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A WIDER OR A FRACTURED EUROPE?

By Janusz Bugajski

The recent enlargement of the European Union (EU) through the inclusion of eight new democracies from Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), together with the slowdown in EU integration, following the failed Constitutional Treaty, has raised important questions about Europe's ultimate size and structure. Two key regions remain outside the EU - the Western Balkans and the Baltic-Black Sea belt - and their future status could well determine whether Europe will be widened or fractured.

The expectations generated by institutional enlargement have intensified debates about the significance of the EU's Eastern Dimension. The states that emerged from the Soviet Union are a source of strategic competition between Russia and Central Europe. This competition has sharpened significantly following NATO and EU expansion. Most of the CEE capitals have endeavored to pull their immediate neighbors into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, while Russia has sought to construct a countervailing political, economic, and security structure.

The CEE countries have close historic, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political ties with particular Eastern neighbors. Poland has vigorously campaigned for Ukraine and Belarus and has promoted democratization in both states. Latvia and Lithuania maintain close links with Belarus and have directly assisted the pro-democracy movement. Romania pursues a close relationship with Moldova and has tried to help resolve the separatist Transnistrian dispute, while both Romania and Bulgaria are developing broader Black Sea policies.

The CEE states seek to increase their leverage within the EU and NATO, as well as their close relations with the U.S., to pull Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia into the Western orbit. Meanwhile, Russia is intent on maintaining primary influence over these coun-

tries, especially over their foreign policies and security orientations, and to prevent their merger into Western organizations.

Several West European states are hesitant in offering any realistic prospect for further eastward enlargement, fearing that this could lead to a deterioration of relations with Moscow. For Germany and France in particular, commercial pragmatism and bilateral ties with Vladimir Putin's Russia evidently prevail over geopolitics and common EU interests.

The Central Europeans remain concerned about EU compromises with the Kremlin that could weaken the U.S. role and endanger their own long-term security interests. The specter of a long-term or permanent freeze on EU enlargement is also stirring fears in the CEE capitals over new dividing lines in Europe. They contend that such a scenario would damage inter-state relations, undermine economic cooperation, encourage Russian revanchism, obstruct structural reform, and potentially destabilize the region.

The CEE states argue that the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has been inadequate in providing the struggling democracies of Eastern Europe with a sufficient incentive to reform. Unlike the Western Balkan states, which were given some prospect of joining the EU through Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA), provided they fulfilled the stipulated membership criteria, the Eastern countries are still treated as long-term neighbors rather than as future members. In this vein, some of the older EU members contend that the Union cannot offer entry to countries that fail to meet the basic standards for closer association with the Union. EU newcomers counter such assertions by pointing out that without the prospect of EU membership few basic standards can be achieved by any aspiring candidate.

With regard to the Western Balkans, two possible futures can be envisaged: Europeanization or marginalization. Europeanization would mean a realistic roadmap of entry for Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo into both the EU and NATO, as was the case with the recently admitted members from Central Europe and the soon-to-be member states from the Eastern Balkans, Bulgaria and Romania.

If there are long delays in accession or the prospect is eliminated, then there will be precious little incentive for reform and for meeting international standards in governance. This could assign the region to a peripheral and pauperized gray zone, increase opportunities for cross-border criminal organizations and

other non-state interests, result in potential depopulation as locals seek to escape to the EU, and radicalize a younger generation with few opportunities for employment and personal improvement. Ultimately, it may be less costly and disruptive to have these states Europeanized rather than marginalized.

From the perspective of the CEE capitals, two issues are of particular concern. First, is the perception that close relations between several EU heads of state and the Kremlin are the driving force behind the EU's Eastern policy. Moreover, some EU member states have called for a "strategic partnership" with Russia, which many of the new entrants view as a strategic error that would gain the Kremlin unwarranted influence in EU policy making, threaten their national interests, and undercut America's role in a Wider Europe.

And second, without a realistic prospect of further enlargement, the EU loses its most effective foreign policy tool toward neighboring states. The incentive for reform could then diminish among the elites while public disillusionment could lead to apathy at best and radicalism at worst. A restricted and inward-looking EU strategy may also raise the level of Euroscepticism among new Union members and generate rifts in numerous other areas of EU policy.

ALBANIA

The EU has assisted Albania's post-communist transition and stabilization since 1990 by awarding the country access to EU duty-free zones and giving it preferential treatment in the area of trade. In 1992 a Trade and Cooperation Agreement was established between Albania and the EU. Negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a formal contractual agreement on the path of full integration, started on 31 January 2003. Former Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta released an open letter to the Albanian people, in which he called the association between Albania and the EU a new page in the history of the country. This step was perceived both by the public and the elite as a break from isolationism. The EU's confirmation of its commitment toward Albania raised hopes that the country was entering a new era of effective democracy-building with EU support.

In the area of security, the EU has helped to establish a cross-border security apparatus and has assisted Albanian NGOs in the areas of human rights and democracy building. In the framework of the CARDS program, the government was expected to invest 500,000 *euro* in financial assistance into projects for social development in the border regions, to fight against corruption, and to streamline the business registration process. In the period from 1994 to 2002, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) financed projects to develop the private sector,

promote foreign investment, and build an energy infrastructure which had amounted to 227.5 million *euros* (27 January 2005, ATA). This investment has been inefficiently utilized.

In June 2004 the Council set up a European Partnership for Albania, which is one of the means defined by the Thessaloniki Agenda of how to intensify the Stabilization and Association Process. The European Partnership identifies the priorities for action specifically for Albania's stage of preparation and expects Albania to adopt a detailed plan and timetable for how to achieve the set targets. The organization and execution of the general elections in July 2005 was a test of international standards for the country. Brussels evaluated the parliamentary elections "competitively overall" but with "a number of shortcomings." Further comments on the election will be noted in the Regular Report to be published in November 2005.

SAA technical negotiations are ongoing and the two delegations met on 29-30 September 2005 in Tirana where Albanian leaders outlined their plans for further economic and democratic reforms. The European Commission encouraged the Albanian government to focus on the following areas: fighting organized crime and corruption, improving the judiciary, accelerating property restitution and compensation, improving the treatment of detainees, promoting media freedom and improving customs administration. The November 2005 Progress Report will be decisive for Albania since it will include the European Commission's evaluation whether to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement.

The Albanian public and the political elite strongly embrace the European idea. The public perceives the Union as an institution that can provide guidance and control over much-needed liberalization. The 2004 Eurobarometer findings showed that Albania had a favorable image of the EU. Fifty-eight percent stated that their country benefits from ties with the EU, and 44 percent considered their future to be linked to the EU.

BELARUS

"Europe's last dictator," President Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus came to power in 1994. He isolated Belarus from the West, repressed the political opposition and the independent civic society and mass media, and manipulated elections to stay in power. Lukashenka's autocratic rule has created a pocket of obscurity along the EU's eastern border. An EU neighbor since the May 2004 enlargement, the push for a democratic and open Belarus has become a priority for several EU members.

The EU hardened its stance towards Belarus to further isolate Lukashenka through an increasingly restrictive visa policy and recur-

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ring public statements in opposition to his regime. The EU engaged various political groups and independent media through funding and international forums to improve dialogue between the EU and the country's opposition movement. The EU restricted visas for Belarusian officials who were suspected in the disappearance of several opposition leaders and journalists prior to the 2001 parliamentary elections. These restrictions were heightened in December 2004 following the rigged parliamentary vote and presidential referendum extending Lukashenka's rule.

In spring 2005, the European Commission hosted three events aimed at assessing the needs of Belarusian civil society. A July 2005 European Parliamentary initiative provided increased funding for broadcasts into Belarus from neighboring Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania (Baltic News Service 7 July 2005). These efforts are not only evidence of increased leverage of the new member states in influencing EU foreign policy, but are also a reaction to the increased repression inside Belarus.

Among Belarusians, support for joining the EU has increased in recent years. A poll conducted by the Minsk-based Independent Institute of Socio-Economics and Political Studies (IISEPS) in November 2001 registered a mere 15 percent support for EU integration. In May 2005, over 47 percent of Belarusians were in favor of joining the EU compared to 35 percent who were against entry.

The EU's efforts to improve their strategies for assisting Belarusian opposition groups and independent media illustrate that the EU is well-aware of the widening gap between Lukashenka and Belarusian society. It is unknown whether the recent French and Dutch "no" votes and the perception that the EU itself is in a state of disarray will decrease Belarusians' largely positive view of the EU.

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

On 21 October 2005, the European Commission recommended that negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) be opened with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), giving strong hope to the country's political elite and public that a European future is possible. The decision came following the House of People's adoption of an agreement to restructure the country's ethnically divided police force, a key EU requirement. Due to its complexity, the plan is estimated to take five years to implement. EU Ministers are scheduled to adopt the negotiating framework for the SAA in December 2005.

One of the greatest obstacles to Bosnia-Herzegovina's path toward European integration has been the weakness of the Bosnian state when compared to the two state entities it administers: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. In the ten years since the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, institutions in the two separate entities have persistently blocked the central authorities, which are overseen by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The OHR was afforded legitimacy

through the Bonn Powers given to the office in December 1997. This gave the Representative the "authority to impose legislation and dismiss from office any public official who obstructs the implementation of Dayton." As a result, there have been several instances where elected government officials have been forced out of office by the internationally appointed High Representatives for failure to implement the Dayton Accords. The OHR has come under criticism that its actions have had a detrimental effect on the process of state-building.

In many respects, the OHR itself remains an impediment to Bosnia-Herzegovina signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). However, according to the November 2003 European Commission report, the Bonn Powers do not hinder the country's ability to form a strong and stable state that would be capable of entering into negotiations for an SAA, as just has occurred in October 2005. The EU contends that the number of OHR decisions imposed on the federal and state entities have been steadily declining. During the period between June 2002 and January 2003, 101 decisions from the OHR were passed down to state and local authorities, whereas between February and September 2003 there was a decline in the number of OHR decisions to 68. The EU believes that the OHR has been successful in stabilizing the Bosnian state, while the objective of steadily "phasing out" the OHR is gaining ground among policy makers. On 20 July 2005, current High Representative Lord Paddy Ashdown outlined a proposal to limit the OHR's Bonn Powers to the federal and state authorities.

As with other West Balkan countries, one of the EU's conditions for entering into an SAA agreement process has been an inability to locate some former generals and officials wanted by the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). A stronger and more effective Bosnian state would also improve its ability to meet the objective of centralizing the security forces outlined in the feasibility report. Police reform has also represented a major hindrance for Bosnia in qualifying for the EU path. The approved agreement on police restructuring marked a major breakthrough this October.

Despite differences of opinion by the international community over how Bosnia-Herzegovina should move toward EU entry, the Bosnian public seems more certain. According to a July 2004 public opinion poll, 87.5 percent of the population supports EU entry, while over two-thirds of respondents felt that EU membership depended upon the elimination of crime and corruption.

The challenge for the EU is to slowly phase out the increasingly unpopular OHR while continuing to centralize certain state institutions, particularly those pertaining to justice and home affairs. Though the EU remains ambiguous in its position towards the OHR, its increasing funding for statewide institutionalization seems to be moving the country toward a more centralized state structure. A new financing agreement was signed in July between the Bosnian government and EU officials providing nearly 50 million euros for continued reform efforts through the remainder of 2005. Of this amount, 31 million euros will be spent on the centralization of state institutions and judicial reform, and nearly 15 mil-

lion euros for social and economic development. While the overall levels of EU assistance to Bosnia has declined since the late 1990s, allocations for centralizing state structures had been steadily increasing.

CROATIA

Since November 2000 Croatia has participated in the EU's Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). Zagreb signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in October 2001 and the document came into force on 1 February 2005. The Agreement, facilitating cooperation in areas such as legal and economic reform, established the contractual framework between Croatia and the EU.

Croatia submitted its application for EU membership on 21 February 2003. On 18 June 2004 candidate status was awarded. Accession negotiations were scheduled to be launched on 17 March 2005. However, they were postponed by the Council of EU Foreign Ministers as it deemed Croatia's cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague insufficient. Finally, on 3 October 2005 the Council approved opening the negotiations following the "green light" given by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

According to the spring 2005 Eurobarometer survey, 28 percent of the Croatian population holds a favorable perception of the EU. Only 27 percent of those surveyed stated that future EU membership is a good thing, indicating a slight drop from the fall 2004 survey, which recorded 30 percent support. Compared with other EU candidate countries Croatian citizens are the most Euro-skeptic.

Croatia's accession depends on its progress in meeting the requirements for membership. The Negotiation Framework elaborated by the EU expects further actions in the following areas: minority rights, return of refugees, judicial reform, regional cooperation and anti-corruption. In addition, the Council highlighted the importance of full cooperation with the ICTY, stating that this might "affect the overall progress of negotiations." Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn also warned Zagreb that a slow down in the reform process might cause a suspension of the accession negotiations.

MACEDONIA

Macedonia signed its Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in November 2000. It detailed the steps to be taken in ensuring the free movement of goods and labor and the application of EU standards. The document entered into force on 1 April 2004. The European Commission is expected to give its opinion on whether membership talks should be opened with Macedonia in November 2005. The decision will be based upon the level of political stability, progress in economic and legal reforms, efforts

to combat crime and corruption, and improvements in the state's administrative capacities.

Macedonia's most urgent reforms are stipulated by the Ohrid Peace Agreement, which was signed by Macedonian and Albanian minority leaders on 8 August 2001. The Agreement ensures minority participation through decentralization and ethnic proportionality at all levels of government. The most contentious reforms have already been legislated and implemented. The decentralization reform was designed to provide local self-governance for Albanians with the government redrawing the country's municipal borders.

Another key reform, an increase in proportional Albanian representation in the public administration, is also underway. It has allowed Albanian leaders to have a decisive voice in high-level judicial and legislative matters. As stipulated by the amended Constitution, the adoption of laws and the elections of judges to the Supreme Court now requires a certain percentage of support from minority representatives in parliament. The authorities also amended the Basic Law to allow for the use of Albanian as a second official language at all levels of government. The new Constitution grants ethnic Albanians the right to establish schools and universities where Albanian will be the predominant language of instruction.

The general expectations within the EU is that ethnic divisions in Macedonia will diminish and give way to a stronger European identity. However, the reform process faces challenges. For example, rapid decentralization has failed to provide appropriate training for officials in the newly designed local governments. Moreover, many of the new municipalities have been created without consideration for their economic sustainability. In addressing ethnic issues, the government has fallen short in purging the judicial system of corruption and lacks the capacity to handle the overwhelming number of cases brought to court. Other areas, such as the transformation of the agricultural sector, have also lagged behind.

Public support in favor of joining the EU has remained overwhelmingly high among 96 percent of the population. Seventy percent of those supporters believe that EU membership should be a national priority. Most political parties are united in their support of membership and this common project promotes stability in Macedonia.

MOLDOVA

For Moldova, the poorest country in Europe, integration with the EU has been a priority and main driving force behind the reform process. President Vladimir Voronin has stressed the importance of a European future for Moldova since 1998 as he has reformed the ruling communist party and distanced himself from Russia. Despite the strong will of the Moldovan ruling elite to join the EU, the country's political, territorial, ethnic and economic problems make the prospect of EU membership distant and elusive. President Voronin has continuously stressed that Moldova cannot bat-

tle its problems without Western help.

Moldova's partnership with the EU began in 1998 with the signing of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Chisinau hoped that the PCA would lead to eventual EU membership. The EU has taken steps to engage Moldova within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and established a Moldova-EU Action Plan in December 2004. These EU frameworks offered both specific proposals and general recommendations to Moldova. A sign of an increased EU commitment was the first visit to Chisinau by European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who opened the new Delegation of the European Commission to Moldova on 6 October 2005. The EU Commissioner pledged to double allocations promoting reforms and democracy and to increase assistance for battling poverty, which the EU views as the toughest problem for Moldova's development.

Moldova lags far behind other potential EU candidates in terms of both economic potential and political stability; the latter is highlighted by the separatist movement in Transnistria. Candidate status is unlikely to be considered if Transnistria is not resolved. However, Moldova cannot solve this problem on its own and has called for both EU and U.S. mediation. Constructive engagement with Brussels through the Action Plan and a clearer path towards EU accession can help strengthen the government's commitment to democracy and reform and therefore weaken the separatist movement. As long as Transnistria remains a conflict zone, Moldova will have limited means to ensure stability and democratic reform and criminal activities in the region will persist. With the anticipated accession of Romania in 2007, the EU will find its border even more vulnerable to instability from Moldova.

SERBIA-MONTENEGRO & KOSOVA

On 10 October 2005 the European Union opened talks for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia-Montenegro, a dual state provisionally forged by the EU, pending decisions on final status for both republics. The move coincided with the fifth anniversary of the collapse of the Milosevic regime. Formal contractual relations between the EU and Serbia-Montenegro were only established with the opening of SAA talks. The Feasibility Report released by the European Commission in April 2005 concluded that Serbia-Montenegro had made sufficient progress to begin negotiating an SAA with the EU. However, the EU adopted a "twin-track" approach, according to which negotiations will be held with the union state, but handled individually through the constituent republics.

After a decade of violence and disintegration, the UN Resolution 1244 for Kosovo in June 1999 and the Belgrade Agreement on Restructuring Relations between Serbia and Montenegro signed on March 14, 2002 were celebrated as major victories of European diplomacy. However, since their inception, the two policies

have proved to be stop-gap measures that have postponed long-term solutions for the future status of Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Talks on the future of Kosovo are imminent and the moratorium on holding an independence referendum in Montenegro expires in the spring of 2006. Although the prospect of EU membership for all Balkan states has been the main driving force behind reform and reconciliation, international players must first resolve the outstanding status questions to afford political legitimacy to the process. Any ambiguity or indecisiveness by the Brussels could escalate Euroskepticism and marginalize the region.

In turn, the authorities in Belgrade, Podgorica, and Prishtina should play their part in ensuring that institutional, judicial, and economic reforms are properly implemented in order to meet EU standards. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague is vital for overcoming the legacy of violence in the region. The protection of human rights, especially with regard to the status of minorities, should also be ensured, while the handling of refugee issues should be noticeably improved.

EU accession is a long and rigorous process, which cannot be achieved by ambiguous state entities. European standards cannot be achieved without permanent, legitimate, democratically elected, functioning institutions, which are clearly absent in the Serbia-Montenegro union structure. The EU's so-called Thessaloniki Commitment, which asserts that all Western Balkan states may eventually become members, may be too vague and distant to serve as any inspiration in the short-term.

TURKEY

Official relations between Turkey and the EU date back to 1959 when Turkey applied for association to the European Economic Community (EEC) and its application was accepted. The resulting Association Agreement, the so-called Ankara Agreement, was signed in September 1963. The main element of the Association Agreement was the establishment of a Customs Union in three stages. In April 1987, Turkey applied for full EEC membership. In 1989, the country's eligibility was confirmed. However, candidate status was declined due to political and economic shortfalls, as well as concerns over the dispute over Cyprus. The process of establishing a Customs Union also slowed down, only coming into force on 1 January 1996.

In 1999 Turkey's status as a candidate country was officially recognized at the Helsinki Summit. As a result of accelerated reforms, in December 2004 the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 with the provision that Turkey recognize Cyprus, an EU member state from May 2004. Since the 1970s Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus instead of Cyprus. To fulfill EU criteria, Turkey signed the so-called Ankara protocol extending its customs union to the new EU member states, among them Cyprus. This protocol was sufficient for the European Union. On 3 October

2005, the accession negotiations began with a slight delay due to Austria's objection. Compromise was ensured by the British EU Presidency.

According to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in Spring 2005, 59 percent of the Turkish population favors EU membership, down 3 percent from fall 2004. However, public opinion in 14 member states out of 25 has been against Turkish membership.

The negotiation framework, issued on 3 October 2005, defined needed areas for improvement in Turkey, including zero tolerance in the ill-treatment of prisoners, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, women's rights, trade union rights, and minority rights. The rapid implementation of these requirements is essential. A further requirement is the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and Cyprus. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated that, "Turkey will be under ever closer scrutiny by the EU, by European public opinion and by member states."

UKRAINE

Ukraine's Orange Revolution accelerated prospects for deeper association and even for EU accession. The country's EU aspirations were evident in President Viktor Yushchenko's platform, which called for increased engagement with the EU and the United States and for the initiation of necessary reforms. Ukraine's new Prime Minister, Yuriy Yekhanurov, has pledged to boost EU-Ukraine relations and to speed up economic and political reforms. However, the country still lacks the status of a market economy and has one of the lowest per capita GDPs in Europe (only 6000 USD). Combined with high corruption and crime rates, EU membership for Ukraine seems a distant prospect.

Ukraine is a priority partner country of the EU via the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which includes countries such as Moldova, Belarus, Tunisia and Jordan. Since February 2005 a joint EU-Ukraine Action Plan has been in place to promote cooperation with the EU and since 1990 Ukraine has received technical assistance to promote democracy and a market economy via the TACIS program. The EU has also pledged support for Ukraine's WTO membership, signaling a possibility for eased trade relations between the Union and Ukraine and even a possibility for a free trade agreement. EU officials have also indicated potential relief on visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens.

Despite the stronger partnership, Ukraine still needs a clearer prospect for accession to the Union. While underscoring the im-

portance of the strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine, High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, has not issued a statement regarding Ukraine's future EU entry. New EU members such as Poland and Lithuania have stressed the importance for drawing a path for Ukraine's EU membership and President Yushchenko has kept EU aspirations a priority. The beginning of EU accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 gave hope to Kyiv that the enlargement process has not stopped.

WHERE DOES EUROPE END?

By Ilona Teleki

With all of the EU's virtues of generating stability and prosperity on the European continent, perhaps one of its greatest attributes, and at the same time its greatest flaw, is that the European project has no set boundaries. Not knowing clearly where Europe ends has been a positive influence on the democratic development of the continent and at the same time, has the potential to be a negative force if future prospects are not more clearly defined.

For many, the French and Dutch "no" votes on the European Constitution in late May and early June 2005 signaled the end of enlargement for the European project. Symbolized by the Polish plumber taking jobs away from ordinary Frenchmen, the French "no" reverberated as a protest against enlargement. Fears of immigration and cheaper labor from the new member states coupled with shifting jobs to the east where corporate tax rates and labor are more competitive than in Western Europe, preoccupied voters. The subsequent failure to agree on the EU budget at the June 2005 EU Summit sparked a crisis in Europe, which led to doubts about the EU's future shape and content.

Before the May 2004 enlargement, the debate as to whether or not the EU should enlarge to include countries from the post-Soviet space was largely absent from the public sphere. Many analysts noted that this absence was deliberate to ensure the widening of the EU project. The European project remains a tug-of-war between those who want to deepen the Union through more binding institutions and those who wish to widen the EU and limit the potential for federalization. The public referenda on the EU Constitution served as a barometer of public opinion on sentiments toward both enlargement and integration. At the same time, the carrot of EU entry pushed each candidate to conduct appropriate reforms. But what impact will the removal of this key incentive have on the current aspirants, if only association agreements or neighborhood programs are offered by the Union? This question is also of enormous concern for the EU newcomers who form the Union's new border.

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