Mexico's Armed Forces
A Factbook

A Military Studies Report of the
CSIS Americas Program, Mexico Project

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CHAPTER 1

History, Legal Standing, and Values

Unlike most Latin American militaries throughout the twentieth century, Mexico's armed forces have obeyed—rather than deliberated—when they have received orders from their commander-in-chief, the president. The kaleidoscopic rise and fall of governments during the country's first half-century of independence convinced dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911), himself a general, that he should employ a vast array of devices to curb militarism lest he be ousted by scheming officers. He complemented professionalization with corruption on the theory that a "dog with a bone in its mouth cannot bite." Although deftly fending off threats from the barracks, Díaz and his technocratic advisers fell prey to civilian opponents, who felt alienated by the strongman's disdain for democracy, chumminess with foreign investors, and suppression of *campesinos*, urban workers, and middle-class progressives. The overthrow of Díaz sparked the bloodiest revolution in the hemisphere. For more than a decade, the country resembled a Tolstoyan battlefield, highlighted by conniving politicians, stacked corpses, penurious peasants, invading forces, and disheveled armies marching off in different directions.

The fragility of the ensuing peace bolstered the determination of three strong presidents—Alvaro Obregón, Plutarco Elías Calles, and Lázaro Cárdenas—to shrink the hoards of men under arms, to slash the number of generals, and to professionalize the smaller—but still large—army in accord with provisions of the 1917 Constitution. Cárdenas not only emphasized improved training, diminished political involvement, and greater attention to public works for the military, he also established a broad-based civilian counterpoise to the army in the form of a corporatist political organization, now known as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). As elected politicians and their bureaucratic allies supplanted generals on Mexico's political stage, the armed forces increasingly concentrated on converting a hodgepodge of units—most with old, variegated weapons and equipment—into a modern, well-trained, disciplined body. Assistance from the United States and Mexico's dispatch of a squadron of combat aircraft to the Philippines during World War II gave impetus to this process.

Although less politicized than most of its counterparts in the Americas, Mexico's military—at the direction of civilian leaders—has broken strikes, captured dissident union bosses, quelled peasant uprisings, eradicated rural guerrillas, intimidated opposition political parties, sent spies onto university campuses, and massacred antigovernment demonstrators. As discussed in Chapter 5, President Ernesto Zedillo has turned to the armed forces to manage

problems he and his fellow politicians deem intractable—specifically, containing a guerrilla uprising in Chiapas state, fighting narco-trafficking, and combating street crime. The role of the military will increase in salience as Mexico undergoes the extremely difficult transition from an authoritarian, hierarchical, statist regime to one that emphasizes pluralism, fair elections, the rule of law, and market economics.

Steps toward Depoliticizing Mexico's Military[1]

Mexico gained full independence in September 1821, thanks to a revolutionary force—the Army of the Three Guarantees—commanded by Agustín de Iturbide and composed of approximately 16,000 troops. In Mexico City alone, nearly 5,000 officers commanded 8,000 enlisted men. On Iturbide's coronation as "constitutional emperor," the revolutionaries became Mexico's first standing military body, known as the Mexican Imperial Army. A virtual replica of Spain's colonial militia, individuals of direct Spanish descent served as officers while Indian peasants—possibly recruited in raids on their villages—constituted the rank-and-file. These untrained, poorly equipped "recruits" frequently deserted.[2] Moreover, during Mexico's first 25 years of independence, the budget for the armed forces exceeded government revenues two out of every three years.[3]

What is more, during Mexico's first half-century of independence, more than 50 governments rose and fell, as 30 different men became president. The most contemptible of these was General Antonio López de Santa Anna, a "cryptic, mercurial, domineering military chieftain" [4] who captured the presidency 11 times between 1833 and 1855. His name became synonymous with the treachery, intrigue, and betrayal that retarded Mexico's economic development and political unification. Following the loss of half of Mexico's national territory to the United States through the Mexican–American War and Gadsden Purchase (1848–1853) and intervention by France (1862–1865), several Mexican leaders succeeded in diminishing the army's political influence.

President Porfirio Díaz (1876–1911)

- ❒ Quieted foes too powerful to crush by facilitating their enrichment through graft and corruption;
    - Deliberately offended weaker rivals, whom he discharged and exiled;

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1. This section draws heavily from Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America,* rev. ed. (New York, N.Y.: Council on Foreign Relations, 1965), pp. 101–121.
2. James D. Rudolph, ed., *Mexico: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1985), p. 321.
3. Lucas Alamán, *Historia de Méjico,* Vol. 4 (Mexico City, Mex.: J. M. Lara: 1849–1852), pp. 445–448.
4. Peter H. Smith, *Mexico: The Quest for a U.S. Policy* (New York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy Association, n.d.), pp. 6–7.

- Coopted loyalists with big salaries, generous expense accounts, and opportunities for self-enrichment;

❒ Shifted commands in the newly created 11 military zones to prevent senior officers from capturing the loyalty of large numbers of enlisted personnel;

❒ Promoted potential opponents to governorships or drummed them out of the military on charges of corruption in a policy known as *pan o palo* ("bread or the club");

❒ In the absence of an efficient fighting force, established the *rurales*—a personal constabulary—to discharge police functions and crush uprisings; and

❒ On the eve of the 1910 revolution, Mexico—with a population of 14 million people—possessed an army composed of approximately 4,000 officers and 20,000 enlisted men. "Its ranks were filled with primitive Indian conscripts, among them a good number of vagabonds, beggars, and criminals."[5]

President Alvaro Obregón (1920–1924)

The 1910–1917 revolution doubled the size of the poorly trained, poorly organized army to 80,000 men while ballooning the number of officers, few of whom had studied modern military science. To reduce the army's size, budget, and lack of professionalism, General Alvaro Obregón—the revolution's most distinguished officer—spearheaded various changes:

❒ Forced hundreds of revolutionary generals into retirement; others died under mysterious circumstances.[6] Those who remained were incorporated into the federal army and placed on the government's payroll to enhance loyalty to Mexico City;

❒ When necessary, bribed opponents with so-called silver cannonballs—on the premise that "No Mexican general can withstand a cannonball of 50,000 pesos";[7]

❒ Purged all officers suspected of backing General Adolfo de la Huerta's abortive coup in 1923;

❒ Filled vacancies with young professionals who had graduated from the reorganized Colegio Militar at Chapultepec, which offered a three-year curriculum with specialized infantry, cavalry, and artillery training (In 1917, General Obregón had created a general staff school in which new officers received training from counterparts who had served in Díaz's army);

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5. Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics,* p. 105.
6. Rudolph, *Mexico: A Country Study,* p. 325.
7. Quoted in Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico,* rev. ed. (New York, N.Y.: Atheneum, 1965), p. 196.

- ❒ Sent promising young officers to Spain, France, Germany, and the United States to learn modern military methods and techniques; and
- ❒ Succeeded in cutting the military budget from 142 million pesos in 1921 to 117 million pesos when he left office in 1924.

President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–1928)

- ❒ Selected Joaquín Amaro, a young Indian general who had served as secretary of war and the navy, to continue the reforms launched by President Obregón;
- ❒ Through General Amaro, disbanded the least reliable units and discharged the flotsam from the army's ranks;
- ❒ Put troops to work building roads, constructing schools, and undertaking other public works projects;
- ❒ Weaned enlisted men off local *caudillos* by promoting educational and recreational programs designed to enhance patriotism and *esprit de corps;*
- ❒ Sent more young officers to France, Spain, Italy, and the United States to learn about foreign militaries and, on their return home, made them his advisers;
- ❒ Increased the efficiency of the general staff by establishing—again through General Amaro, the first director of military education—both a Commission of Military Studies (1926) and a Superior War College (1932) under French tutelage. In addition, General Amaro completely revised the curriculum of the Heroic Military College;
- ❒ Dispatched graduates of the newly organized Colegio Military to regiments of "doubtful loyalty" as a buffer between revolutionary generals and their private armies;
- ❒ Provoked foes of modernization by shifting commands;
- ❒ Enjoyed the loyalty of thousands of peasant troops in putting down the subsequent revolt led by General José Gonzalo Escobar; and
- ❒ Took pride in the fact that, even though nearly 20 percent of the officer corps had joined the 1923 anti-Obregón rebellion, few regular officers and only one out of every five soldiers had backed General Escobar.[8]

8. Oscar Aguilar Asencio, "Proceso de Institucionalización de las Fuerzas Armadas en America Latina: Los Casos de México y Venezuela," Paper presented at the University of Notre Dame, 1991 (mimeo.), p. 5.

President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940)

- ❒ Instead of serving as a puppet for his predecessor, built up a powerful counterpoise to the pro-Calles military by arming and training 100,000 workers and peasants;[9]
- ❒ Emphasized the role of the military in education and public works rather than as guardian of internal order;
- ❒ Refused to enlarge the regular army while promoting loyalists to key positions;
- ❒ Divided the Secretariat of War and Navy into two autonomous defense ministries—National Defense (army and air force) and Navy (navy and marines)—to attenuate the power of the armed forces;
- ❒ Accelerated shifts in commands, as well as the removal of governors suspected of disloyalty;
- ❒ As part of a six-year program for the "moral and professional advance of the army," gave all infantry officers below the rank of colonel examinations in military science, requiring those who failed to return to school;
- ❒ Made competitive technical examinations a prerequisite for promotion (1936);
- ❒ Issued a *reglamento* barring officers from participating in any political activity (1936);
- ❒ Banned civilian employment for active-duty officers (1937);
- ❒ Reconfigured the confederal "revolutionary party" into a corporatist organization composed of four separate sectors—labor, peasant, professional, and military—with the result that any serious presidential candidate would need the support of the party's civilian elements to achieve his goal;
- ❒ Drafted the Law of National Military Service (1941), which established compulsory basic military training for 18-year-old males, selected through a lottery system;
- ❒ Backed the efforts of the Confederation of Mexican Workers to remove the anti-labor governor of Sonora, General Juan Yocupicio, and acquiesced in the governing party's expulsion of "congressional" generals who had opposed agrarian reform and pro-labor initiatives;
- ❒ Put down the 1938 uprising led by General Saturnino Cedillo, who succeeded in mobilizing only 5 percent of the troops, chiefly from his home state of San Luis Potosí;

9. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

- Watched his hand-picked candidate, General Manuel Avila Camacho (Cárdenas's secretary of national defense), easily win the presidency against General Andreu Almazán, zone commander in the Monterey region and a supporter of local industrialists who excoriated social reforms. Although himself a staunch reformer, Cárdenas backed the moderate Avila Camacho to avoid "radicalization" of the political system, which could have threatened national unity at a time of intense political pressure from the United States;[10] and
- Applauded new president Avila Camacho's (a) eliminating the military sector from the revolutionary party, (b) breaking up the military bloc in Congress, and (c) retiring a number of revolutionary generals.

Constitutional Provisions Pertaining to Mexico's Armed Forces

Article 29. In the event of invasion, serious disturbance of the public peace, or any other event which may place society in great danger or conflict, only the President of the Mexican Republic, with the consent of the head officials of the State Departments, the Administrative Departments and the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic and with the approval of the Congress of the Union, and during adjournments of the latter, of the Permanent Committee, may suspend throughout the country or in a determined place the guarantees which present an obstacle to a rapid and ready combating of the situation; but he must do so for a limited time, by means of general preventive measures without such suspensions being limited to a specified individual. If the suspension should occur while the Congress is in session, the latter shall grant such authorizations as it deems necessary to enable the Executive to meet the situation. If the suspension occurs during a period of adjournment, the Congress shall be convoked without delay in order to grant them.

Article 34, Sec. IV. [Among t]he rights of citizens of the Republic are: To bear arms in the Army or National Guard in the defense of the Republic and its institutions, under the provisions prescribed by the laws.

Article 36, Sec. II. [Among] obligations of citizens of the Republic are: To enlist in the National Guard.

Article 55, Sec. IV. [Among t]he following are the requirements to be a deputy:[11] Not to be in active service in the federal army nor to hold command in the police or rural *gendarmería* in the district where the election is held, within at least ninety days prior thereto.

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10. Cárdenas's March 18, 1938, expropriation of 17 foreign oil companies—still celebrated as a day of "national dignity"—gave rise to economic sanctions and even cries to invade Mexico; see Asencio, "Proceso de Institucionalización," p. 8.

11. The same provision applies to senators.

Article 73, Secs. XII, XIII, XIV, and XV. [Among t]he duties of Congress:

- ❒ To declare war, in the light of information submitted by the Executive;
- ❒ To enact laws pursuant to which captures on sea and land must be declared good or bad; and to enact maritime laws applicable in peace and war;
- ❒ To raise and maintain the armed forces of the Union, to wit: army, navy, and air force, and to regulate their organization and service; and
- ❒ To prescribe regulations for the purpose of organizing, arming, and disciplining the national guard, reserving to the citizens who compose it the appointment of their respective commanders and officers, and to the States the power of training it in accordance with the discipline prescribed by such regulations.

Article 76, Secs. II, III, IV, and VII. [Among t]he exclusive powers of the Senate are:

- ❒ To ratify the appointments which said official makes of ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls general, high-level employees of the Treasury, colonels and other high-ranking chiefs of the national army, navy, and air force, in accordance with provisions of law;
- ❒ To authorize him [the President] also to permit the departure of national troops beyond the borders of the country, the passage of foreign troops through the national territory, and the sojourn of squadrons of other powers for more than one month in Mexican waters;
- ❒ To give its consent for the President of the Republic to order the national guard outside of its respective States, fixing the necessary force; and
- ❒ To ratify the appointments made by the President of the Republic as ministers, diplomatic agents, consuls general, high-level employees of the Treasury, colonels and other high-ranking officers of the national army, navy, and air force, in accordance with provisions of law.

Article 82, Secs. V. In order to be President it is required [among other things]: Not to be in active service, in case of belonging to the army, within six months prior to the day of the election.

Article 83, Secs. IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII. [Among t]he exclusive powers of the President are:

- ❒ To appoint, with the approval of the Senate, the colonels and other high-ranking officers of the army, navy, and air force, and the high-level employees of the Treasury;
- ❒ To appoint the other officers of the army, navy, and air force, as provided by law;

- To dispose of the entire permanent armed forces, including the land forces, the sea force, and the air force for internal security and exterior defense of the Federation;
- To dispose of the national guard for the same purposes, under the terms indicated in section IV of Article 76; and
- To declare war in the name of the United Mexican States, pursuant to a previous law of the Congress of the Union.

Article 118, Secs. II and III. Nor shall the States, without the consent of the Congress of the Union:

- Have at any time permanent troops or ships of war; and
- Make war themselves on any foreign power, except in cases of invasion and of danger so imminent that it does not admit of delay. In such cases, a report shall be made immediately to the President of the Republic.

Article 129. No military authority may, in time of peace, perform any functions other than those that are directly connected with military affairs. There shall be fixed and permanent military commands only in the castles, forts, and warehouses immediately subordinate to the Government of the Union; or in encampments, barracks, or arsenals established for the quartering of troops outside towns.

Article 132. The forts, barracks, storage warehouses, and other buildings used by the Government of the Union for public service or for common use shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Powers in accordance with provisions to be established in a law enacted by the Congress of the Union; but, in order that property acquired in the future within the territory of any State shall likewise be under federal jurisdiction, the consent of the respective legislature shall be necessary.

Also important are the following "regulatory laws":

- Código de Justicia Militar, SEDENA, latest version, 1994.
- "Ley Orgánica del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos," latest version, 1971.
- "Ley Orgánica de la Armada," latest version, 1985.[12]

12. Renato de J. Bermúdez, *Compendio de Derecho Militar Mexicano* (Mexico City, Mex.: Porrúa, 1996).

Values Instilled in Mexico's Armed Forces[13]

Nationalism

Reverence for Symbols. The heroic cadets (*niños heroes*) who threw themselves from the walls of Chapultepec Castle instead of surrendering to U.S. forces in the Mexican–American War; the Battle of Puebla, when Mexico's army fought French troops on May 5, 1862; the Mexican Revolution; and the tricolored national flag.[14]

- ❒ Wariness of the United States[15]
- ❒ Obedience to civil authorities
- ❒ No pronouncements in press on national problems
- ❒ Populism[16]
- ❒ Conformity
- ❒ Secrecy
- ❒ Strict obedience to superiors[17]

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13. Source: Gisbert H. Flanz & Louise Moreno, "Mexico," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1988).

14. During the last half of President Zedillo's six-year term, the army has sought out conspicuous sites at which to fly huge flags. One of the largest flags flies at a height higher than the cathedral in Mexico City's Zócalo central plaza.

15. A close observer of Mexico's armed forces reports that wariness of the United States—a legacy of the Mexican–American War and other interventions orchestrated by Washington—manifests itself in the changing of the guard ritual each day at Chapultepec Castle. In essence, the "Orders of the Day" instruct the new relief to "kill every *gringo* in sight"; even as relations between the army chiefs of the United States and Mexico gave every appearance of warming, Mexico's National Defense Ministry disseminated to all general officers specially prepared copies of a highly tendentious 1993 pamphlet, the introduction to which was written by extremist Lyndon LaRouche, that alleged a U.S. scheme to destroy the militaries of Latin American countries. See John A. Cope, "In Search of Convergence: U.S.–Mexican Relations into the 21st Century," in John Bailey and Sergio Aguayo Quezada, eds., *Strategy and Security in U.S.–Mexican Relations beyond the Cold War* (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996), pp. 8–9.

16. The army's popular revolutionary origins stand in contrast to the background of most Latin American militaries. Although prepared to repress communist-inspired insurgencies and other rebellions, the army's ideological orientation—especially since the conclusion of the Cold War—seems more compatible with the center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) (nationalism, social justice, statism, and *antiyanquismo*) than with the technocratic wing of the PRI (neoliberalism, privatization, and globalism). The army still identifies itself with the "people," and impoverished Oaxaca state provides the largest share of troops. That the PRD's program resonates with many military men means neither that they are attracted to such party leaders as Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Manuel Andrés López Obrador, or Porfirio Muñoz Ledo—whom they view as old priístas because they bolted the PRI in 1987—nor that they vote for the PRD, as shown in Tables 14 and 15. The author is indebted to Professor Oscar Aguilar Ascencio for this astute observation.

- ❒ Close institutional ties to the president[18]
- ❒ Institutional loyalty
- ❒ Male-centered[19]

17. Although subordinates apparently knew of General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo's extensive contacts with drug barons while regional commander in Jalisco, no one raised this issue when the secretary of national defense, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, concurred in President Zedillo's placing Gutiérrez Rebollo at the head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs, Mexico's anti-narcotics agency.

18. General Gutiérrez Rebollo's arrest occurred just a week before the 1997 National Army Day. In view of this case, President Zedillo went to great lengths to use the ceremony to praise the loyalty and professionalism of the institution. He made his presentation to the top brass—General Cervantes, all regional and zone commanders, the heads of military schools, and so forth—assembled at the Campo de Mayo military facility in Mexico City. In contrast, some officers privately expressed disappointment with Zedillo's predecessor as president, Carlos Salinas (1988–1994), for four reasons: (1) in September 1992, the Ministry of Education, then led by Zedillo, prepared textbooks—later withdrawn—that highlighted the army's repressive role in the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre; (2) he remained silent amid rumors that former secretary of national defense Juan Arévalo Gardoqui was involved in high-level narcotics trafficking; (3) instead of allowing an in-house investigation, he ordered the National Commission on Human Rights to investigate a November 1991 incident in which soldiers killed seven federal drug agents at a remote landing strip in Veracruz; and (4) unlike President Díaz Ordaz, who personally bore the onus of the Tlatelolco event, President Salinas failed to accept responsibility for the uprising of the Zapatista guerillas on January 1, 1994, thus casting indirect blame on the armed forces. See Stephen J. Wagner and Donald Schulz, "The Zapatista Revolt and its Implications for Civil Military Relations and the Future of Mexico," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* No. 37 (Spring 1995), p. 19.

19. Women constitute less than 1 percent of military personnel.

CHAPTER 2

Training, Functions, Weapons, and Expenditures

Post–World War II civilian leaders in Mexico diminished both the political role and the economic assets of the military. After all, Guatemala and other Caribbean Basin countries posed no threat to Mexico, while its armed forces could not even hope to repel an attack launched by the United States—in the extremely unlikely event of a conflict between these neighbors, who share a border 2,000 miles long. Thus, President Miguel Alemán and his successors concentrated on internal economic development, ultimately adopting a protectionist import-substitution model to spur industrialization. For its part, the army concentrated on civic-action programs in accord with its role as "servant of the people"; suppressed guerrilla bands that emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s; and helped to maintain political stability as indicated at the beginning of Chapter 1. For its part, the navy functioned as a coast guard, conducting search-and-rescue missions, pursuing smugglers, and helping to clean up oil spills and other types of pollution.

Through most of the 1970s, Mexico's military remained one of the worst-equipped and poorly paid in Latin America. A medley of events changed this situation: the influx of refugees from civil wars plaguing Central America, sparking fear of turmoil in Chiapas and other dirt-poor southern states; the discovery of a cornucopia of oil and gas in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec; the escalation of the production and shipment of drugs; and the designation of a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone off Mexican shores that was off-limits to fishermen from the United States and other countries.

These factors sparked a program to modernize and enlarge Mexico's armed forces. Although a severe crisis in the early 1980s forced a scale-back of the initiative, the size of the military doubled between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s. In addition, the army, navy, and air force improved their training, increased their stock of weapons, and boosted compensation for their personnel. One expert believes that the sharp expansion of its armed forces' budget in recent yeas has vaulted Mexico from near the bottom in per capita military outlays to the average for all countries.

The Training of Mexico's Armed Forces[20]

I. Top-tier institution

A. National Defense College (located at old Colegio Militar at Popotla in Mexico City)

1. Created in September 1981;
2. Provides army colonels and generals—and their counterparts in rank in the air force and navy—with advanced formal training in national security policymaking, resource management, international affairs, and economics. Also includes participants from the ministries of foreign relations, finance, and government (*Gobernación*)—in an effort to forge ties between military officers and civilians from ministries with national security responsibilities. Of 30 participants on average in a class, three to five are civilians;
3. 70 percent to 75 percent of instructors have civilian backgrounds;
4. The year-long program includes course work, as well as one domestic and one foreign trip. When Mexican officers visit the United States, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Defense, they receive briefings on force modernization, organizational issues, command and control, and equipment acquisition policy; and
5. Graduates receive the degree of Master of Military Administration for Security and National Defense.

II. Second-tier institutions

A. Superior War College (Mexico City)

1. Created in 1932;
2. Provides the equivalent of a college education to young officers with 5 to 10 years of military service to prepare them for command assignments;[21]
3. Largely military faculty, who—according to Roderic Ai Camp

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20. Source: Rudolph, ed., *Mexico: A Country Study*, pp. 352–356.

21. Graduating classes through the mid-1980s typically included 8 majors, 25 first captains, and 12 second captains. A change limited entrance to the Superior War College to lieutenants and second captains, and since 1988 more than one-third of graduates have been lieutenants. This indicates the army's desire to socialize future colonels and generals at a younger, more receptive age; indeed, the average age for graduates is 26. See Roderic Ai Camp, "What Kind of Relationship? The Military and Mexican Politics," Paper presented at the National Latin American Studies Conference, Washington, D.C., April 1991, pp. 514–515.

—display an arrogant teaching style with the awarding of grades based more on subordination to authority than on knowledge of subject matter;

4. Coursework concentrates on administration, military strategy and tactics, war gaming, and logistics—as well as more general subjects such as military history and foreign languages. Often compared to U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Three-year program for army personnel; two-year course for specialized air force training; and navy officers could elect to take a comparable course at their own institution, the Center of Superior Naval Studies; and
5. Graduates receive the degree of *Licenciate* in Military Administration and the title of General Staff Graduate (Diplomato de Estado Mayor, or DEM). In addition to being a prerequisite for a flag rank in any of the services, the DEM also ensures recipients a stipend of between 10 and 25 percent of their salary for the remainder of their active service.

B. Center of Superior Naval Studies (Mexico City)

1. Created in 1970;
2. Provides advanced training for naval officers holding the rank of captain and above;
3. Largely military faculty;
4. Curriculum includes naval and military science, war gaming, international maritime law, geopolitics, and logistics. The center also sponsors a correspondence program for commissioned officers assigned to naval zone facilities. The two most important offerings are the National Security and Senior Command course and the Naval General Staff course. The former, equivalent to the National Defense College course, includes (naval) lieutenants and colonels, as well as civilians from Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the ministries of foreign relations, communications and transport, and government; and
5. Graduates of the one-year general staff course receive the title of Naval General Staff Graduate.

C. Mexican Army and Air Force Study Center (Mexico City)

1. Created in 1995;
2. Composed of four military schools:
    a. Military School of Intelligence (established in 1990 as the School of Training and Command Groups before

adopting current name in 1994)

i. designed to train military analysts[22]

ii. students are captains, majors, and occasional lieutenant colonels

iii. 21 to 25 students per class

iv. mostly civilian faculty

b. School of Human Resources

c. School of Military Administration

d. School of Logistics

3. Each school offers three courses:

a. Basic

b. Advanced

c. Superior (six months)

D. Military College of Health Service Graduates (Mexico City), created in 1970

E. Military Medical School (Mexico City), created in 1916

F. Military School of Dentistry (Mexico City), created in 1976

G. Military Engineering School (Mexico City), created in 1960

H. Military School of Communications, created in 1925

III. Third-tier institutions

A. Heroic Military College (Mexico City)[23]

1. Created on October 11, 1923;
2. Provides the equivalent of a preparatory-school education for young men in their mid- to late-teens who have graduated from a secondary school or a private military academy;
3. Military administration and largely military faculty who stress rote learning, obedience, discipline, and loyalty to one's classmates. Such emphasis on group-over-individual-achievement means that cheating is tolerated, if not encouraged,

22. Although regional and zonal commanders often assign a low priority to collecting information, army intelligence or S–2 officers gather volumes of material from around the country; however, the military has lacked a center to teach its personnel how to analyze the data that flow into Mexico City. Thus, the Ministry of Defense cannot differentiate accurate reports about, say, guerrilla groups from wild speculation.

23. Roderic Ai Camp notes that the army added the adjective *Heroico* to the Colegio Militar in 1949 because of the school's loyalty to the president.

particularly if it fosters fraternal bonding. Instructors discourage initiatives by individual cadets;
4. The four-year program offers the opportunity to specialize in infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering, or administration; and
5. Graduates attain the equivalent rank of second lieutenant in their branch of specialization.

B. Heroic Naval Military School (Veracruz)

1. Created July 1, 1897;
2. Program is the naval equivalent of that offered at the Heroic Military College;
3. 70 percent to 75 percent of instructors have civilian backgrounds;
4. Graduates earn the rank of ensign for service with the naval surface fleet, naval aviation, or marine infantry units. The navy also operates an aviation school at Mexico City's Benito Juárez International Airport; and
5. Since the late 1980s, a U.S. military officer teaches English at Mexico's naval and air force academies, as well as at the Superior War College. Similarly, Mexican officers offer Spanish instruction at West Point, Annapolis, and Boulder.

C. Air College (Jalisco)

1. Created in 1959;
2. Program is the air force equivalent of that offered at the Heroic Military College;
3. 70 percent to 75 percent of instructors have civilian backgrounds; and
4. Graduates earn the rank of second lieutenant as air force pilot-aviator, general specialist, or specialist in maintenance and supply.

Table 1: Directors of the National Defense College, 1981–1998[24]

Name	Tenure
Gral. Bgda. Int. (DEM) Rafael Paz del Campo	August 1997–
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Rodrigo Isidoro Alcaraz Leyva	March 1996–August 1997
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Luis Mucel Luna	December 1994–March 1996
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Spencer Benjamín Calderón G.	February 1993–December 1994
Gral. Div. (DEM) Mario Renán Castillo Fernández	April 1992–February 1993
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Gerardo Clemente Ricardo Vega García	December 1988–March 1992
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Enrique Tomás Salgado Cordero	May 1988–December 1988
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Ricardo Maldonado Baca	August 1986–April 1988
Gral. Bdga. (DEM) Adrián de Jesús Ruiz y Esquivel	September 1984–August 1986
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Tito Valencia Ortíz	May 1984–September 1984
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Ricardo Andriano Morales	March 1984–May 1984
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Joel J. Martínez Montero	December 1982–March 1984
Gral. Bgda. (DEM) Vinicio Santoyo-Feria	January 1981–March 1982

24. Source: Marcelo Mereles, Foreign Press Office, Mexican Presidency.

Table 2: Directors of the Superior War College, 1932–1998[25]

Name	Tenure
Arturo Olgin Hernandez	1998–1999
Jacinto Romero Arrendo	1997–1998
Armando Arturo Nuñez Cabrera	1996–1997
José de Jesús Humberto Rodríquez	1995–1996
Fausto Manuel Zamorano Esparza	1992–1994
Gilberto Renato García González	1991–1992
Alfredo Hernández Pimentel	1989–1991
Daniel Velázquez Cordona	1988–1989
Rafael Macedo Figueroa	1985–1988
Rodrigo Montelongo Moreno	1982–1985
Joel Martínez Monter	1982
Alfonso Pérez Mejía	1980–1982
Marco Antonio Guerrero Mendoza	1978–1980
Pedro Feria Rivera	1976–1978
Mario Carballo Pazos	1975–1976
Alonso Aguirre Ramos	1973–1975
Juan Antonio de la Fuente Rodríguez	1972–1973
Esteban Aguilar Gómez	1970–1972
Arturo Corona Mendióroz	1966–1970
Antonio Ramírez Barrera	1961–1966
Raúl Rivera Flandez	1960–1961
Francisco J. Grajales Godoy	1959–1960
Cristobal Guzmán Cárdenas	1957–1959
Alfonso Gurza Falfán	1955–1957
Alberto Violante Pérez	1953–1954
Juan Beristaín Ladró	1953
Rubén Calderón Aguilar	1947–1953
Daniel Somuano López	1945–1947
Luis Amezcua Figueroa	1944–1945
Luis Rivas López	1940–1944
Tomás Sánchez Hernández	1936–1940
Luis Alamillo Flores	1932–1935

25. Source: Camp, *Generals in the Palacio* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 153; Marcelo Mereles, Foreign Press Office, Mexican Presidency.

Table 3: Directors of the Heroico Colegio Militar, 1920–1998[26]

Name	Tenure
Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda	1996–1998
Rigoberto Castillelos Adriano	1994–1996
Luis Angel Fuentes Alvarez	1992–1994
Luis Duarte Sacramento	1990–1992
Carlos Duarte Sacramento	1988–1990
Carlos Cisneros Montes de Oca	1985–1988
Jaime Contreras Guerrero	1983–1985
Enrique Cervantes Aguirre	1980–1982
Absalón Castellanos Domínguez	1976–1980
Salvador Revueltas Olvera	1973–1976
Miguel Rivera Becerra	1971–1973
Roberto Yáñez Vázquez	1965–1970
Jerónimo Gómar Suástegui	1959–1965
Francisco J. Grajales Godoy	1955–1959
Leobardo C. Ruiz Camarillo	1953–1955
Tomás Sánchez Hernández	1950–1953
Rafael Avila Camacho	1948–1950
Luis Alamillo Flores	1945–1948
Gilberto R. Limón Márquez	1942–1945
Marcelino García Barragán	1941–1942
Alberto Zuno Hernández	1939–1941
Othón León Lobato	1936–1938
Manuel C. Rojas Rasso	1936
Rafael Cházaro Pérez	1935–1936
Joaquín Amaro Domínguez	1931–1935
Gilberto R. Limón Márquez	1928–1931
Juan José Rios Rios	1927–1928
Miguel M. Acosta Guajardo	1925–1927
Amado Aguirre	1925 (HCM closed)
Manuel Mendoza Sarabia	1925
Miguel Angel Peralta	1923–1925
J. Domínguez Ramírez Garrido	1923–1923
Víctor Hernández Covarrubias	1921–1923
Marcelino Murrieta Murrieta	1920–1921
Joaquín Mucel Acereto	1920

26. Source: Camp, *Generals in the Palacio,* p. 140. *Note:* From 1940 to 1973, all 10 directors reached top positions in the National Defense Secretariat, including two secretaries (Marcelino García Barragán and Gilberto Limón Márquez), two subsecretaries (Gilberto Limón Márquez and Jerónimo Gómar Suástegui), and three chiefs of staff (Luis Alamillo Flores, Tomás Sánchez Hernández, and Roberto Yáñez Vázquez). Rafael Avila Camacho had served already as official mayor, and Francisco Grajales Godoy and Leobardo C. Ruiz Camarillo previously had been chiefs of staff.

Table 4: Increased Military Functions Compared with Arms Acquisitions, 1940–Present[27]

	1940	1950–1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	1997–2000
Key internal and external events	World War II	Castro's rise to power in Cuba	Tlatelolco declared massacre Discovery of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone off country's shores Emergence of guerilla organizations[a]	Discovery of huge oil field in Isthmus of Tehuantepec Civil wars in Central America Guatemalan refugees pour into the South Earthquakes strike Mexico City		Escalation of drug trafficking NAFTA takes effect Zapatista uprising in Chiapas Hurricanes lash Acapulco area	
Missions	Quell social unrest Invoke civic action Fight abroad		Counterinsurgency	Protect oil fields Eradicate drugs Defend fishing resources Relocate refugees		Directing police in Mexico City and in states and cities throughout the country	
Major weapons acquisitions	Under Lend-Lease program, acquired $40 million worth of weapons, including 17 P–47 Thunderbolt fighters		Navy: 2 *Fletcher*-class destroyers	Army: 40 Panhard vehicles; 40 Panhard VBL light armored cars; 35 German HWK–11 armed personnel carriers; domestic mass production (in cooperation with Germany) of G–3 automatic rifles, ¾-ton trucks for military use, and DN–III armored cars Air Force: 12 F–5 supersonic fighters;[b] 55 Pilatus PC–7s (training and counterinsurgency); 5 Boeing 727–100s (transport); 20 Mudry CAP–10Bs (training); C–130s (cargo) Navy: 2 *Gearing*-class destroyers; 6 *Halcón*-class frigates; 4 *Aguila*-class fishery-protection vessels	Army: Mi–8 HIP helicopters (Russian) Navy: 2 *Knox*-class frigates		Army: 73 UH–1H Huey helicopters. In 1998, the navy planned to purchase another *Knox*-class frigate to use for spare parts needed to make the 2 already purchased operational

a. People's Union (UP), Revolutionary Action Movement (MAR), and People's Armed Revolutionary Forces (FRAP).

b. The United States established a military liaison office (MLO), staffed by Air Force personnel, to manage the F–5 purchase; subsequently, the MLO coordinated navy purchases of U.S.-made frigates and army acquisition of U.S.-made night-radar equipment.

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27. Sources: Raúl Benítez Manuat, "Las fuerzas armadas mexicanas a fin de siglo: su relación con el estado, el sistema político y la sociedad," in Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, ed., *Reconversión militar en america latina* (Guatemala City, Guatemala: Flacso, 1994), pp. 63–89; Rudolph, ed., *Mexico: A Country Study;* and Edward J. Williams, "The Evolution of the Mexican Military and Its Implications for Civil–Military Relations," in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., *Mexico's Political Stability: The Next Five Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), pp. 143–158.

Current Army and Air Force Weapons Inventory[28]

Army

Artillery

18 M–116 howitzers
16 M–2A1 armored fighting transport vehicles or M3 light tanks
60 M–101 towed artillery pieces
24 M–56 towed artillery pieces
5 DN–5 self-propelled artillery ("Buffalo")
1500 81 mm mortars
75 Brandt mortars
8 VBL (antitank guided weapons)
1 B–300 rocket launcher
30 37 mm M–3 mobile artillery
40 M–55 antiaircraft guns
1 RBS–70 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system

Reconnaissance

119 ERC–90F rocket communications systems
40 VBL
25 MOWAG light tank
15 MAC–1 armored car
41 MEX–1

Infantry

40 HWK–11
34 M–2A1 towed artillery
36 VCR/TT armored personnel carrier (APC)
40 DN–4 APC ("Coballo")
40 DN–5 APC ("Toro")
409 AMX–VCI tracked armored vehicles (APC)
95 BDX
26 LAV–150 ST amphibious assault vehicles

Armor

40 M–8 light tanks

28. Source: *Military Balance 1997–1998* (London, U.K.: International Institute for Strategic Studies).

Air Force

Fighter

8 F5–E attack fighters
2 F5–F attack fighters

Reconnaissance

14 Commander 500S
1 SA 1–37A surveillance aircraft
4 C–26 cargo planes[29]

Transport/Utility/SAR

2 BN–2 small transport planes
12 C–47 cargo planes
1 C–54 cargo plane
10 C–118 cargo planes
9 C–130A cargo planes
5 Commander 500
1 Commander 650
5 DC–6 transport plane
2 F–27 firefighters
5 727 passenger aircraft
12 IAI–201 business transport planes
2 King Air executive aircraft
11 CT–134A utility aircraft
40 F–33A fighters executive aircraft

Presidential Fleet

1 757 passenger aircraft
2 737 passenger aircraft
1 L–188 training jet
3 FH–227 cargo planes
2 Merlin multi-use helicopters
4 T–39 training planes
1 AS–332 multi-use helicopters
2 SA–330 transport helicopters
2 UH–60 armored transport helicopter

Training

74 PC–7 fighter trainers
27 AT–33 counterinsurgency fighters
20 CAP–10 maneuver trainers
5 T–39 trainers

29. Recent acquisitions that cannot be used for surveillance missions until they undergo some $3 million in modifications.

22 MD–530F utility helicopters

Helicopters

5 Bell 205 Huey II armored transport helicopters
27 Bell 206 scout helicopters
25 Bell 212 attack and support helicopters
73 UH–1H Huey armored transport helicopters[30]
3 SA–332 transport helicopters
2 UH–60 armored transport helicopters
6 S–70A transport helicopters

Current Naval Weapons Inventory[31]

Personnel

3,700, including 8,650 marines

Surface Assets

Combatants

Destroyers

- ❒ 2 former U.S.-owned *Gearing* FRAM-I–class, approximately 2,448 tons' (light) displacement
  - E–03 *Quetzalcoatl*
  - E–04 *Netzahualcoyotl*
- ❒ 1 former U.S.-owned *Fletcher*-class, approximately 2,050 tons' displacement
  - E–02 *Cuitlahuac*

Frigates

- ❒ 2 former U.S.-owned *Brostein*-class, approximately 2,360 tons' displacement
  - E–40 *Nicolas Bravo*
  - E–42 *Hermenegildo Galeana*

30. Grounded as unsafe because gearbox problems gave rise to a number of accidents.
31. Source: A. D. Baker III, ed., *The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World 1995* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

- ❒ 3 high-speed transports (used primarily as patrol ships), approximately 1,450 tons' displacement
    - 1 former U.S.-owned *Charles Lawrence*–class

        B–07 *Coahuila*
    - 2 former U.S.-owned *Crosley*-class

        B–06 *Usumacinta*

        B–08 *Chihuahua*

        2 *Knox*-class[32]

Patrol Ships

4 *Aguila*-class, approximately 907 tons' displacement

6 *Halcón*-class, approximately 767 tons' displacement

16 former U.S.-owned *Auk*-class former minesweepers, approximately 890 tons' displacement

12 former U.S.-owned *Admirable*-class former minesweepers, approximately 650 tons' displacement

1 *Guanajuato*-class gunboat, approximately 1,300 tons' displacement

Patrol Boats and Patrol Craft

Patrol coats

- ❒ 31 *Azteca*-class, approximately 115 tons' displacement.

Patrol craft

- ❒ 4 *XFPB*-class, approximately 75 tons' displacement
- ❒ 13 *Olmeca*-class, approximately 18 tons' displacement
- ❒ 4 *Polimar*-class, approximately 57 tons' displacement
- ❒ 2 former U.S. Coast Guard *Point*-class, approximately 64 tons' displacement
- ❒ 2 former U.S. Coast Guard *Cape*-class, approximately 87 tons' displacement

Riverine patrol craft

- ❒ About 20 *Taipei*-class, approximately 1.5 tons' displacement
- ❒ 5 *AM-1*–class, approximately 37 tons' displacement

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32. Acquired from the United States but remain inoperable because they were not properly outfitted.

Auxiliaries

1 repair ship, a former U.S.-owned *Fabius*-class former aircraft repair ship

❒ A–05 *General Vicente Guerrero,* approximately 4,100 tons' displacement

Survey and research vessels

❒ 2 former stern-haul trawlers

- H–04 *Onjuku,* approximately 494 tons' displacement
- H–03 *Alejandro de Humboldt,* approximately 585 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former U.S. Navy survey ship, the former *Samuel P. Lee*

- H–06 *Antares,* approximately 1,297 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former U.S.-owned *Robert D. Conrad*–class oceanographic research vessel

- H–05 *Altair,* approximately 1,200 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former U.S.-owned *Admirable*-class former minesweeper

- H–2 *DM 20,* approximately 615 tons' displacement

Transports

❒ 2 *Huasteco*-class, approximately 2,650 tons' displacement

❒ 1 vehicle and personnel transport, A–08 *Iguala,* approximately 4,205 tons' displacement

❒ 1 naval transport, B–02 *Zacatas,* approximately 780 tons' displacement

Cargo ships

❒ 1 former commercial cargo ship, A–25 *Tarasco,* approximately 3,200 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former lighthouse supply vessel, A–23 *Maya,* approximately 924 tons' displacement

Training vessels

❒ 1 sailing ship, A–07 *Cuauhtemoc,* three-masted bark, approximately 1,200 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former U.S.-owned *Edsall*-class training frigate, A–*06 Manuel Azueta,* approximately 1,200 tons' displacement

❒ 1 former armed transport, B–01 *Durango,* approximately 1,600 tons' displacement

Tugs

- ❒ 4 former U.S.-owned *Abnaki*-class fleet tugs, approximately 1,325 tons' displacement
- ❒ 2 ex-U.S. Maritime Administration V–4 class, approximately 1,863 tons' displacement

Service Craft

2 174-foot fuel lighters
1 general-purpose tender
2 yard tugs
3 floating drydocks, lift capacity 3,500 tons each
1 small auxiliary floating drydock, capacity 1,000 tons
7 floating cranes
1 pile driver
5 miscellaneous dredges

Aircraft

Primarily general aviation aircraft, used mostly for coastal surveillance and search-and-rescue. Many of the larger ships (the 2 former *Gearing*-class destroyers and many patrol ships) have small liaison helicopters attached.

Table 5: Mexico's Military Expenditures Compared with Other Countries of the Americas[33]

	Defense Expenditures												
	US$m			US$ per capita			% of GDP			Numbers in Armed Forces (000)		Estimated Reservists (000)	Para-military (000)
Country	**1985**	**1995**	**1996**	**1985**	**1995**	**1996**	**1985**	**1995**	**1996**	**1985**	**1996**	**1996**	**1996**
North America													
Mexico	1,695	2,366	2,582	22	26	28	0.7	0.8	0.8	129.1	175.0	300.0	15.0
Canada	10,688	9,126	8,387	421	324	295	2.2	1.6	1.5	83.0	70.5	27.7	9.3
United States	352,551	277,834	265,823	1,473	1,056	1,001	6.5	3.8	3.6	2,151.6	1,483.8	1,880.6	88.3
Caribbean													
Antigua and Barbuda	3	3	3	39	47	46	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.2	0.1	n/a
Bahamas	13	19	21	56	74	80	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.9	n/a	2.3
Barbados	16	14	14	71	50	50	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.4	n/a
Cuba	2,181	700	686	216	64	62	9.6	5.8	5.4	161.5	100.0	135.0	19.0
Dominican Republic	70	109	101	11	14	13	1.1	1.3	1.1	22.2	24.5	n/a	15.0
Haiti	42	59	62	7	8	9	1.5	3.4	3.5	6.9	n/a	n/a	7.0
Jamaica	27	28	28	12	11	11	0.9	0.6	0.6	2.1	3.3	0.9	0.2
Trinidad and Tobago	100	72	71	84	55	54	1.4	1.2	1.1	2.1	2.1	n/a	4.8
Central America													
Belize	5	13	14	33	62	64	1.4	2.4	2.5	0.6	1.1	0.7	n/a
Costa Rica	40	48	50	15	14	14	0.7	0.6	0.6	n/a		n/a	7.0
El Salvador	344	145	122	72	26	21	4.4	1.8	1.5	41.7	28.4	n/a	12.0
Guatemala	160	150	154	20	14	14	1.8	1.4	1.4	31.7	44.2	35.0	12.3
Honduras	98	54	57	22	9	9	2.1	1.3	1.3	16.6	18.8	60.0	5.5
Nicaragua	301	39	36	92	9	8	17.4	1.8	1.5	62.9	17.0	12.0	n/a
Panama	123	107	109	56	40	40	2.0	1.3	1.4	12.0	n/a	n/a	11.8
South America													
Argentina	4,945	3,879	3,732	162	113	108	3.8	1.7	1.5	108.0	72.5	375.0	31.2
Bolivia	173	146	152	27	18	18	2.0	2.1	2.1	27.6	33.5	n/a	30.6
Brazil		9,824	10,341	24	61	63	0.8	2.0	2.1	276.0	295.0	1,115.0	385.6
Chile	3,209	1,947	1,990	140	137	138	7.8	3.7	3.5	101.0	89.7	50.0	31.2
Colombia	579	1,791	1,846	20	51	52	1.6	2.6	2.6	66.2	146.3	60.7	87.0
Ecuador	388	530	528	41	45	44	1.8	3.4	3.4	42.5	57.1	100.0	0.3
Guyana	43	7	7	54	9	9	6.8	1.1	1.0	6.6	1.6	1.6	1.5
Paraguay	82	112	110	22	23	22	1.3	1.4	1.3	14.4	20.2	164.5	14.8
Peru	875	874	1,061	47	37	44	4.5	1.6	1.9	128.0	125.0	188.0	68.6
Suriname	11	14	14	29	34	33	2.4	3.9	3.5	2.0	1.8	n/a	n/a
Uruguay	326	331	270	108	104	85	3.5	2.9	2.3	31.9	25.6	n/a	2.5
Venezuela	1,125	882	903	65	40	40	2.1	1.1	1.2	49.0	46.0	8.0	23.0
Total	**381,910**	**311,224**	**299,293**							**3,578.8**	**2,884.7**	**4,515.1**	**885.8**

33. Source: *Military Balance 1997–1998*, pp. 293, 295, and 296. Substantial increases in Mexico's military budget in recent years have raised defense expenditures both as a percentage of gross domestic product and on a per capita basis.

Pay and Benefits[34]

I. Salaries

A. Although periodically revised, the Law of Promotions and Compensation and the Law of Pensions and Retirement—both promulgated in the 1920s to bring the armed forces under the control of the central government—set the framework for military pay and benefits.

B. Although the Ministry of Defense does not publicize elements in its budget, it is believed to earmark 60 percent of its outlays for administration, salaries, and benefits.

C. The three branches of the military provide uniform compensation for equivalent rank and years of service.

1. During the 1950s and 1960s, compensation rose faster than the cost of living;

2. During the 1970s, pay failed to keep pace with both price increases and the salaries of civilians;

3. Pay raises during the 1980s helped most military personnel to preserve or even improve their purchasing power—with officers enjoying "comfortable incomes";

4. In the early 1990s, some junior officers reportedly resorted to moonlighting because their pay averaged only $300 per month; and

5. Salaries have risen in recent years in part because of the Chiapas conflict, and in part because of the many functions members of the armed forces now are required to perform.

D. Bonuses for education, hazardous duty, command positions, and so forth enable officers to supplement their base pay substantially.

II. Pensions

A. Retirees or their dependents/beneficiaries receive pensions.

B. A 1983 amendment to the Law of Pensions and Retirement stipulates that an officer can retire after 30 years of service at 100 percent of his pre-retirement salary, as well as raises and cost-of-living adjustments granted to active-duty personnel.

C. The minimum benefit for individuals with fewer than 30 years of service is 20 percent of base pay.

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34. Source: This section relies heavily on Tim L. Merrill and Ramón Miró, *Mexico: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1996), pp. 317–318.

III. Fringe benefits

A. A social security system separate from those of other government employees; namely, the Mexican Armed Forces Social Security Institute (Instituto de Seguro Social para las Fuerzas Armadas Mexicanas, or ISSFAM).

B. Access to a national network of ISSFAM hospitals, including the extremely modern and sophisticated Central Military Hospital in Mexico City.

C. Low-interest loans via the National Bank of the Army, Air Force, and Navy (Banco Nacional del Ejército, Fuerza Aérea, y Armada, or Banejército).

D. Subsidized housing whose rent cannot exceed 6 percent of an individual's income.

E. Free education for dependents.

F. Payment of moving expenses for service-related transfers.

G. Access to small commissaries and various social services.

CHAPTER 3

Organization, Manpower, and Leadership

Changes in the army's organization, manpower, and leadership reflect the new array of challenges facing Mexico. Poverty, a large indigenous population, a forbidding terrain, ubiquitous official corruption, proximity to Guatemala, and activist officials of the Roman Catholic Church have nurtured guerrilla movements in Mexico's South. Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Chiapas consistently rank near the top of the country's most impoverished and violent states. In addition, Chiapas—along with neighboring Tabasco—boasts huge reserves of oil and natural gas. Such factors have prompted the military to establish new military zones inside Chiapas, to which the secretary of national defense has dispatched additional battalions to contain the rebel movement Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN, or Zapatista).

Increased drug-trafficking has drawn more military units to northern border states and to the country's two coastlines. In fact, concern over smuggling along the relatively unpopulated West Coast accounts for the establishment of a third military zone on the Baja California peninsula.

Whether combating guerrillas or narco-mafiosi, the army has emphasized greater mobility. This goal explains the acquisition of helicopters and the formation of Airborne Special Forces Groups (GAFEs), whose personnel have trained in the United States.

Such improvements aside, Mexico's armed forces suffer from a top-heavy officer corps, a lack of initiative by subordinates, poor cooperation between the army and the navy, and widespread corruption.

The Organization of Mexico's Armed Forces[35]

I. Army

   A. 12 Military Regions

   B. 41 Zonal Garrisons,[36] which include the following units:

35. Sources: Rudolph, ed., *Mexico: A Country Study;* and Miró and Merrill, eds., *Mexico: A Country Study.*

36. In July 1998, the army was in the process of creating a 41st Military Zone (MZ), encompassing western Jalisco state. In effect, the new MZ would cut in half MZ 15, headquartered in Monjonera. As of mid-year, the secretary of national defense had not announced the location of the new zones.

1. 1 armored division;
2. 19 motorized cavalry divisions;
3. 1 mechanized infantry division;
4. 7 artillery regiments; and
5. 3 artillery and 8 infantry brigades.

C. Specialized units

1. 1 Presidential Guard Brigade (3 infantry, 1 special forces, and 1 artillery battalion);[37]
2. 1 motorized infantry brigade (3 motorized infantry regiments);
3. 3 infantry brigades (each with 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion);
4. One airborne brigade (3 battalions);
5. Special forces air groups (Grupos Aeromóviles de Fuerzas Especiales, or GAFEs);[38]
6. 1 military police brigade;
7. 1 engineering brigade; and
8. air defense, engineering, and support units.

D. Rural Defense Corps

1. Under the control of the army;
2. Date to 1915, when peasants organized into rural defense units to protect themselves against the "white guards," as the private armies of large property owners were known;
3. Supported the constitutional government against zealous Catholics in the Cristero Rebellion of the mid- to late-1920s;
4. Until 1955, enlistment restricted to *ejidatarios,* residents of communal farms; since that time, attached to *ejidos,* but participation is open to all small farmers and laborers;
5. Members neither wear uniforms nor receive pay, but are eligible for limited benefits—including an old rifle;
6. Corps organized into 11-member platoons, which receive

37. In fact, this unit, which protects the president, is totally independent of the army and forms part of the Estado Mayor Presidencial.

38. Approximately 64 GAFE units exist across the country: 2 per Military Region (MR) and 1 additional per Military Zone (MZ). The MZ GAFEs are not fully staffed, and only the Mexico City–based unit (originally 2, now merged and redesignated the headquarters element) is truly well-trained and equipped.

rudimentary training from regular troops assigned to relevant military zone;

7. Corps fall under the immediate command of military zone officers, but they are responsible to the local *ejido* government as well; and

8. Functions include the provision of intelligence, serving as guides for military patrols, taking part in civic-action projects, and occasionally pursuing cattle rustlers and drug traffickers;

II. Air Force

A. Part of the army

B. Composed of 2 wings and 10 air groups

C. Three Air Force Regions, which embrace the following Military Air Bases (Bases Aéreas Militares, or BAMs):[39]

1. Northern

a. La Paz, Baja California Sur (No. 3); Ensenada, Baja California Norte (No. 9); Caliacán, Sinaloa (No. 10); Tijuana, Baja California Norte (No. 12); Chihuahua, Chihuahua (No. 13); Monterey, Nuevo León (No. 14); and Hermosillo, Sonora (No. 18)

2. Central

a. Santa Lucia, Mexico City (No. 1); Zapopán, Jalisco (No. 5); and Acapulco, Guerrero (No. 7)

3. Southeast

a. Ixtepec, Oaxaca (No. 2); Cozumel, Quintana Roo (No. 4); Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas (No. 6); Mérida, Yucatán (No. 8); Xoxocotla, Oaxaca (No. 15); Ciudad Pemex, Tabasco (No. 16); and Copolar, Chiapas (No. 17).

III. Navy

A. Six Naval Regions and Naval Zones (one for each coastal state—6 Gulf; 11 Pacific)

B. Gulf bases:

1. 1st Region (Veracruz);

2. 3rd Naval Zone (Veracruz);

3. Commander of Gulf and Caribbean Naval Forces (Tuxpan)

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39. Many of these facilities are located at civilian airports, giving rise to the question of their future status when the government privatizes the country's airports.

        a. Sector (Coatzocoalcos);
    4. 1st Naval Zone (Ciudad Madero);
    5. 3rd Region (frontiera);
    6. 5th Naval Zone (frontiera);
    7. 7th Naval Zone (Lerma);
        a. Sector (Ciudad Carmen)
    8. 5th Region (Chetumal);
    9. 11th Naval Zone (Chetumal);
        a. Sectors (Isla de Mujeres; Cozumel)
    10. 9th Naval Zone (Yucalpeten);

C. Pacific bases:

    1. 2nd Naval Region (Guaymas);
    2. 6th Naval Zone (Guaymas);
        a. Sector (Puerto Penasco)
    3. 2nd Naval Zone (Ensenada);
        a. Sector (San Felipe)
    4. 4th Naval Zone;
    5. 8th Naval Zone;
        a. Sector (Topolobampo)
    6. 4th Naval Region (Manzanillo);
    7. 14th Naval Zone (Manzanillo);
        a. Sector (Isla Socorro)
    8. 10th Naval Zone (San Blas);
    9. 12th Naval Zone (Puerto Vallarta);
    10. 16th Naval Zone (Lázaro Cárdenas);
    11. 6th Naval Region (Acapulco);
    12. 18th Naval Zone (Acapulco);
    13. Commander of Pacific Forces (Acapulco);
        a. Sector (Ixtapa-Zihuatenejo)
    14. 20th Naval Zone (Salina Cruz);
    15. 22nd Naval Zone (Puerto Madero);

D. Other naval facilities:

1. 5 naval air stations;
2. Marines:[40]
    a. 1 paratroop brigade comosed of 3 battalions;
    b. 1 battalion attached to the Presidential Guard Brigade;
    c. 3 battalions with headquarters in Mexico City, Acapulco, and Veracruz; and
    d. 35 companies
        i. guard ports, bases, and zonal installations; and
        ii. participate in some inland river patrols.

40. Miró and Merrill, eds., *Mexico: A Country Study,* p. 307.

Table 6: The Structure of Mexico's Army[41]

41. Source: Raúl Benítez Manaut, Center of Interdisciplinary Studies in the Sciences and Humanities, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), as modified by information supplied by off-the-record interviews.

Table 7: The Army's Military Regions and Zones



Table 8: States Embraced by Mexico's 12 Military Regions, 1998

I	II	III*	IV
Federal District Mexico State Morelos	Baja California Baja California Sur Sonora	Sonora Sinaloa Durango Chihuahua (part)	Nuevo León Tamaulipas San Luis Potosí
V	VI	VII	VIII
Jalisco Nayarit Zacatecas** Colima Aguascalientes	Hidalgo Tlaxcala** Veracruz (part)	Chiapas Tabasco	Oaxaca Veracruz (part)
IX	X	XI	XII
Guerrero	Yucatán Campeche Quintana Roo	Coahuila Chihuahua (part)	Michoacán Guanajuato** Querétaro**

* MRIII embraces the country's "golden triangle" of drug cultivation.

** Denotes least-conflictive states.

Traits of Regional, Zonal, and Garrison Commanders[42]

I. Regional commanders (12)

   A. Two- or three-star generals

   B. More likely than their peers to have emerged from a low socioeconomic background

   C. Officers from infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armored branches[43]

   D. Likely to have graduated from the Superior War College and to have taught at a military school

   E. Approximately mid-50s to 62 years of age

   F. Often have combat experience, at least in the anti-drug campaign

   G. Salary: $5,000–$6,000 per month; the SECDEF earmarks several thousand dollars more for battalions and regiments serving in Chiapas or drug-infested areas; in addition, unit commanders receive

42. Sources: Interview in Mexico City and Camp, *Generals in the Palacio*, pp. 202–207.

43. Infantry and cavalry officers attain the lion's share of commands because of their disproportionately large numbers in Mexico's army.

discretionary funds in drug zones for transportation, fuel, and preparation of hot meals for troops

H. Twice as likely as their peers to have served abroad as military attachés

I. Enjoy the support of the SECDEF

J. Exhibit an ability to work with civilian politicians

K. Rotated every 2 to 24 months[44]

II. Zone commanders (40)[45]

A. At least one- or two-star generals[46]

B. More likely than their peers to have emerged from a low socioeconomic background

C. Officers from infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armored branches

D. Likely to have graduated from the Superior War College and have taught at a military school

E. Approximately 50 to 56 years old

F. Often have combat experience, at least in the anti-drug campaign

G. Salary: $3,000–$4,000 per month

H. Twice as likely as their peers to have served abroad as military attachés

I. Enjoy the support of the SECDEF

J. Exhibit an ability to work with civilian politicians

K. Rotated every 12 to 14 months.

III. Garrison commanders (40)

A. One-star generals

B. Officers from infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armored branches

C. Likely to have graduated from the Superior War College

D. Approximately 50 to 56 years old

E. Often have combat experience, at least in the anti-drug campaign

F. Salary: $3,000–$4,000 per month

G. Enjoy the support of the SECDEF

H. Rotated every 12 to 14 months

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44. Service in Chiapas may be longer at all levels of command.

45. In mid-1998, the SECDEF was in the process of creating the 41st Zone.

46. In early 1998, a three-star general headed Zone 34 (Chetumal) because of the enormous amount of cocaine entering Mexico through Quintana Roo.

Table 9: Mexico's Population and Military Forces, 1965, 1970, 1975–1998[47]

Year	Population	Men (13–17)	Men (18–22)	Men (23–32)	Total Armed Forces
1998	95,000,000				235,000
1997	93,793,000	5,103,000	4,865,000	8,372,000	235,000
1996	93,793,000	5,103,000	4,865,000	8,372,000	235,000
1995	93,086,000	5,265,100	5,137,200	8,312,700	225,200
1994	91,354,000	5,273,000	5,068,000	8,036,000	217,859
1993	87,341,000[a]	5,525,000	5,031,000	7,838,000	210,241
1992	91,024,000	5,470,400	4,925,500	7,564,600	203,829
1991	88,928,000	5,415,000	4,820,000	7,291,000	198,955
1990	84,272,000	5,360,000	4,578,000	6,929,000	192,994
1989	85,409,000	5,203,000	4,423,000	6,674,000	184,095
1988	83,300,000				179,305
1987	83,300,000				175,960
1986	79,000,000				166,746[b]
1985	78,000,000				120,000
1984	73,000,000				124,130*
1983	71,500,000				119,420*
1982	69,000,000				116,500*
1981	71,500,000				107,000
1980	67,405,700[c]				90,300*
1979	66,770,000				97,000
1978	64,440,000				86,000*
1977	62,260,000				89,500
1976	58,350,000				82,500
1975	56,380,000				82,000
1970	48,225,238[d]				67,100*
1965	42,690,000[e]				60,750*
* Information found in *Statesman's Yearbook.*					

a. 1993 population figure is Mexico's official estimate for 1993, found in *1995 Europa World Year Book,* Vol. II.

b. The jump in the size of the armed forces springs from shifting sources: from *Military Balance* and *Statesman's Yearbook* to the paper of Benítez Manaut, which, in turn, relies on Poder Ejecutivo Federal, *Segundo Informe de Gobierno, Anexo 1,* September 1, 1996.

c. 1980 population figure is the official Mexican Census for 1980, found in the 1981–1982 edition of *Statesman's Yearbook.*

d. 1970 population figure is the official Mexican Census for 1970, found in the 1977–1978 edition of *Statesman's Yearbook.*

e. James W. Wilkie, ed., and Catherine Komisaruk and José Guadalupe Ortega, co-eds., *Statistical Abstract of Latin America,* Vol. 42 (Los Angeles, Cal.: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1996), p. 110.

47. Sources: *Military Balance* (London, U.K.: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974–1975 to 1997–1998); *Statesman's Yearbook* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1964–1965, 1969–1970, 1977–1978, 1979–1980, 1981–1982 to 1983–1984, 1986–1987, and 1992–1993); *The Europa World Year Book,* Vol. II (London, U.K.: Europa Publications Limited, 1995); and Raúl Benítez Manaut, "La contención de los grupos armados," Table 4.

Table 10: Mexico's Military Forces, 1965, 1970, and 1975–1997[48]

Year	Total Forces	Army and Air Force	Navy[a]
1997	235,000	180,000	55,000
1996	235,000	180,000	55,000
1995	225,200	172,072	53,128
1994	217,859	169,689	48,170
1993	210,241	162,169	48,072
1992	203,829	139,142	46,687
1991	198,955	155,218	43,737
1990	192,994	151,178	41,816
1989	184,095	142,961	41,134
1988	179,305	137,350	41,955
1987	175,960	133,435	42,525
1986	169,746[b]	129,695	40,051
1985	120,000	94,500	20,000
1984	124,130*	95,000*	23,630*
1983	119,420*	95,000*	19,420*
1982	116,500*	95,000*	16,500*
1981	107,000	83,000	20,000
1980	90,300*	72,000*	12,300*
1979	97,000	72,000	19,000
1978	86,000*	69,000*	11,000*
1977	89,500	69,000	14,500
1976	82,500	65,000	11,500
1975	82,000	65,000	11,000
1970	67,100*	51,000*	11,100*
1965	60,750*	51,000*	6,200*
* Information found in *Statesman's Yearbook.*			

a. Includes naval aviators and marines.

b. The jump in the size of the armed forces springs from shifting sources: from *Military Balance* and *Statesman's Yearbook* to the paper of Benítez Manaut, which relies heavily on *Poder Ejecutivo Federal, Segundo Informe de Gobierno, Anexo 1,* September 1, 1996; the figures for 1996 and 1997 represent conservative "guestimates" based on off-the-record interviews with close observers of Mexico's armed forces

48. Sources: *Military Balance* (London, U.K.: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974–1975 to 1997–1998); *Statesman's Yearbook* (New York, N.Y.: St.Martin's Press, 1964–1965, 1969–1970, 1977–1978, 1979–1980, 1981–1982 to 1983–1984, 1986–1987, 1992–1993); and Raúl Benítez Manuat, "La contención de los grupos armados."

CHAPTER 4

The Military and Politics

Inaugurated in 1946, Miguel Alemán became the first elected president since the revolution who had not served in the military. Even so, military men continued to hold a healthy share of governorships and congressional seats until the late-1950s. Several factors have contributed to their decline in the latter part of the century: (1) the 1968 "massacre" at Tlatelolco that badly hurt the military's image; (2) the determination of President Luis Echeverría to train and recruit young technocrats for key government posts; (3) the growing salience of economic issues that lay beyond the competence of most officers; (4) the mounting pressure to forsake *alquimismo* (vote manipulation) for fairer elections, a development that favors attractive, well-educated members of the middle class over union leaders, peasant activists, and generals; and (5) the corruption, repression, and incompetence associated with state administrations headed by officers-turned-politicians, most recently General Jorge Carrillo Olea, the Morelos governor forced out of office in mid-1998.

In the past, the handful of retired or "on-leave" officers serving in Congress belonged to the PRI. In the mid-1990s, several military men joined the ranks of the leftist-nationalist PRD—partly because of disaffection with President Zedillo's neoliberal economic policies; partly because of disenchantment with the government's strategy in Chiapas and in its anti-narcotics campaign; and partly because of greater opportunities in the notably smaller PRD.

Proceso magazine and other sources have alleged that military families have cast their ballots increasingly in favor of the PRD. Such a phenomenon may have occurred in some areas; however, recent results from precincts near military installations in Mexico City and Monterey indicate a strong preference for the PRI in the former and the National Action Party (PAN) in the latter.

As pointed out in the last section of this chapter, military personnel maintain contacts with civilians in scores of venues. Should an opposition party win the presidential campaign in 2000, there is every reason to believe that the armed forces will exhibit the same loyalty to its new commander-in-chief as it has shown to PRI chief executives.

Table 11: Secretaries and Undersecretaries of the Ministries of National Defense and the Navy, 1935–Present

President	Term	Secretary of National Defense	Date and Place of Birth	Period in Office	Undersecretary of National Defense	Secretary of Navy	Date and Place of Birth	Period in Office	Undersecretary of Navy
Zedillo	1994–2000	Cervantes Aguirre, Enrique	1935; Puebla, Puebla	Dec. 1, 1994–present	Contreras Guerrero, Jaime	Lorenzo Franco, José Ramon	1935; Apizaco, Tlaxcala	Dec. 1, 1994–present	Pérez y Elías, Jaime
Salinas	1988–1994	Riveiello Bazán, Antonio	1926; Mexico City	Dec. 1, 1988–Nov. 30, 1994	Ochoa Toledo, Alfredo	Schleske, Mauricio Ruano Angulo, Luis Carlos	1926; Veracruz, Veracruz 1927; Veracruz, Veracruz	Dec. 1, 1988–Jul. 18, 1990 Jul. 19, 1990–Nov. 30, 1994	Zepeda Torres, David
De la Madrid	1982–1988	Arévalo Gardoqui, Juan	1921; Mexico City	Dec. 1, 1982–Nov. 30, 1988	Guerro, Marco Antonio	Gómez Ortega, Miguel A.	1917; Orizaba, Veracruz	Dec. 1, 1982–Nov. 30, 1988	Martínez Najera, Humberto
López Portillo	1976–1982	Galván López, Félix	1913; Villa de Santiago, Guanajuato	Dec. 1, 1976–Nov. 30, 1982	de la Fuente Rodríguez, Juan A. Portillo Jurado, Héctor	Cházaro Lara, Ricardo	1920; Veracruz, Veracruz	Dec. 1, 1976–Nov. 30, 1982	Montejo Sierra, José M.
Echeverría	1970–1976	Cuenca Díaz, Hermenegildo	1902; Puruandiro, Michoacáan (d. 1977)	Dec. 1, 1970–Nov. 30, 1976	Gomar Suástegui, Jerónimo Sandoval Castarrica, Enrique Comargo, Héctor	Bravo Carrera, Luis	1902; Oaxaca, Oaxaca	Dec. 1, 1970–Nov. 30, 1976	Cházaro Lara, Ricardo
Díaz Ordaz	1964–1970	García Barragán, Marcelino	1895; Cuahitlán, Jalisco (d. 1979)	Dec. 1, 1964–Nov. 30, 1970	Gastélum Salcido, Juan José	Vázquez del Mercado, Antonio	1903; Mexico City	Dec. 1, 1964–Nov. 30, 1970	Fritsche Anda, Oscar Aznar Zetina, Antonio J.
López Mateos	1958–1964	Olachea Aviles, Agustín	1892; San Venancio, Baja California Sur (d. 1974)	Dec. 1, 1958–Nov. 30, 1964	Flores Torres, Juan	Zermeño Araico, Manuel	1901; Guadalajara, Jalisco	Dec. 1, 1958–Nov. 30, 1964	Orozeo Vela, Oliverio F.
Ruiz Cortines	1952–1958	Ramos Santos, Matías	1891; San Salvador, Zacatecas (d. 1962)	Dec. 1, 1952–Nov. 30, 1958	Guinart López, Modesto A.	Sánchez Taboada, Rodolfo Poire Ruelas, Alfonso Gómez Maqueo, Roberto Meixueiro Alexandre, Héctor	1895; Tepeaca, Puebla (d. 1955) n/a 1892; Orizaba, Veracruz (d. ?) 1900; Santiago Xiacuide de Ixtlán de Juárez, Oaxaca (d. ?)	Dec. 1, 1952–May 1, 1955 May 2, 1955–Dec. 22, 1955 Dec. 23, 1955–Apr. 2, 1958 Apr. 7, 1958–Nov. 30, 1958	Poire Ruelas, Alfonso
Alemán	1946–1952	Limón, Gilberto R.	1895; Alamos, Sonora (d. ?)	Dec. 1, 1946–Nov. 30, 1952	Gárate Legleu, Raúl González Lugo, Jesús Calles Pordo, Aureo L.	Schaufelberger, Luis F. Coello, David Pawling, Alberto J. López Sánchez, Raúl	1893; Puebla, Puebla (d. 1958) 1885; Alvaro, Veracruz (d. 1959) 1887; Campeche, Campeche (d. 1955) 1904; Torreón, Coahuila (d. 1957)	Dec. 1, 1946–Oct. 8, 1948 Oct. 8, 1948–Oct. 20, 1949 Oct. 21, 1949–Feb. 6, 1952 Feb. 7, 1952–Nov. 30, 1952	Schaufelberger, Luis F. Pawling, Alberto J.
Avila Camacho	1940–1946	Macías Valenzuela, Pablo E. Cárdenas, Lázaro Urquizo, Francisco L.	1891; Las Cabras, Sinoloa (d. 1975) 1895; Jiquilpan de Juárez, Michoacan (d. 1970) 1891; San Pédro de las Colonias, Coahuila (d. 1969)	Dec. 1, 1940–Sept. 11, 1942 Sept. 11, 1942–Aug. 1945 Sept. 1, 1945–Nov. 30, 1946	Urquizo, Francisco Limón, Gilberto R.	Jara, Heriberto	1884; Orizaba, Veracruz (d. 1968)	Jan. 1, 1941–Nov. 30, 1946	Blanco, Othón P.
Cárdenas	1934–1940	Figueroa, Andrés Avila Camacho, Manuel Castro, Jesús Agustín	1884; Chaucingo, Guerrero (d. 1936) 1897; Teziutlán, Puebla (d. 1955) 1887; Ciudad Lerdo, Durango (d. 1954)	Jun. 18, 1935–Oct. 17, 1935 Oct. 17, 1935–Jan. 17, 1939 Jan. 23, 1939–Nov. 30, 1940	Avila Camacho, Manuel Corral, Blas González Villareal, Marciano	Gómez Maqueo, Roberto	1892; Orizaba, Veracruz (d. ?)	Jan. 1, 1940–Dec. 31, 1940	Vázquez del Mercado, Antonio

Table 12: Mexico's Military Governors, 1935–Present

President	No. of mil. govs. sworn in during presidential term	No. of states with one or more mil. gov. during term	States and their governors[a]
Zedillo (1994–)	0	1	Morelos: Carrillo Olea (until forced to request a "leave of absence" in mid-1998)
Salinas (1988–1994)	0	1	Morelos: Jorge Carrillo Olea (1994–1998*)
De la Madrid (1982–1988)	1	1	Chiapas: Absalón Castellanos (Dec. 1982–Nov. 1988); Aguascalientes: Miguel Angel Barberena Vega (Dec. 1986–Nov. 1992)[b]
López Portillo (1976–1982)	2	2	Oaxaca: Eliseo Jiménez Ruiz Mar. 1977–Nov. 1980*); Yucatán: Graciliano Alpuche Pinzón (Feb. 1982–Feb. 1984*)
Echeverría (1970–1976)[c]	0	0	
Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970)	1	1	Tlaxcala: Ignacio Bonilla Vázquez (Jan. 1969–Jan. 1970);
López Mateos (1958–1964)	3	3	Baja California Sur: Bonifacio Salinas Real (1958–1965*); Campeche: Colonel José Ortiz Avila (Sept. 1961–Sept. 1967); Puebla: Antonio Nava Castillo (Feb. 1963–Oct. 1964*).
Ruiz Cortines (1952–1958)	9	8	Baja California Sur: Petronilo Flores Castellanos (Apr. 1956–April 1957), Lieutenant Colonel Luciano M. Rebolledo (Apr. 1957–Dec. 1958); Coahuila: Raúl Madero González (Dec. 1957–Nov. 1963); Guerrero: Raúl Caballero Aburto (Apr. 1957–Jan. 1961*); Hidalgo: Alfonso Corona del Rosal (Apr. 1957–Dec. 1958); Morelos: Colonel Norberto López Avelar (May 1958–May 1964); Oaxaca: José Pacheco Iturribarría (Oct. 1955–Nov. 1956); Sinaloa: Gabriel Leyva Velázquez (Jan. 1957–Dec. 1962); Tabasco: Miguel Orrico de Los Llanos (Mar. 1955–Dec. 1958)

Alemán (1946–1952)	6	5	Chiapas: César Lara (1947–Nov. 1948), Francisco J. Grajales (Dec. 1948–Nov. 1952); Coahuila: Paz Faz Riza (Mar. 1948–June 1948); Colima: J. Jesús González Lugo (Nov. 1949–Oct. 1955); Morelos: Rodolfo López de Nava (May 1952–May 1958); Oaxaca: Manuel Cabrera Carrasquedo (Aug. 1952–Oct. 1955)
Avila Camacho (1940–1946)	15	12	Baja California Norte: Juan Felipe Rico Islas (Aug. 1944–1946); Baja California Sur: Francisco J. Múgica (1940–1945), Agustín Olachea Avilés (1945–1956*); Chiapas: Juan Esponda (Dec. 1944–Jan. 1947*); Coahuila: Benecío López Padilla (Dec. 1941–Nov. 1945); Durango: Elpidio G. Velázquez (1940–1944), Blas Corral Martínez (1944–1947); Guerrero: Gabriel Leyva Mancilla (Apr. 1945–Mar. 1951); Michoacán: Félix Ireta Viveros (Sept. 1940–Sept. 1944); Oaxaca: Vicente González Fernández (Dec. 1940–Nov. 1944), Edmundo Sanchez Cono (Dec. 1944–Jan. 1947); Quintana Roo: Gabriel R. Guevara (1940–1945); San Luis Potosi: Ramón Jiménez Delgado (Aug. 1941–Sept. 1943); Sinaloa: Pablo E. Macías Valenzuela (Jan. 1945–Dec. 1950); Tamaulipas: Eulio Ortiz (Feb. 1945–1946)

Cárdenas (1934–1940)[d]	32	21	Baja California Norte: R. N. Cortina (1935–Feb. 1937), Rodolfo Sánchez Taboada (Feb. 1937–Aug. 1944); Baja California Sur: Juan Domínguez (1935–1936), Lieutenant Colonel Rafael M. Pedrajo (1936–1940); Chiapas: Colonel Victorio R. Grajales (1935–Sept. 1936*); Chihuahua: Rodrigo M. Quevado (1935–Oct. 1935); Colima: Miguel Santa Ana (Nov. 1935–Oct. 1939); Durango: Severino Ceniceros (Dec. 1935–Aug. 1936*); Guerrero: José Lugo (Nov. 1935–1937), Alberto F. Berber (1937–Feb. 1941); Hidalgo: Ofilio Villegas (1940–1941); México: Colonel Wenceslao Labra García (Sept. 1937–Sept. 1941); Michoacán: Rafael Ordorico Villamar (June 1935–Sept. 1936), Gildardo Magaña (Sept. 1936–Dec. 1939), Félix Ireta Viveros; Morelos: José Rufugio Bustamante (May 1935–May 1938*), D. Elpidio Perdomo (May 1938–May 1942); Nayarit: Juventino Espinosa Sánchez (1938–Dec. 1941); Nuevo León: Gregorio Morales Sánchez (Sept. 1935–1936), Anacleto Guerrero (1936–1939); Oaxaca: Colonel Constatino Chapital; Puebla: Maximino Avila Camacho (Feb. 1937–Jan. 1941); Queretaro: Ramón Rodríguez Familiar (1935–1939); San Luis Potosi: Colonel Mateo Hernández Netro (1935–May 1938), Genovevo Rivas Guillén (May 1938–1939), Reynaldo Pérez Gallardo (1939–Aug 1941*); Sinaloa: Gabriel Leyva Velázquez (Dec. 1935–Sept. 1936), Alfredo Delgado (Sept. 1936–Sept. 1940), Colonel Rodolfo Loaiza (Sept. 1940–Feb 1944**); Sonora: Ramón Ramos (Sept. 1935–Dec. 1935*), Jesús Gutiérrez Cázares (Dec. 1935–Jan. 1937); Tabasco: Aureo Calles (July 1935–1936); Tlaxcala: Colonel Isidro Candia (1937–1941)
* Governor resigned or was removed from office.			
** Governor was assassinated.			

a. Baja California Norte was a territory until 1952, and Baja California Sur and Quintana Roo until 1975. All governors held the rank of general unless otherwise indicated.

b. Although he never held a command position, Barberena graduated from the Heroic Naval College and, on leaving the state house, served as a member of Salinas's military staff in 1989. See Camp, *Generals in the Palacio*, pp. 69–70.

c. Echeverría designated General Hermenegildo Cuenca Díaz as the gubernatorial candidate in Baja California; however, the former secretary of national defense died before the election.

d. Presidents with military service.

Table 13: Number of Individuals with Military Backgrounds Serving in Congress, 1982–Present[49]

Legislative Session	Chamber of Deputies					Senate					
	PRI	**PAN**	**PRD**	**Other**	**Total Deputies**	**PRI**	**PAN**	**PRD**	**Other**	**Total Senators**	**Total Legislators**
LVII (1997–2000)	3 (1 naval officer)	0	1	0	4	2	0	0	0	2	6
LVI (1994–1997)	3	0	1	0	4	1 (naval officer)	0	0	0	1	6
LV (1991–1994)	3	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
LIV (1988–1991)	5 (1 air force officer) (2)*	0	n/a	0	5	3	0	n/a	0	3 (2)*	8
LIII (1985–1988)	5 (5)*	0	n/a	0	5	0	0	n/a	0	0	5
LII (1982–1985)	6 (4)*	0	n/a	2**	6	2 (1 naval officer)	0	n/a	0	2 (1)*	8

* Indicates the number of these legislators who were on leave *con licencia* from active duty.

** Both deputies were retired enlisted men: one belonged to the Mexican Communist Party (PCM); the other to the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM). Both parties became part of the PRD, which was formed in 1989.

49. Sources: Camp, *Generals in the Palacio*, pp. 69–70; and the Instituto Federal Electoral.

Table 14: Voting Results in Mexico City Precincts with High Military Populations (Near Campo Militar No. 1), July 6, 1997[50]

1997 Mayoral Election and 1997 Senate Elections																
Precinct	**PRI**	**%**	**PAN**	**%**	**PRD**	**%**	**Other**	**%**	**Invalid Votes**	**%**	**Total Votes**	**PRI**	**%**	**PAN**	**%**	**PRD**
4990	309	77.25	23	5.75	49	12.25	13	3.25	6	1.50	400	294	73.50	32	8.00	41
4912	72	42.35	27	15.88	47	27.67	23	13.53	1	0.59	170	62	36.47	36	21.17	40
4993	129	51.81	45	18.01	50	20.08	21	8.43	4	1.61	249	117	47.36	57	23.07	41
5091	201	60.18	34	10.81	63	18.86	17	5.09	14	4.19	334	197	61.56	41	12.81	59
5092	49	66.22	4	5.41	11	14.86	10	13.51	0	0.00	74	46	62.16	6	8.10	9
5093	87	70.16	6	4.84	20	16.13	8	6.45	3	2.42	124	89	71.77	9	7.25	15
5094	88	47.06	53	28.34	34	18.18	10	5.35	2	1.07	187	75	40.10	54	28.87	37
Total	935	60.79	192	12.48	274	17.82	102	6.63	30	1.95	1,538	880	57.81	235	15.44	228

1997 Federal Deputies Election																
%	**Other**	**%**	**Invalid Votes**	**%**	**Total Votes**	**PRI**	**%**	**PAN**	**%**	**PRD**	**%**	**Other**	**%**	**Invalid Votes**	**%**	**Total Votes**
10.25	25	6.25	8	2.00	400	291	72.75	34	8.50	40	10.00	26	6.50	9	2.25	400
23.52	30	17.64	2	1.17	170	64	37.64	29	17.05	40	23.52	35	20.58	2	1.17	170
16.59	32	12.95	2	0.80	247	119	47.79	53	21.28	45	18.07	29	11.64	3	1.20	249
18.43	23	7.18	14	4.37	320	202	60.47	37	11.07	62	18.56	19	5.68	14	4.19	334
12.16	11	14.86	2	2.70	74	47	64.38	5	6.84	11	15.06	10	13.69	0	0	73
12.09	10	8.06	1	0.80	124	88	70.96	8	6.45	16	12.90	10	8.06	2	1.61	124
19.78	13	6.95	8	4.27	187	75	40.10	54	28.87	35	18.71	17	9.09	6	3.20	187
14.98	144	9.46	29	1.90	1,522	886	57.64	220	14.31	249	16.20	146	9.49	36	2.34	1,537

50. Source: Instituto Federal Electoral.

Table 15: Voting Results in Mexico City and Monterey Precincts with High Military Populations, 1994–1997[51]

Year	City	Election	PRI	%	PAN	%	PRD[a]	%	Other	%	Invalid Votes	%	Total Votes
1997	Mexico City[b]	Mayoral	935	60.79	192	12.48	274	17.82	102	6.63	30	1.95	1,538
1997	Mexico City	Senate	880	57.81	235	15.44	228	4.98	144	9.46	29	1.90	1,522
1997	Mexico City	Chamber of Deputies	886	57.64	220	14.31	249	6.20	146	9.49	36	2.34	1,537
1997	Monterey[c]	Senate	1,296	25.07	3,103	60.03	112	2.17	546	10.56	112	2.17	5,169
1997	Monterey	Chamber of Deputies	1,383	26.67	3,107	59.91	120	2.31	466	8.99	110	2.12	5,186
1994	Mexico City	Senate	1,569	56.42	633	22.76	316	11.36	222	7.98	41	1.47	2,781
1994	Mexico City	Chamber of Deputies	1,483	53.58	643	23.23	340	12.28	240	8.67	62	2.24	2,768
1994	Monterey	Senate	2,087	34.82	3,177	53.01	122	2.04	574	9.58	33	0.55	5,993
1988	Monterey	Chamber of Deputies	1,910	33.17	3,208	55.71	110	1.91	432	7.50	98	1.70	5,758

a. The Labor Party (PT) captured the lion's share of minor party votes.
b. Precincts: 4990, 4912, 4993, 5091, 5092, 5039, and 5094.
c. Precincts: 1623, 1629, 1635, 1636, 1640, 1641, 1870, 1871, and 1872.

Notable Civilian–Military Contacts

- ❒ Retired members of the armed forces serving in Congress, where they tend to concentrate on military issues
- ❒ Retired and active-duty officers supervising or commanding civilian law-enforcement units in Mexico City and some 20 states
- ❒ Retired and active-duty officers involved in such traditionally civilian tasks as customs and immigration operations, especially in the northern states
- ❒ Officers serving as aides-de-camp to the president, cabinet members, governors, or other high-ranking officeholders
- ❒ Retired officers supervising or commanding security units for Petróleos Mexicanos, Comisión Federal de Electricidad, airports, or other public entities
- ❒ Active-duty officers serving at Mexican embassies as military attachés (which are extremely lucrative, highly coveted posts)
- ❒ Active-duty officers taking classes with senior bureaucrats at the National

51. Source: *Ibid*.

Defense College and other advanced military schools

- The army's building houses, constructing roads, repairing bridges, teaching children to read and write, and providing medical care for civilians, especially in Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, and other impoverished states that incubate guerrillas
- The army's implementing its DN–III plan when hurricanes, earthquakes, or other disasters afflict the country
- Military personnel working with civilian authorities against narco-traffickers and, in a growing number of cases, with narco-traffickers against civilian authorities
- Military contacts with the Ministry of Foreign Relations (SRE), which performs as a government watchdog to minimize contacts between Mexico's armed forces and their U.S. counterparts

CHAPTER 5

The Military and Contemporary Problems[52]

President Zedillo has turned increasingly to the armed forces in his fight against guerrillas in Chiapas, drug kingpins throughout the country, and crime in Mexico City and other urban zones.

Such reliance is relatively new. Traditionally, Mexican leaders have resisted thrusting the military into high-profile activities lest its relatively apolitical generals acquire a taste for power as well as for more money-making opportunities. This concern points to the reason that then president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado vetoed the army's implementing its vaunted DN–III disaster relief plan when earthquakes devastated Mexico City and neighboring states in September 1985. Presidential advisers warned darkly that an effective performance before the international media could whet the appetite of military men for greater political involvement. Thus, the army's major function lay in securing buildings and preventing looting. In so doing, the troops occasionally impeded grassroots rescue ventures, thereby blemishing the army's image—a fact that embittered some top brass toward the *políticos* who had restrained them.

To his credit, President Zedillo did not hesitate to mobilize the military when hurricanes lashed the Acapulco area in 1997. In fact, he placed a general in charge of the rescue effort after discovering that local officials were using relief supplies for their own political and economic gain.

Like President Carlos Salinas before him, President Zedillo has depended on the army to contain Subcomandante Marcos and his Zapatista rebels until such a time that the government can achieve a negotiated peace in impoverished Chiapas state. After an armed confrontation took 150 lives in early 1994, politicians directed the army to cordon off, but not crush, the Zapatista movement in hopes of hammering out a negotiated settlement.

In contrast to anti-drug and public-safety functions, military professionals regard duty in Chiapas as an important, career-enhancing ticket to punch. Publicly, officers have endorsed the government's policy of a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, alarm at the Zapatista claim of "autonomy" for 33 of the state's 111 municipalities has led some commanders covertly to arm and

52. This introduction draws heavily from George W. Grayson, "Civilians Order Army Out of the Barracks," *Hemisfile*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (May–June 1998), pp. 8–9.

encourage paramilitary groups to attack the ski mask–wearing rebels whose four-and-a-half years of highly publicized guerrilla theater embarrass more than threaten the regime. Action by army-inspired irregulars may have sparked the December 1997 killing of 45 Mayan peasants in Acteal. Mexico's secretary of national defense, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, condemns such freelance attacks, and the National Human Rights Commission found no army involvement in the massacre. Still, widespread flaunting of Zedillo's policy of restraint engenders friction between elements of the army and civilian decision makers.

Even before the killer earthquakes struck Mexico City in 1985, government executives had summoned the army to help to drive marijuana and heroin-poppy producers from their enclaves in the corrugated western Sierra Madre mountains. The military managed temporarily to displace the drug-traffickers, giving rise to a continuing crop-eradication program.

Subsequently, three factors ballooned the anti-narcotics role of Mexico's army: the proliferation of Croesus-rich drug cartels; the abject corruption of federal and state police; and the quest by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense—eager to find new tasks in the aftermath of the Cold War—to forge links to a dependable partner south of the Rio Grande.

In his late 1994 inaugural address, President Zedillo labeled drug trafficking as the "major threat to national security." This conclusion jibed with the views and interests of important Washington insiders, including then secretary of defense William J. Perry. His trip to Mexico the following October marked the first time that a U.S. secretary of defense had set foot on Mexican soil.

Obviously, Perry saw eye-to-eye with Zedillo and Mexico's defense chief, Cervantes, who soon began dispatching the first of several thousand young men to the United States to study anti-drug tactics so they could return home to train air-mobile special forces attached to each of Mexico's 12 regional and 41 zonal headquarters.[53]

The *New York Times* also reported that the CIA quietly had complemented this effort by providing instruction, resources, and operational support for an intelligence unit inside Mexico's army, the Center for Anti-Narcotics Investigations (CIAN). The CIAN claims to have delivered blows against the powerful Juárez and Tijuana cartels. Although this assertion may be true, Mexico's military has suffered one scandal after another since escalating its counter-narcotics to embrace 40 percent of the 185,000-member army at the same time that naval personnel have succumbed to temptation, too.

For example, the government allowed Secretary of the Navy Mauricio Schleske Sánchez to resign for "family reasons" in mid-1991 after authorities discovered that he owned two homes in Houston's Galleria section valued at $700,000—a sum redolent of drug dealing that equaled his total salary for 40 years.

Much more embarrassing was the early-1997 arrest of General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, whom Zedillo recently had named Mexico's drug czar. No sooner had the

53. Tim Golden, "Dangerous Allies: A Special Report. U.S. Helps Mexico's Army Take a Big Anti-Drug Role," *New York Times,* December 29, 1997, Internet edition.

new enforcer settled into office when evidence emerged of his protracted, lucrative relationship with drug kingpins during Rebollo's seven-year tenure as regional commander in Jalisco.

Cervantes has announced in public the arrest of some 50 officers for drug-related crimes. But resentment is building in the army as senior officials watch their colleagues hustled off to the stockade at the same time that prominent politicians go scot-free even as they fatten their bank accounts with narco-dollars.

Mexico's urban thefts and assaults—once low compared with U.S. cities—shot up after the December 1994 peso crisis and the ensuing deep recession. Just as in the case of fighting illegal drugs, President Zedillo lost confidence in Mexico City's three police forces because of their notorious venality and lack of professionalism. As a result, he shocked many observers—including the capital's mayor, who was abroad at the time—by replacing the city's civilian public security secretary with Enrique Tomás Salgado Cordero, a tough-as-nails brigadier general.

The appointment of a soldier to a police post represented nothing new. Indeed, General Salgado himself had filled a law-enforcement slot in the capital in the early 1970s. President Zedillo's innovation lay in naming generals and colonels to all of the top 20 public safety jobs in Mexico City, which is home to some 8.5 million people.

A strict disciplinarian, General Salgado dispatched military police into the city's most crime-ridden boroughs, beginning with violence-plagued Iztapalapa. Meanwhile, the square-jawed general pulled out regular police officers, cashiered the bad actors, and assigned the rest to two months of military police–style training. After successfully completing the course, many returned to the city's streets—often with hefty raises. Ultimately, he planned to rotate policemen from each of the megalopolis's 16 sections.

Chilangos, as denizens of the capital are known, were quick to applaud the arrival of General Salgado and his entourage. Bouquets gave way to brickbats when, despite 7 percent growth in gross domestic product in 1997, the crime rate remained alarmingly high—the only difference was that well-armed, organized bands by then had become responsible for ever-more assaults, car thefts, and holdups that once had been attributed to out-of-work novices. Moreover, a growing number of soldiers-turned-gendarmes currently stand accused of corruption or brutality.

As a former attorney general of Mexico stated, "Army personnel lack the social skills to make good cops because they are taught to kill and repress, not to bargain and negotiate with citizens enmeshed in emotional situations."

Although critical of the Mexico City's "militarization" when a candidate, the PRD's Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas—mayor since December 1997—has continued to rely on the armed forces to achieve law and order in the capital. He replaced General Salgado with retired air force colonel Rodolfo Debernardi, but cynical city residents tell pollsters they see little or no change in the level of police corruption. Still, so bad is the reputation of civil law-enforcement agencies that some 20 states have recruited active or retired military officers for pivotal police posts.

Not only has growing reliance on the remarkably loyal armed forces failed to resolve intractable problems, it has expanded the military's political role

inexorably while exacerbating corruption in what used to be a relatively clean Mexican organization. Bereft of answers themselves, Mexico's politicians have implored the armed forces to do the impossible: cure the most grievous ills plaguing the country. Now that civilians have rousted soldiers from the barracks, can they expect the officers and men to return one day, impervious to the power they have wielded and the opportunities for enrichment they have encountered?

Key Events Sparking the Escalation of the Military's Involvement in Chiapas

Late 1960s.	Catholic priests and bishops, inspired by the tenets of liberation theology, initiate pastoral work on behalf of the poor—with Bishop Samuel Ruiz García of San Cristóbal de las Casas emerging as the leading advocate for social change.
1970s.	Leftist groups appear, including the Proletarian Line, Pueblo Unido (PU), the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST), and the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos/Partido Comunista Mexicano (CIOAC/PCM).[54]
Late-1970s/early-1980s.	The oil boom attracts many highlanders to the nearby petroleum fields. When the boom ends, these workers return to their homelands, bringing with them capital and new technology. The use of fertilizers, herbicides, and other modern practices allow more intensive production but spur erosion of the soil and loss of fertility. Many communities witness polarization between the relatively wealthy agro-export farmers and cattle ranchers and traditional campesinos—with the latter drifting into cities or migrating to the agricultural fringes of the Lacandón jungle.
Early 1980s.	Some 100,000 Guatemalan refugees enter Mexico, fleeing a bloody civil war but exacerbating population and economic problems in Chiapas.

54. Colonel Donald E. Schulz of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College has compiled a comprehensive list of known or suspected rebel groups, including those that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. These are the Comando Armado Revolucionario del Sur, Comando Clandestino Indígena de Liberación de la Sierra del Sur, Ejército Popular de Liberación José María Morelos, Ejército Revolucionario Insurgente Popular (Baja California), Fuerzas Armadas Clandestinas de Liberación Nacional, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación para los Pueblos Marginados de Guerrero, and the Movimiento Popular Revolucionario. In addition, Mexico's army has identified several additional organizations: Ejército Guanajuatense Revolucionario, Ejército Justiciero del Pueblo Indefenso, and Justicia de Guerrero. For more information, see Juan Fernando Reyes Pelaez and Maria Teresa Espinosa, "Material Gráfico de los Movimientos Armados en México, 1964–1996," *Cuadernos de Avances de Investigación* No. 3, CIMHA, n.d.

Early-/mid-1980s.	Change-oriented groups arise, devoted to raising the consciousness of the local population, including the federal Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI), the Unión de Uniones (UU), the Central Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos (CIOAC), and the Organización Campesino Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ).
Late 1980s.	Coffee prices are deregulated. Small growers suffer a drop in income between 65 percent and 70 percent between 1989 and 1993.
Late 1980s/early 1990s.	As the militance of *campesino* groups increases and demands for land and political change intensify, so do levels of violence. Peasant land occupations are met with paramilitary violence on the part of local cattlemen and political and military authorities.
Early 1990s.	The Salinas administration's anti-poverty program, Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) funnels the lion's share of money for poor Chiapans to local political bosses.
October 1992.	The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) first appears. During a celebration marking 500 years of popular resistance to repression, thousands of peasants, brandishing bows and arrows, march in military formation to the central plaza, where they topple and smash the statue of conquistador Diego de Mazariego, a symbol of white domination.
Early 1993.	The government amends Article 27 of the Constitution to end Mexico's moribund land-distribution program and give *ejido* members the right to sell, rent, and divide their land as well as to enter into joint ventures. At the same time, various neoliberal economic reforms, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), reduce agricultural subsidies, making it more difficult for peasants to sustain their livelihoods. The resulting insecurity and confusion fuel discontent throughout rural Mexico, providing the Zapatistas and, to a lesser extent, other guerrilla groups with a base of popular support for their activities.
March 1993.	Leaders of the Chiapas Cattlemen's Association inform President Salinas of the presence of guerrillas in the state and ask him to suppress them. In the same month, authorities discover the bodies of two junior officers who were hacked to death and buried in a shallow pit in an Indian village in Los Altos region.

May 1993. A firefight takes place outside Ocosingo between Mexican soldiers and armed men. A colonel from Military Zone 31 reports that his unit conducted reconnaissance missions in search of training camps. Eager to gain approval of NAFTA by the U.S. Congress, the Salinas government denies the presence of any guerrilla threat in Chiapas

November 1993. The U.S. Congress approves NAFTA.

January 1, 1994. NAFTA goes into effect, and the Zapatistas launch an uprising. Some 150 people die during 12 days of warfare between the Zapatistas and Mexico's army. The chief executive replaces Elmar Setzer as governor with Javier López Moreno.

January 12, 1994. President Salinas calls for a cease-fire in order to launch negotiations between his government and the Zapatistas. The president subsequently appoints Manuel Camacho Solís as "peace commissioner" to bargain with the rebels.

August 1994. Eduardo Robledo Rincón of the PRI wins the governor's office in a hotly contested race.

November 1944. The pro-Zapatista Comisión National de Intermediación, led by Bishop Samuel Suiz, is founded.

December 1994. In response to the inauguration of the PRI's candidate as governor, the defeated PRD candidate, Amado Avendaño, forms a Zapatista-supported "government-in-opposition." Subsequently, Subcomandante Marcos announces that the Zapatistas have broken out of the Mexican army's cordon and seized 38 municipalities. Although this claim soon proves false, it sparks a panic among Mexican and foreign investors, contributing to Mexico's severe economic crisis.

February 1995. Mexico's army stages a surprise attack on the Zapatistas, designed to chase the rebels into a small, remote jungle enclave and separate them from their support base among indigenous communities. During the same month, the government "unveils" Subcomandante Marcos as Rafael Sebastián Guillén Vicente, 37, a middle-class university activist originally from Tampico.

March 1995. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate establish the Comisión de Concordia y Pacificadión (COCOPA) to pursue peace negotiations in Chiapas. The Ministry of Government chooses Marco Antonio

	Bernal as its peace commissioner.
February 1996.	COCOPA and the Zapatista leadership sign the San Andrés Larrainzar Agreements that, *inter alia,* grant greater autonomy to indigenous communities.
June 28, 1996.	The Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) emerges in Guerrero as a new guerrilla group. It launches its first armed attacks in three states in late August.
November 29, 1996.	The COCOPA proposes constitutional changes that would expand the autonomy of Indian municipalities throughout the country.
Late 1996.	The government chooses not to present the COCOPA proposals to Congress.
April 1997.	President Zedillo replaces as peace commissioner Marco Antonio Bernal with Pedro Joaquín Coldwell.
December 23, 1997.	Some 45 pro-Zapatista peasants are killed in the town of Acteal.
January 1998.	President Zedillo replaces Julio Ruiz César Ferro as governor with Federal Deputy Roberto Albores Guillén. He also substitutes as peace commissioner Pedro Joaquín Coldwell with Emilio Rabasa Gamboa.
Early 1998.	After taking a piecemeal approach for three years, the Zedillo administration initiates a broad-based policy *vis-à-vis* Chiapas in 1998—namely (1) proposing a constitutional amendment to enhance the power of municipalities; (2) cultivating PAN support for the legislative initiative; (3) strengthening greatly the team at the Ministry of Government; (4) naming as its negotiator a first-rate lawyer, Emilio Rabasa; (5) launching a media-propaganda blitz, including radio broadcasts in five Indian languages; (6) designating as foreign secretary Rosario Green, a *tercermundista* who can stand up to foreign critics of Mexico's policy; (7) giving the boot to "political tourists" from Italy and other countries; (8) designating as interim governor a mover and shaker, Roberto Albores; (9) focusing more carefully on the financial assistance flowing into the state from abroad via nongovernmental organizations; and (10) encouraging the private sector to undertake investments.
March 15, 1998.	President Zedillo presents to the Senate his own plans for giving greater authority to Indian communities.

May 1998. The Ministry of Government announces the deportation of "political tourists" from Italy, the United States, and other countries.

June 11, 1998. Nine die in a clash between Zapatistas and 500 police and soldiers attempting to recapture the municipality of El Bosque, 25 miles north of San Cristóbal de las Casas.

December 1998 Protest by Military Personnel

In a display of internal division unprecedented in modern memory, approximately 51 placard-waving army officers of diverse ranks staged a protest in downtown Mexico City on December 20, 1998. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Hidelgard Bacilio Gómez, age 43, the self-styled Patriotic Command to Raise the People's Consciousness excoriated the military justice system for penalizing officials who had refused either to implement unlawful orders or commit human rights abuses. The protesters also demanded higher pay, criticized neoliberal policies, and accused the federal government of provoking "violence, misery, unemployment, and injustice."

At the conclusion of the march, Lieutenant Colonel Gómez—joined by two senators from the PRD—read a statement condemning official corruption and urging Mexicans to join the protest:

> It can't be possible that in a country of 98 million people there is not a single intelligent, pragmatic, innovative leader who can assume power with a political, social, and economic model designed to lead Mexico out of its current difficulties.

In a statement delivered to the Senate several days before the march, the officers declare that "discipline has become 'unilateral and tendentious' and that 'sometimes orders come from the president, the interior secretary and the secretary of national defense.'" The manifesto also states,

> Without a doubt, this has conditioned the two biggest massacres that the Mexican military has committed, such as that of Oct. 2, 1969 [of protesting students in Mexico City], and that of El Charco, Guerrero [of suspected guerrillas earlier this year], to mention only a few acts where the military has been an instrument used by the government to repress the civilian population.... In the heart of our military institution, there is a feeling of abandonment and lack of comprehension and support for our high command; because it has involved the Mexican military in activities that do not correspond to it such as police and judicial functions, road blocks to make unconstitutional searches of the population, and because the military is not trained in these activities it frequently commits crimes and then [soldiers] are submitted to civilian or military courts, and left completely without a defense.

Lieutenant Colonel Gómez, in the name of the Patriotic Command, cited Zapatista Subcommander Marcos among others when he asked for an end to the "exploitation of man by man."

Although the lieutenant colonel articulated a long litany of grievances again the government, even expressing sympathy for Venezuela's president, Hugo Chavez (another officer-turned-politician), the genesis of his activism appears to lie with personal problems. Gómez's superiors had charged him with a dozen military crimes related to private clinic he had operated for 10 years (Gómez is a physician).

The limited scope of the demonstration aside, army officials came down like a load of bricks on the participants, lest other military men consider breaching the institution's strict standards of discipline. Later in January 1999, the attorney general of the Ministry of Defense charged Lieutenant Colonel Gómez and five of his junior colleagues with sedition, conspiracy to rebel, insubordination, and failure to honor the common duties of army members under the Military Justice Code. In addition, the defendants stand accused of the crimes of sedition, conspiracy, and incitement to sedition under the Federal Penal Code.

The five lieutenants facing trial are incarcerated in the military prison of the Third Military Region in Sinaloa state, while Lieutenant Colonel Gómez remains a fugitive.

Table 16: The Eradication and Seizure of Drugs in Mexico, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976–1996[55]

	1996	1994	1992[a]	1990	1988	1986	1984	1982	1980	1978	1976	1974	1972	1970
opium (hectares)														
total	17,732	46,685	17,000	7,000	9,920	10,979	6,990	1,897	2,681	6,692	11,979	4,442	2,769	1,847
armed forces	13,157	36,124	12,614	5,123	6,956	8,596	5,149	625	1,054	4,911	4,378	2,442	1,466	535
cocaine (kg.)														
total	23,600	22,116	38,000	49,861	16,557	6,689	460	750	29	222	218	160	116	8
armed forces	1,958	1,835	3,154	2,352	940	1,366	1	347	0	13	7			
marijuana (hectares)														
total	12,200	8,495	12,100	8,778	9,023	12,201	11,853	1,794	1,377	3,020	5,578	5,742	2,493	1,128
armed forces	7,783	5,419	7,719	5,388	5,026	9,228	9,346	910	678	1,534	2,393	2,549	1,647	659

a. Data for1992–1996 are derived from percentages calculated from U.S. Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Report,* various years. Mexico's government tends to report higher numbers for eradications and seizures.

55. Source: Government of Mexico, *Informes Presidenciales, 1970–1990.*

Table 17: The Military and Public Safety[56]

Number of Police Agencies in Each State Headed by Active-Duty or Retired Military Officers[a]					
5	**4**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**0**
Baja California	Chihuahua	Baja California Sur	Durango	Zacatecas	Guanajuato
Tamaulipas	Nuevo León	Sonora	Nayarit	Colima	Querétaro
Mexico City	Mexico state	Sinaloa	Aguascalientes	Michoacán	
	Quintana Roo	Coahuila	San Luis Potosí	Guerrero	
		Jalisco	Veracruz	Morelos	
		Hidalgo	Tlaxcala	Puebla	
		Oaxaca	Tabasco	Chiapas	
			Yucatán	Campeche	

a. The five units are Federal Judicial Police (PJF), Special Anti-narcotics Prosecutor (INCD), state judicial police, municipal police, and port and airport police. In April 1997, President Zedillo disbanded the INCD and replaced it with the Special Prosecutor's Office for Crimes Against Health, known by the Spanish-language acronym FEADS.

56. Source: Raúl Benítez Manaut, "La contención de los grupos armados, el narcotráfico y el crimen organizado en México: el rol de las fuerzas armadas," final version of a paper presented to the Mexico Project Workshop on Organized Crime and Democratic Governability in Mexico and the United States, sponsored by Georgetown University and the Iberoamericana University, Washington, D.C., July 14–15, 1997, mimeo., pp. 44–45.

CHAPTER 6

Mexico's Military and the United States

Real and perceived U.S. affronts to Mexican sovereignty suffuse the books, lectures, and rituals of Mexico's armed forces. At the same time, Mexico's officer corps greatly admires U.S. military institutions. Although World War II marked the high point in bilateral military cooperation, the integration of North America's economy through the North American Free Trade Agreement has increased interdependency among the United States, Mexico, and Canada in every sector—including the armed forces.

This trend raises the hackles of Mexico's political leaders. On the one hand, they seek an army, navy, and air force that can handle an ever-broader array of problems; on the other, they fear that a highly modern and professional military not only would demand a higher percentage of the national budget, but someday would become a competitor for power.

For their part, the U.S. Department of Defense and intelligence services are anxious to expand contacts with military men south of the Rio Grande. Official Washington realizes, however, that overzealousness on its part is more likely to slam, rather than to open, doors.

The *modus vivendi* struck in the mid-1990s embraces several elements. First, an increasing number of official contacts is taking place, but largely at very senior levels. Second, the Ministry of Foreign Relations participates in bilateral sessions involving Mexico's military to ensure civilian management of the evolving relationship. Third, President Zedillo and Secretary of National Defense Cervantes have authorized several thousand young officers to undertake training in the United States in order to obtain skills that will help them to battle guerrillas, drug traffickers, and common criminals. Finally, while acquiring most of its military hardware from the United States, Mexico continues to make purchases from other countries lest it appear overly reliant on a single source.

In mid-1998, U.S. president Bill Clinton named a distinguished Mexican-American as secretary of the army—a move that could improve bilateral military affairs.

Summary of Mexico–U.S. Military Relations[57]

Post–Cold War/Neoliberal (1990–present)

Mexico's Goals vis-à-vis *the United States*

- ❒ Attracting U.S. trade, investment, loans, and technology without compromising Mexico's sovereignty.

U.S. Goals vis-à-vis *Mexico*

- ❒ Encouraging democracy, promoting open markets, spurring economic integration, while enlisting Mexico's cooperation in initiatives to combat cross-border drug trafficking, the influx of illegal aliens from Mexico, the entry of contraband and other practices.

Major Events

- ❒ The Zapatista National Liberation Army in Chiapas rises up on January 1, 1994. On June 28, 1996, the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR) emerges in a half-dozen states—with guerrilla attacks concentrated in Oaxaca and Guerrero.

Cooperative Military Activities

- ❒ High-level meetings are held between the secretary of national defense and his U.S. counterpart, often including Mexico's secretary of foreign relations in these sessions.
- ❒ Mexico sends only its ambassador to the United States, the defense attaché, and several embassy officials to the first Defense Ministerial [conference] of the Americas, hosted by the U.S. secretary of defense and held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in July 1995.
- ❒ General Colin Powell, then chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, presides over the 50th anniversary of the Joint Mexican–United States Defense Commission (JMUSDC), held in Washington, D.C., in early 1992. Mexico's government takes the unprecedented step of hosting a JMUSDC plenary session in April 1992, raising false expectations that the joint commission might be revitalized.

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57. Sources: Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico,* rev. ed. (New York, N.Y.: Atheneum, 1965); George W. Grayson, *The United States and Mexico: Patterns of Influence* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1984); Rudolph, ed., *Mexico: A Country Study;* Donald E. Schutz, *Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security,* SSI Special Report, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Penn., June 24, 1997; and John A. Cope, "In Search of Convergence: U.S.–Mexican Military Relations into the Twenty-First Century" in Bailey and Aguayo, eds., *Strategy and Security in U.S.-Mexican Relations Beyond the Cold War,* pp. 179–209.

- The number of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels making port calls in Mexico shoots up from 9 (1991) to 46 (1992)—with the United States limiting to 3 per coast the number of its warships that would visit Mexican ports at any one time. Common pursuits—search-and-rescue operations, containing oil spills, combating smuggling and drug trafficking, and so forth—have fostered many more informal contacts between the two countries' maritime services than between their armies.
- President Zedillo decides to expand the military's participation in the war on narcotics. Following the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to Mexico City in October 1995, Mexico's secretary of national defense, General Enrique Cervantes, begins to dispatch the first of several thousand young men to the United States to study anti-drug tactics. General Cervantes returns the visit in April 1996, at which time he and Secretary Perry sign an agreement for the transfer of 20 UH–1H "Huey" helicopters to Mexico's air force—with up to 53 more to be delivered the following year. In 1997, U.S. military assistance to the Zedillo government totals $37 million.
- General Gordon Sullivan, chief of staff of the U.S. Army (1991–1995), spearheads the convening of Border Commanders' Conferences between the two armies—with the U.S. Fifth Army hosting the first gathering in 1990, when General Sullivan is vice chief of staff.
- By late 1998, 3,000 officers complete training at 17 U.S. bases—with 328 junior officers' taking courses carefully designed to enable them when they return home to train air-mobile special forces attached to each of Mexico's 12 regional and 40 zonal headquarters.
- Meanwhile, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency complements this effort by providing instruction, resources, and operational support for approximately 90 officers assigned to an intelligence unit of Mexico's army, the Center for Anti- Narcotics Investigations (CIAN). The CIAN claims to have delivered blows against the powerful Juárez and Tijuana cartels.[58]

Cold War (1946–1989)

Mexico's Goals vis-à-vis *the United States*

- The "climate of cordiality" that characterized the immediate postwar period gave way to an emphasis on principles long embraced by Mexico's government, namely (1) national self-determination; (2) opposition to intervention in the affairs of other countries; (3) repect for international law; and (4) the salience of sovereignty. In the 1970s, Mexico sought a

58. Tim Golden, "Dangerous Allies: A Special Report; U.S. Helps Mexico's Army Take a Big Anti-Drug Role," *New York Times,* December 29, 1997, Internet edition.

leadership role among those developing countries eager to accomplish a redistribution of resources from the impecunious South to the affluent North.

- ❒ In the latter years of this period, Mexico pursued a negotiated peace—via the Contador Process—in Central America, in which civil strife had given rise to a flood of refugees, especially from Guatemala, into southern Mexico.

U.S. Goals vis-à-vis *Mexico*

- ❒ Craft an inter-American defense policy based on the Río Treaty (1947).
- ❒ Prevent Latin American and Caribbean countries from aligning with the Soviet Union while seeking support for the overthrow (Cuba, Chile, Grenada, and Guatemala) or isolation (Cuba, Nicaragua) of regimes deemed pro-communist.
- ❒ Protect the air and sea lanes of the Western hemisphere, including the unrestricted use of the Panama Canal; maintain a limited military presence at several bases in the Caribbean Basin; and preserve access to bauxite, petroleum, and other valuable resources derived from the area.
- ❒ Improve military-to-military relationships, an objective that arose from a 1988 internal U.S. government review of policies toward Mexico.

Major Events

- ❒ Mexico abstained from voting on a U.S.-backed condemnation of communism that was aimed at Guatemala at an inter-American conference in Caracas, Venezuela (1954); Mexico also opposed the creation of an inter-American military force that it thought could threaten the sovereignty of countries in the Western hemisphere as well as the occupation of the Dominican Republic by U.S. forces (1965). Mexico stood as the sole member of the Organization of American States that refused to break diplomatic relations with the Castro regime in Cuba.
- ❒ In the 1980s, the United States dispatched aid and advisers in an unsuccessful attempt to help the "Contra" army to overthrow the Marxoid Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The U.S. Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency also provided assistance to other Central American governments fighting leftist insurgents.

Cooperative Military Activities

- ❒ Although a conservative, President Alemán (1946–1952) signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Río Treaty), Mexico interpreted the accord as a juridical association of states, not as a military alliance. In each of the 16 times (1948–1984) that the treaty was invoked, Mexico

emphasized its commitment to self-determination and nonintervention in voting against the adoption of collective security measures.

- ❒ Mexico insisted that the Inter-American Defense Board—created under the aegis of the Organization of American States—function in a consultative capacity only.
- ❒ Mexico's government received no grants of arms or matérial under the United States Military Assistance program after 1950; it accepted no Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits for the purchase of military equipment from the United States after 1968; and it agreed to limited participation—on a reciprocal basis only—in the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
- ❒ As part of its pro–third world élan most evident in the 1970–1982 period, Mexico championed the Tlatelolco Treaty (1967), which prohibits the introduction of nuclear weapons into Latin America; it also promoted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), which limits the application of nuclear technology to peaceful purposes.

World War II (1939–1945)

Mexico's Goals vis-à-vis *the United States*

- ❒ Assist in the defeat of fascism—a position that crystallized after German submaries sank two Mexican tankers in the Caribbean Sea in 1942. In that year, six former presidents appeared with incumbent president Avila Camacho on the country's day of independence to "bury the hatchet" and demonstrate unity in time of war.
- ❒ Modernize Mexico's military.

U.S. Goals vis-à-vis *Mexico*

- ❒ Provide support to Mexico via military cooperation, intelligence, guest workers (*braceros*), and raw materials.

Major Events

- ❒ Mexico broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers on December 8, 1941.
- ❒ Mexico declared war on the Axis powers on May 30, 1942.
- ❒ Mexico and the United States launched the *bracero* program on August 4, 1942.
- ❒ Mexico signed the United Nations Pact in Washington, D.C., on June 14, 1942.

- ❒ President Camacho met with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt in Monterey on April 20, 1943.

Cooperative Military Activities

- ❒ Mexico and the United States established the JMUSDC in February 1942.
- ❒ Mexico and the United States developed a Plan of Integral Defense, which linked the activities of Mexico's Pacific Command with those of the U.S. Fourth Army while providing for the advanced training of Mexican officers in U.S. military schools.
- ❒ Mexico participated in the Lend-Lease Program, under which it received $40 million in tanks, radar, aircraft, and other equipment.
- ❒ Under a pact signed in June 1943, approximately 6,000 Mexican soldiers were inducted into the U.S. Army.
- ❒ After a year's training in the United States, Mexico dispatched Squadron 201 of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force to the Philippines in April 1945. Some 32 Mexican pilots participated in 50 combat missions, which resulted in the deaths of 7 aviators.

Interwar Period (1920–1938)

Mexico's Goals vis-à-vis *the United States*

- ❒ Presidents Obregón (1920–1924), Calles (1924–1928),[59] and Cárdenas endeavored to pacify the strife-torn country, develop an orderly system of governance, and lay the groundwork for industrial development—free of intervention by the United States.

U.S. Goals vis-à-vis *Mexico*

- ❒ During this period of relative isolationism, the United States sought safeguards for its citizens and property in exchange for diplomatic recognition. The Harding administration extended such recognition after both signs had signed the Bucarelli Agreement in spring 1923, in which Mexico's government pledged not to seize control of foreign-operated oil activities (as permitted under Article 27 of Mexico's 1917 constitution), provided that the firms had taken "positive acts" to extract the oil prior to May 1, 1917.

59. Although formally turning over the presidency to others after Alvaro Obregón's assassination in 1928, Plutarco Elías Calles remained the power behind the throne through 1934.

Major Events

- ❒ 1923 Bucarelli Agreement on oil.
- ❒ After a protracted dispute, Mexico's President Cárdenas nationalized foreign holdings on March 18, 1938.
- ❒ Concern for other U.S. interests in Mexico combined with the outbreak of World War II in Europe dissuaded President Roosevelt from yielding to big oil and other proponents of intervention in Mexico.

Cooperative Military Activities

- ❒ None.

World War I (1914–1919)

Mexico's Goals vis-à-vis *the United States*

- ❒ Prevent intervention in its affairs.

U.S. Goals vis-à-vis *Mexico*

- ❒ Support a government that could preserve order and safeguard American citizens and investments.
- ❒ Exclude rival powers from the region, a goal first articulated in the Monroe Doctrine (1823).
- ❒ Prevent Mexico's allying with Central Powers in World War I.
- ❒ Keep the Mexican Revolution from pouring over the U.S. border.

Major Events

- ❒ U.S. occupation of Veracruz (1914).
- ❒ Pancho Villa raids Columbus, New Mexico (March 9, 1916).
- ❒ General John J. "Blackjack" Pershing's punitive expedition to capture Villa (1916).
- ❒ Zimmermann Telegram (1917).

Cooperative Military Activities

- ❒ None.

Highlights of U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico[60]

- ❒ Mexico received more assistance through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program than any other country in the region in 1996 and 1997.
- ❒ Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in attendance at the School of the Americas in 1997 and second in 1996.
- ❒ Mexican personnel ranked first in the region in attendance at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy in 1996 and 1997.
- ❒ In 1997, Mexico was second in the region in counter-narcotics assistance received through the U.S. Department of Defense's "Section 1004" account.

60. Source: *Just the Facts: A Civilian's Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean,* a project of the Latin American Working Group in Cooperation with the Center for International Policy (Washington, D.C., 1998), p. 189.

Table 18: Arms Transfers

Subcategory	Program	1996 (actual)	1997 (actual)	1998 (estimated)	1999 (estimated)
Sales and Leases	Foreign Military Sales	$4,430,000	$27,663,000	$15,000,000	$15,000,000
	Direct Commercial Sales	$146,617,738 (licenses)	$22,153,000 (licenses)		
		$991,000 (deliveries as of March 1997)	$12,642,000 (expected deliveries)	$11,665,000 (expected deliveries)	$47,225,000 (expected deliveries)
	Excess Defense Articles Sales	$2,372,000 offered (current value)	$0		
Grants	Excess Defense Articles Grants	$2,372,000 offered (current value)	$3,023,000 offered and delivered (current value)		
	Section 1031 Counter-drug	$0	$8,000,000		
	Excess Property	$0	medical supplies $343,160		
	Emergency Drawdowns	$0	$37,000,000		
	Section 1004 Counter-drug		amount for equipment unknown; total account: $28,905,000	amount for equipment unknown; total account: $20,079,000	
	International Narcotics Control	amount for equipment unknown; total account: $2,200,000	amount for equipment unknown; total account: $5,000,000	amount for equipment unknown; total account: $5,000,000	amount for equipment unknown; total account: $8,000,000

Table 19: Highlights of U.S. Security Training and Educational Programs with Mexico[61]

Subcategory	Program	1996 (actual)	1997 (actual)	1998 (estimated)	1999 (estimated)
Funding	International Military Education and Training (IMET)	$450,000; 73 students	$487,000; 66 students	$500,000; 68 students	$500,000; 68 students
	Expended IMET	$3,232; 2 students, 0 civilians	$18,000; 2 students, 0 civilians		
	International Narcotics Control	amount for training unknown; total account $700,000	amount for training unknown; total account $650,000	amount for training unknown; total account $600,000	amount for training unknown; total account $800,000
	Section 1004 Counter-drug		amount for training unknown; total account $137,000	amount for training unknown; total account $6,000	

61. Source: *Just the Facts,* p. 188.

CHAPTER 7

Miscellaneous Information

This section contains a farrago of information that, by and large, lies outside the scope of previously presented material.

Of the following miscellanea, readers should view with particular skepticism the public opinion surveys found in Tables 22 and 23.

Polls in Mexico, like those in other countries, may be contaminated by sample bias, loaded questions, asking two questions in one, or question order effects (that is, responses to one item contaminate responses to another that is further down the questionnaire). Other problems include inept questioners, eliciting spur-of-the-moment responses that may be unrelated to behavior, or the timing of the survey. For example, the PRI enjoyed a "bounce" in the polls immediately after the assassination of its presidential nominee, Luis Donaldo Colosio. Polls represent only a "snapshot" of opinions and, unless a series of surveys are taken, they fail to show the dynamics of political opinions. Polls may fail to measure the intensity of answers or to differentiate between the answers of the elites (who may influence other voters) and the masses (who may not even vote). The race, gender, or age of an interviewer sometimes can influence positions on racial/gender/generational issues. High nonresponse rates can affect poll results, too: for example, in state-of-the-art university surveys in the United States, response rates sometimes can dip to 50 percent; frequently, they fail to exceed 70 percent.

Several additional problems are particularly acute in Mexico. One is a basic distrust of the political system. People are reluctant to answer questions lest there be some official reprisal against those who criticize the government. For this reason, pollsters seldom conduct interviews personally (by telephone or in the homes of respondents) because the loss of anonymity may exacerbate fear of retribution. Some analysts find that the PRI scores up to 10 points higher in home interviews compared with those carried out on the street. In addition to the measurement error that comes from anxiety, some people have suggested that Mexicans like to be "agreeable" when surveyed; that is, they tend to give opinions that conform to the perceived positions of the interviewer. Other problems related to electoral surveys include difficulties in determining who will vote, low education levels, and the tendency of pollsters to conduct most surveys in and around urban centers, largely ignoring rural areas.

Having raised these caveats, it should be noted that respondents to surveys consistently assign relatively high marks to two institutions: the Roman Catholic Church and Mexico's military. It remains to be seen how the prolonged Chiapas conflict will affect the latter's standing.

Women and Mexico's Armed Forces[62]

Sexism pervades Mexico's armed services, in which less than 1 percent of personnel is female. For example, neither the army nor naval academy admits women. The highest rank a woman can attain is that of major general, which a senior military surgeon has reached. With the exception of one university graduate who is undergoing pilot training in the navy, all other distaff members of the armed forces serve as:

- ❒ secretaries;
- ❒ aides (*edecanes*);
- ❒ nurses;
- ❒ dentists;
- ❒ doctors; or
- ❒ communications specialists.

Table 20: Officer Rank Structure of Mexico's Armed Forces

Navy	U.S. Equivalents	Army	U.S. Equivalents
Guardiamarina	Ensign/O–1	Subteniente	Second Lieutenant/O–1
Teniente de Corbeta	Lieutenant Junior Grade/O–2	Teniente	First Lieutenant/O–2
Teniente de Navío	Lieutenant/O–3	Capitán Primero Capitan Segundo	Captain/O–3
Capitán de Corbeta	Lieutenant Commander/O–4	Mayor	Major/O–4
Capitán de Fragata	Commander/O–5	Teniente Coronel	Lieutenant Colonel/O–5
Capitán de Navío	Captain/O–6	Coronel	Colonel/O–6
Contralmirante	Rear Admiral (lower half)/O–7[a]	General Brigadier	Brigadier General/O–7[b]
Vicealmirante	Rear Admiral (upper half)/O–8	General de Brigada	Major General/O–8[c]
Almirante	Vice Admiral/O–9[d]	General de División	Lieutenant General/O–9[e]

a. In current U.S. usage, both one-star and two-star flag officers are designated "Rear Admiral." In previous times, one-star flag officers were called "Commodores" and (as recently as the 1980s) "Commodore Admirals."

b. The equivalent of Brigadier General in Mexico's air force is General de Grupo.

c. The equivalent of Major General in Mexico's air force is General de Ala.

d. There is no Mexican equivalent of Admiral unless he is the Secretary of National Defense.

e. The only four-star General in Mexico (U.S. equivalent: General/O–10) is the Secretary of National Defense. The U.S. Army has the additional rank of General of the Armies (five stars, pay grade O–11) that is used occasionally in wartime.

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62. The Organic Law states that women have the same rights and duties as men in the military. Thus, machismo and tradition—not legal barriers—severely limit women's activities in Mexico's armed forces.

Table 21: Commissioned Officers' Ranks and Insignias[63]



63. Source: Merrill and Miró, eds., *Mexico: A Country Study*, p. 320.

Table 22: Mexican Public Opinion and the Armed Forces[64]

		Party Affiliation					
Institutions in which respondents expressed a "great deal" or "fair amount" of confidence[a]	**National Total (1,004)**	**PRD (124)**	**PAN (360)**	**PRI (202)**	**Mexico City (200)**	**Monterey (196)**	**Tijuana (205)**
Army	71%	71%	70%	81%	71%	75%	73%
Federal government	50	49	39	65	48	63	59
Counter-narcotics police	47	49	44	61	48	50	51
Federal police (PGR)	44	42	44	62	43	51	46
Justice system	40	39	35	53	37	48	52
Local police	36	32	41	52	32	61	43

a. Telephone poll commissioned by the United States Information Agency of 1,004 residents of Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterey, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juárez, October 14–16, 1997.

64. Source: United States Information Agency, *Briefing Paper* No. B–82–97, Washington, D.C., October 20, 1997.

Table 23: Mexican Public Opinion and Key Institutions[65]

Institution (the degree to which respondents expressed "a lot" or "quite a bit" of confidence)	**1981**[a]	**1990**	**1994**[b]	**1997**[c]
Army[d]	48.1%	47.0%	48.0%	71.0%
Police[e]	31.4	32.0	25.0	42.3
Federal government[f]	23.0	28.2	37.0	50.0

a. Data for 1981 and 1990 derive from a University of Michigan study of values in the world's major countries, employing nationwide samples.

b. The 1994 data were collected in October by the United States Information Agency (USIA) from a nationwide telephone poll of 1,200 respondents; Professor Oscar Aguilar Asencio provided the author with a photocopy of the results. As in most surveys, citizens expressed substantial confidence in the Roman Catholic Church (47.0 percent).

c. The 1997 data come from a telephone poll commissioned by the USIA of 1,004 residents in Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterey, Tijuana, and Ciudad Juárez, conducted October 14–16, 1997; see USIA, *Briefing Paper* No. B-82-97, Washington, D.C., October 20, 1997.

d. University of Michigan researchers sought attitudes about the "armed forces"; the USIA poll asked about the "army."

e. The University of Michigan survey referred to the "police," while the USIA questionnaire contained questions about the "counter-narcotics police," the "federal police (PGR)," and the "local police." The 42.3 percent rating in 1997 represents an average of the scores for the three law-enforcement agencies.

f. The University of Michigan study focused on the "civil service," while the USIA inquired about the "administration" in 1994 and "federal government" in 1997.

65. Source: University of Michigan, World Values Study group (ICPSR 61–60), "World Values Survey," 1981–1984 and 1990–1993.

Specialized Military Vocabulary

BAM. Una Base Aéreo Militar, or a military air base.

Brigada Blanca. The "White Brigade"—a special force formed in 1977 to combat guerrilla activities; allegedly comprised of members of the Federal Judicial Police and other police forces, including personnel assigned to the military police.

Canonazo. Literally, a canon shot or fusillade, but also employed to refer to a bribe. When reorganizing the army, Alvaro Obregón observed that few generals could resist a "canonazo" of 20 silver pesos.

Cartilla. A military identity card. Article 5 of the National Military Service Law stipulates that eligible men serve in the "primary reserve" until age 30; at this point, their *cartillas* are revalidated for 10 years while they participate in the "secondary reserve"; on reaching age 40, a second validation takes place as the men enter the National Guard until age 45. This photo-bearing document is required when applying for a passport, driver's license, or social security benefits.

Con licencia. A leave of absence, such as when a member of the regular armed forces accepts a political or private-sector post. The period spent in this nonmilitary position is added to his years of regular service in computing salary, pension, and other benefits.

Cuartelazo. A barracks uprising.

DEM. Diplomado de Estado Mayor, the prestigious title conferred on graduates of the Superior War College.

DN–I, DN–II, DN–III. Mexico's three national security plans: war (DN–I), internal security (DN–II), and disaster relief (DN–III).

Domingueros. Young men who undertake their obligatory—but not necessarily rigorous—military service on Saturdays and Sundays.

GAFE. Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, units trained for anti-narcotics and counterinsurgency missions.

Generales de dedo. Generals selected on political rather than professional grounds—a practice widely used last by President Miguel Alemán (1946–1952).

Golpe del estado. A *coup d'état*.

Grito de Dolores. Mexican Independence Day, the anniversary of the date, or *Grito* (September 1810), on which parish priest Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla called for the end to Spanish rule.

Jaguares. A specialized police force trained by army units in charge of security in Mexico City that participated in the beating of citizens. Disbanded in late 1997.

MLO. The U.S. military liaison office; established in Mexico City in 1981 to manage and promote Mexico's purchase of U.S.-made military hardware.

Pan o Palo. President Porfirio Díaz's use of the carrot or stick (literally "bread or club") to deal with hostile officers.

Pronunciamientos. Antigovernment statements or "pronouncements" from military leaders.

Reglamento. An order.

Soldaderas. Women who brought or foraged for food, which they cooked for army units. By the 1930s, the *soldadera* system had been abolished on the grounds that it spawned immorality and vice.

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About the Author

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