inexperienced party and uncertain economic plan, the ambitious Cárdenas remains suspect on this score. Nevertheless, his supporters number an impressive array of intellectuals who could become office-holders and advisers to his administration.

Still, detractors fret that Cárdenas would simply use city hall as a springboard to Los Pinos, giving short shrift to the affairs of the D.F. After all, campaign promises aside, a mayor without robust backing from the federal government remains a weak executive. In addition, the fact that the first elected incumbent will serve only three years—what political scientist Luis Rubio sarcastically labels a "brilliant" transition²—invites him to pursue higher office rather than try to govern what increasingly appears as an ungovernable city.

Fortunately for Mexico, while social and political ferment would quicken under an opposition-party mayor, three factors militate against a break-down of the political system, much less an upheaval, in the short- to medium-term: (1) the absence of a Fujimori, Milosevic, or other "man on horseback" to exploit the problems flailing rank-and-file Mexicans; (2) the inclination of PRI dinosaurs to acquiesce—albeit grudgingly—in what they would deem a stunning defeat if Cárdenas or Castillo Peraza should attract the most votes without themselves endeavoring to rig the outcome or activate the barracks; and (3) the probability that, despite a campaign of vicious charges and counter-charges likely to continue after the election, the losing parties will ultimately

² "Incentivos perversos en el DF," *Reforma*, May 25, 1997.

accept the results of the July 6 contest, although a PRI loss would spur defections from the revolutionary party as the PRD vies with the PAN to become the main opposition force.

Surveys of opinion show that Mexico's ever-more cynical public has heard enough rhetoric from the PRI, PAN, and PRD. Now politicians—whether Zedillo, Mexico City's next mayor, governors, or lawmakers—must devote themselves to improving the lives of average men and women or find the citizenry seeking other channels through which to protest their disenchantment with the current system.³

³ Carlos Elizondo Mayer-Serra, "Riesgos de la transición," *Reforma*, April 18, 1997.

About the Author

George W. Grayson, the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William and Mary, has made 40 research trips to Mexico since 1976 and lectures regularly at the National Defense University and the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State. He is an associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

His recent books on Mexico include *Mexico: Corporatism to Pluralism?* (Harcourt-Brace, forthcoming), *The North American Free Trade Agreement* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995), *The North American Free Trade Agreement* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1993), *The Church in Contemporary Mexico* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), and *Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).

Professor Grayson earned his Ph.D. at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and his J.D. at the College of William and Mary. He has served as a member of the state legislature of Virginia for 20 years. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.