CIVIL AFFAIRS IN WORLD WAR II

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Description/Definitions

The need for civil affairs during World War II, particularly in the occupations of Germany and Japan and the subsequent success of these missions, provide many lessons for current and future CA and stability operations. While the concept of civil affairs has been around for centuries, it was not until WWII that the U.S. government institutionalized the program in the Army. The creation of the first civil affairs field manual, the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division in the Army General Staff, and the indoctrination of specialization[1] were all done in direct response to the challenges faced by civilians and the military in occupied and liberated territories during WWII.

It is important to note the definitional and conceptual differences between civil affairs during WWII and the current understanding. At the time of this case study, the term "civil affairs," was used interchangeably with "military government," which was, in fact, the primary component of all CA operations. When the Field Manual for Civil Affairs Military Government (FM 27-5, written in 1940) was first published, the U.S. had yet to become involved in the war. [2] However, history had created the need for a conventional, doctrinal standard of civil affairs, which would establish the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. Army, and would compliment the preexisting capabilities of our allies.[3] FM 27-5 defined civil affairs/military government (CA/MG) as,

> *"All powers exercised and responsibilities assumed by the military commander in an occupied or liberated area with respect to the lands, properties, and inhabitants thereof, whether such administration be in enemy, allied, or domestic territory."* [4]

[1] Specialization in civic skills such as administration, public safety, finance, health and civil infrastructure were considered especially important for the CA missions during World War II.

[2] The need for a well-established civil affairs plan was first recognized after World War I, by Colonel Irwin L. Hunt. His report on the occupation of the Rhineland coupled with War College committee reports over the years, eventually led to the creation of FM-27-10, *Rules of Land Warfare* in the late 1930's, which included a section on military government. This was succeeded by FM-27-5 in 1940. See Earl F Ziemke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," *Military Affairs*, December 1972, 130-133.

[3] The British already had a well-established Directorate of Civil Affairs, and by 1941 had established "military administrations," in many of the Italian colonies. The British also offered "politico-military," courses at Cambridge, through the War Office, which it is said the U.S. Army modeled its own training courses after. Like the eventual United States division, British civil affairs was primarily composed of career military officers and uniformed civilians. For more information on British civil affairs, see Ziemke "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," and F.S.V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government North-West Europe, 1944-1946* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961).

[4] U.S. Army and Navy, *Civil Affairs Military Government*, FM 27-5 (Washington, D.C.: Departments of the Army and Navy, October 1947).

The determination of whether the operation was to be entitled "civil affairs" or "military government" depended on the political situation of the occupied territory. For liberated territories, the term "civil affairs," was thought to be passive enough so as to retain a positive perception of U.S. presence with both occupied inhabitants and the American public. In enemy territories however, the term civil affairs was thought too soft and so "military government," was the preferable assertion of authority.

Because of this distinction, FM 27-5 more specifically defines civil affairs as,

> *"the assumption by the responsible commander of an armed occupying force of a degree of authority less than the supreme authority assumed under military government, over enemy, allied, or domestic territory. The indigenous governments would be recognized by treaty, agreement, or otherwise as having certain authority independent of the military commander."*

This definition is not unlike our modern understanding of civil affairs, which includes provisions for the military to undertake tasks that would normally be the responsibility of a civil government, and intends to enhance the relationship between occupied civilians and military forces. This is also not to say that soldiers in Europe and Japan were not involved in clearing roads, repairing sewage lines, or assisting refugees. However, WWII is considered unique in that it saw the Army go beyond its "traditional role" more so than ever before.[5] References to civil affairs and military governance within this case study are made in line with the original definitions outlined above, and are specifically focused on events occurring between 1942 and 1952 in Germany and Japan. While many other civil affairs missions took place during WWII in North Africa, the Pacific Islands and territories around Europe, Germany and Japan offer more complete historical perspective as their campaigns lasted for a long period time and are considered two of the greatest successes in U.S. stabilization history.[6]

Key Actors

Allied forces, in particular the U.S. and Britain, played the largest role in civil affairs. Although both parties agreed they would need to take responsibility for the execution of civil matters during and after combat, there was a divide between both sides of the Atlantic on how to go about it. President Roosevelt was of the belief that issues of governance should be entrusted to civilian agencies, and the military should be focused on the more fundamental task of war fighting.[7] The British, as an historically colonial power were comfortable with the idea of the military taking the lead. Civilian agencies attempted involvement in the North Africa campaign, but their dysfunction and mere presence proved disastrous in the field. [8] General Eisenhower

[5] Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, "U.S. Army in World War II: Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992).
[6] James Dobbins, et. al. *After the War: Nation Building from FDR to George W. Bush*, (RAND Corporation: 2008), 28.
[7] It was also seen as somewhat hypocritical to overthrown fascist regimes, only to replace them with totalitarian military rule. Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting Or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 26.
[8] The Department of State, Department of Agriculture, Board of Economic Warfare and Lend Lease all attempted unsuccessfully to direct civil affairs in North Africa in 1942. Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 27.

submitted forceful complaints about the inability of these agencies to manage themselves stating, "I am having as much trouble with civilian forces behind aiding us as I am with the enemy in front of us."[9] This instance, in conjunction with pressure from the War Department, eventually persuaded Roosevelt that the military was the most capable body, and the most efficient way of exercising civil power.[10]

This is not to say that the Army did not coordinate with civilian agencies. Despite the failures of agencies in North Africa, the Army recognized that if operations in Europe and Japan were eventually to be turned over to agencies like the State Department, they would need to have their voices heard at the table. For this reason, interagency coordinating groups were set up in Washington to facilitate action on interdepartmental civil affairs issues. One of the most successful of these groups was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, organized in 1944, in which the Subcommittee for Europe and the Subcommittee for the Far East hashed out issues between the departments in Washington, rather than sending representatives to the commands.[11]

The military's dominance in civil affairs was also necessary due to the overall lack of international non-profit organizations at the time. Although the Red Cross provided necessary support to the military during the war, organizations like the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) were not as effective. Not only was the organization devoid of the skill set needed to govern an occupied territory, but also were too small to even manage their own tasks, which furthered the Army's role in responsibility for refugees, post-combat.[12] Because of the abolition of governments in liberated territories, the seizure of remnant government in Japan, and the defunct government of Germany there was a lack of enemy services for the U.S. and allies to compete with. While this may seem ideal, the complete lack of civil governance in these territories—particularly in Germany proper—obliged U.S. involvement.[13]

Objectives & End States

For liberated territories in Europe, the main objectives were to assist in the winning of the war by securing cooperation from occupied citizens, and to further "long-range national policies."[14] This also included plans to reinstate exiled governments as quickly as possible. These were similar to the primary objectives in Japan, which because of its retention of functioning government structures, was approached with a liberated territory model, despite the realities of U.S. occupation.[15]

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 26.
[11] Edwin J. Hayward, "Co-Ordination of Military and Civilian Civil Affairs Planning," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 150, 19-27.
[12] Donnison, *Civil Affairs*, 341.
[13] Not only were Allied forces compelled by the socio-political situations in liberated and occupied territories, but they were also compelled by international law. The Law of Occupied Territories, as defined in the Hague Convention of 1907 obligated occupying armies to restore law and order and provide basic civil capacities. Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 26.
[14] Harry Lewis Coles Jr., "Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1950, 131-139.
[15] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 36.

As a largely defunct enemy territory, Germany presented more challenging objectives for civil affairs. Lessons learned from WWI taught military planners that a weak and degraded Germany was an impetus for retaliation. However, the sweeping power grabs illustrated in both world wars indicated that an independently strong Germany was also not ideal. While the objective of civil affairs in general was to assist military operations in winning the war, Germany's case provided opportunities to use military government installations to inculcate democratic ideals, follow through with de-Nazification efforts, and develop sound economic plans for the future that would balance punishment with prosperity.

While it was recognized that harsh sanctions after WWI were in some ways responsible for the conditions leading to WWII, the key objectives in German territory were still undertaken with a more stern application than those in liberated territories. For example, in addition to the stability objectives aforementioned, the first concern of the military commander would be to "help maintain the striking power of the military forces by controlling movements of people and by preventing disease and disorder." Provision of relief, supplies and other important duties in liberated territories were strictly limited to "measures [in] which the Supreme Allied Commander may specifically direct to prevent a general breakdown of civil life and the spread of disease" in Germany.[16]

Major General John H. Hilldring, head of the original Civil Affairs Division, described the comprehensive operational objectives of civil affairs, in both liberated and occupied territories, as two-fold. First, civil affairs were to secure the civilian population to the fullest extent, and therefore maintain law and order. Secondly, they were to prevent civilians from interfering with military operations and in doing so, treat civilians in a way "that they [would] be able to assist the forward movement of our troops to the greatest extent possible."[17] Hilldring also elucidated that these objectives were to be "the beginning and the end," of U.S. involvement in civil affairs. He constituted success as, the end of U.S. obligation under international law, and the absence of civilian interference in military operations. When these conditions were met, military success could be declared and the missions would be turned over to civilian organizations.[18]

In addition to the objectives in theater, the War Department had a domestic and internal plan to institutionalize civil affairs into the formal Army command structure. Generally in the past, civil-affairs had been organized *ad hoc* in the field as the need arose.[19] However, this spontaneous organization meant there was a lack of preparation and trained skill sets needed to produce long-term effects, as evidenced by the failure of the aforementioned objectives in WWI. Because of this, the inherent difficulty of governing a foreign nation was exacerbated by the fact that civil affairs skills were not of the kind a soldier acquired in basic training and combat experience.[20] Therefore, even before the failure of the civilian North Africa campaign

[16] Earl F. Ziemke, *Army Historical Series: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946*, (Washington, DC.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990), 31.
[17] Coles and Weinberg, 3.
[18] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 28.
[19] Ziemke, "Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty," 131.
[20] Coles and Weinberg, 3.

established the military's role in executing civil affairs, it was recognized in the War Department that a domestic preparatory program and a division held accountable under the Army command structure would be imperative to the success of operations overseas during WWII and in the future.

Operational Strategies/Key Missions And Tasks

The U.S. had two major strategies for addressing civil affairs in Europe and Japan. The preferred strategy was the indirect control approach, whereby civil affairs officers would develop relationships with the heads of local governments rather than govern civilians directly. This was the preferred approach of the USG, particularly in liberated territories, for several reasons. First, in most of these areas the exiled government still held legitimacy with civilians and would therefore be most effective and efficient in governing their own localities. Secondly, the indirect approach was preferred so as not to create the perception that Allied liberators had taken over governance in a similar way to the totalitarian regime they had just abolished.

The tactic of indirect governance was facilitated by contractual civil affairs agreements with liberated territories such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. These agreements helped to accomplish the civil affairs objective of assuring the winning of the war by securing maximum cooperation from civilians and preventing interference in military operations. By entering into formal written agreements with the *de jure* governments of these territories, the USG ensured greater cooperation from local civilians, secured access to many resources the exiled governments had control over, and gained the moral high ground which would facilitate missions against Germany and pave the way for good relations after the war.[21]

The agreements stipulated what were to be the primary duties of all parties involved in the affected territories. There were operational phases, the first of which was a military phase. During this time, the Supreme Allied Commander exercised authority to fully assist the needs of the military. Additionally, civil affairs officers were made available to local authorities to help them reestablish government, judicial and administrative services. When the "military situation," permitted it, there was to be a transition to the next operational phase when responsibility for civil affairs was reintroduced to local authorities.[22]

In Japan, operational strategies were similar to those in a liberated territory, despite the occupation of enemy territory undertaken by the U.S. military. Because the civic structures in Japan remained largely intact after their surrender, General Douglas MacArthur conducted civil affairs in Japan primarily through existing government institutions in a "top-down," strategic approach. However, because MacArthur used pre-existing establishments to accomplish his mission of creating stability and efficiency in Japanese governance, he may have underused the available civil affairs detachments.[23] Instead of directly administering Japan, civil affairs officers were tasked with responsibilities such as reporting on the progress of reforms, assisting with

[21] Coles Jr., "Civil Affairs Agreements for Liberated Territories," 131.
[22] Ibid., 138
[23] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 36.

democratic elections[24] and providing counsel on issues the Japanese had not encountered under a totalitarian regime.[25]

The second strategy, which applied largely to Germany, was the direct control approach. In this method, civil affairs officers often had a governing relationship with the population directly, whether by personally selecting new government authorities or by governing themselves. This is not to say that direct control was the preferred option, in fact in both Germany and Japan the USG had the intention to manage civil affairs through existing government structures. However, this tactic became unavoidable after the final collapse of Hitler's regime in 1945, which left nearly no functioning government agencies, and after the de-Nazification purge prohibited 2.5 percent of the population from performing civil services.[26] In this case drastic changes in laws, institutions, and administrators were necessary and could not be accomplished through indirect control tactics. Additionally, because Allied forces could not agree on a form for central authority in Germany, civil affairs missions were conducted primarily at the state and local levels.[27]

In general, from 1944-1996 the key missions of civil affairs were almost entirely military governance. The CA detachments in Germany followed a simple plan of action. Upon entering a town, they would post ordinances including curfews, laws and other pieces of information to ensure cooperation from local inhabitants. They would then often select a new mayor or police chief, and in the interim held absolute power over arrests, dismissals and in some cases policy.[28] Maintaining law and order as well as public safety were huge issues tackled by civil affairs detachments. Many towns were largely lawless, with looters, rapists and other criminals. Civil affairs officers drawn from local US police forces became invaluable during this period of the war not only in directly managing crime issues but also in retraining the loyalty and skills of local German police forces.

In addition to governance and public safety, managing displaced persons in Europe was another key mission of civil affairs, particularly during 1944-1946. Civilian agencies like the State Department and the UNRRA had come to terms with the fact that they were simply unequipped to manage the awesome task of providing food and shelter for so many refugees. The Army dutifully took the lead in this area as well, and many civil affairs detachments became involved in more general public order and refugee services.

In addition to missions in theater, the establishment of a conventional training program for civil affairs that would be integrated into the Army command structure was an important aim for the USG as training was, and still is, possibly the most important element of an effective civil affairs mission. To create a cadre of soldiers knowledgeable on military government and a standard doctrinal framework among these officers, the United States needed a training course specifically tailored for civil affairs.[29] In order to achieve this objective, the Secretary of War

[24] The first democratic general election in Japan occurred in April, 1946.
[25] Dobbins, 28.
[26] To its full extent, the purge prohibited these people from any work other than manual labor. Ibid., 28.
[27] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power,* 36.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ziemke, *Army Historical Series,* 7.

instituted the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville in 1942, which by 1943 was graduating up to 175 officers every twelve weeks. The school taught governance, economics, and because many of the students were commissioned civilian recruits, also offered instruction on basic Army structure and regulations.[30] A Civil Affairs Training Program was also instituted at several universities across the country and catered specifically toward commissioned civilians. It was a two-phase training experience, in which one month was spent on basic training at the Provost Marshal General's School at Fort Custer, Michigan. The second, three month phase focused on foreign language and area studies, in addition to general civil affairs curriculum, similar to that in Charlottesville, and produced graduates prepared to deal with civil affairs in specific occupied areas.[31]

Instituting civil affairs into the Army command structure was another key objective of the USG. To accomplish this task, a Military Government Division was initially created under the Provost Marshall General's office. However, the disconnect between this office and the General Staff proved garnering operational authority for the Division a largely insurmountable task. To remedy this command flaw, the Civil Affairs Division was officially established in 1943 under the General Staff and was tasked with the duty of reporting directly to the Secretary of War on all applicable matters, co-ordinate all actions of civilian agencies in theaters of operations for the War Department, and with making certain that all plans to occupy territory included a plan for civil affairs engagement.[32] While occupation *policy* authority continued to rest within the Department of State, the creation of the Civil Affairs Division and the institution of procedural training formalized the military's role in civil issues in WWII, and in the future.

Ends-Means Relationship

The post-WWII transformation of Germany and Japan from totalitarian regimes into two of the world's most booming democratic economies remains in many ways the most successful attempts of occupation, democratization and nation-building ever undertaken by the United States.[33] Civil affairs was an integral part of this transformation as it provided needed support and sometimes complete control over local governance and civilian services. This time consuming operation saw soldiers and civil affairs officers remain in occupied territory as late as 1952[34] until the two primary objectives were achieved: the end of U.S. obligation under international law, and the absence of civilian interference in military operations.[35] Evidence of their achievement in Europe and Japan was found in the instatement of democratic governments, the growing ability of civilian agencies to take the reins and the cessation of situations which required direct military involvement.

These ends were not reached without costs, many of which are more ethical than physical. First, President Roosevelt's position on military involvement in civil affairs at the

[30] Ibid., 8.
[31] Ibid., 19.
[32] Ibid., 17.
[33] Dobbins, et.al. *After the War*, 11.
[34] Military occupation of Germany largely ended after 1949 when control of the territory was passed to a civilian. In Japan, military occupation ended when the peace treaty was signed in 1952.
[35] General John H. Hilldring's objectives for civil affairs, as previously stated.

beginning of the war was not unfounded. Military governance was not in line with America's understanding of the Army's responsibilities—it was considered abnormal and even undesirable.[36] While it was recognized that there was a practical and legal responsibility to assume governance of occupied territories for a temporary period, the authority was begrudgingly given to the military, and may not have been managed this way had civilian agencies at the time been more equipped to handle the challenges.

It is worth clarifying that the issue of military versus civilian administration of occupied territories was "far less important than the issue of military values versus civilian [values]."[37] Civil affairs are fundamentally different than the traditional military mission. It is related to war only in the sense that it occurs in an occupied territory and because of this a civil affairs officer is held to sometimes opposing standards; that of supporting combat forces but also the ability to comply with international law and govern in the best interest of the occupied nation.[38] The end results of the effective transformation of formidable adversaries into two of the USG's best allies and the institutionalization of civil skill sets in the Army command structure seem to outweigh these ethical questions. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that beyond its immediate benefits, this institutionalization introduced the ability of the military to breach the conventional public understanding of its role in war and perpetuated an unease that still exists today.

The capabilities available to the USG in the execution of civil affairs were developed efficiently and applied effectively. As previously stated, the Military Government Division initially calculated the manpower requirement to number over 6,000 trained civil affairs officers. In a display of incredible efficiency, the numerous civil affairs training programs around the country had produced 10,000 soldiers trained in civil and foreign area issues in the short period of 1942-1946. Additionally, the Army made phenomenal use of commissioned civilians who greatly assisted success in areas like public safety, economics, and infrastructure where the efforts of WWI had previously failed. These capabilities were essential not only in achieving the civil affairs objectives of effectively governing and rebuilding occupied territories, but were an integral part to overall completion of objectives and achievement of success in WWII as a whole. Even in areas where the Army was largely unprepared to participate, such as refugee services and basic humanitarian needs, civil affairs detachments were effective in reinstating law and order and preparing the German police force to reassume the responsibility for civil control.

There were two major challenges to the capabilities of Army Civil Affairs in WWII, neither of which were directly instigated by the military. First, after Germany's surrender in 1945 Allied forces made the decision to split Germany into four zones of command. While this plan may have arguably held some benefits for military strategy as a whole, it critically complicated civil affairs.[39] For example, although the U.S. military governor retained authority within the U.S. zone of Germany, any issues including civil affairs that involved areas outside this zone had to be brought before the Allied Control Council in Berlin.[40] The zones made developing a consistent national policy, particularly on economic and central government issues nearly

[36] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 26.
[37] Coles and Weinberg, XII.
[38] Ibid., 3.
[39] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 33
[40] Dobbins, et.al. *After the War*, 26.

impossible. While many of these issues were later remedied, it may have unnecessarily lengthened the need for U.S. civil affairs as demonstrated by the fact that Germany did not see a federal government system installed until 1949.

The second shortfall was the lack of capabilities within civilian agencies to support Army civil affairs missions, and eventually assume responsibility for the operation altogether. Again, while this is a capability flaw the Army is not directly responsible for it had an indelible effect on the duties of civil affairs, particularly in Europe. In effect, civil affairs lost sight of its governance mission when it was delegated responsibility for feeding, clothing and sheltering the thousands of displaced persons that State and UNRRA were unable to manage themselves. This shortfall also contributed to an unnecessarily prolonged military civil affairs operation, which for example, in Germany was not effectively turned over to civilian authority until 1949.

Final Thoughts

Civil affairs in WWII was successful in developing and instituting training, deploying many small detachments specialized in installing the types of governance and infrastructure that were known to be in need of rebuilding, and by recognizing the end of military involvement in civil affairs when there was no longer interference from civilians or the need to facilitate a military mission. In doing so, it has provided many lessons that prove applicable to modern civil affairs and stability operations.

First and foremost, while some believe civil affairs as military governance may largely be a definition of the past, it provides applicable tactics to current and future military operations. Current civil-military operations only address reconstruction, economic development and stability at the strategic level. However, at the operational level civil affairs is focused on "feeding, and sheltering of dislocated civilians (DCs); police and security programs; and building FN government legitimacy."[41] While this is not totally unlike the type of civil affairs seen during WWII, the fundamental difference is that military government is not defined as a primary function. By reinstituting a clear purpose and method for military governance, and by recognizing the need for such operations in similar modern missions, like those in Iraq, the military may be more efficient and effective in abolishing enemies and installing sustainable and reliable government structures in conflict areas. While the ethical tradition against military governments still exists in America, and largely around the world, the effective and responsible use of civil affairs for this purpose in WWII demonstrates that it cannot be discounted. Civil affairs seem to remain the most viable outlet for execution of military government because of their inherent specialization and training requirements.

The direct and indirect approaches to achieving civil-military objectives are also of great importance. In areas where governments still hold legitimacy, can assist the USG in gaining cooperation from inhabitants, and have access to resources, contractual agreements and indirect management are useful approaches. In conflict areas that are reminiscent of the situation in WWII Germany, purging corrupt leaders, installing U.S. friendly replacements and retaining military presence to guide the course is an effective direct approach to governance. These tactics,

[41] Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, (2008), ix.

and the recognized difference between territories to use them in, greatly contributed to success in CA operations during WWII and still hold tactical value.

Additionally, WWII demonstrates the need for greater cooperation and planning between civilian agencies and the military. While many of these issues have largely been remedied over the years, the turf wars during WWII make several illustrative conclusions. First, the military's resources, personnel and logistical capabilities may in fact make it the most effective body to carry out civil affairs—be it military government or more humanitarian services—and this effectiveness should not be totally discounted for the sake of avoiding domestic discontent. The failure of civilian agencies to manage civil affairs during the North Africa campaign of WWII altered Roosevelt's understanding of the military's role and put in place a more effective method of governance application. At the very least WWII demonstrates that if both civilian agencies and the military hold responsibilities in the area there should be a planned, structured method of approach, recognition of resources and extensive coordination to ensure the most effective use of both parties. While coordinating committees are excellent at developing policies, on the ground work needs to be coordinated as well. The unexpected need for the military to take the lead on refugee work during WWII demonstrates how these issues can be avoided if, for example, the UNRRA and State Department had recognized from the outset the reality of their capabilities.

There is a common understanding that an effective military learns from its mistakes and should be prepared to fight the next, rather than the last war. In this way, the effective use of civil affairs in WWII provides many lessons for our modern military. While its tactics and definitions may seem antiquated for an era of unconventional warfare, the great successes seen in the implementation of civil affairs and military governance from 1942-1952 can hardly be ignored and provide insight into current and future CA and stability operations.

Appendix I: Qualitative "Order of Battle"

WWII saw massive amounts of volunteers and conscripts dedicated to the cause, to which the force presence of civil affairs is incomparable; however, the need was just as great. In September of 1942, the Military Government Division estimated that more than 6,000 trained civil affairs officers in addition to 6,000 support soldiers from tactical units would be needed worldwide to effectively accomplish the substantial civil challenges posed by WWII. Although the Civil Affairs Division would eventually number over 10,000 personnel who had been trained at Charlottesville and other programs,[42] there was a need for skilled civil affairs officers from the very beginning of the occupation period.

Because of this need, around thirty percent of the civil affairs officer corps consisted of commissioned civilian recruits, with the remainder of the positions filled by the services.[43] Civilians were selected primarily for their skills in administration, public safety or law and order, economics and finance, health, as well as civil infrastructure, and were referred to as "functional specialists," as opposed to a generalist CA officer.

As previously stated, the political situation in Japan provided a less crucial need for civil affairs than that of Germany. General MacArthur took up headquarters in Tokyo to direct the military operations of around 500,000 U.S. occupying troops from inside the capital, while the majority of civil affairs detachments were sent outside of Tokyo. The situation in Germany provided a greater need for civil affairs, where 150 detachments were deployed by early 1945. By the end of the war, 250 CA detachments and an additional 200 provisional attachments had been deployed to Germany to manage the numerous challenges and objectives previously discussed.

The detachments were composed on average of four generalist CA officers, and six enlisted men. These smaller detachments were responsible mainly for localities and towns, and would often manage duties such as posting ordinances, salvaging government documents and maintaining cooperation from the local inhabitants. There were also smaller detachments primarily composed of two generalists and two public safety officers who would take responsibility for appointing new local officials and maintaining law and order. State level civil affairs in Germany were administered by larger detachments consisting of 27-43 officers. These detachments often included more senior level officers as well as a significant amount of functional specialists in areas such as economics, transportation, public health, welfare and legal matters who could contribute to state and regional redevelopment efforts.[44]

[42] Zaalberg, *Soldiers and Civil Power*, 27
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

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