


# Bridging Strategic Asia

## The United States, Japan, and India

A Conference Report of the  
CSIS International Security and South Asia Programs

PROJECT DIRECTOR & EDITOR  
Derek J. Mitchell

DECEMBER 2008



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
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
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# BRIDGING STRATEGIC ASIA

## THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND INDIA

As relations among India, Japan, and the United States have evolved gradually over the past decade, the three countries, at both the official and unofficial levels, have begun to consider common interests and potential cooperation on a range of international issues. Indeed, the policy communities in all three countries are just beginning to tear down the conceptual barriers that have divided South and East Asia in their strategic mindsets.

### **Part I. Meeting at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., June 28–29, 2007**

On June 28–29, 2007, the International Security Program and South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, held a private two-day meeting in Washington, D.C., entitled “Bridging Strategic Asia: The United States, Japan, and India.” The objective of the Washington meeting was to continue the process of interaction among the three countries through dialogue on international security issues among a select number of younger U.S., Japanese, and Indian foreign policy and security specialists. The meeting was the first of two meetings to discuss international issues of mutual concern to the United States, Japan, and India. A corollary purpose of the initiative in fact was to facilitate contact among a younger generation of experts to build a network that may form the basis for continued interaction and dialogue among the three countries in the future.

There were sessions on each country’s strategic vision and perspective on China, nonproliferation, and energy security. Keynote addresses were also made by Richard Boucher, assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State; James Clad, deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia at the U.S. Department of Defense; Ronen Sen, Indian ambassador to the United States; Sanjaya Baru, spokesman in the Indian prime minister’s office; and Ryozyo Kato, Japanese ambassador to the United States.

#### **Strategic Visions**

The first session of the conference attempted to identify the three countries’ respective global strategic visions, their perceived roles in East Asia, and their bilateral relations with each other. It also attempted to identify issues where their strategic visions coincide.

The U.S. presenter discussed the strategic vision of the United States in the context of the upcoming presidential election cycle. He noted that next year's election will be largely about foreign policy and that all the major candidates have committed to the goal of retaining U.S. primacy in the world. In addition, he believed that all candidates will be broadly supportive of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the transformation of the U.S. relationship with India, given that neither Japan nor India is a revisionist power and that both countries have a national interest in sustaining the preeminence of the United States and the neoliberal order. The speaker's remarks concentrated on five areas of debate likely to emerge during the election: (1) the war on terror, (2) the war in Iraq, (3) China, (4) soft versus smart power, (5) democratic promotion, and (6) nonproliferation. He argued that historians will look back on this period and note that the most important shift was the rise of Asia, with the rise of China at its core.

Following the presentation there was discussion on including China in the democracy debate in Asia in order to ensure that it is not seen as a Western or U.S.-led phenomena. There was also debate on the lack of a neat institutional architecture in Asia due to reasons of geography and the contested values of Asia. As such, governments do not want one overarching institution, but rather a variety of forums and tools, so they can hedge while building trust and patterns of cooperation and socializing China into these patterns. Nonetheless, these institutions cannot provide the same public goods that regional alliances provide.

The Japanese presenter argued that there are two issues that shape the direction of Japanese security policy: (1) the globalization of security policy, and (2) traditional issues such as China and North Korea. He noted Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Taro Aso's promotion of "value-oriented diplomacy," which placed emphasis on universal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and the market economy. The presenter noted three developments in Asia that are important to consider in the strategic setting of the region: (1) the rise of China, (2) the concern over a U.S. retreat from its commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, and (3) the approaches and the flaws of the multilateral process.

The discussion that followed noted the psychological and cultural distance between Japan and India, which had made it difficult to put India into the Japanese strategic landscape—although there exists potential for cooperation in peacekeeping operations, securing sea-lines of communication (SLOCs), and energy security. There was also debate on the constitutional barriers for Japan to adopt a more assertive defense policy, though there is room for Japan to take initiative irrespective of the pace of constitutional revisions.

The Indian presenter divided his presentation into three parts: (1) the history of India's strategic vision until the 1990s, (2) reasons behind the change in India's strategic vision, and (3) the challenges facing India's strategic vision. He noted that from its independence in 1947 until the end of the Cold War, India's strategic vision was inward looking and guided by nonalignment. This has changed in the last decade, with the end of the Cold War, India's rapid economic growth, and the rise of international issues such as terrorism.

He noted that India's strategic vision operates on three levels. First, India seeks a peaceful periphery in South Asia. Second, India's interests in its extended neighborhood—including Central Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia, and China, as enshrined in India's "Look East Policy"—are tied to its energy security needs and overseas Indian population. On an international level, India's strategic vision seeks to shape a new international order and build strategic relationships with the United States, European Union, China, Russia, and Japan in order to address issues such as energy security, international terrorism, and drug and arms trafficking.

In the discussion that followed, participants highlighted the potential for cooperation between Japan and India in democracy promotion and both states' bids for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. There was also discussion of India's strategic culture. An Indian delegate highlighted that India's strategic culture is civilizational rather than embodied by an individual agency, which has fueled the misunderstanding in the West that India lacks a strategic vision for itself.

## China

The second session discussed each country's assessment of its bilateral relationship with Beijing and the future of China's role in Asian security, as well as issues where the three sides share a common view concerning China's future and the role it should play in the region.

The Indian presenter began her presentation by stating that India's perceptions and policies of China and Sino-Indian relations have been primarily determined by two events—the border conflict in 1962 and India's nuclear tests in 1998. The former ended the idealistic *bhai-bhai* framework of bilateral relations and made China India's single most important security threat and challenge. The latter shaped the strategic dimensions of the relationship, although officially neither India nor China considers the other a security threat.

She argued that the recent "rise of China" has been proceeding in parallel with the forces of economic globalization and the emergence of an Asia-centric world order. China's chief strategic objective is to be recognized as one of the dominant global powers, through the continuation of Communist Party rule, which requires preserving and enhancing its legitimacy through high growth rates, rising living standards, social stability, and the creation of a "harmonious society."

Externally, China has been focusing on "the creation of a favorable international environment" by stabilizing political and diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, promoting economic interaction and regional integration, and promoting cooperative security through multilateral forums. The debate on whether China is a threat or an opportunity continues although there is a general consensus in the region in favor of continued engagement. She argued that Beijing sees Washington as its primary strategic challenge based on its assessment that the United States seeks to keep China contained within the region. Nonetheless, the strategy in Beijing seems to be one of neither complete collaboration nor uncompromising opposition to the United States.

The presenter noted that Sino-Indian relations are undergoing a process of transformation. A mutually advantageous relationship with China based on a clear analysis of the political,



economic, security, and social implications of a rising China is one of India's crucial foreign policy objectives. The relationship, she stated, is acquiring a comprehensive, multidimensional character that will help promote mutual interests although both states are far from adopting coordinated strategies to global issues. Furthermore, India has yet to respond to China's role in South Asia. China's presence in the subcontinent has been constant, its economic largesse to India's smaller neighbors unambiguous and deliberate, and its cordial relations with all of them in sharp contrast to the troubled nature of India's ties with the region. The presenter asserted that Sino-Indian relations may be seen as being characterized by a major paradox: the noticeably broadening and deepening multilevel engagement between them and the remarkable increase of trade on the one hand, and the low levels of mutual trust and confidence on the other.

The Japanese presenter looked at China's domestic dynamics and external relations. On China's domestic developments, his comments focused on four areas: population, economy, military, and political reform. China was undergoing a "period of strategic opportunity" given its economic growth and potential to emerge as the world's largest economy in 2020 by purchasing power parity. Nonetheless, China faces a number of risks including an economic downturn after the Olympic Games, environmental pressure, limited natural resources, and social unrest.

With respect to China's political reforms, the presenter identified positive elements, negative elements, and wild cards. Positive elements include sustainable economic development, generational changes, gradual reforms in local politics, the role of the Internet and other media, and international pressure on Beijing to institute reforms. Negative elements include China's size and population, the role of ethnic minorities, income gaps, constitutional rigidity, difficulties of collective leadership, bureaucracy and corruption, inefficiencies of the corporatist model, and China's history of suppression. The presenter also identified a number of "wild cards" in China's development including nationalism, civic movements (e.g., environmentalism), and social unrest. As such, China's road to democracy with "Chinese characteristics" remains uncertain.

In the military realm, the presenter noted that if China continues the double digit growth of its military budget, its defense budget would be two to three times Japan's (nominal) defense budget in two decades, although Japan may reassess its own military spending if China continues its military buildup. He noted that China's military is still heavily dependent on Russian and European technology, with a focus on establishing a capability to fight limited warfare under conditions of informationalization.

Although China has been emphasizing peace, stability, and global interdependence, the presenter noted a number of positive and negative factors in China's diplomacy. The positive factors include China's moves to become a responsible great power, participation in antiterrorism efforts, and support in developing multilateralism in East Asia and Eurasia. The negative factors include China's struggle against Taiwan and diplomacy without consideration of human rights. He also noted that China favors multilateralism that excludes the participation of the United States and Taiwan. Whether China would cooperate with the U.S.-Japan alliance remains a key question for the foreseeable future.

On the Sino-Japanese relationship, the presenter noted that Japan's strategic goal is a "mutual beneficial relationship based on strategic interests." On the positive front, trade and investment, technology transfers, and people-to-people exchanges have promoted cooperation. On the negative front he noted mutual distrust, the role of the media, history, Taiwan, accidents and crises in the East China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyudao dispute, the Japan-U.S. alliance, and human rights. He also identified several wilds cards that might influence the bilateral relationship, including regional environmental issues and North Korea. On these issues, China and Japan do not share the same priorities. For instance, on North Korea, China's top priority is preserving stability on the peninsula, while Japan cares more about denuclearization and human rights, namely the abduction issue.

As for U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation, the presenter noted that the three parties should promote common views in their engagement with China. He noted that China will be a great but unstable power without democracy for the foreseeable future, while Japan could become a balancer but not a great power. He emphasized the need for "predictability building" and reassurance in the region by engaging China through multilateral efforts with the United States, Japan, and India forming the core group.

The U.S. presenter began his presentation by noting that the United States is not trying to contain China. Moreover, the question faced by both scholars and state officials is not whether the United States should engage China, but rather how to engage China. In reviewing China's role in cooperation with the United States he laid out several factors, both encouraging and negative. Encouraging elements include economic interdependence in an era of globalization and cooperation on energy, health issues, and other nontraditional security threats, as well as on North Korea's nuclear program. As one of the five permanent members of UN Security Council, China has the potential to play a more constructive role in cooperation with the United States in addressing both traditional and nontraditional security issues. Negative factors include the currency issue, political values, and human rights. The Taiwan question is also among the most critical issues between China and the United States.

The U.S. presenter also touched on the issue of value building as relevant to China's rise. He noted that compared to the United States, China has been giving more attention to the use of soft power as a policy instrument in its long-term thinking and planning, as demonstrated by the so called Beijing consensus as a possible alternative to the U.S.- or Western-oriented value system in world development.

In the discussion that followed, questions were raised about the role of Tibet in bilateral relations with China. An Indian participant noted that China's concern about India's intention in Tibet is similar to India's worry about China's interaction with Pakistan. A Japanese participant noted that the Tibet issue is low on Japan's political agenda, although it plays a prominent role in popular culture. On the issue of border disputes, a Japanese participant noted that there is a distinction in China's policy on land and maritime borders, with maritime border disputes being much more difficult to resolve. There was also debate on the role of China's internal dynamics on

regional peace and stability. A U.S. participant argued that historically when China is not secure internally, it ignores its periphery and external environment. On the other hand, when it is facing a secure internal environment, China may choose to expand. As such, although China has stated that it has no intention to change the status quo; its intention after a decade remains unclear.

## **Nonproliferation**

The session on nonproliferation examined each side's respective views concerning global trends in nonproliferation, as well as the current status of efforts by each country on nonproliferation and the prospects for cooperation through the proliferation security initiative and other vehicles.

The Japanese speaker opened his remarks by emphasizing that Japan, the United States, and India share a common perspective on the strategic importance of nuclear energy to all three countries. He noted that the foundation of Japan's nuclear cooperation rested on three pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan's nuclear policy had been shaped by the use of nuclear weapons on its soil during World War II, the oil shocks in the 1970s, and the threat posed by North Korea and China's nuclear capabilities. As such, Japan's civilian program is the largest among all nonnuclear weapons states, although Japan remains a staunch supporter of the nonproliferation regime.

The Japanese speaker identified numerous risks to the nonproliferation regime, including the role of China, North Korea, and Pakistan, and rivalry between India and China. He noted that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal must be pursued in such a way as to prevent the escalation of a regional arms race, especially given the trend in Japanese society toward supporting a stronger military deterrent. To counter these potentially dangerous trends, Japan must help cap any potential Asian arms race before it begins.

The Indian presenter stated that India resides in a region of proliferation fueled by asymmetric conflicts; regional instability; "a failing state with nuclear weapons—Pakistan"; and the A.Q. Khan nuclear "Wal-Mart" supply chain in technologies, expertise, components, and subassemblies. As such, India's concerns about the systemic weakness of the global nonproliferation regime pertain to the relevance of compliance to asymmetric violent nonstate actors, the linkages between brinkmanship states and those nonstate actors, and the abetted second proliferation by China with regard to Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea.

As a rising power, the speaker argued that India's growing economic-industrial power and its strategic military capabilities had endowed its strategic autonomy, which could not be cowed by the discriminatory rigidities of international treaties. However, India as a nonmember had been a "responsible stakeholder" of the nonproliferation regime. India's role would be building its capabilities premised on its strategic autonomy with a cooperative accent to international regimes. Moreover, India's export control system is extensive, well routinized, and over the years has become increasingly comprehensive. The speaker also argued that India's expertise in nuclear power provides an emergent opportunity for the international nuclear export community.

The presenter argued that India's participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency and its support for a 1,000-ship navy as an interoperable partner demonstrates the U.S.-Japan-India consensus to thwart "proliferation rings networks." The speaker argued that India's growing tryst with globalization and its maritime basis has a strong convergence with the United States. The synergies of this partnership would be the cornerstone of a meaningful India-U.S.-Japan partnership in nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

The U.S. speaker noted that the positions of Japan, India, and the United States allow for cooperation on nonproliferation although the three countries have national philosophies or approaches to the issue, which offer opportunities for both convergence and divergence. The three states have common positions on addressing issues of development, nuclear terrorism and proliferation, and regional stability. Also, they each believe in a nuclear renaissance for various reasons. Still, despite these commonalities, there is divergence; they all have "nuclear baggage," and their unique histories affect how they view disarmament and nonproliferation.

The U.S. position on nonproliferation is undergoing a "radical transformation," with a shift from the traditional U.S. position that any proliferation is a danger or threat toward a policy of recognizing "good" and "bad" types of proliferation. Japan, meanwhile, has long championed and promoted both disarmament and nonproliferation but is now conflicted, especially in viewing how the U.S.-Japan alliance will relate to these issues in the contemporary environment.

India is in a state in flux. The U.S. speaker noted that it is clear that nuclear weapons are connected to India's identity as a modern powerful state, which helps define its relationships with other powerful states, and yet its nonaligned and other peaceful positions cause a paradox for India. In the past India was hostile to joining multilateral institutions, whereas now India is harmonizing its domestic laws with international standards. As India's status has changed, it has become more important for them to ensure that other states do not obtain nuclear weapons.

A notable discrepancy among the three countries regards the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Japan has signed and ratified the treaty; the United States signed it but did not ratify it; and though it will not stand in the way of the treaty, India has not signed the CTBT. The speaker emphasized that signing the treaty would help influence other states to sign on, assist nonproliferation efforts, and promote trilateral cooperation. Finally, the U.S. speaker contended that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal has been oversold as a nonproliferation initiative. He insisted that increased cooperation and alignment of perspectives on nonproliferation between India and the United States is necessary if the civilian nuclear agreement is to succeed as a nonproliferation initiative.

In the discussion that followed, there was mention of India's use of its record and positions on nonproliferation to help reform multilateral institutions on nonproliferation. On the issue of Iran, an Indian participant noted that India is in a dilemma as it is opposed to having another proliferant come into the neighborhood but is also consumed by its energy security needs through the IPI gas pipeline. The exceptionalism in the international energy policymaking structure also made India reluctant to submit to the rules of the system.

## Energy Security

The final session on energy security focused on the respective energy security policies of each side. The panel also discussed the challenges faced by each country associated with energy security and how to deal with pariah countries such as Iran, Burma, and Sudan, whose political characteristics pose difficulties in energy cooperation.

The Indian presenter noted the challenges faced by India in meeting its energy needs, including its rapid growth, significant and burgeoning population, need for internal stability, dependence on coal for over half of its energy needs, and dependence on imports for two-thirds of its oil consumption of which two-thirds comes from the Middle East. The speaker also highlighted the decentralized and fractured structure of India's energy bureaucracy, which has resulted in the lack of a coherent energy policy. This has deterred much needed foreign investment into India's energy sector, prevented reforms to India's power distribution sector, and prevented the removal of subsidies on refined oil products.

The speaker also discussed the challenges for Indian companies in competing with Chinese energy companies on the world stage, fueled by China adopting a more strategic and holistic approach that integrates financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic enticements, and arms packages. Sino-Indian energy tensions have been further fueled by both countries' relations with third parties, namely China's reservations over the U.S.-India nuclear deal and China's support for Pakistan's nuclear program. Finally, the speaker addressed the effect of China and India's energy security needs on their foreign and national security policy, including the development of ports and overland links to bypass chokepoints, improving relations with states adjacent to potential chokepoints in Southeast Asia and West Asia and ambitions to develop blue water naval capabilities. The speaker noted that China has generally been more successful in terms of pursuing energy diplomacy on the world stage by resolving or shelving disputes on its borders and providing a number of monetary and diplomatic enticements to energy supplier countries.

The speaker highlighted a number of areas of friction between India and the United States in the energy sphere, notably in India's relations with pariah states such as Iran. However, the restrained U.S. criticism of India's engagement with Burma compared to U.S. criticism of China suggests that the United States may tolerate India's engagement with these regimes as a reflection of the growing strategic partnership between India and the United States. Furthermore, Indian engagement with these pariah regimes offers a potential third way to deal with them—beyond the Chinese policy of “aid without conditions” and the Western policy of sanctions and isolation. Another point of contention in the U.S.-India energy relationship is the issue of climate change. India has rejected proposals to impose caps on carbon emissions given its implications for growth and poverty alleviation, although it is open to technologies that curb carbon emissions and is actively pursuing alternative energies such as wind and hydropower. Finally, India's exclusion from the International Energy Agency has fueled the belief in New Delhi that it is being dictated to with regard to energy policy rather than having a role in the global energy policymaking structure.

Nonetheless, there also exist a number of areas of bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the energy sphere, especially in the area of the United States providing India with expertise and technology on improving its efficiency, including investment in the electric power sector, clean coal technologies, and resource mapping for oil, gas, and renewable energies such as wind power. The most notable instance of U.S.-India energy cooperation has been on the nuclear issue with the U.S.-India nuclear agreement being justified as a means to reduce India's dependence on oil, including imported oil from pariah regimes. In reality, nuclear power is unlikely to solve India's energy shortages in the foreseeable future given that it is starting from such a low base. Nonetheless, nuclear power does offer a potential solution to addressing environmental concerns from burning fossil fuels and, as such, is relevant to the climate change debate within India.

India and Japan, along with other major energy consuming countries in Asia can cooperate on addressing shared concerns to their energy security such as developing regional strategic petroleum reserves, the protection of sea-lines of communication, collective bargaining to address the Asian premium on imported oil, encouraging joint development of disputed energy-rich territories, and improving energy conservation and efficiency. Tokyo and Washington can also wield their diplomatic and economic strength to promote stability and integration along India's periphery, which in turn can fuel energy cooperation within the region.

The U.S. speaker addressed the issue of energy security on three levels: (1) the geopolitics of the relationship among the United States, India, and Japan; (2) the demand issue; and (3) the energy-environment nexus. He began by arguing that today's high prices, tight markets, unstable supplies, and sense of scarcity in world oil markets have resulted in growing anxiety among East Asian powers, the United States, and other major oil consuming nations in the form of energy nationalism. These tensions are further aggravated by the resource nationalism from producer governments, which are reducing access to supplies, squeezing the ability to produce, and underinvesting in production.

The U.S. speaker argued that energy has emerged as an issue of high politics of strategy rather than low politics of domestic economic energy policy. As such, energy has become too important to be left entirely to the markets. He called for the need to refocus on a common interest in a stable world oil market, reduced disruptions, more diverse supply sources and transport, and an environmentally sustainable future.

There are the makings of energy cooperation among the United States, Japan, and India, although if the three cooperate without China, it will become an anti-China process or at least China will perceive it that way. China needs to be included in this process, or it will not have much effect. Comparing India and China in terms of U.S. perceptions, the speaker noted the contrast between the constant bickering with China over its energy interests in pariah regimes and the muted response to India's interests in the same places. He suggested that this is a function of the strategic relationship between the United States and India, on the one hand, and mistrust in the U.S.-China relationship, which colors U.S. perceptions of China's behavior on energy issues, on the other.

The speaker had several specific recommendations. First, more aggressive bilateral dialogues that address broader strategic energy concerns. Second, India must be brought into some kind of alignment with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other institutions of global energy. Otherwise China, India, Russia, and the Middle East will set up their own institutions for global energy management, which will be much more statist and rigid. Third, there need to be stronger regional energy institutions for energy confidence building in the region.

Next, the U.S. speaker called for consuming nations to cooperate to control demand growth through painful market reforms and changes in domestic energy policies. The speaker said that this will take creative and courageous political leadership because it will require going up against powerful vested interests in each country. The speaker noted that the cost of reducing consumption is much lower than increasing production or other supply side solutions.

The speaker also addressed the energy-environment nexus. He argued that demand reduction, particularly for coal is the best solution for carbon and pollution concerns. The United States and Japan can bring tremendous technologies to bear on reducing India and China's coal demand, but this will need to be done with massive financial and technology transfers. The speaker highlighted that the United States and Japan, on the one hand, and China and India, on the other, are headed in fundamentally different trajectories on climate and carbon.

The Japanese speaker noted Japan's commitment to improving global energy efficiency by promoting energy conservation with both new technology and existing technology utilization through numerous bilateral and multilateral forums and dialogue and joint actions with emerging economies such as China and India. Another important energy concern for Japan is maintaining the security of supply through dialogue with the major oil producing countries. The resurgence of resource nationalism in these countries is destabilizing as it has unilaterally imposed restrictions against equal access, a failure to comply with contracts, and artificial limits on supply of oil and gas to markets. A third pillar of Japan's energy policy is to secure critical energy infrastructure, particularly the safety of navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz and securing pipelines from Russia to the Asian market.

In the discussion that followed, a U.S. participant highlighted that the IEA is dominated by industrialized economies although three-quarters of the growth in oil demand comes from developing countries resulting in a mismatch—with industrialized countries holding reserves and managing the decisionmaking process, while the growth in demand comes from developing countries. If the IEA is to remain relevant to the oil market, India and China must have some sort of institutional alignment if not membership whereby China and India can align themselves with the IEA's collective management of strategic stocks and range of expertise. If not, they will create their own system whereby there is a convergence between the interests of resource holders and insecure new demand countries to create a nonmarket system.

On the issue of carbon emissions, participants highlighted the fundamentally different viewpoints. Developing countries have three arguments: (1) per capita use is one-tenth that of the developed world; (2) industrial countries caused the problem, and as such they should fix it; and (3)

developed countries are exporting their carbon to the developing world as the latter are producing goods for markets in the former. The need for technology transfer between developed and developing countries was also discussed. The barriers in doing so included the scale of transfer, the willingness of developing countries to accept such technologies, enforcement of intellectual property rights, cost, and reforming the regulatory environment and bureaucracy to encourage investment.

## **Keynote Remarks**

In his keynote remarks, Ronen Sen, Indian ambassador to the United States, noted that India has been connected to East and Southeast Asia for centuries through trade and religion although these links were later weakened by European colonialism, the Cold War divide, and Indian protectionism. These connections are now being revitalized. Sen remarked that a number of economic and strategic commonalities are growing between Japan and India. India's "Look East" policy envisages Japan as a key partner in East Asia. India also recognizes the United States as a legitimate Pacific power. In this context, a trilateral relationship has begun to emerge.

Ambassador Sen continued by emphasizing that India, Japan, and the United States have shared values based on democracy and the rule of law. All three countries recognize that democracy and development are not only compatible but inextricably linked. India has demonstrated that, not just in developed but also developing countries, free markets work best and are most sustainable in free societies. Sen stressed that democracy and free market economies contribute to stability. The United States and Japan thus realize that India's development will be an instrument of stability in the region.

All three countries realize that potential for economic cooperation is just beginning to be tapped. Japan has assisted efforts to upgrade India's infrastructure. With the combination of U.S. innovation, Japanese technology, and Indian human capital there are significant opportunities for cooperation in high technology. Energy security is another key area of convergence, according to Sen. All three have interests in diversifying their energy portfolios, and all three are partners on green initiatives. Additionally, the three countries all attach a high priority to combating terrorism, as well as combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. He noted that cooperation between the United States, Japan, and India was extensive in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. A number of agreements have identified common defense priorities, and the first trilateral naval exercise was conducted in April 2007. The intersection of shared interests is also evident in cooperation within multilateral institutions. All three countries have a record of contributing positively to the international system. Sen concluded that this trilateral cooperation has not emerged from a decision to form a strategic alliance, but rather as a product of converging ideals and interests.

In the discussion that followed, Ambassador Sen identified opportunities for investment in India's economy, including its aviation and telecom sectors. There was also discussion on the role of India's soft power. Sen noted that Indian power has always tended to be soft, with the example of



Gandhi's nonviolent movement. He noted that Indian identity is a civilizational identity with democracy as one of its core values.

Sanjaya Baru of the Indian prime minister's office also noted areas of common concern and cooperation between India, Japan, and the United States. All three states have China as a major trading partner and share concerns over China's role on nuclear proliferation. All three states also adopt common positions on addressing Islamic extremism in Asia; promoting modern, secular education in the region; recognizing the legitimate interests of the United States in the Asia Pacific region; dealing with energy security, particularly on new technologies such as clean coal, renewables, and nuclear cooperation; and promoting democracy.

Baru noted that India continues to hold democracy as one of its strengths and is committed to promoting and strengthening democracy throughout the world. He noted potential for trilateral cooperation in developing Afghanistan into a modern democratic Islamic state, as well as addressing problems in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. He noted differences of opinion over Pakistan and Burma, which are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. China's rise continues in the background and must be taken into consideration for trilateral cooperation. China's relations with India's neighbors and ensuring that regional multilateral forums are not transformed into a club for China will be necessary. Finally, Baru noted that for the next 50 years India's relationships and foreign policies will be defined by its development priorities. He noted that Japan and the United States have a responsibility and opportunity to help India invest in its development.

## **Conclusion**

In concluding the conference, it was noted that a key question that remains to be addressed is how to deal with institutional challenges to trilateral cooperation. Considering the different histories and mindsets among the three countries, as well as between the three and other international and regional actors, it is necessary to enhance mutual trust and cooperation. Among the three countries, such issues as nonproliferation and global governance will continue to test the partnership, since the three tend to choose different ways to tackle these problems, though they may share the same philosophy. It was also hoped that the depth of discussion would encourage the network of scholars from the three countries to expand.

## **Part II. Meeting at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, February 18–19, 2008**

On February 18–19, 2008, the International Security Program and the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with the Japan Institute for International Affairs, held a private two-day meeting in Tokyo, Japan, entitled “Bridging Strategic Asia: The United States, Japan, and India.” The objective of the meeting was to continue the process of interactions among the three countries through dialogue on international security

issues among a select number of younger U.S., Japanese, and Indian foreign policy and security specialists. The meeting was the second of two meetings, the first having taken place in June 2007 in Washington, D.C. A corollary purpose of the initiative was to build a network that may form the basis for continued interaction and dialogue among the three countries in the future.

The Tokyo conference had sessions on economic convergence, Southeast Asia, counterterrorism, maritime security, and human rights and democracy. Keynote addresses were made by Sasae Kenichiro, Japanese deputy minister for foreign affairs; Hemant Krishan Singh, Indian ambassador to Japan; and Teresita Schaffer, former U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka and deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia.

## **Economic Convergence**

The first session of the conference focused on economic convergence among the three countries.

The presenter discussing India opened the first session by noting that U.S. and Indian interests converge more in Asia than anywhere else in the world. She noted that India's foreign policy is becoming more and more economically driven and that its neighbors to the East, particularly China and Japan, are becoming increasingly higher priorities.

India's partnership with Japan is particularly valued due to Japan's increasing investment in India. Moreover, the fact that Japan actually completes its projects is noted in India, in contrast to investments made by unnamed other countries.

The next speaker drew on this more than 20 years working in the private sector in Japan. His overarching observation was that significant capital is moving to Asia and that this is where his firm is seeing its strongest growth, growth that will continue even if the U.S. economy faces difficulty in the near to mid-term. He is particularly upbeat about Japan, the second-largest economy in the world and is a leader in the "green" economy, which will undoubtedly grow in the future. Regarding India-Japan economic relations, he noted that there are about 400 Japanese companies in India and that increased trade is likely on the horizon since it will follow investment. Regarding prospects for future growth, he suggested that lessons learned in Japan regarding efficiency could be applied to India, as well as "greening" technologies, which he said hoped Japan would share with India "generously."

The Japanese speaker discussed Asian economic convergence with an emphasis on free trade areas (FTAs) in the region. His first observation was that the ASEAN FTA has been a success, as tariffs on goods among the original six ASEAN members have almost completely been eliminated. However, Northeast Asia has been a failure in terms of free trade, with Japan, China, and South Korea having difficulty signing any sort of FTA among them. As a result, the Northeast Asian powers are striking out elsewhere. He contended that ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 will not be the end point of Asian integration because Asia is unwilling to set boundaries. Regarding the United States, he noted that Asia is a very open region and that U.S. participation is contingent on its own decision to engage. As for India's regional economic integration, while a Japan-India FTA is going to be very difficult to achieve, Japanese industry is behind the idea.

The discussion that followed focused on the current status of the Indian economy, the role of China and South Korea in the economic web, and understanding of India in Japan.

The discussants agreed that India's economic emergence should be viewed somewhat cautiously. An important reason for this caution is the underdeveloped state of India's infrastructure, an area that all parties agree must be a priority. For this reason and others, Japanese and U.S. trade and investment with India are still in their infancy, compared, for instance, with their interests in China.

Other reasons for a deficit of Japanese trade and investment in India were also drawn out during the discussion. One reason cited by several members of the group was a general unfamiliarity with India in Japan. Compared with China, very few Japanese students study or focus on India. Another problem is that Japan is often risk averse, something that Korean firms, for instance, are not. All in all, despite some immediate challenges, the group agreed that Japan-India economic links will undoubtedly grow in coming years.

## **Southeast Asia**

The second session focused on Southeast Asia, with presenters from each country offering assessments of their country's strategy for the region.

The session began with a discussion of recent U.S. neglect of regional multilateral organizations and some of its historically strong bilateral partnerships in Southeast Asia, which is in stark contrast to China's engagement in the region. A speaker noted that there is potential for change in the near term if the next president were to undertake a number of initiatives, such as working with regional leaders on soft power issues such as climate change, signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and making sure that the U.S. secretary of state attends ASEAN Regional Forum summits. Ideally, policy toward the region would be coordinated to some degree with Tokyo. The speaker continued by noting that the U.S. position in the region is a bit paradoxical; it is weak in terms of multilateral diplomacy and public opinion, but strong in terms of bilateral relationships and partnerships. All together, this suggests that, while the United States is not sufficiently using its many levers of influence today, there is potential for change in the short to mid-term.

The Japanese presenter continued the session by highlighted the changing geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia due to the rise of China. He noted his belief that China's end goal is to supplant the traditional regional order, which was dominated by the United States and Japan. This shift is already apparent, with China and Japan's rivalry putting Southeast Asia nations in an uncomfortable and difficult position. One result of China's emergence is a stronger form of regionalism that is marked by the transformation of ASEAN as a major factor in Southeast Asian affairs and East Asian affairs more broadly. Much like the United States, Southeast Asian nations have adopted three policies—constructive engagement, hedging, and balancing—to manage challenges and opportunities posed by China's rise.

The Indian presenter began by reminding the group that India's 1990s "Look East" policy was a marked departure from decades of inattention to Southeast Asia. Since that time, India has

changed considerably internally, and its relations with Southeast Asia have grown. However, the reality is that Indian interests and influence are very small compared to those of the United States and Japan—and even South Korea and Australia—and are more about future potential than present conditions. Even moving forward, India faces difficulties. One reason is that India’s “assets,” such as democracy and pluralism, which are appealing to the United States, are less important to Southeast Asians than economic development. Instead, they see decrepit infrastructure, a country poorer than China, real “downtowns,” in certain cities and the like. Another problem that India faces is its own rough neighborhood, which has failed to stabilize, making it difficult for India to claim a role in Southeast Asia. From the Southeast Asian side, the question of how it views India’s democracy is related to its own democratic development. If democracy had truly taken root in Southeast Asia, India would be more appealing, but to date, it has not. Ultimately, however, India’s influence in Southeast Asia will be dependent on its domestic economic performance.

The discussion that followed focused on a variety of issues, in particular the role of diasporas in forging ties and perspectives on Indonesia and Burma.

It was noted that diasporas, including the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, have the potential to serve as bridges between one’s homeland and the land of one’s ancestors. However, two major problems were pointed out in the case of Indians in Southeast Asia. First of all, there are very few Indians compared to Chinese in Southeast Asia. Second, the largest ethnic-Indian population in Southeast Asia (Malaysia) occupies a complicated and disadvantaged place in Malaysian society. As an example of the potential that diasporas can hold, however, it was pointed out that one should look at the Vietnamese-American community as a driver of stronger U.S.-Vietnam relations.

When asked if U.S., Japanese, and Indian strategic objectives converge in Indonesia, the group offered a mixed picture. On one hand there are common interests such as maritime security and the consolidation of democracy. However, there are problems in Indonesia’s bilateral relations with each country. Regarding India, the two countries are often rivals because they are both big and poor, people-to-people relations are very thin, and the rise of pride in Islam in Indonesia has diminished the country’s Indic underpinnings. As for the United States, it must be careful to be delicate as it administers its programs in Indonesia due to popular distrust of Washington. It was agreed that Japan gets little credit for its many contributions to the country.

On the Burma issue, the group had significant disagreements. Some were sympathetic to India’s engagement with the Burmese junta, believing that India had no other option due to its security situation in its northeast and increased Chinese involvement in Burma. Others vehemently disagreed, saying that they did not think that India had any real interests in Burma. Also, some pointed out the complexity of China’s presence in Burma, given that Chinese influence is greatest in Mandalay and the north, while the Burmese leadership is hunkered down in Naypyidaw.

## Counterterrorism

The third session, on counterterrorism, demonstrated distinctly different perspectives held by the three countries on the issue due to their individual experiences.

The U.S. participant began by suggesting that the threat is overstated and that it ought not be at the center of U.S. defense policy. In this spirit, he offered six organizing principles for thinking about the threat: (1) do not exaggerate the issue; (2) realize that Islamist groups may collapse on their own; (3) look to lower the temperature by addressing grievances like Israel/Palestine and Kashmir; (4) realize that terrorism cannot be neatly thrown in one basket, since groups such as Hezbollah and al Qaeda differ; (5) look to allies and partners for lessons learned; and (6) develop a much “softer” approach to counter the threat. He continued his presentation by sharing his frustration with the “high-fear globalization” that the United States has helped propagate over “high-trust globalization.” The United States needs fundamentally to change its approach to the world in this regard by working on its soft power, not overreacting to horrific but small events, and being generous with its aid and intelligence sharing.

The Japanese participant continued the discussion by arguing that the threat of terrorism in Japan is relatively low. Nevertheless, he advocated a three-pronged counterterrorism approach for Japan, combining prevention, consequence management, and pursuit, since Japan currently lacks a cohesive and strategic framework. It also does not have a legal definition of terrorism or a system of designating state sponsors of terrorism. Furthermore, he noted that Japan did not even do an independent review following the attacks on the Tokyo subway, so it is in need of a comprehensive review to ensure that Japan is prepared for a terrorist attack. All in all, while terrorism is not such a major threat to Japan, Tokyo should develop a national strategy for counterterrorism, both domestically and internationally.

The Indian presenter continued with an assessment of India’s unique perspective on terrorism, given its experience with both domestic and international terrorism. He noted that India’s fears are heightened by an upsurge in the global terrorism fears, which have led to two important strands in India’s counterterrorism strategy: (1) cooperating with other countries; and (2) sharing India’s experience in fighting terrorism. Although U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation suffered during the 1980s and 1990s for a host of reasons, New Delhi offered “unlimited support” to Washington, reviving an emphasis on defense cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. The presenter also noted the importance of the United States beginning to notice Pakistan as a source of terrorism, which has led to a frank discussion of security threats and national interests between top officials in New Delhi and Washington.

The presenter went on to argue that India’s substantial experience with counterterrorism should be utilized internationally, including with Japan. In this regard, there have been positive developments in India-Japan cooperation with the establishment of security dialogues to identify future areas of cooperation. In the immediate future, Japan’s comprehensive counterterrorism assistance to Southeast Asia offers a promising template for building Indo-Japanese security relations. All together, even as there are important differences between New Delhi and

Washington and between New Delhi and Tokyo, there remains immense potential for U.S.-India and India-Japan cooperation on counterterrorism.

The group's discussion included a rebuttal by one U.S. discussant of an earlier speaker's view of the terrorist threat, labeling it as somewhat complacent. He argued that it reflected 20/20 hindsight and also does not take into account that a government in a democracy has to appear that it is actively addressing an apparent threat. That earlier speaker responded by elaborating on the mistakes the United States has made before and after 9/11, such as failing to fill the strategic void at the end of the Cold War, thinking about counterterrorism strictly in a security-minded way, freely calling a variety of activities "terrorism," and failing to harden the peace-minded majorities in the Middle East.

## **Maritime Security**

The U.S. presenter began the session by noting that maritime security is emerging as a central security issue both in Asia and globally. Securing sea lanes in the western Pacific is a major U.S. objective, which largely relies on the U.S. maintaining a global forward-deployed presence to ensure access. The presenter noted a new security reality is emerging. He urged the United States to note the changing regional dynamics, helping allies and friends, particularly South Korea and Indonesia to develop their navies. He argued that protecting sea lanes is paramount for resource and commercial reasons (Strait of Hormuz, oil, etc), and the United States can do it by continuing to promote stability in the source regions (Iraq, Syria, Iran), while empowering friends in Asia to secure and stabilize the destinations.

The Japanese presenter continued with a discussion of the vulnerabilities of sea lanes in Asia today, as well as the opportunities available for bilateral and trilateral cooperation on maritime security. He noted that there are many issues plaguing the sea lanes of Asia, including maritime territorial disputes, piracy, international terrorism, and others. He noted that maritime security cooperation is in keeping with the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance and that successive Japanese governments had expressed willingness to further these efforts. He discussed the efforts between Japan and China to avoid incidents at sea—the "three P" process (3 Ps)—but indicated that this was far from a comprehensive solution and further confidence building was needed. He also stressed, especially in the case of Japan-China maritime cooperation, the importance of communication, which has been quite weak. The presenter finished by indicating that a partnership among democracies would be the most successful, because of shared goals, values, and interests. Thus, India is an ideal partner for broader Asian maritime security.

The Indian presenter began by noting that, while the United States worked out the relationship between politics and naval power long ago, India is still working on it. Due to a generally negative attitude toward sea power in India, the Indian Navy is forced to talk about constabulary duties such as antipiracy, counterterrorism, and antitrafficking. However, naval strategy and power is intertwined with geopolitics, and New Delhi is becoming increasingly nervous about China's rise and its ambitions for access to the Indian Ocean, making India feel that it is being contained.

Moving forward, he noted large swaths of common interest among India, Japan, and the United States regarding China, Pakistan, North Korea, Taiwan, terrorism, and other areas. Ultimately it will be politics that will determine what is operationally feasible.

During the short discussion that followed, participants suggested that China and South Korea ought to be part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). China in particular would be a valued partner, according to one participant, as it would be a way to bring it into the current normative framework.

## **Human Rights and Democracy**

The final session dealt with the role of human rights and democracy in the foreign policies of the three countries. Each presenter focused, at least some time, on the Burma issue.

The U.S. presenter began by describing the moral challenge in Burma. While Burma should be the logical pivot between South and East Asia, he said, it is instead a problem that divides. On this issue, the major division between approaches is between those who want to manage the problem and those who want to solve the problem. India is a classic example of a country that wants to manage the problem, as was the United States for almost 20 years before changing its approach decisively after the Burmese junta crushed the September 2007 uprising. Regarding the problem's resolution, the presenter argued that conditions must be created inside Burma so that the junta and the opposition can reach a compromise. In order to create these conditions, the international community needs to attack the junta's personal interests through smart sanctions, which ultimately will involve targeting wealth deposited abroad. Only in this way can leverage be created. As for coordination with Japan and India, it is essential that they speak in one voice alongside the United States, that Japan implement targeted sanctions and that it change from a "managing" approach to a "solving" approach. He closed by pointing out that India's strategic objective will not be achieved with the junta in power, namely, China's port will be built and India's wild northeast will still be wild so long as the junta remains.

The Japanese presenter provided an overview of the importance of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy, especially in light of Japan's much-discussed values-oriented diplomacy proposed under Prime Minister Abe. She began by reviewing the increasing importance of human rights policy within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the last 30 years. She explained Japan's stated philosophy on the promotion of human rights abroad, which she characterized as flexible and having the ability to be tailored to different situations. She also noted that Japanese official development assistance (ODA) policy has changed recently to stipulate that countries must have a good track record in human rights, market liberalization, and freedom to be considered for assistance. She also discussed three examples in which Japan has had to balance various interests—North Korea, China, and Burma. On North Korea, Japan has had to balance its security concerns with humanitarian concerns over the abductees issue. On China, Japan has had to balance concerns about its human rights situation with the need to maintain good relations in

light of historical problems. On Burma, Japan has had to balance economic interests and sentimental historical ties with concerns about its human rights record.

The Indian presenter noted that while India should be at the forefront of human rights and democracy promotion globally, it has not taken on this role. While India should have been a democratic model for the developing world during the Cold War, it could not promote democracy in its foreign policy because it had to focus on growing its economy first; it could not choose sides between the United States and the Soviet Union for domestic reasons; and it was bogged down with domestic insurgencies, as well as the Sri Lanka conflict, which turned it inward. The end of the Cold War has allowed India to consolidate its democracy and develop its economy, which is changing its character and offers an opportunity to rethink the importance of democracy to its foreign policy. Nonetheless, she said, India remains consumed by internal challenges, insurgencies, and territorial defense priorities with regard to Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. She closed by saying that the outlook for democracy as a conceptual frame for Indian foreign policymaking was mixed, since some Indian leaders see it as an important component and others simply do not.

The discussion then focused on Burma, which remained an area of disagreement between the three countries and thus an interesting case study on values-based cooperation. One Japanese participant wondered if Japan is really sticking to its principles in the Burma case and wondered if it might be using the “Asian values” excuse once more. On the Indian side, a participant noted that no amount of cajoling would convince New Delhi that engagement was not in their national interest, while a U.S. participant argued that Indian backing gives the junta precious confidence and that India does not realize how much damage this may do to its image in Washington. It was also pointed out by more than one participant that Burma could potentially be an area of U.S.-Japan-India cooperation if the junta were to fall and the international community had to pick up the pieces and that near-term cooperation should begin to prepare for that eventuality.

Turning to the U.S. approach to human rights and democracy abroad, the group found agreement that the United States is selective in its policy. Where it has significant national security interests (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan), it is quiet; where it does not have major security interests (Burma), it speaks loudly. However, one participant argued that regardless of inconsistencies, when there is an opportunity to speak out, and in the case of Burma, it is important to act.

## **Keynote Remarks**

Sasae Kenichiro, Japanese deputy minister for foreign affairs, began his remarks by noting that Asia is relatively calm and prosperous, despite a few problems areas. He outlined Japan’s strategic outlook, noting its expectations and hopes for the United States, China, North Korea, India, and Asian regionalism in turn.

Sasae said he expected more active and consistent Japanese engagement from the United States. He contended that the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to be strong, because it serves the region broadly.



Although there are natural adjustment periods after leadership changes, it should be recognized that Japan is the United States' most important ally in Asia.

Turning to China, Sasae noted that China's rise is a fact that must be accepted and welcomed. Rather than trying to contain China, a new, constructive approach is necessary. However, he noted, one must remember that China faces huge challenges, both foreign and domestic.

Sasae added that it is a critical moment for U.S.-Japan cooperation regarding North Korea. While acknowledging that U.S.-Japan collaboration has been reasonably good and has come a long way, priorities still need to be set between the two countries. Most importantly, the United States should work with Japan and South Korea, as opposed to thinking about its policy toward North Korea alone.

Sasae expressed his governments desire to see more active participation by the United States in Asian regional forums. At the same time, the United States should be able to trust Japan to lead the process. Noting that both track I and track II dialogues are expanding, he said he sees the need for more regional and more U.S.-Japan-South Korea dialogue on North Korea and other issues.

Turning to India, Sasae noted that Japan and India have a lot in common, since they are both large democracies, and that India's role is being felt more prominently in the region as of late. As India's attention shifts east, Sasae sees possibilities for more U.S.-Japan-India cooperation in trilateral relations. Currently, Japan would like to see more from India on Burma, climate change, and nonproliferation. He also noted that India's nuclear program remains a concern for Japan, which will be a major issue at this summer's G-8 summit.

All in all, Sasae thinks that Japan's top priority, even as it still bids for UN Security Council reform, is to seek harmony between the U.S.-Japan alliance and its partnerships in Asia, including with China. Lastly, the biggest threat is also the biggest opportunity for cooperation, that being climate change, an issue on which Japan is determined to lead.

H.K. Singh, India's ambassador to Japan, focused his remarks on the evolving Japan-India relationship.

Ambassador Singh began his remarks by reflecting on a history of strong Japan-India relations extending over 1,400 years and remarked that Japan-India relations are poised to play a critical role in shaping the future of Asia, especially as India turns its attention east.

Ambassador Singh discussed at length how Japan-India relations intensified between 2000 and 2005 in a variety of areas as a result of growing recognition by both sides of strategic convergences and economic complementarities. On the leadership level, the two countries hold annual summits and minister-level strategic dialogues and biannual dialogues with vice ministers. The two navies and coast guards hold joint exercises, and defense officials regularly discuss counterterrorism and nonproliferation, among other issues. Economic relations are developing rapidly, anchored by increased Japanese interest in investing in India. While currently limited, people-to-people exchanges are on the rise. Thinking about the relationship in the context of the broader region, Singh discussed his government's appreciation that Japan is supportive of India's involvement in

East Asia. All together, the two governments have outlined a roadmap toward an enhanced partnership.

Ambassador Singh also took some time to discuss Japan-India relations in light of the new Fukuda administration in Tokyo. First and foremost, despite changes in Japan's outlook under Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda as opposed to Prime Minister Abe, the substance of Japan-India relations remains unchanged, an assessment confirmed by a recent conversation between the nations' prime ministers. There is a mutual belief that a strong India is good for Japan and a strong Japan is good for India. The top priority in the relationship must be to substantiate the economic engagement, an area in which the private sector will be critical.

Ambassador Singh concluded by offering a final thought, "At the end of the day, it does not matter how much goodwill there is between India and Japan and how unblemished their relations have been; what matters is the value each country attaches to nurturing their relationship and the sustained efforts of leaders, governments, and the private sector to play their respective roles in pursuing common objectives. Nothing can undermine our common future more than the benign neglect of our strategic convergences and the opportunities for economic partnership that now surely lie within our grasp."

## **Conclusion: The Way Forward in U.S.-Japan-India Relations**

The artificial division that has separated "East Asia" and "South Asia" in strategic mindsets and government bureaus in the United States and elsewhere is overdue for review. Over the past decade, there is no question that this review has begun to occur, with India in particular taking its place as an increasingly important element in the strategic dynamics of Northeast and Southeast Asia. India's "Look East" policy, rapid economic development, and widening strategic goals, which take it beyond its immediate periphery, have produced a fresh awareness of India as a potential asset for partnership on a range of global issues, leading virtually all of the world's major nations to beat a path to its door to discuss building relationships based on an assortment of mutual interests.

The United States and Japan have not been exceptions to this trend. Indeed, the present study built on this new awareness within all three capitals of the importance and relevance of India to the affairs of East Asia and of the potential benefits of cooperation among the three sides to global affairs more broadly. As indicated in this report, the United States, beginning in the last years of the Clinton administration and then picking up steam during the Bush administration, actively reached out to build political, economic, and military ties with India. The culmination of these efforts came with the conclusion of the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, which became an important symbol of mutual commitment to a new strategic relationship.

Japan, once dismissive of entreaties to consider India a potential economic or political opportunity, has awakened to the economic and strategic value of a resurgent India. Japanese

leaders and companies today are seeking to make up for lost time through regular official visits and business outreach, particularly in the information technology and infrastructure development sectors.

The U.S.-Japan alliance, of course, is a far deeper and institutionalized relationship. In recent years, the alliance has focused more and more on expanding the scope of the relationship beyond the narrow confines of Japanese defense. The alliance has also sought to reach out to include other major powers for expanded and coordinated cooperation in a kind of new “alliance pluralism.” U.S. allies Australia and Korea have been notable participants in this regard. India’s size and rising salience in international affairs have led the United States and Japan to consider India in the same light.

It is clear that India is far from ready to be a comparable ally to the United States and Japan. New Delhi’s tradition of suspicion toward great powers, a legacy of its colonial past; strict sensitivity to protecting its sovereign independence from outside interference or influence; and continued commitment to a policy of “strategic autonomy” will limit the pace and degree of partnership in coming years. Its “nonaligned” mentality, a holdover from the Cold War, remains deeply ingrained in the instincts of its political and bureaucratic elite, fueling suspicion particularly of the United States. While many in Washington and Tokyo have grand ambitions for an India that aligns with the “West” over time, even if informally, they will have to accommodate an India whose primary focus for the foreseeable future will be inward, on its economic and social development, while remaining quite independent and restrained in its foreign policy despite some overlapping interests, goals, and values.

As indicated in this report, however, the most severe constraint on the relationships is arguably the lack of institutional understanding and personal and cultural ties—among the elites of the United States and Japan on the one hand and India on the other. The deep knowledge and history of interaction necessary for mutual trust and strategic ties simply is not present within those two bilateral relationships. Nonetheless, that gap is narrowing steadily, and further narrowing that gap in understanding and in institutional and personal ties was one of the motivating factors of the present project.

Indeed, the project identified a number of areas in which trilateral cooperation on issues of overlapping interest has great potential—from maritime affairs to nonproliferation and energy security, from economic development to counterterrorism. The growing maritime capabilities of Japan and India, for instance, will enable greater potential coordination and cooperation in sea lane security. Highly reliant on maritime transit for the critical trade, energy, and other resources required for their national development, India and Japan have a natural incentive to work together in this arena. Indeed, the three countries already have begun combined naval exercises to build joint capacity and cooperate on international security through the Proliferation Security Initiative and Container Security Initiative.

The common challenge of balancing continued economic growth with the hazards of increased energy consumption to feed that growth—from readily available and sustained energy supply to

basic air quality to climate change—lends itself naturally to trilateral cooperation. The three countries are among the top five energy consumers in the world, with Japan the world's most energy efficient country and India highly inefficient. The United States and Japan are leaders in the development of technologies to capture carbon emissions and develop alternative energy sources, such as nuclear, solar, wind power, etc. Given the stakes for India—and other nations—of environmental degradation and climate change, New Delhi is an essential country with which to partner to harness both its market for new environmentally friendly technologies and its people's growing ingenuity and creativity in developing these technologies. Indeed, U.S.-Japan-India cooperation and coordination could serve as a leading nexus in the ongoing international discussion of the issue within both the developed and developing worlds as they represent major actors in each camp.

Likewise, as leading developed and developing nations, the three countries can play a potentially crucial role in the establishment of values and norms, whether on aid conditionality, human rights, or good governance standards. Among the world's longest-standing and largest democracies, they can work together to help set standards of international conduct during a period when the traditional standards set by the West are under some stress from new rising powers such as China. How Japan and India choose to apply themselves in providing aid and promoting trade, democracy, and other norms internationally remains uncertain, although the rhetoric from recent governments within each nation offers hope for common purpose and action in this regard. The continuing tragedy of Burma, despite some conflicting interests, offers a useful platform for consideration of coordinated, if not identical, action toward a common strategic goal.

More broadly, the three nations have mutual concern about the transnational effects of rogue actors. This includes safeguarding the security of nuclear material and mitigating its spread to Islamic extremists and other unsavory and unstable nations such as North Korea. The broader question of stability and development in the Middle East and South Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan, are hardly the unique concern of the United States or India today but have implications with far-reaching impact on the three countries and beyond. The world's two largest economies and the dominant power in South Asia would do well to discuss and coordinate their approaches to these questions.

As three of the central players in Asia's political and economic future, the United States, Japan, and India ought to discuss the emerging security architecture of the region, as well. The three countries should consider questions about the agenda and direction of the East Asian Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum, even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They have a clear common agenda concerning reform of the United Nations, including expansion of permanent membership on the UN Security Council to include Japan and India, and they would do well to discuss strategies about how to realize that goal.

In the end, engaging in such a dialogue on these and other issues will require accommodation to new patterns of interaction. It is not natural for those in the United States and Japan to consider regular dialogues with India given the thin understanding of India within the East Asian establishments of each. India, as well, has not traditionally viewed these nations as potential partners in international affairs. Nonetheless, trilateral opportunities on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, even the East Asian Summit in the future can build habits of interaction and greater understanding of perspectives from which a meaningful partnership can evolve. Policy planning divisions of respective foreign and defense ministries may also consider holding periodic meetings to scope out a common agenda.

More practically, the three governments should establish dialogue processes on specific functional issues, such as energy security, humanitarian assistance, and climate change, as part of the emerging “mini-lateral” pattern of cooperation that is becoming the preferred method for addressing a range of common challenges. It is no secret that the larger multilateral vehicles, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, have proved too large and unwieldy to be effective in addressing practical problems. Solutions to these issues require more focused attention among a smaller set of nations with common interests, common commitment, and the ability, experience, and inclination to apply their capabilities to the task at hand. The Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea and the rapid response of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India to the December 2005 tsunami in Southeast Asia are examples of just such mini-lateral cooperation. The United States, Japan, and India could serve as another component of this emerging regional security architecture to help set the agenda and terms of discussion for addressing a host of common challenges.

Such a trilateral vehicle, of course, would not supplant others or seek to exclude others from the discussion. During the conduct of the present project and throughout the two conferences, the specter of China necessarily loomed over the trilateral dialogue. Some will assume that promoting the notion of a U.S.-Japan-India trilateral must have the exclusion, if not encirclement, of China in mind. That is not the case. All three countries recognized that China should not and cannot be excluded from the discussion over the future of Asia and Asian security affairs and that it is an essential part of any solution. While all sides betrayed uncertainty about the future trajectory of a rising China, and saw the benefit of hedging strategies against a potentially aggressive China, none recommended an antagonistic posture toward Beijing, nor did any suggest that a trilateral bloc directed against China would be productive, viable, or desirable for their respective national interests.

Indeed, all three countries registered support for a peaceful, open, stable, and economically viable China that integrates itself constructively into the international system. They likewise noted that China supported its own set of mini-lateral vehicles, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to the ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan, Korea) process to the Six-Party Talks. Given the attention China is giving to linking itself with like-minded countries to promote its agenda and shape the discussion in ways it prefers, the consensus view was that it should not be considered provocative for democratic nations such as the United States, Japan, and India to do the same, but

rather should be viewed as healthy for the ongoing debate about the shape of the international system in coming years.

U.S. alliances combined with a host of overlapping dialogues and institutions will likely serve as the “order” of East Asia as the region undergoes a transition toward a more permanent security architecture. Participants commented that the key is for these dialogues and institutions to be open and inclusive, directed not at other countries but at the transnational questions and common challenges the region faces. And nothing about the addition of India to the discussion should suggest either an expansion or dilution of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but rather should be viewed as a force multiplier, an appropriate union of like-minded countries that for too long have ignored the possibilities and benefits of cooperation and that together can leverage their weight in the pursuit of common objectives.

As indicated above, however, even as the United States, Japan, and India consider greater cooperation, it was clear from the conference discussions that they each must make adjustments in their foreign policies and traditional mindsets to realize these possibilities. As indicated above, India remains caught in transition between those who retain a traditional postcolonial, nonaligned mindset of suspicion about the international system and those who want India to engage in that system, integrate itself actively into the global order, and thus make itself relevant to the affairs of the world. Taking this latter course, however, will require voluntarily mitigating its sovereign independence to a slight degree—just as all others in the international system have done. Only through this latter course may India become a great power and a great partner. The debate in New Delhi on this point is ongoing and may take time to work itself out fully as generations change and a new strategic culture emerges in India. But the trend toward openness and engagement seems inexorable, offering hope for international partnerships with India in years to come.

Likewise, Japan must reach a sustainable consensus about what kind of role it wants to play in international affairs. Its foreign policy ambitions have grown in recent years, with apparent changes in the more reticent and restrained post–World War II mindset, due to generational change and more assertive leadership at the political center. But as noted above, Japan continues to labor under legal and political self-constraints in the deployment of its “self-defense force” to problem areas, and it continues to resist asserting its right to collective self-defense in conjunction with the United States and others. Political division has caused gridlock within the Japanese system, constraining decisive action in international affairs. As a result, Japan’s growing capability and interest to engage more actively is not matched by consistent action, affecting its reliability as a partner.

Finally, the United States has been distracted from strategic focus on the affairs of East Asia, instead applying its attention and assets to the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan. Missteps in Iraq and in the war on terrorism, and economic difficulties affecting the international trading and financial system, have negatively impacted U.S. leadership and its reputation in the world. Outdated notions of a dominant United States that can dictate the terms of international debate

without consideration of the opinions of others have constrained effective and sustainable U.S. leadership in recent years. Despite this, however, the United States retains a reservoir of authority and respect internationally that may be rekindled with better leadership and policy. Should it decide to engage with greater consistency and strategic focus, in ways that are viewed as consistent with the values and interests of old and new partners alike in fresh vehicles that reflect the conditions of an evolving strategic environment in Asia (and elsewhere), the United States can quickly regain its footing.

It is clear that U.S.-Japan-India trilateral cooperation is a work in progress, a nascent notion with great potential, but that it is likely to move deliberately in practice. That is as it should be given the distance all three sides need to go to overcome legacies of the past. The step-by-step process required to advance the relationship will only occur, however, through more consistent interaction, confidence building, and habits of cooperation over time. The present project demonstrated the tremendous synergies among the three great powers and the enormous but productive learning curve inherent in convening specialists that bridge East and South Asia. As the United States, Japan, and India look to the future, narrowing this gap—and redefining, indeed “bridging strategic Asia” in the process—will become more relevant to all sides in handling the challenges and opportunities they will face in the twenty-first century.



# APPENDIX A

## CONFERENCE AGENDAS

### Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., June 28-29, 2007

#### June 28, 2007

Welcome:	John J. Hamre, <i>President and CEO, CSIS</i>
Introduction:	Teresita Schaffer, <i>Director, South Asia Program, CSIS</i> Derek Mitchell, <i>Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS</i>
Welcome Address	
Chair:	Stephen Flanagan, <i>Director, International Security Program, CSIS</i>
Speaker:	Richard A. Boucher, <i>Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State</i>
First Session:	Strategic Visions
Chair:	Derek Mitchell, <i>Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS</i>
United States:	Michael J. Green, <i>Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS</i>
Japan:	Heigo Sato, <i>Professor, Takushoku University</i>
India:	Suba Chandran, <i>Professor, Jammu University</i>
Luncheon Address:	U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
Chair:	Stephen Flanagan, <i>Director, International Security Program, CSIS</i>
Speaker:	James Clad, <i>Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, U.S. Department of Defense</i>
Second Session:	China
Chair:	W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, <i>Professor, Madras Christian College</i>
Presenters:	Alka Acharya, <i>Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University</i> Yasuhiro Matsuda, <i>Senior Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies</i> Derek Mitchell, <i>Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS</i>



## Reception & Dinner

Chair: Stephen Flanagan, *Director, International Security Program, CSIS*

Speaker: Ronen Sen, *Indian Ambassador to the United States*

## June 29, 2007

### Morning Address

Chair: Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*

Speaker: Sanjaya Baru, *Spokesman, Indian Prime Minister's Office*

First Session: Nonproliferation

Chair: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Presenters: Nobumasa Akiyama, *Professor, Hitotsubashi University*  
W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, *Professor, Madras Christian College*  
Jon Wolfsthal, *Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*

### Luncheon Address

Chair: Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*

Speaker: Ryoza Kato, *Japanese Ambassador to the United States*

Third Session: Energy Security

Chair: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Presenters: Chietigj Bajpae, *Research Associate, South Asia Program, CSIS*  
Mikkal E. Herberg, *Research Director, Energy Security Program, National Bureau of Asian Research*  
Manabu Miyagawa, *Director, Economic Security Division, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Wrap-up Session: Next Steps/Future Challenges and Opportunities for Trilateral Cooperation

Chair: Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*  
Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*

**The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan,  
February 18-19, 2008**

**February 18, 2008**

Welcome: Yukio Satoh, *President, JIIA*

Introduction: Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*  
Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*

First Session: Economic Convergence

Chair: Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*

Presenters: Krishen Mehta, *Partner, Pricewaterhouse Coopers in Tokyo*  
Fukunari Kimura, *Professor, Keio University*

Luncheon Address

Chair: Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*

Speaker: Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*

Second Session: Southeast Asia

Chair: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Presenters: Ben Dolven, *Senior Director, Brookings Asia*  
Nobuto Yamamoto, *Professor, Keio University*  
Sadanand Dhume, *Bernard Schwartz Fellow, Asia Society*

Third Session: Counterterrorism

Chair: Raja Menon, *Rear Admiral (ret.), Indian Navy*

Presenters: Steven Clemons, *Director, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation*  
Naofumi Miyasaka, *Professor, National Defense Academy*  
Manjeet Singh Pardesi, *Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Bloomington*

Dinner

Chair: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Speaker: Kenichiro Sasae, *Deputy Minister, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

## February 19, 2008

First Session: Maritime Security

Chair: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Presenters: Michael McDevitt, *Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Center for Naval Analysis*

Hideaki Kaneda, *Director, OKAZAKI Institute*

Raja Menon, *Rear Admiral (ret.), Indian Navy*

### Luncheon Address

Chair: Raja Menon, *Rear Admiral (ret.), Indian Navy*

Speaker: Hemant Krishan Singh, *Indian Ambassador to Japan*

Second Session: Human Rights and Democracy

Chair: Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*

Presenters: Tom Malinowski, *Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch*

Ikuko Togo, *Professor, Kanazawa Institute of Technology*


Maya Chadda, *Professor, William Paterson University of New Jersey*

Wrap-up Session: Next Steps/Future Challenges and Opportunities for Trilateral Cooperation

Presenters: Takashi Osanai, *Deputy Director-General, JIIA*

Derek Mitchell, *Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS*

Teresita Schaffer, *Director, South Asia Program, CSIS*



## APPENDIX B

### CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

#### Washington, D.C., Participants

Carla Abercrombie  
U.S. Department of Defense

Alka Acharya  
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Takeshi Akahori  
Embassy of Japan

Nobumasa Akiyama  
Hitotsubashi University

Chietigj Bajpae  
CSIS

Sanjaya Baru  
Indian Prime Minister's Office

Richard A. Boucher  
U.S. Department of State

Suba Chandran  
Jammu University

James Clad  
U.S. Department of Defense

Lisa Curtis  
Heritage Foundation

Xenia Dormandy  
Harvard University

Carolyn Fleisher  
Center for Global Partnership

Michael Green  
CSIS

Gloria Gong  
General Electric

David P. Good  
Tata Group

John Hamre  
CSIS

Mikkal E. Herberg  
National Bureau of Asian Research

Loren Hershey  
Attorney at Law

Masafumi Ishii  
Embassy of Japan

Ryozo Kato  
Japanese Ambassador to the United States

Alex Lennon  
*The Washington Quarterly*

Claudio A. Lilienfeld  
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Surjit Mansingh  
American University

Daniel Markey  
Council on Foreign Relations

Yasuhiro Matsuda  
Japanese Ministry of Defense

Kiyoto Tsuji  
CSIS

Daudi David Migereko  
General Electric

Tsuneo Watanabe  
Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute

Derek J. Mitchell  
CSIS

Jon Wolfsthal  
CSIS

Manabu Miyagawa  
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Adeline Wong  
Embassy of Singapore

Anit Mukherjee  
Johns Hopkins University

Takeshi Yuzawa  
Japan Institute of International Affairs

Niharika Chibber Joe  
Mansfield Foundation

Takashi Osanai  
Japan Institute of International Affairs

W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar  
Nanyang Technological University

Anupam Ray  
CSIS

Heigo Sato  
Takushoku University

Teresita Schaffer  
CSIS

Ronen Sen  
Indian Ambassador to the United States

Anirudh Suri  
Carnegie Endowment for International  
Peace

Yuki Tatsumi  
Henry L. Stimson Center

## Tokyo Participants

Maya Chadda  
William Patterson University

Steven Clemons  
New America Foundation

Sadanand Dhume  
Asia Society

Ben Dolven  
BrooksBowerAsia

Kimura Fukunari  
Keio University

Brian Harding  
CSIS

Kaneda Hideki  
Okazaki Institute

Togo Ikuko  
Kanazawa Institute of Technology

Sasae Kenichiro  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tom Malinowski  
Human Rights Watch

Michael McDevitt  
CNA Corporation

Krishen Mehta  
Pricewaterhouse Coopers

Raja Menon  
Indian Navy (ret.)

Derek Mitchell  
CSIS

Miyasaka Naofumi  
National Defense Academy

Yamamoto Nobuto  
Keio University

Isanori Oha  
JIIA

Manjeet Singh Pardesi  
Indiana University

Teresita Schaffer  
CSIS

Hermant Krishan Singh  
Embassy of India

Osanai Takashi  
JILA

Satoh Yukio  
JILA