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1800 K Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 775-3270

(To comment: Acordesman@aol.com)

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The Lessons of the Iraq War: Issues Relating to Grand Strategy

**Asymmetric Warfare, Intelligence, Weapons of Mass
Destruction,
Conflict Termination, Nation Building and
the “New Middle East”**

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy

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The reader should also be aware that this book makes extensive use of reporting on the war from a wide range of press sources, only some of which can be fully footnoted, interviews with serving and retired officers involved in various aspects of the planning and execution of the war, and the extensive work done by Australian, British, and US officers in preparing daily briefings and official background materials on the conflict.

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THE DANGERS OF AMERICAN “TRIUMPHALISM”

The US, British, and Australian victory in Iraq is no excuse for any form of “triumphalism.” The US and its allies remain vulnerable to asymmetric warfare and terrorism. It has no good answer to nations that have successfully proliferated, and where preemption or “first strikes” can provoke terrible regional conflicts.

Any definition of victory cannot ignore the war’s cost in human lives, dollars, and property. It also cannot ignore the fact that Iraq was an enemy with many defects. It is far from clear that the US can plan for a world in which future opponents are equally weak. The US would face much more severe limits in any future war with North Korea or any confrontation with Russia or China. US ability wage and win wars is in no sense matched by its abilities to win a peace through peacemaking and nation-building. Its status as the “world’s only superpower” is heavily dependent on a network of regional allies and ultimately on sustaining a favorable balance of global political support.

One of the critical uncertainties surrounding the Iraq War is still how optional the war really was, and whether containment and disarmament could have dealt with Saddam Hussein. The threat Iraq posed under Saddam Hussein does not seem to have been imminent, but it is not yet clear from the discoveries to date how much Iraq’s success in retaining weapons of mass destruction made that threat so proximate that the US and Britain had to attack. Saddam Hussein’s long history of tyranny, aggression, and proliferation may well justify the Iraq War, but its timing may yet prove to It is also clear that the US and Britain were also far less prepared for peacemaking and nation-building than for warfighting. The US, in particular, was initially unprepared to deal with any major aspect of conflict termination, and many US policymakers had serious illusions about their ability to turn Iraq into a rapid example of the kind of state that might catalyze political and economic change in the Middle East. They also clear failed to properly characterize the threat Iraq posed in terms of weapons of mass destruction; although the repeated discovery of mass graves made it all too clear that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a vicious tyranny.

In short, the debate over the war plan, new way of war, and Rumsfeld Doctrine are far less important than the lesson that the advances in US warfighting capability do not mean America can wander off in search of enemies, or abandon the search to build stronger international institutions and use diplomacy instead of force. The US may have the ability to dethrone a series of the world’s less powerful and more obnoxious leaders, but “can” is never a synonym for either “must” or “should.” As Clausewitz notes,¹

“The first, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that it is not. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive...”

Ultimately, the United States must have the world’s trust to underpin its structure of alliances and to reduce the risk its actions will create a network of opposing military, political, and economic alliances. Trust is not earned by new ways of war, it is earned by justice and restraint.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

One of the key issues shaping the war was the ability of US and British forces to adapt to asymmetric warfare. In practice, US forces responded quickly and effectively to Iraqi tactics, whether in the form of covert mine warfare attempts, dealing with raids by “technicals,” preventing suicide attacks, or coping with urban stay behinds and diehards., US and British forces demonstrated that they could adapt tactics and force postures to new and surprising uses of asymmetric warfare. The lessons of Somalia, North Ireland, and Afghanistan had been learned and the value of improved training and organization for asymmetric warfare was clear.²

At the same time, the US and UK benefited from the lack of large numbers of dedicated irregulars and martyrs. As General Wallace pointed out, Iraq did achieve surprise. There were serious battles involving mixes of regular and irregular forces near Al Hillah, and the situation might have been very different if Iraq had used chemical or biological weapons along with asymmetric warfare, or had been able to launch more than nine Al Samoud missiles and long range tactical rockets.

There still, however, are important “what ifs.” One such “what if” is how the Coalition would have fared if Iraq truly had been able to mobilize and use the large popular army it had created arms caches for throughout the country, particularly given the increasing need for powers like the US and UK to reduce total casualties, civilian casualties, and collateral damage. Another is how different the war would have been if Iraq had been able to combine guerrilla or irregular warfare with the effective use of weapons of mass destruction and/or covert and terrorist attacks on the US and British homeland. The Iraq War is only a limited warning of the kind of challenge a more effective opponent might pose.

Moreover, it has become all too clear that the fall of Baghdad and Tikrit, and the Coalition victory over Iraq’s conventional forces, did not put an end to the fighting. Instead, the US, Britain, Australia, Poland, and the other allies involved in nation building have found that this process must take place in a climate of low-level asymmetric warfare. As has been the case in Afghanistan, even dramatic military victory does not mean the conflict is over, and has been the case in so many other peacemaking efforts, armed opposition changes and mutates.

The causes of this “post-conflict” conflict are unclear. They may be the result of the political vacuum and insecurity following the fall of a 30-year long tyranny. They may be the result of nationalism and the fears, anger, and conspiracy theories caused by the Coalition’s failure to provide a quick and effective security and nation building effort, and to announce a clear future plan for Iraq that can command popular support. At least some of the violence is the result of religious and ethnic tensions in Iraq, and Shi’ite and other Islamic resentment of what is felt to be a forced process of secularization.

Many of the attacks, however, have come from Ba’ath loyalists, and their activity has certainly been encouraged by the Coalition’s failure to kill or capture Saddam Hussein and his sons. As was the case in Afghanistan, visibly destroying the leadership of a hostile regime is of major importance in reducing the level of support for that regime. There also are indications that Saddam Hussein’s regime planned to fight a low intensity conflict designed to confront the US and its allies with a slow war of attrition in the form

of constant low-level casualties and efforts to sabotage key elements of nation-building even before the war. While the evidence is limited, it may have left cadres behind to try to fight and coordinate such a war after the regime collapsed.³

Since President Bush declared an end to the major fighting on May 1, the Coalition has increasingly been forced to combine military and nation building operations, and US has been forced to conduct a series of military operations to deal with attacks on its forces and on the nation-building process. These operations have included Operation Peninsula Strike, Operation Desert Scorpion, and Operation Rattlesnake.⁴ The scale of these operations has been significant. During Operation Desert Scorpion, which lasted from June 15 to June 28, the US 4th Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division conducts a series of raids which detained some 1,330 individuals, and confiscated some 497 AK-47s, 235 hand grenades, 124 rocket propelled grenades, 22 machine guns, 130 pistols, 100 rifles, and 8,122 round of ammunition. The Operation also confiscated \$9,460,000 US dollars, 1,557,000,000 Iraqi Dinars, 1,071 bars of gold, and 52 vehicles.⁵

Coalition forces launched a new series of operations called Operation Sidewinder on June 29. It became as the third of a series of operations focused on rooting out various subversive elements attempting to undermine coalition efforts to restore basic infrastructure and stability in Iraq. On the day that Operation Sidewinder began, Coalition forces conducted 1,317 day patrols and 1,053 night patrols. They also conducted 213 joint day patrols with the Iraqi police and 161 night patrols. The total patrols and raids resulted in 128 arrests for various criminal activities including one murder arrest in Baghdad.⁶

Growing questions exist as to whether some organized element in Iraq deliberately sought to cause nearly one US casualty a day, and Britain has lost as many as six killed in a single day of “peace.”⁷ As has been discussed in Chapter IV, the US and Britain have had to deal with a stream of attacks on their forces, and with deliberate sabotage to key elements of the Iraqi economy like oil pipelines.

These attacks have caused significant casualties. Six British military policemen were killed in a single incident. The patterns in US casualties are shown in detail in the following table, and the cost of the fighting since the “end” of the war is all too clear. A total of 138 out of 199 deaths between March 19 and June 27 occurred during the war (3/19-4/30). Out of these, 89 were the result of hostile action, one was the result of illness, and 28 were the result of accidents other than in helicopters and 15 were the result of accidents in helicopters. Two occurred because a US NCO shot several other soldiers in his unit (The Camp PA incident) and three were the result of known cases of friendly fire. If one looks at the “postwar” total, there were 61 deaths between May 1 and June 27. Out of total, 19, were the result of hostile action, four came from non-hostile action, 31 were the result of accidents other than in helicopters, 7 were the result of accidents in helicopters, and none were the result of known cases of friendly fire.⁸

There is no way to predict whether future Coalition nation building and security efforts will bring an end to this violence, and it is important to note that the level of combat as of July 2003 was still very low and that accidents had been far more lethal than combat. At the same time, Iraq is a further lesson that the transition to peace making and nation building can also be a transition to asymmetric warfare, and Afghanistan is scarcely the

only precedent. Lebanon and Somalia are glaring examples of the fact that it “isn’t over when its over,” and that that the conflict termination process should be as much a matter of limiting or avoiding asymmetric warfare as creating a stable peace.

INTELLIGENCE, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

There are a number of lessons that affect intelligence; and the ability to deal with weapons of mass destruction; and psychological warfare. While these lessons cannot be fully separated from the analysis of IS&R, targeting, and conflict termination in other chapters, there are a number of issues which merit detailed examination.

Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses

The Coalition had overwhelming overall superiority in the intelligence aspects of IS&R. It had also the advantage of experience and a vast range of intelligence collection and analysis to build upon. The US had used space and other intelligence assets to study and target Iraq for more than 12 years from the summer of 1990 to the beginning of 2003, and had had to prepare for war several times after 1991.

The US and Britain carried out major strikes in Desert Fox in 1998, and repeatedly flew reconnaissance missions and strikes over Iraq to enforce the “No Fly Zones” during 1998-2003. This combination of intelligence effort and combat experience provided a unique degree of situational awareness before the war began. At the same time, it is important to temper any lessons about the advantages of US intelligence assets with the understanding similar experience and knowledge may not be present in future contingencies.

At the same time, the Iraq War is warning that even the world’s most advance intelligence systems, and more than a decade of intensive intelligence collection and analysis coverage could still leave major gaps and serious intelligence problems. As has been discussed in the broader analysis of the IS&R effort in Chapter VI, and throughout much the preceding analysis, the US and its allies still had serious problems in the following aspects of intelligence collection and analysis:

- The US did not have enough area experts, technical experts, and analysts with language skills at any level to make optimal use of its sensors and collection. This was as true at the national level as at the tactical level, and collection overload was a problem in many areas.
- The US had a far greater capability to target buildings than characterize what went on in the building, and the effect of strikes on most sets of structures. It could not measure the level of wartime activity in many cases (facilities with high emission levels were an exception), and this made the efforts at “effects-based” operations discussed in later chapters difficult and sometimes impossible. Moreover, estimates of the level and nature of underground and sheltered facilities and activity were generally highly problematic.
- The IS&R effort mistargeted leadership facilities, exaggerated the importance of C4I strikes, and overtargted fixed military facilities. It is, however, unclear that the US and its allies had any choice. Striking more targets in the face on uncertainty was probably better than striking only those targets where a high confidence could be established as to the effect.
- The IS&R effort often had to take a “worst case” approach to the potential role of Iraq’s security forces, intelligence services, irregular forces like Saddam’s Fedayeen, and unusual military formations like the Special Republican Guards. In fairness, however, it is difficult –

if not impossible – to accurately characterize the warfighting capability of forces that have never fought and which do not conduct open and realistic exercises.

- The IS&R sensor and analytic effort focused more on major combat forces, with heavy weapons, than on infantry or irregular forces. It could do a much better job of locating and characterizing weapons platforms and military emitters than dealing with personnel and forces that relied on light vehicles. It was generally difficult or impossible to locate distributed forces in a built-up or urban environment until they were forces into some form of open military activity and the US often lacked the density of specialized assets like UAVs to carry out this mission even when open activity took place.
- The IS&R effort did much to reduce collateral damage and the risk of civilian casualties. It was neither organized nor capable, however, of assessing either civilian or military casualties.
- The speed and intensity of the war seems to have led to a major breakdown in the battle damage assessment (BDA) process. Quite aside from the many gaps and uncertainties remaining in the BDA process, the IS&R system could not close the cycle in terms of target-shoot-assess on a timely and accurate basis which remains a critical challenge in creating true netcentric war.
- The IS&R effort was not able to characterize and target the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction effort before or during the war, or provide reliable warning of the tactical threat. It seems to have been somewhat better in dealing with potential delivery systems, but the level of improvement relative to the inability to locate the Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear effort is unclear.

The Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems

The most controversial failure in intelligence lay in the area of weapons of mass destruction. It will be months or years before it will be possible to locate and analyze the data the war makes available on Iraq's history of proliferation, its imports, and domestic programs, its capabilities at the time of the Iraq War, and its goals on objectives.

The annexes to this book summarize US, British, and UN efforts to characterize the size and nature of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction before the war. It is clear from these summaries, from press reports, and from the history of the war, that the members of the Coalition had only a tenuous understanding of the threat it faced, or even the scale of an Iraqi effort that they described as a key motive for the conflict, before the war began.⁹¹⁰

It is also clear from the previous chapters that Coalition commanders had little intelligence on Iraqi WMD programs and warfighting capabilities as they advanced, and it is clear from a wide range of reports during the war that there were many false alarms when elements of the advancing forces thought they had found weapons of mass destruction or the facilities to produce them, and when Coalition forces either donned chemical protection gear they later turned out not to need or Coalition commanders had to ignore the risk Iraq might use such weapons without adequate tactical intelligence support to give them a clearer picture of the risks involved..

Problems in Collecting Data on Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems

In spite of all of the advances the US and Britain had made in IS&R capabilities, they went to war with Iraq without the level of evidence needed to provide a clear strategic

rationale for the war, and without the ability to fully understand the threat Iraqi weapons of mass destruction posed to US, British, and Australian forces. This uncertainty is not a definitive argument against carrying out a war that responded to grave potential threats. It is a definitive warning that this intelligence and targeting are not yet adequate to support grand strategy, strategy, and tactical operations against proliferating powers or to make accurate assessments of the need to preempt.

It is difficult to put the problems involved into perspective without access to classified material. Past declassified US intelligence reporting on proliferation has, however, made it clear that proliferation presents very serious problems for intelligence collection and analysis, and UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports show that Iraq was well aware of these problems and how to exploit them:

- Iraq and other powers sophisticated enough to proliferate are also sophisticated enough to have a good understanding of many of the strengths and limitations of modern intelligence sensors, the timing and duration of satellite coverage, and the methods use to track imports and technology transfer. They have learned to cover and conceal, to deceive, and to create smaller and better disseminated activities.
- Intelligence collection of relies heavily on finding key imports and technology transfers. Such reports, however, only usually cover a small fraction of the actual effort on the part of the proliferating country, and the information collected is often vague and uncertain, in part because importers and smugglers have every incentive to lie and are also familiar with many the ways to defeat intelligence collection and import controls. When information does become available, it is often impossible to put in context, and a given import or technology transfer can often be used in many difficult ways, often was other than proliferation. Such import data can hint at the character of a proliferation effort, but give no picture of the overall character of the activity.
- Even when data are available on given imports or technology transfers, they generally present three serious problems. One is that there is no way to know the end destination and use of the import and how it is integrated into the overall effort. The second is there is no way to know if it is integrated into an ongoing research and development effort, a weapons production effort, being procured or stockpiled for later use, or simply an experiment or mistake that is never further exploited. The third is that many imports have civilian or other military uses. These so-called "dual-use" imports may have legitimate use.
- The very nature of arms control agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Chemical Weapons convention (BWC) encourages proliferating nations to lie and conceal as effectively as possible. The same is true of supplier agreements like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia List, and any form of sanctions. Arms control only encourages compliance among non-proliferators and non-sellers, and current enforcement efforts are too weak to be effective while their provisions effective license technology transfer to those nations who succeed in lying or concealing.
- The technology of proliferation generally permits the research and development effort to be divided up into a wide range of small facilities and projects. Some can be carried out as legitimate civil research. Others can be hidden in civil and commercial facilities. As proliferators become more sophisticated, they learn to create dispersed, redundant and parallel programs, and mix high secret covert programs with open civil or dual-use programs. Chemical, biological, and cruise missile programs are particularly easy to divide up into small cells or operations. However, this is increasingly true of nuclear weapons centrifuge programs, plutonium processing and fuel cycles, and the testing and simulation of nuclear weapons that does not involve weapons grade materials. Many key aspects of ballistic missile R&D, including warhead and launch system design fit into this category.
- Iraq and most other proliferators have, in the past, focused on creating stockpiles of weapons for fighting theater conflicts against military forces. These stockpiles require large inventories, large-

scale deployments, and generally mixes of training and warfighting preparations that create significant intelligence indicators. There are, however, other strategies and many proliferators may now be pursuing them. One is to bring weapons to full development, and to wait until a threat becomes imminent to actually produce the weapon. A second is to follow the same course, but create large dual-use civil facilities that can be rapidly converted to the production of weapons of mass destruction. These can include pharmaceutical plants, food-processing plants, breweries, petrochemical plants, and pesticide plants, but key assembly lines can be concealed in a wide range of other commercial activities.¹¹ Weapons production facilities can be stockpile for a later and sometimes sudden breakout. A third is to focus on creating as few highly lethal biological or nuclear weapons to attack key political or civilian facilities in a foreign country, rather than its military forces. Highly lethal non-infectious or infectious biological agents are one means of such an attack, biological weapons directed at crops or livestock are another.

- Countries can pursue very different strategies in dealing with their past inventories of weapons. They can disclose and destroy them, knowing they do not face an urgent warfighting need, better weapons are coming, and this suits current political objectives. They can claim to destroy and hide the remaining weapons in covert areas known only to a few. They can claim to destroy, or lie, and disperse weapons where they can be used for warfighting purposes. In many cases, intelligence collection may not be able to distinguish between such strategies, and a given proliferator like Iraq can pursue a mix of such strategies – depending on the value of the weapon.
- In many cases, there is no clear way to know whether a program is R&D, production and weapons deployment, or production capable/breakout oriented. The problem is further complicated by the fact that Iraq and other countries have learned to play a “shell game” by developing multiple surface and underground military facilities and dual-use facilities and to create relatively mobile mixes of trailer/vehicle mounted and “palletized” equipment for rapid movement. Large special-purpose facilities with hard to move equipment often still exist, but they are by no means the rule. Intelligence collection takes time and may often lag behind country activities.
- Unless a country keeps extremely accurate records of its programs, it is often far easier to estimate that maximum scale of what it might do than provide an accurate picture of what it has actually done.
- In most cases, it is impossible to know how far a given project or effort has gotten and how well it has succeeded. The history of proliferation is not the history of proliferators overcoming major technical and manufacturing problems. It is the history of massive management and systems integration problems, political failures, lying technical advocates and entrepreneurs, project managers who do not tell their political masters the truth, and occasional sudden success. Short of an intelligence breakthrough, it is rarely possible to assess the success of a given effort and even on the scene inspection can produce vary wrong results unless a given project can be subjected to detailed technical testing. For example, UNSCOM and the IAEA found that virtually all of their preliminary reporting on Iraq’s nuclear effort in 1992-1993 tended to exaggerate Iraqi capabilities once they had had the time to fully assess the efficiency of key efforts like the Calutron and centrifuge programs.
- The only definitive way to counter most of these collection problems is to have a reliable mix of redundant human intelligence (HUMINT) sources within the system or as defectors. The US, however, has never claimed or implied it had such capabilities in any proliferating country, and the history of US, British, UNSCOM, and UNMOVIC efforts to deal with Iraq makes it painfully clear both that such transparency was totally lacking in Iraq and that most Iraqi defectors and intelligence sources outside Iraq made up information, circulated unsubstantiated information, or simply lied. Breakthroughs do occur, but HUMINT is normally inadequate, untrustworthy, or a failure, and these shortcomings cannot generally be corrected with data based on other intelligence means. Either inside information is available or it is not. When it is, imagery and signals intelligence generally do far more to indicate that HUMINT is wrong or suspect than to reveal the truth.¹²

- In many cases, even the leaders of a proliferating country may not have an accurate picture of the success of their efforts, and most probably do not have a clear picture of the accuracy, lethality and effects, and reliability of their weapons. US and British research efforts have long shown that even highly sophisticated technical models of the performance and lethality of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and delivery systems can be grossly wrong, or require massive levels of human testing that simply are not practical even for closed authoritarian societies. No declassified intelligence report on any proliferation effort in any developing country has yet indicated that Iraq or any other proliferator has sophisticated technical and testing models in these areas. Intelligence cannot collect data that do not exist.

Problems in Analyzing Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems

Many of the resulting problems in the analysis of the WMD capabilities of Iraq and other countries are the result of the previous problems in collection, and the details of US, British, and allied intelligence analyses remain classified. At the same time, background discussions with intelligence analysts and users do reveal the following additional problems in analyzing the WMD threat:

- The uncertainties surrounding collection on virtually all proliferation and weapons of mass destruction programs are so great that it is impossible to produce meaningful point estimates. As the CIA has shown in some of its past public estimates of missile proliferation, the intelligence community must first develop a matrix of what is and is not known about a given aspect of proliferation in a given country, with careful footnoting or qualification of the problems in each key source. It must then deal with uncertainty by creating estimates that show a range of possible current and projected capabilities – carefully qualifying each case. In general, at least three scenarios or cases need to be analyzed for each major aspect of proliferation in each country – something approaching a “best,” “most likely,” and “worst case.”¹³
- Even under these conditions, the resulting analytic effort faces serious problems. Security compartmentation within each major aspect of collection and analysis severely limits the flow of data to working analysts. The expansion of analytic staffs has sharply increased the barriers to the flow of data, and has brought large number of junior analysts into the process that can do little more than update past analyses and judgments. Far too little analysis is subjected to technical review by those who have actually worked on weapons development, and the analysis of delivery programs, warheads and weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear proliferation tends to be compartmented. Instead of the free flow of data and exchange of analytic conclusions, or “fusion” of intelligence, analysis is “stovepiped” into separate areas of activity. Moreover, the larger staffs get, the more stovepiping tends to occur.
- Analysis tends to focus on technical capability and not on the problems in management and systems integration that often are the real world limiting factors in proliferation. This tends to push analysis towards exaggerating the probable level of proliferation, particularly because technical capability is often assumed if collection cannot provide all the necessary information.
- Where data are available on past holdings of weapons and the capability to produce such weapons – such as data on chemical weapons feedstocks and biological growth material – the intelligence effort tends to produce estimates of the maximum size of the possible current holding of weapons and WMD materials. While ranges are often shown, and estimates are usually qualified with uncertainty, this tends to focus users on the worst case in terms of actual current capability. In the case of the Iraq, this was compounded by some 12 years of constant lies and a disbelief that a dictatorship obsessed with record keeping could not have records if it had destroyed weapons and materials. The end result, however, was to assume that little or no destruction had occurred whenever UNSCOM, UNMOVIC, and the IAEA reported that major issues still affected Iraqi claims.

- Intelligence analysis has long been oriented more towards arms control and counterproliferation rather than war fighting, although DIA and the military services have attempted to shift the focus of analysis. Dealing with broad national trends and assuming capability is not generally a major problem in seeking to push nations towards obeying arms control agreements, or in pressuring possible suppliers. It also is not a major problem in analyzing broad military counterproliferation risks and programs. The situation is very different in dealing with war fighting choices, particularly issues like preemption and targeting. Assumptions of capability can lead to preemption that is not necessary, overtargeting, inability to prioritize, and a failure to create the detailed collection and analysis necessary to support warfighters down to the battalion level. This, in turn, often forces field commanders to rely on field teams with limited capability and expertise, and to overreact to any potential threat or warning indicator.
- The intelligence community does bring outside experts into the process, but often simply to provide advice in general terms rather than cleared review of the intelligence product. The result is often less than helpful. The use of other cleared personnel in US laboratories and other areas of expertise is inadequate and often presents major problems because those consulted are not brought fully into the intelligence analysis process and given all of the necessary data.
- The intelligence community does tend to try to avoid explicit statements of the shortcomings in collection and methods in much of its analysis and to repeat past agreed judgments on a lowest common denominator level – particularly in the form of the intelligence products that get broad circulation to consumers. Attempts at independent outside analysis or “B-Teams,” however, are not subject to the review and controls enforced on intelligence analysis, and the teams, collection data, and methods used are generally selected to prove given points rather than provide an objective counterpoint to finished analysis.¹⁴

More broadly, the users of intelligence are at best intolerant of analysis that consists of a wide range of qualifications and uncertainties even at the best of times, and the best of times do not exist when urgent policy and warfighting decisions need to be made. Users inevitably either force the intelligence process to reach something approaching a definitive set of conclusions, or make such estimates themselves.

Intelligence analysts and managers are all too well aware of this fact. Experience has taught them that complex intelligence analysis -- filled with alternative cases, probability estimates, and qualifications about uncertainty -- generally goes unused or makes policy makers and commanders impatient with the entire intelligence process. In the real world, hard choices have to be made to provide an estimate that actually will be used and acted upon, and these choices must either be made by the intelligence community or the user.¹⁵

The Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems

All of these points have obvious importance in assessing the political and policy-level use of intelligence during the Iraq War. It is easy to focus on the extent to which the intelligence that the US and Britain provided before the war was or was not “politicized” as part of the effort to make the case for the war. Yet, far broader issues are involved that are scarcely specific to the Iraq War, and which are almost certain to apply to future crises and conflicts. The same problems that limited US and British intelligence capabilities during the Iraq War – and which will limit them for the foreseeable future -- necessarily apply to other countries and to any international organizations.

There also are no peers with superior capabilities. No other state can compete with the US in intelligence collection and analysis resources, although a growing number of states do have significant satellite and other technical means and any state can score a human

intelligence breakthrough. Organizations like the UN have no independent intelligence collection capability other than the reporting and inspection provisions provided by international agreements. As UNSCOM and UNMOVIC showed during their inspection efforts in Iraq, direct inspection can often provide important discoveries, but such search techniques also only provide limited and time consuming coverage and cannot function effectively without intelligence data and analytic inputs from other countries.

No one who focuses on the specific case of the Iraq War can afford to ignore the fact that future threats posed by proliferation by states or terrorist movements may again seem so great that it may not be possible to wait to take military action until many key uncertainties are resolved. Moreover, it is difficult to see how leaders can lead if they communicate all of the uncertainties involved in the intelligence assessment of most proliferating countries.

In practical terms, any political effort to try to communicate the true level of uncertainty and probable outcomes inherent in most estimates of proliferation seems almost certain to make it difficult or impossible to gain a political consensus for timely and effective domestic or international action. Communicating uncertainty may be a good way of arguing against action but only because its impact is to create nearly endless discussion and debate and block agreement on any policy that requires broad political agreement on a single course of action or the use of military force. In practical terms, the US and its allies may again have to act on the basis of something approaching “worst case” assumptions, and this is a risk that proliferating nations and extremist movements may have to learn they take when they proliferate.

Dealing with a Proven Proliferator

It is also necessary to put any US or British politicization of intelligence in context. Whatever mistakes may have been made in the intelligence assessments before and during the war, Saddam Hussein’s regime was clearly proliferating. During the period from 1991-1998, UNSCOM found that Iraq had concealed major chemical, biological, and nuclear programs, and continued to lie about them until it expelled UNSCOM from Iraq. These lies affected many detailed aspects of the Iraqi nuclear and missile program. They also, however, succeeded in concealing the existence of a biological weapons program until 1995 – four years after the war was over and a massive inspection effort was underway. They succeeded in concealing a major VX nerve gas weaponization program until 1997-1998 – seven years after the war was over and a massive inspection effort was underway.¹⁶

Iraq clearly failed to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1441 that established the ground rules for the resumption of UN inspections under UNMOVIC. Iraq’s declaration to the UN did virtually nothing to resolve immense uncertainties about the remaining scale of the Iraqi proliferation effort that could still have involved massive stocks of chemical and biological weapons. UNMOVIC found that Iraq continued to try to conceal major violations of the ceasefire limits on the development of long range missiles, and it was anything but forthcoming in making Iraqi scientists available for interviews and in implementing most other aspects of cooperation with the UN. When it did improve its cooperation, it almost always did so because the threat of US and British military action had become more imminent.¹⁷

Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC before and during the war, and a man who disagreed with many of the US British assessments of Iraqi capabilities issued to make the case for war, made many of these same points in his last report to the UN.¹⁸

...the Commission has not at any time during the inspections in Iraq found evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items – whether from pre-1991 or later. I leave aside the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which we concluded was proscribed. As I have noted before, this does not necessarily mean that such items could not exist. They might – there remain long lists of items unaccounted for – but it is not justified to jump to the conclusion that something exists just because it is unaccounted for.

...we note that the long list of proscribed items unaccounted for has not been shortened by inspections or Iraqi declarations, explanations or documentation. It was the task of the Iraqi side to present items unaccounted for, if they existed, or to present evidence – records, documents or other – convincing the inspectors that the items do not exist.

If – for whatever reason – this is not done, the international community cannot have confidence that past programmes or any remaining parts of them have been terminated. However, an effective presence of international inspectors will serve as a deterrent against efforts aimed at reactivating or developing new programmes of weapons of mass destruction.

Although during the last month and a half of our inspections, the Iraqi side made considerable efforts to provide explanations, to begin inquiries and to undertake exploration and excavations, these efforts did not bring the answers needed before we withdrew. We did not have time to interview more than a handful of the large number of persons who were said by Iraq to have participated in the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons in 1991. Such interviews might have helped towards the resolution of some outstanding issues, although one must be aware that the totalitarian regime in Iraq continued to cast a shadow on the credibility of all interviews.

The report before you gives details of the Commission's supervision of the destruction of 50 Al Samoud 2 missiles out of the 75 declared deployed and of other items in the missile sphere... Fifty per cent of the declared warheads and 98% of the missile engines remained intact. Also, there was no time to assess whether the Al Fatah missile programme stayed within the range allowed by Security Council resolutions.

In the context of destruction of proscribed items, I should like also to draw the attention of the Council to the information... that the weapons that were destroyed before inspectors left in 1998, were in almost all cases declared by Iraq and that the destruction occurred before 1993 in the case of missiles, and before 1994 in the case of chemical weapons. The existence and scope of the biological weapons programme was uncovered by UNSCOM in 1995 despite Iraq's denials and concealment efforts. As to items, only a few remnants of the biological weapons programme were subsequently found. A great deal – Iraq asserts all – was unilaterally destroyed in 1991.

Thus, in the main, UNSCOM supervised destruction of actual weapons and agents took place during the early years of the Commission, and had regard mainly to items declared by Iraq or, at least, found at sites declared by Iraq. Subsequent UNSCOM disarmament activities dealt almost exclusively with the destruction of equipment and facilities for the production of weapons connected to past programmes. In addition, of course, UNSCOM was able, with great skill, to map large parts of Iraq's WMD programmes.

While we are all aware of the large amounts of proscribed items, which still remain unaccounted for, we should perhaps take note of the fact that for many years neither UNSCOM nor UNMOVIC made significant finds of weapons. The lack of finds could be because the items were unilaterally destroyed by the Iraqi authorities or else because they were effectively concealed by them. I trust that in the new environment in Iraq, in which there is full access and cooperation, and in which knowledgeable witnesses should no longer be inhibited to reveal what they know, it should be possible to establish the truth we all want to know.

As Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM from 1991-1997, pointed out after the war, Iraq never gave up the basic core of its chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons efforts or the effort to find dual-use and other production equipment.¹⁹

The Costs of Politicizing Intelligence

That said, one key lesson of the Iraq War is still that it is dangerous to over-politicize intelligence and to not provide a picture of the threat and reasons for warfighting that is not qualified to some extent. Overselling the threat before a war leads to overreacting during a conflict, and major credibility problems in the aftermath of the conflict that can interfere with nation building and limit domestic and international support in future conflicts. The US and Britain did not find the right balance of persuasion and objectivity in their public analyses of the threat before the war and their arguments in favor of the conflict. The fact that no evidence surfaced during or soon after the war that Iraq had the capability to use weapons of mass destruction in warfighting, or had active programs for the production of weapons mass destruction that were creating an imminent threat, has been a source of major embarrassment for the Bush and Blair governments, as well as for allied governments like Australia.

Postwar reports and interviews make it clear that the US and Britain did present worst case estimates to the public and the UN without sufficient qualification, and that their intelligence communities came under serious political pressure to make something approaching a worst case interpretation of the evidence, and interpret the inability to account for missing weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and production capabilities as meaning Iraq had something approaching matching inventories of deployed weapons.

As has already been mentioned, there are many indications that the US intelligence community came under pressure to accept reporting by Iraqi opposition sources with limited credibility, and in some cases, a history of actively lying to either exaggerate their own importance or push the US towards a war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. In what bore a striking resemblance to similar worst case interpretations of the global threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles under the Rumsfeld Commission, US policymakers not only seem to have pushed for the interpretation that would best justify military action, but to have focused on this case as if it were a reality, rather than a possibility.²⁰ This pressure seems to have come primarily from the Office of the Vice President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but it seems clear that the Bush Administration as a whole sought intelligence that would support its case in going to war, and this had a significant impact on the intelligence community from 2002-onwards.²¹

The British reporting on the Iraqi threat presented further problems because the so-called intelligence report presented by the British government copied text from the work of a graduate student, and questions still remain as to why both the US and British governments stated there was evidence that Iraq had imported Uranium when at least one of the sources mentioned was clearly fraudulent.²² Similarly, a claim that Iraq was ready to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes, including against its own Shi'ite population, later turned out to be based on a single unvalidated report from an Iraqi officer of uncertain credibility.²³

The Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and Coalition US intelligence Effort

The problems in the US and other Coalition intelligence efforts affected warfighting as well as the politics of the war. In spite of all of the advances in IS&R capabilities, and more than a decade of additional intelligence collection and targeting experience, the US and its allies were just as unable able to characterize and target Iraqi capabilities to use, produce, and deliver weapons of mass destruction during military operations as it was during Desert Storm and Desert Fox. If anything, the US was more successful in the Gulf War, although many of its limited successes during the Gulf War were more the accidental result of hitting secondary targets than intelligence analysis and military planning.

Each of the military services had to plan before and throughout the Iraq War for the risk that Iraq would use weapons of mass destruction. General John P. Abizaid, General Franks' deputy during the war and the new commander of USCENTCOM, described the situation as follows to the Senate Armed Services Committee:²⁴

Intelligence was the most accurate I've ever seen on the tactical level, probably the best I've ever seen on the operational level, and perplexingly incomplete on the strategic level with regard to weapons of mass destruction. It is perplexing to me...that we have not found weapons of mass destruction, when the evidence was so pervasive that it would exist...I can't offer a reasonable explanation..."

Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force describes the problems created by such uncertainties as follows:²⁵

...we were... not hit with weapons of mass destruction -- I think we had four triggers that we were prepared to defend ourselves against -- different times when we thought that the regime might try to employ the weapons of mass destruction against us. And we truly thought that they were distributed -- not to everybody, not to the regular army divisions that we saw in the south. But my personal belief was that they probably did reside in the Republican Guard units, and we encountered, arguably, three, maybe four, Republican Guard divisions on the way to Baghdad. But my personal belief was that the Republican Guard corps commander probably had release authority, and that we might well see them when we started to encounter his force or enter his area.

It was a surprise to me then, it remains a surprise to me now, that we have not uncovered weapons, as you say, in some of the forward dispersal sites. Again, believe me, it's not for lack of trying. We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there. Now, what that means in terms of intelligence failure, I think, is too strong a word to use at this point. What the regime was intending to do in terms of its use of the weapons, we thought we understood or we certainly had our best guess, our most dangerous, our most likely courses of action that the intelligence folks were giving us. We were simply wrong. But whether or not we're wrong at the national level, I think, still very much remains to be seen.

It is important to note that from an operational point of view, no commander could know whether weapons of mass destruction could or would be used to the end of the war, that there were many cases where units had to use protective gear, and that the speed of maneuver employed involved significant potential risk in the face of any sudden Iraqi escalation to the use of such weapons.

The fact that Iraq did not use chemical and biological weapons did not prevent repeated needs to use protection. In many cases, more sophisticated and quicker reacting detectors

and grids could have reduced the strain on US and British forces. It is also clear from the results of search for weapons of mass destruction during and after the war, that field equipment cannot rapidly and accurately characterize some chemical and biological threats and can produce serious false alarms. In case after case, units encountering suspect facilities and weapons trend to produce a false positive that could only be disproved after further testing in the rear.

Problems also still exist in using protection suits in combat. While reporting to date is anecdotal, several field reports indicate the equipment produced significant fatigue and interfered in operations. One typical field report states:

“we had guys tripping over their floppy MOPP boots trying to attack trench lines. One guy tripped, fell into a trench, and found himself fighting with a Republican Guardsman. Shot him in the head, by the way, and then took his MOPP boots off and tossed them out of frustration. Regardless of what people say, you can’t do fire and movement effectively in the shit for extended periods.”

This point is further illustrated in the report on the lessons of the war by the Commanding General of the 1 Marine Division:²⁶

During the planning phase for offensive operations in Iraq, it became apparent that the Division had insufficient decontamination capability to free us from contamination without siphoning off combat capability. The doctrine for NBC decontamination states that the NBC section needs augmentation from combat engineers, motor transport, and other Division elements. We assigned this task to 3rd AA Battalion along with the additional task of traffic management control. The Division NBC Platoon augmented the battalion to provide expertise and support. Decontamination sites were placed by water sources because the Division does not have the organic capability to transport the volume of water necessary to conduct decontamination operations.

Recommendation: ... Adopt the doctrinal roles of operational decontamination and traffic management and control. The Division possesses a more robust capability, in both personnel and equipment, to achieve the ability to conduct decontamination at the rate of one company per hour. CSS assets should be tasked with providing the water for the decontamination site to keep the location independent of local water sources.

Assessing proliferation is not simply an intelligence or policy problem, it is an operational problem, and the greater the uncertainty, the greater the operational dilemma in choosing between protective and defensive measures, and maintaining the tempo and focus of combat. If the Iraq War provides a lesson in this area, it is that the US and its allies have no reliable way as yet to reduce this dilemma, reduce the risks involved, or reliably deal with this aspect of asymmetric warfare.

Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search During and After the War

The Iraq War provides important lessons about the need to search for possible weapons of mass destruction and sensitive facilities during a war, and the need to secure such facilities as soon as possible. The US did carry out an ongoing effort to find and secure Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related facilities as it advanced, but this effort had limited manning, uncertain intelligence support, and could provide only limited coverage. The US lacked an effective plan and coordinated effort to secure Iraq WMD and missile facilities as US forces advanced, and some – including nuclear facilities – were looted as a result.

The US was so convinced that it would find large stocks of Iraqi weapons and/or major ongoing proliferation efforts that it failed to formulate a clear strategy for dealing with the almost inevitable charges it would conceal the facts and challenges in the UN over the lifting of sanctions.²⁷ The mix of biologists, chemists, nuclear experts, arms control experts, computer and document experts, and special forces troops was tailored around the case that Saddam had deployed weapons and given release authority to his commanders to use them under certain circumstances.²⁸ It did not really have the scale, expertise, language skills to deal with other types of Iraqi proliferation activity -- such as covert research and development efforts, tracking down complex patterns of illegal imports, locating and interviewing scientists, searching out concealed and dispersed facilities, and analyzing possible destruction sites.

The US made little preparation had been made for the start of a timely disarmament and inspection effort with a credible audit trail. It relied on US teams operating without international support and observers. It did not aggressively seek to include the UN. The inclusion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA would certainly have created political problems, but the US does not seem to have been sensitive to the need to create teams that would have a high degree of international credibility.²⁹

The Initial Search Effort

During the war, the US military tasked various elements of Special Forces and other units to search for weapons of mass destruction As US forces advanced into Iraq. The overall level of equipment and training was limited, however, and many units overreacted to suspected sites and failed to properly characterize the weapons, equipment, facilities and substances they found.³⁰ Task Force 20, the US Army Special forces team that had a key mission in this search was deployed in March and evidently before the actual fighting began. However, the team in Task Force 20 was relatively small and had the much broader mission of looking for key figures in the Iraqi leadership. Similar problems in resources and mission focus affected many of the other special purpose teams involved.³¹

The main initial US effort, however, was conducted by a 600 person group called 75th Exploitation Task Force which was supported by the 513th military intelligence brigade and smaller effort sent in by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. These specialists moved slowly and spent most their initial efforts going through known facilities slowly and by the numbers. They focused on the facilities most likely to have been vacated months earlier because they were known to be targets both for UNMOVIC and US military action, but failed to ensure that the US secured key declared facilities like the nuclear facilities subject to IAEA inspection.³²

There are conflicting reports about the pace of the initial search effort. One source reports that as of early May, the US, "had only secured only 44 of the 85 top potential weapons sites in the Baghdad area and 153 of the 372 considered most important to rebuilding Iraq's government and economy."³³ Others states that the US inspections teams had visited 19 top weapons sites, with two left for investigation, and that they had y surveyed another 45 out of 68 top "non-WMD sites," without known links to weapons of mass destruction, but suspect as potential sites.³⁴ In still another report, the 75th Exploitation Task Force was reported to have visited some 300 facilities by the end of May.³⁵ The true scale of the targeting and search problem may best be indicated by the

fact that Stephen A. Cambone, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, announced on May 30 that only 70 of roughly 600 potential weapons facilities had been examined out of an "integrated master site list" prepared by U.S. intelligence agencies before the Iraq War.³⁶

Expanding the Effort and Creating the Iraq Survey Group (ISG)

As time went on, the growing political and military problems created by the lack of an effective wartime and early postwar search effort forced the US to greatly expand its search team and give it far more capability. In late May, the US announced it would supplement the 75th Exploitation Task Force with a much larger Iraq Survey Group (ISG), that included elements from the US, British and Australian intelligence communities. The search effort was expanded to the point where the ISG was manned by between 1,300 and 1,400 people from the United States government and from the United Kingdom and Australia.

The way the US initially approached the post-war effort to survey Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and the reasons for creating the ISG, are described as follows in a Department of Defense briefing on May 7, 2003:³⁷

The command, USCENTCOM, has a command inside of Iraq known as the Coalition Land Component Commander -- Coalition Forces Land Component Commander or CFLCC...And each day, within that organization in what they have as their operation center, which is known as the C3, they sit down and work through their priorities. That priority list itself has been pulled together as a consequence of information that we had going into the conflict of sites that we thought important. As you know, there are some thousand sites that we identified; those sites included not just weapons of mass destruction sites, but also prisoner of war -- prisoner camps -- prisons, rather, prisoner of war locations, terrorist camps and facilities, as well as regime and leadership targets. So there are some thousand of them, roughly, of which about half are related to weapons of mass destruction..

...As it stands now, we have been to about 70 sites that we were looking to cover. Now, what's interesting about that is that those are the 70 sites that were on the list when we started. Since then, we have been to about another 40 which have come to light as a consequence of this process that I have been describing to you here. And the way this works is with respect to a WMD site in particular, once it's been identified, there is a survey team, which may have been there already, having come up with the troops as they came through the countryside, or sent out in advance. And they will go to the site, they will do a survey and determine whether or not it's important for more advanced units to come in and take a look at what's there. So, it's a site survey team. And so their job is done.

Next would come in a mobile exploitation team, an MET, as they're being called, which would do a much more thorough assessment of the site and also inspect any additional sites that USCENTCOM might have recommended.

And then, to the extent you need disablement of a facility or a capability in the site, there are disablement teams that are sent out to disarm, or render safe or destroy those -- any delivery systems, weapons, agents or facilities that might be found.

Now, the organization that currently is assigned this mission is...known as the 75th Group. It is assigned this discovery and exploitation mission. It, in turn, is supported by a military intelligence brigade, the 513th. These units have been, by the by, in theater for a very long period of time.

The expertise within the 75th Group extends across some 600 people, and they are distributed across interrogators, interviewers, people who do the document exploitations, the material exploitation and the analysts; that is, the people who each day sort of come together, take the information that's come on board and try then to make recommendations about what might be

done next. The expertise within the group is made up of people from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, from the individual services, from DTRA, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the FBI, and then there are coalition partners who, themselves, are part of this ongoing effort.

That group, the 75th, will soon, toward the end of this month, begin to have an augmentation take place, and that will be done under the auspices of what we're calling the Iraq Survey Group. That group will be headed by a two-star general, a major general, Keith Dayton, who, as it turns out, is a member of Admiral Jacoby's staff. He will take the lead for the discovery and the exploitation that we have been talking about. And in particular, its mission is to discover, take custody of, exploit and disseminate information on individuals, records, materials, facilities, networks and operations as appropriate relative to individuals associated with the regime, weapons of mass destruction, terrorists and terrorist ties and their organizations, information having to do with the Iraqi Intelligence, Security and Overseas Services, and those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and POWs. So it's a very large undertaking of which the weapons of mass destruction effort is a part in an important part of that effort, but only a part.

The organization will pretty much double or triple in size. There'll be some 1,300 experts who will be associated with this organization, plus another support element of maybe another 800. So you're talking about 2,000 people, more or less, who will begin arriving with the lead elements of the command starting toward the end of this month and the expertise, again, from the organizations I described a moment ago and will include, as well, people from Treasury, some of whom are already in theater, by the way, as well as U.S. citizens who had been in the past UNSCOM inspectors, some other contractors, and again, our coalition partners.

Now, that effort is going to be supported by a fusion cell that is being constructed here in Washington, again under the executive agency of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is made up of experts from around the United States government. And they receive information from the 75th Group now, and they will receive it from the ISG as it stands up. And their job is going to be to do that kind of in-depth analysis that's necessary in order to make this a successful effort over time.

...When one comes across a site where we think that we need to be taking samples, for example, there are roughly four sets of samples taken, one for processing in-theater, two are sent here to the United States, and another one is sent to a non-U.S. laboratory for independent analysis and the verification of the results of those tests. And there is a very strict chain of custody process that is put in place to assure that those samples are not tampered with either in the theater, in transit, when they're in the laboratories, or when the results come back to us here. That's all supplemented, then, as I said a moment ago, by interviewing the personnel who we think are involved. I made mention to you of the subordinate scientists as well as the lead scientists are being interviewed. The regime figures are interviewed. We go through the documents and so forth. And then, if we find we've got to dispose of materials, we do so in a way that is safe for all concerned.

The ISG's main center of activity remained in Iraq, with a headquarters in Baghdad, but it had additional facilities in Qatar. Its collection operation included a joint interrogation debriefing center, a joint materiel exploitation center, chemical and biological intelligence support teams and an ISG operation center. Its main analytic effort was co-located with the CENTCOM forward headquarters in Qatar, along with its combined media processing center. The ISG had liaison elements with CJTF-7 in Kuwait and with other U.S. government agencies inside Iraq, and an intelligence fusion center in Washington, D.C. All of its elements were linked electronically.³⁸

Conversion to a Forensic Search Effort

Somewhat ironically, the Coalition search for Iraq weapons of mass destruction was forced to take on much of the character of the previous UNMOVIC effort. It had to shift from a search for warfighting capability to a much more forensic effort to search through Iraqi records and facilities, a task greatly complicated by its inability to search many key

facilities from looting. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Lt. General Norman Schwartz, Director of Operations of the Joint Staff, testified to the House International Relations Committee in May that the Bush Administration now estimated that the process of determining Iraq's true level of proliferation could take years, and that no new chemical and biological weapons had yet been found.³⁹ Moreover, the US was forced to allow the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) to resume its inspection efforts.⁴⁰

It is still unclear what this search effort will find. In late June, US officials were talking about the need to go through tons of documents. They noted that the US had only taken custody of 69 of some 255 top Iraqi officials that might know something about the Iraqi WMD effort, and only seven of some 3,152 lower ranking officials. They also stated that the US had only conducted meaningful inspections of inspected only 157 of 578 suspect sites.⁴¹

As of July 2003, however, the US search effort had not shown that a single suspect site was a valid military target. It also had found any valid evidence that a significant Iraqi capability to use weapons of mass destruction existed before the war, or that Iraq had any major imminent capability to produce such weapons. The only meaningful discoveries were buried plans and parts for a centrifuge design dating back to 1991, and what appeared to be two trailers designed to produce biological weapons.⁴²

It seems certain, given the results of the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC effort, that the US will find some evidence of an ongoing program, but it far from clear what kind of Iraqi program and effort will emerge. However, the centrifuge discovery did nothing to shed significant light on recent Iraqi efforts.⁴³ The trailers may well be a more significant discovery, and the CIA has made a powerful case to this effect, but even experts within the US intelligence community – particularly within the State Department -- dispute whether the trailers are really being used for biological weapons purposes.⁴⁴ This again illustrates the inherent uncertainty surrounding estimates of proliferation and foreign WMD capabilities.

Lessons for the Future

The end result of the entire intelligence and search effort relating to Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has so far been to strengthen those who argued against the war, and who have since sought to discredit or block a Coalition-led nation-building effort. It also threatens to be specter that will haunt any future US and allied efforts to deal with the threat posed by proliferation, and particularly in winning for domestic and international political support for military or preemptive action.

The solution is to some extent to admit the scale of problems that currently exist in the collection and analytic effort, and then make major efforts to reduce them. It is also to lay the ground for any future action in a crisis by systematically educating decision makers, the media, and public opinion in the level of uncertainty that is inevitable in such assessments through a series of classified and unclassified intelligence products that are as detailed and objective as possible. Credibility and understanding have to be created over a period of years, not in a crisis. Moreover, the US and Britain need to understand that the Iraq War has left a heritage of distrust that now must be overcome.

It is not enough to have a preemptive strategy. The key argument for preemptive attack must be that it is in fact preemptive and that the potential threat is real enough to justify a major war. Legalistic arguments over whether threats must be imminent may have only secondary value in the real world, but the need to unambiguously resolve the kind of uncertainties that surrounded the Iraqi effort in weapons of mass destruction in both the Gulf War and Iraq War is a critical national priority. So is the need to examine far more intrusive methods of data gathering, such as unattended ground sensors. If the choice is between infractions of national sovereignty, and war or unacceptable risks, aggressive intelligence gathering and infractions of national sovereignty are by far the better course,

There are two important corollaries of this lesson. The first is that until this aspect of intelligence can be greatly improved and made far more accurate and reliable, the US, Britain, and other nations must place primary reliance on both operational and national defense and response capabilities. Missile defense is only one of these capabilities and currently may have limited cost-effectiveness. The fact the US could never characterize Iraqi links to terrorism or ability to make covert use of weapons like smallpox is a warning that defense and response must look at the full range of threats and possible asymmetric attacks.

The second corollary is that the problems involved go far beyond any failures on the part of the US. Over a decade of the most intrusive international inspection of a country in history also failed to characterize its efforts in weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, and failed to disarm Iraq. It is easy to focus on the fact that the US and Britain may have exaggerated the threat and miss the point,

The UN accomplished a great deal, and the work of the IAEA, UNSCOM, and UNMOVIC merit the world's gratitude and respect. What could be done was done. Nevertheless, an intensive international arms control effort using better means of inspection and arms control than cover any other nation in the world was still inadequate. This is a grim warning that major improvement are needed in the scope, intrusiveness, technology, and intelligence support provided for international arms control efforts if they are to be effective, and if they are ever to be an effective substitute for preemptive or other military action.

Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation-Building

There is another critical set of intelligence problems which related to the intelligence assessment of the Iraqi opposition, the attitudes of the Iraq people, and the divisions within Iraq as a nation, and which have proved to be of critical importance during conflict termination and the initial phases of nation building. One problem was that policymakers either did not want objective intelligence on the nature and capabilities of various elements of the external and internal Iraqi opposition or the intelligence community did not provide it. Adequate intelligence cannot focus simply on "enemies." It must also assess the strengths and weaknesses of potential "friends," and it must do so objectively and without policy level interference.

The US, in particular, seems to have failed to accurately assess information from exiles and defectors, many of whom lied or exaggerated their importance. At least some elements of the US government exaggerated the value and capabilities of outside Iraqi opposition movements like the Iraq National Congress. In at least some cases, they also

failed to objectively assess defector information, using information more because it supported policy than because the source had real credibility.

These problems in intelligence did not simply apply to the outside opposition. They applied to the assessment of key parts of the Iraq population like the Shi'ite south, where the US and Britain seem to have expected far more support than was forthcoming. It is unclear that a full risk analysis was performed of the probable impact of the US and British advance, and it is unclear that the intelligence effort had a good picture of the power structure within the Shi'ite south and the divisions within it. It seems virtually certain that intelligence underestimated the problems caused by the lack of any secular political structure within the Shi'ites, the importance of Shi'ite religious leaders and their search for political influence and power, and relative strength of Iranian-backed Shi'ite resistance movements versus other opposition movements.

Similar problems occurred in the mixed areas near Baghdad and the Sunni areas in central Iraq. The intelligence effort was not capable of distinguishing which towns and areas were likely to be a source of continuing Ba'athist resistance and support. The intelligence community exaggerated the risk of a cohesive Ba'ath resistance in Baghdad, the Sunni triangle, and Tikrit during the war, and was not prepared to deal with the rise of a much more scattered and marginal resistance by Ba'ath loyalists after the war.

It is less clear that intelligence failed to assess the problems that were likely to occur within the Kurdish areas of Iraq, the deep divisions between the Talibani and Barzani factions, and the potential divisions between Kurd, Arab, and Turcoman. Nevertheless, the US and its allies still seem to have been unprepared for these problems.

It has been suggested in Chapter VI that many of the problems in analytic and collection capability cannot be called "intelligence failures" and are rather current "intelligence impossibilities." At the same time, the failures just listed were avoidable, and they were compounded by the failure of the intelligence community to come to grips with the need for intelligence tailored to conflict termination and nation building versus intelligence on warfighting.

This was almost certainly partly the failure of US policymakers, who failed to provide proper tasking – and who may sometimes have discourage such analysis. At the same time, at least CIA was very slow to address the issues involved, and effectively did so only in late 2002, months after an interagency effort and State Department task force had highlighted the importance of such an effort. When this effort did begin, it was weakly staffed, demonstrated a serious lack of analytic depth and area expertise, and had a high degree of theoretical content.

The following chapters also suggest that this intelligence failure is part of a much broader policy level failure to come to grips with the problem of conflict termination and nation building before, during, and at the end of the war. US strategy seems to have correctly identified the fact that threats are becoming more and more asymmetric, and have a steadily greater ideological and regional content. US practice has failed to come to grips with the fact that military forces can defeat the main elements of such threats – whether they are military forces as in the case of Iraq or guerilla and terrorist forces as in the case of Al Qaida and the Taliban – but that only a successful nation building effort can prevent such threats from mutating or new threats from emerging. In any case, a major change is

needed in the mindset, focus, and analytic/collection capabilities of the intelligence community to deal with conflict termination and nation building.

Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare

The skill and scale of the Coalition military victory does not mean that the US and Britain do not need to learn painful lessons about the political, diplomatic, and psychological dimensions of the war. The tactical effort in psychological warfare seems to have had significant successes. One of the key lessons of the war, however, is that the US and Britain failed to conduct a successful political, diplomatic, and psychological campaign at the tactical, strategic, and grand strategic level.

Limited Success in Psychological Warfare

The US and Britain had considerable success in those aspects of psychological warfare that helped cause Iraqi military inaction and expedite surrenders such as dropping of leaflets, etc. The Psyops effort involved some 58 EC-130E Commando Solo sorties, and 306 broadcast hours of radio and 304 hours of broadcast television. Compass Call flew another 125 EC-130H sorties, and many made an effort to jam Iraqi communications. The psyops team prepared some 108 radio messages and 81 different leaflets. The Coalition ultimately dropped nearly 32 million leaflets, and flew 158 leaflet missions both to drop over civilian and military areas, Interestingly enough they included 32 A-10 and 68 F-16CJ HARM sorties – a strong indication that leaflet drops were timed to go to Iraqi combat troops at the most critical moment. The evidence to date indicate that these mission helped considerably to either persuade Iraqi forces not to fight or to defect/desert/surrender.

The Coalition failed, however, to silence Iraqi radio and TV in spite of the fact it included at least 10 major media targets among its total of 116 C⁴I targets. While the Iraqi Information Minister's daily briefings took on the character of a popular farce in the West, they had considerable impact in Iraq and the Arab world. The continuing presence of the media in Iraq also allowed Iraq to exploit both Arab and Western media and to have a major voice in the world up to the day the regime abandoned its effort to defend Baghdad.

More generally, the psychological warfare effort failed to lay the groundwork for conflict termination and nation building. This was partly the result of the intelligence failure to accurately assess Iraqi attitudes and public opinion, and the Coalition clearly misread the level of popular Iraqi support it had at the time it attacked. The US, in particular, missed the cumulative impact of (a) its failure to support the uprising in 1991, (b) its failure to conduct a meaningful public diplomacy campaign to explain that it was not responsible for the suffering of the Iraqi people under UN sanctions, (c) Iraqi and Arab hostility to the US because of its support of Israel and the Arab portrayal of the Second Intifada, and (d) the Coalition's failure to convincing rebut various regional conspiracy theories such as the assumption that its goals were "neoimperialist" or it was fighting to seize Iraqi oil.

As a result, far too little effort was made to persuade key factions in Iraq, and the Iraqi people as a whole, that the Coalition was not seeking to oust Saddam Hussein for its own benefit and was not fighting the war to take control of Iraqi oil, use Iraq as a military

base, or serve Israel's interests. The tactical psychological and political warfare effort failed to address conspiracy theories in a country and region where such theories usually have far more impact than vague promises about liberation and democracy, and whose history gives it little reason to trust the West.

Perhaps because the US and Britain put too much faith in the reassurances of the outside opposition, the psychological and political warfare effort made little effort to reassure Iraq's Shi'ites and failed to understand the importance of dealing with their religious leaders – the only meaningful opposition to the regime inside Iraq after Saddam's political purges of 1979. Similar problems occurred in dealing with the Kurds, and the need to avoid Kurdish versus Arab and Turcoman confrontations in the north. The US also made attempts to bribe and subvert Iraqi Sunni officials and commanders, but failed to provide any clear picture of their fate after the liberation.

More generally, however, the US and Britain also failed before, during, and after the war to set clear goals for their nation building effort in Iraq. As is discussed in a following chapter, they did not carry out the kind of positive psychological and political warfare effort that could assure both the Iraqi people as a whole, and key elements within Iraq, that the Coalition had workable plans for nation building that would both meet immediate and urgent needs and produce the kind of "Iraq for the Iraqis" that gave the Iraqi a strong incentive to cooperate with the Coalition. No psychological and political warfare effort is competent which only focuses on defeating the enemy and fails to deal with conflict termination and nation building, and the failure to carry out effective programs in this area was a serious defect in the US and British efforts.

Longstanding Failures in Public Diplomacy

There are a number of reasons why the Coalition failed in the strategic aspects of No psychological and political warfare. Part of the problem lay in the fact that the Clinton Administration never developed a meaningful or effective public diplomacy for dealing with Iraq and the Iraqi people. It relied largely on the impact of the victory in the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli peace process. It did not attempt to explain the reasons for UN sanctions, the nature of the oil for food program, or deal with aggressive Iraqi efforts to persuade the Iraqi people and many others that the US and UK were responsible for their suffering. It also failed to conduct any meaningful public diplomacy to explain and justify its military presence in the Gulf and Arab world.

The Clinton Administration also never rebutted the exaggerated charges that the US had strongly encouraged public uprisings in Iraq in 1990-1991, when a limited US campaign focused largely on persuading the Arab military. It allowed the myth to be disseminated that it was somehow responsible for the ability of Saddam Hussein to put down the uprisings because the ceasefire agreement did not prevent Iraqi use of combat helicopters. It failed to explain the reasons the US had not actively sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein immediately after the Gulf War, and it allowed the INC to claim that it could somehow have threatened Saddam Hussein militarily if it had only had more active US backing.

The Clinton Administration attempted to make a case against Iraqi proliferation without seeming to understand that while much of the region feared Saddam Hussein, it saw

proliferation as a legitimate reaction to Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and the conventional strength of the US.

Problems Stemming from the Bush Administration

The Bush Administration inherited these failures and the backlash from the breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process. It does not seem to have understood, however, just how angry Arab public opinion became over the Second Intifada, US ties to Israel and the way they were portrayed by much of the Arab media, hostile Arab governments, and Arab and Islamic extremist movements.

The Bush Administration also dealt with the aftermath of "9/11" by allowing a climate to grow up in which much of the Arab world perceived it as anti-Arab and anti-Islamic. The fact that this was untrue simply compounded the fact that the US failed in the kind of broader political and psychological warfare that is vital to winning the war on terrorism, as well as failed to lay the political groundwork for war against Iraq. This was made worse by the Bush Administration's failure to explain its support for democracy in terms that did not appear to threaten its Arab allies and that sometimes appeared to be an attack on -- if not contempt for -- Arab societies.

As has been touched upon earlier, both the US and Britain left their efforts to explain the threat posed by the Iraqi search for weapons of mass destruction until the last moment and issued propaganda-like statements and briefings at a time they seemed to be more a rationale for war than a legitimate warning. They made only belated cases for regime change and then failed to clearly define their goals for Iraqi nation-building in ways that defused the host of fears, Arab resentments, and conspiracy theories that war was the almost inevitable byproduct of the decision to go to war. The US also obviously badly miscalculated the support it could gain in the UN, its problems with its traditional allies in Europe, and key bilateral relations like those with Turkey.

The Strategic and Grand Strategic Aspects of Psychological and Political Warfare

Some of these failures are the result of the ideological character of the Bush Administration, and its reluctance to come to grips with the realities of peace making and nation building. It is important to note, however, that the Clinton Administration made serious mistakes of its own and that throughout both administrations, the professionals of the US State Department failed to articulate and carry out a coherent and effective campaign of public diplomacy and see their function as one which was to support US policy in terms equivalent to psychological and political warfare. This lack of professionalism, and aggressive action within the State Department reached the point where its public diplomacy was often little more than passive diplomacy.

The cumulative result is that the US and Britain must now achieve an extraordinary degree of success in nation-building to win the peace that can win the war. They must also address the Arab-Israeli peace problem in ways that have considerably more visibility and success, and deal with a host of problems in rebuilding their relations in the Arab world and the West. The key lesson for the future should be that is that the strategic and grand strategic dimensions of psychological and political warfare are at least as important as the tactical dimensions, and effective operations must focus long before any actual fighting begins on conflict termination and nation building

THE VALUE OF ALLIES AND BUILD-UP TIME

The Iraq War provides important lessons about regional friends and allies. In spite of all of the tensions between the US and the Arab world over terrorism and the Second Intifada, the United States obtained sustained open support from Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, and quiet support from Jordan Saudi Arabia. This illustrated both the general value of regional friends and alliances, and the dangers of assuming that force transformation is a substitute for foreign bases and the support of foreign states.

Access to allied territory in the Gulf allowed the US and Britain to deal with the key logistic problems in their build-up by slowly delivering virtually all of the supplies and major land combat equipment used by sea over the period from June 2002 to February 2003. The two major Coalition partners had access to the critical bases in the Gulf that they needed for operations. Their allies in the Gulf then made substantial adjustments to accommodate a democratic Turkey's refusal to allow the US to create a northern front or use facilities in that country.

In spite of tensions over the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the US on September 11th, 2001, Saudi Arabia allowed overflights by US aircraft and missiles, allowed the expanded use of Saudi airbases for "No Fly Zone" missions that helped weaken Iraqi air defenses before the war and during the war, provided fuel at minimal cost for AWACS and E-8C missions on Saudi soil, allowed the use of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) to manage Coalition air operations, and made facilities at Ar Ar available for Special Forces search and rescue missions. Above all, it ensured the flow of oil exports in ways that helped compensate for the loss of Iraqi and Venezuelan exports.⁴⁵ While US combat forces will leave Saudi Arabia following the Iraq War, it is important to that US advisory teams will remain, that the Kingdom is still taking delivery on tens of billions of dollars worth of US military exports, that joint exercises continue, and Saudi Arabia may be of great value to the US and Britain in the future.⁴⁶

Other Arab allies also helped. Egypt allowed free transit through the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace, and Jordan quietly allowed US operations in the south as well as overflight operations. Jordan permitted US overflights, and allowed US Patriot units and missile warning systems to operate on its soil. It quietly allowed the USAF and US Special forces to operate from bases in Eastern Jordan. At least 24 F-16s, equipped with Litening II targeting pods and armed with weapons like the GBU-27 laser-guided bomb operated from Jordanian soil. They flew roughly 700 sorties. Special Forces operated from Jordan to search for Scud launch boxes in western Iraq.⁴⁷

The US had assistance from still another ally. Israel permitted overflights, did not increase the tempo of its operations in the Second Intifada, and relied on defense in the initial phases of the war.

In short, no discussion of the lessons of the Iraq War should ignore the continuing value of alliances and foreign bases, and the need for coalition partners. Equally, it should not ignore the value of decades of military relations and engagement with friendly Arab states, and the willingness of those states to support the US even when they sometimes opposed the war or this presented serious problems in terms of domestic political opinion. It is all too easy for the US to be blinded by the beauty of its weapons and ignore these

lessons. Regardless of force transformation and any new way of war, US strength remains dependent on coalitions, even when these are coalitions of the partly willing.

To be more specific, the defeat of Iraq also does not justify any negligence in rebuilding the relations that underpin the US alliance with Europe, efforts to strengthen relations with Russia, or efforts to strengthen US ties to the Arab world. As the next chapters discuss, it is all too easy to talk about transforming Iraq and the Middle East, and far more difficult to achieve even moderate success. The success of US arms has not been matched by the success of US diplomacy and nation building not only is not a science, it is not yet an art form.

It is absurd to talk about “fourth world wars” with states that have generally been friendly. It is equally absurd to talk about regime change in the Middle East without explaining exactly how this change is to be accomplished, why it will meet the needs of the peoples involved, and why it will produce better and more stable results than encouraging self-reform that addresses demographic, economic, and cultural issues and not simply a demand for instant democracy. Trading Arab friends and allies for radical religious regimes, or “one man, one vote, one time is not a strategy likely to serve any nation’s interest.

Once again, military victory in Iraq is not a reason for American “triumphalism.” If anything, it should be a prelude to readjusting the US military presence in the Gulf and Middle East to reflect the downfall of a dangerous tyrant and reduction in the threat, to concentrating on nation-building in Iraq, to strengthening and rebuilding tie to Arab allies, and using diplomacy and the momentum of victory to discourage proliferation and the threat of terrorism. It is also a time to try to use US prestige and power to offer Israel real and lasting security by advancing a peace process that can seek to end the Second Intifada, and do so on terms that both give Israel security and the Palestinians dignity. The US cannot do this alone, but nothing can succeed without such a US effort.

Similarly, the fact the US now has no military peer, and faces major interoperability problems in integrating its forces with those of most allies, does not mean it does not need NATO or allied countries. It is inconceivable, for example, that the US could fight North Korea without South Korea taking on most of the military burden and Japanese support in terms of basing. Designing transformational forces to be interoperable may have its costs, but the value of allies like Britain and Australia has long been clear, as is the value of new allies like Poland in the Iraq War.

The risk of the US becoming isolated from the warfighting capabilities of even its closest allies is also illustrated by the statement of Admiral Sir William Boyce after the Iraq War. Admiral Boyce took the opportunity of his retirement to state a few lessons from the Iraq War that act as yet another warning about the growing gap between US and allied capabilities. He said that Britain’s armed forces were overstretched, and should not pursue another war for eighteen months. Admiral Boyce said: “If you asked us to go into a large scale operation in 2004, we couldn’t do it without serious pain. We must allow ourselves time to draw breath...If it was to be something of the scale that we have done this time, it would have to be something that the government is convinced is pretty important because I would tell them it would take a while to recuperate.”⁴⁸

Admiral Boyce said that the armed forces could not handle another "discretionary conflict, a conflict waged by choice" if it were launched in 2004. He also questioned the need to spend £18 billion on 232 Euro fighters when bombers had proved much more important than fighters in the conflict, but said that British plans for two new "super aircraft carriers" had been proved necessary by the diplomatic difficulties of flying planes over sensitive countries in the run up to the invasion of Iraq. The fact that transformational changes are at least as difficult for allies as for the US is not a casual lesson. Cooperation and interoperability are critical unless the US military wish to become very lonely.

CONFLICT TERMINATION, PEACEMAKING AND NATION BUILDING

There is nothing new about the lesson that it is harder to implement grand strategy than to be successful in implementing strategy and tactics. It is one of the iron laws of military history that armies are far better equipped to win the war than to win the peace, and that strategic objectives in warfighting are far easier to achieve than the grand strategic objectives necessary to shape the peace that has lasting value.

It is also unfair to exaggerate the scale of the problems that emerged during conflict termination, peace making, and the transition to nation building:

- There was remarkably little initial resistance to US and British forces, and Saddam's regime failed to mobilize any significant portion of the Iraqi people to resist the Coalition advance.
- An expected humanitarian crisis did not emerge. Problems rapidly developed in security, in terms of looting, medical services, and in the material aspects of life -- ranging from the availability of utilities like water and power to continuity in trade and employment. In broad terms, however, there were no major life-threatening problems with food or basic services.
- While the US and Britain failed to halt looting, they largely succeeded in preventing Saddam's supporters from destroying Iraq's oil production and export facilities or crippling the economy.
- For all of the postwar chaos and tensions in Iraqi city, the "Battle of Baghdad" was quick and involved minimal collateral damage and most Iraqi cities emerged intact.
- No major crises or clashes emerged in the north between Kurds and Arabs and Turkey did not intervene.
- Iran did not intervene and the Iranian-sponsored outside opposition did not take military action.
- Although attacks on Coalition forces and sabotage began almost immediately, the level of such action was very low for a nation of some 25 million people that had been ruled by Saddam and the Ba'ath Party for nearly 30 years, whose economy had begun to collapse as early as 1982 as a result of the cost of the Iran-Iraq War, and where power had always been given to a small Sunni elite at the expense of a Shi'ite majority and a large Kurdish minority.

The fact remains, however, that the Coalition's success in joint warfare was not matched by its success in conflict termination, peacemaking, and in transitioning to nation building. This was partly a matter of force ratios: The same strategy designed to deliver a carefully focused attack on the regime did not provide enough manpower to simultaneously occupy and secure the areas that the Coalition liberated and fell short of the manpower necessary to occupy the country.

The Coalition might also have been better prepared if, as had originally been planned, it had gained the support of a second UN Security Council Resolution, and had been able to draw upon the support of a wide range of other nations immediately after the end of the war. This, however, is questionable. It is easy to task the UN and "international community," but they have no resources other than those contributed by individual states. Moreover, only a limited number of countries have forces trained and equipped for actual "peacemaking" under conditions that involve actual combat.

Most foreign forces are not capable of dealing with local military and security threats in actual combat and would have had little value, and would have presented a host of interoperability problems from language to a lack of self-protection capability. Moreover,

other nations have very finite supply of either “peacemakers” or “peacekeepers,” and most of these resources were already deployed in other contingencies and crises. International forces also would have had to rely on the US for lift and sustainment at a time when the US had limited capacity and Iraq did not have functioning ports and airports.

The Impact of Limited Military Resources

Virtually all wars involve a chaotic transition from war to peace, and the US and Britain do not seem to have properly prepared to secure the areas they liberated, or to deal with the wide range of local, regional, ethnic and religious divisions they encountered. Key objectives were not secured against looting, the flow of aid was slow, and little preparation was made to deal with long-standing historical tensions.

This was partly a result of the sheer speed of the Iraqi regime’s collapse at the end of the war, Iraqi tactics that made it impossible to enter cities without diverting forces to secondary missions, and the problems created by not having a second front from Turkey and anything like the force totals originally planned.

General Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described the problem as follows in the Department of Defense daily briefing on April 15, 2003:

“You know, some have suggested, “Well, gee, you should have delayed combat operations to protect against looting, or you should have had more forces, should have waited till more forces arrived.” To that I would say this: The best way to ensure fewer casualties on [the] coalition side and fewer civilian casualties is to have combat operations proceed as quickly as possible and not prolong them. And so it gets back to the -- a matter of priorities. And we're dealing with some of those issues that you just brought up...the first thing you have to deal with is loss of life, and that's what we dealt with. And if you remember, when some of that looting was going on, people were being killed, people were being wounded.”

Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, the commander of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command described the military reasons as follows:⁴⁹

we had to fight our way into Baghdad. Now, that fight was characterized by decisive armor and infantry actions into Baghdad before he could set an urban defense of Baghdad. And the speed of our campaign allowed us really to seize the initiative and to exploit success, but even with that, we had to fight our way into Baghdad. So I can tell you from being here that those lead formations, both Marine and Army that maneuvered into Baghdad first of all, were killing bad guys, and secondly, were protecting Iraqi people. And so if some of the facilities became subject to looting over that period of time by Iraqis, I will tell you that our priority was to fight the enemy and to protect Iraqi people.

...I am satisfied that the forces are here (now) and are continuing to flow here that will allow me to execute what are my phase four missions, and that is to provide a degree, a certain degree of stability and security in Iraq as we transition back to Iraqis in control of their own country. I would caveat that, though, by reminding everyone that there aren't enough soldiers or Marines to guard every street corner and every facility in Iraq, so there's some risk-taking in some areas. And we try to focus our forces where our intelligence and mission sets drive us to focus those forces. But I am satisfied that I have had enough forces on the ground to execute the campaign very decisively to this point. And we have the additional forces we need for phase four flowing in now.

Lt. General William Wallace, defended V Corps problems in dealing with looting and civil unrest as follows:⁵⁰

We train for war fighting, but peacekeeping is something that we do. If you look across our formation, I would bet that 30 percent or more of our soldiers have had some real-world peacekeeping experience in the Balkans. So we have a lot of experience in how to deal with civil affairs, with civilian populations, with establishing institutions to get civilian populations involved in their own destiny. There is just a lot of experience in our forces with this civil-military dynamic, largely as a result of our operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

...One day our troops are kicking down doors, and the next they're passing out Band-Aids. And in some cases, they're kicking down doors without really knowing if they are going to have to pull a trigger or pass out a Band-Aid on the other side. And it's really a remarkable tribute to the mental acuity of our soldiers that they are able to do that.

Avoidable Problems

At the same time, all of these statements describe the resource problems and limitations that existed largely because the US failed to properly plan for conflict termination before the war, and to provide the proper resources. A wide range of problems could have been avoided during the war and immediately after it. The fact remains that the US, as the leader of the Coalition and the only power with the necessary resources to act, failed to effectively terminate the conflict for the following reasons:

Problems in International Coordination

- It may have been impossible to shape an international consensus as to how to deal with the problems involved, but the US and UK did not seem to have a clear plan to either seek such a consensus within the UN, or a clear back up plan if that effort failed.
- The Coalition drew on many Arab allies for bases and support in war fighting but failed to get the level of regional support for peacemaking and nation building it needed after the fighting.

Failures in US Policymaking and Leadership

- The Bush Administration had received advice from a number of sources that US experience in Panama, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo showed it was critical to introduce a trained constabulary or military police force immediately into urban areas after the fall of local and national authority to prevent looting, civil unrest, and acts of revenge. US military forces do not have training for these missions, however, and the countries that do did not participate in the Coalition. As a result, there were no personnel on the ground with the dedicated mission of maintaining order and with the training and skills to do so.
- The Coalition conducted a psychological warfare campaign, but failed to conduct a meaningful campaign to tell the Iraqi people how it planned to allow them to shape the peace, and what the Coalition would do to make that possible. Iraqis had no clear idea of what to expect when the Coalition arrived and many had a conspiracy theory picture of its goals and motives.
- At least some senior US political leaders ignored warnings from intelligence, military, and regional experts that the Coalition forces would not be greeted as liberators, and that the Coalition should expect to deal with a mixture of anti-Western/anti-colonial sentiment and deep ethnic and religious tensions and divisions.
- The US failed to develop a coordinated interagency approach to planning and executing peace making and nation building before and during the war. Much of the benefit of detailed planning efforts was lost or made ineffective. This reflected a broader and continuing failure of leadership within the Bush Administration. The National Security Council acted largely in an advisory role and did not force effective interagency coordination.
- Deep divisions occurred between the State Department and Department of Defense during the US effort to plan for peacemaking and nation building. When Defense was put in charge in

late 2002, evidently because the problem of establishing security was given primacy, much of the State Department and other interagency efforts were dropped or given low priority.

- The military correctly understood that the enemy had to be fully defeated, the remnants of the regime had to be purged, and order had to be established to allow effective nation building to be established. It did not, however, properly size and train its forces for these missions. It did not properly train forward and combat units for dealing with activities like looting and the problems in distinguishing between hostile and non-violent civilians and irregular forces and enemies. In many ways, troops were trained to fight asymmetric warfare but not to deal with the consequences of victory.

Failures at the Field and Tactical Levels

- The direction of the nation building effort initially lacked the kind of driving leadership needed for success, and few involved had real area expertise or experience with peacemaking and nation building.
- Humanitarian efforts and expertise were sometimes confused with a very different mission, and weeks were wasted making the transition from planning to deal with a non-existent humanitarian crisis to very real and immediate problems in peacemaking and nation building. Key issues like jobs and economic security were address much later than should have been the case.
- Looting and criminal activity were not seen as major problems during the war or in preparing for conflict termination in spite of several thousand years of warning that this could be the case, and the fact that it was clear that Iraq 's prewar economy was driven by nepotism and influence and much of Iraq's population had reasons to feel it was justified in acting against the regime and strong reasons to do so.
- The US failed to create an effective structure for managing the peace making and nation building effort in the field, to clearly subordinate the military to General Garner and Ambassador Bremer on a timely and effective basis, and to task the military accordingly.
- The lack of civil-military coordination greatly complicated the practical problems in actually providing aid and keeping promises.
- Military commanders do not seem to have fully understood the importance of the peacemaking and nation building missions. They often did not provide the proper support or did so with extensive delays and little real commitment.
- The "jointness" that helped the US win the war was almost totally lacking during the conflict termination and peacemaking stage. No US commander seemed to have responsibility. Even within the Army, major difference emerged in how given units performed their tasks (The 3rd Infantry Division favored reacting to incidents; the 4th Division aggressively patrolled.) There was no cohesion to the military effort.
- Even where military resources were clearly available, too little emphasis was placed on immediately securing key urban areas and centers of government.
- In urban areas, the initial security efforts were generally reactive rather than part of a cohesive effort to provide security for the entire area. This left constant gaps in coverage and allowed looting, firefights, and ambushes to occur before an effort was made to act.
- US forces lacked enough people with the necessary language and area skills, and the limited numbers of such experts that were available were dedicated to warfighting tasks.
- The US and its allies failed to assess the motives and competence of the outside Iraqi opposition. Members of the Iraqi opposition had their own goals and ambitions and often proved to be unreliable in such roles.

- At least initially, the US tried to select leaders and representatives from within Iraq on the basis of its views of what Iraq should be, rather than letting such leaders emerge from within key Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups.
- The “De-Ba’athification” effort was handled in too rigid a way for a country that had been under the same dictatorship for nearly three decades. Senior officials and officers were excluded from the nation-building role simply because of rank and Ba’ath membership, rather than screened on a person-by-person basis. The end result was to compound the power vacuum created by the systematic murder and purging of secular opposition from 1979 onwards,
- The problem of establishing an actual interim authority was addressed by creating a semi-civilian body unprepared to enter and operate a still hostile country at the earliest possible period.
- Humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations do not operate in hostile military environments, but demand high levels of protection to perform humanitarian missions with short term goals that ignore the need to fully secure areas and create the political basis for nation building. In contrast, military organizations have not yet adapted to the need to provide suitable protection for humanitarian organizations and NGOs. Both sides need to change their present procedures.

The Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of Warfighting

There is nothing new about the failure to give conflict termination the proper priority. The history of warfare is generally one where the immediate needs of war fighting, tactics, and strategy are given priority over grand strategy. Conflict termination has generally been treated as a secondary priority, and the end of war has often been assumed to lead to a smooth transition to peace or been dealt with in terms of vague plans and ideological hopes.

The US was unprepared for effective conflict termination in the Gulf War, and sought to avoid the security and nation building missions in the Afghan conflict. It encountered serious problems in dealing with conflict termination and the aftermath of war in the Spanish American War, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and virtually all of history’s major military victors have failed to capitalize on their victories in grand strategic terms in at least some important respects.

Nevertheless, much more could have been done before, during and immediately after the war *if* the Coalition, and especially the US, had not seen conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building as secondary missions, and *if* a number of senior US policymakers had not assumed the best case in terms of Iraqi postwar reactions to the Coalition attack. The US was the only country in the world that could have provided the necessary resources to ensure a successful transition from conflict to nation building, and it failed to do so.

A Failure of US Leadership and Organization

The broad failures in US policy that failed to give conflict termination the proper priority and underestimated the scale of the problems in nation building were compounded by major organizational problems within the US government. These problems included deep divisions between the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and other agencies. The State Department had attempted to coordinate systematic planning for

nation building during the course of 2002, but this effort took the form of interagency consulting bodies that never had clear authority or unified Cabinet-level policy support. They also were largely civilian, and were not capable of handling the security problems that arise in liberated areas during combat or of dealing with the problems in securing a nation after the most intense phases of combat ended.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense was formally given the lead for conflict termination, and the early phases of nation building, in late 2002 and early 2003. This seems to have been because US military forces were the only instrument that could perform the security mission during and immediately after combat. In assuming this mission, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense left much of the previous interagency process hanging, and took a heavily ideological approach to the issue that assumed the Coalition would have far more popular support, particularly in the south, than it actually did.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense also assumed that Saddam Hussein's regime would fall in ways that left much of the Iraqi government and economy functioning – an assessment that ignored both the acute limits to the process of government under Saddam and the fact that much of the planning for war assumed a far more serious battle of Baghdad than took place. The Department also ignored case after case in which earlier collapses of authoritarian regimes ended in looting and sectarian or ethnic divisions and violence.

Put differently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had large numbers of policymakers who had earlier seen the Clinton Administration's focus on nation building as a waste of US resources. They concentrated on warfighting and assumed that conflict termination would be a more limited priority. They also did so in the face of advice to the contrary from many area experts within the US government, US officials with experience in peacemaking and nation building, experts within the intelligence community, and the wide assortment of outside experts that had been brought in to advise the interagency planning groups. There certainly was no consensus as to how the security and nation building problems should be dealt with. There was, however, a consensus that the problems would probably be far more serious and immediate than the Office of the Secretary of Defense planned for.

These organizational failures were compounded by the failure of the National Security Council to act as a forceful body that could make the interagency process work. This was partly a matter of personalities, and a lack of clear lines of responsibility within the NSC and administrative capability, but it also reflected a deliberate decision by the President to treat the NSC as more an advisory body than as an active manager.

There are good intellectual and theoretical arguments for such an approach to running the NSC in a government based on lines of responsibility going through Cabinet-level officials. The problem is that they simply do not work in practice when new and demanding interagency coordination and action must be taken. Worse, the stronger the Cabinet members, the stronger the role of the NSC must be, and the tensions and competition between the leadership of Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and Secretary Rumsfeld has led to stronger interagency competition under President George W. Bush than at any time in recent memory. The need for "Jointness" is not something

that simply applies to the US military, it must apply to the entire US government, and it seems far easier for civilians to press the military for “jointness” than to recognize the need for it in their own operations.

The Inability of the US Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy

At the same time, at least some of the failure to prepare and implement effective plans for conflict termination were the result of conceptual problems within the US military. Western military forces are not political forces, and professional warfighters like the US and British military tend to see peace making and nation building as a diversion from their main mission. It also seems far to argue that conflict termination and the role of force in ensuring stable peacetime outcomes has always been a weakness in modern military thinking. Tactics and strategy, and military victory, have always had priority over grand strategy and winning the peace.

Another source of the failure to prepare and implement effective plans for conflict termination were the result of the US military culture, which fails to look beyond war fighting in defining the role and responsibility of the US military. The subordination of the military to civilian control in the US leads to a natural reluctance on the part of the US military to become involved in planning for “political” activities like conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building; and to challenge civilian policy makers in these areas. Soldiers naturally focus on war rather than conflict termination.

American military thinking simply has not focused enough on grand strategy, conflict termination, or the consequences of military action. US staff colleges have begun to explore the issue, but force transformation and the tactics and strategy of dealing with new threats like terrorism, proliferation, and asymmetric warfare have had priority. As a result, US military thinking tends to focus on winning the war rather than winning the peace, although defeat of the enemy in battle is pointless unless it results in a successful grand strategic outcome.

Resource problems compound the US military’s reluctance to become involved in conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building. The US military faces broad stresses in terms of global deployments and resource limitations that make military planners try to avoid committing high technology soldiers to largely low technology peacemaking missions. There is a natural desire to avoid tying troops down in open-ended security, peace making, and nation building efforts. Few officers want to devote major resources to creating large forces trained largely for peace making, and with the required skills in terms of area expertise and language.

Such forces require specialized training and equipment for security and paramilitary police functions, humanitarian assistance, and nation building and the creation of dedicated forces for such missions comes at the direct expensive of war fighting capabilities. Quite naturally, US military planners and commanders see such activities as a diversion from their main mission, as a further stress on an over-deployed force structure, and as missions that should be performed by less capable allied forces.

What military planners and commanders want, however, is not necessarily what they should get or be ordered to do. Even in World War II, the failure to plan for conflict

termination helped create many of the problems that led to the Cold War, and successful nation building in Germany and Japan occurred more as a result of the fact they already were strong, cohesive nations.

The challenges involved have also grown far more urgent since the end of the Cold War. Most of the wars of the 21st Century are likely to be fought in developing countries and nations that lack an effective political structure and government, and with serious ethnic and sectarian divisions. In many cases, the US and its allies will be fighting nations or terrorist/extremist movements with hostile ideologies, different cultural values, and societies that operate on the margin of poverty and with limited practical ability to function as modern economies. Basic functions of the state, such as the effective rule of law, will be missing or so flawed that they must be rebuilt from the ground up. The defeated country may be generally hostile to many aspects of Western and secular culture, and have no meaningful political parties or internal opposition.

Iraq is scarcely likely to be the last conflict in which the US and its allies must fight without cohesive international support. Even when the US does have that support, there are no large pools of trained peacemakers to draw upon, and many nations who claim to structure their forces for peacekeeping missions cannot project or support them for sustained missions, and are unwilling to use them in situations where they must actually fight to create and maintain a peace. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can only provide limited support. They are organized primarily for humanitarian missions in a peaceful, or at least permissive environment. NGOs will always be a critical source of help, but they will never be a substitute for military operations.

The end result is that the US military needs to fully accept the fact that conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building are as much a part of their mission as war fighting. They must have the same priority as combat if terrorists and unstable countries are not to mutate, change tactics, and reemerge in a different form. No strategy for asymmetric warfare can be adequate that does not address these tasks as being as critical as the defeat of most enemy forces in battle.

The US military did not learn this lesson from the first Gulf War, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. In the case of Afghanistan, it was not really ready to act on even the most basic lessons of conflict termination, such as the critical need to secure the country during the period between the fall of a regime and the moment self-appointed leaders try to seize local power. As a result, the need to see conflict termination and the transition to nation building as a critical military mission is one of the most important single lessons of the Iraq War.

There is No “New Way of War” Without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation building

The US and its allies must also learn this lesson as a basic part of force transformation. This is a dangerous time to talk about a new way of war without talking about a new way of peace. In the 21st Century, planning and training for conflict termination, peace making and nation building have to be given the same priority as planning for peace. Like it or not, most limited wars will only be won by success in these efforts, and the morality and ethics of the use of force can only be justified in these terms.

As a result, jointness must be restructured on a civil-military, and interagency, basis to provide more capability in these missions if US, British, and other Western power projection forces are to get the domestic, allied, and other foreign support they need to act. Stable war fighting outcomes can only be achieved if the country defeated or fought over becomes stable after the war. Put differently, even the best military victory cannot, by itself, win the peace.

This requires both political decision makers, and military planners and commanders, to accept the lesson they must make the same commitment to winning the peace they make to military victory. The only justification for war is the pragmatic result. Simply defeating today's enemy without creating the conditions for future stability is a near certain recipe for future conflict. As a result, peacekeeping and nation building are even more essential aspects of grand strategic planning by political leaders as for the military.

This requires proper organization of civil as well as military activity, the creation of staffs with the skills necessary to carry out the mission and above all the understanding that a political commitment must be made to take the necessary time and spend the necessary resources. Military leaders can be forgiven for concentrating on winning wars, political leaders cannot be forgiven for failing to win the peace.

Any effort to act on this lesson of the Iraq War must also recognize that peacemaking and nation building are still experimental activities and that no one as yet has a clear history of success. There are no rules and procedures that guarantee what will or will not work, and most case studies fail to clearly apply to the next case. In many cases, priorities only become apparent once activity begins. It is also virtually impossible for an effort that is intended to create a more democratic government in a non-democratic state to avoid some tension and violence between suppressed factions and groups.

NATION-BUILDING AND THE CHALLENGE OF WINNING THE PEACE

Regardless of the mistake the US and its allies made in conflict termination, there is still time to deal with the broader challenge of nation building. The US and Britain have at least several years in which to create and lead an effective medium and long-term effort, and may well be able to create a climate where they can create an enduring partnership with a new Iraqi regime that is truly committed to meeting the needs of the Iraq people. It is already clear, however, that there are deep divisions in Iraq, and in the world, over how Iraq should change and evolve.

It is also clear that there is a long and complex list of factors that will determine the eventual outcome of the nation building effort:

- Speed with which security, jobs, and conditions of ordinary life can be restored and improved.
- Quality of US and British peace making and nation-building efforts, and their management and funding of the process.
- Effectiveness of peacekeeping and intervention in bringing Iraqi factions together, and/or the level of internal conflicts, if any,
- Role and effectiveness of other states, the UN, and NGOs.
- Scale of humanitarian and economic aid,
- Ability to create a stable form of Iraqi federalism and pluralism that can integrate ethnic and sectarian factions into an effective and stable government.
- Ability to limit interference by neighbors into Iraqi affairs, minimize regional competition for influence in Iraq,
- Effectiveness of efforts to reform criminal and commercial justice systems and protect human rights.
- Ability to restructure Iraqi economy from a command to a modern market economy,
- Level of de-Saddamization of the state system, including national oil company,
- Legal status of Iraq as new or inheritor state, and ability to deal with foreign debt, reparations, and existing contingency and ongoing international contracts,
- How well the Iraqi oil industry is reshaped, repaired, and renovated,
- Role of Iraq in OPEC and world oil market,
- Arab and Islamic perceptions of war, conflict termination, and nation-building effort – pro or con,
- Ability to rebuild Iraqi military forces and integrate Iraq into a stable security structure in the region, and
- Post conflict terrorism, if any.

This list of the challenges involved in transforming Iraq into a modern nation involves so many problems and fracture lines within Iraqi society that it will be years before the outcome in Iraq is clear – much less how the nature of a postwar Iraq will impact on the other states in the Middle East. What is clear is that if the US and Britain fail, the Iraq War has failed.

At the same time, Iraq's future must be one where Iraq is shaped by the Iraqis, and the US and Britain must recognize they only have limited time in which to act.. It seems unlikely that the Iraqi people will tolerate a foreign occupation and nation building effort that endures for more than a few years. Creating stable new patterns of Iraqi political, social, economic, and energy development will take at least 5-10 years, while it seems doubtful that outside powers like the US and Britain can have a major impact on Iraq's decisions for more than two to three.

Looking at Postwar Iraq: The Internal Political Fracture Lines

The key to grand strategic success in winning the peace, will ultimately be whether the US and Britain can succeed in the putting the Iraqis on a path where they can transform Iraq into some form of a stable federal republic and one that is on the road to economic development. The answer is unclear, and it is too soon to be either optimistic or pessimistic.

All nations face difficulties in their development, and the fact that Iraq faces serious internal political and economic problems after thirty years of dictatorship is important. There is a need for realism on all sides, and especially for the Iraqi people to understand that everything ultimately depends on their willingness to put nation-building before selfish interests and ethnic and religious feuding. The initial postwar problems in Iraq in securing the countryside, looting, rioting, and ethnic issues cannot be ignored. However, it is far from clear whether Iraq is now experiencing the initial teething problems of emerging from dictatorship, or the signs of more enduring problems.

Key Political Fracture Lines

It does not take an act of genius to predict that the political future of a postwar Iraq will not be as good or as bad as the more extreme voices favoring either future have projected. A war can remove a regime, but cannot create a new culture or set of values, or suddenly create a modern and stable political system and an economy. Iraq may be a sophisticated state with some 25 million people, but, it is also a nation with a 30-year old dictatorial regime, and no viable political parties.

Iraq has many political fracture lines, which are summarized in Table One. These include major religious and ethnic fault lines that date back to the Ottoman Empire. It is 60-65% Shi'ite, but has been rule by a Sunni elite than was not even based on broad representation of the entire Sunni community. Iraq is largely urban, but has had a ruling elite more clan and tribally oriented around village society. It is largely Arab (75%+), but has a large Kurdish minority, a significant Turcoman minority, and other minorities – including Assyrian Christians. Its minorities have deep internal fault lines, but all have faced significant Arab persecution.

Divisions within Divisions

As Table One shows, there are divisions within these divisions. Saddam encouraged a steady growth of tribal and clan divisions between 1992 and 2003, as part of his divide and rule tactics. The Kurds have long been divided between a “Barzanistan”-- that was more than willing to make alliances with Saddam, the Turcomans, and Turks – and a “Talibanistan” that made occasional alliances with Iran. The shell of a modern Kurdish democracy developed after 1992, but the economy and stability of the Kurdish enclave depended on aid, smuggling, and oil for food income – not economic development. At least some Kurds also took the side of Saddam. The Turcomans came to regard both Kurd and Arab as potential oppressors, and Saddam used the Assyrian Christians to displace Kurds in the north in ways that may come back to haunt them.

The ruling Sunni minority feuded, and divided by town, clan, and family. The Shi’ite divided between secularists, modern religious Shiites, traditional religious Shi’ites, and those who supported the regime. The development of the south received far less attention than the development of Sunni areas, except for Basra. A low-level civil war by Shi’ite opponents of the regime targeted fellow Shi’ites as well as the regime, and long-standing feuds over the control of Shi’ite religious shrines and revenues continued to affect Najaf, Karbala, and other cities. As the initial outbreaks of violence showed after the war, there are also tensions between the religiously-oriented segment - led by the Iranian-backed Mohammed Baker Al-Hakim, and the more moderate and pro-Western Shiites -led by the Khomeini family and INC.

Table One

The Detailed Fracture Lines Within Iraq

Insiders versus outsiders

- Outsiders vs. Insiders: INC, INA, Hakim: The enemy of our enemy is not our friend.
- National "interests" include conflicting political lifestyles, competing economies based on the same resource or lack thereof-oil, sectarian and tribal enmities, and level of comfort in a prolonged U.S. military presence in the region.
- Of Iraq's 25 million population, up to 3 million have been in exile, primarily in Jordan, Europe, and the United States. Many of them represent the cream of Iraqi society-its scholars, writers, scientists, intellectuals, technicians, and craftsmen.
- Three wars and the long years of sanctions have decimated the ranks of Iraq's middle class-the talented, educated, doctors, lawyers, professional bureaucrats and civil servants-who ran the government civil service, schools, offices, and hospitals.
- Many who remained in Iraq belonged to the Baa`th Party, but most probably joined for the perquisites a Party credential guaranteed-education, careers, and the promise of a secure future, albeit one in a dangerous political environment. Some, however, were either true Ba'athists or loyal to Saddam Hussein.
- Elements of the Iraqi opposition in exile, such as those led by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Ahmad Chalabi, may promise a broad coalition crossing ethnic, political and sectarian elements, but they have no practical experience in governance and are often unpopular inside Iraq.
- The Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was the most effective outside force in creating a military challenge to Saddam Hussein and has considerable support among Iraq's Shi'ites.
- Other outside opposition groups like the Iraqi National Accord, led by a former general and a Baa`th Party refugee, and other once-prominent military and political defectors will compete for power.
- More marginal outside factors include Iraq Sharif Ali, representing the Constitutional Monarchists
- The Kurds inside Iraq are divided into two major factions, the Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic Party and the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
- There are divisions within the Turkoman, and Assyrian and Chaldean Christian communities in side Iraq and between them and other factions.
- Coalitions have an unlucky history in Iraq. None have survived long enough to govern, the last being the 17 July 1968 coalition that the militant Baptists and Saddam Husayn replaced 2 weeks later.

Political Heritage and Governance Problems:

- Iraq has no democratic tradition. It did not have one under the British, under the King, or under the authoritarian military- and party-dominated regimes that have ruled Iraq since 1920.
- Iraq's political society has been ruthlessly purged ever since 1979. There are no surviving modern and effective political parties, and serious risk of service politics.
- There is no effective rule of law, or functional legal system based on proper legal procedures, human rights, or commercial codes.
- There is no stable pattern of separation of the executive, legislative, and judiciary, and the military and security services have sometimes acted as independent branches of government. Presidential

and parliamentary systems create the risk of electing another strong man or one man, one vote, one time,

- Iraq will have to build new political institutions that are democratic, pluralistic, transparent, and diverse. At the same time, Iraq's Kurds talk about federalism and many outside Iraq believe Iraq can be easily divided among its ethnic and religious communities.
- Iraq cannot be easily divided into ethnic and religious areas for the purposes of governance. Sunni, Shi'ite, Turcoman, and Kurdish areas overlap in terms of key urban areas, oil reserves, and control of water.
- Iraq's Sunni Arabs face serious problems in dealing with democratization, pluralism, and federalism. They are only 17 percent of the population, and have ruled Iraq since Ottoman times. The Shi'ites, however, are 60-65% of the population. The Kurds are 15-20%, and the Turcomans, Assyrians and Chaldeans total 5%.

A Shattered military: Restructuring the security and military forces will present both regional and internal problems:

- If a new Iraqi military is to reflect the shape of the new government, it must be turned into a more diverse institution, bringing the right proportion of Shi'ites, Kurds, and Turcomans into all echelons of the military.
- Some Kurds were among the senior ranks but very few;
- Shia recruits were nearly 80 percent of the regular army but few made it into the Republican Guards or ranks of senior officers.)
- Under Saddam the Iraqi Regular Army was stripped of its status, prestige, and weapons and subordinated in the 1980s to the Republican Guard, whose members are recruited from especially loyal Sunni Arab tribes, including the al-Ubayd, al-Jabbur, al-Shammar, and al-Ani.
- Iraq must deal with major military debts to Russia, France, China, and other states. It also must find some way to fund major imparts to rebuild and modernize its forces.
- Some form of paramilitary and security forces must be created to provide local security and help control internal and ethnic divisions. All of the existing structures have been led and largely staffed by the worst of Saddam's loyalists.

Saddam's Exploitation of traditional tribal chiefs and leaders, especially outside the large cities and in the more isolated south and west.

- Saddam restored tribal rights to administer local justice and impose taxes so long as they did not contravene national law and maintained law and order. Tribal elements manned local police and security posts while the national police and security organizations manned border posts.
- Ba'ath Party members once patrolled the streets of the cities and helped maintain law and order, but some sources report that since the Kuwait War and imposition of sanctions these Iraqis are too busy working 2 or 3 jobs to feed their families and too demoralized to care.
- The constant suppression of Shi'ite secular leaders, and well-recognized clerics, has created a power vacuum in the south that favors Shi'ite religious factions, including the Iranian-backed SCIRI.

Looking at Postwar Iraq: How Its Political Fracture Lines Interact with Its Neighbors

Iraq's internal fracture lines have impacts outside Iraq, as well as within it. Rather than act to stabilize or "reform" the region, they pose potential threats of regional tensions and conflicts.

Iran has a longstanding interest in Iraqi Shi'ite religious politics, and in the overall role and power of Shi'ites in Iraqi society and politics. This interest is religious (key shrines and seminars are in Iraq), ideological (Iran favors a more theological Shi'ite power structure), security (avoiding another war and limiting the impact of a US presence on its border and in the Gulf), power-political (a weak Iraq is a strong Iran in terms of Gulf power politics), energy (oil production and quotas), and economic (Iran has reparations claims left over from the Iran-Iraq War, and would like to clear the Shatt Al Arab.)

Turkey fears Kurdish autonomy and a lack of security along the border of its own Kurdish area. It is politically committed to supporting Iraq's Turcoman minority (300,000 to 500,000 but Turkey has sometimes claimed 3 million). Turkey needs oil pipeline revenues from Iraq, and sees Iraq as a major trading partner – one where its exports including agriculture and manufactures can be far more competitive than in the EU. As a result, Turkey does not want to see Kurdish control of Mosul or Kirkuk, or a major Kurdish role in control of Iraq's northern oilfields. Iraq's Kurds, in turn, still have some ambitions to create an independent Kurdistan including Turkey's Kurds. They fear and resent the Turks, who sent in troops to hunt down Turkish Kurdish guerrillas hiding in Iraq five times between 1991 and 2003.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states fear the break up of Iraq's territorial integrity, a loss of Sunni control, and a shift in the balance of power in the Gulf. All Arab states fear any weakening of Arab control of Iraq, and any break up that would give Iraq's Kurds independence. The Southern Gulf states are afraid that Shi'ite separatism or control of Iraq would create a major new pro-Iranian power center in the Gulf, potentially destabilizing the balance of power in the Gulf. They are already concerned that Iraq's loss of much of its military power and equipment has gravely weakened its ability to deter Iran.

Jordan fears a loss of trade and low-cost oil: Jordan has long benefited from Iraqi oil subsidies, and from the fact Iraq imported goods through the port of Aqaba because of the Iranian closing of the Shatt al Arab and UN sanctions. The future of such subsidies and trade is now unclear. Jordanians also saw Saddam as a supporter of the Palestinians and Second Intifada.

Syria has lost a major trading partner and counterbalance to Israel. While little love was lost between the two Ba'ath regimes, a rapprochement in recent years led to better relations, more trade, and Syrian profiteering by exporting Iraqi oil sent illegally through a pipeline to Syria. Iraq's proliferation and strong conventional forces also acted as a potential threat to Israel. A new regime with far fewer military forces is much less reassuring.

Looking at Postwar Iraq: Iraqi Demographic Fracture Lines

The challenges in shaping a postwar Iraq go beyond politics. In spite of decades of war and sanctions, Iraq has serious demographic problems that create additional fracture lines. Iraq's population rose from 5.2 million in 1950 to 6.8 million in 1960, 9.4 million in 1970, 13.0 million in 1980, 17.3 million in 1990, and 22.9 million in 2000. UN and US Census Bureau estimates indicate it will rise to 30 million in 2010, 37.1 million in 2020, 43.1 million in 2030, 48.4 million in 2040, and 53.6 million in 2050.

The sheer momentum of this population increase is creating major problems in terms of scarce water and arable land resources and dropping real per capita oil income. Per capita oil revenue was a little over \$700 per capita in 2002 versus over \$6,000 in 1980, and had dropped far more in constant dollars. To put this in perspective, Saudi Arabia with somewhat similar population growth, saw its per capita income drop from around \$23,820 in 1980 to \$2,563 in 2001.

Iraq has a very young population. Roughly 48% of the population is of 14 years of age or younger. The younger job age population from 15-30 years in 2000 totaled some 2.5 million or 28% of the population and the of the total "bow wave" population aged 14 years or younger totaled 9.6 million. This part of the population has never lived under any other rule than Saddam Hussein's, has seen its education collapse since the later 1980s, and has little experience with modern jobs and commerce.

Iraqi Economic Fracture Lines

Iraq has great mid and long-term economic potential, but its postwar government will inherit a command economy crippled by decades of grandiose mismanagement, war, and UN sanctions. There has been a steady decline in relative wealth since 1982, not 1991; and 70% of the cut in its GDP per capita occurred before the Gulf War. The Iraqi economy has not really functioned as a market economy. It has been ruled by an elite that treated it more as a base for a profiteering kleptocracy than national development. Its criminal justice system was corrupted by Saddam Hussein's regime, but its civil law also failed to develop and implement a modern and effective commercial code.

Economic Strains and Weaknesses

Iraq has long imported over half its food because of a failure to institute effective agricultural reform and invest in and modernize the agricultural sector. Its banking and commercial sectors are outdated and government-dominated. Aside from a state-controlled construction industry, it has no efficient heavy or light industry and its service sector needs major reform.

Iraq's economy has been dependent on UN "oil for food" and its "black" market sector in order to operate, and some estimate that Iraq will still have a 50-70% dependence on food imports once the economy recovers. Iraq must pay for a major modernization and expansion of medical and educational services, stabilize its currency, and remove the artifacts of a command economy that has been centered around a dictatorship for three decades. It has some solid economic institutions but no real market system in terms of modern market-driven distribution, banking, insurance, or a uniform commercial code.

While the current war may have only done limited damage to Iraq's infrastructure, it suffers from underfunding since the first years of the Iran-Iraq War and from a lack of recovery and investment after the Gulf War. According to one estimate, Iraq had 9,800 megawatts of generating capacity before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Desert Storm left it with only 380. Hussein has since restored about 4,800 megawatts, but the country would need as much as 14,000 megawatts to match its 1990 capacity, adjusted for population growth.

Debt, Reparations, and Contingency Contracts

There are many estimates of Iraq's debt and reparations burden. An analysis by the CSIS is shown in Table Two. They show a total of \$127 billion in debt (\$47 billion in interest), \$320 billion in reparations claims (\$148 billion settled), and some \$57 billion in pending contracts that Saddam Hussein's regime signed with nations like Russia and the Netherlands.

These burdens could cripple any hope of recovery even more than the treaty of Versailles and WWI reparations claims crippled the economy and political stability of Weimar Germany. To put them in perspective, US intelligence estimates that the entire GDP of Iraq was only \$28.6 billion purchasing power parity rates in 2002, and only \$15.5 billion at market exchange rates. Its total merchandise exports were only \$13 billion, of which \$12.3 billion were oil export revenues – including the estimated value of some \$3 billion worth of smuggled oil.

Table Two
Iraq's Financial Burden

- **Total Debt: \$127 billion**
 - Interest: \$47 billion
 - Gulf states: \$30 billion
 - Kuwait: \$17 billion
 - Russia: \$12 billion
 - Bulgaria: \$1 billion
 - Turkey: \$800 million
 - Poland: \$500 million
 - Jordan: \$295 million
 - Morocco: \$32 million
 - Hungary: \$17 million
 - France, Egypt, Others: ?

- **Pending Contracts: \$57.2 billion**
 - Russia: \$52 billion (90%)
 - Netherlands: \$3.6 billion (6%)
 - Egypt: \$740 million
 - China: \$80 million

- **Reparations (Less claims from Iran-Iraq War): \$320 billion claimed**
 - \$148 billion settled
 - \$172 billion unsettled
 - Status of interest on payments unsettled.

Postwar Iraq: Iraqi Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines

The glue that will hold Iraq together, or the wealth that will divide it, is the revenue from petroleum and petroleum-related exports. Oil underpins Iraq's exports, market economy, and government revenues. Iraqi oil revenues are critical to its development, as is the proper sharing of such revenues to any hope of its political stability. Iraq's oil wealth is acutely limited in comparison to the past. The EIA estimates that Iraq's oil revenues peaked at \$57.8 billion in 2000 dollars in 1980. They were only \$15 billion in 2001, and \$12.3 billion in 2002. They would only have been \$15.7 billion in 2003 with no war and no discount for smuggling.

At the same time, Iraq's oil reserves give it immense future potential. The EIA estimates that Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia). Iraq's true resource potential may be far greater than this, however, as the country is largely (90% or so) unexplored due to years of war and sanctions. Deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels).

The National Iraqi Oil Company (NIOC) has a large number of competent technocrats and managers, and only had a light top layer of thugs and killers under Saddam Hussein. Iraq has not, however, had adequate development funding, planning, and management since 1982 – the year in the Iran-Iraq War when Syria closed its pipeline to Iraq and Iraq ran out of money. UN surveys by Saybolt are only preliminary but indicate that Iraq's fields suffer from waterflooding and overpumping in most areas, that only 24 of 73 fields were working before the war, and that 12-40% of its oil wells were at risk.

Iraqi Oil Development Needs

Iraq needs major funding to rehabilitate and modernize its oil fields, as well as to pay for any wartime damage. At best, its present economic production capacity is 2.8 MMBD, and possibly only 2.5 MMBD. This amounts to about 3% of world markets, and makes it roughly equivalent to Nigeria.

There is no way to predict the short and mid-term future of Iraqi oil development. Experts simply have too limited a knowledge of Iraq's problems, and investment priorities, costs, opportunities. An Iraqi study in 1996 claimed it would cost \$35 billion to get to 3.5 MMBD. Other sources estimate it would take \$7 billion and minimum of 3 years to increase capacity to 3.5 MMBD, and \$20 billion plus to raise capacity to 6 MMBD by 2010.

In December 2002, the Council of Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute released a report that concluded that:

- Iraq's oil sector infrastructure was being held together by "band-aids," and was experiencing a production decline rate of 100,000 bbl/d per year;
- Increasing Iraqi oil production would require "massive repairs and reconstruction...costing several billions of dollars and taking months if not years;"
- The costs of repairing existing oil export installations would be around \$5 billion, while restoring Iraqi oil production to pre-1990 levels would cost an additional \$5 billion, plus \$3 billion per year in annual operating costs;

- Outside funds and large-scale investment by international oil companies would be needed; existing oil contracts would need to be clarified and resolved in order to rebuild Iraq's oil industry, with any "prolonged legal conflicts over contracts" possibly "delay[ing] the development of important fields in Iraq;"
- Any "sudden or prolonged shut-down" of Iraq's oil industry could result in long-term reservoir damage;
- Iraq's oil facilities could easily be damaged during any domestic unrest or military operations;

Given these problems, it is unrealistic to expect massive rises in oil export earnings in the near future. According to the Middle East Economic Survey, Iraq's oil sector suffers from years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, etc.; and damage to oil storage and pumping facilities required major investment. MEES does estimate, however, that Iraq could reach a production capacity of 4.2 million bbl/d within three years at a cost of \$3.5 billion, and a production capacity of 4.5-6.0 million bbl/d within seven years.

Contingency Contracts Signed Under Saddam

The challenge of rebuilding and expanding Iraq's petroleum industry and dividing up its resources and revenues, is compounded by another problem. The EIA reports that Saddam Hussein's regime signed several multi-billion dollar deals with foreign oil companies mainly from China, France, and Russia. Deutsche Bank estimates they are worth a total of \$38 billion for new field development -- with potential production capacity of 4.7 million bbl/d.

In 1992, Iraq announced plans to increase its oil production capacity to over 6.3 million bbl/d following the lifting of U.N. sanctions. This plan, which was to be accomplished in three phases over a five-year period, assumed the availability of billions of dollars worth of foreign investment. Much of the production was to come from developing giant fields in the south (Halfaya, Majnoon, Bin Umar, West Qurnah), plus the Mishrif reservoir (Luhais, North and South Rumaylah, Zubair, etc.), East Baghdad, and others.

The EIA estimates Russia signed a \$3.7 billion, 23-year deal with Saddam's regime to rehabilitate Iraqi oilfields, particularly the 11-15 billion barrel West Qurna field (located west of Basra near the Rumaylah field). In October 2001, a joint Russian-Belarus oil company, Slavneft, signed a \$52 million service contract with Iraq to develop the 2-billion-barrel, Suba-Luhais field in southern Iraq. Full development of the Suba-Luhais field could result in production of 100,000 bbl/d (35o API) at a cost of \$300 million over a period of three years.

These contracts may not have been signed under duress, but they certainly were intended to buy political support for Saddam in freeing Iraq from sanctions. The economic competitiveness of the French and Russia contracts is unclear, and Iraq may have a strong interest in renegotiating them.

The Ethnic Fracture Lines of Oil Development and Control

The divisions between Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi'ites could greatly complicate the future development of Iraq's present fields, much less its proven and unproven reserves. While some of the current fields are in Sunni areas, and major new potential reserves exist in the

Sunni west, Iraq's proven oil reserves are not distributed evenly throughout the country. In fact, prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, about two-thirds of Iraq's production was coming out of the southern fields of Rumaila, Zubair, and Nahr Umr in Shi'ite areas. Other potentially huge fields such as Majnoon and West Qurna (see below for more details) are also located in the southern part of the country.

The EIA data on these fields show Iraq's main recent exports of crude oil have come from the country's two largest active fields: Rumaylah and Kirkuk. It is clear that Iraq needs investment to rehabilitate and modernize these fields, as well as develop others, but the cost and time required can only be guessed at.

Iraq also needs money to develop its gas resources to allow it to meet domestic energy demand while freeing oil for export, and to restore and expand its downstream operations. Iraq's refining capacity in January 2003 was about 417,000 bbl/d, compared to a pre-Gulf War, nameplate capacity of 700,000 bbl/d. Iraq has 10 refineries and topping units. The largest are the 150,000-bbl/d Baiji North, 140,000-bbl/d (or higher) Basra, and 100,000-bbl/d Daura plants.

Iraq needs to create a modern downstream sector. Iraq currently lacks light-end products, and relies on low quality gasoline and the EIA reports that both Baiji in northern Iraq as well as the refineries at Basra, Daura, and Nasiriyah were severely damaged during the Gulf War. Rising pollution levels because of a lack of water treatment facilities are also problems for Iraq's refining sector. Iraq's prewar/post-sanction plans called attracting foreign investment to perform refinery upgrades (Iraq identified dozens of such projects) and for a new \$1-billion, 290,000-bbl/d "Central" refinery near Babylon.

The Fracture Lines of Oil and Gas Exports

The movement of Iraqi oil creates additional ethnic and international fracture lines. Iraq's most efficient and profitable shipping route is through the oil terminals in the Gulf to Asia, but then no country other than Iraq benefits. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline goes through the Kurdish area but favors Turkey. The Kirkuk-Banias pipeline favors Syria. Iraq's oil shipments to Jordan have been a politically motivated subsidy, smuggling oil by truck into Turkey, and by barge through Iranian waters have been the result of UN sanctions. Each nation can be expected to put some form of political pressure on Iraq to ship oil in ways that serve their own interests.

The war does not seem to have damaged Iraq's export facilities, but some still reflect damage from the Gulf War or the result of years of underinvestment. The EIA reports that the 600-mile, 40-inch Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is Iraq's largest operable crude export pipeline. It has a design capacity of 1.1 million bbl/d, but reportedly can handle only around 900,000 bbl/d. A second, parallel, 46-inch line has an optimal capacity of 500,000 bbl/d and was designed to carry Basra Regular exports, but at last report was inoperable. The two parallel lines have a combined design capacity of 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d.

Iraq has three tanker terminals in the Gulf at Mina al-Bakr, Khor al-Amaya, and Khor az-Zubair (which mainly handles dry goods and minimal oil volumes), and these are Iraq's only way of exporting without paying a premium shipping from a foreign pipeline. Mina al-Bakr is Iraq's largest oil terminal, with four 400,000-bbl/d capacity berths capable of handling very large crude carriers (VLCCs). Gulf War damage to Mina al-Bakr has been

largely repaired and the terminal can handle up to 1.2-1.3 million bbl/d. A full return to Mina al-Bakr's nameplate capacity apparently would require extensive infrastructure repairs. Mina al-Bakr also is constrained by a shortage of storage and oil processing facilities, most of which were destroyed in the Gulf War.

The EIA reports that Iraq's Khor al-Amaya terminal was heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq War (and completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991) and has been out of commission since then. As of March 2001, reports indicated that Iraq had largely completed repairing two berths at Khor al-Amaya. Upon full completion of repairs, Iraq projects Khor al-Amaya's capacity will rise to 1.2 million bbl/d.

Iraq's pipelines through Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have been shut since the Gulf War, and its only other line goes through Syria. On August 20, 1998, Iraq and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding for the reopening of the 50-year-old, rusting Banias oil pipeline from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria's Mediterranean port of Banias (and Tripoli, Lebanon). The pipeline had been shut for 17 years.

Iraq does have an internal pipeline network that cuts across its internal ethnic and religious divisions. In order to optimize export capabilities (i.e., to allow oil shipments to the north or south), Iraq constructed a reversible, 1.4-million bbl/d "Strategic Pipeline" in 1975 and the resulting flow of oil only reached about 120,000 barrels per day. Iraq's other options have been providing subsidized oil to Jordan, and smuggling product through Turkey and Iran, neither of which seem to have much future now Saddam's regime has gone. This pipeline consists of two parallel 700,000-bbl/d lines. The North-South system allows for export of northern Kirkuk crude from the Persian Gulf and for southern Rumaylah crudes to be shipped through Turkey. During the Gulf War, however, the Strategic Pipeline was disabled after the K-3 pumping station at Haditha -- as well as four additional southern pumping stations -- were destroyed.

Gas exports are also an issue. The EIA reports that Iraq has a major natural gas pipeline with the capacity to supply around 240 MMcf/d to Baghdad from the West Qurna field. The 48-inch line was commissioned in November 1988, with phases II and III of the project never completed due to war and sanctions. The last two phases of the pipeline project were meant to supply Turkey.

Iraq's Northern Gas System, which came online in 1983, was damaged during the Gulf War as well as by the Kurdish rebellion of March 1991. The system supplied LPG to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, as well as dry gas and sulphur to power stations and industrial plants. Iraq also has a Southern Gas System, which came online in 1985. Natural gas also used to be pumped from Rumaylah into northern Kuwait via a 40-inch, 105-mile pipeline. The gas was used to supply Kuwaiti power stations and LPG plants, but was halted following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Transparency and Conspiracy Theories

There are a wide variety of ways in which these challenges can be met, but one key problem the US and outside powers face is that no single issue is more likely to arouse Iraqi distrust and conspiracy theories, and any successful nation building effort must do much more than find a economically and technically valid set of solutions. Iraqis must

believe that the solutions are honest and in Iraq's interests, and wherever possible, formulated by Iraqis.

The process of rebuilding and expanding the Iraqi energy sector will also be the only real source of money that can fund an Iraqi federal government, and act as the financial glue that can tie the country together. At the same time, no resource can be more attractive to try to dominate or steal, and Iraq's heritage as a functional kleptocracy – with no real history of foreign investment or popular experience with the market system and stock markets – makes any market-driven solution or form of privatization extremely suspect. Power struggles, corruption, and efforts to seize any privatized part of the energy sector are inevitable.

The US virtually had to award emergency contracts to US firms in the period immediately after the war to get production resumed and deal with the impact of years of underfunding, and the looting following the war. It is not clear, however, that the US is prepared for the political reality that transparent management of every detail of this aspect of nation building is critical, that the US must now do everything possible to prove that the US and Britain will not benefit from the postwar development of the energy sector, and that the political aspects of nation building are inevitably tied to how energy money and resources are to be allocated.⁵¹

The Fracture Lines of Disarmament and Rebuilding Iraqi Military Forces

Another set of fracture lines emerges out of the need to both disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and to rebuild its conventional forces to give it new capabilities for self-defense. The fact that the US and Britain did not find large “smoking guns” in the form of Iraqi forces capable of using chemical and biological weapons, and/or a major nuclear weapons development effort, has led many to believe that Iraq was not a serious proliferator in spite of eight years of discoveries by UNSCOM and the IAEA and new discoveries by UNMOVIC.

It seems likely that the US and Britain will gradually find evidence that Iraq continued to research and develop weapons of mass destruction at the time the Iraq War began, and that it probably dispersed and concealed some weapons or assets to hide them from UNMOVIC. It is also possible, however, that Iraq had adopted a strategy of going on with covert research, of destroying its overt holdings of weapons, of buying dual-use facilities and equipment it could later devote to WMD production, and of trying to both break out of UN sanctions and defer a US and British attack. If so, one lesson of the aftermath of the war is that the US and British failure to internationalize the WMD disarmament effort from the start may lead many countries and exports to question the validity of what the US and British find and others to question whether Iraq was ever a serious threat.

The practical lessons of intelligence and targeting have been discussed earlier, but Iraq will face further fracture lines in view of the fact it has lost many of its conventional forces, will see most of its remaining missile and WMD assets destroyed, and will still exist in a heavily armed neighborhood where powers like Israel, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria have their own weapons of mass destruction. Regardless of any US and British disarmament efforts, Iraq will also retain a large amount of human capital in terms of

expert knowledge about how to build and use weapons of mass destruction, and any economic development program will give it new dual-use facilities that presumably will not be under UN inspection.

The full nature of the problems that will occur in rebuilding Iraq's conventional forces remain unclear, although intense land and air combat and the use of some 18,000 precision weapons have almost certainly left Iraq with limited defense capability. When these effects are combined with the near destruction of the Republican Guard, massive air and surface-based air defense losses, and massive desertions in the regular forces, the net result seems to be that Iraq has lost the vast majority of its conventional war fighting capabilities.

The burden of rearming Iraq will also add to all of the economic and energy barriers discussed earlier. It seems extremely unlikely that Iraq will ever return to the militarism it had before the Gulf War. Iraq was spending some 20% of its GNP and 30% of its government revenues on military forces in the late 1970s, before the Iran-Iraq War. It spent some 45% of its GNP and 50% of its government revenues on military forces during the most intense periods of the Iran-Iraq War.⁵²

Iraqi arms imports averaged more than 35% of all imports in the late 1970s, and roughly 60% of all imports in the 1980s.⁵³ According to US estimates, Iraq spent some \$29.7 billion on arms between 1984-1988, of which \$15.4 billion was spent on imports from the former Soviet Union, \$3.1 billion on arms imports from France, \$2.8 billion on imports from China, 30 million on imports from the UK, \$675 million on imports from West Germany, \$675 million on imports from Czechoslovakia, \$750 million on imports from Poland, \$370 million on imports from Italy, \$650 million on imports from Bulgaria, and \$5.2 billion on imports from other countries – largely North Korea and Vietnam.⁵⁴

If one looks at the period between 1983 and 1990, the “run-up” to the Gulf War, and only consider arms purchases in excess of \$50 million, another source indicates that Iraq imported some \$39.6 billion worth of major arms. The Soviet Union sold \$19.5 billion worth, major West European nations sold \$6.4 billion, other European nations sold \$6.4 billion, China sold \$4.0 billion, and all other nations sold \$3.2 billion. (The US sold less than \$50 million worth.) Even though Iraq decisively won the Iran-Iraq War by August of 1988, it still placed \$9.97 billion worth of new arms orders between 1987 and 1990, virtually all with the Soviet Union and Europe.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, Iraq only had several hundred million worth of smuggled arms imports after the UN imposed an embargo in the summer of 1990, and lost many during the Iraq war. In contrast, Saudi Arabia alone imported some \$65.8 billion worth of arms during 1994-2001, and Iran imported \$3.0 billion. The smaller Southern Gulf states imported \$19.1 billion.⁵⁶ Given the fact, Iran alone is a major proliferator, the challenges of rebuilding an Iraqi security structure, war fighting capability, and deterrent are anything but easy.

As a result, the problems in rebuilding Iraqi military forces will not only be affected by the previous political and economic fracture lines, they will be affected by the following challenges to both Iraq and the US and British effort to turn their military victory into a more stable structure of security within Iraq and the region.

- How can Iraq's conventional capabilities be rebuilt? What force levels, arms modernization, and costs are involved?
- How does one disarm a nation like Iraq with practical experience in making and using CBRN weapons? How does one "disarm" Iraq's intellectual capital and deny it the future capability to make use of what will be steadily growing dual-use facilities?
- How can the "new" Iraqi state deal with mid and long-term impact of Israeli, Syrian, Iranian, Pakistani, and Indian proliferation?
- How can Iraq's military and paramilitary forces be restructured to provide security and prevent factional forces or warlords?
- How can they be restructured to support a transition to a true Iraqi rule of law, the enforcement of human rights, and to support national police activity.
- Finally, the issue arises as to whether the US and UK will guarantee Iraq suitable security in a region where key neighbors like Iran and Syria are major proliferators, and an exposed Iraq could be vulnerable to pressure and attack.

There are two lessons that can be drawn from this experience. First, it is impossible to disarm a state of WMD as long as it retains the intellectual capital to build and use such weapons and its economy provides large-scale dual-use facilities that can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. The second is that the security aspects of nation-building require the victors in modern wars to determine how to rearm their opponent – a challenge that will prove anything but easy.

The US may well have made a serious mistake in mid-May 2003, when it dismissed the entire regular structure of the Iraqi armed forces with a month's pay. Iraqi officers had already demanded a role in shaping Iraq's future, and the dismissal treated them as an extension of Saddam and the Ba'ath's rule, rather than as patriot that had fought for their country. It also added several hundred thousand young men to the labor pool at a point where there were virtually no jobs, and effectively told all officers of the rank of colonel and above that they had no future in a post-Saddam environment while implying to all Iraqis that the new Iraq Army might be so weak that Iraq remained little more than a client of the US and Britain in the face of the threat from Iran and possible future intervention by Turkey.⁵⁷

The US stated later that it would pay the soldiers it dismissed a stipend, but it also indicated that it will try to create a new Iraqi Army from the ground up and that this will be a largely internal security force of some 40,000 men.⁵⁸ Like many other aspects of the initial US nation building effort, the end result is a plan that made no coherent effort to build on existing capabilities, excluding many potentially competent personnel at the post cost of making them opponents or enemies, and took no account of Iraqi nationalism. A plan for a military force so small that it would obviously be unable to deal with Iran, a Turkish incursions or any other regional threat is scarcely one that will reassure Iraqis. It also, be default, leaves Iraq obviously dependent on the occupying powers for its security. Small beginnings are one thing, lasting strategic dependence is another.

The Political Lessons of Peacemaking and Nation-building

As has been discussed earlier, one of the most important lessons of the war in Iraq is the need to be ready to make the transition from war to peacemaking and nation-building as combat actually proceeds and as each area is liberated. Another lesson, is to prepare the

country involved, its people, the nations around it, and the world for the concept of peace making and nation-building that will be used. This may not always win popular support. But it will greatly reduce many of the fears and conspiracy theories that arise in the absence of any clear plan and public statements. In this sense, no psychological operation is complete that only focuses on winning the war; “psyops” must give equal weight to preparation for peace making and winning the peace.

A lesson that is less clear, but that may well emerge out of the Iraq War is that the advances in military technology and warfighting that allow reductions in the combat presence on the ground that is necessary to defeat a conventional enemy do not apply to peace making and winning the peace. The world has moved well beyond the point where it will tolerate the delays and problems in dealing with humanitarian needs, reconstruction, and nation-building that occurred in Germany and Japan after World War II. The US and the West also cannot afford to ignore the fact that an era of asymmetric warfare will also be an era of political warfare in which true victory means defeating enemy ideologies and political groups by creating stable successor governments and societies. Cutting one head off the Hydra may be militarily impressive, but it has little grand strategic purpose. All it does is to force the enemy to mutate or create new enemies for the future.

Similarly, “coalitions of the willing” require both regional powers and those who actively participate in a conflict to believe in the justice and adequacy of the peace. The same changes in the morality of war that force powers like the US to fighting in ways that minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, force them to commit themselves to shaping the peace in ways that win the approval of the peoples of the nations they defeat, the nations around them, their coalition partners, and the world. There is no significant operational difference in grand strategic terms between altruism and pragmatism.

Here it is well worth noting the comments of Carl Bildt, one of the few voices with great practical experience in nation-building about the lessons. In looking at the situation in Iraq, Bildt outlined seven further lessons:⁵⁹

Lesson 1: It is imperative to establish a secure environment very fast. In Bosnia, we failed in the critical transfer of territories in Sarajevo. In Kosovo, the mandate for the troops was clearer, but we still failed to protect minorities. In both cases, we still suffer from the consequences of these initial failures. In Afghanistan there are grave question marks over the consequences of limiting the international security presence to Kabul. As long as the gun remains the fastest way to power and property, there simply will not be room for democratic politics and entrepreneurship. With national police in disarray and international police always taking time to recruit, there is no alternative to using soldiers and armies to keep order.

Lesson 2: The central challenge is not reconstruction, but state-building. Reconstruction of the physical scars of war is certainly important, and it can be costly and take time. But building a political infrastructure that unites competing forces and ensures some sort of order, and an infrastructure of economic governance that promotes jobs and growth, is far more complex. Priorities must be right.

Lesson 3: To build a state, you need to know what state to build. Normally this requires some sort of a peace agreement or constitution. When this is not the case as in Kosovo any initial success risks being short-lived. In the Balkans, we have seen the immense challenge of doing so in a multiethnic environment. We must recognize that Iraq has some issues in common with other former parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Kosovo and the Kurdish region.

The potential of Iraq for disintegration is obvious, as are the consequences if this was to happen.

Thus there has to be an early and fast agreement on a constitutional structure that will unite Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and Assyrians of different beliefs in a state structure acceptable to them all.

Lesson 4: While humanitarian problems are always in the focus in the initial phase, it is dangerous to let them predominate over the long-term issues. There must be an early focus on economic questions such as currency, customs, taxation systems, commercial law, banking, debt restructuring and accessing international capital markets.

The sanctions that were provoked by Saddam Hussein have destroyed much of Iraq's economy. Because Iraq has experienced a population explosion, oil income per capita is unlikely to be substantially more than a tenth of what it was in the early 1980s. Job creation and bringing back a vibrant middle class are the keys to long-term stability.

Lesson 5: There has to be a benevolent regional environment. In the Balkans, regime change in Zagreb and Belgrade was key to improving prospects in Bosnia and Kosovo; in Afghanistan, the open or tacit cooperation of Pakistan and Iran is critical. If neighbors try to destabilize, they will sooner or later succeed.

Iraq is now a fragile zone in one of the most volatile areas of the world. Just about everyone recognizes that if the liberation of Iraq from tyranny is not followed by the liberation of Palestine from occupation giving true security to Israel, too the presence of U.S. and other NATO forces in Iraq will be an extremely challenging operation.

Lesson 6: Nation-building takes a longer time, and requires more resources, than most initially believe. As the first High Representative in Bosnia, I was told that everything should be concluded within a year. When the folly of this was recognized, a new deadline of two years was given. But five years after that has expired, the fourth High Representative is hardly less busy than the first. Bosnia and Kosovo might be easy cases compared with Afghanistan and Iraq. Peace-building requires an abundance of patience.

Lesson 7: The greater the international support, the easier the process. If there is international disagreement over the state-building process, this sooner or later risks translating into conflicts in the country in question. Some sort of UN framework normally helps, although it is not a guarantee. Building peace is a far more fragile, complex, costly and drawn-out process than fighting a war. So a peace coalition normally needs to be much broader than a war coalition.

The next chapter suggests that there is only a limited hope that the US and Britain, and others who participate in nation-building, can hope for broad regional support from Iraq's neighbors or a peaceful Middle East. This seems equally true of any prospects for a stable regional security structure – a goal that might well be Lesson 8, if it were feasible. It seems extremely unlikely that Iraq will be admitted to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), at least in the near term, that its forces can be quickly rebuilt in a form that will create a better balance of power in the region, or that it can establish stable security relations with Iran without becoming a Shi'ite dominated state. As the next chapter shows, the only lessons harder to act upon than those of nation-building are those of region-building.

More broadly, Iraq will have to deal with each of its fracture lines either actively or default in the process of nation-building. There is no current way to determine how much the US and Britain can accomplish in helping Iraq to do this while they still have a dominant impact on Iraq's development, or what course Iraq will pursue once a regime emerges that shapes Iraq's longer term destiny.

What is clear is that divisions and fracture lines within Iraq run so deep that achieving a stable path towards unity, pluralism, and economic development will take years—if not a decade. Events may well prove in the process, that the US and Britain cannot impose

grand strategic goals on Iraq in terms of “nation-building.” If they succeed, it will be because Iraqis want them to succeed, continue to want these goals years after US and British forces have left, and adopt them as their own goals. One way or another, Iraq will not be an instant example of anything to its neighbors. It also eventually will truly be Iraq for the Iraqis.

THE OUTCOME OF THE IRAQ WAR AND THE NEW, OLD, MIDDLE EAST

The broader lessons of grand strategy are even more speculative. However, it seems likely that the Iraq War will provide yet another iteration of the lesson that small wars have fewer transformational effects on the regions where they are fought than many of their protagonists have thought in choosing to fight such wars. In fact, this often is true of much larger wars as well. The war to make the world safe for democracy did not and the war to end all wars began more wars than it ended.

In the case of the Iraq War, some neoconservatives and liberals have rushed out to talk about fundamental changes in the region that will put an end of old regimes and many of the region's tensions and conflicts. In contrast, some Arabists have reversed the cloak of Samuel Huntington and have warned of "clashes of civilization" and outbreaks of terrorism.

Like most developments in history, the reality is likely to be different. The impact of the war is likely to be more limited and more mixed. In fact, the "new" postwar Middle East may look surprisingly like the old.

An Example of What?

One key problem is the one raised in the previous chapter: it may be years before Iraq is an example of anything other than US military strength, and then it is unclear what it will be:

- At a minimum, Iraq will be a work in progress for several years. It will be a work that outside powers will seek to influence in political and economic terms, with pressures from the UN to internationalize the nation-building effort; US pressure to maintain control while internationalizing the border; and French, Russian and other pressures to serve their respective commercial interests and weaken US influence. Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Southern Gulf states will compete for influence and control over Iraq, almost regardless of what government emerges.
- If Iraq becomes a weak, client democracy, the new regime will do nothing more than appear to validate all of the regional conspiracy theories that see the US as an aggressive power with neoimperialist goals and the desire to take over Iraq's oil resources.
- If Iraq emerges as weak and divided, with feuding or warring Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'ite factions, this will create a dangerous power vacuum. It will, at a minimum, lead Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the Southern Gulf states to intensify their competition for influence and control.
- If Iraq should tilt towards Iran and/or Syria, or towards any form of theocratic state, would create a new pattern of instability in the Middle East.
- If Iraq becomes a strong and united state willing to act as a "have power" and concentrate on internal development, it will still have to rebuild its military forces and rearm. Even if it is peaceful and democratic, this will still lead to tensions with some of its neighbors.

It is far too early to know which future Iraq will pursue, how soon the choice of this future will be apparent, and how the Iraqi people will view the US and British role in shaping that future. It now seems that most are grateful for Saddam's fall, but not for war or for American political and economic influence over the peace process. The images of the Second Intifada, the problems of trying to establish a balance between Iraq's factions,

and the natural desire for instant economic benefits are all problems in Iraqi perceptions of the US and UK. So are conspiracy theories over the US role in shaping Iraq contracts and its oil industry.

Even if the US is successful in putting Iraq on the road to successful nation-building. Success does not necessarily mean popularity and gratitude. There are few – if any – cases where foreign intervention of this kind has met with broad approval, and Iraq remains a very different culture, society, and ethnic/religious mix. In any case, Iraq cannot be an example of anything other than the military defeat of a tyrant to the region until it is (a) clearly Iraq for the Iraqis, and (b) clearly successful. It is hard to see how this can take less than a few years.

Israel and the Second Intifada

There is no reason to assume that the “new” Iraq will be a major military threat to Israel or willing to subsidize Palestinian suicide bombers. At the same time, there is no reason to assume that Iraq will be pro-Israel unless it comes under intense pressure from the US or there is a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iraqis have seen all of the same images of the Second Intifada from the Arab media as other Arabs and those images will not become more favorable because Saddam has fallen. If anything, these same images are likely to reinforce any resentment of the US.

Many in the Arab world see the end of the Iraq War as the time for more American action to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and to advance the “road map of a peace plan developed by the UN, EU, UK, and US. The US has already begun such an effort.

It is clear that the Bush Administration’s wartime agreement with Prime Minister Blair will lead the US to at least make another major try at advancing a peace plan. It is also clear that American officials have become more sensitive to Arab concerns in the region and the need to defuse the Second Intifada to both maintain US alliances in the Arab world and reduce Arab hostility to the US.

Making progress, however, may be extremely difficult -- with or without Palestinian reform. Israel sees deep flaws in the “road map,” and Palestinian “acceptance” of it is probably more a matter of tactical maneuver than any real support. The US also will not sacrifice Israel’s interests, and it is unclear whether the US will take enough action to really alter Israeli-Palestinian tensions or the broader tensions between Israel and the Arab world. There is a good chance that the Second Intifada will go on, and even intensify, regardless of such US efforts and the outcome of the Iraq War.

Iran

Iran and Syria have different interests from the US in both Iraq and the region. On the one hand, Iran has seen a key threat disappear. On the other hand, Iran has seen American triumphant on its borders, and heard US rhetoric that is at least indirectly threatening. The end result may deter Iran from some adventures, but it could provoke it into others. It could also exacerbate the fault lines within Iranian politics.

Iran has a longstanding interest in Iraqi Shi’ite religious politics, and in the role and power of Shi’ites in Iraqi society and politics. This interest is religious (key shrines and seminars are in Iraq), ideological (Iran favors a more theological Shi’ite power structure),

security (avoiding another war and limiting the impact of a US presence on its border and in the Gulf), power-political (a weak Iraq is a strong Iran in terms of Gulf power politics), energy (oil production and quotas), and economic (Iran has reparations claims left over from the Iran-Iraq War, and would like to clear the Shatt Al Arab.)

The Iranian “game” in Iraq is almost certain to be to play pro-Iranian Shi’ites off against other factions, seeking to create a friendly and Shi’ite dominated Iraq. It will be careful because of its own military weakness, need to maintain friendly relations with the Southern Gulf states, and desire to keep up its efforts at developing missiles and nuclear weapons without provoking the US. The end result, however, is likely to be a more disruptive Iranian role in Iraq than in Afghanistan and a constant pressure to internationalize the nation-building effort in the US and to push US forces out of Iraq and the Gulf.

Rafsanjani, among others, has talked about finding some way to legitimize a political dialog with the US. At the same time, Iran has done little to encourage SCIRI and other pro-Iranian Shi’ites to cooperate with the US nation-building effort in Iraq and is unlikely to do so unless it can see clear tactical value in doing so.

As for the fracture lines in Iran, it is unclear that any major faction in Iran welcomed the US intervention in Iraq. The pro Khatami faction may now be more willing to compromise and seek dialog, but the pro-Khomeini and hard-line factions are more likely to feel threatened and take a hard-line internally while trying to play the nation-building game in Iraq against the US, and exploit Arab resentment against the US to reduce its presence in the Gulf.

In balance, the Iraq War may do more to harden the hardliners than push Iran towards a more pro-Western position. In any case, the course of nation-building in Iraq will be seen as both a potential win and as a potential threat to Iran’s vital interests. At least, some degree of competition with the US seems inevitable.

Syria

The radically differing ideological views of the Bush Administration and Syria make for troubled relations at best. Syria has lost a major trading partner and counterbalance to Israel. While little love was lost between the two Ba’ath regimes, a rapprochement in recent years did lead to better relations, and more trade. Iraq’s proliferation and strong conventional forces also acted as a threat to Israel and a new Iraqi regime with far fewer military forces offers Syria far less of a counterbalance to Israel.

Syria clearly sees the US victory as “anti-Arab” removing a potential ally against Israel and placing American forces next to Syria for the first time. Syrian Pan Arab rhetoric and conspiracy theories reinforce a very real fear of US “neocolonialism” and a follow-on threat to the Syrian regime. Syria also sees the US effort in nation-building in Iraq as a threat to Ba’ath ideals and goals – regardless of the fact they have had limited realization in Syria.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the game that Syria has played in Iraq is one of a spoiler seeking to rebuild some form of Ba’athist role and Syrian influence, and one of harassing the US while pressing for the internationalization of the nation-building process.

What will be interesting is whether the Syrian-Iranian alliance that helped support the Hezbollah in Lebanon can be extended to cooperation in trying to influence the outcome of nation-building in Iraq or whether Arab versus Persian become the more important fault line.

Turkey

It is too soon to determine how much residual tension will exist between Turkey and the US as a result of Turkey's refusal to base US forces. What is clear is that Turkish democracy now has a strong Islamic element and the Turkish economy faces what could be a half-decade of crisis.

Like all of Iraq's neighbors, Turkey has a strong national interest in shaping nation-building in Iraq to serve Turkey's goals and objectives, rather than seeing it as an example. Turkey fears Kurdish autonomy and a lack of security along the border of its own Kurdish area. It is politically committed to supporting Iraq's Turcoman minority. Turkey needs oil pipeline revenues from Iraq, and sees Iraq as a major trading partner – one where its exports including agriculture and manufactures can be far more competitive than in the EU. As a result, Turkey does not want to see Kurdish control of Mosul or Kirkuk, or a major Kurdish role in control of Iraq's northern oilfields. Iraq's Kurds, in turn, still have some ambitions to create an independent Kurdistan including Turkey's Kurds. They and fear and resent the Turks, who sent in troops to hunt down Turkish Kurdish guerrillas hiding in Iraq five times between 1991 and 2003.

The Iraq War certainly is not going to help stabilize Turkey. The Kurdish and Turcoman problems in Iraq will be a constant source of tension, and serious questions will arise over Turkey's future role in Iraq's economy. Oil shipments for example, could shift towards more exports through the Gulf. The Kurds may prefer other trading partners, and seek to influence Iraq towards trading policies that favor other countries.

The end result is unlikely to reach the point of a major crisis unless the Kurds show very little judgment and discretion, but the Iraq War will scarcely make things easier for Turkey at least in the near term.

Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States

As far as the impact of Iraq on the Southern Gulf. As is the case in most other parts of the Arab world, much of the popular reaction depends on how successfully, how quickly, and if the US can help create a stable Iraq for the Iraqi's. The US victory has initially been seen by much of the population as motivated by a search for control of Gulf oil, military dominance in the Gulf, and/or helping Israel to secure its position in the region. Regimes may be less concerned about the more extreme version of such fears, but quietly share deep concern about US ability to create a unified and stable Iraq.

It is difficult to see why a Saudi Arabia so concerned with its own political, cultural and economic issues is going to see Iraq as a useful example of anything. The two states cultures, and societies are simply too different. While Iraq has been a tyranny resisting change, Saudi Arabia has been a nation where the more progressive princes, technocrats, and businessmen have sought to modernize a deeply conservative people and Ulema.

The governments of Saudi Arabia and the southern Gulf states are relieved at the fall of Saddam Hussein, but neither of these regimes nor most of their citizens welcome a growth in the power and role of Shi'ites and Kurds in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states fear the break up of Iraq's territorial integrity, a loss of Sunni control, and a shift in the balance of power in the Gulf. The Gulf states fear any weakening of Arab control of Iraq, and any break up that would give Iraq's Kurds independence. The Southern Gulf states are afraid that Shi'ite separatism or control of Iraq would create a major new pro-Iranian power center in the Gulf, potentially destabilizing the balance of power in the Gulf. They are already concerned that Iraq's loss of much of its military power and equipment has gravely weakened its ability to deter Iran.

The Kuwaiti reaction has been more favorable in terms of seeing Saddam go, but Kuwait now lacks a unifying threat, the two leading members of the royal family are ill to the point of incapacity, the National Assembly is bogged down in service politics, and the power of Islamists is growing and is scarcely pro-American.

The other Southern Gulf states will continue to focus on their own political dynamics, with a Shi'ite problem in Bahrain and succession issues in Oman. The interest of that societies so dependent on foreign labor and oil wealth shown in pluralism and the Iraqi example – even if there is one – will be limited.

In general, the outcome of the Iraq War has so far added to the concerns and tensions between the US and Southern Gulf states growing out of the Second Intifada, the US reaction to "9/11," and the size of the US military presence in the region. At least in the case of Saudi Arabia, there has also been increased concern about new US efforts at regime change, and US unwillingness to recognize Saudi efforts at economic reform and the problems the regime faces with an ultraconservative population.

Jordan

Iraq will increase Jordan's problems, at least in the short term. Jordan fears the loss of trade and low-cost oil: Jordan has long benefited from Iraqi oil subsidies, and from the fact Iraq imported goods through the port of Aqaba because of the Iranian closing of the Shatt al Arab and UN sanctions. The future of such subsidies and trade is now unclear.

Some Jordanians recognized that Saddam was a tyrant in Iraq, but most saw him as a supporter of the Palestinians and Second Intifada. They now see King Abdullah's support of the US as at least a partial betrayal, and their expectations are likely to be focused more on postwar US efforts to create an Arab-Israeli peace than on Iraq nation-building. The Iraq War will not make things in Jordan radically worse, but—at least in the short term—they are unlikely to make them even marginally better.

Egypt

Egyptian government perceptions of the Iraq War are likely to be one of relief that it is over and did not make the fracture lines between the US and Arab world even worse. They also however, are deeply concerned over the potential emergence of an Iraq that is less Sunni Arab. Popular reactions are far more critical, and many see the government as

having betrayed the Arab cause by giving the US basing aid and transit rights through the Suez Canal.

The end result has so far been to increase the resentments growing out of the Second Intifada and the US treatment of "9/11," and filled with conspiracy theories about US and British motives in Iraq, Gulf, and Arab world. While some Egyptians do see the fall of a tyrant as desirable, even these Egyptians view nation-building in Iraq in terms of unrealistic demands for instant success in nation-building, instant internationalization, and instant US departure.

In broad terms, however, Iraq is a sideshow in the internal politics of Egypt, which reflect increasing tension over an aging Pharaoh, the lack of a clear succession, and the problems of the Egyptian economy. The successful suppression of Islamist challenges to the government has been suppression, not defeat, or a moment towards a more stable form of pluralism. It is not the example of Iraq. It is also unclear that Egypt's noisy media and secular politicians that seem likely to shape the post-Mubarak era. It is rather the army versus the Islamists.

In any case, years of troubled nation-building in Iraq are not going to reshape the perceptions and attitudes of an equally troubled Egypt.

North Africa

Iraq is too far away to have much impact on the Maghreb states, except to serve as one more example of Western interference in Arab affairs – at least in the short term. The image of the Iraq War is likely to blur with the image of US support for Israel and the hostility much of the US media has shown to Islam and the Arab world since "9/11," but it is unclear that the impact will be particularly strong or negative.

A truly successful Iraq in political and economic terms might have a long-term influence on the Arab states in North Africa, but the internal problems of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia are so great – and so driven by internal factors – that Iraq is not likely to have major impact even if it does become a striking success story.

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism

Arabists have argued that the Iraq War will polarize and anger the Arab world, creating new groups of Islamic and other extremists and a new wave of terrorist attacks. Neoconservatives have argued that defeating Iraq will serve as a deterrent symbol, and at worst be the first phase in a series of military operations to defeat terrorist states.

In practice, it is difficult to see why either view should be correct. The war may well stimulate some sources of terrorism and deter others, achieving a rough balance. It is difficult to see those Arabs and Islamic extremists that already resent the US will resent it that much more because of a conflict removing a secular dictator.

As for deterrence, the message of the war to extremists and terrorists may well be that conventional forces cannot do serious damage to the US but that irregular forces can. In any case, it is far from clear how the message of military victory will deter suicide bombers and violent extremists more than the US victory in Afghanistan, and Iraq's role as a supporter of terrorism was so tenuous that it is unclear why removing Saddam's regime will make that much of a difference.

If anything, it is the quality of nation-building in Iraq, and the mid and long-term message this sends, that is likely to be more important than the military outcome.

The US Role and Presence in the Region

The Iraq War is not likely to make the presence of US forces in the region radically more—or less—popular than at the start of the war. Fear may lead some states to want the US to reduce its presence because of the risk the US will push for regime change but it may make others less willing to differ from the US and fail to support its power projection efforts. The US as yet has no way of estimating how many forces it needs to keep in Iraq in the short term, and its security needs relative to Iran in the longer run.

In any case, many of the tensions shaping US presence in the Gulf are more the long-term legacies of the US military presence in Saudi Arabia, and the tensions that grew up between Saudi Arabia and the US following “9/11,” than tied to Iraq. The US decision to remove its combat forces from Saudi Arabia should ease these tensions considerably.

The US presence in Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman has never led to serious popular pressure for their removal. It also has generally been more tied to their perception of the threat posed by Iran than the threat posed by Iraq, although Kuwait’s fundamentalists may be more willing to oppose US and Kuwaiti military ties now that the threat from Iraq has diminished.

The situation affecting the US presence in the region may be more destabilizing in terms of Egypt and Jordan. The Iraq War has made the quiet support their governments gave to the US more visible, and they already face serious problems because of the Second Intifada, economic problems, and other internal issues. Much will depend both on progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process and the quality of the nation-building effort in Iraq.

Energy Imports and Energy Security

One of the ironies of the Iraq War is that while it was a war about the stability of a region with some 60% of the world’s oil reserves, and was a war about the security of oil exports, there is little prospect that it will offer the US or US any particular advantages except in the form of a more stable global oil market. While the liberation of Iraq may ease the price squeeze on world oil prices once Iraqi oil exports resume, no oil deals made by the US and Britain can survive once they leave Iraq unless the Iraqis feel these deals clearly benefit Iraq. In fact, there is no single area where both the US and Britain must do more to show Iraq and the world that all transactions and actions are in the interest of the Iraqi people.

“Oil imperialism” has little practical value to a modern economic power. The flag a multinational oil company uses is no indication of economic benefit to its “host” country and the tax and revenue streams from foreign operations have a limited impact on national revenues – if any. The international political costs of backing an oil company in a non-market driven foreign operation almost inevitably outweigh the tenuous economic advantages. Any control over the end-destination of the oil produced is negligible and subject to IEA sharing agreements in an energy emergency. Creating a strong national Iraqi oil industry that can attract global investment and operate on market terms offers far more advantages than a return to the 19th Century and a failed colonialism.

In any case, large-scale expansion of Iraq's oil exports is likely to come only after the US and UK have long gone from Iraq, and its supply and price impact is already anticipated in OPEC, IEA, and DOE forecasts. These projections call for Iraqi production to increase to 3.1 MMBD by 2005, 3.9 MMBD in 2010, 4.5 MMBD in 2015, and 4.8-5.5 MMBD in 2020 if the world is to meet expanding demand with moderate prices. Iraq may or may not meet or exceed these goals, but it will do it long after US and British influence has faded, and do so on its own terms. In practice, it is far more likely to be driven by the world economy, its internal needs, the availability of sustained investment, and the energy politics of its neighbors and OPEC.

The Underlying Factors that Shape the New Old Middle East

The greatest factor limiting the Grand Strategic impact of the Iraq War, however, is that it does not deal with any of the larger forces pressing on the Middle East. In summary, it has removed a major tyrant and a key proliferator, but it has not fundamentally changed the Middle East or even disturbed most fracture lines. In any case, it will be several years before the victory in Iraq, and the nation-building that follows, can be a key example of anything. Even when outcome is clear, it seems doubtful that it will have a definitive impact on any of the other 22 countries in the region, each of which has its own problems, goals, and imperatives. The outcome of the Iraq War will be a factor that affects the future of the Gulf and the Middle East, but only one factor among many.

The broader forces that shape the Middle East are too powerful for any one conflict or example to reshape the region. These factors include massive population growth, and the failure of effective economic development and reform in virtually every country in the region. They include the precipitous decline of agriculture, war shortages, urban migration, hyperurbanization, and the destruction of traditional social structures and force restructuring of extended families.

Iraq's future politics are important, but it is equally important to understand the scale of the other forces at work. The World Bank's report on Global Economic Development for 2003 shows a sharp decline in economic growth in GDP in constant prices from 6.5% during 1971-1980 to 2.5% during 1981-1990. While growth rose to 3.2% during 1991-2000, it barely kept pace with population growth. This is reflected in the fact that growth in per capita income in constant prices dropped from 3.6% during 1971-1980 to -0.6% during 1981-1990, and was only 1% from 1991-2000 – reflected static income over nearly twenty years in a region with extremely poor equity of income distribution.

While inter-regional comparisons may be somewhat unfair, the economic growth in East Asia and the Pacific was 6.6% during 1971-1980, 7.3% during 1981-1990, and 7.7% during 1991-2000. The growth in real per capita income was the economic growth in East Asia and the Pacific was 3.0% during 1971-1980, 4.8% during 1981-1990, and 5.4% during 1991-2000.

Demographics are a major problem. The total population of the Middle East and North Africa has grown from 78.6 million in 1950 to 101.2 million in 1960, 133.0 million in 1970, 177.9 million in 1980, 244.8 million in 1990, and 307.1 million in 2000. Conservative projections put it at 376.2 million in 2010, 449.3 million in 2020, 522.3 million in 2030, 592.1 million in 2040, and 656.3 million in 2050.

This growth will further exhaust scarce natural water supplies, increase permanent dependence on food imports, and raise the young working age population aged 15 to 30 from 20.5 million in 1950 to 87.8 million in 2000, and 145.2 million in 2050. The fact that the age group of 14 years or younger now totals over 40% of the population of the region creates an immense bow wave of future strain on the social, educational, political, and economic system.

The resulting social turbulence is compounded by an extremely young population, overstretched and outdated educational systems, and the failure of the labor market to create productive jobs, or any jobs at all for many of the young men entering the labor force. Emigration creates another source of social turbulence, while religious and cultural barriers to the effective employment of women compound other problems in productivity and competitiveness with other developed regions.

All of these forces affect a regime where political structures remain fragile and large authoritarian regardless of the formal structure of government. Traditional monarchies often interfere less in human rights and normal social conduct than supposed democracies. In broad terms, however, no state in the region has managed to create a secular political culture that provides effective pluralism.

The Middle East is also a region where competing secular ideologies have failed: Pan-Arabism, socialism, capitalism, Marxism, statism, and paternalism have all proved unable to provide adequate development and meet social needs. The fact that so many in the region have turned back to more traditional social structures and religion is scarcely surprising, but it is unclear that this offers any meaningful solution to the problems involved.

Given these regional divisions and pressures, the main grand strategic lesson seems to be that both the results of the Iraq War and the outcome of nation-building in Iraq, must be viewed as a one-country solution to a twenty-three country problem. It is an important move in the three-dimensional chess game that will shape the region over the next ten years, but only a move.

¹ The author is indebted to Merrick E. Krause for this quote, who used it in a different context in "Decision Dominance: Exploiting Transformational Asymmetries," Defense Horizons, Washington, NDU, February 2003, p. 3. It is taken from the Michael Howard and Peter Paret translation of On War, Princeton University, 1976, p. 88.

² For a technical explanation of some of the adaptations in helicopter tactics, see Robert Wall, "Guerrilla War," Aviation Week, March 31, 2003, pp. 24-25.

³ Paul Martin, "Iraqi Secret Plan Orders Mayhem," Washington Times, June 9, 2003, p. 1; Alexei Barrionuevo and Michael M. Phillips, "Mounting Troop Deaths in Iraq Raise Questions of US Control," Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2003; Warren Vieth and Alissa J. Rubin, "Iraq Pipelines Easy Targets for A Saboteur," Los Angeles Times, June 25, 2003; Daniel McGrory, "Saboteurs Leave Cities Stifling in Dark,"

London Times, June 25, 2003; “Rumsfeld Downplays Resistance in Iraq,” New York Times on the Web, June 18, 2003; Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Officials Say They See No Organized Iraqi Resistance,” New York Times, June 15, 2003; Dave Moniz, “Official: US Not Ready for Iraq Chaos,” USA Today, June 11, 2003; Michael Slackman, “Carefully Planned Attacks Target US Troops in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2003; Rowan Scarborough, “Rumsfeld Says Fate of Saddam Fuels Guerrilla Attacks,” Washington Times, June 11, 2003; Paul Martin, “Scores of Saddam Backers Arrested,” Washington Times, June 30, 2003; “Rumsfeld Doesn’t See Iraq Attacks as Guerilla Warfare,” Dallas Morning News, June 28, 2003; Michael Elliot, “The War that Never Ends,” Time, July 28, 2003, p. 28; James Gordon Meek, “US Calls Saddam Key to GI Killings,” New York Daily News, June 30, 2003; Thomas E. Ricks, “Experts Question Depth of Victory,” Washington Post, June 27, 2003; Alexei Barrionuevo, “Resistance Groups Attack Iraqis Who Are Helping Coalition Forces,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2003..

⁴ “US Hunts Down Saddam Loyalists,” BBC News, June 13, 2003, 2101; USCENTCOM Press Release, “Operation Desert Scorpion Begins Combined Combat and Humanitarian Action,” USCENTCOM, Baghdad, Iraq, June 15, 2003; USCENTCOM Press Release, “Coalition and Iraqi Police Work to Make Iraq Secure,” Release 03-06-78, June 24, 2003,

⁵ USCENTCOM News Release, Release Number: 03-06-102, June 30, 2003.

⁶ USCENTCOM News Release, Release Number: 03-06-102, June 30, 2003.

⁷ William Booth, “Six British Soldiers Killed in an Iraqi Town,” Washington Post, June 25, 2003; James Hide, “US Deaths Rise,” London Times, June 20, 2003.

⁸ Estimates differ as to the causes. According to the Wall Street Journal, the US had lost 92 dead to enemy fire since Baghdad had fallen on March 19 versus 102 during the war, and 52 Americans had been killed since President Bush had announced the formal end of combat action on May 1, Source: Alexei Barrionuevo and Michael M. Phillips, “Mounting Troop Deaths in Iraq Raise Questions of US Control,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2003.

¹⁰ Many of the comments made in this section are based on interviews with US, British, and Australian officials, officers, and experts after the war, and the author’s prior experience in analyzing proliferation. There are many useful press reports that have emerged since the war. In addition to those referenced later in this section, these include Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, “CIA Lack Info To Counter Claims About Iraqi Weapons,” Miami Herald, June 3, 2003; James Risen, “Word that US Doubted Iraq Would Use Gas,” New York Times, June 18, 2003, Bruce Auster, Mark Mazetti, and Edward Pound, “Truth and Consequences,” US News and World Report, June 9, 2003; Evan Thomas, Richard Wolffe, and Michael Isikoff, “Where are Iraq’s WMDs?” Newsweek, June 9, 2003; Michael Duffy, “Weapons of Mass Disappearance,” Time, June 9, 2003; James Risen, “Iraq Arms Report Now the Subject of A CIA review,” New York Times, June 4, 2003; Maggie Farley, “Blix’s Final Words to Security Council are Words of Caution,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2003; Tony Capaccio, “Pentagon 2002 Study Reported No Reliable Data on Iraq Weapons,” Bloomberg.com, June 6, 2003;

¹¹ For an interesting discussion of the problems in assessing dual use facilities in Iraq, see Walter Pincus, “weapons Linked to Dual Use Facilities in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 2, 2003.

¹² For some additional data on this aspect of these assessments made of Iraq, see Bill Gertz, “Iraqi Group Aid CIA Intelligence,” Washington Times, June 12, 2003; John Diamond, “Broad Purges Wiped Out Most Iraqis Helping CIA,” USA Today, June 17, 2003; John Diamond, “Weak Spy Network Hurt Hunt for Arms,” USA Today, June 17, 2003.

¹³ Earlier unclassified CIA reports on problems like the ballistic missile threat often projected alternative levels of current and future capability. The qualifications and possible futures are far less well defined in more recent reports. For example, see CIA, Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” National Intelligence Council, December 2001, http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/Unclassifiedballisticmissilefinal.htm.

¹⁴ There is no way to determine just how much the Special Plans Office team set up within the office of the Secretary of Defense to analyze the threat in Iraq was designed to produce a given conclusion or politicized intelligence. The Department has denied this, and stated that the team created within its policy office was not working Iraqi per se, but on global terrorist interconnections. It also stated that the Special Plans Office was never tied to the Intelligence Collection Program - a program to debrief Iraqi defectors – and relied on CIA inputs for its analysis. It states that simply conducted a review, presented its findings in August 2002,

and its members returned to other duties. See Jim Garamone, "Policy Chief Seeks to Clear Intelligence Record," American Forces Information Service, June 3, 2003; and Briefing on policy and intelligence matters, Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, and William J. Luti, deputy under secretary of defense for special plans and Near East and South Asian affairs, June 4, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030604-0248.html>.

Some intelligence experts dispute this view, however, and claim the team's effort was used to put pressure on the intelligence community. Such "B-teams" also have a mixed history. They did help identify an intelligence community tendency to underestimate Soviet strategic nuclear efforts during the Cold War. The threat analysis of missile threats posed to the US by the "Rumsfeld Commission," however, was a heavily one-sided assessment designed to justify national missile defense. Also see Greg Miller, "Pentagon Defends Role of Intelligence Unit on Iraq," Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2003; and David S. Cloud, "The Case for War Relied on Selective Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2003..

¹⁵ Some press sources cite what they claim is a deliberate effort to ignore a September 2002 DIA report on Iraqi chemical weapons capabilities called "Iraq-Key WMD Facilities-An Operational Support Study." See James Risen, "Word that US Doubted Iraq Would Use Gas," New York Times, June 18, 2003 and Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon 2002 Study Reported No Reliable Data on Iraq Weapons," USA Today, June 6, 2003.

In fact, the unclassified excerpts from the DIA report, show that DIA was not stating that Iraq did not have chemical weapons, but rather that it had, No reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has – or will – establish its chemical weapons facilities." The report went on to say that, "although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possess CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly include artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possess bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent of stabilized VX."

If anything, the report is a classic example of what happens when intelligence reports do state uncertainty and of how the user misreads or misuses the result.

¹⁶ For a detailed analysis of the history and nature of this effort, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraq and the War of Sanctions, Westport, Praeger, 1999.

¹⁷ See Felicity Barringer, "UN Inspectors Say Baghdad Never Resolved Arms Issues," New York Times, June 3, 2003; Maggie Farley, "Blix's Final Words top Security Council on Iraq are of Caution," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2003; Bob Drogan, "UN Nuclear Experts Back In Iraq," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2003; "UN Nuclear Team Heads for Iraq," BBC News, June 4, 2003, 0943 GMT.

¹⁸ Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, "Notes for briefing of the Security Council on the thirteenth quarterly report of UNMOVIC," June 5, 2003, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/>.

¹⁹ Rolf Ekeus, "Iraq's Real Weapons Threat," Washington Post, June 29, 2003, p. B7. For the full text of the report, see the thirteenth report of the Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, S/2003/580, May 30, 2003.

²⁰ In addition to the previous sources, see James Risen, CIA Studying Prewar Reports on Iraqi Threat," New York Times, May 22, 2003, p. 1; Walter Pincus, "Officials Defend Iraq Intelligence," Washington Post, June 9, 2003; Walter Strobel and John Walcott, "CIA Lacked Info To Counter Claims About Iraq Weapons," Miami Herald, June 3, 2003; David S. Cloud, "Case for War Relied on Selective Intelligence," Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2003; James Risen, "Iraq Arms Report Now the Subject of A CIA Review," New York Times, June 4, 2003; Dan Plesch and Richard Norton Taylor, "Straw, Powell Has Serious Doubts Over Their Iraqi Weapons Claims," The Guardian, May 31, 2003.

²¹ In addition to the previous sources, see Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, "Analysts Cite Pressure on Iraq Judgments," Washington Post, June 5, 2003; and Warren P. Strobel and John Walcott, "CIA lacked Info to Counter Claims About Iraqi Weapons," Miami Herald, June 3, 2003.

²² Bill Gertz, "Iraqi Group Aided CIA Intelligence," Washington Times, June 12, 2003.; Warren Hoge, "Iraq Report Mishandled, Blair Aide Concedes in Letter," New York Times, June 9, 2003; Mark Huban and Mark Turner, "Evidence About Iraqi Uranium Not Fake," London Financial Times, June 6, 2003, p. 3; Walter Pincus, "Officials Defend Iraq Intelligence," Washington Post, June 9, 2003; Andrew Sparrow and Benedict Brogan, "Blair: I have Weapons Proof," London Daily Telegraph, June 2, 2003; Glenn Frankel, "Blair Accused of Exaggerating Claims About Iraqi Weapons," Washington Post, May 30, 2003; John Diamond, "Uranium Reports Doubted Early On," USA Today, June 13, 2003; Walter Pincus, "CIA Says It Cabled Key Data to White House," Washington Post, June 13, 2003.

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- ²³ "Serving Officer was 45-Minute claim Source," Times On Line, June 15, 2003.
- ²⁴ John Hendren, "Weapons Reports Called Lacking," Los Angeles Times, June 26, 2003.
- ²⁵ Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander, First Marine Expeditionary Force, "Live Briefing From Iraq, May 30, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0229.ht>.
- ²⁶ Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, "Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): Lessons Learned," MEF FRAGO 279-03, May 29, 2003.
- ²⁷ For example, see Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: Selective Intelligence," New Yorker, May 12, 2003.
- ²⁸ Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq: Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post, May 11, 2003, p. A1.
- ²⁹ Bob Drogan, "New Hunt for Iraqi Arms Resembles Old," Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2003.
- ³⁰ William J. Broad, "US Civilian Experts Say Bureaucracy and Infighting Jeopardize Search for Weapons," New York Times, April 16th, 2003; Dan Morse, "US Troops Go House to House in Search of Chemical Weapons," Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2003; Judith Miller, "US Inspectors Find No Forbidden Weapons at Iraqi Arms Plants," New York Times, April 16, 2003.
- ³¹ Barton Gellman, "Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms," Washington Post, June 13, 2003;
- ³² John J. Fialka, "US Readies A Different Army to Search for Weapons in Iraq," Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2003,
- ³³ Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq: Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post, May 11, 2003, p. A1.
- ³⁴ See Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: Selective Intelligence," New Yorker, May 12, 2003, and Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq: Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post, May 11, 2003, p. A1.
- ³⁵ "Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group," Stephen A. Cambone, under secretary of defense for intelligence, and Army Maj. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, director for operations, Defense Intelligence Agency, May 30, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html>.
- ³⁶ Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: Selective Intelligence," New Yorker, May 12, 2003. The best reporting on the issue at this writing, however, can be found in Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq: Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post, May 11, 2003, p. A1.
- ³⁷ Department of Defense Briefing, Stephen A. Cambone, USD (Intelligence) presenter, May 7, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030507-0158.html>
- ³⁸ "Briefing on the Iraq Survey Group," Stephen A. Cambone, under secretary of defense for intelligence, and Army Maj. Gen. Keith W. Dayton, director for operations, Defense Intelligence Agency, May 30, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030530-0231.html>.
- ³⁹ Bill Nichols, "Weapons Search Could Take Years," USA Today, May 16, 2003, p. 1; Judith Miller, "Radioactive Material Found at Test Site Near Baghdad," New York Times, May 12, 2003; Barton Gellman, "Seven Nuclear Sites Looted," Washington Post, May 10, 2003, p. 1.
- ⁴⁰ Bob Drogan, "UN Nuclear Experts Back In Iraq," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2003; "UN Nuclear Team Heads for Iraq," BBC News, June 4, 2003, 0943 GMT; Bob Drogan, "New Hunt for Iraqi Arms Resembles Old," Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2003. The US Department of Defense explained the role of the IAEA by stating that, "The purpose of the inspection is to inventory and assess the condition of the material that is under IAEA safeguards at the Baghdad yellow-cake storage facility. The material at this facility includes approximately 500 metric tons of safeguarded uranium and several non-fissile radioisotope sources that are not under IAEA safeguards. The uranium is mostly in the form of yellow cake, an isotopically natural form that is an impure oxide. There is a small quantity of low-enriched and depleted uranium. Typically, the IAEA would conduct an NPT safeguards inspection at this location annually. The last inspection was conducted in December of 2002. Given the changed circumstances, the United States has determined it would be helpful to have the IAEA reinventory this location. I would like to underscore, though, that this is a cooperative effort. The coalition will be providing necessary transportation, security and other minimal logistics to the team, which will consist of seven IAEA experts. The safeguards activity will be led by the IAEA under the protection and auspices of coalition forces. To ensure safety and protection, coalition forces will accompany the IAEA at all times. Coalition nuclear experts will also participate in the inspection and the inventory. Upon completion of the inventory, the IAEA will repackage the material as necessary, reseal all safeguarded rooms, buildings and containers as appropriate, and the coalition will, as

appropriate, assist in this effort. I want to note that this access to the IAEA is not an IAEA inspection pursuant to the U.N. Security Council resolutions and does not set any precedent for future IAEA involvement in Iraq in any disarmament or UNSCR-related activity. And lastly, we expect that the IAEA will share their findings with us as we work cooperatively on this effort.” He explained the looting problem as follows: “Tuwaitha, as has been stated earlier, is about a 23,000-acre facility that’s about 20 kilometers to the southeast of Baghdad. And Site Charlie, where radiological materials, principally yellow cake were stored, consists of three buildings, and they’re surrounded by a fence and a wall of concrete barriers about 12 feet tall on three sides. According to reports from civilians in the area, on or about the 10th of March, Iraqi army forces who were guarding the site reportedly left their weapons -- some of their weapons with the local civilians -- and abandoned the site. We also believe, from talking to the local civilians, that on or about 20 March, the 20th of March, the civilians guarding the site abandoned it also. And, of course, we were conducting our attack across the Kuwaiti border on the 21st. On the 7th of April, U.S. Marines from our land component first arrived at Tuwaitha Site Charlie and assumed the security, and remained there until the 20th of April, when they turned over control of the facility to U.S. Army soldiers from another unit. And Tuwaitha Site Charlie has been secured and under the positive control of U.S. forces since the 7th of April. When the U.S. forces first arrived, they found the Tuwaitha site facility, Tuwaitha Charlie facility, in disarray. The front gate was open and unsecured, and the fence line and barrier wall on the back side of the facility had been breached. And the troops reported that there were no seals on the exterior doors of the buildings. But since taking control of Tuwaitha Site Charlie, no thieves or looters have been allowed inside the facility. We have taken several positive steps to try to mitigate any risks from Tuwaitha Charlie to either the soldiers or the population in the surrounding area or to the environment. And I’ll list of a couple of those. Between the 8th and 10th of April, a team conducted an initial survey outside the buildings at Tuwaitha Charlie, and they determined that additional exploitation was required beyond their capability. And so the exploitation task force, the folks responsible for that operation, decided to keep the security at the site and to deny access to anyone except properly trained personnel. On the 18th of April, some Iraqi scientists from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, who had worked at the facility, were allowed in to check the site and to mitigate any radiological hazards within their capability. And they moved some sources into a building from the concrete outside. On the 12th of May, our Threat Reduction Agency personnel arrived in Iraq and began planning for its operation at Tuwaitha Charlie. And between the 15th and 20th of May, our task force disablement and elimination team conducted its technical assessment and an inventory of what was there. And from what we know at this time, the quantity of materials we have found at the site exceeds the quantity of materials that we had assessed would be present at the site. On the 18th of May, a direct support team teamed up with the Coalition Provisional Authority personnel and some additional people from IAEC, the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, and they decided to conduct a buy-back operation because the troops were starting to hear stories that some of the barrels -- there were barrels in the local community that resembled those that were at the site. The team went to two villages and offered to pay \$3 a piece for any items that may have come from the facility, and they pointed out what these items might look like. The team recovered over 100 barrels of various sizes and shapes and condition, as well as five radioactive sources and some other items. But virtually none of the people admitted to having taken the items from the facility. They said they had bought them. And indeed, barrels like these are ubiquitous around Iraq. And although there are some similar containers available in markets -- and the same type barrels are sometimes found in people’s homes. The team checked the items for radioactivity and also checked the people to reassure them. None of the people registered any radiation above normal background levels. And these barrels of various sizes and shapes and colors -- none of them registered more than background level or slightly above normal background radiation. They then transported the items to Tuwaitha Charlie and secured them. And so, there’s no way to tell at this point if they came from Tuwaitha, but they were taken back there just in case, for safety. The technical assessment also determined that outside the fence line at Tuwaitha Charlie, there was negligible risk to the soldiers guarding the site and to the population within a wide area out to a kilometer from the fence line. But the site had apparently been looted before U.S. soldiers arrived. Uranium materials and some other stored materials had been dumped on the floor in places, and in one building, there were a number of radiological sources scattered around the floor. Radiological readings measured only background levels out at the fence line, and readings at the buildings and inside were somewhere between two and 10 times background readings -- background readings. We’ve been conducting weekly meetings with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, with our coalition forces experts

and with the Coalition Provisional Authority experts to continue the way ahead in a joint manner. We've developed a plan and objectives for improvement of the site. This week, the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, commonly called CHPPM, arrives from the United States. And they'll conduct a risk assessment on the soldiers and Marines who were there and those who are still there. And the purpose of that is to reassure those soldiers and Marines, but also to determine what, if any, risks they might have occurred -- incurred, rather, from being at -- near the site. Together with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission and the Iraqi Ministry of Health, CHPPM will also help to conduct a wider search and a health risk assessment of the surrounding civilian area, out to about five kilometers. Iraqi scientists and physicians began that work this week by conducting an initial assessment and a census of those people out there. We also formed a joint team with the Iraqi experts and repaired and sealed the buildings as a further measure of safety, so that even if the weather changed to something severe that we hadn't expected, the buildings would still be secure. We've also recruited a 100-man Iraqi guard force. And we're in the process of training them so that once they meet standards, they'll eventually take over the security. And of course, IAEA arrives in Baghdad this weekend to begin its work. And that's about all I have for opening comments." (Senior Defense Official, "Background briefing on the upcoming IAEA nuclear safeguards inspection and the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility in Iraq," June 5, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030605-0250.html>.)

⁴¹ Judy Keen, "US: Weapon Search has Barely Begun," USA Today, June 20, 2003.

⁴² See William J. Broad, "US, In Assessment, Terms Trailers Germ Laboratories," New York Times, May 29, 2003.

The CIA summarized the importance of this discovery as follows in a report on Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants dated May 28, 2003 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html)

"Coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program.

- Kurdish forces in late April 2003 took into custody a specialized tractor-trailer near Mosul and subsequently turned it over to US military control.
- The US military discovered a second mobile facility equipped to produce BW agent in early May at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul. Although this second trailer appears to have been looted, the remaining equipment, including the fermentor, is in a configuration similar to the first plant.
- US forces in late April also discovered a mobile laboratory truck in Baghdad. The truck is a toxicology laboratory from the 1980s that could be used to support BW or legitimate research.

The design, equipment, and layout of the trailer found in late April is strikingly similar to descriptions provided by a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants. Secretary of State Powell's description of the mobile plants in his speech in February 2003 to the United Nations (see inset below) was based primarily on reporting from this source.

Secretary Powell's speech to the UN in February 2003 detailed Iraq's mobile BW program, and was primarily based on information from a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants.

- Iraq's mobile BW program began in the mid-1990s—this is reportedly when the units were being designed.
- Iraq manufactured mobile trailers and railcars to produce biological agents, which were designed to evade UN weapons inspectors. Agent production reportedly occurred Thursday night through Friday when the UN did not conduct inspections in observance of the Muslim holy day.
- An accident occurred in 1998 during a production run, which killed 12 technicians—an indication that Iraq was producing a BW agent at that time.

Analysis of the trailers reveals that they probably are second- or possibly third-generation designs of the plants described by the source. The newer version includes system improvements, such as cooling units, apparently engineered to solve production problems described by the source that were encountered with the older design. The manufacturer's plates on the fermentors list production dates of 2002 and 2003—suggesting Iraq continued to produce these units as late as this year.

The source reported to us that Iraq in 1995 planned to construct seven sets of mobile production plants—six on semitrailers and one on railroad cars—to conceal BW agent production while appearing to cooperate with UN inspectors. Some of this information was corroborated by another source.

- One of the semitrailer plants reportedly produced BW agents as early as July 1997.
- The design for a more concealable and efficient two-trailer system was reportedly completed in May 1998 to compensate for difficulties in operating the original, three-trailer plant.
- Iraq employed extensive denial and deception in this program, including disguising from its own workers the production process, equipment, and BW agents produced in the trailers.

Examination of the trailers reveals that all of the equipment is permanently installed and interconnected, creating an ingeniously simple, self-contained bioprocessing system. Although the equipment on the trailer found in April 2003 was partially damaged by looters, it includes a fermentor capable of producing biological agents and support equipment such as water supply tanks, an air compressor, a water chiller, and a system for collecting exhaust gases.

The trailers probably are part of a two- or possibly three-trailer unit. Both trailers we have found probably are designed to produce BW agent in unconcentrated liquid slurry. The missing trailer or trailers from one complete unit would be equipped for growth media preparation and postharvest processing and, we would expect, have equipment such as mixing tanks, centrifuges, and spray dryers. These other units that we have not yet found would be needed to prepare and sterilize the media and to concentrate and possibly dry the agent, before the agent is ready for introduction into a delivery system, such as bulk-filled munitions. Before the Gulf war, Iraq bulk filled missile and rocket warheads, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and spray tanks.

The majority of our information on Iraq's mobile program was obtained from a chemical engineer that managed one of the plants. Three other sources, however, corroborated information related to the mobile BW project. The second source was a civil engineer who reported on the existence of at least one truck-transportable facility in December 2000 at the Karbala ammunition depot. The third source reported in 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile systems for the production of single-cell protein on trailers and railcars but admitted that they could be used for BW agent production. The fourth source, a defector from the Iraq Intelligence Service, reported that Baghdad manufactured mobile facilities that we assess could be used for the research of BW agents, vice production.

Our analysis of the mobile production plant found in April indicates the layout and equipment are consistent with information provided by the chemical engineer, who has direct knowledge of Iraq's mobile BW program. The source recognized pictures of this trailer, among photographs of unrelated equipment, as a mobile BW production plant similar to the one that he managed, even pointing out specific pieces of equipment that were installed on his unit.

Common elements between the source's description and the trailers include a control panel, fermentor, water tank, holding tank, and two sets of gas cylinders. One set of gas cylinders was reported to provide clean gases—oxygen and nitrogen—for production, and the other set captured exhaust gases, concealing signatures of BW agent production.

The discovered trailers also incorporate air-stirred fermentors, which the source reported were part of the second-generation plant design. Externally, the trailers have a ribbed superstructure to support a canvas covering that matches the source's description. Data plates on the fermentors indicate that they were manufactured at the same plant the source said manufactured equipment for the first generation of mobile plants. The plant also was involved in the production of equipment used in Iraq's pre-Gulf war BW program.

Employees of the facility that produced the mobile production plants' fermentor revealed that seven fermentors were produced in 1997, one in 2002 and one in 2003. The seven fermentors appear to corroborate the source's reporting that Iraq in the mid-1990s planned to produce seven mobile production plants. The two fermentors produced in 2002 and 2003 reportedly were sent to the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul—the site where the second trailer was found—and probably are the fermentors found on the trailers in US custody.

There are a few inconsistencies between the source's reporting and the trailers, which probably reflect design improvements. The original plants were reported to be mounted on flatbed trailers reinforced by nickel-plate flooring and equipped with hydraulic support legs. The discovered plants are mounted on heavy equipment transporters intended to carry army tanks, obviating the need for reinforced floors

and hydraulic legs. The trailers have a cooling unit not included in the original plant design, probably to solve overheating problems during the summer months as described by the source. The original design had 18 pumps, but the source mentioned an effort to reduce the number to four in the new design. The trailer discovered in late April has three pumps.

Coalition experts on fermentation and systems engineering examined the trailer found in late April and have been unable to identify any legitimate industrial use—such as water purification, mobile medical laboratory, vaccine or pharmaceutical production—that would justify the effort and expense of a mobile production capability. We have investigated what other industrial processes may require such equipment—a fermentor, refrigeration, and a gas capture system—and agree with the experts that BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles.

The capability of the system to capture and compress exhaust gases produced during fermentation is not required for legitimate biological processes and strongly indicates attempts to conceal production activity. The presence of caustic in the fermentor combined with the recent painting of the plant may indicate an attempt to decontaminate and conceal the plant's purpose. Finally, the data plate on the fermentor indicates that this system was manufactured in 2002 and yet it was not declared to the United Nations, as required by Security Council Resolutions.

Some coalition analysts assess that the trailer found in late April could be used for bioproduction but believe it may be a newer prototype because the layout is not entirely identical to what the source described.

A New York Times article on 13 May 2003 reported that an agricultural expert suggests the trailers might have been intended to produce biopesticides near agricultural areas in order to avoid degradation problems. The same article also reported that a former weapons inspector suggests that the trailers may be chemical-processing units intended to refurbish Iraq's antiaircraft missiles.

Biopesticide production requires the same equipment and technology used for BW agent production; however, the off-gas collection system and the size of the equipment are unnecessary for biopesticide production. There is no need to produce biopesticides near the point of use because biopesticides do not degrade as quickly as most BW agents and would be more economically produced at a large fixed facility. In addition, the color of the trailer found in mid-April is indicative of military rather than civilian use.

Our missile experts have no explanation for how such a trailer could function to refurbish antiaircraft missiles and judge that such a use is unlikely based on the scale, configuration, and assessed function of the equipment. The experts cited in the editorial are not on the scene and probably do not have complete access to information about the trailers.

Senior Iraqi officials of the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul were shown pictures of the mobile production trailers, and they claimed that the trailers were used to chemically produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. Hydrogen production would be a plausible cover story for the mobile production units.

The Iraqis have used sophisticated denial and deception methods that include the use of cover stories that are designed to work. Some of the features of the trailer—a gas collection system and the presence of caustic—are consistent with both bioproduction and hydrogen production.

The plant's design possibly could be used to produce hydrogen using a chemical reaction, but it would be inefficient. The capacity of this trailer is larger than typical units for hydrogen production for weather balloons. Compact, transportable hydrogen generation systems are commercially available, safe, and reliable.

We continue to examine the trailer found in mid-April and are using advanced sample analysis techniques to determine whether BW agent is present, although we do not expect samples to show the presence of BW agent. We suspect that the Iraqis thoroughly decontaminated the vehicle to remove evidence of BW agent production. Despite the lack of confirmatory samples, we nevertheless are confident that this trailer is a mobile BW production plant because of the source's description, equipment, and design.

- The initial set of samples, now in the United States, was taken from sludge from inside the fermentor, liquid that was in the system and wipes from the equipment. A sample set also was provided to a coalition partner for detailed laboratory analysis.
- As we expected, preliminary sample analysis results are negative for five standard BW agents, including *Bacillus anthracis*, and for growth media for those agents. In addition, the

preliminary results indicate the presence of sodium azide and urea, which do not support Iraqi claims that the trailer was for hydrogen production.

- Additional sample analysis is being conducted to identify growth media, agent degradation products, and decontamination chemicals that could be specific for BW agents, as well as to identify a chemical associated with hydrogen production.

Although individuals often interchangeably use the terms production plant and laboratory, they have distinct meanings. The mobile production plants are designed for batch production of biological material and not for laboratory analysis of samples. A truck-mounted mobile laboratory would be equipped for analysis and small-scale laboratory activities. US forces discovered one such laboratory in late April.

The mobile laboratory—installed in a box-bodied truck—is equipped with standard, dual-use laboratory equipment, including autoclaves, an incubator, centrifuges, and laboratory test tubes and glassware. These laboratories could be used to support a mobile BW production plant but serve legitimate functions that are applicable to public health and environmental monitoring, such as water-quality sampling.”

One Iraqi defector has made claims of a much more serious ongoing biological weapons effort but these have not been validated. See Bob Drogin, “Iraq Had Secret Labs, Officer Says,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2003.

The CIA issued the following statement on the discovery of the centrifuge on June 26, 2003 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/wmd/iraqi_centrifuge_equipment.htm):

- The head of Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge uranium enrichment program, Dr. Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, approached U.S. officials in Baghdad and turned over a volume of centrifuge documents and components he had hidden in his garden from inspectors since 1991. Dr. Ubaydi said he was interviewed by IAEA inspectors - most recently in 2002 - but did not reveal any of this.
- Dr. Ubaydi told us that these items, blue prints and key centrifuge pieces, represented a complete template for what would be needed to rebuild a centrifuge uranium enrichment program. He also claimed this concealment was part of a secret, high-level plan to reconstitute the nuclear weapons program once sanctions ended.
- This case illustrates the extreme challenge we face in Iraq as we search for evidence of WMD programs that were designed to elude detection by international inspectors.
- We are working with Dr. Ubaydi to evaluate the equipment and documents he provided us.
- We are hopeful that Dr. Ubaydi’s example will encourage other Iraqis with knowledge of Saddam’s WMD programs to come forward.

⁴³ Joby Warrick, “Iraqi Scientist Turns Over Nuclear Plans, Parts,” Washington Post, June 26, 2003, p. 14.

⁴⁴ Douglas Jehl, “Agency Disputes View of Trailers as Labs,” New York Times, June 26, 2003.

⁴⁵ See Michael Dobbs, “US-Saudi Alliance Appears Strong,” Washington Post, April 27, 2003, pp. A20 to A21; Usha Lee McFarling, “The Eyes and Ears of War,” Los Angeles Times, April 24, 2003, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Vernon Loeb, “US Military Will Leave Saudi Arabia this Year,” Washington Post, April 30, 2003, p. 1; Eric Schmitt, “US to Withdraw All Combat Units from Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, April 30, 2003, p. 1;

⁴⁷ David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Baghdad Confidential,” Aviation Week, April 28, 2003, p. 32,

⁴⁸ Bill Jacobs, “Defense chief warns against another war,” Edinburgh Evening News, April 29, 2003, <http://www.edinburghnews.com/index.cfm?id=488602003>

⁴⁹ Department of Defense briefing on April 23, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030423-0122.html>.

⁵⁰ Interview with James Kitfield, “Attack Always,” in National Journal, April 25, 2003.

⁵¹ Colum Lynch, “Potential Iraq Donors Seek Great Accountability from US on Oil Plans,” Washington Post, June 26, 2003, p. 16; L. Paul Bremer, “Operation Iraqi Prosperity,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2003; Michael Slackman, “Ruled by Rumors in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2003.

⁵² US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Washington, GPO, 1990, p. 51.

⁵³ US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Washington, GPO, 1990, p. 93.

⁵⁴ US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Washington, GPO, 1990, p. 93.

⁵⁵ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service 91-578F, August 2, 1991, pp. 54 and 67.

⁵⁶ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001, Washington, Congressional Research Service RL31529, August 6, 2003, p. 58.

⁵⁷ Ceasar C. Soriano, "Iraqi Troops Now Request Postwar Roles," USA Today, May 16, 2003, p. 16;

⁵⁸ Riad Kahwaji and Barabara Opall-Rome, "Rebuilding Iraq's Military," Defense News, June 2, 2003.

⁵⁹ This list is taken, with minor edits, from Carl Bildt, "Hard-earned Lessons on Nation-Building: seven Ways to Rebuild Iraq," International Herald Tribune, May 7, 2003, p. 6.