

*FOLLOW THE MONEY:*

WHY THE US IS LOSING THE WAR IN  
AFGHANISTAN

Draft: September 19, 2008

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Most of the literature on the cost of the Iraq War, Afghan War, and “war on terrorism” focuses on the burden it places on the federal budget and the US economy. These are very real issues, but they also have deflected attention from another key issue: whether the war in Afghanistan is being properly funded and being given the resources necessary to win.

Figure 1 provides a rough picture of the steady growth in Taliban-HiG-Haqqani and Al Qa’ida threat activity and the consequent impact on US casualties. It reflects the fact that the situation has now deteriorated steadily for more than five years, an assessment the US intelligence community has agreed to in its latest analysis of the war. The NATO commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan has noted that violence was at least 30% higher in September 2008 than in September 2007, and was driven by three factors:<sup>1</sup>

- The insurgents have adapted their tactics to smaller scale IEDS and ambush type attacks- more events.
- The US and NATO/ISAF have greater presence, and therefore greater contact with the insurgency.
- A deteriorating condition in these tribal areas of Pakistan. More drugs and insurgents are being sent over the border.

A new CSIS briefing – “Losing The Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat,” available on the CSIS web site at [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080917\\_afghanthreat.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080917_afghanthreat.pdf) -- tells this story in more depth, and how it is reflected in growing Afghan and allied casualties. UN and declassified US intelligence maps that show the steady expansion of threat influence and the regions that are unsafe for aid workers. Other data show how Afghan drug growing has steadily moved south and become a major source of financing for the Taliban and other insurgent movements.

Work by Seth G. Jones, a leading Rand analyst, has shown how insurgent groups like the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Gulbuddin Hakmayer’s Hezb-i-Islami (HIG); Al Qa’ida; and affiliated groups in Pakistan have formed three fronts in Northeastern, Southeastern, and Southern Afghanistan that are linked by what he calls “a complex adaptive system” of loosely cooperating groups that act as a distributed and constantly adapting network.<sup>ii</sup> At the same time, the UN and other assessments summarized in the CSIS briefing show that the Taliban and other groups have steadily expanded their presence and influence in the country side, particularly in the many areas where NATO/ISAF and the Afghan government cannot provide either security or governance. These now include substantial areas in central Afghanistan, in and around the capital, and growing pockets in the north and west.

This recovery and expansion did not begin to gather serious momentum until 2003 and did not seriously threaten the Afghan government and US-NATO-ISAF forces until 2005. The US had several critical years in which to provide the resources necessary to deter and

defeat it. Instead of acting decisively and effectively, however, the US failed to provide the necessary resources – a situation that the Chairman of the Joint Chief made clear continues to this day in his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008. .<sup>iii</sup>

... the Chiefs and I recommended the deployment of a Marine Battalion to Afghanistan this fall and the arrival of another Army brigade early next year. These forces, by themselves, will not adequately meet General McKiernan's desire for up to three brigades, but they are a good start. I judge the risk of not sending them too great a risk right now to ignore.


If a nation chooses to fight a war, it has to pay enough to win it. A look at the reporting on the overall cost of the Afghan War shows that the US has failed to commit anything like the resources it committed to the war in Iraq. The US has been slow to commit the resources required and has never adequately funded the conflict. The US failed to provide substantial funds early in the war, when national building and stability operations might well have stopped to resurgence of the Taliban and growth of the insurgency, and then reacted to the growth of the threat with inadequate resources and funding of the US military, US aid and diplomacy, and Afghan force development efforts.

The end result is a consistent failure to provide the resources to allow the US and NATO/ISAF to seize the initiative, and defeat the insurgency. It is also a legacy of underfunding that has progressively increased the length and total cost of the war in human lives, the wounded, and dollars.

This will be a major challenge to the next President. The problem is not simply US troop levels. It is dealing with a failure to create anything like an effective overall strategy to fight the war, if strategy is defined as a requiring a practical plan to implement and the resources to act.


**Figure 1: The Rising Threat the US failed to Respond To**

**UN Estimate of the Growth in the Number of Security Incidents: 2003-2008**



Source: United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008," Executive Summary, August 2008, p. 19

### Total US Casualties By Month, 2001-2008



Note: Killed in action includes died of wounds, Accidents includes other deaths

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division

## **The Comparative Scale of the Threat and Need for Stability Operations and Nation Building**

As Figure 2 shows, Afghanistan is larger than Iraq, has a larger population, has far more difficult terrain to fight in, and has a virtual enemy sanctuary in Pakistan on its eastern and southern borders. It is also a nation which has never had a cohesive government and whose governmental structure was in war or near chaos over two decades before the UAS invasion. It also never had a military or police force that was more than a fraction the size of Iraq, and had no modern national military forces after 1993.

While there are no reliable statistics on either country, the CIA data provide as good a rough estimate as any. Moreover, many of these numbers show just how much more serious the nation building challenge is in a country that has never moved towards major economic development in the past, and that Afghanistan faces ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic divisions at least as serious as those in Iraq.

While there are no reliable estimates of the size of Taliban-HiG-Haqqani forces in Afghanistan relative to the size of Al Qa'ida in Iraq and its affiliates, the background briefings given by various intelligence organizations indicate that the insurgent threat to Afghanistan – core cadres (the guesstimate of 10,000 is often used for both wars), part time fighters, and associated supporters -- is probably at least as large as the insurgent threat in Iraq.

Recent background briefs also indicate that there are now significantly more foreign fighters involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan than the insurgency in Iraq, although numbers vary so much from estimate to estimate that it is impossible to provide even a reasonable range of numbers.

A comparison of the cost to date of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, however, reflects the same comparative lack of resources that is reflected in troop levels and in aid personnel. In spite of significant allied contributions, the Afghan War has so far received less outside funding than the Iraq War, and has had fewer combat troops than were committed to the Coalition forces in Iraq at their peak. Afghanistan is also a far poorer country, had no savings and capital resources to draw upon once the initial fighting war over, and not oil exports or other economic activity capable of funding the basic needs of its population, much less funding development and strong national security forces.

**Figure 2****Afghanistan vs. Iraq: The Basic Challenges – Part I**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Iraq</b>
<b>Area in Square Kilometers</b>	<b>647,500</b>	<b>437,072</b>
<b>Border length</b>	<b>5,529</b>	<b>3,650</b>
Pakistan	2,430	-
China	76	-
Tajikistan	1,206	-
Turkmenistan	744	-
Uzbekistan	137	-
Iran	936	1,458
Kuwait	-	240
Saudi Arabia	-	814
Syria	-	605
Jordan	-	181
Turkey	-	352
<b>Maximum Elevation</b>	<b>7,485</b>	<b>3,607</b>
<b>Land Use</b>		
Arable land:	12.13%	13.12%
Permanent crops:	0.21%	0.61%
Other:	87.66%	86.27%
Irrigated land: (sq. km)	27,200	35,250
<b>Total renewable water resources: (cu km)</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>96.4</b>
<b>Population:</b>	<b>32,738,376</b>	<b>28,221,180</b>
Age structure:		
0-14 years:	44.6%	39.2%
15-64 years:	53%	57.9%
65 years and over:	2.4%	23%
Median age (years)	: 17.6	20.2
Life expectancy at birth (years)	44.2	69.6
<b>Ethnic divisions:</b>		
Pashtun	42%	-
Tajik	27%	-
Hazara	9%	-
Uzbek	9%	-
Aimak	4%	-
Turkmen	3%	-
Baloch	2%	-
Arab		75-80%
Kurd		15-20%
other	4%	5%
<b>Sectarian Divisions:</b>		
Sunni Muslim	80%,	32-37%
Shi'a Muslim	19%,	60-65%
other	1%	3%
<b>Linguistic Divisions (no percentage data for Iraq, largely Arabic and Kurdish))</b>		
Afghan Persian or Dari (official)	50%	-
Pashto (official)	35%	-
Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen)	11%	-

**Figure 2****Afghanistan vs. Iraq: The Basic Challenges – Part II**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b>	<b>Iraq</b>
30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai)	4%	-
<b>Literacy</b>		
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.1%</b>	<b>74.1%</b>
Male	43.1%	84.1%
Female	12.6%	64.2%
<b>Economy</b>		
GDP (purchasing power parity): \$USB (2007)	35	103.3
<b>GDP (official exchange rate): \$USB</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>55.44</b>
GDP - per capita (PPP):	1,000	3,600
GDP - composition by sector:		
agriculture:	38%	5%
industry:	24%	68%
services:	38%	27%
note: data exclude opium production (2005 est.)		
<b>Labor force (Million)</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7.4</b>
by occupation:		
agriculture:	80%	-
industry:	10%	-
services:	10%	-
Unemployment rate:	40-53%	40%
Population below poverty line:	53%	NA
<b>Budget: (\$US Billion)</b>		
<b>revenues:</b>	<b>0.715</b>	<b>43.2</b>
<b>expenditures:</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>48.4</b>
<b>Comparative Economic Metrics</b>		
Electricity – production in million kWh	754.2	33,530
Electricity – consumption in million kWh	801.4	35,840
Oil – production in bbl/day	0	2,110,000
Oil – consumption in bbl/day	5,000	295,000
Exports in \$US billion (less opium)	0.274	38.11
Imports in US billion	3.823	24.81
Debt –External in \$US billions	8.0	100.9
Airports	46	110
<b>With paved runways over 2,400 meters</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>58</b>
Roadways (km)		
Total	34,782	45,550
<b>Paved</b>	<b>8,229</b>	<b>38,339</b>
Unpaved	26,553	7,151
Railways (km)	0	2,272

Note: Many data are estimated from past years, or highly uncertain.

Source: CIA, World Factbook, 2008, electronic edition, updated 4 September, 2008

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/>

## Resourcing the War

There are differences in the estimates of the relative cost of the Afghan and Iraq Wars, but there is a broad consensus as to the cost of direct expenditures by the federal government in terms of budget authority. The most recent work by Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service shows that the total budget authority for the Afghan War now totals \$171.1 billion for expenditures over eight fiscal years (counting the FY2009 bridge funds as part of FY2008) versus \$653.1 billion for six fiscal years of the Iraq War.<sup>iv</sup> Accordingly, expenditures have been 3.8 times higher on Iraq to date, and the average expenditure on Afghanistan per years has been \$21.46 billion versus \$108.9 billion for Iraq – the average expenditure on Iraq has been roughly five times higher.

As Figure 3, shows, however, comparative costs are only part of the story. The US made the same fundamental mistakes in both wars. It entered them without any plan to conduct meaningful stability operations, to take on nation-building tasks, or to fight a major insurgency. This grand strategic failure occurred as a result of decisions made by the Bush Administration in spite of warnings from many experts in the US military, US State Department, the US intelligence community, and outside experts. This failure contributed immensely to the US and allied casualties in both wars and to their length, total cost, civilian casualties, collateral damage, and opportunity costs.

There was, however, a fundamental difference in the way in which the Bush Administration reacted to the challenges it faced after the initial moment of conventional victory. As Figure 2 shows, the US reacted almost immediately by making massive expenditures on US forces in Iraq and economic aid. Total funding rose from \$53.0 billion in FY2003 to \$75.9 billion in FY2004, \$85.5 billion in FY2006, \$133.6 billion in FY2007, and \$149.2 billion in FY2008.

These figures were radically different in the case of Afghanistan. The US effectively failed to resource a steadily more serious insurgency as it developed during FY2002 through FY2006—a pattern shown in more detail in the appendix to this report. The Bush Administration simply did not fund the war it had to fight. As Figure 2 also shows, it never committed anything like the aid resources necessary to support a “win, hold, build” strategy, in spite of the fact that Afghanistan – unlike Iraq – did not have substantial funds left over from the previous regime and a major ongoing stream of income from oil exports.

There was a never a year in Afghanistan where the US made a major aid commitment as it did in FY2004 in Iraq, when it committed \$19.5 billion in funds for foreign aid and diplomatic operations. Moreover, the US wasted two critical years – FY2001 and FY2002 – by providing only token funds for foreign aid and diplomatic operations (\$800 million in FY2001 and FY2002). Given the fact that a start up aid program takes at least a year to begin to be effective, often takes 14-18 months to go from authorization to a start up on the ground, and then takes months to years to complete, this was a major failure. The Administration never seemed to realize that it needed to take the initiative to shape the broad politico-military battlefield, and dominate the situation before the Taliban-HiG-

Haqqani-al Qa'ida could react. For all the US talk of shaping the decision-making cycle, it was the US that has reacted to enemy gains and actions since 2002.

**Figure 3: Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror (GWOT) Operations: FY2001-FY2009 Bridge (CRS estimates in billions of budget authority)**

Operation and Expenditures	FY01/02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	Total Bridge
<b>OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)</b>									
Department of Defense	0	50.0	56.4	83.4	98.1	129.6	145.4	53.4	<b>616.2</b>
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Opse	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	2.8	0.8	<b>34.4</b>
VA medicalr	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.0	0.0	<b>2.5</b>
<b>Total: Iraq</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>53.0</b>	<b>75.9</b>	<b>85.5</b>	<b>101.7</b>	<b>133.6</b>	<b>149.2</b>	<b>54.3</b>	<b>653.1</b>
<b>OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Afghanistan and GWOT</b>									
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	34.9	30.2	12.5	<b>158.9</b>
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Opse	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	2.3	0.6	<b>12.4</b>
VA Medicalr	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Total: OEF</b>	<b>20.8</b>	<b>14.7</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>20.0</b>	<b>19.0</b>	<b>36.9</b>	<b>32.8</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>171.7</b>

Source: <sup>1</sup> Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 16 and 19.

### Authorizing Money versus Obligating and Actually Spending It

There are no detailed data available on actual spend out rates for aid, but the data on Department of Defense authorizations versus obligations provide a rough idea of just how important the time gap is between authorizing and executing. The same report by Amy Belasco reports that Department of Defense obligations for FY2001-FY2008 totaled \$444.2 billion or 77% for Iraq; and \$100.4 billion or 18% is for Afghanistan and other GWOT activity. The budget authority for the same period was \$808.0 billion, with \$616.2 billion going to Iraq and \$187.2 billion going to Afghanistan and other GWOT activity. (Note that like the other data, these figures include other GWOT activity in the totals for Afghanistan.)

These numbers indicate that only 72% of the money authorized for Iraq has been obligated (which is not the same as actual spending or any form of actual activity on the ground), and only 63% of the money for Afghanistan and the GWOT. Ironically, the rate of obligation is slower for the Afghan conflict although it has been a much longer conflict.

Figure 4 also shows how low the average monthly obligation rates have been in the Afghan War versus Iraq. It is also striking to note that these figures clearly reflect the cost of the "surge" in Iraqi that help correct for past failures to plan and execute stability

operations, nation-building, and immediate counterinsurgency operations. Nothing approaching that level of effort has occurred in Afghanistan.

**Figure 4: Obligations by Operation: FY2001-FY2008**  
(in billions of dollars)

Mission and Type of Spending	Average Monthly Obligations							DoD Total FY01-April 30 2008
	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07 DFAS	FY07 Adj		
<b>Operation Iraqi Freedom</b>								
Operations	4.2	4.3	4.7	5.9	7.0	7.1	NA	
Investment	0.2	0.6	1.8	1.3	3.0	3.2	NA	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>6.5</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>444.2</b>	
<b>Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror</b>								
Operations	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.6	1.9	NA	
Investment	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	NA	
<b>Total</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>100.4</b>	


Source: Amy Belasco, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 25 and 26.

## Underresourcing the US Defense Effort

There are no clear formulas for deciding what level of forces or military spending is needed to win a war. What is clear, however, is that underresourcing, and underreacting to the growth of the threat, allow an insurgency to grow and potentially win, and that deploying decisive resources and forces as early as possible enable a force to both deter the growth of an insurgency and to defeat it. As Figure 5 shows, the growth of Department of Defense spending on Afghanistan not only lagged far behind spending on Iraq, it failed to provide adequate funding during the critical years immediately after the Taliban's defeat in 2002.

What is equally striking about the relative defense efforts is that the US approached the early years of the Afghan War as if could declare "mission accomplished," and all that was required was peacekeeping and aid. In the process, it was able to obtain substantial support from NATO and other countries that showed great sympathy for the Us after the events of "9/11," and obtain substantial money and forces for the peacekeeping and aid missions.

**Figure 5: Comparative Department of Defense spending on the Iraqi War (OIF) and the Afghan War (OEF) and Global War on Terrorism**



Source: Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 16 and 19.


At least partly because of the demands imposed by the war in Iraq, however, USD and allied forces never reacted to the steady rise in threat activity by deploying adequate US troops, military weaponry, and contractor support – all of the capabilities made possible by adequate spending by the Department of Defense. The US instead attempted to pressure its allies and NATO to increase their force levels and spending, and convert from a peacekeeping to a warfighting mission.

It is a tribute to nations like Canada, Britain, and Denmark that they took on a major warfighting mission in Southern Afghanistan. It is scarcely a tribute to the US that it sought to obtain more than it could from allied countries, which lacked the domestic

political support, and often the kind of power projection resources, necessary to make a major shift in mission. In fact, US attempts to use NATO as a substitute for US forces were not the “ultimate test of NATO,” but rather the result of a US failure to react to the resurgence in Taliban-HiG-Haqqani activity from 2004 onwards that was made possible by a progress US failure to deploy adequate resources.

This was scarcely a matter of dollars alone. US commanders repeatedly asked for more US forces as the insurgency intensified. As Figure 6 shows, however, it was only in 2007 that the US officials have openly recognized realities that should have been clear half a decade ago, and it was not until 2008 that the US began to seriously respond.

**Figure 6: US Force Levels: in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2006, 2007, and 2008-**



Source: Iraq: JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, “US forces in Iraq,” CRS RS22449, July 24, 2008, p. 5. Data for Iraqi forces are for assigned personnel. US troop levels for end August are taken from Associated Press, Sep 4, 2008 (9:21 a.m.); Afghanistan: JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, “US forces in Iraq,” CRS RS22633, July 15, 2008, p. 5

Even then, the increase in US forces fell far short of what was required. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made this point, somewhat obliquely, in his testimony to the House Armed Service Committee on September 10, 2008:<sup>v</sup>

We did not get to this point overnight, so some historical context is useful. The mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the years – in both positive and negative ways. Reported insurgent

activities and attacks have grown over the past 2 ½ years. In some cases, this is a result of safe havens in Pakistan and reduced military pressure on that side of the border. In others, it is the result of more international and Afghan troops on the battlefield – troops that are increasingly in contact with the enemy.

In response to increased violence and insurgent activity in 2006, in January of last year we extended the deployment of an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring, the United States deployed 3,500 Marines. In all, the number of American troops in the country increased from less than 21,000 two years ago to nearly 31,000 today.

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF Allies and Partners restated their commitment to Afghanistan. France added 700 troops in Eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland is also increasing its forces by more than 1,000 troops. The number of Coalition troops – including NATO troops – increased from about 20,000 to about 31,000. It appears that this trend will continue – as other allies, such as the United Kingdom, add more troops. Thanks to success in Iraq, we will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan by deploying a Marine battalion this November and in January 2009 an Army brigade combat team – units that had been slated for Iraq.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mike Mullen, made it clear in the same hearing, however, that US force levels would remain inadequate through at least the beginning of the 2009 campaign season, and the next President would not only inherit a war being fought without adequate resources, but one that did not have a coherent strategy.<sup>vi</sup>

I am convinced we can win the war in Afghanistan.

That is why I intend to commission a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region, one that covers both sides of the border. It's why I have pushed hard for the continued growth and training of Afghan National Security Forces. It's why I have pressed hard on my counterparts in Pakistan to do more against extremists, and to let us do more to help them.

And it's why the Chiefs and I recommended the deployment of a Marine Battalion to Afghanistan this fall and the arrival of another Army brigade early next year. These forces, by themselves, will not adequately meet General McKiernan's desire for up to three brigades, but they are a good start. I judge the risk of not sending them too great a risk right now to ignore.

My expectation is that they will need to perform both the training mission and combat and combat support missions simultaneously until such time that we can provide additional troops. I cannot at this point say when that might be.

Again, we must continually assess our progress there and in Iraq, weighing it against global risk and the health of the force before we make any more commitments.

General David G. McKiernan, the NATO ISAF commander in Afghanistan, made similar points made about the need for more forces in an interview published in the *National Journal* on September 13, 2008.<sup>vii</sup> He stated later that the small increase in US forces that President Bush announced in September had still left him at least three brigades short of the US forces he needed.<sup>viii</sup>

In some ways, bringing sustainable security to Afghanistan is more difficult than in Iraq, starting with the fact that this is one of the poorest countries on Earth, with a literacy rate estimated at only 30 percent," McKiernan said in an interview at his headquarters in Kabul...there is a lack of human capital in Afghanistan to do the things you expect of government, whether that's serving as mayor or policeman, or running a budget, or managing a labor force. In comparison, Iraq is a

fairly rich and literate society, which is why I don't find comparisons between the two conflicts all that helpful.

...Building Afghan security and governance capability, from the bottom up at the local level and from the top down at the national level, will be one of the most important factors to winning in Afghanistan...Military capability by itself won't win this fight. After security is established, we have to build governance and have reconstruction and development to meet the needs of the Afghan people. Only when all three of those lines of operation work together in tandem will we get the right outcome.

...There is no doubt that Afghanistan has not received the resources from the international community needed to meet its requirements for security, governance, or development...Militarily, we have never had enough forces to conduct a proper counterinsurgency campaign across Afghanistan. To do that--clear out insurgents, keep them separated from the population, and set the conditions for reconstruction and development--all of that translates to boots on the ground, and we are short of them."

...I'm happy to take contributions from as many partner nations as possible, but what these national restrictions do is limit NATO's inherent advantage in speed, mobility, intelligence-gathering, firepower, command-and-control, and logistics. When nations restrict the use of their forces, it decreases those advantages."

So did Major General Jeffrey J. Schloesser, the commander of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division and US forces in Eastern Afghanistan, in an interview published on the Newsweek web site on September 10, 2008,<sup>ix</sup>

...We need more troops here in the east. I think General McKiernan has said the same, speaking more broadly of Afghanistan. I don't want to characterize it as a troop surge. But to clear, hold and build we will need more forces, and that includes more Afghan forces, which are critical. Are two to three more brigades the answer? It depends on our success as we increase the number of troops. And then, what's the impact on the enemy? Some things are not knowable in the coming months.

## **Underresourcing the US Aid and Diplomatic Effort**

The problems in aid spending are complex and difficult to summarize. The US was able to get a significant percentage of allied aid contributions in terms of pledges, but cash flow was often slow, and some pledges were not met or given in the flexible grant terms that Afghanistan needed. National aid programs were diverse in character and dividing the country into national Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ensured a lack of coordination. Aid efforts also initially treated Afghanistan as if it were a secure exercise in traditional economic development, rather than a war zone in which aid had to be used to offset insurgent activity as part of a coordinated “win, build, hold” activity that concentrated both military and aid resources in a joint effort to contain and defeat a rising insurgency.

Even in 2008, it is sometimes difficult to find clear references to the fact that Afghanistan is at war in the reporting by various aid efforts. In other cases, the fighting is treated as an annoyance, or interference in peaceful aid activity – regardless of the fact that the insurgent see aid workers as a major target and the UN has expanded its maps of threats to aid workers to cover well over half the country.

In many cases, however, most aid workers cannot or will not go into the high threat areas where dollars are a critical complement to bullets, and aid is critical. There are also basic shortages of qualified US aid workers. The Department of Defense report to Congress on the war issued in June 2008 reported that 1,021 of the US aid worker in the PRTs were military. In contrast, there were 11 Department of State aid workers, 12 of 13 authorized USAID personnel, and 4 of 11 authorized Department of Agriculture personnel.<sup>x</sup>

The situation is further complicated by trying to run a major drug eradication program without adequate aid, aid workers, and Afghan government support to provide alternative income. The aid agenda even lacks the broad emphasis on agricultural development that is critical in a country where this is the major source of employment, which has suffered from decades of war, and is now a significant food importer. The end result has been to make many Afghans dependent on growing opium while confronting them with the threat of eradication without adequate options or compensation. Ironically, it has also driven opium cultivation steadily into the Taliban-controlled areas in southern Afghanistan, effectively funding the insurgency.

The lack of coordination in the aid effort has also been matched by far too many efforts that do not spend their resources in Afghanistan, and which lack validated requirements, fiscal controls, and measures of effectiveness. While there are many dedicated and competent aid efforts, there are many failures – compounded by the pervasive corruption of the Afghan government. There is no lack of noble concepts and good intentions, but execution generally falls far short of what is required.

It is particularly striking that Figure 7 shows that the US did recognize the need to surge aid money into Iraq early in that war in spite of the fact Iraq still had large reserves of capital left over from the era of Saddam Hussein and significant oil export income. The

US committed \$3.0 billion in FY2003 – the first year of the war, and surged \$19.5 billion in aid funds in FY2004. The US spent a total of only \$800 million in aid in the Afghan War during FY2001 and FY2002, and only \$0.7 million in FY2003. It never surged aid during any year of the Afghan conflict, and its peak spending of \$2.8 billion came in the fifth year of the war.

This underfunding takes on particular importance in the view of the testimony that Secretary Gates gave to y to the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008.<sup>xi</sup>

As in Iraq... additional forces alone will not solve the problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside development and governance. We must maintain momentum, keep the international community engaged, and develop the capacity of the Afghan government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the EU, NGOs, and other groups – our full military and civilian capabilities – must be on the same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan government. I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts associated with civil reconstruction and development and building the capacity of the Afghan government.


Similarly, Chairman Mullen stated,<sup>xii</sup>

We can build roads and schools and courts, and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are doing just that. We can build roads and schools and courts, and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams are doing just that. But until we have represented in those teams more experts from the fields of commerce, agriculture, jurisprudence and education those facilities will remain but empty shells. Less than one in twenty PRTs throughout the country are supported by non-military personnel.

Afghanistan doesn't just need more "boots on the ground." It needs more trucks on those roads, more teachers in those schools, and more trained judges and lawyers in those courts.

Foreign investment. Alternative crops. Sound governance. The rule of law. These are the keys to success in Afghanistan. We can't kill our way to victory, and no armed force anywhere—no matter how good—can deliver these keys alone. It requires teamwork and cooperation. And it will require the willingness by everyone in the interagency and international community to focus less on what we think we each do best and more on what we believe we can ALL do better together.

**Figure 7: Comparative State Department Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Operations Spending on the Iraqi War (OIF) and the Afghan War (OEF) and Global War on Terrorism**



Source: Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 16 and 19.

## **Underresourcing the Afghan Military and Police Forces**

The impact of underresourcing the war goes beyond inadequate US force levels and nation-building activity. The Bush Administration made equally serious mistakes in the timing and scale of its efforts to create effective host country forces in both wars. It came to see the need for large and effective host country forces only after the insurgency had taken hold in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and it then continued to underreact and under-resource the creation of both Afghan and Iraqi security forces. Once again, however, these mistakes were corrected much more quickly in Iraq than Afghanistan, and the US has never funded an adequate effort in Afghanistan.

For years, the US pushed key parts of the Afghan mission off on allies who had no real capabilities to create anything more capable than a conventional European police force. It did not provide either the US money or US military personnel to create an Afghan Army close to the size required. As the Department of Defense reported in June 2008,<sup>xiii</sup>

The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti- government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community's Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

It was not until September 11, 2008 – almost seven years to the day after “9/11,” that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced that the slow expansion of the Afghan Army would suddenly change from a goal of some 85,000 men to 162,100 troops. Chairman Mullen provided the following testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on September 10, 2008,<sup>xiv</sup>

As I once said about Iraq, let me now say about Afghanistan. Absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek. And frankly, sir, we are running out of time.

We can train and help grow the Afghan security forces ... and we are. In fact, they are on track to reach a total end strength of 162,000 troops by 2010. The Marines conducting this training are doing a phenomenal job. But until those Afghan forces have the support of local leaders to improve security on their own, we will only be as much as a crutch, and a temporary one at that.

It is important to note that these increases come after warning by the GAO and others that the goal of making Afghan forces ready in 2011-2012 was not realistic, even when qualified by the fact that such readiness would still be limited and full development of adequate Afghan forces was planned to require a lasting commitment of NATO/ISAF forces and a strategic partnership that extended beyond 2019. The interim CSTC-A, Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and Police Forces

agreed to in January 29, 2008, and before two follow-on expansions in the force goals for the ANA, set the following goals:<sup>xv</sup>

- **Phase 1: Field/Generate Afghan National Security Capability:** Army and police forces are manned, have completed individual training, and are equipped to 85 percent or better. *Complete by mid-2010*
- **Phase 2: Develop Afghan National Security Capability:** Afghan and Coalition forces will jointly plan, coordinate, and conduct operations. Coalition forces will partner with army and police units to assist in the development of capabilities necessary to achieve CM1. Complete by the end of 2011
- **Phase 3: Transition to Strategic Partnership** The Afghan government will assume the lead responsibility for its own security needs, with continued engagement by the international community. CSTC-A will have completed its current mission and should transition into a security assistance organization. Extends beyond 2019

### Underresourcing the Afghan National Army (ANA)

To put this expansion in perspective, the original goal set in 2002 was to create an ethnically balanced and voluntary ANA force of no more than 70,000. This goal was still being reaffirmed in 2006, and the US, NATO/ISAF, and the Afghan government set the end of 2010 as the timeline for the establishment of the ANA. It was not until February 2008, that they responded to the steady growth in Taliban activity by endorsing a 10,000-person increase in the ANA from 70,000 to 80,000.<sup>xvi</sup>

The US also failed to provide serious funding for a force that could take on serious counterinsurgency missions until FY2005, and then cut back in FY2006 for reasons that are remarkably hard to determine. It only began a truly major funding effort in FY2007 and that was cut by more than 50% in FY2008 – only to see the war worsen and the sharp increases in force goals that took place in CY2008.

As Figure 8 shows, the US not only failed to adequately fund the ANA, it only reacted after the Taliban-HiG-Haqqani scored major gains in the power vacuum left by inadequate forces and resources.<sup>xvii</sup> It then reacted erratically and as if a surge in one year could somehow solve the problem. The strategy for the ANA was no more coherent or effective than the strategy for US force levels or US aid. The US was strong on concept and rhetoric and dismally incompetent in planning, management and execution.

### Figure 8: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008 request <sup>a</sup>	Total
Afghan Army	\$76.9	\$362.7	\$723.7	\$1,736.6	\$767.1	\$4,884.2	\$1,721.7	<b>\$10,273.0</b>
Afghan Police	\$25.5	\$5.0	\$223.9	\$837.9	\$1,299.8	\$2,701.2	\$1,105.6	\$6,198.8
Total	<b>\$102.4</b>	<b>\$367.7</b>	<b>\$947.6</b>	<b>\$2,574.5</b>	<b>\$2,066.9</b>	<b>\$7,585.4</b>	<b>\$2,827.3</b>	<b>\$16,471.8</b>

Source: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

a Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$1,450 million that has been appropriated (approximately \$1,108 million for the ANA and approximately \$342 million for the ANP) and approximately \$1,378 million that has been requested (approximately \$614 million for the ANA and approximately \$764 million for the ANP).

b Totals include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. Fiscal years 2007 and 2008 figures include Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding, and International Military Education and Training funds.

c Funding for the Afghan Army includes detainee operations.

The cost of failing to provide the proper resources for the Afghan Army, which has been seen as the key alternative to more US troops, and the inability to obtain more allied troops, has been that an effective force has not been created as quickly as possible, and US and NATO/ISAF goals remain unmet. The GAO summarized the progress in creating the Afghan Army as follows in a report in June 2008.<sup>xviii</sup>

The United States has invested over \$10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed.

The GAO also provided more details on the impact of a slow start and systematic underfunding in the full report.<sup>xix</sup>

- Since we reported in 2005, more personnel have been trained and assigned to the ANA. Specifically focusing on combat troops, Defense reports that 37,866 combat troops have been trained and assigned to the ANA as of April 2008, compared with 18,300 troops in March 2005. Although this represents more than a twofold increase in the amount of combat troops, it is approximately 5,000 forces less than Defense had predicted would be trained by fall 2007. Moreover, new positions have been added to the ANA's structure since our 2005 report, including an expanded Afghan air corps and the ANA force structure has increased to 80,000.
- While more troops have received training, as of April 2008, only two ANA units—out of 105 rated—are assessed as CM1—fully capable. Thirty-six percent of ANA units (38 of 105 rated units) are assessed at CM2 and are capable of conducting their primary mission with routine international support. The remaining ANA units are less capable. Thirty-one percent (32 of 105 rated units) are CM3—capable of partially conducting their primary mission, but reliant on international support; 11 percent (11 of 105 rated units) are CM4—formed but not yet capable; and 21 percent (22 of 105 rated units) are not yet formed or not reporting.
- The expected date when the ANA will gain the capability to assume lead responsibility for its own security is unclear. As of April 2008, monthly reports provided by CSTC-A show the expected date of full ANA capability as March 2011. However, this date does not account for shortfalls in the required number of mentors and trainers. Thus, Defense officials cautioned that currently predicted dates for the achievement of a fully capable Afghan army are subject to change and may be delayed.
- Defense assessment reports from November 2007 to February 2008 show between 8 and 12 percent of combat unit personnel were absent without leave (AWOL), with AWOL rates as high as 17 percent for soldiers in one ANA corps. For the ANA to achieve sustained growth, a senior Defense official stated that AWOL rates should be no higher than 8 percent. although basic

recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist positions. Defense reports that recruiting goals for ANA infantry positions have been met, despite adjustments to increase ANA training output by 6,000 soldiers annually. However, CSTC-A noted shortfalls in the number of candidates available for non-commissioned officer (NCO) and specialty skill positions, such as logistics and medical support. Between November 2007 and February 2008, ANA manning levels for NCOs ranged between 50 to 70 percent of the authorized number.

- Shortages exist in the number of embedded trainers and mentors fielded. For instance, as of April 2008, the United States has fielded 46 percent (1,019 of 2,215) of Defense's required number of embedded trainers. Officials attributed these shortfalls to competing U.S. priorities for Defense personnel, including the war in Iraq. CSTC-A has submitted requests for additional forces to act as embedded trainers to assist the ANA; however, the request has been deferred. As of April 2008, members of the international community assisting in this effort have fielded 32 out of 37 mentor teams promised, although the number of international mentors in the field is smaller than the number of U.S. embedded trainers. Approximately one-third of personnel in the field assisting ANA unit development are coalition mentors, while two-thirds are U.S. personnel.
- Since we reported in 2005, new equipment plans for the ANA have been implemented and the ANA has received more equipment items. In 2005, Defense planned to equip the Afghan army with donated and salvaged weapons and armored vehicles. However, much of this equipment proved to be worn out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. In 2006, Defense began providing some ANA forces with U.S. equipment. Further, as security deteriorated, equipment needs changed and Defense planned to provide more protective equipment, such as armored Humvees, and more lethal weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades.... of 55 critical equipment items for ANA combat forces, CSTC-A reports having less than half of the required amount on hand for 21 of these items.

The GAO reporting on shortages of US and NATO advisors are also only part of the story. As Department of Defense reporting in June 2008 stated,<sup>xx</sup>

As of March 2008, U.S. ETTs require a total of 2,391 personnel; however, only 1,062 are currently assigned (44 percent fill). The low fill-rate is due to the additional requirement to provide support to the ANP through Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). Full PMT manning requires 2,358 total military personnel. Currently, 921 personnel are assigned (39 percent fill). Sourcing solutions are being worked to address the shortfall of personnel across the ETT and PMT requirements. Afghanistan deployment requirements are being weighed against other global manning priorities.

In addition to the ETTs and PMTs, NATO OMLTs are also providing critical guidance and mentorship to the ANA. As of March 2008, there are a total of 31 validated OMLTs out of a NATO commitment to provide 71.

...NATO ISAF supports ANA training and mentoring in three main areas: generating and deploying OMLT teams; filling CSTC-A training billets; and providing functional area mentoring, mobile niche training, schools, and courses. DCG-ISC coordinates the validation and fielding of OMLTs through cooperation with ISAF DATES. Currently, there are a total of 32 validated OMLTs. This number is insufficient to meet current needs. Furthermore, some OMLTs come into the country with national caveats that prevent them from deploying with ANA units out of their home area of operations, thus hindering operational flexibility. The shortage of OMLTs delays ANA development and has a further adverse effect on police mentoring. At present, the police mentor mission is significantly under-resourced. ISAF does not directly support ANP development with resources. However, the more NATO OMLTs in the field, the more U.S. military assets can be applied to the police mentor mission. Functional area and niche training

efforts include officer and commando training provided by France and NCO and officer training provided by the U.K.

**Underresourcing the Afghan Police**

The failure to provide effective resources for the Afghan National Police (ANP) has been even more serious. Figure 9 shows the ANP funding profile using GAO data, which are different from those used by the CRS. What is striking is that it took until FY2004 to begin serious funding of the police effort. Given the lead times involved in creating effective units, this meant that any major output from the funding could only begin in FY2005 and could only gather serious momentum in FY2006.

In practice, however, the actual training effort was so badly manned and organized, that the actual pace of progress has been far slower. Only 35,000 men had been trained as of January 2005, and no one knew how many had actually stayed in service.<sup>xxi</sup> This is scarcely reassuring for a force whose completion dates have reflected a nightmare of slippage, while its force goal rose from the original goal of 62,000 men to 82,000 in May 2007.

As the GAO notes, "...the completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period when the completion date was reported as "to be determined... without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.

<sup>xxii</sup>

**Figure 9: Defense and State Funding for Training and Equipping Afghan National Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008**  
Dollars in millions

	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008 request <sup>a</sup>	Total
Afghan Police	\$25.5	\$5.0	\$223.9	\$837.9	\$1,299.8	\$2,701.2	\$1,105.6	\$6,198.8

Sources: GAO analysis of Defense and State data.

Note: Totals above include funding from a variety of Defense and State sources. In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, these sources included Afghan Security Forces Funding, Defense Counternarcotics funding, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement counternarcotics funding. <sup>a</sup> Fiscal year 2008 includes approximately \$342 million that has been appropriated and approximately \$764 million that has been requested.

As for current capabilities, the GAO summarized them as follows in June 2008 testimony to Congress:<sup>xxiii</sup>

- Since 2002, the United States has provided about \$6.2 billion<sup>3</sup> to train and equip the ANP. However, as of April 2008, no police unit was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission. Over three-fourths of the police units were assessed as not capable—the lowest capability rating Defense assigns to units that have been formed. As of the same date, the ANP had reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000—about 97 percent of the force’s end-strength of 82,000. However, the extent to which the ANP has truly grown is questionable given concerns that have

been raised by Defense about the reliability of police manning figures. Building a capable ANP requires manning, training, and equipping forces; however, several challenges have impeded U.S. efforts to build a capable ANP.

- ...as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3).<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, among rated units, about 96 percent (296 of 308) of uniformed police districts and all border police battalions (33 of 33), which together comprise about 75 percent of the ANP's authorized end-strength, were rated as not capable.
- Six of the remaining 12 uniformed police districts were rated as capable of leading operations with coalition support, and the other 6 as partially capable. Overall, Defense assessed approximately 4 percent (18 of 433 units rated) of police units as partially capable and about 3 percent (12 of 433 units rated) as capable of leading operations with coalition support. According to Defense reporting as of April 2008, the expected date for completion of a fully capable Afghan police force is December 2012. However, the benchmark set by the Afghan government and the international community for establishing police forces that can effectively meet Afghanistan's security needs is the end of 2010.
- The shortage of police mentors has impeded U.S. efforts to conduct training, evaluation, and verification that police are on duty.<sup>4</sup> As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> According to Defense, the shortfall in military mentors is due to the higher priority assigned to deployments of U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
- The ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. As of February 2008, shortages remained in several types of police equipment that Defense considers critical, such as trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Defense officials expressed concerns about the quality and usability of thousands of weapons donated to the police. For example, officials estimated that only about 1 in 5 of the nearly 50,000 AK-47 automatic rifles received through donation was of good quality. In addition, distribution of hundreds of equipment items on hand has been delayed due to limited police ability to account for equipment provided to them.
- ...In September 2007, Defense reported that it was unable to verify the physical existence of about 20 percent of the uniformed police and more than 10 percent of the border police listed on the ministry payroll records for the provinces surveyed. Because Defense's census did not cover all 34 Afghan provinces, these percentages cannot be applied to the entire police force. Nonetheless, the results of Defense's census raise questions about the reliability of the nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned.
- Police mentor teams in Afghanistan consist of both civilian mentors, who teach law enforcement and police management, and military mentors, who provide training in basic combat operations and offer force protection for the civilian mentors. As of April 2008, only about 32 percent (746 of 2,358) of required military mentors were present in country. Due to this shortage of military mentors to provide force protection, movement of available civilian mentors is constrained.<sup>9</sup> According to Defense officials, the shortfall in military mentors for the ANP is due to the higher priority assigned to deploying U.S. military personnel elsewhere, particularly Iraq.
- Dyncorps weekly progress reports showed that 94% of the units reported had problems with pay, 87% had problems with corruption, and 85% had problems with attacks.

The US is now experimenting with a new system called Focused District Development where it takes all of the police in a given district offline for training, and replaces them with a model unit in the interim.<sup>xxiv</sup> This effort only began in November 2007, however, and is still experimental. So far, it has been completed in less than 11 of 433 ANO units in 365 districts, if urban police districts are included.

Moreover, the GAO notes that, “although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum, no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that outline the effort. In the absence of interim milestones and a consistent end date for Focused District Development, it will be difficult to determine if this ambitious new effort is progressing as intended. Without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend beyond a decade.”<sup>xxv</sup>

“...only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities.”

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<sup>i</sup> Luis Martinez, ABC News, September 16, 2008.

<sup>ii</sup> Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Volume 4, Rand National Defense Research Center, 2008, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG595/>.

<sup>iii</sup> House Armed Services Committee, transcript provided September 11, 2008.

<sup>iv</sup> Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, RL33110, Updated July 14, 2008, pp. 16 and 19.

<sup>v</sup> DefenseLink and OSD Public Affairs, transcript provided September 11, 2008

<sup>vi</sup> House Armed Services Committee, transcript provided September 11, 2008.

<sup>vii</sup> James Kitfield, “Plan For Afghanistan Begins With Stability,” *National Journal*, September 13, 2008.

<sup>viii</sup> Luis Martinez, ABC News, September 16, 2008.

<sup>ix</sup> Reprinted in Department of Defense, *Current News*, September 12, 2008, No. 19.

<sup>x</sup> Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181), June 2008, P. 60.

<sup>xi</sup> DefenseLink and OSD Public Affairs, transcript provided September 11, 2008.

<sup>xii</sup> House Armed Services Committee, transcript provided September 11, 2008.

<sup>xiii</sup> Department of Defense, “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces ,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), June 2008, P.5.

<sup>xiv</sup> House Armed Services Committee, transcript provided September 11, 2008.

<sup>xv</sup> Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, p. 17.

<sup>xvi</sup> Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, p. 6.

<sup>xvii</sup> The Department of Defense reports on FY2008 funding efforts in different terms, “The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately \$2.7 billion, including \$1,711 billion for the ANA, \$980 million for the ANP, and \$9.6 million for detainee operations. For the ANA, these funds will equip and sustain the 70,000-person, 14- brigade force in 2008; upgrade garrisons and support facilities; enhance ANA intelligence capabilities; and expand education and training, including the National Military Academy, counter-improvised explosive device (CIED) training, mobile training teams, branch qualification courses, and literacy and English language programs. For the ANP, these funds will increase CIED, communications, and intelligence training; purchase additional equipment, weapons, and ammunition to respond to insurgent threats; enhance ANP intelligence capabilities; set conditions for interoperability with the ANA to respond to events; enhance border surveillance; add basic health clinics in select provinces to improve casualty treatment; and expand field medic and combat life support training. Because the operational and security realities in Afghanistan are constantly changing, it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the long-term costs and budget requirements for developing the ANSF.” Department of Defense, “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces ,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), June 2008, pp. 6-7.

<sup>xviii</sup> The GAO noted at the time that, “In February 2008, the Afghan government and its international partners endorsed an increase in the force structure of the ANA by 10,000. A Defense official stated that increasing the force structure by 10,000 additional army personnel will cost approximately an additional \$1 billion.

In addition, Defense estimates that approximately \$2 billion a year will be needed for the next 5 years to sustain the ANSF—\$1 billion for the Afghan army and \$1 billion for the police.<sup>18</sup> This is based on a 152,000-person end- strength—70,000 ANA and 82,000 ANP. Defense officials estimate that increasing the ANA force structure by 10,000 will cost about \$100 million annually to sustain. By comparison, in 2005, Defense and State estimated the cost to sustain an ANA force of 70,000 and an ANP force of 62,000 would total \$600 million per year.

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This sustainment estimate, however, did not include the cost of sustaining capabilities such as airlift, which is currently being developed for the Afghan army.” Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, Highlights Page, <http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/abstract.p>

<sup>xix</sup> Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661, June 18, 2008, p. 18-30.

<sup>xx</sup> Department of Defense, “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces ,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), June 2008, pp. 17, 18, 33.

<sup>xxi</sup> Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director International Affairs and Trade, “AFGHANISTAN SECURITY U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 2008, pp. 6-7

<sup>xxii</sup> Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director International Affairs and Trade, “AFGHANISTAN SECURITY U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 2008, p. 15.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director International Affairs and Trade, “AFGHANISTAN SECURITY U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 2008, pp. 1-2, 7-8,

<sup>xxiv</sup> The Department of Defense reports that, The current ANP force has not been sufficiently reformed or developed to a level at which it can adequately perform its security and policing mission. However, the Afghan and U.S. governments, and our international partners, recognize the shortcomings and are working to improve ANP capabilities. The target for the ANP is to build a reformed force of 82,000 personnel that is capable of operating countrywide. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior is instituting rank and salary reforms to ensure that qualified officers remain on the force and achieve the rank and salary that they deserve. The new Focused District Development (FDD) plan, which began being implemented in late 2007, shows promise. The FDD withdraws the locally-based Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) from selected districts, replacing them temporarily with highly trained and effective Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The AUP then receive two months of immersion training and equipping in a concentrated program of instruction. The goal of the FDD program is for the AUP to return to their home districts with increased professional capability and confidence to enforce the laws of their country. Department of Defense, “United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces ,” Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, Public Law 110-181), June 2008, p.4.

<sup>xxv</sup> Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director International Affairs and Trade, “AFGHANISTAN SECURITY U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-883T, June 18, 2008, p. 15