

**CSIS**

---

**Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1800 K Street N.W.  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 775-3270  
[Acordesman@aol.com](mailto:Acordesman@aol.com)**

**Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli-Palestinian War**

***Rough Working Draft: Circulated for Comment and  
Correction***

# **From Peace to War: Terrorism for Settlements**

**Anthony H. Cordesman  
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy  
Center for Strategic and International Studies**

**With the Assistance of Jennifer K. Moravitz**

**January 13, 2005**

## **Introduction**

The reader should be aware that this is an initial rough draft. The text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time. It reflects the working views of the author and does not reflect final conclusions or the views of the CSIS.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>III. FROM PEACE TO WAR: TERRORISM FOR SETTLEMENTS.....</b>	<b>1</b>
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND ITS PRE-WAR STRUGGLE WITH HAMAS AND THE PIJ ...	2
THE COURSE OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM DURING THE PEACE PROCESS.....	4
PATTERNS IN PALESTINIAN TERRORISM DURING THE PEACE PROCESS .....	12
THE CHANGING EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY SECURITY FORCES .....	13
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK.....	14
ARMING THE PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES .....	17
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES .....	19
<i>Divide and Keep Ineffective</i> .....	20
<i>The Arafat Problem</i> .....	21
THE ROLE OF ISRAELI SECURITY FORCES AND PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION .....	22
THE ROLE OF THE CIA .....	25
LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE .....	27

## List of Tables, Figures, and Maps

TABLE III.1: KEY INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM SINCE THE OSLO ACCORDS IN SEPTEMBER 1993 AND PRIOR TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN WAR ..... **ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.**

FIGURE III.1: PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PARAMILITARY FORCES IN 2002..... **ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.**

FIGURE III.2: OTHER PRO-PLO/PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PALESTINIAN PARAMILITARY FORCES IN 2000..... **ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.**

### **III. From Peace to War: Terrorism for Settlements**

If the Palestinians came to see the Israeli approach to “land for peace” as “settlements for war,” many Israelis came to see the Palestinian Authority’s approach to “security” as “tolerance of terrorism.” In order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Palestinian Authority and its security forces, however, it is necessary to understand the sources of Palestinian violence and terrorism and how they developed between the Oslo Accords and outbreak of war.

From the start, the Palestinian Authority faced major problems in developing effective security forces and fighting terrorism. The Security Annex of the September 1995 accords included specific commitments on the part of Israel and the Palestinian Council to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attacks. It specified that the Palestinian Police was the only Palestinian security authority, and that it should act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror, confiscate any illegal arms, and arrest and prosecute individuals suspected of perpetuating acts of violence and terror. It also specified that the Palestinian Council would issue permits in order to legalize the possession and carrying of arms by civilians.

In practice, however, the Palestinian leadership often failed to meet these commitments, and Palestinian security efforts were poorly organized and had limited resources. Table III.1 shows that the level of Palestinian sponsored terrorism declined between the signing of the Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian War in September 2000. It is important to note that the number and intensity of terrorist attack attempts during this time never halted.

A total of 140 Israeli civilians and soldiers were killed between the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993, and September 13, 1995. These deaths included 27 civilians and soldiers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 62 civilians and 26 soldiers within the Green Line. Palestinian extremist groups killed a total of 73 Israeli soldiers during 1994, and wounded more than 100 additional Israelis – a slightly higher total than in 1993. At least 20 additional Palestinians were killed, and well over 100 were wounded in 1994 as well.

## **The Development of the Palestinian Authority and its Pre-War Struggle with Hamas and the PIJ**

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were the source of most major acts of overt violence and terrorism, and their terrorist activity continued throughout the peace process. These acts generally peaked at times when acts of terrorism could do most to block the progress of the peace process and drive the two sides apart. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority failed to act decisively and effectively to counter such terrorism and violence and at times, even sought to encourage or exploit it.

The history of terrorism during this period is summarized in Table III.1. The resulting combination of terrorism and the tolerance for terrorism had a major impact on Israeli public opinion, and threatened to bring an end to the peace process long before September 2000. Terrorist attacks during 1994 and the first part of 1995 shifted Israeli opinion against further withdrawals, and intensified after the beginning of 1995.

On January 22, 1995, two bombs exploded at a bus stop at Beit Lid, killing twenty-one and wounding sixty. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. Less than one week later, on January 27, an unidentified assailant wounded three Israelis near Netzarim, in Gaza. In another attack, an unidentified gunman killed an Israeli in Gaza. This pattern of violence continued in April 1995. On April 9, a suicide bomber, linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, drove an explosives-laden car into a bus near Kfar Darom in Gaza killing seven Israelis and one American and wounding thirty-four. Another attack on the same day near Netzarim left 11 Israelis wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for this second attack.<sup>1</sup>

While some Israelis accused the Palestinian Authority of encouraging these attacks to put pressure on Israel, it is far from clear that the Authority did so at this time. A U.S. State Department investigation of these events concluded that they had, “no information that incidents of terrorism were perpetrated or organized by PLO elements under Arafat's control during the period covered by this report.” Moreover, former Prime Minister Rabin stated during a speech on May 15, 1995 that, “Fatah groups under the Palestinian Authority headed by Arafat have not taken part in any murderous terrorist attacks against Israelis.”

The State Department investigation also found that Palestinian and PLO officials did denounce acts of terrorism as they occurred. For example, Chairman Arafat telephoned former Prime Minister Rabin to express his condolences in response to the Beit Lid attack on January 22, 1995, and called the attack a “criminal act that threatens the peace process.” The Planning Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Nabil Sha’ath, called the act a “criminal deed, which we resolutely condemn.” The Health Minister of the Palestinian Authority reacted to the March 19, 1995 attack in Hebron by stating that the Palestinian Authority “shares the grief of the families” of the victims, and stressed that no terror attack would stop the peace process. The Housing Minister called the attack on civilians “deplorable.” Arafat responded to the April 9 bombings in Kfar Darom and Netzarim, by stating he would “make war on the perpetrators of terrorist attacks who seek to thwart the peace process.”

The Palestinian Authority’s words, however, were not an adequate substitute for action. Like Israel’s continuing expansion of its settlements, each attack by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad undermined the peace process. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority was slow to recognize that it either had to match its words with action or see Israeli support of the peace process come to a halt. A particularly bloody terrorist attack on Israeli civilians on April 9, 1995, was one early catalyst in this process.<sup>2</sup> Israel reacted by making it clear that the peace process could only continue as long as the Palestinian Authority improved the quality of its security options and publicly and consistently cracked down on violent movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel threatened to enforce prolonged travel bans in Gaza and the West Bank that affected tens of thousands of Palestinian jobs and businesses – even partial bans cost Gaza nearly \$1.5 million a day.<sup>3</sup>

According to an annual survey of Israeli public opinion by the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies that makes respondents select either peace talks or bolstering military power as the best way to strengthen Israeli national security, 1995 was the first time since 1986 that a majority of respondents—approximately 60%—chose increasing military power over peace talks. By comparison, each year from 1996 through 2000 a clear majority of respondents again favored peace talks over bolstering the military. It was not until 2001, a year into the current conflict, that a majority again selected force over diplomacy—and even then it was by a narrower margin than in 1995 (53% vs. 47%).<sup>4</sup>

This Israeli reaction cost Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad a considerable amount of popular Palestinian support due to the loss of Palestinian jobs and trade with Israel. It also led the Palestinian Authority to take a much firmer line in reacting to attacks. Subsequently, the PA's security forces and the Israeli security forces improved their cooperation and conducted extensive interrogations, quick trials, and expanded their prisons. These actions seemed to reduce the number of terrorist incidents, and weaken Islamic Jihad. These actions also indicated that the Palestinian Authority and PLO were capable of cracking down effectively on Hamas and the Islamic Jihad without losing significant public support or major reprisals.<sup>5</sup>

## **The Course of Violence and Terrorism During the Peace Process**

As Table III.1 shows, clashes between the IDF and militant Palestinian factions generally did become less serious from 1995 through September 2000. Terrorist attacks became more sporadic in 1995, although they still peaked in reaction to political events. A record high of 87 Israelis died due to related violence near the time of the inauguration of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Then, in 1997, there were 31 reported Israeli fatalities as a result of terror attacks. Nevertheless, the number of terrorist incidents increased again in 1998, leading the Israeli Foreign Ministry to claim in September 1998 that,

Although peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have been taking place over the last five years, terrorism still remains a major threat. Since the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO on September 9, 1993, the threat of terrorism against Israelis has dramatically increased. In fact, more Israelis have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the 5 years since the Oslo Accord, than in the 15 years preceding it.

...While five years have passed since the first agreement was reached with the Palestinians, and the framework of PA responsibilities was adopted, terrorism remains, and the number of its victims has grown. The Israel Government Press Office has recently released figures showing that during this 5-year period, 279 men, women and children have been killed in 92 lethal attacks carried out against Israelis by Palestinian terrorists. This is 50 percent more than the number of Israelis killed in the six years of the Intifada ('87-'93), and surpasses the number of those killed in the entire 15 years preceding the signing of the agreements.<sup>6</sup>

It is one of the ironies of the peace process that the pattern of terrorism declined again in 1999 and remained relatively low until Camp David and its immediate aftermath. Palestinian counterterrorism improved as did the seriousness of Palestinian Authority efforts. In addition, cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli security forces contributed to this decline in terrorism before the onset of war in September 2000. According to the Israeli Policy Forum, this cooperation was a main reason why terrorist attacks, particularly those sponsored by Hamas,



declined between 1997 and September 2000.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, according to the 1999 and 2000 US Department of State Patterns of Global Terrorism reports, “Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and other senior officials publicly acknowledged the continuing improvement in Israeli-PA security cooperation. . . . [and] credited the Palestinian security services for foiling a terrorist bombing in Tel Aviv in March and for preventing at least two attacks against Israeli civilians in October [1999]”; and , in early 2000, “PA and Israeli security forces disrupted Hamas networks that were planning several large-scale anti-Israeli attacks. . . . designed to inflict mass casualties, including the bombing of a high-rise building in Jerusalem.”<sup>8</sup> Thus, the PA’s active cooperation with Israel in developing leads on the PIJ and Hamas notably disrupted these groups’ activities during this time.

Between 1998 and September 2000, Palestinian security forces unilaterally preempted numerous terrorist attacks, “sought more actively to develop leads about Hamas and PIJ activity. . . to disrupt the groups’ activities,” and arrested dozens of the groups’ members, including several key leaders.<sup>9</sup> According to a report by the Israeli Policy Forum in 1999, some Israeli officials accepted that much of the Palestinian security forces previous ineffectiveness was due to inexperience, and they recognized these autonomous improvements in the Palestinian security forces’ efforts and abilities.<sup>10</sup>

Tragically these positive trends towards mutual security in 1999 and early-mid 2000 were reversed by the outbreak of the Israeli-Palestinian war on September 29, 2000. In the very early stages of the fighting, “contacts between security officials from both sides were cut and replaced with angry accusations. Israel said Palestinian security agents were often involved in attacks on Israelis, while Palestinians complained that Israel used excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators.”<sup>11</sup> As a result, the outbreak of fighting was far more lethal than the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987. In fact, over the first two weeks of fighting, from September 29 to October 13, 2000, the same number of people were killed as were in the first four months of the 1987-1993 Intifada.

**Table III.1****Key Incidents of Terrorism since the Oslo Accords in September 1993 and Prior to the Israeli-Palestinian War****1993**

- September 12, 1993 A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suicide bomber crashes an explosives-laden car into a bus carrying soldiers at Sheik Ajlun in Gaza. The car failed to explode, and the only casualty was the driver of the car.
- September 24, 1993: Yigal Vaknin was stabbed to death in an orchard near his home in the village of Basra. A Hamas 'Iz a-Din al Kassam squad claimed responsibility for the attack.
- October 4, 1993 A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) car bomb is detonated in proximity to a bus on the no. 173 line. Thirty people are lightly injured.
- October 9, 1993: Dror Forer and Aran Bachar were murdered by terrorists in Wadi Kelt in the Judean Desert. The Popular Front and the Islamic Jihad 'Al-Aqsa Squads' each publicly claimed responsibility.
- October 24, 1993 Two small explosive charges detonate near the French embassy in Tel Aviv. There was no damage or casualties. A member of the Jewish extremist Kahana Hay movement claimed responsibility for the explosions, saying the attack was carried out to protest PLO leader Yasser Arafat's visit to France and agreements he signed there.
- October 29, 1993: Israeli Chaim Mizrahi was kidnapped from a poultry farm near Ramallah and murdered by three members of Fatah.
- November 7, 1993: Efraim Ayubi of Kfar Darom, Rabbi Chaim Druckman's personal driver, was shot to death by members of Hamas near Hebron.
- November 17, 1993: IDF Sgt. 1st Cl. Chaim Darina, 37, was stabbed by a PIJ terrorist while seated at the cafeteria at the Nahal Oz road block at the entrance to the Gaza Strip.
- December 1, 1993: Shalva Ozana, 23, and Yitzhak Weinstock, 19, were shot to death by terrorists from a moving vehicle, while parked on the side of the road to Ramallah because of engine trouble. Hamas claimed responsibility.
- December 5., 1993: David Mashrati, an IDF reserve soldier, was shot and killed by a terrorist attempting to board a bus on route 641 at the Holon junction. The PIJ Shekaki group claimed responsibility.
- December 6, 1993: Mordechai Lapid and his son Shalom Lapid, age 19, were shot to death by terrorists near Hebron. Hamas publicly claimed responsibility for the attack.
- December 22, 1993: Eliahu Levin and Meir Mendelovitch were killed by shots fired at their car from a passing vehicle in the Ramallah area. Hamas claimed responsibility.
- December 24, 1993: Lieut.Col. Meir Mintz, commander of the IDF special forces in the Gaza area, was shot and killed by terrorists in an ambush on his jeep in Gaza. The Hamas Iz a-Din al Kassam squads publicly claimed responsibility for the attack.
- December 31, 1993: Two Israeli men—Chaim Weizman and David Bizi—were found murdered in their Ramle apartment. A leaflet from the PFLP 'Red Eagle' group, claiming responsibility for the murder, was found in the apartment, .

**1994**

- January 12, 1994: Three Palestinian workers stabbed their Jewish employer, Moshe Becker, to death while working in his orchard. The PFLP claimed responsibility for his murder.
- January 14, 1994: Grigory Ivanov was stabbed to death by a terrorist in the industrial zone at the Erez junction, near the Gaza Strip. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

- January 29, 1994 A Jordanian diplomat was shot and killed outside his home in Beirut. The government of Lebanon arrested and prosecuted Abu Nidal Attacker terrorists for the attack
- February 9, 1994: Ilan Sudri, an Israeli taxi driver, was kidnapped and murdered while returning home from work. The Islamic Jihad Shekaki group claimed responsibility for his murder.
- February 13, 1994: Noam Cohen, 28, a member of the Israeli General Security Service, was shot and killed in an ambush on his car. Two of his colleagues who were also in the vehicle suffered moderate injuries. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.
- February 19, 1994: Members of Hamas shoot and kill Zipora Sasson, five months pregnant, on the trans-Samaria highway.
- *February 25, 1994: Jewish right-wing extremist and U.S. citizen Baruch Goldstein opened fire on Moslem worshippers at a mosque in West Bank town of Hebron, killing 29 and wounding about 150.*
- March 23, 1994: Victor Lashchiver, a guard at the Income Tax offices in East Jerusalem, was shot and killed near Damascus Gate on his way to work. The Popular Front claimed responsibility for the attack.
- March 31, 1994: Yosef Zandani, 28, was found murdered in his apartment. Near the body was a leaflet from the DFLP "Red Star" claiming responsibility for the killing.
- April 6, 1994 Car rigged with explosives detonates next to a bus in Afula in Northern Israel. 9 Israelis killed and 45 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- Yishai Gadassi, 32, was shot and killed at a hitchhiking post at the Ashdod junction by a member of Hamas. Bystanders at the scene killed the terrorist.
- April 13, 1994 A Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Hadera in central Israel. 6 Israelis killed and 45 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- April 16, 1994 A Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) car bomb is detonated at the roadside kiosk at Mehola, Israel in the Jordan valley. One person is killed and nine injured.
- April 20, 1994: Terrorists disguised as religious Jews murdered IDF officer cadet Shachar Simani, 20. Hamas claimed responsibility.
- May 20, 1994: A Hamas terrorist shot and killed two IDF soldiers—Staff Sgt. Moshe Bukra, 30, and Cpl. Erez Ben-Baruch, 24—at a roadblock one kilometer south of the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip.
- July 18, 1994 A car bomb explodes at the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA), killing 100 persons and wounding more than 200 others. The explosion causes the seven-story building to collapse and damaged adjacent buildings. Hizballah claims responsibility.
- July 19, 1994 A commuter plane explodes in flight over the Santa Rita Mountains in Panama, among the 21 victims are Israeli nationals, dual Israeli-Panamanian citizens, three US citizens and 12 Jewish persons.
- July 23, 1994 Two unknown Palestinians stab and seriously injure an American woman in the Arab quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. The assailants escape unharmed.
- July 26, 1994 A car bomb explodes at the Israel Embassy in London, injuring 14 persons. The bomb is planted by a woman who was driving an Audi car.
- July 27, 1994 A car bomb detonates outside a building that houses Jewish organizations in London. Five persons are injured in the attack.
- August 14, 1994: IDF soldier Ron Soval, 18, was shot to death in an ambush near Kissufim junction in the Gaza Strip. Hamas claims responsibility.
- October 9, Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) terrorists opened fire with automatic weapons in Jerusalem's Nahalat Shiva'a business district. An off-duty soldier and an Israeli Arab were killed in the attack. One of the attackers was shot by bystanders and the other captured. Fourteen are injured
- October 11, 1994: IDF Sgt. Nahshon Wachsmann was kidnapped by Hamas terrorists while hitchhiking. His abductors murdered him on 14 Oct 1994, during an unsuccessful raid attempt on

their safehouse in Dir Naballah by IDF Sayeret Matkal special forces. IDF Capt. Nir Poraz, 23, was also killed in the course of the failed rescue operation.

- October 19, 1994 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Tel Aviv. 22 Israelis killed and 48 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- November 11, 1994 Palestinian suicide bomber on a bicycle in the Gaza strip kills 3 Israeli soldiers. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.
- November 19, 1994: Hamas terrorists fired shots from a car driving close to the Israeli roadblock at Netzarim Junction, killing an Israeli soldier, Sgt.-Maj. Gil Dadon, 26.
- December 25, 1994 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 12 Israelis wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

## 1995

- January 22, 1995 Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bomb in Beit Lid junction in central Israel. 21 Israelis killed. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.
- March 19, 1995: Unidentified terrorists fire on an Egged bus near the entrance to Hebron, killing passengers Nahum Hoss, 32, and Yehuda Fartush, 41.
- April 9, 1995 Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs outside two Israeli settlements in Gaza Strip. 7 Israeli soldiers and one American killed. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad claim responsibility.
- June 25, 1995 A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activist detonates an explosives-laden cart near an I.D.F. vehicle, injuring 3 soldiers.
- July 24, 1995 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Tel Aviv. 6 Israelis killed and 28 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- August 21, 1995 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 4 Israeli soldiers and 1 American killed. More than 100 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- September 5, 1995: Daniel Frei, 28, was stabbed to death by a PFLP terrorist who broke into his Ma'aleh Michmash residence at 2:30am. His wife was also seriously injured in the attack and lost her unborn child.

## 1996

- Two IDF soldiers—Sgt. Yaniv Shimel and Major Oz Tibon—were both killed when unidentified terrorists shot at their car as they were traveling on the Hebron-Jerusalem road.
- February 25, 1996 Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs in bus in Jerusalem and at a soldier's hitchhiking post near Ahkelon along the coast. Kill 23 Israelis, 2 Americans, and 1 Palestinian. Wound more than 80. Hamas claims responsibility.
- February 26, 1996 American Arab drives rental car into Jerusalem bus stop. 1 Israeli killed and 23 wounded. Driver is shot and killed. Seems to have acted on own but Hamas claims responsibility.
- March 3, 1996 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 18 Israelis killed and 10 wounded. The Students of Yehiye Ayyash, a splinter group of Hamas, claim responsibility for the attack.
- March 4, 1996 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb outside shopping center in Tel Aviv. 12 Israelis killed and more than 100 wounded. Both Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claim responsibility for the bombing.
- May 13, 1996 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) gunmen open fire on a bus and a group of Yeshiva students near the Beth El settlement, killing a dual US/Israeli citizen and wounding three Israelis. No one claims responsibility for the attack, but Hamas is suspected.
- June 9, 1996 :Unidentified gunmen opens fire on a car near Zekharya, killing a dual US/Israeli citizen and an Israeli. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is suspected.

- June 26, 1996: Terrorist infiltrators from Jordan ambush and kill three IDF soldiers—Staff Sgt. (Res.) Asher Berdugo, 22; Sgt. Ashraf Shibli, 20; and Cpl. (Res.) Ya'acov Turgeman—along the Jordan River north of Jericho.
- July 26, 1996: Unidentified gunmen killed three members of Moshav Mevo Betar in a drive-by shooting near Beit Shemesh.
- December 11, 1996: PFLP terrorists shoot and kill Etta Tzur, 48, and her son Ephraim, 12, as they were driving near Surda, west of Beit El.

## 1997

- February 23, 1997: A Palestinian gunman opens fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State building in New York City, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors from the United State, Argentina, Switzerland and France before turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the “enemies of Palestine”.
- March 21, 1997 A Hamas suicide bombing on a restaurant terrace in Tel Aviv killed 3 Israeli women and injured 48.
- July 22, 1997 An Israeli Arab injures 12 English and Canadian tourists visiting Jaffa by trying to run them over and stab them.
- July 30, 1997 Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs inside the Mahane Yehuda bazaar, the central produce market in Jerusalem. 13 Israelis killed, and 170 wounded. Hamas appears to claim responsibility.
- September 4, 1997 Three Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. Four Israelis are killed and nearly 200 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.
- September 22, 1997: Members of the Jordanian Islamic Resistance shot and wounded two Israeli security personnel in front of the residence of an Israeli Embassy family in Amman, Jordan.
- November 19, 1997: Automatic gunfire kills Gabriel Hirschberg, 26, in the Old City of Jerusalem. No one claims responsibility.
- November 20, 1997 Unknown gunmen shoot and kill a Hungarian Yeshiva student and wound an Israeli student in the Old City of Jerusalem. No one claims responsibility.
- December 31, 1997: Yael Meivar was shot by terrorists near the settlement of Alei Zahav in Samaria. She died of her wounds six days later. No one claims responsibility.

## 1998

- January 14, 1998 A booby-trapped videocassette explodes at Israel-Lebanon border near Metulla. Intended target was a senior Israeli intelligence officer. 3 Israelis and 3 Lebanese wounded. Amal claims responsibility.
- Apr 2, 1998 An Israeli vehicle was fired upon near Telem, Israel. There are no casualties.
- April 19, 1998: Fatah activists kill American-Israeli farmer Dov Driben, 28, near Maon Farm, West Bank.
- Apr 30, 1998 A firebomb is thrown at the parking lot of the Jerusalem hotel in Amman, Jordan. The Jordanian authorities arrest eight members of a foreign-backed Islamic group, accusing them of being behind a wave of recent arson attacks.
- *May 3, 1998 A pipe bomb explodes in front of the apartment of three Arab students in the Mussrara neighborhood of Jerusalem. A fire in the stairwell is the only damage caused. Israeli police suspect right-wing extremists.*
- May 6, 1998: A Jewish seminary student, Haim Kermann, 28, was stabbed to death on his way to pray at the Western Wall in Old City, Jerusalem.
- *May 7, 1998: A Jewish extremist stabs an Arab man on his way to work in the Bet Yisrael neighborhood of Jerusalem.*
- Jun 1, 1998 Two terrorists ambush and fire six shots at an Israeli vehicle. No casualties are reported.

- *July 13, 1998: One Arab man is injured when a small explosive device detonates outside the Orient House, the unofficial PLO headquarters in East Jerusalem. Police blame the bombing on Jewish extremists.*
- August 5, 1998: Hamas attackers shoot and kill Harel Bin-Nun, 18, and Shlomo Leibman, 24, as they are patrolling the borders of the Yitzhar settlement in the West Bank.
- Aug 20, 1998 Rabbi Shlomo Raanan is stabbed to death by a Hamas terrorist in his home in Tel Rumeiyda, Israel. The attacker enters the house through a window and escapes after throwing a Molotov cocktail, which sets fire to the house.
- August 27, 1998: 14 people are injured when a small bomb in a garbage dumpster near Allenby Street, Tel-Aviv, explodes during the morning rush hour. Hamas claims responsibility.
- Sep 24, 1998 An IDF soldier was injured when a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) bomb explodes in a bus station near the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The explosion destroys the bus shelter.
- Sep 30, 1998 Fourteen IDF soldiers and 11 Palestinians are wounded when a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) terrorist hurls two grenades at a border police jeep in Hebron. The patrol shoots the attacker in the leg and pursued him into the Palestinian-controlled part of Hebron, but he manages to escape.
- Oct 1, 1998 Thirteen soldiers and five Palestinians are injured in a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) grenade attack in Hebron. A Palestinian from the Palestinian-controlled H-1 area lobs two grenades at the soldiers. One explodes close to where the men were standing, injuring several Palestinian passers-by, soldiers, and border policemen. The second hits two cars parked on a sidewalk and injures nearby Palestinians. Two border policemen and one soldier suffer moderate injuries, while ten others were only slightly hurt. Five Palestinians were taken to Hebron hospitals. The soldiers give chase to the assailant and one of them opens fire and apparently hits him in the leg. However, he manages to escape back into the H-1 area.
- October 9, 1998: IDF soldier Michal Adato, 19, was stabbed to death at Moshave Tomer in the Jordan valley.
- October 13, 1998: Itamar Doron, 24, was killed and a companion critically wounded when they were ambushed and shot by two terrorists as they swam in a spring in the Jerusalem Hills. Hamas claims responsibility.
- October 19, 1998 Two grenades are hurled into crowd at Central bus station at Be'er Sheva, Israel during rush hour. At least 59 people are wounded. Most of the injured are lightly or moderately wounded, though two were seriously hurt. The attacker is overwhelmed by several bystanders, who turn him over to civil guard policemen. Hamas claims responsibility.
- *October 27, 1998 . Mohmoud Majzoub, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad Attacker in Lebanon, is seriously injured in a car bomb assassination attempt. The car bomb also injures his wife, their nine month-old son and a Syrian passerby.*
- October 29, 1998 A Hamas suicide bomber targets a school bus carrying children from the community of Kfar Darom to a regional school near the Gush Katif Junction. The bus is escorted before and after by army jeeps. While transporting children, a suicide bomber driving an explosives-laden vehicle attempts to collide head-on with the bus. The driver of the leading jeep moves to block the suspicious car from reaching the bus, and the bomber detonated the explosives near the jeep. At least one person in the jeep is killed, along with the suicide bomber. Two passengers of the jeep are seriously injured. Six people sustain light-to-moderate injuries, including three young people and three children.
- *October 31, 1998: Khaled Kurdiyeh, a Fatah activist, survives an assassination attempt in Lebanon. The car bomb explodes at a Palestinian refugee camp. No one is injured.*
- November 6, 1998: Two suicide bombers drive car bomb into Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem. 20 people injured. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

- *December 2, 1998: Osama Musa Natche, 41, was stabbed to death outside his home in Abu Tor, a mixed Arab-Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem. Jerusalem Police Commander Yair Yitzhaki said that the circumstances suggest the murder was committed by a Jewish extremist, and speculated that it was related to a series of previous knife attacks on Arabs in Jerusalem.*

## 1999

- January 13, 1999: Sergeant Yehoshua Gavriel, 25, was killed by terrorist gunfire at the Othniel Junction bus stop near Hebron.
- August 7, 1999: the body of an Israeli, shot in the head, was discovered in a burned vehicle near Jenin. Hamas claims responsibility.
- August 10, 1999: Six people were wounded when a driver, inspired by literature on Hamas, steered twice into a group of civilians and soldiers at a bus stop in Central Israel. The attack occurred at about 7:55 a.m. and ended when police shot and killed the assailant.
- August 30, 1999: Two Israeli hikers – Sharon Steinmetz, 21, and Yehezkel Shai Pinpater, 26 – were shot and killed several kilometers from the autonomous Palestinian town of Jenin. Two Israeli Arabs affiliated with Islamist groups were later arrested for the murders
- September 5, 1999: Two car-bomb explosions occur within minutes of each other in Tiberias and Haifa at around 5:30 p.m., killing three Hamas terrorist bombers and seriously wounding a 73-year-old woman. The car-bomb attacks occurred less than 24 hours after the signing of the Sharm e-Sheik Memorandum.
- November 7, 1999: Three pipe bombs explode at a busy intersection in the center of Netania during the morning rush hour, injuring 27 people. Hamas claims responsibility.
- December 29, 1999: One Israeli soldier and 12 local residents were injured when a Hizballah suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into Klaiyat, Lebanon and detonated it near an Israeli convoy.

## 2000

- September 27, 2000: An IDF patrol escorting civilians was ambushed by members of the Fatah Tanzim at the Netzarim Junction in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists electronically detonated two roadside bombs as the convoy drove by, killing IDF Sgt. David Biri, 19.

Source: US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," various editions, Washington, GPO; Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Middle Eastern Terror Attacks," [http://www.ict.org.il/ARAB\\_ISR/attackresults.cfm](http://www.ict.org.il/ARAB_ISR/attackresults.cfm); International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, "Middle East Conflict Statistics Project: Incidents & Casualties Database," <http://www.ict.org.il/>.

## Patterns in Palestinian Terrorism During the Peace Process

A study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy helps to put some of these pre-war patterns in Palestinian terrorism in perspective. The study compared a period of 69 months before the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in September 1993 (December 9, 1987-September 13, 1993) with the 70-month period that followed (September 14, 1993-July 6, 1999). This study found that in the earlier period, there were 152 lethal incidents involving Israelis killed, or approximately 2.2 a month; and there were a total of 973 lethal incidents involving Palestinians killed, or approximately 14.1 per month. The totals dropped sharply after the signing of the Declaration. For example, in the 70 months that followed, there were 112 lethal incidents involving Israelis—a 27.3% decrease of 1.6 a month and 254 lethal incidents involving Palestinians killed—a 74.3% decrease of 3.6 per month.<sup>12</sup>

The study reveals that while the Palestinian security forces improved over time, there is only a limited correlation between the development of the Palestinian security forces and the patterns in terrorism. Drops in the number of incidents did not lead to similar cuts in fatalities, largely because of the use of larger bombs in attacks against Israelis and a reduction in intra-Palestinian feuds and killings. In the earlier period, 212 Israelis were killed, or 3.1 a month, and 1,236 Palestinians were killed, or 17.9 per month. These totals dropped strikingly after the Declaration. In the 70 months that followed, there were 287 Israelis killed, or 4.1 a month. In contrast, there were 391 Palestinians killed, or 5.6 per month. The percentage of Israelis killed by bombs rose from 2.1% under the Shamir government to 47.2% under Rabin/Peres and 33.8% under Netanyahu. In contrast, well over 90% of the Palestinians who died were killed by gunfire under all three Israeli governments.<sup>13</sup>

It was the political climate surrounding the peace process, not the development of the security forces, which did the most to affect the patterns in terrorism. The patterns revealed in the Washington Institute study show the impact of the rise in anti-peace Palestinian terrorism following the Oslo declaration, and then followed by a sharp drop in terrorist incidents as the Israeli government pushed for stronger security measures and the security efforts of the Palestinian Authority improved.<sup>14</sup> At the same time, there was a clear shift towards suicide bombings, and the drop in civilian casualties occurred at the cost of higher levels of IDF intervention and casualties.

- The number of Israeli fatalities per month rose from 2.7 per month under the Shamir government to 6.0 under the Rabin/Peres governments, then dropped to only 1.9 under the Netanyahu government, and finally rose again to 3.4 under the Barak government.<sup>15</sup>



- The number of Palestinian fatalities per month dropped from 18.7 per month under the Shamir government to 10.1 under the Rabin/Peres governments, then dropped to only 3.3 under the Netanyahu government, and rose to 17.4 under the Barak government.
- Terrorist bombings were responsible for only 2.4% of the Israelis killed before the Oslo Declaration, but 54% after the Declaration, reflecting the impact of anti-peace terrorist groups.
- The number of Israeli civilians killed dropped from 70.5% of the total Israeli fatalities under the Shamir government (103) to 66.2% under the Rabin/Peres governments (188), and then to 64.3% (45) under the Netanyahu government. Under the Barak government, the number sunk to 57.4%.<sup>16</sup>
- The number of Israeli military killed rose from 22.6% of the total Israeli casualties under the Shamir government (33) to 33.1% under the Rabin/Peres governments (92), and then to 35.7% (26) under the Netanyahu government. It then increased to 42.6% under the Barak government.

The Washington Institute study indicates that progress in the peace process did alter the pattern of violence; however, such progress did not create an underlying and lasting improvement in security or a continual reduction in terrorism. At the same time, it is also clear that stronger Palestinian and Israeli security measures did limit the capabilities of extremists, and that when both sides cooperated it proved possible to have both “peace” and a high level of security.

## **The Changing Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces**

It is still unclear how much of the blame for the Palestinian Authority’s failure to deal with terrorism was the fault of its leadership and how much was the result of a lack of competence on the part of its security forces. At the time, US State Department experts indicated that the Palestinian Authority security forces slowly but steadily improved their performance after mid-1995, although none of these sources describe any element of its security forces as well trained, properly organized, or professional. Some Israeli officials remained far more critical, and believed that the Palestinian Authority was still years away from developing effective internal security forces when the war began in September 2000.<sup>17</sup>

The challenges the Palestinian Authority faced were daunting, regardless of the extent to which it was actually committed to counter-terrorist efforts. It was tasked with converting anti-Israel paramilitary elements into an effective security force that could provide security and law enforcement for a secular Palestinian Authority. It had to simultaneously expand its capability to conduct joint patrols with Israeli security forces, prevent attacks on Israelis, disarm and suppress violent extremist movements like the Islamic Jihad, and prevent conflict between Palestinians. Moreover, it had to learn how to act in ways that would preserve the support of the Palestinian

people, and learn how to act in an environment where the Palestinian Authority was moving towards true sovereignty, and where the need to reflect more democratic methods, preserve human rights, and resist corruption and power brokering was becoming steadily more important.

During the period after mid-1995, the Palestinian Authority did make efforts to co-opt Hamas and the PIJ into the peace process. For instance, at a May 9, 1995 press conference, Palestinian Authority representatives publicly announced that they would license weapons for members of Hamas and the PIJ. And from 1994 through mid-1997, there were thirty-seven documented instances of the Palestinian Authority offering asylum to Hamas and PIJ members who had murdered Israelis and were seeking refuge in cities under their control.<sup>18</sup>

In 1998, President Yasser Arafat made overtures to include Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the new Palestinian Authority administration. However, both Hamas and the PIJ refused to join the new cabinet, on the grounds that they would not participate in any government that approved of agreements limiting Palestinian sovereignty, including the Oslo accords.<sup>19</sup> While Hamas leaders expressed approval of Arafat's desire to consult with opposition groups, this approval did not signify warm relations between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.<sup>20</sup>

Despite foreign aid and assistance from the US CIA, however, Palestinian Authority security forces continued to have problems with internal discipline, corruption, human rights issues, and infiltration by anti-peace elements. In addition, there was a significant risk that the loyalty of the security forces could be threatened or undermined by a collapse or delay in the peace process, and by being asked to take decisive action against fellow Palestinians.

## **The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and the West Bank**

The Palestinian forces deployed in Gaza and the West Bank that supported peace and counterterrorism operations before September 2000 are summarized in Figure III.1. The size of these forces in 2000 was substantially higher than in 1995, when there were some 16,500 to 18,000 police officers and security personnel, including 7,000 men in the Public Security Force, 4,000 men in the Civil Police, and 2,500 men in the Preventive Security Force.

Palestinian Authority security forces faced a wide range of other Palestinian factions and paramilitary forces that helped shape the collapse of the peace process and the course of the


Israeli-Palestinian War. It was the anti-peace Palestinian factions that were the source of pre-war terrorism that triggered the escalation on the Palestinian side, and did most to block the success of the peace negotiations.<sup>21</sup>

The Palestinian Authority had to build upon cadres that had lost most of their strength in the fighting with Israel in 1982, and most of their income after the Gulf War. Syria and the Lebanese Army then partially disarmed many of the pro-PLO Palestinian factions in Lebanon in 1991, and took away their heavier arms, such as tanks, APCs, and artillery (although Syria and the Lebanese Army left pro-Syrian factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) alone). The Lebanese Army continued these efforts after 1991, and conducted new operations against the Fatah Revolutionary Council in 1994. In fact, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon maintained tight control over the operations and weapons of all Palestinian movements based on their territory, and showed little interest in giving them real military competence.

It is scarcely surprising that progress in creating effective Palestinian security forces was slow and the security forces still had some severe problems when the war began. These problems were least severe in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority absorbed much of the Palestinian personnel and administrative structures that worked in Gaza under the Israeli civil administration, and steadily improved its administrative efforts in Gaza.

The Palestinian security operations on the West Bank, however, consisted of 13 different Palestinian Authority security services when the Israeli-Palestinian War began, 12 of which were official. Ten of these forces were under the leadership of Nasr Yusuf and the control of the Palestinian Police Force Directorate or General Security Service when the fighting began. These forces included the Civil Police (Shurta), National Security Forces, Preventive Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Military Police, Local Governorate Security and Emergency Services, as well as small elements like the Air Guard and the Maritime Police in Gaza. The Presidential Security Detail (Amn al-ri-asa), known as Force-17, and the Special Security (Al-Amn al-Khass) were both independent units that answered directly to Yasser Arafat.

**Figure III.1**  
**Palestinian Authority Paramilitary Forces in 2002**



	Presidential Security	Military Intelligence	General Intelligence	Preventive Security	Civil Police	Public Security
Total	500	500	1000	3000	10000	14000
West Bank	-	-	-	1800	6000	8000
Gaza	-	-	-	1200	4000	6000

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance 2002-2003 and discussions with US and regional experts. (Note that from 2000 to 2002, there was a major drop in Presidential Security and General Intelligence totals. The total for PS dropped from 3,000 to 500 and the total for GI dropped from 3,000 to 1,000.)

In addition to the officially recognized security forces, the Fatah Hawks formed during the later days of the Intifada. Commanded by Arafat Abu Shabat, the Fatah Hawks acted as the armed enforcers for Fatah—the primary base of political support for the Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat’s original group until the group was dismantled in a 1995-1996 security agreement with Israel.<sup>22</sup>

In 1995 Yasser Arafat and the Fatah leadership set up the Tanzim (“organization”) under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti to become the ideological and paramilitary heir to the Fatah Hawks. The Tanzim formed an unofficial militia for Fatah in order to help offset the increasing popularity and influence of the armed wings of Palestinian Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and to serve as a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority’s security services. Fatah exhibited only limited commitment to peace before September 2000, and has since become an increasingly strong anti-Israel force as fighting progressed.

As Figure III.2 shows that in 2000, there were additional pro-Palestinian Authority and/or PLO forces including the security, military and paramilitary elements of Fatah, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Arab Liberation Front (ALF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). Some forces such as the Palestine National Liberation Army (PNLA) still exist as cadres even though much of their manpower has been incorporated in the forces of the Palestinian Authority.

### **Arming the Palestinian Security Forces**

All of the Palestinian security forces were weak and poorly armed when the peace process began. The new “Oslo II” peace accords signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority on September 13, 1995, further strengthened the role of the Palestinian security forces in Gaza. They allowed the Palestinian Authority to deploy 18,000 men in Gaza out of a total security force of 30,000, and recruit up to 7,000 men from Palestinians abroad. The agreement allowed them to be armed with rifles and pistols, and possess 7,000 light personal weapons, 120 machine guns of .30 to .50 caliber, and 45 wheeled armored vehicles.<sup>23</sup> In practice, the Palestinian Authority built up significantly larger forces than the accords permitted by 1997, and subsequently continued to maintain them.

Under the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority were allowed to deploy 12,000 men on the West Bank, out of a total Palestinian Authority security force of 30,000 men – including the 18,000 men in Gaza. This force could have a total of 5,000 men recruited from Palestinians abroad. A total of 6,000 could be deployed initially to Area A and limited parts of Area B, with the other 6,000 to be deployed later. The force could have a total of 4,000 rifles, 4,000 pistols, 120 machine guns of .30 to .50 caliber and 15 light unarmed riot vehicles.

Under the initial deployment schedule, the Palestinian Authority was permitted to deploy up to 6,000 men, and increase this total as it took control over the seven largest Arab cities. The Palestinian Authority could deploy an additional 1,000 men in the Jenin District, 400 men in the Tulkarm District, 1,200 men in the Nablus District, 400 men in the Qalqilyah District, 1,200 men in the Ramallah District, 850 men in the Bethlehem District, and 950 men in the Hebron District (including 400 men in the zone under Palestinian Authority control within the city limits). It could deploy up to 600 men in the Jericho District, which were counted as part of the 18,000 men who could be deployed in Gaza.<sup>24</sup>

In practice, the Palestinian Authority built-up substantially larger numbers of men and weapons than the accords formally permitted while paying only limited attention to training them for security and counter-terrorism missions. There was substantial smuggling of weapons like AK-47s from Iraq through Jordan into the West Bank, many of which went into private hands or were given to Fatah, Palestinian Authority militias like the Tanzim, and other militant groups, such as Hamas and the PIJ. In March 2001, for example, a Jordanian trucker was caught with 130 guns and 27 ammunition clips at the Sheikh Hussein border between Jordan and Israel. The trucker had apparently conducted at least four successful smuggling missions prior to his arrest.<sup>25</sup>

It is nearly impossible to sort out the morass of Israeli charges and Palestinian denials regarding these arms sales and smuggling efforts and establish the truth. What is known is that Fatah and Tanzim activists were able to use anti-tank weapons against IDF tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in Gaza on October 31, 2000, although their fire was largely ineffective. It is also clear that the Palestinian Authority obtained some unauthorized artillery rockets, anti-tank rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, and possibly man portable surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-7.

At the same time, it is clear that these efforts only became truly serious as the war progressed. On May 6, 2001, for example, an Israeli naval patrol intercepted a shipment of approximately 40 tons of modern weapons on its way to Gaza. The weapons included 50 China-manufactured 107mm Katyusha rockets, two Russian 60mm light mortars with 98 rounds, 70 Russian fragmentation mines, and 20 RPG-7s with special sights and 120 anti-tank grenades. Thirty AK-47 assault rifles with 13,000 rounds of standard 7.62mm ammunition were also confiscated. The shipment's most problematic weapons included four Strela-2 (SA-7 'Grail') SAM launchers capable of threatening civilian aircraft during take-off or landing.<sup>26</sup>

## **The Development of Major Elements of the Palestinian Security Forces**

The Palestinian security forces suffered from a number of continuing handicaps during the time of the peace process. First, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership never fully rejected armed force, and tolerated and exploited terrorism as a fallback position and lever against Israel. Second, Arafat divided the security forces into competing factions he could personally control and made no real effort to create a coherent structure that could be efficient or part of a state system. Third, the security forces were headed by outsiders or "Tunisians," rather than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Many of those living in the West Bank and Gaza had spent their lifetime committed to armed struggle with Israel, and found it difficult to change. And, the various security services had to recruit large numbers of young men from within the West Bank and Gaza, many of who had been radicalized by the first Intifada, and had only a tenuous commitment to the peace process.

Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the development of the individual security forces was slow and varied according to element. The services in Gaza and the West Bank were placed under the direction of the General Security Service (GSS), an umbrella organization that coordinates and maintains ten Palestinian security services, as well as nine administrative departments, from two separate headquarters. The GSS, together with the Special Security Force (SSF) and the Presidential Security Force ('Force-17'), constituted the Palestinian Security Services (PSS).

The National Security Force (NSF) became the largest security service, responsible for missions along the borders of Area A and inside cities, including Israeli-Palestinian Joint Patrols

and checkpoints at city limits. Key elements of the force were formed largely out of elements of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and Fatah forces, based throughout the world. In September 2000, the force consisted of four brigades (three of which were headquartered in Gaza), numbering 8,500 personnel. The force had 3,500 personnel stationed in the West Bank, divided into eight units stationed in different cities. The NSF's commander-in-chief, Abd el-Razek el-Majiada, was headquartered in Gaza. General Hajj Ismail, who operated autonomously, was the West Bank commander of the NSF.<sup>27</sup>

The Civil Police Force became the main law enforcement tool in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and was responsible for ordinary police functions, such as directing traffic, arresting common criminals, and keeping public order. It employed some 12,200 officers in both the West Bank and Gaza and could deploy its forces in twenty-five selected villages in the areas of the West Bank known as Area B+. The Civil Police also headed a 700-man special police unit to handle complex crises, such as severe riots and counter-terrorism operations. General Ghazi Jabali was the commander of the Police Force.

### **Divide and Keep Ineffective**

What these various forces had in common was that they initially drew upon remnants of the PLA and Fatah that formed the NSF, had little cohesion, and had little or no training for their new mission – either in dealing with extremists like those in Hamas or the PIJ or dealing with crowd and riot control. Some training was received in Jordan or Egypt, however, the training efforts that came after the Oslo Accords also involved limited numbers of personnel and were slow to develop. They did not attempt to create the kind of force that could find the best balance between necessary operations and human rights, and corruption was a problem. These forces also included a large number of men who were more aging bureaucrats living on a PLO income rather than effective paramilitary fighters, and they initially had little money, equipment or training.

The regular police force combined volunteers from Gaza and the West Bank, including some former violent opponents of Israel like the Fatah Hawks and Black Panthers. It is scarcely surprising therefore that some members of al Fatah militia exchanged gunfire with IDF forces during the opening clashes of the war and its leaders declared that they strongly supported the need for the continued uprising of the Palestinian people. Some elements in the security forces



had divided loyalties and this made the prospects for enforcing a cease-fire or peace more fragile.<sup>28</sup> In the years that followed, the Palestinian security forces were also slow to train and organize for riot control. They concentrated on counterterrorism. As a result they lacked the riot equipment, security posts, communications equipment, and experience to deal with a major Palestinian uprising.

There were continuing problems in the command structure of the forces involved. Within the PSS, responsibilities of several units often overlapped, leading to street clashes, confusion, inefficiency, and battles over blurred jurisdictions. Rivalries within the various security and paramilitary forces were often tied to longstanding rivalries within the PLO and Arafat's immediate entourage. Coordinating the services was complicated by Arafat's insistence on personally directing and arbitrating between the groups, and exploitation of their divisions to ensure that no rival could emerge.

In addition, three groups of generals were represented in the Palestinian security establishment. The first group consisted of "outsiders" – generals who arrived in the territories in 1994 as part of the Oslo accords and did not actively participate in the Intifada. A second group was made up of prominent figures in the Palestinian struggle for independence during the Intifada. This group enjoyed popular support and some feel one of its members may be chosen as Arafat's successor. A third group consisted of officers brought to the territories by Arafat from abroad to command the most sensitive security bodies, primarily intelligence services.

### **The Arafat Problem**

"Divide and control" does not create an effective command structure. Arafat deliberately placed the security forces under the command of a heterogeneous group of generals, often at odds with each other, in order to prevent the formation of a cohesive general staff with authoritative power. In the process, he reduced the possibility that his power would be challenged but greatly compromised the various security services.<sup>29</sup> The security forces could never overcome the fact that Arafat had created overlapping groups that were highly political in character and spied on each other.

There was also considerable internal violence and feuding within the security services. The security services were as subject to family and clan interests as every other aspect of the Palestinian Authority. They also became increasingly unstable at their lower levels as they co-

opted young Palestinians into the security forces to keep them from joining the opposition. This hiring of low-grade personnel to create jobs and offer positions for patronage purposes helped to ensure the loyalty of Palestinian youth before the war, but it also made corruption, feuding, and human rights abuses worse and meant that many members had only a limited commitment to peace.

## **The Role of Israeli Security Forces and Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation**

Israel too faced problems in reshaping its security forces after the outbreak of the current conflict. While Israel was able to rapidly adapt its forces to the problem of controlling Palestinian movement in and out of Gaza, and securing its access to Gaza, key lines of communication, Israeli settlements, and mixed areas, it had difficulties trying to develop and enforce complex new arrangements with the Palestinian Authority in order to define the right of hot pursuit, and secure key roads inside Gaza, as well as the perimeter of several key settlements.

In retrospect, Israel's concentration on security and counterterrorism also led it to underestimate the political, economic, and social pressures inside Gaza and the West Bank that led to the outbreak of mass violence on September 29, 2000. Israel was slow to see the cumulative mix of pressures and frustrations that were building up on the Palestinian side and the IDF and security forces did not prepare to deal with a mass popular uprising, as distinguished from terrorism. They failed to train and prepare effectively for riot control and the outbreak of an Israeli-Palestinian war, and to be able to act in ways that minimized the use of lethal force. Israel sometimes pressured the Palestinian security forces to take hard-line action without sufficiently considering the fact that the Palestinian Authority had to keep its popular support and it often delayed implementing the Oslo and follow-on accords on security grounds without fully considering the linkage between such delays and the lack of Palestinian support for the peace process.

The members of the IDF and Israeli security forces that dealt with the new Palestinian security services initially had serious reservations about whether the Palestinians could become effective in conducting counter-terrorism operations. Over time, they felt that some of the Palestinian security and police forces gained experience, improved their training and equipment,

and set up more effective intelligence and informer networks; however, trust always remained limited on both sides.

The Israeli security forces came to feel that the Palestinian Authority only sought serious improvements in the Palestinian security forces when the growing risk that tolerance of Palestinian terrorism would lead to a breakdown in the peace process. There was some justification for such Israeli views. For example, the Palestinian security forces only began to take decisive action after the April 9, 1995 suicide attack on Israelis. The Palestinian security operation in Gaza and Jericho built up total forces of 9,000 regular police and 12,000 security police by late 1994, and demonstrated that a number of its cadres had at least moderate effectiveness.<sup>30</sup>

Nevertheless, the Palestinian security forces did benefit from cooperation with Israel as time went on. They established national, regional, and district security liaison offices manned on a 24-hour basis with special communications links. They established a Joint Security Committee (Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security or JSC) with Israel, with five to seven members from each side, which operated on the basis of agreement by both sides, and tried to develop comprehensive plans for the transfer of regional authority. Joint Regional Security Committees (JRSCs) were created for the West Bank and for Gaza, and joint District Coordination Offices (DCOs) for each district.

These DCOs were set up with six officers from each side, a commander, and five duty officers. They coordinated affairs in the individual districts, directed joint patrols, and reported to the JRSCs and the JSC. Joint mobile units intended to ensure “free, unimpeded, and secure movement” along key roads and provide a rapid reaction to any incidents. Each joint patrol had an Israeli and a Palestinian vehicle with an officer and three guards. The JRSCs, DCOs and joint patrols were supposed to share intelligence, and support joint liaison bureaus at the key crossing points along the border with Jordan. The Palestinian Police Forces and Israeli Security Forces were to cooperate fully in the areas of security and forensics. The PPF was also to submit a complete list of its policemen to Israeli forces.<sup>31</sup>

The various accords gave Israel some significant advantages in carrying out such activities. They specified that the IDF and Israelis could continue to move freely on roads in the West Bank and Gaza. In Area A, Israeli vehicles were accompanied by joint patrols. Israelis

could not, under any circumstance, be arrested or placed in custody by the Palestinian police, and were only required to present identity and vehicle documentation. Only the Israeli side of a joint patrol could make a request for identification on roads that were jointly patrolled.

New agreements were made between Israel and the Palestinian Authority as part of the Wye Accords in 1998 that built on the experience both sides had gained since 1993. The new agreements called for the sharing of intelligence, joint patrols on key roads, joint mobile units for rapid response to disturbances and terrorist attacks, and joint liaison bureaus at the key crossing points. The agreement expanded regional and district security liaison offices that are manned on a 24-hour basis and have special communications links. The Wye Accords of 1998 strengthened the role of the CIA in training the Palestinian Authority, and led to more stringent Palestinian Authority action in dealing with extremists and terrorists. They also created a more formal role for the CIA as an arbiter and buffer between the two sides. The CIA was not, however, supposed to be involved in an operational role and claims that it had not departed from advisory and liaison functions.

Then in 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum helped to remove a number of causes of friction between the Palestinians and Israel, called for full implementation of the Wye Accords. It also stipulated the two sides to act to ensure the immediate, efficient, and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement by either Israelis or Palestinians.

In addition, the Memorandum called for Palestinians to fully implement their responsibilities for security, security cooperation, ongoing obligations and other issues – particularly those called for in the Wye River Memorandum. Specifically, it called for a continuation of the Palestinian program to collect all illegal weapons, provide reports on the apprehension of suspects, and for forwarding a full list of Palestinian policemen to Israel no later than September 12, 1999. A revitalized Israeli-Palestinian Monitoring and Steering Committee was to review this compliance.

Nevertheless, serious tensions remained throughout the continuation of the peace process. The clashes between IDF forces and Palestinian security forces that took place after September 2000 were scarcely the first sudden outburst of violence. In September 1996, Netanyahu decided to reopen a pedestrian tunnel near the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Fighting between the

Palestinians and Israelis broke out for three days, leaving 72 people dead. This event was particularly noteworthy since it was the first time Palestinian forces turned against Israeli forces and began to fire on the Israeli forces.<sup>32</sup>

Joint cooperation also halted early in the Israeli-Palestinian War. On November 23, 2000, joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols were terminated after a grenade or mortar shell killed an Israeli officer at a DCO in the Gaza Strip. Israel suspected that Palestinians within the DCO had cooperated with the attack, and Palestinian forces were instructed to leave the security office in Gaza. Within hours, the IDF submitted a formal request for the Palestinian Authority to remove all of its security forces from all of the DCOs in the territories.

Barak and Arafat agreed the next day via telephone to the re-implementation of the security patrols. However, the patrols never resumed due to the continuing violence. In fact, the following months saw a complete halt to the Israeli-Palestinian joint security patrols and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.

## **The Role of the CIA**

One possible lesson for the future is the positive role played by the CIA in helping to reduce terrorism by encouraging greater security cooperation and by assisting in the development of concrete means to implement joint security endeavors and other cooperative agreements. The Agency's role was further highlighted during the negotiations at the Wye Plantation in the fall of 1998, which culminated in a memorandum that set the stage for further Israeli redeployments from the West Bank and a strengthened commitment to joint Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements. This training and liaison work not only improved the effectiveness and credibility of Palestinian operations, it also helped the Palestinian security forces reduce the use of arbitrary arrests and forces and to adopt more effective and modern methods of counterterrorism.

There are unconfirmed reports that Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. cooperation in counterterrorism was further strengthened by the formation of a "joint framework" to deal with terrorism in the fall of 1999. According to one report, this framework was established at the urging of King Abdullah of Jordan, with the support of President Clinton, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Barak, and Chairman Arafat. This effort has not been confirmed, however, and few details are available.<sup>33</sup>

Some Israeli officials opposed such CIA activity on the grounds it strengthened the Palestinian position. Even Prime Minister Barak initially sought to reduce the role of the CIA after his election in the spring of 1999 since he felt that Israel and the Palestinian Authority must learn to work together and feared that this coordination was creating independent ties between the US and the Palestinians that undercut U.S.-Israeli ties and limited Israeli freedom of action.<sup>34</sup> However, the CIA continued its efforts, and played a significant role in trying to contain Palestinian-Israeli violence after the war began in September 2000. The CIA was charged with continuing this role as part of the October 17, 2000 summit agreement.

In any case, the role of the CIA diminished in the first few months following the inauguration of George W. Bush as U.S. President on January 20, 2001. This shift occurred in conjunction with the new administration's decision to seek a less active U.S. role in mediation between Israelis and Palestinians. The Bush administration initially urged the sides to cooperate directly with each other, despite Palestinian appeals to resume the agency's role as a facilitator in the negotiations.

In June 2001, however, the continuance of the Israeli-Palestinian War led the Bush administration to reverse its decision. It dispatched George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Middle East. Tenet's arrival in the Middle East came at a time when Israeli-Palestinian tensions had reached a peak—a suicide bomber had killed himself and 21 young Israelis, and a powerful Israeli military response was anticipated.

At this time, a serious attempt to renew security cooperation between the sides was made, when each side reluctantly accepted DCI George Tenet's cease-fire proposal. The proposal called on the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership to resume security cooperation immediately. Concrete steps were to include the formation and weekly gathering of a joint senior-level U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian security committee and the reinvigoration of the DCOs. The Tenet plan called on the security committee to identify "key flash points", for which joint Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) would be developed, which in turn would address how the sides would handle and respond to security incidents. These arrangements broke down due to continued fighting, however, and little has happened since that time. Israeli and Palestinian security officials have since met occasionally to discuss a renewal of the security

cooperation, but these attempts have been overshadowed, and eventually rendered fruitless, by the escalation of violence.

The CIA effort nearly collapsed after September 2002 as the war escalated and the Palestinian security forces became increasingly involved in fighting the IDF. Israel began to openly treat the Palestinian security forces as an enemy, directed by Arafat, as part of what Israel perceived as his personal commitment to armed struggle and violence. The end result was that Israel then gradually destroyed much of the ability of the Palestinian security forces to operate, and created a growing power vacuum that favored Hamas, the PIJ, and the growth of radical Palestinian militias.

## **Looking Toward the Future**

As the following chapters show, the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has since destroyed many of the capabilities of the Palestinian security forces, and it seems likely that substantial foreign aid will be needed in any future effort to reconstitute effective Palestinian security forces. It is also all too clear that any future progress cannot be expected to be easy, much less produce perfection. A fundamentally unpopular peace or ceasefire will be unenforceable. Yet, virtually any achievable agreement will now create an ongoing risk that new terrorist attacks and low-intensity fighting between Palestinians and Israelis, or between Palestinians, will escalate to major proportions.

If the past is any prelude to the future, the Palestinian Authority's future ability to enforce security measures will be highly dependent on Palestinian public support, progress in the peace process, progress in reducing Israeli control over the Palestinians, and belief that the peace will bring jobs and economic development. It will also be influenced by the extent to which pro-PLO and anti-PLO factions—both from within and from outside the PA—will attempt to continue to pose a challenge and/or succeed to increase their influence inside the PA. As long as significant sects of the Palestinian Authority security forces continue to overtly or covertly support anti-peace extremists or insurgents, or maintain a willingness to combat the IDF, their ability to enforce security will remain compromised.


Thus, the Palestinian Authority's experience between the Oslo Accords and the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian War does illustrate the need for continued Palestinian reform. Far too much of the Palestinian Authority political structure was built around the influence of one man,

Yasser Arafat, who failed to make the difficult transformation from leader of an opposition in exile to someone who could both govern and be a statesman. Effective leadership and unity of operations is a key to effective security forces.



**Figure III.2**

**Other Pro-PLO/Palestinian Authority Palestinian Paramilitary Forces in 2000**



Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

---

<sup>1</sup> This analysis is based on US State Department reporting on the Palestinian Authority's compliance with the peace accords in dealing with terrorism.

<sup>2</sup> US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994," Washington, GPO, April 1995, pp. 15-19 and "Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998," Washington, GPO, April 1999; Executive News, July 13, 1995, 1544.

<sup>3</sup> Executive News Service, October 2, 1995, 1147.

<sup>4</sup> Asher Arian, "Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2001: Memorandum No. 60," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, August 2001, pp. 20-21.

<sup>5</sup> Washington Post, October 17, 1995, p. A-1; Washington Times, September 4, 1995, p. A-9..

<sup>6</sup> Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terrorism and the Peace Process, Background Paper," September 14, 1998, [www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH02lm0](http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH02lm0).

<sup>7</sup> "Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation Contributes to Terror Decline." Israeli Policy Forum, Washington Bulletin, June 22, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," 1999 and 2000 reports, Washington, GPO.

<sup>9</sup> US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism," 1999 and 2000 reports, Washington, GPO.

<sup>10</sup> "Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation Contributes to Terror Decline." Israeli Policy Forum, Washington Bulletin, June 22, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> Mark Lavie, "Barak, Arafat Agree on Security," Associated Press Online: International News, November 24, 2000.

<sup>12</sup> See the summary in Alisa Mandrel and Josuha Obstfeld, "Trends in Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987-1999," Research Notes, The Washington Institute, No. 8, October 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Alisa Mandel and Joshua Obstfeld, "Trends in Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987-1999," Research Notes, No. 8, Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 1999.

<sup>14</sup> Alisa Mandel and Joshua Obstfeld, "Trends in Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities, 1987-1999," Research Notes, No. 8, Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 1999.

<sup>15</sup> Information on the number of fatalities under the Barak government has been published as an update to the earlier Washington Institute research note on April 10, 2001. See Liat Radcliffe, "Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities during the Barak Government: A Statistical Overview," PeaceWatch # 317, April 10, 2001

<sup>16</sup> Information on the number of fatalities under the Barak government has been published as an update to the earlier Washington Institute research note on April 10, 2001. See Liat Radcliffe, "Israeli-Palestinian Political Fatalities during the Barak Government: A Statistical Overview," PeaceWatch # 317, April 10, 2001

<sup>17</sup> For a summary of criticism and charges by major Israeli officials, see Near East Report, April 24, 1995, p. 54. These criticisms do, however, predate many of the measures taken to strengthen the Palestinian Authority Security forces after April, 1995.

<sup>18</sup> David Bedein, "Arafat, the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas: A Surprising Cooperative Relationship," Israel Resource Review, August 11, 1997

<sup>19</sup> Reuters, June 16, 1998.

<sup>20</sup> See "The Charter of the Hamas" Articles One to Thirty-Six, [www.womeningreen.org/hama.htm](http://www.womeningreen.org/hama.htm).

<sup>21</sup> The original peace agreement authorized 9,000 PLO police officers. IDF reports indicate that 14,000-17,000 have been hired. Prime Minister Rabin also authorized 2,000 more police for Gaza in February 1995. Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1995, p. A-2; Washington Times, February 8, 1995, p. A-1; Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 1995, p. 7.

<sup>22</sup> Steve Rodan, "Fatah Hawks Watch and Wait," Jerusalem Post, February 14, 1994, pg. 7; International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Fatah Tanzim," Profiles of International Terrorist Organizations, [http://www.ict.org.il/inter\\_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=82](http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=82), accessed July 9, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Summary text of peace accords, US State Department; Israeli government Internet data base, accessed October, 1995; information sheets provided by the Palestinian Authority; Washington Post, September 27, 1995, p. A-27; Jane's Intelligence Review, February, 1994, pp. 69-70; Washington Times, September 28, 1995, p. A-13.

<sup>24</sup> Summary text of peace accords, US State Department; Israeli government Internet data base, accessed October, 1995; information sheets provided by the Palestinian Authority; Washington Post, September 27, 1995, p. A-27; Jane's Intelligence Review, February, 1994, pp. 69-70; Washington Times, September 28, 1995, p. A-13.

<sup>25</sup> Nomi Morris, "Palestinians say they have Weapons, Patience for Long War; Israelis Suspect Arms being Smuggled through Egypt, Jordan," Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, April 29, 2001, p. 19A

---

<sup>26</sup> David Eshel, "Israel Intercepts Strela-2 Shipment," Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1, 2001

<sup>27</sup> Avner Avrahami, "The Powers That Be," Ha'aretz (On-line Weekend Edition), June 7, 2001

<sup>28</sup> Lahoud, Lamia. "Tanzim Leader: The Intifada must go on" Jerusalem Post November 6, 2000

<sup>29</sup> Luft, Gal. "The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army." *Washington Institute Research Memorandum No. 36*. November, 1998.

<sup>30</sup> discussions with US and Israeli experts; Philadelphia Inquirer, July 28, 1995, p., A-23.

<sup>31</sup> Text of the Wye River Memorandum, US Information Agency web pages, accessed March 1, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Calgary Herald, September 27, 1996, p. D1; The Boston Globe, September 29, 1996, p. A1; New York Times, September 29, 1996, A-12.

<sup>33</sup> Mideast Mirror, October 1, 1999, Israeli Section.

<sup>34</sup> See Reuters, November 16, 1999, 0837.