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# The Iraq War: Key Trends and Developments

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# *Introduction*

- *This briefing is an attempt to summarize key maps, trends, and recent polling data on Iraq.*
- *It draws heavily on official sources and the reader should clearly recognize that much of the data are selected to portray a favorable view of the war.*
- *The Iraqi War is also very volatile and time sensitive. For example, the bulk of the data shown report on the status or trends at a point where Al Qa'ida in Iraq had suffered serious reversals, but before Prime Minister Maliki began his campaign against Sadr on March 25, 2008.*
- *The briefing does, however, attempt to provide perspective in some areas, particularly in assessing the strength and weakness of the “surge,” by providing polling data, by projecting war costs, and by showing the limits to the US aid process*

# The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

**AFGHANISTAN**

## AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- *Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: \$35.B GDP, \$1,000 PC*
- *Budget: \$2.6; \$8.9B in aid pledges*
- *Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved*
- *Restrictive terrain dominates the country*

## IRAQ


- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- *Economy dominated by the oil sector: \$100.0B GDP, \$3,600 PCI*
- *Budget \$48.4 billion; \$33B+ in aid pledges*
- *Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved*

**IRAQ**

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000

# Iraq vs. Afghanistan




	Afghanistan	Iraq
■ Territory (Sq Km)	647,500	437,072
■ Population	31,889,923	27,499,638
■ GNP (\$USB)	35	100
■ Oil Export Revenues - 2007 (\$USB)	0	41
■ Per Captia Income (US\$)	1,000	3,600
■ Literacy Rate (%)	28.1	74.1
■ Median Age	17.6	20
■ % 0-14 years	44.6	39.4

# *Strategy*


- **No real picture of the way ahead from the Administration since early 2007**
- **General strategy slide shown by General Petraeus in April 2008 testimony to Congress.**
- **Broad picture of potential US force cuts and shift of US role to strategic overwatch presented in September 2007, but with little details.**
- **No clear timelines: All US plans are “conditions based.”**
- **Both the Iraqi MoD and head of MNSTC-I said in February 2008 that Iraqi forces would not be ready to assume full counterinsurgency role before 2012.**
- **No meaningful development or aid strategy reflecting cuts in aid and massive increases in Iraqi oil export revenues.**

# Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI



Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008


# Recommended Force Reductions/Mission Shift



# Increase Ground Capabilities

**+\$8.7B**  
FY08 - FY09


<b>Army</b> Active	<b>42</b>	Brigade Combat Teams (482.4K Soldiers)	➔	<b>48</b>	Brigade Combat Teams (547.4K Soldiers)
	<b>12/12</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed		<b>24/12</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed
<b>Marine Corps</b> Active	<b>2.5</b>	Marine Expeditionary Forces (175K Marines)	➔	<b>3</b>	Marine Expeditionary Forces (202K Marines)
	<b>7/7</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed		<b>14/7</b>	Months Home Station / Months Deployed



# *Sectarian and Ethnic Divisions, and Political Accommodation*

- **Current CIA and other estimates of Arab Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, Kurdish, and minority shares of population have no clear source and very uncertain credibility.**
- **Data on sectarian and ethnic violence only reflect deaths, not patterns of low level violence, intimidation, kidnappings, and displacement (cleansing).**
- **Data on refugees and displacements uncertain by may reach more than 2 million internally and 2 million driven outside country in nation of 28 million.**
- **Data precede Maliki offensive in Basra and fight against Sadr; Shi'ite public opinion now far more uncertain.**
- **Option data show growing Sunni support for government, but date back to February 2008, and there has been significant progress since then.**

# Major Threats to Iraq



# Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

## ◆ *Sectarian Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi'a. 1% Other*

◆ *Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other*

## ◆ *Ethnic Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4%*

◆ *Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%*

## ◆ *Tribal Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided*

◆ *Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.*

# Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population Parameters?


Three sources:


- CIA World Factbook, unsourced;
- “Iraq: a Country Study,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1988, unsourced (“knowledgeable observers”);
- Average ABC News polls ‘07-‘08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points.

	CIA WF	LoC	ABC
Shiites	60-65%	60-65%	49%
Sunni Arabs	12-22*	13	33
Kurds	15-20	NA	15
Non Muslims	3	NA	3

\*Extrapolated

# Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions







Source: MNF-I, April 2008

# Movement of Iraqi Refugees


- Some 2.7 million displaced within Iraq
- 1.2 million before February 2007
- 1.5 million since
- 300,000 in first three months of 2008





# Iraq's Sectarian Divide


ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll



# Views on PKK Activities


ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

■ Sunnis ■ Shiites ■ Kurds



Turkish incursions vs. PKK justified

Iraqi gov't not doing enough to control PKK




# Little Progress in Governance: World Bank Rating: 2003-2006

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Control of Corruption	1.9	8.7	2.4	5.3	3.4
Voice and Accountability	0.0	4.3	2.4	8.2	7.7
Political Stability	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Government Effectiveness	0.5	2.4	4.7	1.9	1.4
Regulatory Quality	0.0	5.9	4.4	5.4	7.3
Rule of Law	3.3	1.4	0.5	0.5	1.0

# Views on Reconciliation

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# Future Structure of Iraq

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

■ All   ■ Sunnis   ■ Shiites   ■ Kurds



# Progress in Political Accommodation


- ***Provincial Elections:*** The CoR is currently reviewing the law, which will set the legal basis and structure of provincial elections.
- ***Hydrocarbons Package:*** The level of control allocated to the central government in the July 2007 draft version of the Framework Law (currently in CoR Committee) is the key point of disagreement; there may be more progress on the Revenue Management Law, currently with the Shura Council, in the coming months.
- ***Amnesty Law PASSED:*** CoR approved the law on February 13; the law was signed by the Presidency Council February 26 and was implemented March 2.
- ***Pensions Amendment PASSED:*** Published in the Official Gazette December 2007.
- ***De-Ba'athification PASSED:*** Approved by default by the Presidency Council February 2008. Reform Published in the Official Gazette in mid-February.
- ***Provincial Powers PASSED:*** CoR approved the law on February 13; the law was vetoed by the Presidency Council February 26. The veto was rescinded on March 19.

US State Department, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, April 9, 2008


# *The Course of the Fighting*

- Major gains against Al Qa'ida in Iraq from mid-2007 onwards, but now face major uncertainties over impact of Maliki offensive, fighting with Sadr, and role of Iran.
- Iraqi government data indicate major rise in violence in Baghdad in March and April of 2008.
- Maps cover al Qa'ida, but not pattern of clashes with extreme Shi'ite groups, elements of Mahdi Army.
- Attack data reflect sharp cuts in the level of insurgent attacks, but have risen again, and do not reflect overall climate of violence: crime, ethnic and sectarian cleansing, etc.
- Casualty data only reflect killing, not wounded, kidnapped, disappearances, impact of "cleansing, etc.
- Casualty counts very uncertain.


# Iraqi Civilians Killed: 2003-2007



# Iraqi Civilian Deaths Per Day from Vehicle Bombs, Gunfire & Executions: 2003-2007




Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of May 3, 2008




## Strife-Related Stress - 3/07

ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll



# US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Various Wars




Civil War is Union only; Confederate dead were 74,524 battle and 59,297 other; wounded unknown.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Analysis

Division, as of April 8, 2008


# Monthly US Casualties – Operation Iraqi Freedom: March 2003- April 2008



Note: Accidents includes "other deaths; Killed in Action includes "died of wounds".


Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

# Total US Killed and Wounded in Iraq: 2003-May 3, 2008




# US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Iraq by Cause: March 2003-April 5, 2008

## Killed in Action





Total of 3,267 hostile deaths, 738 Non-hostile deaths, and 29,676 wounded = 33,681





# Al Qa'ida in Iraq December, 2006



# Key Surge Operations




# Anbar Attacks



Density plots are of locations where attacks occurred


*As of 31 Aug 07*






Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

# Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008




# Rise in Terrorism in Iraq: 2005-2007

## Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants




Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov)

## High Profile Attacks (Explosions)




Source:  
MNF-I  
April 9,  
2008

# Trend in Weekly Security Incidents




## Caches Found and Cleared




Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008

# OEF Close Air Support Sorties With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007


(Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)



## Civilian Deaths




# Iraqi Body Count: Iraqi Civilians Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat




# Icasualties: Iraqi ISF & Civilians Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat

ISF




Source: Icasualties, <http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx>

## Iraqi Forces and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq January 2006 – February 2008




Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008; DoD News Releases and CIDNE as of Feb 23 2008. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths.

# Total US and Allied Killed During the “Surge” and Afterwards



# Monthly US Casualties – “Surge” and Afterwards: January 2007-April 2008






	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
	2007												2008		
Wounded	647	519	618	653	658	753	616	565	361	297	203	212	234	215	323
Non-Combat Deaths	5	11	10	8	6	8	12	29	23	9	8	9	6	4	3
Killed in Action	78	70	71	96	120	93	66	55	42	29	28	14	34	25	36



Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

# Ethno-Sectarian Violence




Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.



# Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-2008


(Trend in Total Incidents per Month by Type)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	16	23	15	32
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	2	1
■ Assasination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16	21	16	15	22
□ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
■ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16	6	13	13	13
■ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46	82	62	228	216
■ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71	103	77	131	118

# Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-2008


## (Monthly Distribution of Incidents by Type)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
■ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71	103	77	131	118	0
■ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46	82	62	228	216	0
■ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16	6	13	13	13	0
■ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
■ Assassination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16	21	16	15	22	0
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	2	1	0
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	16	23	15	32	0

# Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007-2008


(Trend in Total Casualties per Month by Type)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126	123	116	135	117
■ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29	31	28	42	64
■ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84	77	72	121	141
■ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104	153	197	322	531
■ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329	311	453	941	1525

# Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007-2008

(Monthly Distribution of Casualties by Type)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Total
■ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329	311	453	941	1525	0
■ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104	153	197	322	531	0
■ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84	77	72	121	141	0
■ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29	31	28	42	64	0
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126	123	116	135	117	0

Source: Iraqi Official


# *Impact of the “Surge”*

- Much of the success in 2007 was the result of Al Qa’ida alienation of Sunni tribes and spontaneous tribal uprising.
- Sadr ceasefire also had critical impact.
- No data on Iraqi perceptions since beginning of Maliki offensive in Basra and struggle with Sadr.
- Earlier public opinion shows Iraqis gave the US only limited credit for its successes.

# Saw Local Violence During Past 6 Months: August 2007-February 2008

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll

■ Car bombs/suicide attacks	27%	Baghdad	61%
■ Snipers/crossfire	24%	Mosul	58%
■ Sectarian fighting	22%	Diyala	58%
■ Unnecessary violence			
by U.S. forces	28%	Anbar	54%
by militia	18%	Basra	60%
■ Forced separation	14%	Baghdad	28%
		Basra	29%



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008


# The “Surge” - I

## ◆ *What Went Right in Original Strategy*

- ◆ *US build-up to 20 brigades*
- ◆ *Shift in tactics to lasting forward deployment.*
- ◆ *Only fight where can both “win” and “hold.”*
- ◆ *Exploitation of major advances in IS&R.*
- ◆ *Surge airpower as well as ground forces.*

## ◆ *What Went Sort of Right*

- ◆ *Iraqi government support of operations against both Sunni & Shi’ite violent extremists*
- ◆ *Iraqi Army deployment, although slower than planned and Iraqi forces far less ready.*
- ◆ *Expansion of embeds, partner units, partner cells.*
- ◆ *Focus on Baghdad*



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008


# The “Surge” - II

## ◆ *Synergy and Serendipity*

- ◆ *Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes*
- ◆ *Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq*
- ◆ *Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire.*
- ◆ *Kurds wait on Article 140*


## ◆ *What Went Wrong*

- ◆ *Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, “Sons of Iraq”.*
- ◆ *Police generally fell short, did not perform.*
- ◆ *Negligible progress in rule of law*
- ◆ *Extremely slow progress in political accommodation.*
- ◆ *US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal.*
- ◆ *Iraqi government spending on development, services, and security.*
- ◆ *Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing intra-Shi’ite tensions.*
- ◆ *Growing Iranian role and influence*
- ◆ *Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions.*
- ◆ *Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors.*




# Focus of Gains: Baghdad and Anbar

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll




# Local Security, 2/08 - Positive Ratings by Locale

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.



Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 34


# After the “Surge”

- ◆ *Reducing the Uncertainties of a “Long War”*
  - ◆ *Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political accommodation.*
    - ◆ *Sons of Iraq*
    - ◆ *Sadr vs. ISCI*
    - ◆ *Stable autonomy for Kurds.*
  - ◆ *Open list and air elections at national, provincial, and local level.*
  - ◆ *Creation of Effective governance and services at national, provincial, and local level.*
  - ◆ *Resolving petroleum and national budget issues.*
  - ◆ *Move from aid and government subsidies to sustained development and employment.*
  - ◆ *Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf*
  - ◆ *US and Iraqi domestic politics*

# *Patterns of Violence by Province and Transfer of Responsibility*

- Violence varies sharply by province.
- Violence by province diminished from mid-2007 to April 2008, but Maliki offensive in Basra and fighting with Sadr that began in March 2008 has since radically increased the level of violence and areas impacted.
- Polling data date back to February 2008.
- Reporting on transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces have consistently bordered on the absurd. Transfers have been cosmetic and Iraqi forces are not ready for the mission.
- Iraqi government cannot provide effective governance or presence in many areas supposedly under its control.


## Average Daily Attacks by Province July 2007 – November 2007



Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.  
 Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.


### Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province

December 1, 2007 – February 22, 2008



Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.

# Transferring Provincial Control



- Transitioned
- Projected within 6 Months
- Partially Ready
- Not Ready

Projected Transfer Date	
JUN 08	Anbar
JUL 08	Qadisiyah
NOV 08	Wasit
NOV 08	Babil
DEC 08	Diyala
DEC 08	Baghdad
JAN 09	Salah Ad Din
JAN 09	Ninewa
TBD	Ta'mim

# Slipping Deadlines for Transfer of Provincial Security Control to Iraq

Original target date of PIC transfer of security control to Iraqis set for June 2006



ANTICIPATED PIC DATE

- Original target date of PIC transfer of security control to Iraqis set for June 2006
- Extended per June 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per September 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per December 2006 9010 Report
- Extended per December 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per March 2007 9010 Report
- Achieved PIC Status

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 104.

# Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis


Date	FOBs	# Transferred	% Transferred
October 2006	110	52	47.3%
June 2007	122	61	50.0%
September 2007	125	61	48.8%
November 2007	125	61	48.8%
January 2008	125	63	50.4%


**Source:** DoD, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, November 2006, June 2007, September 2007, December 2007, and March 2008.

**Note:** DoD did not report on FOBs in March 2007.


# *Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq*

- Trend has been more favorable, since victories in 2007 but...
- Iraqi public opinion data date back to February 2008. Events since that time may have increase Sunni tolerance and support of US forces and reduced it for Shi'ites.
- Data on Iraqi perceptions show clear conflict between nationalism, desire for US to leave, and understanding US presence still necessary.
- Sharp polarization of Iraqi opinion along sectarian and ethnic lines.






Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008



# Acceptability of Attacks on U.S. Forces - by Locale


ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# Continued Role for U.S. in Iraq


ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll






# Boots on the Ground: Two Views

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK and ABC News/Washington Post polls



# Immediate Withdrawal?

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK and ABC News/Washington Post polls



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# *Iraqi Force Development - I*


- Iraqi Army and regular military forces continue to make real progress,
- *but*
  - MNF-I continues to grossly overstate this progress by lumping together units that can operate independently and units dependent on US.
  - Constant force expansion still stresses quantity over quality; shortages of officers and NCOs.
  - Sectarian and ethnic divisions and favoritism remain a problem.
  - Regular forces remain dependent on US support, armor, air power, embeds, partner units, IS&R, support and other “enablers.”
  - Regular forces will not have counterinsurgency capability to fully replace US forces before 2012-2015; capability to defend country alone until 2020.

# *Iraqi Force Development - II*

- **Data on police progress disguise reality that most police are now controlled at local and governorate level, many “trained and equipped” men are no longer in service, and embeds have not been provided or effective.**
- **Corruption and incompetence in MoD and Mol remain major problems. Prime minister’s office continues to provide ineffective guidance and management.**
- **The future role of the tribal militias and “Sons of Iraq” remains uncertain in spite of slow Iraqi government efforts to deal with issue.**
- **No clear plans for transferring funding responsibilities from US aid to Iraqi government budget, but progress is taking place.**


# US and Iraqi Security Funding: 2003-2008

In \$US Billions



**Note:** Includes expenditures from the IRRF 2, ISFF, ESF, and CERP. See Appendix D for a sector cross-reference to Security.

# Cumulative US Security Forces Fund Aid to Iraq (\$US Billions)




Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 36.

**Note:** Numbers are affected by rounding. Data for October–December 2007 and February–March 2008 was not available.

# US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year


(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan			2.21	1.9	0.58	2.04	1.85
■ Afghanistan			3.26	14.63	21.32	25.49	58.14
■ Iraq	0.23			5.67	42.14	52.75	184.07


# Cost of Aid to Afghan and Iraqi Forces

(\$US Current Billions)




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2001-2008
<b>Afghan</b>	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	7	1	0
<b>Iraq</b>	0	0	0	0	5	6	3	6	2	0
<b>Total</b>	0	0	0	0	5	7	5	13	3	0

# Iraq Security Forces Expenditures



# How US Iraqi Security Forces Funds Have Been Spent



Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 51.

Note: Numbers are affected by rounding. Allocation detail for ISFF funding is unavailable this quarter; therefore, the percentages in this graphic are calculated using dollars obligated.

# Comparison of GOI Funding to MOD and MOI (\$ billions)

	2006	2007	2008
MOD	3.40	4.14	5.07
MOI	1.90	3.18	3.93
Total	5.30	7.32	9.00

**Source: MNSTC-I, responses to SIGIR data call, October 2007 and April 12, 2008.**

**Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.**

# Iraqi Security Forces

Iraq Security Forces as of January 1, 2008 <sup>a</sup>			
Component	Current Authorized Personnel <sup>b</sup>	Assigned Personnel <sup>c</sup>	Total Trained Personnel to date <sup>d</sup>
<b>Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces <sup>e</sup></b>			
Iraqi Police Service <sup>f</sup>	288,001	275,300	155,248
National Police <sup>g</sup>	33,670	32,389	41,399
Border Enforcement	38,205	39,649	27,959
<b>Total MoI</b>	<b>359,876</b>	<b>347,338</b>	<b>224,606</b>
<b>Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces <sup>h</sup></b>			
Army	186,352	159,938	174,940
Support Forces	17,369	18,794	19,750
Air Force	2,907	1,305	1,370
Navy	1,483	1,115	1,194
<b>Total MoD</b>	<b>208,111</b>	<b>181,152</b>	<b>197,254</b>
<b>Counter Terrorism Bureau</b>			
Special Operations	4,857	3,126	3,485
<b>Total Iraqi Security Forces</b>	<b>572,844</b>	<b>531,616</b>	<b>425,345</b>

a Numbers do not include ministry staffs.

b Numbers reflect Government of Iraq (GOI) authorizations.

c Numbers are based upon GOI payroll data and do not reflect present for duty totals.

d Numbers reflect assigned personnel that have received training.


e Numbers reflect total ISF personnel trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, AWOL, and normal separation.

f MoI strength does not reflect investigative and administrative forces, the MoI HQ, MoI Forensics, Dignitary Protection, or contracted guards.

g MoI Police Support Unit, Provincial Security Force, and Emergency Response Unit personnel are part of the Iraqi Police Service and does not include other Ministry FPS.

h The MoD strength are derived from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs).

# Near Term Iraqi Force Goals




\* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% due to Operation Fardh Al Ghaib lessons learned. (FMS funded).

Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel as of January 17, 2008			
Unit	HRIMS Authorized <sup>a</sup>	Assigned as percent Authorized	Present-for-Duty as percent Authorized
<b>Iraqi Ground Forces Command HQ</b>	<b>1,145</b>	<b>59%</b>	<b>59%</b>
1st Division	11,852	111%	74%
2nd Division (including 8th IAIB <sup>b</sup> )	13,152	100%	68%
3rd Division	8,463	94%	77%
4th Division (includes 4/4 & 13 IAIBs)	24,969	108%	72%
5th Division	9,963	119%	88%
6th Division (includes 16th IAIB)	16,902	117%	82%
7th Division	9,213	107%	70%
8th Division (includes 17th IAIB)	10,152	159%	125%
9th Division (includes 11th IAIB)	11,585	116%	78%
10th Division	9,213	135%	114%
11th Division	8,393	96%	71%
14th Division	6,774	109%	69%
<b>Total Fielded Ground Forces</b>	<b>141,576</b>	<b>113%</b>	<b>81%</b>
<b>Additional Units Planned or in Generation, and 120% manning initiative<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>50,561</b>		
<b>Total Ground Forces Fielded and Planned</b>	<b>192,137</b>		

# Iraqi Combat Battalion Generation

*Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, and National Police Battalions*




Operational Readiness Assessment = ORA

Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008

# MOI Training: 2007-2008

Service	2007	First Quarter 2008
Iraqi Police Service Shurta	30,773	14,304
Iraqi Police Service Officer	1,572	373
<b>IPS Total</b>	<b>32,345</b>	<b>14,677</b>
National Police Shurta	12,343	3,620
National Police Officer	206	191
<b>NP Total</b>	<b>12,549</b>	<b>3,811</b>
Department of Border Enforcement Shurta	1,580	1,071
Department of Border Enforcement Officer	0	82
<b>DBE Total</b>	<b>1,580</b>	<b>1,153</b>
Facilities Protection Service Shurta	3,238	1,436
Facilities Protection Service Officer	39	307
<b>FPS Total</b>	<b>3,277</b>	<b>1,743</b>
<b>Total Shurta</b>	<b>47,934</b>	<b>20,431</b>
<b>Total Officer</b>	<b>1,817</b>	<b>953</b>

## Mof National Police Forces: Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I as of Feb 6 2008 (based on Jan 2008 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.


# Sons of Iraq

## Concerned Local Citizens

**Total Contracted:** 91,641  
**Volunteers:** 4,605  
**Sunni:** 78%  
**Shia:** 19%  
**Other:** 3%

**Transitioned:** 21,128  
**Anbar:** 8,206  
**Iraqi Security Forces:** 8,241  
**Non-Security Employment:** 4,681

**Costs:**  
**Average Monthly CERP:** \$16M




Density ← Least [Color Scale] Most →

# Awakening Councils: Impact on Security

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll


■ Better ■ Worse ■ No effect




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# Strong Presence - Gov't Forces vs. Militia

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.




# *Iraqi Conditions of Life, Economics*

- Polling data show important improvements, but major problems remain.
- USG and Iraqi government reporting often meaningless. Macroeconomic data do not reflect distribution of income, distinction between oil export revenues and progress in development, and regional and local differences.
- Data on government spending has many conflicts, and the ability to spend is meaningless unless measures exist to show that spending is productive.
- Unemployment and underemployment figures have no credibility, do not reflect problem of youth unemployment, and understate real world problems, Even so, underemployment is reported at 50% or more.
- Important sectarian and ethnic differences.

# Iraqi Oil Production



# Iraqi Oil Production & Exports: 2003-2008




**Note:** NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 16, 2008, noted that ITAO's oil data for Iraq differs from NEA-I data

for production, exports, and refined fuels. a Iraq does not receive the OPEC average for its oil. Average price for Iraqi crude oil in 2003 was \$25.91 per barrel and \$91.66 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008. Source: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 16, 2008.


# Iraqi Oil Exports

■ Revenue (US\$B) ■ Projected Exports (MBPD)



- 2006 Revenue Estimate: \$31.3 Billion
- 2007 Revenue Estimate: \$41.0 Billion
- 2008 Revenue Estimate: \$18.2 Billion (ytd)

# Rise in Iraqi Oil Revenues: 2003-2008



Note: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 16, 2008, noted that ITAO's oil data for Iraq differs from NEA-I data for production, exports, and refined fuels.

<sup>a</sup> Iraq does not receive the OPEC average for its oil. Average price for Iraqi crude oil in 2003 was \$25.91 per barrel and \$91.66 per barrel in the first quarter of 2008. Source: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, April 16, 2008.


# Uncertain Spending & Budget Sharing

Figure 2.37

## BUDGET EXPENDITURE COMPARISON FOR 2006 AND 2007

\$ Billions

Source: Treasury, Response to SIGIR Data Call (1/4/2008)



Notes:

1. Numbers are affected by rounding.
2. 2007 expenditure data is reported for the period January through September 2007.

- Spend on salaries, central government operating costs, but not on capital development.
- At end 2007, had spent 71% of salary budget, 25% of capital budget.
- Total Capital budget for 2007 was \$10.1 billion, or 25% of total vs. 18% in 2006.
- But, \$6.4B of \$10.1 billion was for central government ministries, \$1.6 billion went to Kurdish region, and only \$2.1 billion went to other provinces.
- Central government ministries get 76% of total budget, Finance Ministry gets 34%.

# Iraqi Capital Budgets for Reconstruction: 2003-2008

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 141.

Calendar Year	Capital Budget (In Dinars)	Conversion Rate (Dinar/USD)	Iraqi Capital Budget (\$US)	Document Source
2003	Not Provided in Dinars	NA	\$609,500,000	"Republic of Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses 2003, July – December"
2004	5,114,323,000,000	1,500	\$3,409,548,667	"Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005"
2005	7,550,000,000,000	1,500	\$5,033,333,333	"Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005"
2006	9,272,000,000,000	1,500	\$6,181,333,333	"GOI Budget" (as approved by TNA and written into law December 2005); U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008
2007	12,679,254,000,000	1,260	\$10,062,900,000	"Approved Iraqi Federal Budget for 2008"; U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/3/2008
2008	15,671,227,000,000	1,200	\$13,059,000,000	"Approved Iraqi Federal Budget for 2008"; U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/3/2008
<b>Total</b>			<b>\$38,355,615,333</b>	


# Iraqi Capital Budget Expenditure By Province: 2003-2008


Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 143, 144.

PROVINCE	TOTAL AVAILABLE	TOTAL AVAILABLE COMPARED TO TOTAL EXPENDED	PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDED VS TOTAL AVAILABLE	KIRKUK/TAMEEM	\$	 Total Available \$ <span style="margin-left: 20px;">Total Expended \$</span>	%
				KIRKUK/TAMEEM	\$90.5	 Total Available \$90.5 Total Expended \$31.0	34.2%
ANBAR	\$107.1	 Total Available \$107.1 Total Expended \$4.0	3.7%	MISSAN	\$76.2	 Total Available \$76.2 Total Expended \$39.0	51.3%
BABYLON	\$127.0	 Total Available \$127.0 Total Expended \$61.9	48.8%	MUTHANNA	\$52.4	 Total Available \$52.4 Total Expended \$9.9	18.9%
BAGHDAD	\$559.5	 Total Available \$559.5 Total Expended \$174.4	31.2%	NAJAF	\$88.1	 Total Available \$88.1 Total Expended \$56.4	64.1%
BASRAH	\$195.2	 Total Available \$195.2 Total Expended \$40.8	20.9%	NINEWA	\$226.2	 Total Available \$226.2 Total Expended \$58.5	25.9%
QADISSIYA	\$64.3	 Total Available \$64.3 Total Expended \$24.7	38.5%	SALAH AL-DIN	\$92.9	 Total Available \$92.9 Total Expended \$31.5	33.9%
DIYALA	\$109.5	 Total Available \$109.5 Total Expended \$0.0	0.0%	THI-QAR	\$138.1	 Total Available \$138.1 Total Expended \$54.8	39.7%
KERBALA	\$71.4	 Total Available \$71.4 Total Expended \$29.4	41.1%	WASSIT	\$83.3	 Total Available \$83.3 Total Expended \$33.7	40.5%


# Median Monthly Income

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll






Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17,



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

# Living Conditions Since 2/04


ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# The Iraqi Product Import Crisis

■ Production ■ Import □ Target Shortfall




Note: This is a daily average for April 7 – April 13

- Diesel: 12.6 ML supply of 24.5 ML target
- Kerosene: 6.2 ML supply of 14.6 ML target
- Gasoline: 14.0 ML supply of 26.8 ML target
- LPG: 3,743 tons supply of 5,100 tons target

# The Iraqi Electricity Crisis

Daily Electricity Supplied and Estimated Demand in Iraq Since January 2004



- Daily electricity demand April 9-15 was 17% above the same period last year. Daily supply from the grid was 9% above the year-earlier period and met 57% of demand, compared with 61% for the year-earlier period.
- Data on average hours of power after meeting demand from essential services was unavailable for this reporting period.

US State Department, Iraq: Weekly Status Report, April 7, 2008

# Life Satisfaction and National Expectations - Since 11/05

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll

◆ Own life: Going well  
■ Iraq in a year: Expect better

71%

69%

55%

46%

100%  
90%  
80%  
70%  
60%  
50%  
40%  
30%  
20%  
10%  
0%

Nov 2005

March 2007


Aug 2007

Feb 2008


Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.


# Local Security, Commerce, Economic Well-Being - Since 2/04

ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.





Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.



**Freedom of Movement, 2/08 - Positive Ratings by Locale**  
ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll


Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

## *US Aid to Iraq*

- Immense effort between 2001 and 2007 with many local successes.
- But,
  - No meaningful measures of effectiveness ever provided. SIGIR has documented immense waste.
  - Past major aid program now 95% dispersed.
  - Details of combined State and DoD FY2008 and FY2009 plan, program, and budget request unclear. Congress unlikely to fully support request.
  - Serious shortfalls in qualified aid, PRT, and EPRT personnel.
- No clear plan to transfer success to Iraqi government management and funding.

# The Steady Declining Annual Cost of US Aid to Iraq

Timeline in \$US Billions



Note: Funding totals are not to scale.

\* Total includes P.L. 110-28, enacted May 25, 2007, and aggregate total of FY 2008 continuing resolutions for ESF; also includes FY 2007 rescission of \$76 million.

# 112.5 Billion in Iraqi Reconstruction Funding

**\$50.3 Billion in Iraqi Funds; \$46.3 Billion in US Funds**

**Note: Numbers are affected by rounding.**  
 a Includes August 11, 2004 transfer of \$86 million cash from the Central Bank of Iraq for CERP at the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.


b In previous Quarterly Reports, SIGIR reported approximately \$20 billion in DFI cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. SIGIR has refined that number to reflect only reconstruction funding, which is approximately \$7 billion, according to

GAO Report 05-876 (July 28, 2005, p. 2).  
 c For a breakdown of Iraqi capital budget expenditures, CY 2003-2008, see the *Governance and Capacity Development section in this Report*.


d For the description of projects and programs funded by U.S. appropriations, see the endnote referenced in the first paragraph of this overview.

e May include humanitarian aid or other types of assistance.

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 16.




# Total Reconstruction Funds Now = \$113.9 Billion



- a. Includes August 11, 2004 transfer of \$86 million cash from the Central Bank of Iraq for CERP at the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.
  - b. In previous Quarterly Reports, SIGIR reported approximately \$20 billion in DFI cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. SIGIR has redefined that number to include only reconstruction funding, which is approximately \$7 billion, according to GAO Report 05-876 (July 28, 2005, p. 2).
  - c. Table 2.1 includes a breakdown of Iraqi capital budget expenditures, CY 2003-2008.
  - d. Where Iraq-only appropriations are unavailable, SIGIR assigned 85% for Iraq based on historical trends.
  - e. May include humanitarian aid or other types of assistance.
  - f. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, January 4, 2008.
- Note: This quarter, SIGIR changed methodology for reporting international donor pledges. Beginning with the January 2008 Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress, SIGIR will use the official U.S. government source — DoS:NEA-I — as the sources for pledge data. The dollar change from last quarter is due to the revised reporting method.


# US Aid Spending vs. Projects Completed: 2003-2008



Note: Financial data includes obligations and expenditures from the IRRF 1, IRRF 2, ISFF, ESF, CERP, and INL fund types. Project data includes projects from the IRRF 2, ISFF, ESF, and CERP.


# Effectiveness of Reconstruction - 8/07

ABC News/BBC/NHK poll




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director of Polling ABC News, "War in Iraq: The Public Perspective," presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.

# CRS Estimate of US Cost of Aid in Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



Source: CRS RL-33110, February 8, 2008, pp. 11 & 13. Includes Foreign aid and diplomatic operations. Afghanistan includes GWOT.


# US Total Assistance Per Capita Per Year (Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	8.1	4.29	3.02	5	5.84
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	25.02	43.59	78.68	86.79	120.32
■ Iraq	0.24	0.01	1.62	157.42	332.7	277.39	333.76


# US Economic Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)





	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	5.89	2.39	2.44	2.96	3.99
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	21.76	28.96	57.36	61.3	62.19
■ Iraq	0	0.01	1.62	151.75	290.56	224.64	149.7

# PRT and EPRT Locations – March 2008





Note: Locations are approximate.

# CERP AID Obligations: 2003-2008





# CERP Project Completions: 2003-2008



**Note:** Date shown reflects the actual completion date of projects. CERP projects were started prior to CERP receiving direct appropriations because it was created with seized Iraqi assets and oil revenue from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

# CERP Allocation by Function: FY 2004-FY 2008



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# Core US Aid is Now 95% Disbursed

Sector/Status			Committed			Obligated			Disbursed		
	Allocated	Un-allocated	Last Week	Current	Change	Last Week	Current	Change	Last Week	Current	Change
(Millions of USD)											
<b>Security and Law</b>	\$4,975	\$23	\$4,954	\$4,954	\$0	\$4,953	\$4,953	\$0	\$4,867	\$4,867	\$0
<b>Justice and Civil Society</b>	\$2,288	\$13	\$2,239	\$2,239	\$0	\$2,234	\$2,234	\$0	\$2,153	\$2,157	\$5
<b>Electricity Sector</b>	\$4,203	\$22	\$4,056	\$4,056	\$0	\$4,049	\$4,049	\$0	\$3,797	\$3,801	\$5
<b>Oil Infrastructure</b>	\$1,722	\$3	\$1,597	\$1,597	\$0	\$1,597	\$1,597	\$0	\$1,570	\$1,570	\$0
<b>Water and Sanitation</b>	\$2,067	\$37	\$1,957	\$1,964	\$7	\$1,943	\$1,944	\$1	\$1,788	\$1,790	\$2
<b>Transportation and Comm\</b>	\$462	\$1	\$456	\$456	\$0	\$449	\$449	\$0	\$409	\$410	\$1
<b>Roads, Bridges and Const\</b>	\$327	\$7	\$317	\$317	\$0	\$317	\$317	\$0	\$248	\$250	\$1
<b>Health Care</b>	\$813	\$10	\$783	\$783	\$0	\$776	\$776	\$0	\$728	\$728	\$1
<b>Private Sector Development</b>	\$821	\$2	\$821	\$821	\$0	\$821	\$821	\$0	\$813	\$813	\$0
<b>Edu\, Refugees, Human Rights</b>	\$436	\$0	\$423	\$423	\$0	\$423	\$423	\$0	\$398	\$398	\$0
<b>Admin Expense (USAID,DoS)</b>	\$220	\$0	\$210	\$210	\$0	\$210	\$210	\$0	\$210	\$210	\$0
<b>Total IRRF II</b>	\$18,330	\$119	\$17,812	\$17,819	\$7	\$17,773	\$17,774	\$1	\$16,981	\$16,995	\$14
IRRF II Non-Construction	-	-	\$7,923	\$7,923	\$0	\$7,913	\$7,913	\$0	\$7,697	\$7,700	\$3
IRRF II Construction	-	-	\$9,370	\$9,377	\$7	\$9,340	\$9,341	\$1	\$8,767	\$8,778	\$11
IRRF II Overhead	-	-	\$520	\$520	\$0	\$520	\$520	\$0	\$517	\$517	\$0
<b>Total IRRF I</b>	\$2,475	\$0	\$2,291	\$2,291	\$0	\$2,232	\$2,232	\$0	\$2,139	\$2,139	\$0
<b>Grand Total IRRF I &amp; II</b>	\$20,805	\$119	\$20,103	\$20,110	\$7	\$20,005	\$20,006	\$1	\$19,120	\$19,134	\$14


# US Aid Request: FY2007-FY2009

(\$ in thousands)	FY 2007	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2008	FY 2009
	Actual	Supp	Estimate	Supp	Request
<b>TOTAL</b>	157,112	1,959,150	21,177	956,000	397,000
<b>Peace and Security</b>	39,264	1,016,550	16,217	170,000	22,000
Counter-Terrorism	800	-	3,075	-	4,000
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	2,500	-	-	-	-
Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform	35,964	959,150	13,142	170,000	18,000
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation	-	57,400	-	-	-
<b>Governing Justly and Democratically</b>	63,348	787,600	4,960	487,000	198,000
Rule of Law and Human Rights	17,601	169,700	-	169,900	78,000
Good Governance	20,647	251,000	-	302,100	65,000
Political Competition and Consensus-Building	20,100	151,800	-	-	15,000
Civil Society	5,000	215,100	4,960	15,000	40,000
<b>Investing in People</b>	-	-	-	82,000	-
Health	-	-	-	82,000	-
<b>Economic Growth</b>	54,500	150,000	-	217,000	177,000
Macroeconomic Foundation for Growth	-	20,000	-	-	62,000
Trade and Investment	-	20,000	-	-	-
Financial Sector	-	-	-	25,000	40,000
Infrastructure	-	-	-	82,000	-
Agriculture	39,900	70,000	-	-	50,000
Private Sector Competitiveness	14,600	20,000	-	92,500	25,000
Economic Opportunity	-	20,000	-	17,500	-
<b>Humanitarian Assistance</b>	-	5,000	-	-	-
Protection, Assistance and Solutions	-	5,000	-	-	-

# *The Cost and Burden of the War*

- **Approaching \$1 trillion at end-2008, but costs dropping sharply as aid phases out, and will drop further with coming cuts from 20 to 15 brigades.**
- **Long history of failing to plan, program, and budget for war.**
- **No clear US budget for FY2008 and FY2009, no future US spending plan.**
- **Total defense burden on federal spending and GDP remains limited, however, even by peacetime, Cold War, standards. At roughly 4% of GDP**
-

# Annual Cost and Burden of Previous Wars




Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2006, Washington, Department of Defense, April 2005, Table 7-2, and National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2007, March 2006, Table 7-2. Budget total is for entire national defense, not just the Department of Defense.

!000 \$USB BO

# The Total Cost of Previous Wars

(In Billions of \$US Dollars)




Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by the Congressional Research Service as quoted in *Defense News*, May 8, 2006, p. 3

# The US Has Long Dealt with Much Higher National Security Burdens: Defense Spending as a % of GDP Since WWII

**National Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP: 1940-2009**


(050 Total defense spending for DoD and all agencies as % of GDP)



Source: Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). *National Defense Budget Estimate for the FY 2009 Budget* (Greenbook. March 2008, pp. 216-127.

# GAO Estimate of Cost of War To DoD Through FY2007

Figure 2: DOD's Reported GWOT Obligations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 by Operation




Source: GAO-08-423R, GWOT, January 30, 2008, p 5

# CBO Estimate of Cost of Defense Activity in Afghan and Iraq Wars, and GWOT, by Category

(In Appropriations of \$US Current Billions by Fiscal year)

Source: CBO, "Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terrorism," February 11, 2008.



	2001 & 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	08 Enacted	08 Requested	08 Total
Cumulative	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Annual Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Personnel	4	16	18	19	18	18	1	17	18
Procurement	1	10	7	18	25	51	26	45	72
RDT&E		3		1	1	2		4	4
O&M	25	44	46	57	70	92	58	32	91
MilCon		1	1	1		2		2	2
Other		1	1	3	2	1	1	1	2
Transfers		1	2	2		1			
AE& Other				1					

# CBO Estimate of Cost of All Activity in Afghan and Iraq Wars by Category

(In Appropriations of \$US Current Billions by Fiscal Year)

Source:  
CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook for Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018, January, 2008, p. 52

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2001-2008
Military Operations and Other Defense Activities									
Iraq <sup>a</sup>	0	0	46	68	53	89	113	71	440
Other <sup>b</sup>	14	18	34	21	18	22	39	13	178
Subtotal	14	18	80	88	70	111	152	84	618
Indigenous Security Forces <sup>c</sup>									
Iraq	0	0	0	5	6	3	6	2	21
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	1	2	7	1	12
Subtotal	0	0	0	5	7	5	13	3	33
Diplomatic Operations and Foreign Aid									
Iraq	0	0	3	15	1	3	3	1	40
Other	*	2	5	2	2	1	2	1	15
Subtotal	*	2	8	17	3	4	5	1	40
Veterans' Benefits and Services <sup>d</sup>									
Iraq	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	*	0	*
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
<b>Total<sup>e</sup></b>	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>691</b>


\*= between 0 and \$500 million

- CBO estimated how much money has been provided for Operation Iraqi Freedom by allocating funds on the basis of obligations reported by the Department of Defense (DoD). For more information about funding for that operation, see Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq Under Two Specified Scenarios (July 13, 2006).
- Includes Operation Enduring Freedom (in and around Afghanistan), Operation Noble Eagle (homeland security missions, such as combat air patrols, in the United States), the restructuring of Army and Marine Corps units, classified activities other than those funded by appropriations for the Iraq Freedom Fund, and other operations. (For 2005 through 2008, funding for Operations Noble Eagle has been intermingled with regular appropriations for the Department of Defense. That funding is not included in this table because it cannot be separately identified.)
- Funding for indigenous security forces – which went to accounts for diplomatic operations and foreign aid (budget function 150) in 2004 and, since 2005, has gone to defense accounts (budget function 050) – is used to train and equip local military and police units in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Excludes almost \$2 billion in spending for medical care, disability compensation, and survivors' benefits for veterans of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terrorism. Those amounts are based on CBO's estimates of spending from regular appropriations for the Department of Veterans Affairs and were not explicitly appropriated for war-related expenses.
- At the current rate of military operations, the funding provided to date for 2008 will not be sufficient to pay for all the costs that will be incurred this year.

# When You Truly and Sincerely Can't or Won't Plan: The Growing Impact of Wartime Supplementals (in \$US billions)


Of the FY2008 request over \$189.3 billion, only \$102.5 billion have been enacted by March 2008.

Source: Adapted by Anthony C. Cordesman from data provided by Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), "National Defense Budget Estimates for 2008", Washington, Department of Defense, March 2007.



□ Supplemental Bills	19.1	8.6	19.8	17.3	72.6	65.3	75.9	65.8	93.4	189.3	70
■ Bridge Funding							25	50	70		
■ DoD Budget	273.2	295.5	315.7	344.8	382.7	400.5	420	441.5	442.8	481.4	515.4

# President's Partly Funded Budget Request for FY2008 and Non-Request FY2009




## Department Priorities

- Prevail in the War on Terror
- Increase Ground Capabilities
- Improve Force Readiness
- Develop Future Combat Capabilities
- Improve Quality of Life

**Base budget increases by \$35.9B (7.5%) from FY 2008 to FY 2009**

# The Defense Baseline May Understate Costs, But Growth in Federal Spending Will Still Be Driven by Civil Programs


(Trend in Total Spending in FY 2000 \$US Billions)



	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
*Grand Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Undistributed Offsetting Receipts	-54	-53	-43	-53	-53	-62	-65	-59	-65	-62	-65	-67
Agency Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social & Economic	965	1,084	1,238	1,541	1,597	1,602	1,654	1,678	1,687	1,717	1,716	1,798
Net Interest	227	252	223	163	195	198	200	209	221	227	227	225
Veterans, Space, International	69	73	77	106	98	98	113	118	116	120	115	118
National Defense	383	306	295	407	412	426	464	505	433	403	397	395

Source: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). *National Defense Budget Estimate for the FY 2009 Budget (Greenbook)*. March 2008, p. 207.

## The Between the DoD Projected Budget and Real World Probable Costs: The CBO Estimate




Source: CBO. *The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for Fiscal Year 2008*. March 2009, p. 2.

# Rising Operations and Support Costs if The US Cannot Cut Wartime Costs & Deployments

Funding for Operation and Support, by Functional Category

(Billions of 2008 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority)




CBO: Long Term Implications of Defense Spending, March 2008, p 4.

# CBO Estimate Indicates that Probable Cost Escalation Would Still have Limited Impact on Federal Spending and GDP

## Past and Projected Spending for National Security

(Billions of 2008 Dollars of Outlays and Outlays as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product)



# CBO Estimate of the Impact of Mandatory Programs on GDP versus Defense and Other Spending

