

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN DESERT SHIELD/STORM

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Description

It was 1990 and tensions were rising in the Middle East as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had begun using progressively heated rhetoric toward the United States. First, in a February 1990 speech, he blasted “the faint-hearted who would argue that, as a superpower, the United States will be the decisive factor and others have no choice to submit.”¹ Then at Iraq’s Revolution Day celebration on July 17 of that year, Hussein again taunted the West, saying that “O God almighty, be witness that we have warned them,” threatening unspecified harm.² And perhaps most boldly, in that same Revolution Day speech, Hussein said that “If words fail to protect Iraqis, something effective must be done to return things to their natural course and to return usurped rights to their owners.”³

Just days later, Hussein turned his bluster into action by ordering 100,000 troops from Iraq’s Army, then the fourth largest Army in the world, to Iraq’s border with Kuwait.⁴ On August 1, 1990, Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tanks, blazing under the cover of darkness, stormed into Kuwait.⁵ International reaction led by President George H.W. Bush was swift. On August 5, Bush deployed U.S. troops to the Gulf, seeking withdraw of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and telling the nation that Iraq’s aggression “would not stand.”⁶ After a several-month troop buildup, and facing what appeared to be an unyielding Iraqi regime steadfast in its desire to stay in Kuwait, President Bush in a November 1990 speech suggested that the US buildup in Saudi Arabia would culminate in offensive action against Iraq – a marked departure from his original assertion that the US would assume only a defensive posture.

Two months after that speech, claiming that “the world could wait no longer,” Bush announced on January 16, 1991 that the US military had begun conducting airstrikes against Iraq. The 100 hours war as it would later be called, lasted less time than most experts had predicted – a coup for the US military.

Against the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s collapse, America’s lightning-fast victory over Iraq appeared to signal an era of unipolarity. And as the first war to unfold

¹ “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” *The Economist*, September 29, 1990

² Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut,” *The New York Times*, July 18, 1990.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Frontline, “The Long Road to War” Timeline

www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/longroad/etc/cron.html+saddam+hussein+revolution+day+july+17+speech+1990&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=us.

⁵ Ibid., and “Kuwait: How the West Blundered,” *The Economist*, September 29, 1990.

⁶ Elizabeth Drew, “Letter from Washington: Washington Prepares for War,” February 4, 1991.

in real-time on 24-hour cable news networks, the indelible images of American military prowess in the Persian Gulf – Patriot Missiles and Humvee All-Terrain Vehicles to name a few – earned worldwide acclaim. But perhaps just as important as these glamorous tools of battle, yet burdened with a remarkably lower profile, were US Civil Affairs assets, which made monumental contributions in support of combat and post-combat efforts in Iraq and Kuwait.

Indeed, this case study illuminates the numerous contributions of US Civil Affairs assets both in Iraq and Kuwait during combat and post-combat phases. From preventing civilian interference with US combat missions, to taking care of displaced citizens/refugees, to providing essential emergency support for Kuwaitis in the hours immediately following that country's liberation, Civil Affairs personnel played a vital role in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. By any standard, CA operations in DESERT SHIELD/STORM were highly effective, aiding displaced citizens, helping rebuild Kuwait, and even saving lives. Perhaps most notable among these Civil Affairs achievements was the contribution of the Kuwait Task Force, which in the pre-war months identified functional experts and planned for post-war liberation by closely coordinating with the Kuwaiti government-in-exile and with US Government civilian agencies.

But in addition to these dramatic successes, this case study will also identify and address the hiccups, hurdles and roadblocks that limited CA effectiveness. Among the items to be discussed include planning for Civil Affairs that was ad hoc, infrequent, and ill-informed, Army and US government (USG) misunderstanding of CA assets, and uneven distribution of CA assets.

Key Actors

Blue: U.S.

Green: Coalition included 34 countries, including⁷:

Afghanistan	Argentina	Australia	Bahrain	Bangladesh
Canada	Czechoslovakia	Denmark	Egypt	France
Germany	Greece	Hungary	Honduras	Italy
Kuwait	Morocco	The Netherlands	Niger	Norway
Oman	Pakistan	Poland	Portugal	Qatar
Saudi Arabia	Senegal	South Korea	Spain	Syria
Turkey	UAE	United Kingdom		

Red: Iraqi Government (Military/Republican Guard)

Brown: Over 120 NGOs

⁷ List compiled from CNN In-Depth Special: "The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm," Gulf War Facts. Site: <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/>

Objectives & End States

The USG principal objective, as President Bush first stated on August 5, 1990, was “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoration of the lives of citizens held hostage by Iraq, both in Kuwait and Iraq, and restoration of security and stability in the Persian Gulf region.”⁸ Two weeks later, National Security Directive 45, “US Policy in Response to the Kuwaiti Invasion of Kuwait,” codified the themes of President Bush’s speech into four guiding principles:

- The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait
- The restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq
- A commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf
- The protection of the lives of American citizens abroad⁹

During the next few months, however, Iraq proved steadfast in its resolve to stay in Kuwait, leading US policymakers to determine that an offensive operation would be necessary to restore order to the Middle East. In a November 8 speech, Bush told the nation that he had asked for an additional troop increase to “ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals,” claiming that “the State of Kuwait must be restored, or no nation will be safe, and the promising future we anticipate will indeed be jeopardized.”¹⁰

Planning for US Civil Affairs engagement in the Persian Gulf was heavily influenced by President Bush’s initial proclamation that US troop deployment had defensive – rather than offensive – ends. A handful of CA assets from the Army’s only active duty CA unit, the 96th Battalion, were deployed almost immediately after Iraq invaded Kuwait to assess which, if any, CA assets should be deployed to the area.¹¹ Separately, ARCENT conducted a similar assessment, concluding that Saudi Arabia’s extensive experience with contracting and its already significant host nation support apparatus rendered deployment of a large contingent of Civil Affairs personnel to Saudi Arabia unnecessary.¹² Concurring with this assessment, in September 1990 the Commander of the 96th CA Battalion submitted a report requesting a small number of CA troops, largely under the assumption that Iraq would peacefully withdraw its troops from

⁸ “The Need for an Offensive Military Option” Speech of November 8, 1990. George H.W. Bush in Sifry Michah L, and Cerf, Christopher eds. *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, (Times Books/Random House: New York, 1991), p. 228.

⁹ National Security Directive 45, “US Policy in Response to the Kuwaiti Invasion of Kuwait,” p. 2. site: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document2.pdf>.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 229.

¹¹ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*. p. 395.

¹² John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 19.

Kuwait, necessitating few if any reconstruction operations there.¹³ The 96th's assessment, however, did not take into account CENTCOM contingency plans for offensive action.¹⁴ And in November, when President Bush announced the transition from planning for a defensive operation to planning for an offensive one, CA troops became much more integrally involved. Not only would combat operations require CA support, Kuwaiti reconstruction with CA support would also likely be necessary.

In November 1990, USG planning for the provision of CA support to combat operations began quickly, focusing on achieving the chief objective of conducting activities in support of displaced civilians and refugees in all of Iraq and Kuwait.¹⁵ Complicating matters, several planners misunderstood a key aspect of international law, leading them to discount the necessity of planning for civil administration in southern Iraq. CENTCOM planned for troops to conduct a ground sweep through southern Iraq but did not anticipate any occupation of that area.¹⁶ CENTCOM planners therefore concluded, wrongly, that the US was not compelled by international law to protect or care for civilians in Southern Iraq. Precious time was lost before ARCENT G-5 planners convinced their CENTCOM colleagues that a US incursion into Iraq would require civil administration and the offer of help to displaced civilians. As a result, the objective of CA support to combat operations was broadened to include the conduct of temporary civil authority not just in Kuwait, but also in southern Iraq.¹⁷

With the prospect for war steadily rising, US military leaders, including General Norman Schwarzkopf, became increasingly interested in postwar planning for Kuwait. The main objective of US forces in reconstruction was “to provide the legitimate government of Kuwait with military and civilian assistance and to plan and implement a program to restore as quickly as possible the functions and services of that government after the Iraqi forces withdrew.”¹⁸ As a result of a Kuwaiti government request for US Civil Affairs assistance in planning for the provision of post-liberation assistance, the US Government formed the Kuwait Task Force. Although a series of missteps initially prevented the Task Force from starting its work, once it was operational, the Task Force led US planning for post-war Kuwait by working with Kuwaiti leaders and relevant facets of the US Government. In so doing, the Task Force prepared to support the Kuwaiti government in executing the multitude of tasks required in post-liberation Kuwait, such as the provision of basic necessities and the rebuilding of indigenous institutions and public infrastructure. Recognizing that much of Kuwait’s government had fled the country following Iraq’s invasion, US Civil Affairs units planned to endure a very short period after Kuwait’s liberation when they would be completely in charge, waiting for Kuwait’s government-in-exile to return.¹⁹ Beyond simply executing reconstruction missions, the entirety of the Kuwait Task Force’s mission was overwhelming and required strong USG engagement. As LTG John Yeosock described,

¹³ Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*, p. 55.

¹⁴ John T. Fishel, *Civil-Military Operations in the New World*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 136.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁸ Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*, p. 70

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

the Kuwait Task Force's main objective was "to ensure unity of effort in the restoration and reconstruction of Kuwait."²⁰

Operational Strategies/Key Missions and Tasks

Despite difficulties with operational planning and personnel mobilization, validation, and deployment, as ground combat operations began on February 24, 1991, US military units had a full complement of CA units in Saudi Arabia.²¹ In southern Iraq, the ARCENT G-5's plan for allocating Civil Affairs assets in support of occupation was one of decentralization, allowing corps and division commanders to allocate CA assets as they desired, rather than according to a broader campaign plan.²² The result was:

"Two general approaches appeared corresponding to the two deployed corps. In the case of the XVIII Airborne Corps, a fairly broad approach to CMO was adopted based on the corps' experience with contingency operations, especially in Panama. By contrast, the VII Corps tended to follow the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) concept of host-nation support that had been common in the European environment."²³

The XVIII and VII Corps quickly found themselves serving essentially as short-term occupiers of southern Iraq,²⁴ which in turn required CA support in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, displaced civilians, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) all while trying to prevent civilians – or potentially enemy soldiers disguised as noncombatants – from interfering with combat activities and/or possibly endangering themselves.²⁵ CA assets also supported Military Police units handling the throngs of prisoners whom U.S. soldiers freed from Kuwait and southern Iraq.²⁶ At times, Civil Affairs competency at controlling hostile subjects proved useful, as did the CA capacity for interrogating prisoners that enabled CA personnel to obtain valuable information and pass it to intelligence units.²⁷ For CA units in the rear of the operation, where prisoners were considerably scarcer and the security environment was considerably more permissive, CA forces conducted typical emergency relief efforts, but then worked to transition these operations into Civilian/NGO control.²⁸ The numerous – and wide-ranging – tasks that CA units executed in support of combat operations included:

- "Processed dislocated civilians. Gave food, water, and fuel to civilians to minimize their interference with US military operations. Warned them to avoid

²⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

²¹ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 22-23

²² John T. Fishel, *Civil-Military Operations in the New World*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 145

²³ Ibid., 146.

²⁴ Ibid., 161.

²⁵ Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, Vol., 1, p. 540.

²⁶ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 40.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

²⁸ Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, Vol., 1, p. 540.

the main supply routes and not to interfere with convoys. Found 15 gallons of fuel for a civilian with a receipt for same after his fuel had been confiscated by US troops; threw in a case of MRE's for good measure.

- “Located potential sources of water: wells, plants, and lakes. Arranged for obtaining water from a local water plant producing 500,000 gallons per day. Persuaded a local farmer not to evict US Army units drawing water from his well. Coordinated with other farmers to permit US forces to use their wells.
- “Assisted in the EPW mission by interviewing prisoners, exposing Iraqi Soldiers posing as civilians, and processing prisoners for turnover to the MPs.
- “Arranged for local support. Purchased local food and other supplies for dislocated civilian holding areas. Engaged in trouble shooting [sic] problems with local host nation support agreements. Arranged for repair of leased trucks by local mechanics.
- “Made area surveys. Studied the terrain and the local economy, people, culture, and resources. Advised commanders on how to accommodate to local culture. Advised on search procedures for Iraqi women. Advised on looking out for Iraqi antiquities.
- “Surveyed local facilities for US use. Assessed damage to the facilities. Found hot mix asphalt plant (partially usable), housing areas (unusable), construction equipment (some usable). Looked for refrigerator truck to haul blood supplies, but was unable to find one.
- “In one incident, persuaded 23 Iraqi soldiers to surrender.
- “Inspected food and tested local water for quality.
- “Assisted medical units to provide medical care for dislocated civilians and prisoners; provided interpreter services in some cases; helped maintain family integrity.²⁹

In comparison with the CA support to combat operations, reconstruction efforts in Kuwait required significantly greater planning and a much broader – and perhaps more difficult – set of operational strategies and tasks. Planning under the Kuwait Task Force laid important groundwork. On Valentine’s Day in February 1991, a 550-soldier Civil Affairs Task Force was established, subsuming the Kuwait Task Force as well as a number of CA Commands and Companies.³⁰ Soon the Task Force became a Coalition Task Force, incorporating CA personnel from allies including Canada, UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.³¹ In the days before war, the Combined CA Task Force was subsumed into Task Force Freedom to provide CA with additional Army support

²⁹ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 36

³⁰ The Civil Affairs Task Force consisted of the Kuwait Task Force ; the 352d Civil Affairs Command (-) ; the 431st Civil Affairs Company out of Little Rock, Arkansas; the 432d Civil Affairs Company out of Green Bay, Wisconsin ; and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-) out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina . The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (-), though assigned to the task force, remained under ARCENT's operational control.

³¹ Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*,” p. 55.

including logistics, vehicles, and communications.³² Although planning for this phase began late, the creation of the umbrella Task Force Freedom provided the organizational structure, leadership, and coordinate capacity to effectively prepare for Kuwaiti reconstruction. Official US Government policy stated that the Kuwaiti Government would be in charge following liberation. The US military, therefore, served in a supporting role to the Kuwaitis.

The first CA soldiers to arrive in Kuwait after the end of combat operations discovered that Kuwait City had sustained significant damage.³³ Largely due to the citizens' stockpiling of food, water, and medical supplies, shortages were minimal and there were no serious medical crises. US military planners shared the credit for this accomplishment, given that Kuwait Task Force planning had effectively coordinated the stockpiling of food, water, and medical supplies.³⁴ Numerous problems, namely the lack of electricity and running water, existed however. And compounding these issues, as predicted, for several days after the first CA soldiers arrived in Kuwait, Task Force Freedom was responsible for all civil administration because members of Kuwaiti government were still in transit back to their country.³⁵

As one of its chief tasks facilitating Kuwaiti reconstruction, Task Force Freedom established damage assessment teams to: (1) evaluate infrastructure/facilities, (2) identify low hanging fruit where emergency repairs could restore some operations and (3) determine how long it would take to get facilities working again³⁶ in the areas of food, water, power, public infrastructure, communications, public health, transportation, and security.³⁷ Beyond conducting damage surveys, US restoration activities occurred primarily in five categories:

- Infrastructure
- Commerce
- Public security and safety
- Public services,
- Human services.³⁸

As its first mission, Task Force Freedom sought to repair Kuwait's infrastructure, particularly its electrical grid which teams assessed to be the task most critical to accomplishing the civil-military mission.³⁹ In some cases, when repairs could not quickly be completed, US Civil Affairs personnel coordinated delivery and supervised installation of temporary generators.⁴⁰ Additionally, US Civil Affairs teams assisted with a multitude of additional tasks: delivering water and food, working with hospitals, and

³² Ibid., p. 54.

³³ Ibid., p. 71.

³⁴ John T. Fishel, *Civil-Military Operations in the New World*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers), 166.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 165.

³⁶ Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*, p. 78.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 78.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 81.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 81.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 81.

even caring for Kuwaiti zoo animals and helping Kuwaiti police repair their vehicles and communications systems.⁴¹ An under-reported but highly important facet of CA assistance was Civil Affairs' help to Kuwaiti officials in recruiting commercial vendors, rebuilding the labor force, re-starting banking operations, and contracting for over \$500 million in emergency services.⁴²

Ends-Means Relationships/Final Thoughts

By any standard, CA operations in Desert Storm/Shield were highly effective. Despite initial difficulties, US Civil Affairs units eventually arrived in theater with sufficient time to support combat and post-combat operations.⁴³ CA personnel played an extremely important role during combat operations, keeping Iraqis, Kuwaiti refugees, and EPWs from negatively affecting US combat operations.⁴⁴ Similarly, after the cessation of combat operations, CA soldiers were some of the first US personnel to enter Kuwait and were able to accomplish the vast majority of their essential tasks.⁴⁵ Largely due to the Kuwait Task Force's effective planning efforts, in the days following Kuwait's liberation, no public health crises arose.⁴⁶ By March, between 33%-50% of electrical power had been restored,⁴⁷ not to mention transportation and telecommunications systems which were also much improved. In sum, the literature unanimously agrees: "The emergency restoration of Kuwait was a success."⁴⁸

But CA engagement hardly came without roadblocks. The following series of issues serves as a "Lessons Learned" for future CA efforts:

- **Planning for Civil Affairs Was Ad Hoc, Infrequent, and Ill-Informed.** The United States paid little attention to CA planning, especially in the theater planning process.⁴⁹ Although the Kuwait Task Force is largely hailed for its many accomplishments, it took months for the Task Force to be stood up in response to the Kuwaiti Government's request for planning assistance. And even though the Kuwait Task Force proved highly effective in coordinating a largely whole-of-government response in aiding post-liberation Kuwait, the Task Force's planning process was criticized for being conducted completely separately from CENTCOM preparation of war plans.⁵⁰ Moreover, in the initial days and weeks

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 78.

⁴² Ibid., p. 86.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 63.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

⁴⁵ *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf Symposium: Proceedings*, 25-27 Oct 1991, Ft Bragg, NC., p. 14.

⁴⁶ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 49-50.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 49-50.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 49-50.

⁴⁹ Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, Vol., 1, p. 540.

⁵⁰ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 63 and Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, Vol., 1, p. 540.

of DESERT SHIELD, focus on CA deployments was crowded out by greater attention to urgent requirements for combat capabilities.⁵¹ Based on these and other experiences, therefore, one analyst concludes that “Future planning should include CA considerations earlier in the process.”⁵²

- **High Requirements for Mobilization Led to Deployment Delays, Outrage.** Civil Affairs involvement in DESERT SHIELD/STORM started inauspiciously. Civil Affairs forces were forced to meet stringent requirements to be deemed ready to fight – slowing the process by forcing all validation to be conducted at Ft. Bragg rather than dispersed at stations all across the country. The qualification process for functional specialists also drew ire because, in some cases, testing occurred only days before deployment, robbing Civil Affairs assets of critical pre-war time with their units. Many soldiers also complained that the standards were simply too high. Then-SOCOM Combatant Commander General Wayne Downing later reflected that this process was necessary because it provided soldiers with credibility in combat zones.⁵³ Even despite these efforts, however, the USACAPOC IG concluded that “Many reserve personnel were not mentally or physically prepared to go to war.”⁵⁴ Although CA units eventually arrived in Saudi Arabia just before the land campaign, began, one critic argues that “They could have done a much better job if they had been with their supported units for several months”⁵⁵ and that as a result, “CA units should deploy at the same time as their supported units.”⁵⁶
- **Army lack of understanding of the CA capabilities.** In the literature and interviews regarding DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD, there exists nearly unanimous agreement that CA contributions were handicapped by broad USG lack of understanding of CA capabilities. From the start of operations, one interviewee observed that “Most units did not know what to ‘do with’ a Civil Affairs unit and CA advance parties arriving in Saudi found that the tactical and support units to which they were assigned often did not even know they were coming.”⁵⁷ Army officers were apparently chief culprits, and many unit commanders were unaware of how to use CA assets.⁵⁸ In the words of the Secretary of the Army, “A civil affairs colonel who is a municipal planner or an expert in some type of municipal service, who’s called to active duty [should] not have to first explain his credentials and why he’s called. That took place

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 540.

⁵² Ibid., p. 541.

⁵³ *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf Symposium: Proceedings*, 25-27 Oct 1991, Ft Bragg, NC., p. 59.

⁵⁴ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*, p. 402

⁵⁵ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 40.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 40.

⁵⁷ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*, p. 401

⁵⁸ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 40.

repeatedly in the Gulf War.”⁵⁹ Possible solutions to this problem include better instruction regarding CA at War Colleges and general officer basic courses.⁶⁰

- **Uneven Distribution of CA Assets.** Although the Civil Affairs reservists complemented the Active component forces well,⁶¹ the distribution of CA assets was uneven. In some cases, there were too many CA troops; in other cases too few. Better planning would have permitted allocation of CA assets on the basis of expected CA workload (e.g., local population) instead of simply placing a team with every unit.⁶²

⁵⁹ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*. p. 401

⁶⁰ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991*. p. 401

⁶¹ Department of Defense. *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: An Interim Report to Congress*, Washington, Vol., 1, p. 541.

⁶² John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 40.

APPENDIX I: Qualitative “Order of Battle”

In his seminal work on Civil Affairs in DESERT SHIELD/STORM, John Brinkerhoff identifies three key phases in the buildup of soldiers and equipment in preparation for and execution of the Iraq War: (1) Defensive Planning: August 2, until November 7, (2) Offensive: November 8 until early December; and (3) Unit Phase: Early December until the end of the operation in Spring 1991.⁶³ Civil Affairs deployments in the Defensive Planning section suffered from fits and starts. Indeed, although the Department of the Army requested CA reservists to be included in the first round of mobilizations, those units were taken off the list – and they ultimately were not mobilized until the end of December and arrived just before the start of combat operations.⁶⁴ As a result, CA buildup in theater was graduated.⁶⁵ Of the total 4,808 AC/RC US Civil Affairs personnel available, 43% (or 2083) were deployed during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.⁶⁶

*Civil Affairs Deployment to DESERT SHIELD/STORM*⁶⁷

Phase	Dates	Personnel	From # of Units
I	December	104	15
II	Began on Jan. 6	748	7
III	January 16-28	149	N/A

*Civil Affairs Assets in DESERT SHIELD/STORM*⁶⁸

Oct. 1990	Dec. 1990	Feb. 1991	Apr. 1991	Jun. 1991
136	240	2,060	947	21

⁶³ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), p. 16

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁶ Department of the Army, “Civil Affairs Support to Operation Desert Storm,” in *Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf Symposium: Proceedings*, 25-27 Oct 1991, Ft Bragg, NC., p. 255.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁶⁸ John R. Brinkerhoff, *Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in the War with Iraq* (Washington: Office, Chief of the Army Reserve, August 1991), Figure 6.

APPENDIX II: Civil Affairs Assets During Immediate Post Ground-War Phase:

ARCENT G5

TUSA Regular Army Staff
TUSA TPU Augmentees
352nd CA CMD Augmentees

MARCENT

3rd CAG
403rd CA Co.

KUWAIT/TASK FORCE FREEDOM/CCATF

352nd Civil Affairs Command
431st CA Co.
432nd CA Co.
96th CA BN

XVIII ABN Corps

360TH CA Bde
450th CA Co. (82nd ABN Div)
489th CA Co. (101st ABN Div)
422nd CA Co. (24th ID)
407th CA Co. (1st Corps Support Command)
B Co., 96th CA BN (6th French Light Armored Division)

VII Corps

354th Bde
418th CA Co. (1st AD)
401st CA Co. (1st AD)
404th CA Co. (3rd AD)
414th CA Co. (2nd Corps Support Command)

SUPCOM

304th CA GP

THEATER RESERVE

413th CA Co.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Army Central Command G5 Activity During Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield, in Proceedings, p. 239.