# HARMONIZING THE EVOLUTION

*of*

# U.S. AND RUSSIAN DEFENSE POLICIES

*Center for Strategic and International Studies*
*Washington, D.C.*
*&*
*Council on Foreign and Defense Policy*
*Moscow*

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# About the Project

Early this year the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow launched a study on the evolving U.S. and Russian defense policies. A joint steering group prepared this report in close and frequent consultation with senior officials and military officers in the U.S. Department of Defense and in the Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense. As much as possible, the recommendations in this report seek to reflect a potential consensus among officials in both capitals who are responsible for preparing long-term defense policy. Final responsibility for the text of this report, however, rests with the nongovernmental members of the Steering Group.

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*—F.C.I. and S.A.K.*
*Washington, D.C., and Moscow*
*November 22, 1993*

# Contents

# Acknowledgments

Work on this report was started by two separate groups, one in Washington led by Fred C. Iklé and John D. Steinbruner, the other in Moscow led by Sergei A. Karaganov and Gen. Vladimir N. Lobov (Ret.). Subsequently, members of the U.S.-Russian Steering Group met with defense officials in Washington, D.C., and in Moscow to produce an integrated draft. At a meeting held on October 30–31 at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, the Steering Group was joined by senior defense officials and acting military officers from both the United States and Russia to formulate the agreed recommendations. The hospitality of the U.S. Naval Academy is gratefully acknowledged.

A list of essential contributors would extend well beyond the membership of the Steering Group. Owen Harries, editor of the *National Interest*, helped to articulate key ideas and has greatly enhanced the quality of this report. Alex Nacht, a research assistant at CSIS, has provided critical support throughout the project and succeeded admirably in keeping principals in Moscow and Washington coordinated and all participants constructively engaged. Ambassador Philip Merrill and Maj. Gen. Nicholas S. H. Krawciw (U.S. Army, Ret.) brought to the project a better understanding of related defense interests among other key countries.

The most important contributors, however, cannot be acknowledged by name. Without the active participation of presently serving senior defense officials and military officers in both countries, this report would have been just one more academic study. Yet had these officials and officers become formally identified as coauthors, our recommendations could not have departed from previously established policies. Merely to project cold war defense policies into the future was not the purpose of this endeavor. Our goal was to encourage our two governments to take advantage of the present, fluid period in U.S.-Russian relations to build a vastly improved security system between our two countries.

# Summary

Over the past two years the creation of a strategic partnership between the United States and Russia has been repeatedly endorsed by leading officials of both countries, and the idea of such a cooperative relationship now enjoys wide support among Americans and Russians alike. The two military establishments have already taken great strides in moving away from cold war hostility. But we still have much work to do.

1. In particular, and most urgently, fundamental changes in the defense policies of our two nations are needed to overcome the dangerous legacy of the long strategic confrontation. That legacy includes the existence of enormous nuclear arsenals; military forces whose structure and equipment are still designed for a global "East-West" war; and a conceptual framework for nuclear strategy and some aspects of arms control that, at best, serve to stabilize, rather than end, an adversarial bilateral relationship.

   Moreover, lingering suspicions, prejudices, and real substantive differences will, if left unaddressed, jeopardize any new partnership.

   - **The U.S.-Russian strategic partnership cannot be realized without a sustained effort by the two countries' military establishments to reshape their defense policies so as to curtail, step by step, the vestiges of their preparations for continued enmity and to create expanding opportunities for mutual military support.**

2. Defense policies reflect a nation's foreign policies and military aspects of national interest. U.S. and Russian defense policies can be harmonized only to the degree that rapport is achieved in the definition of their respective national interests. Although common interests should provide the foundation for the new strategic partnership, it is also important to recognize the remaining potential for conflicts—not all of which stems from the cold

war—and, to the extent possible, to minimize these sources of conflict. Both countries must work to achieve mutual recognition of each other's vital national security interests; failure to do so would undermine the prospects for a genuine partnership. It is also true that the partnership can prosper only within the wider context of political and economic cooperation.

3. Such a harmonization of U.S. and Russian defense policies should not be seen by other nations as threatening a "condominium." On the contrary: for the United States it will add to and support existing security alliances; for Russia it can enhance peaceful relations with former Soviet republics and other neighboring states.

   - Indeed, the harmonization of the U.S. and Russian defense policies can provide the military backbone for a larger security structure. This might take the form of a security association among the United States and the other NATO members plus Russia, Japan, and eastern Europe. Gradually, such an association might expand to include China and other powers. It is important that the U.S.-Russian military cooperation not be confined to the European–North Atlantic area, but serve to enhance the security of Japan and other Pacific nations. Any eastward expansion of NATO that would exclude Russia would be detrimental to the harmonization of U.S. and Russian defense policies, and this potential harm should be taken into account. It is crucial that the U.S.-Russian partnership itself reflect a common interest in preserving the independence of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

4. The overall relationship between our two countries will, of course, depend on political developments within the Russian Federation and within and among the former Soviet republics, as well as on the evolving foreign policy of the United States. Adverse political developments, in and by themselves, could doom the prospects of a strategic partnership.

   - That should not obscure the fact, however, that the U.S.-Russian military relationship has its own dynamic. The sheer capabilities and latent threats inherent in the military

establishments of the two countries are bound to have a strong influence on future choices regarding weaponry and forces. The threat from nuclear arms, in particular, has the potential either to command a united U.S.-Russian approach to global strategic issues or, conversely, to drive the two powers toward a renewed military confrontation (especially if traditional concerns about asymmetries in nuclear forces and their counterforce potential reemerge).

5. As the wherewithal to build nuclear arms (and other mass destruction weapons) is spreading, many regimes may be moving to acquire them. Long ago, the Soviet Union and the United States came to regard nuclear proliferation as a common threat, calling for limited cooperation even during the cold war. Today, cooperation on a greater scale has become possible—and more urgent. United States and Russian policymakers have recently agreed to tighten controls on the export of nuclear and missile technologies. They should now seek to strengthen international controls on fissionable materials and to improve their safekeeping. But such measures are not enough. Because nuclear capabilities are likely to spread despite the best efforts of technology control, we believe that a further step must be taken.

   - If the world should someday be confronted with a crisis when a reckless, or terrorist, regime actually decided to use a nuclear weapon, Russia and the United States will need to be prepared to respond promptly in a well-coordinated fashion. U.S.-Russian military cooperation would be essential to forestall even greater catastrophes. Given the extreme rapidity with which further untoward developments could occur and the atmosphere of swiftly expanding dangers that would then prevail, advance U.S.-Russian consultations and some basic planning are, in our view, essential. Indeed, widespread knowledge about such U.S.-Russian preparation could help to prevent these untoward developments in the first place.

6. Whether or not the world's two largest nuclear powers will be able to cooperate constructively on deterring, or at least containing, reckless or terrorist use of nuclear weapons will also depend on their own bilateral nuclear relationship.

- If the two largest nuclear powers can end their old nuclear standoff, the risks from nuclear proliferation will be easier to manage. If, however, they fail in this respect and remain locked, even partially, in a "balance of terror," a reckless regime could provoke a severe global crisis, dangerously straining military relations between the United States and Russia. An uncoordinated response to a nuclear disaster by either power could trigger dangerous alert measures by the other and provide opportunities for the instigators of the crisis to provoke a U.S.-Russian confrontation.

7. The fact that nuclear weapons have never been employed since 1945 establishes a tradition of critical importance. During the cold war, NATO emphasized its commitment to use nuclear weapons in the event it could not halt a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. This policy of "first use"—intended to buttress NATO's deterrence posture—also had the unintended effect of becoming a principal cause of the enormous growth in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s.

- Russia and the United States, in cooperation with other powers, should now seek to reinforce the rule that nuclear weapons must never be used first, save as the very last resort in the extreme situation of an assault on the nation's heartland. The more a reckless, nuclear-armed regime expects a devastating worldwide response should it start to use nuclear weapons, the better the prospects for preventing the worst consequences of proliferation.

8. We need to rid ourselves of habits of thought acquired during the cold war. In particular, we need to remind ourselves that the mutual deterrence posture adopted during that struggle is not a sustainable, normal relationship between two friendly powers. Even with the START reductions fully implemented some ten years hence, our two countries would still have massive nuclear forces deployed and capable of destroying each other.

- Had these large, residual nuclear forces not been inherited from a different era, it is surely true that neither Russia nor the United States would now see any necessity to deploy forces of the same size and character against one another. Perpetuating

the cold war strategy of mutually deterring nuclear attack with missile forces constantly deployed for prompt and massive retaliation could, in the long run, result in the most dreadful accident. As far as the United States and Russia are concerned, considerations of safety should begin displacing deterrence as the first priority.

9. United States–Russian discussions have already identified measures that could begin to transform the cold war balance of terror into a cooperative relationship and help to overcome the risk of an accidental missile launch. Talks between the two countries on such measures should be intensified.

   - Specifically, agreement must urgently be reached on a coordinated, reliable U.S.-Russian program to take most strategic missiles off alert status. This program would serve to overcome the hair-trigger alert not only for the systems eventually to be eliminated under START but for all strategic missiles. The complex technical details that such a program entails must be worked out between the United States Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense on a high-priority basis. The agreed procedures might include separating warheads from missiles, partially dismantling missiles, and other steps that could be monitored and would not take years to implement. The aim must be to reach agreement on rapid implementation with clearly established milestones, and to do so without waiting for the scheduled START reductions.

   - Our force structures should be determined by our political purposes, not our political purposes or decisions determined by our force structures. When the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership will have matured, the purpose and posture of their remaining offensive nuclear forces will no longer need to deter a sudden attack from the other side by being ready to inflict prompt and massive retaliation. As a result of this evolution, defenses against aircraft and missiles may cease to be seen as a threat to deterrence stability. At such a time, the two countries may want to bring some of their bilateral arms agreements up-to-date; in particular, they may decide to amend the ABM Treaty so as to facilitate cooperation on tactical and strategic defenses.

10. Although nuclear issues provide the most compelling and urgent reasons for the harmonization of defense policies, other important benefits could flow from close cooperation.

    - Beneficial changes could be facilitated in the structure and size of conventional forces. This is a task both countries face, but it is particularly acute for Russia given the daunting problems it faces in resettling and housing large numbers of its armed forces.

    - The world has recently seen growing interest and activity in peacekeeping and peacemaking. As has now become abundantly evident, this area is fraught with difficulties. The existing resources and experience of the United Nations Organization, or of any one nation, are often insufficient, particularly when faced with several crises simultaneously. Through close cooperation, the world's two leading military establishments can carry out, or support, international peacekeeping operations because of their dominant capabilities for space-based communications and intelligence, airlift, fighter aircraft, air defense missiles, armored vehicles, and other areas of strength. The deterrent effect of such cooperation—particularly when contrasted with earlier competition that was easily exploited by third parties—should not be underestimated.

    - To the extent that the defense partnership flourishes, it should contribute significantly to the creation of an atmosphere conducive to greater economic and political cooperation, including Russian membership of the Group of Seven.

11. To make the U.S.-Russian military partnership more secure and effective, old habits of secrecy must be broken. Greater bilateral openness will not be achieved without a determined effort.

    - The U.S. Defense Department and the Russian Ministry of Defense should establish a joint task force on transparency to progressively reduce military secrecy between the two establishments. The task force could build on the data exchanges that have taken place and expand the scope, year by year, for bilateral transparency. Additional measures to overcome secrecy and avoid misperception must be taken. In particular, a blue-ribbon

commission, supported by the two governments, should be formed and be asked to report annually to the heads of state and the legislatures. The two legislatures also could hold joint hearings on the evolving strategic relationship.

12. Time is a wasting asset, and an opportunity may be lost if the harmonization of defense policies does not proceed with a sense of urgency. To overcome bureaucratic inertia, the process needs to be given specific targets to be reached at appropriate intervals during this decade.

- During the cold war, each defense establishment published annual reports on the state of the adversarial relationship. To keep the two governments focused on the harmonization program and to engage senior decision makers, it would be useful for the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Defense Ministry to issue a joint annual report on their progress in realizing the strategic partnership.

If Russia and the United States can gradually achieve a harmonization of the ends and means of their military establishments, they will avert some of the worst dangers for the coming decades of the nuclear age. As well, if this new military partnership can be harnessed to other peacekeeping structures in the world, the two great nations—destined by geography to have global interests and by history to have a common interest in promoting democracy and peaceful intercourse among nations—will have constructed a mighty bulwark for global peace.

# 1

# Prospects for the U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership

Official defense policies in Washington and in Moscow have been radically changed during the past few years because of the profound transformation of the global security environment. This adjustment of military policy and strategy, however, is far from complete in either nation. Significant further changes must be expected and are desirable.

The basic recommendation of this report is that these future changes should aim not just at removing the vestiges of the cold war but also at harmonizing the ends and means of our two military establishments. Over the next ten to fifteen years, such a strategic rapport will be one of the most effective ways to bring about a partnership that will truly serve the security interests of both our nations and provide a strong foundation for world peace.

Since the 1950s the United States and the Soviet Union have shared one overriding security interest: avoiding global nuclear war. At the same time, however, their defense establishments were designed and maintained primarily for one purpose—namely, to wage war, particularly nuclear war, against each other. Today, of course, Russia and the United States continue to share the overriding interest in avoiding global nuclear war. But they are now also beginning to recognize a much broader range of common interests and to develop common security goals and cooperative military policies.

We need to chart a course for progressively closer and more effective links between the U.S. and Russian defense efforts. This endeavor must be mindful, however, of important national interests that are not shared, as well as troublesome new conflicts that could hinder the emerging bilateral partnership.

The United States and Russia share many security interests that justify close cooperation. Even during the cold war, they cooperated in slowing down the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—efforts that have now been strengthened and have gained in importance. In addition, the United States and Russia now have a common interest in stemming the international and domestic instability that has emerged since the end of the cold war.

Most ethnic, religious, and small-scale border conflicts call for nonmilitary responses and are often a consequence of social tensions. In certain instances, however, diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian intervention will not suffice to prevent large-scale warfare. If international organizations are to cope with these problems, they require adequate military support. To this end, it will be important to foster close cooperation between the foreign policy and defense establishments of Russia and the United States in support of international peacekeeping. Such cooperation could range from early warning and assessment of conflicts to joint contingency planning and training for supporting multilateral peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations. The joint U.S.-Russian peacekeeping exercises agreed to on September 8, 1993, represent a major step in this direction.

It should be stressed that strengthened economic cooperation between the United States and Russia can help to bolster the strategic partnership. The economic advantages generated by an effective strategic partnership are threefold. First, defense budgets can be kept at a lower level. Second, the demand for military assistance to third countries will be less widespread. Third, mutually beneficial bilateral economic relationships will be unconstrained by security conflicts. Although these benefits would be especially significant for Russia's economic recovery, they could also be of great weight in averting an aggravation of the fiscal crisis in the United States.

Certain psychological and political considerations need to be addressed. Whether self-imposed or not, Russia's isolation serves neither its own nor the United States' interests. Russia wants to be "in"; and its full participation in the world community is in the interest of the United States. Russia, however, wants to enjoy a fully equitable position with the United States. These concerns should be met with understanding—not viewed through the prism of Russia's past, but greeted with anticipation of its likely future role. To overcome the trauma to the Russian national psyche, increased cooperation in the military field (where Russia retains global capabilities) could be ex-

tremely helpful. Russia is also interested in a close security relationship with the United States in order to prevent the U.S. security strategy from sliding toward unilateralism.

Finally, a special U.S.-Russian relationship could have a salutary effect on the United States' preeminent status within the international system. Otherwise, the burdens that come with acting as the "sole remaining superpower" might become too onerous for the American people, who may come to view this role as too costly and unrewarding.

The security dimension clearly remains central to the new U.S.-Russian relationship overall. This being so, it seems appropriate and necessary to build initially on common military interests.

But what of the legitimate security interests of third countries, which might suffer as a result of an effective U.S.-Russian security and defense partnership? Indeed, the converse case would seem far more plausible. The more solidly this partnership can be established, the fewer potential security threats would emerge to menace the United States' traditional allies, and the more peaceful the environment would be for the immediate neighbors of Russia and the United States. It is highly unlikely that the foreign policy of either Moscow or Washington would, in the future, favor a global U.S.-Russian condominium. On the contrary, the U.S.-Russian security link could become the backbone of a security community encompassing the Northern Hemisphere.

# 2

# Common and Separate Security Interests

Any harmonization of the evolving U.S. and Russian defense policies will have to take place in the context of the foreign policies of both countries while coping with the cold war legacy in weaponry, military practices, and doctrine. Despite the absence of any territorial dispute or fundamental political antagonism, the United States and Russia might drift toward an estrangement in their foreign policies and thus miss out on the many opportunities for mutually beneficial military cooperation. Or worse yet, under certain circumstances the two powers might become entrapped in a new military rivalry and arms competition—costly and dangerous for both sides.

In this chapter we shall address the risks of and opportunities for the evolving U.S.-Russian military relationship. These are likely to be created, on the one hand, by the interaction of the two countries' foreign policies and, on the other, by the cold war military legacy (material as well as intellectual). The risks and obstacles that stand in the path of a harmonization of the two defense policies are discussed first, followed by an analyses of some of the regional issues that are likely to prevail in Washington and in Moscow over the next five to ten years. In the third and final section of this chapter, we address multilateral organizations and global security concerns that are bound to play an important role in the U.S.-Russian military relationship.

## The Risks of New U.S.-Russian Conflicts

It bears repeating that the fate of the new relationship will depend largely on political developments in Russia and on how they are perceived in the United States. On the one hand, Americans responsible for defense issues are deeply concerned that a political change in Russia toward a more authoritarian (or more nationalist) government would bring a new Russian arms buildup and lead to a new military confrontation with the West. On the other hand, moves to isolate Russia by means of a *cordon sanitaire* of former Warsaw Pact nations (and perhaps even former Soviet republics, notably Ukraine) would spread the fear—far beyond Russia's ultranationalist constituency—that the United States is pursuing a secret strategy to weaken, or even dismantle, the Russian Federation. Combined, these developments might provoke a new sense of hostility and lead to new arms competition.

Additional and quite different types of risks are posed by the onerous military legacy from the cold war. Although great progress has been made during the last few years in coming to terms with this inheritance, further progress might now be slowed by the weight of vested interests, old habits of thinking, and, above all, the enormous accumulation of weaponry—especially the nuclear arsenals. Various factors still at work could recreate an adversarial relationship between the military forces of Russia and the United States. These include:

- Threatening and confrontational features of the nuclear deterrence structure inherited from the cold war—a structure that persists despite the arms control measures so far agreed to. Distrust and reciprocating reactions could be stirred up by moves to modernize elements of the nuclear forces, by strategic missile tests, by a high alert status of offensive nuclear forces, or by strategic missile submarines patrolling close to the other country's territory. Habits of military secrecy could aggravate this reaction.

- Long-standing U.S. defense policies designed for allies, and Russia's attempts to ensure its national security while its defense system is undergoing drastic reorganization, raise the question of the "first use" of nuclear weapons and could lead to new tensions regarding shorter-range (tactical) nuclear arms.

- Until the strategic partnership becomes more firmly established and mature, new U.S. conventional military capabilities, especially advanced long-range nonnuclear technologies (with new "stealth" features or precision guidance), are likely to be regarded as potentially threatening by Russia's military. It may be possible to alleviate this concern through understandings on operational and deployment practices.

- The implementation of the very complex existing arms accords may well lead to disputes between Moscow and Washington, and to disappointment on both sides. For example, the implementation of some of the regional ceilings of the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty, is reportedly causing difficulties for Russia owing to the changed geopolitical situation and economic pressures. In their September 1993 meeting in Washington, U.S. defense secretary Les Aspin and Russian defense minister Gen. Pavel Grachev agreed that further staff meetings will address these issues.

- Different approaches followed by Moscow and Washington to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can engender distrust and diplomatic confrontations (illustrated by recent differences between the United States and China, and by occasional differences between the United States and its European allies).

Almost equal in importance is the potential conflict posed by disputes linked to third countries and to the turbulent periphery of the Russian Federation.

- Russia wants to ensure that its interests are properly recognized by its neighbors. These interests include concerns about ethnic Russians and other minorities in various former Soviet republics; secure and recognized borders; clear legal status for Russian troops and strategic forces in the former Soviet republics; and Russia's continued role as the leading power throughout much of the former Soviet Union. Tensions between Russia and these neighboring states could escalate, which will lead to concerns—and political differences—in the United States about the appropriate American role. On the one hand, even a totally peaceful process of increasing Russian influence in the former Soviet republics might evoke U.S. apprehensions of an oppressive empire

being restored. On the other hand, Russian assessments might greatly exaggerate U.S. involvement in countries bordering on Russia and thus widen the conflict with the United States. A problem could arise if Russia, because of its predominant economic power (and perhaps more effective economic reforms), acts as an economic magnet for some of the former Soviet republics, leading to some type of "reintegration" into a new confederate-type structure. Should the United States become entangled in the complex relationships *among* former Soviet republics, this, too, could cause resentment in Moscow.

- Disagreements about arms sales to third countries and future disputes about the implementation of export controls are bound to arise. Because advances in military technology will create opportunities for new exports, both U.S. and Russian arms industries could be driven to upgrade the technology of arms sales. The tough international competition for arms exports often causes governments of exporting countries to launch special political efforts in order to clinch a sale. Given Russia's current economic difficulties, many Russian industrialists might regard such efforts on the United States' part as hostile acts designed to prevent Russia's industrial recovery.

## Regional Issues

The United States and Russia have the potential to be each other's most important ally in fostering regional stability and countering regional hegemonism. In many regional situations, in fact, U.S. and Russian interests overlap. Thus it appears important that the United States and Russia harmonize their policies in the regions viewed as vital to the security of either or both countries.

Russia has vital or important national interests in a number of areas, such as Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, as well as in the Arctic and the western Pacific. The main threat to Russia's national security stems from internal rather than external developments and is not military in nature. But as seen from Moscow, the regional security issues of greatest concern relate to the former Soviet republics and countries either bordering on the Russian Federation or lying very close to it.

Russia's immediate environment west and south of its new borders is highly unstable. This is more than a transient situation. The process of creating new nation-states out of the former Soviet republics has led to violence and insecurity. Russia is already involved, both directly and indirectly, in several low-intensity armed conflicts and may not be able to disengage. The greatest external threat to Russia comes from the possibility of these conflicts spilling over to Russia itself. They can generate millions of refugees and draw Russia into an endless series of small wars on its periphery. Indeed, they might, through their political dynamic, tear the Federation apart.

Russia's new neighbors hardly pose a military threat to it. For a number of strategic, financial, and other reasons, however, Moscow would prefer to include them in a new defense arrangement, either multilateral or bilateral. Whatever the ultimate result of these efforts, Russia would strongly oppose the participation of the new states in any military alliance of which Russia is not a member, or the stationing of foreign troops in their territory, or the use of their military facilities by a third party.

A special challenge to Russia's security is posed by the possibility of governmental collapse or national disintegration in neighboring states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. Russia's immediate concern is linked to strategic nuclear forces deployed in the other former Soviet republics. If Ukraine should take possession of nuclear weapons now on her territory, Kazakhstan might do the same. This could further strengthen aspirations for nuclear arms in India, Pakistan, and Iran and might well cause the collapse of the Nonproliferation Treaty regime at the 1995 review conference. In the long term, such a development would also put in question the nonnuclear status of Japan and Germany.

If Germany, Japan, China, Iran, or Turkey should expand their political, economic, and cultural influence in the various republics of the former Soviet Union, this could lead to antagonistic competition between those expanding zones of influence and Russia, which has substantial security interests in the newly independent states. And in the longer term, such a competition for influence could lead to military confrontation. Already today, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and various Afghan factions are edging closer to more direct involvement in the violent conflicts in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, to the concern of Moscow. To be sure, these neighboring states may seek to assist in the pacification and economic development of these areas. If so, their policies could be entirely supportive of Russia's interests.

As seen today from Moscow, there is little chance of any military threat emanating from the West. Many in Russia are concerned, however, about the possibility of geopolitical isolation. As of today, Russia is not a member of the G-7, the Council of Europe, or NATO. The perception of exclusion would be exacerbated if NATO were enlarged by including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Such an eastward expansion of NATO, excluding Russia, would be detrimental to the harmonization of U.S. and Russian defense policies, and this should be taken into account. It is crucial that the U.S.-Russian partnership itself reflect a common interest in preserving the independence of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe.

As seen from Washington, Russia and the United States now share a common interest in a peaceful order for all regions where they used to pursue different or mutually hostile policies during the cold war. The situation desired for these regions is often called *stability*— a rather overused term. In this context, *stability* may mean that the states in the region are not breaking up through violent ethnic strife, are not going to war against each other or threatening to do so, and are not launching an accelerating arms race or acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The prospects seem good that Russia and the United States will continue to recognize a common interest in promoting stability so defined. Such a convergence had already begun to emerge between the Soviet Union and the United States in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Today, the common interest in this basic regional stability is clearly perceived in both capitals. It motivates convergent policies, for example, toward North Korea.

At the same time, the common interest in stability is not unlimited. Neither Russian nor U.S. policy favors preserving the status quo in every region without any change. For instance, it is U.S. policy to promote Arab-Israeli settlements that might entail significant political and territorial changes. Again, the United States lends diplomatic support to Japan in its quest for a peaceful settlement of its territorial dispute with Russia. And it continues its efforts to accelerate political change in Cuba.

In U.S. eyes, none of these changes would create significant U.S.-Russian tensions. As seen from Washington, the instability in many former Soviet republics and in the relations of these republics with the Russian Federation, by contrast, poses the greatest potential threat to the emerging U.S.-Russian strategic partnership. The U.S.

government obviously has not formulated specific policy positions for the many possible contingencies within and among these republics. But one can make some guesses about plausible U.S. reactions to various contingencies.

For example, a freely negotiated political agreement between the Russian Federation and various republics for a peaceful economic integration (or "reintegration") would not have an adverse effect on the U.S.-Russian partnership. Again, while a peacefully agreed merging of Belarus and Russia would surely be examined closely by Washington and its NATO allies for its military implications, the framework of then operative arms agreements and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) arrangements could help to prevent such a change from creating a crisis in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship.

By way of contrast, it would be quite a different story if U.S. opinion judged the "reintegration" of one or more of the republics (and in particular, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics) to have been achieved through military force or any other coercive measures—such as support for irregular forces or intimidation by threat of force. One possible reaction would be that NATO would promptly offer full membership to eastern European states, thus creating a new line of military confrontation—and pressures on both sides for increasing military forces.

China merits special mention. Both Russia and the United States recognize the great potential of this nation. Every effort should be made to engage China in new international security arrangements so that its growing strength and sheer geopolitical weight are not perceived as threatening by its neighbors. Both Moscow and Washington want to see China apply its growing economic power to the benefit of its own people, not for military purposes.

A U.S.-Russian strategic partnership is not directed against Beijing; indeed, one of its major goals is bolstering peace and security in East Asia. In fact, China is more likely to follow a cooperative and constructive security policy if Russia and the United States are themselves effectively cooperating. It is desirable for the security both of Russia and the United States that China be included in international peacekeeping and become progressively involved in nuclear and conventional arms control. Practical cooperation with the Chinese military at UN headquarters and farther afield might help develop mutual understanding on strategic issues.

This is not to close our eyes to the fact that strategic prospects for China remain unclear over the long term. There is a real potential for an armed conflict in the South China Sea that would send shock waves far beyond Southeast Asia. A change in China's fundamental policy pursuing a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue would be seen by the United States and its allies as a most serious challenge to stability in the western Pacific. Russia's relations with China are now very good, but the long-standing worries over a large-scale conventional conflict between the two countries, though pushed far back in recent years, have not disappeared completely. The unrevoked territorial claims on Russia, for one thing, are keeping this awful specter alive. Thus, Russia and China could benefit from greater reassurance about ground force operations in the vicinity of their common border and some further arms control; agreements covering the size and deployment of their forces. Conversely, if China began to disintegrate, refugee movements and factional strife could spill over Russia's borders.

## Global Security Interests and Security Structures

Since the collapse of the security systems of the cold war, the international system has been restructuring and regrouping. This uncertain transition is intrinsically hazardous. The United States and Russia, together with other nations, have an enormous stake in the emergence of a world order that will support, rather than threaten, their most vital security interests.

One of the principal new structures for this purpose could be a security system linking the United States and the other NATO members together with Russia, Japan, and eastern Europe. Such a system could be expanded gradually to embrace additional countries (e.g., China) and be linked to other regional and global arrangements (e.g., the Western European Union, the CSCE). A Euro-Atlantic-Pacific security association or "alliance" could be based on the foundations of the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership, as well as the evolving economic interaction between Russia and the G-7. This association could strengthen the security role of the United Nations.

Among the existing security organizations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council might become a suitable institutional framework for planning, organizing, and executing certain peace operations, especially in the crisis management phase. (This council, referred to as the NACC, includes all members of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact members and the other former Soviet republics.) To be able to play a useful role, however, the NACC would need a stronger legal basis, a permanent political structure, and a professional military staff. If strengthened in such a way, its activities could include joint planning sessions, joint peacekeeping training, and joint exercises. Over time, such matters as concepts of operations; rules of engagement; host nation support; status of forces; command, control, and coordination; as well as logistical support and funding might be addressed and applied to specific contingencies. A forum rather than an organization, the NACC has played only a minor role in conflict prevention; it also lacks a military structure and the necessary cohesion for organizing peacekeeping operations. The CSCE might serve, however, to provide the legal framework and political justification for peacekeeping activities undertaken by an ad hoc coalition of national forces.

As for Russian membership in NATO, many defense specialists in Moscow and Washington agree that this is not an appropriate goal in the near or medium term. Conceivably, if the NACC does indeed expand its capabilities and role, it might become the organizational structure for a new, larger alliance. In fact, only a strong U.S.-Russian partnership could enable the NACC to become an effective organization.

A particularly strong and growing security interest that Russia and the United States share with many other nations is to inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The global spread of science and technology will continue to proliferate the means of making such weapons, either nuclear ones or new biological and chemical weapons. Using such weapons, a reckless government or terrorist organization could inflict immense damage on Russia, the United States, and other countries. The prospects for averting disasters will be far better if Moscow and Washington can effectively coordinate all their political and military resources to cope with this threat. If their cooperation remains confined to common diplomatic efforts and export controls, as was the case in the past, we must expect some serious failures of the

efforts to control proliferation. Among measures that might be taken are coordination in detecting the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehicles; the establishment of a common information network for early warning on possible use of weapons of mass destruction; and discussions on how to respond to the use of such weapons. Of course, preventing further proliferation, if this were possible, would be better than managing and containing it after it has occurred.

Under the international conditions that seem likely to prevail in the near future, most, if not all, of the industrial countries that support major military establishments will share some important security interests. For the industrialized democracies, the dominant security interest will be the efficient defense of their home territory. The question remains, though, whether some other powerful state may attempt to expand its jurisdiction by military means. Yet no major power can launch military attacks on other countries without provoking offsetting reactions, first in the region in which the attack took place, and eventually among an opposing worldwide coalition.

The core interest in territorial security shared by all countries imposes different burdens on the major countries with regard to ground force operations. The United States, and to a lesser extent Britain and Japan, are isolated from serious threat of ground attack. France and Germany are embedded in the relatively well developed regional security arrangements for western Europe. But Russia and China are more exposed in both respects. With respect to weapons of mass destruction (and potentially to long-range, highly precise conventional munitions), however, all the major countries are similarly exposed, with little prospect of being able adequately to shield themselves unilaterally by technical means. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, therefore, is a threat that can affect all countries.

After the lengthy exploration of the common and divergent national security interests, all members and consultants of this project concluded that, unlike in previous years, the common interests now definitely prevail. This change makes it possible to develop a genuine strategic partnership benefiting the security of both countries.

# 3
# Harmonizing U.S. and Russian Nuclear Strategies

The endeavor to harmonize the evolution of defense policies between the United States and Russia must focus on the essentials. To this end, the most important aspects of defense policy are those dealing with nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and doctrine, and operational procedures and maintenance practices for nuclear delivery systems. For it is through their intercontinental nuclear systems that Russia and the United States are still militarily engaged and—in the most awesome meaning of the phrase—still continuing to threaten each other's existence.

## The Cold War Legacy

Despite the end of the cold war, a residual nuclear confrontation persists. Even after the agreed, large cuts in strategic arms will have been implemented (reducing deployed warheads by 70 to 80 percent), the United States and Russia will still be physically capable of destroying each other in a single, cataclysmic act.

Without a determined effort to escape both the concepts and the material legacy of the cold war strategy, realization of a U.S.-Russian military partnership would be frustrated by a deadly paradox: Our two nations would continue to maintain large nuclear forces designed for use against each other because we would both fear that some future political conflict might turn into a new nuclear confrontation. Yet our two nations would want to stay militarily prepared for such a new confrontation because we both maintained large nuclear

forces designed for use against each other. Certainly, if the United States and Russia did not already possess tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and thousands of missiles, they would not build such massive forces today. As far as they are concerned, safety should begin displacing deterrence as the first priority.

The abolition of nuclear weapons is not a realistic option today, and certainly not in the coming decades. But a fundamental reorientation and restructuring of the remaining nuclear forces, *is* a realistic and important objective for the U.S.-Russian partnership. The nuclear relationship between France and Great Britain illustrates that two neighboring nuclear powers with forces of roughly equal size, each technically capable of totally destroying the other nation, can coexist without engendering fears of surprise attack or creating any sense of confrontation. One should not overlook the fact, however, that Britain and France are nuclear allies because of a common, and stronger, military opponent (in the past and theoretically in the future). If other nuclear states and large external military threats suddenly disappeared (or became much inferior to the potential of Britain and France), the two countries would reduce and make inactive their nuclear forces lest they begin to develop suspicions about how they are targeted. (An alternative would be complete integration and joint targeting, but this again implies common enemies.)

Considerable work still needs to be done by experts on nuclear forces and by strategists in both countries to develop specific measures for transforming the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The following points cover some of the principal topics for such a program of work.

## Managing a Transition during Which Two Contradictory Strategies Must Coexist

We need to recognize that the nuclear strategy that inspired the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and START I and II will not fit together with a strategy that would best serve the genuine partnership envisioned here. These arms control agreements were designed to strengthen the bilateral cold war deterrence of a massive, deliberate "first strike" (intended to disarm the other side). Yet it will be infeasible to break away quickly from the cold war relationship of mutual deterrence. The strategic transition will have to manage dangerous contradictions by developing new approaches that can lead to a genuine nuclear

partnership without creating fears of undermining the cold war "stability" of mutual deterrence.

A key objective of START II, for example, is the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle on intercontinental ballistic missiles). Yet this objective is of great importance only in a cold war context.[1] To be sure, the elimination of MIRVed missiles is a good thing in our new era as well. But if influential experts continued to take these cold war calculations about "first strike stability" seriously, they might mistakenly come to promote measures to improve such stability by: (1) slowing down the implementation of START; (2) building new offensive forces to take full advantage of START limits; or, most dangerously, (3) keeping forces on a hair-trigger alert.

Suggestions were offered in 1992, both by U.S. and Russian officials, for overcoming the confrontational nature of the two nuclear forces by deactivating missiles, taking bombers off alert, and changing targeting plans. To some degree such measures have been implemented. They can be supplemented by still deeper downloading of residual forces, taking a large part of them off alert by storing warheads separately from missiles and bombers, lowering submarine patrol rates, establishing permanent, mutual on-site monitoring of storages, strategic bases, command centers, and early warning facilities. Eventually the United States and Russia might reduce to a few hundred combat-ready warheads on several submarines on patrol, and to some number of mobile or silo-based ICBMs. While the two powers would retain a considerable, strictly controlled reserve uploading capability (up to several thousand warheads), their strategic capabilities would become broadly interdependent. The nuclear "barrier," which today still overshadows the U.S.-Russian relationship, would be progressively removed. Further analysis by U.S. and Russian experts and bilateral discussions are urgently needed to refine these ideas.

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[1] According to the theory about MIRVs (developed by U.S. experts, but subsequently adopted by Soviet experts as well), given two opponents that have roughly the same number of warheads, a "first strike" is more tempting if the enemy's warheads are clustered in MIRVed missile. For such a situation, abstract calculations show that a small fraction of the aggressor's forces can destroy a large fraction of the victim's forces. Now that U.S. and Soviet nuclear armed forces are no longer facing each other in the center of Europe, it is impossible to imagine a crisis where a *rational* calculation about MIRVs would support the decision to strike first. One can imagine all sorts of irrational decisions and mistakes that could lead to a first strike, but those would scarcely depend on the ratio of MIRVed to single RV missiles.

Solutions must be found to several problems: How could such changes be verified? What protection could be provided against one side realerting its forces (perhaps because of a threat from a third power)? How could the deactivation of SSBNs be verified without making them more vulnerable? Should ASW (antisubmarine warfare) activities be restricted? What should be done about the remaining shorter-range nuclear forces (tactical or "theater")? How important are further reductions (beyond START II) in the number of nuclear weapons? What methods are to be used to analyze the evolving strategic balance?

## The Risks of a "First Use" Strategy

The United States' nuclear strategy from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s relied in part on the deterrent of threatening to use nuclear weapons against an overwhelming Warsaw Pact attack, even if that attack were conducted with conventional weapons only. Even though this "first use" policy became increasingly controversial among U.S. experts, NATO allies strongly resisted changing it. It was modified only twice: with the "flexible response" strategy from 1961 to 1967, and the "last resort" modification in 1990. Even today, "first use" (as a "last resort") is still official NATO strategy, although it has lost its original, and only, purpose of deterring a conventional Warsaw Pact attack.

Declaratory Soviet policy has been to seek an agreement against "first use," and in 1982 the Soviet government unilaterally declared it would not use nuclear weapons first. More recently, military experts in Russia have advocated that Russia should now rely on the threat of "first use" to help defend itself, especially as long as economic difficulties impair its conventional capabilities. On November 3, 1993, Russian defense minister Gen. Pavel Grachev held a press conference on the new Russian defense doctrine. According to the new doctrine, he said, nuclear weapons would not be used against nonnuclear states that have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty—unless they were operating in alliance with nuclear states. But the doctrine said nothing, General Grachev noted, about nonuse of nuclear weapons against states with nuclear weapons. U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher pointed out that this Russian position appeared to be "not very different" from the NATO doctrine.

It is true, of course, that any nuclear power being invaded and facing total defeat would probably resort to "first use" at some point. Such a prospect may help deter aggression. In any event, purely declaratory policies can be meaningless or even misleading. What matters are the preparations for "first use" in terms of forces, operational plans, and military exercises. What would be dangerous and harmful for the future is a more ambitious version of "first use" policy that would require parity with, if not some superiority over, the anticipated adversary, or coalition of adversaries, in every aspect of nuclear strength.

During the first part of the cold war the United States followed this more ambitious "first use" policy. To give the "first use" threat a certain credibility, U.S. defense planners not only promoted better "tactical" nuclear forces than those of the Warsaw Pact but also sought to prevent even a theoretical inferiority in "strategic" forces. Indeed, the initial U.S. idea was that NATO could best deter a Warsaw Pact attack if it possessed *superior* tactical *and* strategic forces.

These concrete problems of a "first use" policy need to be discussed between U.S. and Russian defense experts if we are to avoid stumbling into a new nuclear competition. Such a new competition could be provoked by military preparations against a third country—preparations that included a new buildup in nuclear forces to achieve a "credible" first use posture against that country.

To avert such a deployment, Russia and the United States, in cooperation with other powers, should now seek to reinforce the rule that nuclear weapons must never be used first, save as the very last resort in the extreme situation of an assault on the nation's heartland. The more a reckless, nuclear-armed regime must expect a devastating worldwide response should it start to use nuclear weapons, the better the prospects for preventing the worst consequences of nuclear proliferation.

## The Role of Air and Missile Defenses

One compelling reason for viewing nuclear proliferation with concern is that weapons of mass destruction might come to be controlled by a terrorist or irrationally acting regime. Because deterrence alone would not be sufficient in such a case, both Russia and the United States are now interested in developing better defensive capabilities.

The Clinton administration has decided to continue the program started in the Bush administration to pursue options for new ground- or sea-based defenses against short-range missiles in order to protect U.S. forces or allies in a regional war. Air defense of the national territory, however, remains weak to nonexistent both in Russia and the United States—in Russia mainly because the breakup of the Soviet Union placed important facilities outside its territory; in the United States mainly because of a lack of investment in territorial air defense from the mid-1960s until now.

It makes sense to explore in common the interests of the United States and Russia in the possible development of, and cooperation on, future air and missile defenses and associated warning systems. Preliminary official discussions have already been held in 1992, and in September 1993 it was agreed to hold further discussions. Such cooperation, to be meaningful in the long term, will have to include arrangements for space systems.

In the longer term, having achieved a new strategic relationship, both Moscow and Washington will want to review the whole issue of tactical and strategic defenses. At the present time, both the Russian government and the U.S. government (the Clinton administration as well as a majority in Congress) want to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The Russian government regards the treaty as a restraint on U.S. space-based defenses and military space capabilities that Russia would find difficult to match in this decade. The level of strategic ballistic missile defenses is regarded as a key factor in the overall strategic environment. The U.S. government favors maintaining the treaty because (1) it helps constrain political and industrial pressures for expensive space-based missile defenses, and (2) it avoids the creation of new tension with Moscow.

In parallel with U.S.-Russian progress toward a new bilateral strategic relationship, the two governments should hold talks—first, perhaps exploratory, then, to negotiate an agreement—for a long-term, common approach to the ABM Treaty. Three objectives for such changes to the treaty might be:

1. First, to remove impediments to the development and deployment of defensive systems that could make an extensive deactivation (or de-alerting) of missile forces a safe and reliable option for the United States and Russia. Limited defenses could provide a cushion of security in the event that large parts of the missile forces are deactivated. A protocol to the ABM Treaty could be negotiated to permit cooperation in developing limited ballistic

missile defenses. Russia and the United States should examine the prospects of creating a joint early warning system with an integrated early warning center. Experts could also share their experience on protecting electronic warfare systems from false alarms.

2. Another objective in negotiating changes to the treaty (or its agreed interpretations) would be to make it easier to develop and deploy missile defenses to protect military forces and certain areas in order to counter new threats from the proliferation of missile capabilities. Russia and the United States, possibly with the participation of third countries, should cooperate in providing joint theater/tactical ballistic missile defense. Later on, combined U.S.-Russian theater ballistic missile defense units could be set up.
3. A third objective for the United States and Russia in agreeing to change the ABM Treaty (or its interpretations) might concern offensive space capabilities. Both countries might wish to reassure each other that their evolving space capabilities will not pose a threat to each other. To this end, an agreement might be reached on limiting antisatellite capabilities (ASAT) that would be directed against the other; exchanging data on space activities and the relevant plans of the two countries; inspecting space vehicles at assembly and launch facilities to check compliance with their bilateral agreement; and sharing more information on hazardous or faulty spacecraft.

## The U.S.-Russian Dialogue on Nuclear Arms

The radically changed U.S.-Russian relationship requires an entirely new type of dialogue on nuclear strategic issues. The main elements of such a dialogue could include:

1. Developing joint criteria and methods of analysis of strategic "stability." These criteria should stress the risk of accidental, or irrational, uses of nuclear weapons and focus on concepts of strategic stability that are not based on a confrontational relationship between large forces poised for "retaliation."
2. Conducting joint threat analyses and contingency planning to deal with crises arising from nuclear and missile technology proliferation.

3. Developing joint recommendations as to the structure and composition of future strategic offensive arms.
4. Sharing experience and carrying out joint projects to work out operational and organizational and technical measures to minimize the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to increase nuclear security.
5. Initiating additional joint monitoring measures to assure compliance with agreements on dismantling and deactivation.
6. Identifying methods to neutralize perceived threats as individual units of strategic forces change their readiness status, and holding joint training exercises relevant to such measures.
7. Creating a joint early warning (global monitoring) system to detect third-country missile attack (launches), and holding joint command and staff exercises. A missile early warning center could monitor proliferation of missile technology, to include testing, deployment, and use of missile systems. Such a joint center could also activate tactical ballistic missile defense systems.
8. Developing ways and means to protect the special computer software for processing data on the operational use of weapons; these could provide warning of missile attack.
9. Simulating joint actions in contingencies where a third country is using weapons of mass destruction: exploring ways to build up joint tactical ballistic missile defense forces; and engaging in joint testing of theater missile defense systems to this end.
10. Conducting joint research into (a) methods of holding computerized staff games and exercises, and (b) the special software required. Joint exercises could help prepare the U.S.-Russian partnership for a coordinated response to a single launching of a nuclear missile (or even a larger nuclear attack) by another country.

## Other Nuclear Powers

Discussions will need to be held with the other three major nuclear powers on their position toward the evolving U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship and on "minimum deployment levels" for strategic offensive arms. The position of China might create difficulties in such

talks. The United States, of course, has many opportunities to consult with France and Great Britain about nuclear matters at the North Atlantic Council and elsewhere.

Moscow and Washington will need coordinated policies to ensure that Ukraine promptly ratifies the START I Treaty, and that Ukraine and Kazakhstan join the Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear-weapons states.

In addition, it would seem worthwhile to undertake a further exploration of joint security guarantees that could be meaningful to nations that have given up nuclear weapons. Such guarantees might include formal renunciation of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against such countries, and timely tripartite or bilateral consultations in the event of national security emergencies. Russia might also decide to offer its protective nuclear "umbrella" to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus against a nuclear attack. A stronger U.S. or Russian commitment, however, to help protect the inviolability of borders of countries that are not allies does not seem likely at this time.

# 4

# Harmonizing the Overall Defense Postures

The evolving defense policies of the United States and Russia should not only bring about a transformation of the nuclear relationship but also lead toward a harmonization of the policies and doctrines for conventional, or nonnuclear, forces (see the discussion in the section below). Furthermore, the two military establishments must, between them, seek to reduce their imagined needs for, and habits of, secrecy; these issues of bilateral transparency and problems of new military technologies, especially those designed for outer space, are discussed in the second section below. Multilateral peace operations will present new opportunities for cooperation; these are discussed in the third and final section of this chapter.

## Nonnuclear Forces

Both the United States and Russia face the problem of cutting their conventional forces; the problem is unusually severe for Russia, which is creating virtually new armed forces in a dramatically altered geostrategic, political, and socioeconomic environment. To fit within plausibly available resources, Russian conventional forces must be drastically and rapidly reduced, which in turn calls for more resources for conversion, civilian housing, and so forth. At the same time the Russian forces must be relocated and reconfigured for an entirely different set of requirements. Before they are thus reformed, however, much first has to be salvaged.

It is in the interests of the United States and of the international community generally to relieve some of these burdens imposed on Russian defense planners, to the extent feasible. The most effective means of doing so in the short term would be to continue, and perhaps expand, the assistance for relocating conventional forces out of eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics—mainly by providing housing and alternative employment training for some 300,000 military officers whose positions will have to be eliminated in the course of force reductions. In the longer term, full use should be made of CFE and other understandings throughout Europe and Asia regarding the size, concentration, and rate of movement of conventional units. Common standards could perhaps be developed to keep the relevant forces in a defensive posture (without subscribing to some of the extreme versions of "defensive defense"). If a pattern of mutual reassurance in this regard is established, it might materially relieve the Russian defense burden. (In previous discussions of such measures, difficulties arose about offering reciprocity in the exchange of data, especially for the United States, given its deployments in different regions of the world.

This approach could be augmented by formulating and implementing measures to make the power-projection capabilities of Russia and the United States mutually nonprovocative, and even mutually supportive (e.g., for peace-enforcement operations). In this context, some Russian defense experts want to constrain long-range, conventional precision-guided weapons and ban the development of depressed-trajectory warheads and fast-flying cruise missiles. The U.S. defense community tends to be more skeptical about such restrictions. Perhaps, for the longer term, it might be possible to limit only those new long-range capabilities that would be truly threatening in the bilateral U.S.-Russian context, while other systems that would be used to deter or to defend against an attack on either power (or on one of its allies) would not need to be constrained.

To further mutual reassurance, military-to-military contacts can be dramatically expanded. Such contacts form an important motor for strategic partnership building. Recent experience shows that some institutional framework is needed to develop a comprehensive concept of these contacts and then to promote, oversee, and sustain them. A bilateral commission formed by the Russian Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense, meeting regularly to examine and solve the problems, would make cooperation between the two defense establishments more meaningful and productive. In addi-

tion, a blue-ribbon commission, supported by the two governments, should be formed to report annually to the heads of state and the legislatures; and the two legislatures could hold joint hearings on the evolving strategic relationship.

Preparation for cooperative multinational operations appears to be one of the more promising areas of interaction. The decision reached in September 1993 to conduct joint peacekeeping exercises with the U.S. Third Infantry Division and the Russian Twenty-seventh Motorized Rifle Division is encouraging. Potential peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions would be the most compelling context for joint training and exercising, but counternarcotics and counterterrorist operations also offer an occasion for useful cooperation.

Through close cooperation, the world's two leading military establishments—with their dominant capabilities for space-based communications and intelligence, airlift, fighter aircraft, air defense missiles, armored vehicles, and other areas of strength—can carry out, or support, international peacekeeping operations. The deterrent effect of such cooperation, particularly when contrasted with earlier competition that was easily exploited by third parties, should not be underestimated.

Although Russia no longer aspires to naval parity with the United States, it has yet to define the scope of naval activities it deems necessary to secure its national interests. As both nations proceed to reduce their naval strength, they should be careful not to encourage other countries (particularly those with unpredictable regimes) to fill the vacuum. Meanwhile, the two navies could start practicing disengagement, drastically limiting regular activities near each other's home waters. Confidence-building measures at sea should not be limited to strategic components of sea power. Proliferation of short- and medium-range sea-launched cruise missiles should also be addressed. Joint training for peacekeeping could also include naval units.

Conventional arms exports ought to come under particular scrutiny by both governments lest differences create tension in the bilateral relationship. A truly cooperative approach is likely to be difficult because of the intense competition for arms exports. But it should be possible to agree on some basic ground rules and, in particular, jointly to identify (a) types of armaments that must not be exported and (b) specific countries that must not be allowed to import given categories of armaments. The current Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should be strengthened and expanded to capture shorter-

range and some surface-to-air missiles in order to prevent their subsequent upgrading. Russia should join the MTCR as a full participant. In a more mature partnership the two countries could conduct joint development projects for military purposes and agree to purchase certain armaments and components from each other. The current discussions on space cooperation will provide some experience and precedent to this end.

## Bilateral Transparency and Issues of New Technologies

To reduce military secrecy between Russia and the United States, it is essential that the accountability and transparency of the military establishments be increased domestically, within and among the organs of each government. That is to say, military secrecy must not prevent a review of defense programs and strategies by proper political and military authorities. Devising, implementing, and maintaining open procedures for detailed parliamentary and public discussion and adoption of defense budgets are of critical importance.

Conflicts between "legitimate" national security secrets and the need for bilateral transparency are to be expected. But in the right political context ways can be devised to manage them. As long as the security partnership is more proclaimed than practiced, however, these conflicts will be exacerbated by bureaucratic habits and lingering suspicions.

Secrecy will likely play a role for new weapons technology. On the one hand, the intent may be to shield the new technology from third parties or to prevent undesirable spillover in the context of industrial competition, but the effect might be to introduce an element of tension into the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, abolishing the remaining COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) restrictions on export of information technology to Russia can greatly bolster Russia's confidence.

Secrecy to protect sources and methods of intelligence should become less important in a genuinely open environment. Moreover, there is a strong case for intelligence cooperation in such fields as preventing nuclear and missile proliferation, conflict prevention and crisis management, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and peacekeeping/peace-enforcing operations.

The U.S. Defense Department and the Russian Ministry of Defense should consider setting up a joint commission to help reduce bilateral secrecy. Such a commission might be tasked with providing biannual recommendations to lift secrecy in certain specific areas. The process might start, for example, with military data from the early conflicts of the cold war and with data on weapons capabilities, force sizes, and operational plans from earlier periods. For certain categories secrecy would still have to be maintained toward third countries; for example, if it were decided to exchange the designs of the very first nuclear weapons. For the longer term, such a "transparency commission" ought to review periodically the justifications for remaining areas of secrecy and each sides' concerns about secrecy.

The arms control agreements reached since the mid-1980s helped to increase transparency regarding the deployment, as well as some other aspects, of nuclear forces (and certain conventional forces). These agreements also served to establish procedures for rather extensive on-site verification. Further, the data exchanges mandated by these agreements encouraged the useful practice in Moscow of publicly releasing official and rather detailed data on military forces. To reduce bilateral secrecy in the future, more flexible arrangements will be needed—ones that can broaden the strategic relationship beyond the rather rigidly circumscribed forms of access provided by the formal arms agreements of the 1980s.

Problems of new military technology are bound to raise issues of secrecy. Future developments of science and technology in the civilian sectors of industrialized nations can, and probably will, create significant opportunities for creating new instruments of warfare. The march of science and technology is likely to create an "overhang" of *potential* military applications that could be exploited by many different countries in an attempt to give their armed forces an advantage. This development can become a source of instability in many regions and could also engender new forms of military competition between the United States and Russia (going well beyond recent Russian concerns about "stealth" technology and space-to-earth weapons, or recent U.S. concerns about offensive laser weapons and ASAT capabilities).

To forestall adverse military consequences from developments in science and technology and, in particular, to protect the U.S.-Russian military partnership from such consequences, the two countries need to create a new cooperative mechanism to jointly evaluate and

manage the emerging potential for new weaponry. Also, the United States and Russia will be in a much better position to cope with these coming problems if they can free themselves from the cold war mutual deterrence relationship. The implications of new "tactical" and "strategic" systems and new offensive and defensive systems would be impossible to sort out constructively between Russia and the United States if they still relied on "stabilizing" their military relationship by preserving the threat of prompt and massive nuclear retaliation.

The nonmilitary applications of space technologies, which the two governments are now discussing, might be helpful in efforts to launch a broader approach for separating military and nonmilitary applications of new technology.

## Multilateral Peace Operations

Multilateral peace operations (including traditional peacekeeping, protective peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations) stand out as one of the more promising areas of U.S.-Russian military cooperation. Such operations provide an opportunity to bind all components of the security relationship together, ranging from strategic planning to logistics.

Efforts to resolve crises of mostly internal origin, which have a direct bearing on international peace and security, require a new conceptual framework. Fundamental to this framework should be acceptance of the right of the international community to intervene, under certain circumstances and on specified conditions, in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Obviously, the overriding aim would be conflict prevention and the resolution or containment of crises before they lead to military action. Failing that, substantial military input is essential at various stages, ranging from early warning (monitoring and analysis within an integrated information network), to enforcing sanctions and preventive deployment of forces, to sending in troops to keep, or restore, the peace.

Proper training is of critical importance to the success of peacekeeping missions. The existing military educational institutions in both Russia and the United States should offer (preferably coordinated) courses for senior, middle-level and junior officers and

noncommissioned officers. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) can bring together officers and civilian officials from its member countries. To this end, the NACC partners could think of establishing a staff college; they may also see the need to set up an institute for security studies to provide themselves with a sound applied research base.

Joint exercises can serve to promote a degree of communication (technical and linguistic) that would ensure interoperability, and some standardization in equipment that would make it possible to keep costs down. Not only armies and air forces, but also navies of the two countries should be gradually involved in preparing for and exercising common peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations.

The problem of command and control of peace operations calls for a creative solution. The mandate would normally come from the United Nations, with the Security Council exercising general guidance. Politico-military details might be taken up by an NACC council in permanent session (built on the present ambassadors-level group) and committees under it. The troops would probably be placed under separate U.S. and Russian military command or a joint U.S.-Russian command, in coordination with the UN Security Council.

# 5
# The Need for New Security Concepts

Military planners both in Moscow and in Washington have begun to rethink strategy and doctrines to take account of the recent transformation of the global order. For obvious reasons, the issues on which this rethinking is focused differ between the two countries. In both countries, to be sure, the attention and resources devoted to a large conventional war in Europe have become things of the past. For U.S. planners this change offers an opportunity to accommodate large cuts in the defense budget while maintaining (and in a limited fashion renewing) capabilities to project military power at a distance for "regional" conflicts (i.e., anticipating *smaller* powers as adversaries). By contrast, Russian planners need to cope with a huge redeployment of forces from eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics at a time of great economic stress.

A guiding principle for new security concepts in both countries should be to capitalize on the advantages of the present geopolitical situation and to prevent the emergence of highly dangerous developments. Neither side should unnecessarily provoke the other (e.g., by a dense concentration of forces or a buildup of strike capabilities that would cause perceptions of vulnerability, or expanding alliances, etc.). By eliminating even a hypothetical chance of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO allies in Europe, a new strategic era will have surely begun.

Both sides have rethought the role of tactical nuclear weapons pursuant to President George Bush's initiative of September 1991 to achieve a large-scale withdrawal of these weapons. It appears that, for U.S. military planners, this special category of nuclear weapons desig-

nated as "tactical" has become a thing of a bygone era (although low-yield, shorter-range nuclear systems may, of course, remain in the overall nuclear arsenal).

Planners on both sides have stated that nuclear proliferation has become a growing security concern. But so far the remedies envisaged are the same as those applied during the cold war: controls on technology exports, support for the Nonproliferation Treaty, and diplomacy. Today, cooperation on a greater scale has become possible—and more urgent. U.S. and Russian policymakers have recently agreed to tighten controls on the export of nuclear and missile technologies. Now they should seek to strengthen international controls on fissionable materials and improve their safekeeping. But in themselves such measures are not enough. Because nuclear capabilities are likely to spread despite the best efforts of technology control, further steps must be taken.

If the world should someday be confronted with a crisis when a reckless or terrorist regime actually decided to use a nuclear weapon, the United States and Russia will need to be prepared to respond promptly in a well-coordinated fashion. At that point, U.S.-Russian military cooperation would be essential to forestall even greater catastrophes. Given the extreme rapidity with which further untoward developments could occur, and the atmosphere of swiftly expanding dangers that would then prevail, joint intellectual and conceptual planning is essential. Indeed, widespread knowledge that preparation of this kind had occurred could help to prevent such events in the first place.

The adjustments in strategy that U.S. and Russian planners have made since the end of the cold war are substantial and seem to have moved in the right direction. Without denigrating these adjustments, however, it seems fair to note that they have not yet benefited from the kind of intellectual rigor or innovativeness that were applied thirty or forty years ago to shape the original cold war strategy and that prevented a full-scale global war. It is the main thrust of this report that such an intellectual effort is again required and that it should, to a large extent, become a joint undertaking of U.S. and Russian experts. But this effort will have to compete not only with other, seemingly more urgent, problems but also with various crises preoccupying defense planners on both sides. To impart the necessary momentum to the U.S.-Russian effort, some formal deadlines and milestones will help. Specifically, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation should:

- Build on the ongoing policy planning meetings between them to establish a formal *U.S.-Russian Joint Planning Staff* that will include civilian officials and military officers from each side and meet at least twice a year. Both governments might wish to broaden this group to include participants from other government agencies (e.g., the State Department, Foreign Ministry). Joint working groups could regularly discuss the evolving military doctrines. These working groups could prepare recommendations for improving the harmonization of the defense policies of both countries.

In addition, it might be helpful for

- the Russian minister of defense and the U.S. secretary of defense to task a drafting group with preparing an annual report on the current and forthcoming activities of the U.S.-Russian partnership, such as joint training exercises, peacekeeping activities, joint assessments of security issues, and other appropriate topics. In a sense, such a joint publication could be seen as the replacement of the respective cold war publications, *Soviet Military Power*, formerly issued by the Pentagon, and *Whence the Threat to World Peace*, issued by the Soviet government.

Time is a wasting asset, and an epochal opportunity may be lost if the harmonization of defense policies does not proceed with a sense of urgency. If Russia and the United States can gradually achieve a harmonization of the ends and means of their military establishments, they will avert some of the worst dangers for the coming decades of the nuclear age. If this new military partnership can be harnessed to other peacekeeping structures in the world, the two great nations—destined by geography to have global interests and by history to have a common interest in promoting democracy and peaceful intercourse among nations—will have constructed a mighty bulwark for global peace.

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