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# **Iran, Iraq, and the Structure of Gulf Alliances**

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The Gulf is a deeply divided region with an uncertain and unstable balance of power. The years following the Gulf War have not brought stability or created effective regional alliances. Massive arms purchases have not created effective military forces, and proliferation is creating a major new set of military risks. The Gulf faces acute financial problems because of low oil prices that seem unlikely to change for years to come, and most Gulf countries had long-standing budget deficit problems before the drop in oil prices in late 1997.

The periphery of the Gulf is equally unstable. Yemen has recently fought a civil war, has repeatedly clashed with Saudi Arabia, and has clashed with Eritrea. The entire Horn is engaged in some form of conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea are fighting a border war, Somalia is a faction-torn failed state, and a major civil war in the Sudan has produced more victims than the combined total of every war in the Middle East since 1945. Afghanistan is still involved in another bitter civil war, and the ambitions of its extremist Taliban regime may lead to war with Iran or its Central Asian neighbors. Central Asia and the Caspian have uncertain stability at best and a number of low level conflicts. Turkey's civil war with its Kurds now involves two full corps of the Turkish army and has led to repeated incursions into Iraq as well as military threats to Syria. To the West, the near breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process threatens to destabilize an impoverished Jordan, and present major political problems for every Gulf nation with ties to the US.

Seen from the viewpoint of a map, this situation might seem designed to encourage regional cooperation and evolve an effective regional security structure. The Southern Gulf states have many reasons to work together to create a strong political and military alliance, and to cooperate with foreign allies like the United States. The reality is very different. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states talk about regional cooperation, but they pursue very different national priorities. They often confuse strategic image with strategic reality, and they have not used the time since the Gulf War wisely. The end result is a serious potential threat to a region with some 66% of the world's proven oil reserves and 34% of its gas.

## **The Current Structure of Gulf Security**

The current military balance in the Gulf is shown in Table One, and the patterns in Gulf military efforts are shown in Tables Two and Three. Deep tensions and uncertainties lie behind these numbers. One northern Gulf state, Iraq, has emerged as a major threat and is the focus of active efforts to contain it. In spite of its defeat in the Gulf War, however, it is still the largest land power in the region and it continues covert efforts to proliferate. Iraq has recently improved its relations with Iraq, Syria, and all the Southern Gulf states except Kuwait, but no neighbor trusts it or sees Iraq as anything other than a potential threat. The US sees it as a continuing enemy that must be prevented from rebuilding its conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction. Barring a massive change in the fundamental character of its regime, it is likely to remain a revanchist and aggressive state for years to come.

Iran is another Northern Gulf state that is a major military power. It has built up the capacity to threaten shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and some of the largest unconventional warfare capabilities in the world. It is an active proliferator, is developing long-range missile, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities, and is seeking nuclear weapons. Unlike Iraq, its regime may be moderating, and Iran has recently established “friendly” relations with virtually every Southern Gulf state and has eased its tensions with the US. Iran, however, remains opposed to any Western presence in the Gulf, and all its neighbors still regard it as a potential threat.

Saudi Arabia is the largest Southern Gulf state in terms of area, oil resources, population, and military forces. It is, however, still militarily weak in comparison with Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia also faces a potential threat from Yemen and Arab and Islamic radicalism. It has long standing tensions with Qatar and Oman that limit cooperation with other Southern Gulf states. In spite of the fact Iraq is a common threat, it has done little to create an integrated defense capability with Kuwait. Saudi Arabia also faces an internal struggle with Islamic fundamentalists that oppose the Saud family’s ties to the US and other Western states, oppose “secularism,”

oppose the existence of Israel and the Arab-Israeli peace process, and who ultimately seek the overthrow of the Saud-Wahhabi regime.

The smaller Southern Gulf states are divided among themselves. Kuwait is seen as isolated, “arrogant,” and dependent on the West. Qatar has long-standing feud with Bahrain as well as Saudi Arabia, and has recently accused Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of supporting a coup attempt by the present Emir’s father. The UAE has fired significant numbers of Omanis from its military forces because it feared possible Omani efforts to absorb part of the UAE after the death of the aging President of the UAE, Sheik Zayed, the Emir of Abu Dhabi. The Omani-UAE border has never been fully demarcated, and Oman is still concerned over the security of its border with Yemen.

These tensions and divisions are concealed by rhetoric about regional cooperation, Pan-Arabism, and new regional security structures, but the reality is very different. In spite of the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) following the fall of the Shah and the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, no real progress has been made in regional military standardization and cooperation. The so-called GCC Rapid Reaction Force is a hollow shell, and Omani efforts to create significant GCC forces has foundered because of Saudi opposition. The GCC issued its first meaningful contract to plan an integrated air defense system in 1997, more than 15 years after its founding, and this contract effort is already in deep trouble. Although the Southern Gulf states have ordered some \$ billion worth of arms since the end of the Gulf War, their purchase have not reflected any cooperation in interoperability, sustainability, and command, control, communications, intelligence, and strategic reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>I/SR). There has been considerable emphasis on buying major weapons systems with the most advanced performance characteristics or “glitter factor,” and little emphasis on well-structured mission priorities and balanced force planning.

Pan-Arab cooperation is a charade. In spite of the fact Egypt and Syria sent major forces to the Gulf during the Gulf War, all of the Southern Gulf states are all too aware that the Syrian

forces never engaged in combat and the Egyptian forces advanced slowly, showed serious political reluctance to engage Iraq, and fell behind the Saudi forces on their flanks. The “Damascus Accord” that linked Egypt and Syria to the GCC after the Gulf War still exists on paper, and the first meeting of the Shura of the Damascus Accord took place in 1998. In reality, however, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states never had any intention of allowing major deployments of Egyptian and Syrian forces on their soil or of relying on them for security – these were strictly Egyptian ambitions. The Gulf states never envisaged more than a small joint headquarters that would act as a political symbol. Saudi Arabia in particular feared that Egyptian and Syrian Arab forces would become a conduit for Arab radicalism, and that it would be forced to pay for forces with little military effectiveness. It also remembered the long, bitterly divisive struggle with Egypt during the Yemeni civil war.

There is talk of a “new Gulf security structure” among some Gulf intellectuals and Western middle east expert that would somehow eliminate dependence on the US, and possibly include Iran and eventually Iraq. Such an idea is attractive to those who oppose a major Western military presence, who think in Pan-Arab and Islamic terms, and who see peaceful regional cooperation as a way of eliminating costly military and arms expenditures. There is no substance behind these ideas, however, and no current prospect that any will be put into practice.

To the extent that there is a structure of alliances in the Gulf, it now consists of the fact that every Southern Gulf state now has bilateral relations with the US which underpin its individual security, and most have similar military cooperation agreements with Britain and France – although the Southern Gulf states fully understand just how limited European power projection capabilities now are. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf states actively seek political support from major Security Council powers like Russia and China, and pursue a regional balance of power strategy. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia see political and economic relations with a more moderate Iran as a counterbalance to Iraq. The UAE and Oman seek Iraq as a potential counterbalance to Iran. Bahrain is caught in the middle because unrest within its Shi’ite

majority makes it difficult to cooperate with Iran. At the same time, however, each Southern Gulf state pursues a unilateral strategy of political engagement with both Iran and Iraq, seeking to defuse the threat from both nations.

## **The Evolution of Saudi and Gulf Non-Alliances**

Western planners have been trying to change this situation ever since the mid-1950s and the Anglo-US effort to create the Baghdad Pact. US planners have made countless briefings about the need for improved regional cooperation which long predate the Gulf War, and there has been meeting after meeting to try to encourage Gulf regional security efforts. Certainly, the US would like to limit the assets and liabilities inherent in being the policeman of the Gulf, and has actively sought to build up Southern Gulf military capabilities in ways that reduce the need for both US forward-deployed and power projection forces.

There is always hope, but the region may well continue to repeat the past, whether or not outsiders remember it. In fact, it is impossible to understand either Saudi security policy or the nature of non-alliances in the Gulf without considering the recent history of the overall security situation in the region. Although Gulf civilization can trace its roots to pre-Sumerian times, the principle trade routes in the region have been land routes that bypassed the Gulf for virtually all of history. Both military invasions and the silk route moved through Central Asia, or across Iran and Iraq. The long-vanished "spice route" never involved a high volume of trade and that trade moved by land or through the Red Sea. The rise of Islam centered around Mecca and Medina in the Red Sea area briefly made Arabia a major source of power, but within decades, Islam shifted to create the Caliphate that replaced the Parthian Empire and Arab and Islamic political power was then replaced by Turkey.

By the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the Gulf had been a strategic backwater for centuries, and had no economic importance aside from the pearling industry. Oman focused on an Indian Ocean trading empire. Iran was moving towards the near collapse of the Qajar Dynasty. Iraq was an unimportant and decaying region on the eastern fringe of the Turkish Empire and little trade

passed through the Gulf to Turkey or anywhere else. The small fishing villages that later became Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE were centers of tribal rivalry and feuds, and their feeble economies were based on pearling and piracy. Saudi Arabia consisted of tribal enclaves, of which the most important centered around the Hashemite family in its role as the Sherif of Mecca. The Saud family had led a major religious uprising in the cause of the Wahhabi sect that nearly achieved independence from the Turks, but the Sauds had been decisively defeated by Turkish forces under Muhammad Ali and were in almost total eclipse.

The key factors that changed this situation were British efforts to suppress piracy in the Gulf, an exaggerated British fear that the Gulf might become a Turkish-German route for an attack on India, the rise of the Suez Canal as Britain's major trading route to India, and the need for coaling stations along this route in ports like Aden. The end result was the gradual creation of a new structure of alliances in which the small Southern Gulf states became the protectorates of Britain. This new dependence on the "West" provided a counterbalance to Turkish and Persian military power, as well as a source of protection against invasion by neighboring families and states.

It is somewhat ironic that this pattern of alliances centered around "Western" power at a time when Saudi Arabia and Iraq were little more than dreams, and that the complex balance of power between Turkey, Persia, weak Southern Gulf states, and British power projection was so close to today's balance of power between Iraq, Iraq, the Southern Gulf and US power projection.

World War I removed Turkey from the scene while triggering the creation of Iraq and causing an Arab revolt in Arabia that Ibn Saud exploited to rebuild Saudi power and eventually create Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the fall of the Qazar dynasty created modern Iran out of Persia. Three other key factors reshaped the region during the period between World War I and World War II. One was the emergence of the Saud family as a dominant regional military power which conquered most of Arabia, threatened all of the Southern Gulf states, conquered much of

Western Yemen, and drove the Hashemite family into exile as the rulers of Iraq and Transjordan. The second was the discovery of oil and the beginning of Western rivalry for control of Gulf resources. The third were changes in seapower and airpower that made rapid communication to the region far easier.

From a Saudi perspective, the British presence in the region was far more of a constraint than a source of security. Britain halted the Saudi advance on Kuwait and Iraq and then on Jordan. It limited Saudi ability to seize the Trucial city-states (Bahrain, Qatar, the emirates that later made up the UAE, and Oman.) The fact that Britain places rival Hashemites on the thrones of Iraq and Jordan scarcely endeared the British presence to Saudi Arabia, nor did British efforts to monopolize oil concessions in Saudi Arabia and keep out rival American companies. Britain's continuing interference in Iranian and Iraqi affairs, and later invasion and occupation of both countries during World War II created the fear that the same thing might happen to Saudi Arabia, and was a key factor that led Ibn Saud to allow the US to create a major air base in Dhahran – an air base that was later to be a B-47 strategic bomber dispersal base during the height of the Cold War.

By the end of World War II, it was clear that the Gulf had massive oil resources. This had led to US-British rivalry over access to Saudi oil concessions even before World War II. At the same time, Western and Soviet competition had begun for influence over. These problems were compounded by several other major shifts in the key players in the region: The rise of Pan-Arabism and Nasser, the bloody fall of the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, and civil wars in Yemen and the Aden Protectorates. At the same time, the loss of India and global decline in British power, the failure of the Anglo-French effort to reoccupy to Suez Canal Zone, and the eventual British decision to withdraw from positions east of Suez created a power vacuum in the region.

The result was the evolution of a new form of the old balance of power. A radical Soviet-backed Iraq replaced Turkey as the “threat” to the region. The US attempted to replace Britain and minimize the “asset liabilities” of deploying US forces into the region by building up the Shah

of Iran as a “pillar” strong enough to both limit Iraq and deter Soviet adventures. At the same time, the US sought to strengthen Saudi Arabia as a “twin pillar” that could resist the impact of Nasserism and limit Soviet influence in the Arabian Peninsula. By this time, oil had become a matter of corporate rather than national competition, and the US and Britain cooperated in trying to replace the British crucial relationships by creating small, independent Southern Gulf states with traditional and pro-Western regimes. The British effort to link all of the former Trucial States together into a common alliance failed because of national and family rivalries, although seven of the smaller eastern Emirates eventually joined together to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While they continued to be rivals, they held together because of their mutual fear of Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Britain and the US sought to strengthen Jordan as a way of limiting radical influence from the West and the US joined Saudi Arabia in trying to create a moderate North Yemen as a moderate counterbalance to the Marxist radicalism of South Yemen.

The resulting structure of non-alliances created regional cooperation of a kind and limited asset liability. At the same time, it was complicated by a host of factors. They include the Dhofar Rebellion in Yemen, the Arab-Israeli conflict to the West, and US-Soviet rivalry in the Horn of Africa. They also included constant petty power struggles within and between the Southern Gulf states. This was also a time of considerable tension within Saudi Arabia. The rise of Nasserism and Pan-Arabism led to several coup attempts within the Saudi military and to deep divisions within the Saudi royal family that eventually led Prince Faisal to launch a peaceful coup that seized the throne from his brother and drove a number of other princes into exile. This led to a fear of the military that continues to this day, as well as to careful concern about Saudi public opinion and the sharing of oil wealth, the need to close the Kingdom to external threats of instability, and the need to avoid the rise of radical domestic opposition.

The oil embargo of 1974 then introduced several new dimensions to this situation. It suddenly put oil exports under the control of the Gulf states and led to rises in oil revenues that gave them massive wealth. It shocked the West into realizing the strategic importance of the

region, and triggered a massive new arms race between suddenly wealthy Gulf states. The end result, however, remained a balance of power centered around Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi rivalry, and US ability to check Soviet influence, compounded by the emergence of the smaller Southern Gulf states as powers wealthy enough to have real importance.

There was little formal structure to this balance of power. Iran and Saudi Arabia depended on the US, but were often rivals and often disagreed with US policy. The smaller Southern Gulf states feared Iran and Iraq, but also feared Saudi Arabia and each other. The Yemens fought each other sporadically while they sought outside support from the Gulf states, the US, and Soviet Union. Western states competed to sell arms to Iran and the Southern Gulf states with little regard to any effort to create either effective national forces or a cohesive regional security structure, and the US military presence in the region was limited by the backlash from the Arab-Israeli conflict, fears the US might try to secure oil resources against the threat of another embargo, and internal problems with Arab nationalism.

## **The Fall of the Shah and the Iran-Iran War**

The fall of the Shah created a new radical Islamic Iran that was hostile to the West, and deprived the US of the “pillar” it had used as a substitute for forward deployed forces and as a barrier to Soviet penetration into the region. It also led to a new panic regarding oil supplies and massive rise in oil prices. This was not the only change in the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created fears that Iran might be preparing for an invasion of Iran. In quick succession, the Iranian hostage crisis began, Iraq invaded Iran, and Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon.

It is important to note that the initial reaction of the Southern Gulf states was to spend on purely national defense plans. The perceived threat from Iran did help create the GCC, but it did not lead to any substantive military cooperation between the Southern Gulf states or to any major new security agreements with the West. The US did improve its basing, prepositioning, and rapid deployment capabilities with the cooperation of Bahrain and Oman, and stepped up its air

presence in Saudi Arabia, but these were largely precautionary measures and not preparations for serious war fighting.

If there was any serious improvement in cooperation, it took place within the West and Japan. The oil sharing and stockpile agreements that had led to the creation of the International Energy Agency were strengthened. More importantly, the oil industry learned enough from the oil panics of 1979-1981, to greatly improve its ability to track the global supply and flow of oil in near real time. This greatly reduced the tendency to hoard oil or buy in a near panic, and made the world far less vulnerable to rises in oil prices when the Gulf War finally occurred.

The situation began to change in 1982. Until that point Iraq either seemed to be the winner in the Iran-Iraq War or at least to be holding its own. By late 1982, however, Iraq had spent the oil wealth it had accumulated since 1974, had lost the ability to export oil through Syria, and was clearly on the defensive. As a result, a new informal alliance built up between Iraq and wealthy Southern Gulf states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The Southern Gulf essentially began to pay for the Iraqi portion of the Iran-Iraq War. Western attitudes also shifted. Fears of a Revolutionary Islamic Iran led the US and Europe to steadily improve their relations with Iraq, and to the tacit agreement that France should become a major weapons supplier to the Iraq.

This new pattern of alliance strengthened by 1984-1987, when Iraq was clearly on the defensive and there was a real risk that Iraq might either collapse or lose its southern Shi'ite provinces. It also help lead the Southern Gulf states and the West to ignore Iraq's ruthless suppression of its Kurds and to downplay objections to Iraq's steadily growing use of chemical weapons. The US effectively replaced its "twin pillar" strategy with a combination of efforts to build-up its power projection capabilities in the region and reliance on Iraq as the lesser of two evils. What is striking about this period, however, is that the Southern Gulf states relied on purely national efforts to strengthen their forces and that Saudi Arabia was the only state to make serious arms purchases. Bahrain and Oman were too poor and relied on agreements with the US. Kuwait,

Qatar, and the UAE did very little to develop their defenses, did it very poorly, and did it on a purely national basis.

The next major shift in the balance of power began in 1987. While Iran continued to be on the offensive, it has little access to modern arms and Iraq outspent it on arms imports by a ratio of at least 4:1. Iraq built up a major chemical warfare capability, acquired long-range missiles, and acquired a combination of long-range strike aircraft and anti-ship missiles that allowed it to strike deep into the Gulf at Iran's oil export capability. This led Iran to retaliate by attacking the tankers moving to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – Iraq's major source of aid. Kuwait replied by seeking US escort of its tankers. The resulting reflagging exercise led to the "tanker war" between Iran and the US and Britain and the destruction of a good part of Iran's navy during 1987-1988. At the same time, Iraq's massive superiority in modern arms and chemical weapons, the moral exhaustion of eight years of high Iranian casualties, and a reorganization of Iraq's army allowed it to shift to the offensive in the spring of 1988. By August, 1988, Iran had been driven out of most of Iraq and had lost 40-60% of its inventory of modern weapons, and Iraqi forces occupied strategic positions in southern Iran.

It is interesting to note that virtually every area expert proceeded to guess wrong about what would happen next. The conventional wisdom was that the informal alliance between Iraq, the major Southern Gulf states, the US, and Europe would continue, and that a pragmatic Saddam Hussein would enjoy his victories, new status, and concentrate on development and rebuilding Iraq's economic wealth. The practice was totally different. By early 1989, Iraq was publicly accusing the US of conspiring against it, and was seeking forgiveness from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for over \$60 billion debts. By early 1990, it spending on arms and recovery had driven it near to bankruptcy, and by the spring of 1990, Iraq was accusing Kuwait and the UAE of overproducing oil in ways that lowered oil prices. At the same time, it was quietly threatening Saudi Arabia, demanding that Kuwait cede part of its territory that covered access to Iraq's only

port, and demanding that Kuwait cease to develop and produce the Rumalia oilfield which it shared with Kuwait. A few months later, Iraq invaded Kuwait and triggered the Gulf War.

## **The Aftermath of the Gulf War**

This history does much to explain the current realities described at the beginning of this paper, and why the Gulf has not leant itself to regional cooperation, effective asset management, or “relativization” in the sense of globalization and changes in the structure of alliances. Coalitions in the Gulf have always been ad hoc and crisis-driven. They have always been shaped by the need for an external power to create some degree of stability, accompanied by rivalries between all of the Gulf states and distrust of the same foreign power that the Southern Gulf states depended upon.

There are, however, some additional realities that must be considered in understanding how the present may shape the future. These involve the true nature of coalition warfare, the problems inherent in creating post-Gulf War security agreements, and the limitations to the military modernization of key nations like Saudi Arabia.

### **The Reality of Coalition Warfare**

The rhetoric of coalition warfare emphasizes that anywhere from 23-27 nations were participating in the military coalition against Saddam Hussein. The reality was completely different. The US flew virtually every strike sortie in the war, with limited support from British Tornados. The US provided virtually all sophisticated communications, battle management, intelligence, and electronic warfare capability. Only the US Air Force and Saudi Air Force could fly air defense missions over the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). Only the US, Britain, and Saudi Arabia has the IFF and AC&W capabilities required and could provide airborne refueling. Other air forces either had to be kept out of the KTO or flew symbolic missions that tied up US resources.

It is easy to forget that Saudi Arabia and all of the European states that deployed minesweepers refused British and US requests to deploy them in harm's way during the war, although many countries profited from mine clearing once the war was over. Similarly, France never sent its carrier into operation and only committed ground and air forces once its Minister of Defense was forced to resign. Even then, French forces lacked the equipment to meet their campaign schedule. British land forces insisted on being relocated to join the land attack from the west, and then experienced serious problems in sustaining tank operations. Turkey only allowed the US to deploy air units to Turkey less than 48 hours before the beginning of the air campaign and only because of the personal intervention of Turkey's president. As has been noted earlier, Egypt and Syria played a token role in land warfare, and the only Arab state to deploy sizable ground forces that actually fought aggressively was Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE sent forces of battalion size that fought well in some engagements but they scarcely made a major military contribution.

The political aspects of coalition warfare represented real partnership, the military aspects did not and "burdensharing" often consisted of deploy small forces at vast cost to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and in ways that put a significant burden on US strategic lift and support capabilities. Furthermore, this situation is very unlikely to change in the future. Several European countries have programmed small, but important improvements in their power projection capabilities. These nations include Britain, France, Italy, and Spain. Even these nations however, now have far less overall forces and power projection capability than they had at the time of the Gulf war, and most would have severe interoperability problems in cooperating in the same battle space as US forces equipped for the "revolution in military affairs." No European state can currently contribute to missile defense, fighting effectively in a chemical and biological environment outside Europe, or provide major assistance to the Gulf states in other aspects of counterproliferation.

There is no NATO, EU, or WEU approach to power projection in the Gulf, and no hope of creating one. The same tactical and technical problems that limit interoperability and joint warfare capabilities in Bosnia and Kosovo are far more serious in the Gulf. Although Asia is becoming the primary user of Gulf oil and gas imports, the politics and military realities of Asia preclude anything other than symbolic military cooperation.

Syria's military machine has deteriorated sharply since 1990 because of a lack of arms imports, and tensions over the peace process virtually preclude US and Syrian cooperation. Egypt faces the same political dilemma in attacking an Arab state that it did in 1991, and is also affected by the political backlash from the Arab-Israeli peace process. Pan-Arab rhetoric is fine, Pan-Arab realities are hopeless.

In short, ad hoc coalitions in which the US must be the dominant partner and assume most of the military burden are the only option in the Gulf. Britain is only outside state with which the US can work as a true partner. Consultation with other European and Asian allies, and with key states like Russia and China, can only be to create the political conditions for using force, or to build support or tolerance of the use of force.

### **Building Bilateral Partnerships in the Region**

The fact that the US has not been able to create a stable security structure in the region does not mean that it has not made major progress in developing bilateral partnership since the Gulf War. Table Five describes this progress in detail for each Southern Gulf state, and it has been critical to the development of effective US power projection capabilities and to improving the individual US military advisory efforts that support the build-up of every Southern Gulf state's military capabilities. The arrangements in Table Five may not suit the architects of ideal alliances, but they are still impressive realities.

At the same time, the US and regional states face very serious problems. No Southern Gulf state now supports US efforts to isolate or sanction Iran and it is unclear that top US

policymakers support the kind of legislation and sanctions enforced by the US Congress. The Gulf War with Iraq has been replaced by a “war of sanctions” in which the US and Britain have pursued far more serious effort to limit Iraqi proliferation than the Gulf states, other Arab states, Russia, or China. There is a consensus among the Southern Gulf states that they need US presence and power projection capabilities. There is no consensus about how to create a cooperative policy for dealing with either of the main threats. Further, the Southern Gulf states are only beginning to understand that the Iranian and Iraqi proliferation of long-range strike systems and weapons of mass destruction means that fundamental shifts will take place in deterrence and war fighting in the early 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

There is also a critical weakness in the structure of bilateral partnerships discussed in Table Five. The US does not need to deploy large ground forces to deal with the conventional threat from Iran and can rapidly deploy air and naval power to deal with Iranian naval and air threats. It can rapidly win air superiority over Iraq, and Iraq has no real navy. There is, however, a major Iraqi land threat to Kuwait and northwestern Saudi Arabia.

Iraq's land forces still retain significant warfighting capabilities and much of the force structure that made Iraq the dominant military power in the Gulf after its victory over Iran. Iraqi forces can still seize Kuwait in a matter of days or occupy part of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, *if* they do not face immediate opposition from US, Kuwaiti, and Saudi forces. USCENTCOM and US experts indicate that Iraq could assemble and deploy five heavy divisions south into Kuwait in a matter of days. Iraqi divisions now have an authorized strength of about 10,000 men, and about half of the Iraqi army's 23 divisions had manning levels of around 8,000 men and “a fair state of readiness.” Republican Guards divisions had an average of around 8,000 to 10,000 men. Brigades averaged around 2,500 men -- the size of a large US battalion.

Even today, Iraq has five Republican Guards divisions within 140 kilometers of the Kuwaiti and Saudi border. It can rapidly deploy two to five divisions against Kuwait from the area around Basra. A recent background briefing by USCENTCOM indicates that Kuwait could only

rapidly deploy a few combat strength battalions to defend its territory, and Saudi Arabia would take days to deploy even one heavy brigade into areas north of Kuwait City. The tyranny of geography, Kuwait's small size, and Saudi Arabia's widely dispersed army give Iraq a natural advantage in any sudden or surprise attack.

The failure of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to develop any meaningful cooperative defense plans compounds the problem, as does Saudi Arabia's miserable performance in modernizing its land forces. While Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have developed relatively effective air forces at the squadron level, they cannot fight as integrated air forces without massive US assistance and would still face major problems in coalition warfare.

The land balance is dismal. Saudi Arabia and the US carried out a secret Saudi-US Joint Security Review in August, 1991 called the Malcor Report, after the Gulf War. The resulting plan called for a three corps Saudi force of seven divisions by the year 2000. One option called for a nine division force of 90,000 men. The Saudi Army was soon forced to adopt more modest goals, but even these goals called for the Saudi Army to expand to a total of five divisions by the year 2000. The expansion plans also involved a conversion from a brigade-oriented command structure to a division-oriented structure. Saudi Arabia planned to develop the ability to deploy up to three divisions in the north to defend Saudi Arabia's Gulf Coast and border with Iraq. Another division would be deployed near al-Kharj or the capital, and a fifth division in the south -- although some sources indicate that one brigade of this latter division would be in the south and the other would be at Tabuk.

The Saudi force expansion plans may have been more realistic than the Malcor plan, but they still present an impossible challenge in terms of available manpower. Saudi Arabia lacked the necessary pool of Saudi willing to volunteer for career service, could not impose a draft for political reasons, and had no way to add a large, new mobilization component to its support forces. Saudi Arabia may have set the right force goals but it could not implement them:

- First, the Saudi command structure had not yet progressed to the point where it could integrate combat operations at the divisional level.
- Second, even if all five divisions were lightly manned, the total manning of the combat units in the Saudi Army would have to expand from about 40,000 full time regulars in 1995 to over 100,000 men by the year 2000.
- Third, Saudi Arabia would need more than nine heavy brigades to provide the combat elements for such a force. It currently has seven functional heavy brigades and it is unclear if it has the trained manpower and equipment funds to create and sustain more than eight such brigades.
- Fourth, Saudi Arabia planned to create another airborne brigade or major special forces units, and needs a school for airborne and special forces training. This requirement placed a further strain on Saudi Army manpower and financial resources. A total Saudi force structure of about 10 brigades, plus some lighter independent formations, seems as large a force as Saudi Arabia can create and sustain until well beyond the year 2000.
- Fifth, Saudi Arabia also considered about creating two to three additional light divisions and adding a mobilization or reserve component to its support forces. Such support forces would have limited manning in peacetime, but would use temporary duty civilians in their support forces in a major crisis.
- Sixth, Saudi forces lacked the independent combat support and service support forces necessary to sustain and support the existing strength of the Saudi Army.
- Seventh, much of Saudi maintenance was done by foreign contractors, and the quality of much of this work was mixed and declining. Over-stretching Saudi military manpower meant further delaying Saudi Army ability to provide an adequate Saudi

ordinance corps and Saudi forces that can properly sustain combat equipment away from major bases, in extensive maneuver, or under conditions where combat repair and recovery are needed.

- Finally, the only way Saudi Arabia could field five divisions was to create two-brigade units instead of the present three-brigade forces, and leave them without adequate combat support and service support forces. This change, however, threatened to waste manpower and financial resources on administrative staff. A brigade structure reaming the most efficient way of organizing Saudi forces as long as they are going to be dispersed widely to the borders of the country.

Saudi Arabia also would have need needed substantial new purchases of equipment at a time when funds had become increasingly tight. Expansion required major numbers of additional tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self propelled artillery and mobile air defense systems. Funding these items also presented potential conflicts with the priorities of the National Guard.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Saudi Army kept its brigade structure, and remains at rough three division equivalents. Stretching limited manpower into added combat units serves no purpose. This, however, presents problems in terms of potential threats. Regardless of how Saudi plans develop, no foreseeable expansion of Saudi forces will enable the Saudi Army to defend its territory in the upper Gulf from an all-out attack by Iraq, or to concentrate its forces quickly and effectively to aid Kuwait, unless Saudi Arabia has extensive US support.. Further, the threat from the northern Gulf is only part of the threat that Saudi Arabia must deal with. The Saudi Army must defend a territory roughly the size of the US east of the Mississippi. It must provide forces sufficient enough to defend its Western border area and Red Sea coast, while maintaining forces in the south to deal with a continuing low-level border conflict with Yemen.

The Saudi army cannot concentrate its forces to meet a single threat and normally is dispersed over much of the Kingdom. It has brigade-sized casernes at Khamis Mushayt and

Shahrurah in the southeast, a garrison at Najran and Jazan in the south, and brigade sized forces at King Khalid City in the north, Tabuk in the West, and Dammam in the East. The Gulf Cooperation Council Peninsular Shield Force is located at King Khalid City, which is near the border with Kuwait and Iraq. These deployments are partly a matter of internal security. Saudi forces are usually kept far away from key cities and political centers of power, but they are primarily a reflection of the fact that the Saudi Army cannot leave any of its border areas undefended.

Kuwait dreamed of a 12 brigade force after the Gulf War, but it only has two understrength active brigades and two reserve brigades. Its land forces total only 11,000 personnel, and this total includes 1,600 foreign contract personnel, most of whom are non-combatants. The total manpower of the Kuwaiti armed forces, including the air force and navy, total about one US brigade "slice" (combat manpower plus support). The Kuwaiti army has an active tank strength of only about 75 M-84s (Yugoslav T-72s) and 174 M-1A2s. It is experiencing major problems in converting to the M-1A2, and has been forced to store 75 of its M-84s plus another 17 Chieftains.

Saudi Arabia is choking on massive deliveries of arms, and its army has reverted to a static defensive force which has limited effectiveness above the company and battalion level. Although it claims to have 70,000 full time regulars in the army, plus 57,000 active members of the National Guard, actual manning levels are significantly lower. About 200 of its M-1A2 tanks are in storage, plus about 145 of its 295 AMX-30s. As a result, Saudi Arabia relies heavily on its 450 M-60A3s. This is still a significant amount of armor, but it is dispersed over much of the Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia lacks the training, manpower quality, sustainability, and C<sup>4</sup>I/SR capabilities for effective aggressive maneuver warfare and forward defense. While there are reports of a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rapid reaction force, the reality is a few hollow allied battalions. The GCC is a military myth.

Unless there are weeks of strategic warning, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the US will lack the land forces to stop Iraq. A force of five Iraqi divisions would compare favorably with total Kuwaiti forces of about four brigades, with only about a brigade equivalent combat-ready, and with a total forward-deployed US strength that normally does not include a single forward-deployed land brigade. The Saudi forces at Hafr al Batin are at most the equivalent of two combat-effective brigades which would probably take two weeks to fully deploy forward to the Kuwait and Saudi borders in sustainable, combat-ready form. The so-called GCC rapid deployment force is largely a political fiction with no meaningful real-world combat capability against Iraqi heavy divisions.

There is little prospect that this situation will improve in the near term. The US has not been able to preposition large numbers of equipment sets in or near Kuwait, and prepositioning brigade sets in Qatar and the UAE means that such forces would take at least a week to 10 days to deploy in combat-ready form in Kuwait. Kuwait is making only limited progress in its military modernization, and the Saudi Army has made little progress in improving its capability to move quickly to the defense of Kuwait or to concentrate its forces along the Saudi border with Iraq.

As a result, the ability to deal with a sudden Iraqi attack on Kuwait is likely to depend on US ability to mass offensive air and missile power and use it immediately against Iraq the moment major troop movements begin without first seeking to win air superiority or air supremacy. The US will also require the full support of Saudi Arabia and the other Southern Gulf countries to assist in the deployment and basing of US forces in the region, support from friendly local forces like the Saudi Air Force, and a firm and immediate Kuwaiti willingness to allow the US and Saudi Arabia to employ force.

Even then, the defense of Kuwait will be an increasingly "close run thing." Even today, Iraqi land forces might penetrate into Kuwait City in spite of US, Saudi, and Kuwaiti air power -- if Iraq was willing to take very high losses in reaching and seizing the city. If Iraq then took the Kuwaiti population hostage, it might succeed. The only way that Iraqi forces could then be

dislodged would be through a combination of another land build up in Saudi Arabia by the US and allied forces, and a massive strategic/interdiction air campaign against targets on Iraqi territory.

The essential dilemma in any “second liberation” of Kuwait would be US, Saudi, and Kuwaiti willingness to act in the face of potential massacres of Kuwaiti civilians, versus the willingness of an Iraqi regime to accept massive damage to Iraq. It seems likely that the US and Saudi Arabia would show the necessary ruthlessness if the Kuwaiti government supported such action. Oil is too strategically important to cede such a victory to a leader like Saddam Hussein.

The problem will also become worse as sanctions ease or end, and Iraq rebuilds more of its military capabilities:

- Iraq may somehow obtain nuclear weapons, or demonstrate the possession of highly lethal biological weapons.
- The US may be forced to reduce its forward presence and readiness in the Gulf to the point where it could not rapidly surge air power, and/or had reduced its overall power projection capabilities.
- Iraq may choose a more limited and “acceptable” objective like restoring its pre-Gulf War border or demanding access to Bubiyan, Warbah, the Kwar Abdullah, and the Gulf.
- Saudi Arabia may not immediately and fully support US action and commit its own forces.
- A Kuwait government may refuse to accept the cost of continuing to fight in the face of ruthless Iraqi action against a “hostage” Kuwaiti people.

The three potential solutions to these problems – all of which are interactive -- are the development of effective Saudi ground forces, the integration of Saudi and Kuwait forces and plans for forward defense against Iraq, and added prepositioning for US land forces close enough

to the border with Iraq to support forward defense. All three steps, however, require active Saudi cooperation, if not leadership. They are expensive and would take years to implement.

At this point, only token progress seems likely. Saudi Arabia is now far more concerned with the domestic Islamic and Pan-Arab backlash against the US presence in Saudi Arabia than it is with improving military defenses against Iraq. It faces serious internal political problems in modernizing its army and has no discretionary funds. It is scarcely any more likely to permit the repositioning of US brigade sets than it was in 1991, and neither the US or Saudi Arabia are willing to pay for such activity. Barring major new political developments that make Saudi Arabia far more conscious of the Iraqi threat, it is going to concentrate on keeping the US profile as low as possible, avoiding any further burden-sharing costs, and political efforts to both reduce tensions with Iraq and use Iran as a counterbalance to the Iraqi threat.

The US faces problems of its own. It too is seeking to minimize its presence and costs. It may be locked into enforcing a containment policy of deterrence and defense against Iran and Iraq, but it has no political support for major new discretionary expenditures and is seeking to keep its military profile as low as possible both to avoid tensions with its Southern Gulf allies and as a force protection measure. It is seeking to reduce the build-up/build-down problems it has faced in rushing in forces to deal with each of Saddam Hussein's new crises, and its preferred solution is a growing reliance on long range missile and air strikes and the rapid deployment of air and missile power backed by greatly improved targeting, C<sup>4</sup>I/SR, and battle damage assessment. The good news is that this US response is not ad hoc, and deals with the political and military realities of the region. The bad news is that it is a relatively high risk approach, and will become progressively less adequate once Iraq breaks out of sanctions and resumes its military build-up and proliferation.

### **Building Up Regional Forces and National Defense Capabilities**

The final set of problems that must be considered in addressing the structure of alliances in the Gulf is national warfighting capability. Saudi land forces are scarcely the only problem. It is

impossible to discuss all of the qualitative problems accompanying the arms purchases currently being made in the Southern Gulf. It is all too clear, however, far too many Southern Gulf countries buy arms without a consistent strategy, proper regard for coalition warfare, or meaningful mission priorities. A review of the land force buys since 1991 reveals far too many types of different weapons from different countries both between Southern Gulf states, and often within their force structures. If one looks through both the naval order of battle in the Gulf, and the performance characteristics of the ships purchased since 1991, many naval purchases seem to reflect a contest as to which country can buy the most complex frigate or corvette.

The problems in air orders of battle and land-based air defenses are less obvious, but there are far too many types of aircraft and short-ranged air defense systems that are not integrated into a common and fully computerized southern-Gulf wide system or concept of air operations. Only Saudi Arabia has fully integrated airborne sensor and battle management systems into its concept of air operations. Purchases for offensive air operations reflect a lack of meaningful reconnaissance and targeting capabilities, a failure to integrate battle damage assessment into the loop, and a lack of integrated concepts of joint warfare.

This is not to say that individual countries have not made major progress in some areas, but the fact remains that the Southern Gulf is one of the major threats to the Southern Gulf. This is summarized in crude terms in Table Four, which shows the source of recent arms purchases by Gulf country. This table sharply understates the problem because it does not break out individual national suppliers in detail, show what is being purchased, or count purchases of less than \$50 million. Nevertheless, one does not have to be a military expert to realize that buying radically different mixes of equipment from a wide range of different suppliers presents major problems in terms of interoperability and standardization.

It is not coincidental that the last two USCENTCOM annual seminars dealing with security assistance have focused on the need to provide for adequate training, infrastructure, and sustainability, and have stressed the fact that Southern Gulf states are buying too many major

weapons too quickly. The issue is not “buy American,” since Europe and Russia are perfectly capable of supplying excellent systems, many of which are better suited to Gulf needs than US systems designed for long range and global deployment. The Southern Gulf should not to cease modernization or seeking an edge over Iran and Iraq. It should buy wisely and at the proper rate.

Unfortunately, the cuts in oil export revenues and growing budget deficits make this even more unlikely than in the past, and there is no unifying threat serious enough to catalyze collective action. Furthermore, each Gulf state still has a large backlog on undelivered arms orders which were placed with limited regard to mission priorities, interoperability, and collective defense. This backlog ensures that many problems will get worse over the next few years and not better.

## **State Responses to Threats and Opportunities**

It is an obvious cliché to say that the past is prolog to the future. In the Gulf, however, the past probably *is* the future. Regional cooperation will consist of rhetoric disguising national efforts and mutual rivalry. The US will be able to exert leadership when it is willing to commit forces and when individual nations feel threatened enough to support the US, but each country will pursue its own interests and only major Iranian or Iraqi threats, at or near the crisis level, will catalyze effective collective action.

There are no present prospects that the structure of alliances in the Gulf will acquire more military capability or involve more serious forms of regional cooperation. The US experience in dealing with the sanctions crisis in Iraq is a case in point. Since October, 1997, Saudi Arabia has said it will not support US strikes from its soil, but has agreed to allow cooperation in air and missile defense, and to support US airborne refueling, AWACS, and electronic warfare operations. Oman has quietly agreed to allow the US to stage out of Omani air bases and draw down on prepositioning stocks, the UAE has provided port facilities while declaring it is against the use of force, Bahrain has based US air and naval units while attempting to keep a low profile, and Kuwait has provided extensive open air basing and supported the US in bringing its prepositioned brigade to full readiness.

Each new round of confrontation with the Iraq has to led th new negotiations with the Southern Gulf states that have had to be ad hoc and on a country-by-country basis. At the same time, declining oil wealth has led to steady cuts in burden sharing and to more and more erratic arms purchases – often sacrificing sustainability and war reserves to maintain the purchase of major weapons with a high “glitter factor.” It has proved extraordinarily difficult to get any of the Southern Gulf states to examine the longer-term risks of Iranian and Iraqi proliferation and to consider the changes that need to be made in their force structures.

Even so, the past, current, and future mix of balance of power tactics, self-seeking national policies, and bilateral relations with the US, Britain, and France may well work. There is nothing new about the four-cornered balance of power between Iran, Iran, the Southern Gulf and the US, or living with risks and instability. Iran and Iraq are not able to engage in the arms races of the past, and their efforts to proliferate are creating the kind of threat that is so serious that it makes American deterrence a self-fulfilling prophecy. Iran may be moderating, and Saddam Hussein will not live forever. The Southern Gulf also faces many generational changes in its top leadership and the next generation may be much more interested in effective cooperative defense than its predecessors. To quote the punchline to a story as old as the Gulf, “the horse may learn to sing!”

Table OneGulf Military Forces in 1997 - Part One

	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Bahrain</u>	<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>Oman</u>	<u>Qatar</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia*</u>	<u>UAE</u>	<u>Yemen</u>
<b>Manpower</b>									
Total Active	545,600	429,000	11,000	15,300	43,500	11,800	161,500	64,500	66,300
Regular	420,600	429,000	11,000	15,300	37,000	11,800	105,500	64,500	66,300
National Guard & Other	125,000	0	0	0	6,500	0	57,000	0	0
Reserve	350,000	650,000	0	23,700	0	0	20,000	0	40,000
Paramilitary	40,000	55,400	9,850	5,000	4,400	0	15,500	2,700	70,000
<b>Army and Guard</b>									
Manpower	450,000*	375,000	8,500	11,000	31,500	8,500	127,000	59,000	61,000
Regular Army Manpower	350,000	375,000	8,500	11,000	25,000	8,500	70,000	59,000	61,000
Reserve	350,000	450,000	0	0	0	0	20,000	0	40,000
Active Main Battle Tanks	1,390	1,900	106	249	117	34	710	231	1,030
Total Main Battle Tanks***	1,410	2,700	106	341	141	34	1,055	231	1,320
Active AIFV/Recce, Lt. Tanks	555	1,600	71	355	46	84	1,655	558-578	650
Active APCs	550	1,800	340	100	96	172	2,580	570	540
Total APCs	550	2,200	340	140	96	172	3,380	570	540
ATGM Launchers	420+	480+	15	118	68	124+	480+	275	71
Self Propelled Artillery	290	150	13	41 (59)	18	28	200	175	30
Towed Artillery	2,170	1,800	36	0	91	12	260-338	46	452
MRLs	764+	150	9	27	0	4	60	42-66	220
Mortars	6,500	2,000+	18	50+	89	39	510+	135	600
SSM Launchers	46	36?	0	0	0	0	10	6	30
Light SAM Launchers	700	1,100	70+	48?	62	58	650	100	700
AA Guns	1,700	5,500	24	0	16	12	10	72	362
Air Force Manpower	28,000	35,000	1,500	2,500	4,100	1,500	18,000	4,000	3,500
Air Defense Manpower	18,000	17,000	0	0	0	0	4,000	0	0
Total Combat Aircraft	307	353	24	76	40	18	432	99	49-89
Bombers	0	6?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fighter/Attack	150	130	12	40	12	18	160	43	27
Fighter/Interceptor	114	180	12	8	0	0	191	22	16
Recce/FGA Recce	8	8	0	0	12	0	10	8	0
AEW C4I/BM	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
MR/MPA**	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCU/COIN/CCT	0	18	0	28	16	0	21	26	0
Other Combat Trainers	25	155	0	0	0	0	50	0	6
Transport Aircraft****	74	34	3	4	21	6	72	22	16
Tanker Aircraft	5	2	0	0	0	0	15	0	0
Total Helicopters	602	500	33	28	31	24	157	97	25
Armed Helicopters*****	100	120	24	16	0	18	12	49	8
Other Helicopters*****	502	380	7	12	31	6	145	47	17
Major SAM Launchers	204	340	8	40	0	0	128	36	87
Light SAM Launchers	45	200	0	12	28	9	181	31	200
AA Guns	-	-	-	60	-	-	270-420)	-	-

Table OneGulf Military Forces in 1997 - Part Two

	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Iraq</u>	<u>Bahrain</u>	<u>Kuwait</u>	<u>Oman</u>	<u>Qatar</u>	<u>Saudi Arabia*</u>	<u>UAE</u>	<u>Yemen</u>
Total Naval Manpower	20,600*	2,000	1,000	1,800	4,200	1,800	13,500	1,500	1,800
Major Surface Combatants									
Missile	3	0	3	0	2	0	8	4	0
Other	2	1-2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrol Craft									
Missile	21	1	4	6	4	3	9	8	7
(Revolutionary Guards)	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	42	5	6	5	7	4	21	9	8
Revolutionary Guards (Boats)	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Submarines	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mine Vessels	7	4	0	0	0	0	6	0	6
Amphibious Ships	9	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
Landing Craft	17	-	4	2	4	1	8	5	-
Support Ships	25	3	5	4	5	-	7	3	-
Marines	(5,000)	0	0	0	0	0	(3,000)	0	0
Naval Guards	18,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Naval Air	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Naval Aircraft									
Fixed Wing Combat	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
MR/MPA	8	0	0	0	(7)	0	0	0	0
Armed Helicopters	9	(6)	0	0	0	0	21	(5)	0
SAR Helicopters		0	0	0	0	0	4	(6)	0
Mine Warfare Helicopters	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Helicopters	-	-	2	-	-	-	6	-	-

Note: Equipment in storage shown in the higher figure in parenthesis or in range. Air Force totals include all helicopters, including army operated weapons, and all heavy surface-to-air missile launchers.

\* Iranian total includes roughly 100,000 Revolutionary Guard actives in land forces and 20,000 in naval forces.

\*\* Saudi Totals for reserve include National Guard Tribal Levies. The total for land forces includes active National Guard equipment. These additions total 450 AIFVs, 730(1,540) APCs, and 70 towed artillery weapons.

\*\*\* Total tanks include tanks in storage or conversion.


\*\*\*\* Includes navy, army, national guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary.

\*\*\*\*\* Includes in Air Defense Command

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from interviews, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (IISS, London); various data available from Jane's, Military Technology, World Defense Almanac; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance in the Middle East (JCSS, Tel Aviv)

Table Two

Gulf Country Military Expenditures - 1984-1995  
(Constant \$1995 Millions)




	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95
Qatar	100	107	110	145	119	111	209	1032	284	346	310	330
Bahrain	220	206	214	208	234	235	248	262	271	263	263	273
Oman	2771	2655	2310	1965	1685	1859	1961	1602	1901	1773	1864	1735
UAE	2915	2606	2109	2055	1982	1902	2977	5415	2256	2228	2178	1880
Kuwait	2088	2057	1708	1609	1565	2316	15130	17620	20430	3759	3146	3488
Iran	8686	11680	14840	12190	10860	8893	9307	8654	5410	6333	5586	4191
Iraq	24560	17430	19850	21290	22890	15740	16210	9698	6430	5280	4380	4380
Saudi Arabia	29530	29240	23080	20980	16980	17600	26620	39240	37650	21470	17630	17210

Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, GPO, Washington, various editions.

Table Three

Gulf Arms Agreements and Deliveries: 1987-1997  
(\$Current Millions)



Iran	10,200	2,700	1,600	7,800	3,900	1,900
Iraq	10,500	0	0	16,600	0	0
Northern Gulf	20,700	2,700	1,600	24,400	3,900	1,900
Total GCC	51,300	43,700	24,600	31,400	32,300	45,400
Bahrain	600	200	300	800	300	200
Kuwait	3,500	5,700	2,300	1,300	2,500	4,500
Oman	400	600	600	200	300	1,200
Qatar	100	2,000	2,200	300	0	700
Saudi Arabia	45,700	30,200	14,100	26,300	27,900	36,400
UAE	1,000	5,000	5,100	2,500	1,300	2,400
(GCC less Saudi)	5,600	13,500	10,500	5,100	4,400	9,000
Yemen	300	1,200	700	2,800	300	500

0 = less than \$50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Table Four

The “Dog’s Breakfast” in the Gulf: Too Many Suppliers Changing Constantly Over Time  
(New arms agreements in current US \$millions)

<u>Buyer Country</u>	<u>Supplier Country</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>US</u>	<u>Russia</u>	<u>China</u>	<u>Major West European</u>	<u>Other European</u>	<u>All Others</u>	
<b>Iran</b>							
1987-90	0	3,500	2,300	200	1,200	1,600	8,800
1991-94	0	200	200	100	100	600	1,200
1994-97	0	200	900	100	100	300	1,600
<b>Iraq</b>							
1987-90	0	300	700	500	500	1,000	3,000
1991-94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994-97	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Bahrain</b>							
1987-90	300	0	0	0	0	0	300
1991-94	200	0	0	0	0	0	200
1994-97	300	0	0	0	0	0	300
<b>Kuwait</b>							
1987-90	2,500	200	0	200	200	200	3,300
1991-94	3,500	800	0	1,800	0	100	6,200
1994-97	500	800	200	700	0	100	2,300
<b>Oman</b>							
1987-90	100	0	0	600	0	0	700
1991-94	0	0	0	500	0	100	600
1994-97	0	0	0	400	100	100	600
<b>Qatar</b>							
1987-90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1991-94	0	0	0	2,000	0	0	2,000
1994-97	0	0	0	2,200	0	0	2,200
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>							
1987-90	18,800	200	300	23,000	2,300	200	44,800
1991-94	15,600	0	0	6,600	100	0	22,300
1994-97	4,200	0	0	7,000	1,100	1,800	14,100
<b>UAE</b>							
1987-90	300	0	0	300	0	400	1,000
1991-94	300	500	0	3,900	100	0	4,800
1994-97	300	400	0	3,700	500	200	5,100

0 = less than \$50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest \$100 million.

Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service, various editions.

Table FiveGulf Arms Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements with the US, Britain, and France***Bahrain:***

- Bahrain has maintained close military relations with the US since Britain departed the Gulf. On December 31, 1971, the US and Bahrain signed a leasing agreement allowing the US to use 10 acres at Jufair to support its Middle East Force (MEF) in the Gulf -- this included US use of a transmitter and antennae, priority use of Berth 1 at the port, waterfront ship repair facilities, and land rights, hanger and office space at Muharraq Airfield.
- As a result of the tensions following the October War, Bahrain officially terminated this arrangement on October 20, 1973, but this termination had no practical effect, and Bahrain quietly reinstated the lease in July, 1975 -- expanding its scope on August 12, 1975 and June 30, 1977. The agreement of June 30, 1977 is typical of many aspects of the informal cooperation between the US and Gulf states before the Gulf War. Officially, the US Navy no longer homeported the MEF in Bahrain, but maintained a "temporary duty administrative unit." In practice, the US continued to "homeport" its Gulf naval forces (Middle East Force) in Manama and use the port facility at Mina Al-Sulman.
- Bahrain provided extensive support, basing, and repair support to the US during "Operation Earnest Will" in the tanker war with Iran in 1987-1988. This US operation required extensive support from friendly Gulf states. The US used a total of 27 warships, which conducted 127 missions from July, 1987 to December, 1988. Bahrain played a critical role in helping the US recover the *USS Stark* after it hit a mine in the Gulf, and also supported the US during Operation Praying Mantis -- when the US attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf.
- Bahrain furnished extensive naval and air facilities to the US and Britain during the Gulf War. In September, 1990, Bahrain accepted US F/A-18, A-6, EA-6 and AV-8B air units, and British Tornado units. Bahrain provided a 200-man infantry company to Joint Forces Command (East). Bahrain's air force was relatively new and just absorbing deliveries of F-16s. Nevertheless, the Bahrain Air Force flew a total of 266 combat sorties. It used its new F-16s to fly 166 defensive and offensive counter-air sorties, averaging 4-6 sorties per day. It used its F-5s to fly 122 interdiction sorties, averaging about 3-4 sorties per day. It attacked targets like radar sites, Silkworm sites, and artillery positions.
- Bahrain deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994.
- On October 22, 1991, Bahrain signed a ten year bilateral agreement, expanding the US military presence in Bahrain. The agreement expanded US prepositioning in Bahrain, called for expanded joint exercises and training, allowed the US to set up a JTME(USCENTCOM headquarters), and increased US access to Bahraini ports and airfields. The US now has several warehouses of prepositioned equipment and supplies at Sheik Isa Air Base.
- On July 1, 1995, Bahrain agreed to allow the US to create the headquarters for its new 5th Fleet in Bahrain, with an Admiral and a headquarters contingent. This headquarters commands a force that now averages 15 vessels, including a carrier. There are now roughly 1,500 US military personnel based in Bahrain. The fleet is now officially based at Mina Sulman.
- In November, 1995, Bahrain agreed to allow the US to temporarily deploy 18 additional US combat aircraft in Bahrain to make up for the "gap" created by the need to withdraw a US carrier from the Gulf before a new one could be deployed.

- Joint exercises between Bahraini and US forces have increased from two per year after the Gulf War to early eight.
- There is a US Office of Military Cooperation in Bahrain with six military officers, and one civilian.
- Bahrain purchases large amounts of US military equipment. Between FY1950 and FY1990, it purchased \$874.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$545.2 million worth. Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$197.9 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$239.6 million worth. Bahrain also receives about \$200,000-\$400,000 a year worth of IMET military training assistance from the US.

***Kuwait:***

- Until the tanker war of 1987-1988, Kuwait attempted to maintain its security by balancing the competing political and military interests of its neighbors in ways where it could obtain support from a wide range of countries and defuse potential threats through financial aid or political accommodation. Kuwait then obtained the reflagging of its tankers from the US during the tanker war, cooperated closely with the US to ensure its security against Iran, and bought US F/A-18 aircraft to modernize its air force.
- The US and Kuwait cooperated closely after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and Kuwait provided the US with \$16.056 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$44 million in goods and services, for a total of \$16.059 billion. The US played a key role in helping Kuwait to rebuild its military forces before the liberation of Kuwait, and this help enabled Kuwait to deploy some 7,000 troops and 60 tanks as part of the Saudi-led Joint Force Command (East).
- Less than 200 trained Kuwaiti Air Force personnel were in service at the start of Desert Storm, but Kuwait used French Air Force and US contract personnel to support its 15 operational Mirage F-1s, and 19 A-4s. The Kuwaiti Air Force also had 12 armed helicopters. Kuwaiti units flew 568 interdiction missions and 212 battlefield interdiction missions for a total of 780 sorties. About 650 of these sorties were A-4 sorties, and Kuwaiti A-4s flew an average of about 18-20 sorties per day. Kuwaiti Mirage F-1s flew the remaining 130 sorties, flying 4 to 10 sorties per day. Operational availability rates averaged 80-85% per day. Kuwait lost one A-4 on the first day of fighting, but attacked Iraqi artillery and infantry locations, and some Iraqi air defense positions throughout the war.
- The US Fifth Special Forces trained some 6,300 Kuwaitis for the Free Kuwait Forces, and the US Navy Special Forces Command trained 224 Kuwait marines and sailors.
- Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait has signed security agreements with Britain, France, Russia, and the US. Kuwait signed a 10 year bilateral agreement with the US on September 19, 1991. This agreement provided for \$35 million per year in Kuwaiti payments to offset the cost of US military support.
- Kuwait now relies heavily on the US to help it in rebuilding and expanding its military forces, and its military facilities are being sized and redesigned to support the rapid deployment, support, and sustainment of US land and air units.
- Kuwait is equipping much of its force structure with US Army and US aircraft, and has bought 40 F/A-18s and M-1A2 tanks, M-2/M-3 armored fighting vehicles, and US artillery, and Kuwait has support contracts with US defense contractors that provide it with increased sustainability as well as increased capability to support the deployment of US forces. Between FY1950 and FY1990, Kuwait purchased \$3,541.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$1,089.0 million worth. Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$3,495.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$1,721.6 million worth. The US has an Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait, with a Brigadier General, eleven military personnel, two civilians, and one local employee.

- Kuwait supports the US in maintaining USAF combat aircraft on Kuwaiti soil -- including 24 USAF A-10 attack aircraft based at Ahmed Al-Jaber air base. It is creating a new air base in southern Kuwait to facilitate rapid US air deployments in the most defensible part of Kuwaiti air space. Kuwait has bought \$145.6 million worth of US military construction services since the Gulf War.
- Kuwait allows a cadre of US Army personnel to be stationed in Kuwait, and is paying \$215 million to finance the prepositioning of the combat equipment of one US Army mechanized brigade (three armored companies and three mechanized companies) -- including 58 M-1A2 tanks, M-2A2 Bradleys, and M-109A6 Paladin artillery weapons. A company of US Army military police provides security for the equipment and 600 employees of the DynCorp are responsible for its maintenance.
- The Kuwaiti C<sup>4</sup>I system is now interoperable with that of US forces. The C<sup>4</sup>I links for the US-operated Patriot units in Kuwait are linked to those for Patriot units in Saudi Arabia and to US satellite warning systems that detect the nature and vector of missile launches.
- Kuwaiti land, air, and naval forces now conduct extensive combined training with the US. Kuwait and the US held at least eight major exercises between November, 1991 and January, 1995, including "Eager Mace," "Intrinsic Action," and "Native Fury." These exercises include practicing the unloading of tanks from prepositioning ships and the defense of Kuwait City from an Iraqi invasion.
- Kuwait and the US conducted Operation Vigilant Warrior in early October, 1994, in response to the build-up of 70,000-80,000 Iraqi troops, 1,100 tanks, 1,000 AFVs, and 700 artillery pieces in the border area. Kuwait provided major offset aid, air and kind, and facility support as the US began supplementing the 13,000 troops already deployed in Kuwait with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, 24th Infantry Division, and added Patriot forces.

***Oman:***

- The US has cooperated with Oman since the time of the Dhofar Rebellion and the US provided informal assistance to Oman, Britain, and Iran during their campaigns against the Dhofar rebels. The US supported Oman in its long confrontation with the PDRY, and in dealing with the potential threat posed by Iran after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Oman has long permitted USCENTCOM to conduct exercises in Oman, and US Navy ships to use Omani facilities. Oman has provided data on tanker and other ship transits of the Straits of Hormuz to the US and UK from its base on Goat Island since the early 1980s.
- Oman and the US signed a military access agreement in July, 1981, which provided US access to building cantonments, hardened shelters, warehouses, and other facilities at Seeb, Masirah, Khasab, and Thumrait air bases, and ports at Muscat and Salalah, in return for \$320 million in US funds to build-up these facilities. The US provided over \$199.1 million in FMS credits to Oman between FY1980 and FY1990, and about \$853,000 in IMET assistance. During FY1981-FY1985, the US provided support to Oman for the construction of four air bases at Masirah, Seeb, Khasab, and Thumrait that could be used by US air units in rapid deployment to the Gulf.
- This construction included facilities for rear-area staging and forward deployment, and included improved operations, personnel, storage, and maintenance facilities. The US Navy developed an aircraft maintenance facility, ground support equipment shop, warehouse facility, and ammunition storage facility. The US Army created a staging base at Masirah to support the forward deployment of US Army forces. The US helped provide hardened shelters, dispersal and access pavements, environmentally controlled warehouses, transient billeting, and cantonment support areas at Seeb and Thumrait. The US access agreement is reviewed every five years, and the next review is due in 1995.
- Oman allowed the US and Britain to use Oman as a staging base and to deploy reconnaissance aircraft during the tanker war, and Gulf Wars, and allowed the US to stage reconnaissance and air-control flights

out of Oman during Operation Praying Mantis -- when the US attacked Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf. Oman provided about 950 troops to the Arab Joint Forces Command (East) during the Gulf War.

- Oman has regularly renewed its 1981 access agreement with the US. Oman deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994. Many of Oman's arms are British-supplied, and Oman lacks the funds to make major military purchases. Oman did, however, purchase \$163.3 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) between FY1950 and FY1990, and took delivery on \$91.8 million worth.
- Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$13.2 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$56.6 million worth. Oman also receives about \$110,000 a year worth of IMET military training assistance from the US, and trains about 16 Omani officers per year. A total of 80 Omani personnel were trained as part of the IMET program during 1990-1994. The US maintains an Office of Military Cooperation in Oman, with five military, one civilian, and one local employee.
- Oman works closely with Britain, and there are roughly 200 British soldiers training the Omani Army. There are British officers and NCOs seconded to the Omani Navy, and some 80 British officers seconded to the Omani air force. British SAS personnel have trained the Omani anti-terrorist force and assist in surveillance of the border with Yemen. France provides a limited amount of training for Omani officers.

#### *Qatar:*

- The US did not begin to develop security arrangements with Qatar until the tanker war of 1987-1988, and only began to develop close security arrangements during the Gulf War. Considerable tension existed over Qatar's purchase of smuggled Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during March, 1988 to November, 1990. Since that time, however, relations have steadily improved.
- Qatar permitted US air units to stage out of Qatar during the Gulf War. Qatar provided a 1,600-man mechanized battalion with 25 tanks, 60 other armored vehicles, and 3-5 artillery weapons. This force fought well at the Battle of Khafji, and in Joint Forces Command (East). Qatar also committed 700 men, 21 fighters, and 12 armed helicopters from its small air force. Qatari Mirage F-1s flew 41 interdiction sorties, with a maximum of about 5 sorties per day. Qatari Alphajets flew two sorties. The Qatari Air Force was forced to cancel or abort 22 sorties, but 16 of these cancellations were due to weather.
- On June 22, 1992, Qatar negotiated a bilateral security arrangement with the US that offers the US access to Qatari air and naval facilities. Since that time Qatar has conducted an increasing number of exercises with US forces.
- In March, 1995, Qatar formally agreed to the prepositioning of the heavy equipment for one US Army mechanized brigade in Qatar -- including up to 110 US M-1A2 tanks. Warehouses are now under construction in Doha to preposition US equipment. The Qatari air force has also begun to conduct combined air exercises with the US, and may acquire a site in Qatar.
- Qatari forces are largely French-equipped and only have limited interoperability and sustainability with US forces. Qatar only purchased \$1.9 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) between FY1950 and FY1990, and took delivery on \$1.9 million worth. Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$2.7 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$1.4 million worth.

***Saudi Arabia:***

- Although the US does not have a formal status of forces agreement with Saudi Arabia, it has long had close military ties to Saudi Arabia. The US first leased port and air base facilities in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1943. It renewed these leases on April 22, 1957 and maintained them until April 2, 1962 -- when they were canceled both for political reasons and because the US Strategic Air Command ceased to forward deploy the B-47. Saudi Arabia renewed its US Military Training Mission Agreement with the US in June, 1992.
- During the late 1970s and 1980s, Saudi Arabia increased the size of its air bases and port facilities to aid in US power projection to Saudi Arabia, and created massive stockpiles of munitions and equipment, and support facilities, that could be used by US forces deploying to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia purchased \$16 billion worth of US military construction services during this period, and supervised military construction worth billions of dollars more.
- The US and Saudi Arabia cooperated closely in setting up combined air and naval defenses against Iran beginning in 1983, when Iraq came under serious military pressure from Iran. The two countries conducted combined exercises, and cooperated in establishing the "Fahd Line," which created an Air Defense Identification Zone and forward air defense system off the Saudi coast. This cooperation helped Saudi Arabia defend its air space and shoot down an Iranian F-4 which tested Saudi defenses on June 5, 1984. The US and Saudi Arabia have jointly operated E-3A AWACS units in Saudi Arabia ever since. The US and Saudi Arabia also cooperated closely during the tanker war of 1987-1988.
- The US deployed massive land and air units to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and jointly commanded UN Coalition forces with Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm. Saudi forces played a major role in the air and land campaigns. Saudi Arabia also provided the US with \$12.809 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$4.045 billion in goods and services, for a total of \$16.854 billion.
- Saudi Arabia commanded both Arab task forces -- Joint Forces Command (East) and Joint Forces Command (North). Saudi forces were organized under the command of Lt. General Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud. The Arab task forces reported to Prince Khalid through a Joint Forces Command in the Saudi Ministry of Defense, and were divided into a Joint Forces Command (North), a Joint Forces Command (East), and a Joint Forward Forces Command Ar'Ar (the command of the Arab defensive forces screening the border area). The Ar'Ar command was subordinated to the Joint Forces Command (North). It included two Saudi National Guard battalions, a Saudi Army airborne battalion, and a Pakistani armored brigade with about 5,500 men, over 100 tanks, and about 90 other additional armored vehicles and artillery weapons. These forces did not play an offensive role in Desert Storm. By the time the AirLand phase of the war began, the Saudi ground forces in the theater totaled nearly 50,000 men, with about 270 main battle tanks, 930 other armored fighting vehicles, 115 artillery weapons, and over 400 anti-tank weapons.
- The Saudi Air Force flew a total of 6,852 sorties between January 17, 1991 and February 28 -- ranking second after the US in total air activity, and flying about 6% of all sorties flown. These sorties included 1,133 interdiction missions, and 523 battlefield air interdiction missions, for a total of 1,656 offensive missions. The RSAF flew 2,050 defensive counter-air missions, 129 offensive counter-air missions, and 102 escort missions for a total of 2,281 air defense sorties. The RSAF flew 118 reconnaissance sorties, 85 E3-A AWACS sorties, 485 refueling sorties, and 1,829 airlift sorties. During the slightly longer period of January 16 to February 28, Saudi Air Force F-15C units flew 2,088 sorties (over one-third the total F-15C sorties flown by the USAF) and 451 Tornado ADV sorties. Saudi pilots were as capable in these air defense sorties as most pilots in NATO. The RSAF also flew 665 Tornado GR1/IDS strike sorties, 1,129 F-5 sorties, and 118 RF-5 sorties. Saudi F-15Cs shot down three Iraqi Mirage F-1s with air-to-air missiles

-- including the only double kill by a single fighter in the war on January 24, 1991. The RSAF lost only two aircraft -- one Tornado GR1 to anti-aircraft fire and one F-5 to unknown causes.

- Since the Gulf War, the US has expanded its security arrangements with Saudi Arabia. Although no formal status of forces agreements exist, the US and Saudi Arabia have expanded the USMTM agreement to increase US access to Saudi air and seaports, including Jubail, and have improved the capabilities of the combined AWACS force. The US deploys a wing of aircraft in southern Saudi Arabia, including F-117 and U-2 aircraft. Saudi Arabia has increased stocks of selected spares and electronics to support US forces in deploying -- including enough parts and supplies to support 15 USAF tactical fighter equivalents -- and has increased the number of combined exercises with US forces. It is standardizing key aspects of its C<sup>4</sup>I system to make them interoperable with US C<sup>4</sup>I systems, including theater missile defense arrangements for Saudi Arabia's Patriot missiles. Saudi Arabia has provided the US with additional facilities, and has ordered \$1.6 billion worth of US military construction services since the Gulf War -- \$610.8 million of which has been delivered.
- Saudi Arabia has long been one of the largest single customers for US military exports -- and Saudi purchases have both increased interoperability and sustainability with US forces, and have reduced the unit cost of equipment purchased by US forces. Between FY1950 and FY1990, Saudi Arabia purchased \$35,876.0 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$23,799.4 million worth. Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$24,835.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$8,818 million worth.
- Since the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia has made major purchases of US M-1 tanks, M-2/M-3 armored vehicles, and US artillery and related support systems which increase both Saudi interoperability with US forces and Saudi capability to support the rapid deployment of heavy US ground forces to Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia has not agreed to formal prepositioning of US Army combat unit equipment in Saudi Arabia, it has carried out combined exercises with US land forces since 1991, and is considering storage of selected US Army heavy combat equipment. The US maintains a US Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia with 69 military four civilians, and nine local personnel.
- The Saudi National Guard has long relied largely on US equipment, and on training support by the US Vinnel Corporation.

#### *United Arab Emirates:*

- The US did not begin to develop close security arrangements with the UAE until the tanker war of 1987-1988, but the US and UAE cooperated closely during both the tanker war and Gulf War. The UAE provided port call facilities and support during Operation Earnest Will. The US Navy and MEF conducted a combined exercise with UAE in July, 1990, after Saddam Hussein began to threaten the UAE.
- The UAE provided the US with \$6.572 billion in direct aid during the Gulf War, and \$218 million in goods and services, for a total of \$6.455 billion. The UAE committed a Motorized Infantry Battalion to Joint Forces Command (East) and created a combined aviation battalion with Kuwait. It used its 7,000-man air force to fly 109 sorties, including 58 Mirage 2000 interdiction sorties, 45 C-212 and C-130 airlift sorties, and six Mirage 2000 reconnaissance sorties. The UAE Air Force had reasonable readiness. It canceled or aborted 18 sorties, but only two due to maintenance reasons. Its Mirage 2000 fighters attacked targets like Iraqi infantry and mechanized forces, artillery positions, and supply areas.
- The UAE negotiated a security arrangement with the US in 1992 that offers the US access to UAE air and naval facilities.
- A small amount of US Navy equipment is prepositioned at Jebel Ali and a small US Navy support facility exists in Fujirah. US Navy ships make regular port calls to the UAE -- Abu Dhabi is one of the most

frequent port calls in the world for the US Navy.

- In 1995, the UAE agreed to host a US Army prepositioned brigade with 120 tanks and 70 AIFVs. An agreement in principle has already been signed and negotiations are underway over cost-sharing.
- UAE forces have conducted combined air exercises with the US. The UAE deployed a squadron of fighter aircraft to Kuwait when Iraqi forces moved towards the Kuwaiti border in October, 1994.
- UAE forces have increasing amounts of US equipment, including IHawk missiles and AH-64 attack helicopters. Between FY1950 and FY1990, the UAE purchased \$1,048.8 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and took delivery on \$313.2 million worth. Since the Gulf War, it has purchased \$592.5 million worth of US Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and taken delivery on \$586.6 million worth. UAE force are, however, equipped with weapons from a wide range of sources, and only have moderate interoperability and sustainability with US forces. The US has a military liaison office in the UAE with six military, one civilian, and two local personnel to manage military programs in the country.