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The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan and Iraq Wars

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Burke Chair
in Strategy

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Strategic and Grand Strategic Lessons

Key Lessons for the Future: Is War the Answer?

- ◆ *Is war better than containment, deterrence, and diplomacy?*
- ◆ *What is the true cost of a military engagement?*
- ◆ *Are all the necessary civil-military resources available?*
- ◆ *What happens if the war escalates in cost, time, and impact?*
- ◆ *Is a realistic exist strategy possible and what is the cost of defeat?*

Finding Honest Answers

- ◆ *Use the Interagency process and demand a civil-military partnership.*
- ◆ *Ruthlessly demanding and objective intelligence analysis*
- ◆ *Objective analysis of the ability to develop an adequate host country partner.*
- ◆ *Model and game the full conflict, including exit strategies and possible defeats.*
- ◆ *Plan to commit adequate military, civilian, aid, and advisory resources from Day One.*
- ◆ *Net assessment of the resulting risks and cost benefits.*

Conducting the War

- ◆ *Keep the war limited; if the war goes sour, get out.*
- ◆ *Actually commit adequate military, civilian, aid, and advisory resources from Day One.*
- ◆ *Jointness means integrated civil-military operations.*
- ◆ *Building up the host country partner will be a constant priority.*
- ◆ *Focusing on the enemy will mean defeat if it means ignoring ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other internal fault lines and ignoring neighboring states.*

Redefining “Jointness:” The Civil-Military Challenge

The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

◆ *Political Accommodation*

◆ *Security*

◆ *Governance*

◆ *Development*

The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~49,000

AFGHANISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: \$35.B GDP, \$1,000 PC
- Budget: \$2.6; \$8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

IRAQ


- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: \$100.0B GDP, \$3,600 PCI
- Budget \$48.4 billion; \$33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~176,000

Iraq vs. Afghanistan



	Afghanistan	Iraq
■ Territory (Sq Km)	647,500	437,072
■ Population	31,889,923	27,499,638
■ GNP (\$USB)	35	100
■ Oil Export Revenues - 2007 (\$USB)	0	41
■ Per Captia Income (US\$)	1,000	3,600
■ Literacy Rate (%)	28.1	74.1
■ Median Age	17.6	20
■ % 0-14 years	44.6	39.4

Anaconda Strategy vs. AQI



Counter-Insurgency Approach

“REPLACE FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY WITH TRUST AND CONFIDENCE”

INFORMATION DOMAIN

Connect People to the Government



Build Trust and Confidence in Government



Solidify Popular Support of Government



Build Capacity

- Develop Leadership
- Build a Trusted National Security Capability
- Promote Good Governance
- Facilitate Growth and Development
- Develop Momentum

Degrade Destabilizing Forces

- Isolate Insurgents from People and Government
- Disrupt Support Networks
- Interdict Border Infiltration
- Disrupt Movement

Separate Insurgents from the People



Limit Options to Reconcile, Capture, Kill, or Flee



Discredit Insurgent Vision and Ideology



Strengthen The Nation

- Promote Afghan Ownership
- Sustain Momentum and Confidence in the Future
- Continue to Develop Afghan Leadership Capacity
- Support Afghanistan in Defeating the Insurgency

INFORMATION DOMAIN

RC-East Assessment Summary





DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +81

- ▲ Increased (88)
- ▼ Decreased (7)

GOVERNANCE

- Government increasingly identifying major issues such as corruption but lacks accountability measures
- National and local government capacities are growing, but won't decentralize authorities and resources due to lack of trust
- Lack of Rule of Law and legal capacities impedes accountability and discourages international investment




DISTRICT CHANGE SINCE JULY: +63

- ▲ Increased (78)
- ▼ Decreased (15)

Building a Stable Afghanistan Way Ahead

- Integrated governance, development and security framework
- Province focused, deliberate, condition-based approach
- Cooperative partnership and support
- Sustain national and international comprehensive counterinsurgency approach



Counterinsurgency vs. Nation-Building?

- ◆ *“Worst-case wars” impose special burdens.*
- ◆ *The non-military dimension is as critical, or more critical, than the military one.*
- ◆ *Only the host country can really win, and is must win politically as well as in security terms.*
- ◆ *There will probably never be the number and quality of civilian partners the military needs and wants.*
- ◆ *Most allies may not be able to sustain long wars.*

Counterinsurgency vs. Nation-Building?

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Lessons of Armed Nation Building

- Conflict termination must treat the causes and not just the symptoms.
- *Tactical victories become meaningless without political, ideological, information, and media dominance.*
- Operations must also focus on stability operations, exercises in stability and “nation-building
- Success occurs where the fighting is: The local and regional level of operations is as important as the central government.
 - Political accommodation and ideological operations have critical priority.
 - Governance and provision of critical services in conflict and vulnerable areas become critical aspects of “security.”
 - So is personal; security for the population and preserving/creating the rule of law.
- “Dollars are bullets:” Value of economic incentives and aid.
- Need incentives to convert, disarm terrorists, insurgents, irregular opponents, not just force: “Carrots as well as sticks”

Political Accommodation

*(+Foreign Pressure &
Threats)*

Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

◆ *Sectarian Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi'a. 1% Other*

◆ *Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other*

◆ *Ethnic Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4%*

◆ *Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkman, Assyrian & Other 3%*


◆ *Tribal Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided*

◆ *Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.*

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Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions



Major Ethnic Divisions



Pakistan's Internal Concerns

Political / Civil Climate

- Pakistan contends with political turmoil following Bhutto's assassination

Pakistan Military and Frontier Corps

- PAKMIL and Frontier Corps (FC) realignment ongoing; concern is effectiveness of FC in Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA)

Federally Administered Tribal Area

- 2007 has seen an unprecedented number of offensive actions taken by insurgent elements against the Government of Pakistan (GoP). To date, Pakistani security forces have been unsuccessful in mitigating insurgent presence, have sustained record losses, and have raised serious questions on the Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) and Frontier Corps's capacity and capability to conduct effective military operations in the FATA.

- Due to the GoP's failed policies and security initiatives within the FATA, insurgent elements have been able to expand their influence in the settled areas of NWFP and further solidify greater portions of the FATA as safe-havens.



Iraq Lessons


- ◆ *Work with and around central Government; move towards open lists and local representatives.*
- ◆ *Work in “Iraqi time,” but keep up pressure from behind scenes.*
- ◆ *Deal with ethnic and sectarian “fault lines*
- ◆ *Create parallel efforts to strength local and provincial governments, and hold elections.*
- ◆ *Give all elements role in government and security forces.*
- ◆ *Push government spending & fairly share money.*
- ◆ *Halt worst ethnic and sectarian violence & cleansing.*
- ◆ *Employment is critical, particularly young men.*
- ◆ *Address external pressures and threats.*


Security

Host Country Forces & Threat Fault Lines


The Ground Campaign

Al Qa'ida in Iraq December, 2006








Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008




Key Surge Operations



Weekly Security Incidents




Iraqi Forces and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq January 2006 – February 2008



Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008; DoD News Releases and CIDNE as of Feb 23 2008. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths.


Civilian Deaths




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Ethno-Sectarian Deaths




Caches Found and Cleared




Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)



Source:
MNF-I
April 9,
2008


Average Daily Attacks by Province July 2007 – November 2007



Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.
 Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province

December 1, 2007 – February 22, 2008






These four provinces have approximately 42% of the population but account for 86% of executed attacks.




Since the last reporting period, executed attacks have significantly decreased in all provinces (43% decline in Baghdad Province), with the exception of Ninewa Province which has seen an 17% increase.

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.


Ethno-Sectarian Violence



Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.



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Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 34

The “Surge” - I

- ◆ *What Went Right in Original Strategy*
 - ◆ *US build-up to 20 brigades*
 - ◆ *Shift in tactics to lasting forward deployment.*
 - ◆ *Only fight where can both “win” and “hold.”*
 - ◆ *Exploitation of major advances in IS&R.*
 - ◆ *Surge airpower as well as ground forces.*
- ◆ *What Went Sort of Right*
 - ◆ *Iraqi government support of operations against both Sunni & Shi’ite violent extremists*
 - ◆ *Iraqi Army deployment, although slower than planned and Iraqi forces far less ready.*
 - ◆ *Expansion of embeds, partner units, partner cells.*
 - ◆ *Focus on Baghdad*

The “Surge” - II

◆ *Synergy and Serendipity*

- ◆ *Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes*
- ◆ *Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq*
- ◆ *Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire.*
- ◆ *Kurds wait on Article 140*

◆ *What Went Wrong*

- ◆ *Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, “Sons of Iraq”.*
- ◆ *Police generally fell short, did not perform.*
- ◆ *Negligible progress in rule of law*
- ◆ *Extremely slow progress in political accommodation.*
- ◆ *US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal.*
- ◆ *Iraqi government spending on development, services, and security.*
- ◆ *Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing intra-Shi’ite tensions.*
- ◆ *Growing Iranian role and influence*
- ◆ *Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions.*
- ◆ *Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors.*


After the “Surge”

- ◆ *Reducing the Uncertainties of a “Long War”*
 - ◆ *Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political accommodation.*
 - ◆ *Sons of Iraq*
 - ◆ *Sadr vs. ISCI*
 - ◆ *Stable autonomy for Kurds.*
 - ◆ *Open list and air elections at national, provincial, and local level.*
 - ◆ *Creation of Effective governance and services at at national, provincial, and local level.*
 - ◆ *Resolving petroleum and national budget issues.*
 - ◆ *Move from aid and government subsidies to sustained development and employment.*
 - ◆ *Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf*
 - ◆ *US and Iraqi domestic politics*


Enemy Activity Snap-shot (Weeks 1 – 52 for 2005 & 2006)

01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006)




Activity for Period		
Type of Activity	2005	2006
Suicide Attacks	27	139
School Attacks	98	129
Direct Fire *	1558	4542
Indirect Fire	599	1511
IEDs	783	1677



2005



2006



Note: Does not include land mine strikes

* Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events

Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on Developments in Afghanistan to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008


In 2007 the number of attacks in Afghanistan's Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded that of the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered by a lack of security in some areas and a general lack of government capacity and competency. The ability of the Karzai government, NATO, and the United States to defeat the Taliban will determine the continued support of the Afghan people for the government and the international community. Afghan leaders also must deal with endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on the government's ability to improve security, deliver services, and expand development for economic opportunity.

Although international forces and the Afghan National Army continue to score tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation has deteriorated in some areas in the south, and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year—their first high level losses—does not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations.

Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National Army, which as of the end of 2007 reported attaining 70 percent of its authorized 70,000 end strength. While this is an improvement, the shortage of international trainers in the field, high operational tempo, attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of significant independent action. The Afghan National Police has approximately 90 percent of its authorized 82,000 end-strength. While the National Police may have more forces throughout Afghanistan, corruption, insufficient training and equipment, and absenteeism hamper their effectiveness.


Kabul in 2008 must work closely with the national legislature, as well as provincial and tribal leaders, to establish and extend the capacity of the central government. The country faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government officials at the national and local level.

UNDSS SECURITY INCIDENTS JAN 2003 TO JUL 2007



Rise in Afghan Violence: 2002-2007


Average Annual Monthly Incidents



Adapted from USCENTCOM brief & UNA/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March 2008.

Trend in Afghan IEDs


Incidents by Year



Adapted from Washington Post, 9-30-07, p. A1.

Trend in Afghan Suicide Bombings

Body and Vehicle Born Incidents by Year



--17 more attacks were thwarted in 2006 and 68 in 2007


--40 humanitarian workers killed and 89 abducted in 2007 in 130 attacks.

--40+ food convoys attacked


80 killed and 90 wounded in attack on 17 February 2008; 35 killed and 28 injured in attack the next day

Adapted from UNAMA, "Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, 2001-2007," September 1, 2007 and Pou Martin Linnert. "Afghanistan Index," October 2007, & UNA/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March 2008.


Total NATO/ISAF/OEF Killed Through 2007



Source: <http://www.icasualties.org/oef/default.aspx>.



HIGH ABDUCTION RISK MAP




DNI McConnell: "the Taliban was able to control the population in the area -- about 10 to 11 percent of the country. The government, on the other hand -- the federal government, had about 30 (percent), 31 percent; and then the rest of that was local control." (27-2-08)

Afghan Intel Chief Amrullah Saleh: Only 8 of 364 districts not under government control

Growing Differences Between Insurgent Organizations

TBSL in the south: *Over 2007, the Taliban leadership in the south has been weakened as a result of the capture or kill of senior Taliban leaders. While the insurgency in the south remains Taliban-led, the once overarching influence of the Taliban over the insurgency in the east is diminishing. The insurgency in the east has become a conglomerate of disparate insurgent groups, operating independently from the once prevailing influence of the Taliban senior leadership in the south.*

Insurgent leadership in the east: *The insurgency within the FATA and RC East significantly evolved over 2007; it is no longer a traditional rigid structure, operating in a top-to-bottom order, and more importantly, no longer a Taliban-dominant insurgent network. Interacting networks including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat Mohammad-e drive the concept of the insurgency in the east.*



Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell on Developments in Pakistan to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2008

Al-Qa'ida and its terrorist affiliates continue to pose significant threats to the United States at home and abroad, and al-Qa'ida's central leadership based in the border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component...al-Qa'ida's central leadership in the past two years has been able to regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in the Homeland:

- Al-Qa'ida has been able to retain a safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that provides the organization many of the advantages it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan, albeit on a smaller and less secure scale. The FATA serves as a staging area for al-Qa'ida's attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as a location for training new terrorist operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the United States.


- Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al-Qa'ida has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization's operations around the world. It has lost many of its senior operational planners over the years, but the group's adaptable decision making process and bench of skilled operatives have enabled it to identify effective replacements.

- Al-Qa'ida's top leaders Osama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to be able to maintain al-Qa'ida's unity and its focus on their strategic vision of confronting our allies and us with mass casualty attacks around the globe. Although security concerns preclude them from the day-to-day running of the organization, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers through public statements.

- Al-Qa'ida is improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the US: the identification, training, and positioning of operatives for an attack in the Homeland. While increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al-Qa'ida to view the West, especially the US, as a harder target, we have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006.

- The IC assesses that Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and other Kashmir-focused groups will continue attack planning and execution in India. Shia and Hindu religious observances are possible targets, as are transportation networks and government buildings. We judge Kashmir-focused groups will continue to support the attacks in Afghanistan, and operatives trained by the groups will continue to feature in al-Qa'ida transnational attack planning.

Insurgency Objectives in 2008




Tactical Lessons

- ◆ *Adequate forces key to success.*
- ◆ *Need for forward deployment, and “win,” “hold,” and “build” efforts at local level.*
- ◆ *Create parallel efforts to strengthen local and provincial governments, and tribal leaders.*
- ◆ *Exploit enemy extremism, mistakes.*
- ◆ *Develop/encourage local forces, and integrate into security forces and employment programs.*
- ◆ *Encourage and capitalize on local HUMINT.*
- ◆ *Solve the detainee problem to the extent possible.*
- ◆ *Kill the cadres, not the low-level fighters.*
- ◆ *Exhibit great care in raids, air strikes, regarding civilian casualties collateral damage.*


Military Presence Per Capita

(Soldiers per Thousand Inhabitants in peak year)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.

ISAF Force & PRT Deployments



NATO reports 43,250 ISAF and National Support: US OEF = 16,000

US reports some 48,000 in ISAF (including about 28,000 from US) plus 12,000 US and 1,200 allied troops in CTJF 82

Force Structure Lessons

- ◆ *Uparmoring (ATGM?)*
- ◆ *Counter IED, counter-suicide bombing: Defeat through action, not just technical means*
- ◆ *Forward operating bases (FOBs) versus main operating bases (MOBs)*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*
- ◆ *Vital role of air support, helicopter gunships and mobility.*
- ◆ *Special Forces as critical as “win and hold.”*
- ◆ *Local forces an essential force multiplier.*
- ◆ *Advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets critical.*
- ◆ *Value of operational awareness, “Blue Force Tracker.”*


The Air Side of the “Surge”

The Rising Role of Airpower in Combat

- **Steady rise in combat sorties.**
- **The rise in Iraq has been driven largely by the surge.**
 - **40% rise in fixed wing combat sorties since 2004.**
 - **25% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Iraq since 2004**
 - **97% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Afghanistan since 2004.**
- **The rise in Afghanistan has been driven by a far more steady increase in pressure from the Taliban since 2005.**
- **In both wars, only a limited number of combat sorties actually dropped unguided or guided heavy munitions. Most only used guns, small rockets or did not use a weapon.**
 - **Percentage using munitions has increased with the intensity of combat in both wars.**
 - **Still only 23% in Afghanistan in 2007; 6% in Iraq.**


OIF Monthly Close Air Support Sorties with Munitions Dropped: 2004-2007

(Does not Include 20 & 30 mm cannon and rockets)




OEF Close Air Support Sorties With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007

(Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)



CAS Sorties with Munitions Dropped: Iraq vs. Afghanistan

(Excluding 20mm and 30mm rounds and unguided rockets)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Totals
— Afghanistan	178	163	310	202	179	288	368	670	181	98	289	0	0
— Iraq	89	36	52	45	44	171	303	166	90	42	81	0	0

Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007

The Role of Tankers, Airlift, and Air Drops

- The data do not cover the initial deployments, areas where airlift also played a critical role.
- There is no way to measure the number of land movements or personnel who were not exposed to IEDs, ambushes and land attacks.
- It is clear that tanker and airlift missions have been critical "enablers" in the recent fighting.
- Tanker sorties have not increased strikingly in recent combat, although they rose by some 15% in 2007. What is striking, however, is that the number of receiving aircraft increased sharply as combat became more intense that year, rising from 42,083 to 73,175 (some 74%)
- Airlift has played relatively constant role as a critical source of troop movements and supplies.
- The cargo delivered by airdrops, which play a critical role in dealing with the lack of road and poor terrain in Afghanistan, increased by 75% in 2006, and by over 90% in 2007.


“AirLand” Lessons

- ◆ *Fixed and rotary wing air critical component of success.*
- ◆ *Adequate force levels critical.*
- ◆ *Advanced IS&R again critical, but*
- ◆ *Air far more effective with forces on ground, HUMINT from host-country forces.*
- ◆ *Restraint in targeting and strike authorization critical, as is reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*
- ◆ *Value of all-weather, all terrain capability*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*

Building Host Country Forces

US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year


(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan			2.21	1.9	0.58	2.04	1.85
■ Afghanistan			3.26	14.63	21.32	25.49	58.14
■ Iraq	0.23			5.67	42.14	52.75	184.07

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

Iraq Security Forces Expenditures



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Iraqi Security Forces

Iraq Security Forces as of January 1, 2008 ^a			
Component	Current Authorized Personnel ^b	Assigned Personnel ^c	Total Trained Personnel to date ^d
Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces ^e			
Iraqi Police Service ^f	288,001	275,300	155,248
National Police ^g	33,670	32,389	41,399
Border Enforcement	38,205	38,649	27,959
Total MoI	359,876	347,338	224,606
Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces ^h			
Army	186,352	159,938	174,940
Support Forces	17,369	18,794	19,750
Air Force	2,907	1,305	1,370
Navy	1,483	1,115	1,194
Total MoD	208,111	181,152	197,254
Counter Terrorism Bureau			
Special Operations	4,857	3,126	3,485
Total Iraqi Security Forces	572,844	531,616	425,345

a Numbers do not include ministry staffs.

b Numbers reflect Government of Iraq (GOI) authorizations.

c Numbers are based upon GOI payroll data and do not reflect present for duty totals.

d Numbers reflect assigned personnel that have received training.


e Numbers reflect total ISF personnel trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, AWOL, and normal separation.

f MoI strength does not reflect investigative and administrative forces, the MoI HQ, MoI Forensics, Dignitary Protection, or contracted guards.

g MoI Police Support Unit, Provincial Security Force, and Emergency Response Unit personnel are part of the Iraqi Police Service and does not include other Ministry FPS.

h The MoD strength are derived from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs).


Near Term Iraqi Force Goals



* Manning level of combat battalions raised to 120% due to Operation Fardh Al Gharoon lessons learned (FMS funded).

Afghan Force Goals

Actual and Authorized Manpower




49,000+ men serving in ANA in early 2008 vs. goal of 80,000

Goal for ANA is force of 13 infantry brigades, 1 commando bde, and 1 mechanized bde

ANP goals under study

GAO-07-801SP, Security, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing in Afghanistan, p. 14 & UNA/62/722-S/2008/159, 6 March 2008.

MoD Forces: Operational Readiness




Source: MNF-I as of Feb 6 2008 (based on Jan 2008 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.

Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel as of January 17, 2008			
Unit	HRIMS Authorized ^a	Assigned as percent Authorized	Present-for-Duty as percent Authorized
Iraqi Ground Forces Command HQ	1,145	59%	59%
1st Division	11,852	111%	74%
2nd Division (including 8th IAIB ^b)	13,152	100%	68%
3rd Division	8,463	94%	77%
4th Division (includes 4/4 & 13 IAIBs)	24,969	108%	72%
5th Division	9,963	119%	88%
6th Division (includes 16th IAIB)	16,902	117%	82%
7th Division	9,213	107%	70%
8th Division (includes 17th IAIB)	10,152	159%	125%
9th Division (includes 11th IAIB)	11,585	116%	78%
10th Division	9,213	135%	114%
11th Division	8,393	96%	71%
14th Division	6,774	109%	69%
Total Fielded Ground Forces	141,576	113%	81%
Additional Units Planned or in Generation, and 120% manning initiative^a	50,561		
Total Ground Forces Fielded and Planned	192,137		

Iraqi Combat Battalion Generation

Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, and National Police Battalions



ORA 1 ORA 2 ORA 3 ORA 4 FORMING

Operational Readiness Assessment = ORA

Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008


Army Lessons - I

- ◆ *Realistic timelines are critical components of success. Years longer than initially predicted.*
- ◆ *Fund an adequate force plan from Day 1: No plan and no resources = no force*
- ◆ *Training does not create effective indigenous forces, experience, embeds, and partner units do.*
- ◆ *Leadership key problem and takes time and experience.*
- ◆ *Unclear can transfer Western experience with NCOs.*
- ◆ *Retention is a key problem: Overmanning, pay and allowances, deployment locations and cycles.*
- ◆ *Pay, facilities, equipment and weapons, medical care, disability and payments if killed are critical.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*

Army Lessons - II

- ◆ *Force expansion must take account of quality, not just quantity.*
- ◆ *Finding effective trainers and embeds a critical problem; training the trainers only part of the story.*
- ◆ *Use and improve the host country military culture; don't replace it.*
- ◆ *Deal realistically with ethnic, sectarian, and tribal problems; don't try to solve problems by denial.*
- ◆ *Move new units slowly into combat; don't rush or use them up.*
- ◆ *Build up from the battalion level, but have clear force goals.*
- ◆ *Equipment, weapons, and ammunition deliveries must match pace of force expansion.*
- ◆ *Maintenance, support, supply key problems in force building.*

Mof National Police Forces: Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I as of Feb 6 2008 (based on Jan 2008 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.


Sons of Iraq

Concerned Local Citizens

Total Contracted: 91,641
Volunteers: 4,605
Sunni: 78%
Shia: 19%
Other: 3%

Transitioned: 21,128
Anbar: 8,206
Iraqi Security Forces: 8,241
Non-Security Employment: 4,681

Costs:
Average Monthly CERP: \$16M



Police Lessons

- ◆ *MODs are bad enough; MOIs are a nightmare.*
- ◆ *May be mission impossible if seek a competent national and/or paramilitary force.*
- ◆ *Reality will be regional with national elements.*
- ◆ *Paramilitary mission will often simply be too difficult to add to task of creating effective army.*
- ◆ *Same need for embeds, partners, and win and hold forward presence. Training only small part of story.*
- ◆ *Police require courts and rule of law, governance, and services.*
- ◆ *Pay and allowances, facilities, weapons and equipment, medical care, disability, and death benefits again critical.*

Afghan Force Development: Needs Beyond 2008-2009

- Defense, State, and USAID officials have suggested that securing, stabilizing, and reconstructing Afghanistan will take at least a decade and require continuing international assistance. If the recent administration budget proposals for Afghanistan are approved, the United States will increase funding for Afghanistan well beyond earlier estimates.
- Until recently, Defense's plans for training and equipping the Afghan army and police, called the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), were based on the assumption that the insurgency in Afghanistan would decline and the overall security situation would improve.
- However, Defense revised its plans to adapt to the deteriorating security situation and to rapidly increase the ability of the ANSF to operate with less coalition support. These modified plans call for a total of \$7.6 billion for the ANSF in 2007, which is over a threefold increase compared with fiscal year 2006 and represents more than all of the U.S. assistance for the ANSF in fiscal years 2002 through 2006 combined.
- The costs of these and other efforts will require difficult trade-offs for decision makers as the United States faces competing demands for its resources, such as securing and stabilizing Iraq, in the years ahead.

Afghan Force Development: The Flow of Resources is Just Beginning

Table 3: Defense and State Support for Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-2008

Dollars in millions

	Fiscal years							Total
	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 request ^a	2008 request	
Assistance program								
Afghan army ^b	\$76.9	\$372.6	\$723.7	\$1,736.6	\$768.0	\$4,883.2	\$1,903.7	\$10,464.7
Afghan police	25.5	5.0	223.9	813.9	1,293.7	2,730.6	948.9	6,041.5
Total	\$102.4	\$377.6	\$947.6	\$2,550.5	\$2,061.7	\$7,613.8	\$2,852.6	\$16,506.2

Sources: Departments of Defense and State.

^aFiscal year 2007 includes approximately \$1.6 billion that has been appropriated and approximately \$6 billion as requested by Defense in the 2007 Global War on Terror Supplemental Request.

^bAfghan army includes detainee operations.

Governance

*Presence and Services =
Legitimacy and Support*

The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

◆ *Political Accommodation*

◆ *Security*

◆ *Governance*

◆ *Development*

Military Lessons About Governance


- ◆ *Foreign military forces are the proxy and get the blame.*
- ◆ *Inevitably linked to success in political accommodation and security.*
- ◆ *Central governments are hardest to fix, and will always lack core competence.*
- ◆ *You win at the provincial and local level and you win where you fight*
- ◆ *Legitimacy and popular support are not the product of elections, but of the quality of representation and services that affect local populations.*
- ◆ *The rule of law, key utilities, education, and medical support are key tests.*
- ◆ *Local legitimacy and security cannot be separated from sectarian, ethnic, and tribal issues.*
- ◆ *Long time lines, limited outside competence in aid.*

Development

Dollars Can Be Bullets

Annual Foreign Aid Per Capita

(Annual assistance over the first two years of nation-building)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.


CRS Estimate of Total Cost of War To US Through FY2008

(CRS estimates in billions of budget authority)


By Operation and Funding Source	FY 01 & FY 02 ^a	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08 ^b	Cum. Enacted thru FY08 Consol.Ap props	Pending FY 08 Req. ^a	Cum: FY01-FY08 Req.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)^c										
Department of Defense	0	50.0	56.4	83.4	98.5	129.6	74.7	492.0	79.6	571.6
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops ^d	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	0.9	31.7	2.5	34.2
VA medical ^e	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.7	2.2	0.0	2.2
Total: Iraq	0.0	53.0	75.9	85.5	102.0	133.6	76.4	525.9	82.3	608.3
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Afghanistan and GWOT										
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	34.9	12.6	128.9	21.7	150.6
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops ^d	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	1.1	10.6	0.9	11.5
VA Medical ^e	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.3
Total: OEF	20.8	14.7	14.5	20.0	19.0	36.9	14.0	139.8	22.8	162.7

Does not include FY2009 supplementals or future costs. CBO Estimates that cost of next 10 years for both OIF and OEF would be \$570 billion more if troops fell to 30,000 by 2010, or \$1,055 billion if feel to 75,000 by 2013

CRS Estimate of US DoD Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)




CRS Estimate of US DoD Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



GAO Estimate of Cost of War To DoD Through FY2007

Figure 2: DOD's Reported GWOT Obligations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 by Operation

Dollars (in billions)




GWOT obligations per fiscal year

- Operation Iraqi Freedom
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- Operation Noble Eagle

Source: GAO-08-423R, GWOT, January 30, 2008, p 5

Total US Aid: Pre Soviet Invasion to FY2008

(In \$US Millions Including Supplementals to Date)




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
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Total US Aid: FY2000 to FY2008


(In \$US Millions Including Supplementals to Date)



CRS Estimate of US Cost of Aid in Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES **US Total Assistance Per Capita Per Year**
(Constant Dollars)




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	8.1	4.29	3.02	5	5.84
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	25.02	43.59	78.68	86.79	120.32
■ Iraq	0.24	0.01	1.62	157.42	332.7	277.39	333.76

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

US Economic Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	5.89	2.39	2.44	2.96	3.99
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	21.76	28.96	57.36	61.3	62.19
■ Iraq	0	0.01	1.62	151.75	290.56	224.64	149.7


COUNTRYWIDE R&D ACTIVITY

As at: 1 August 2007 Compiled from Master Spreadsheet 3.0

STATUS	PRT/CIMIC		*OTHER PROJECTS	
	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING	NO OF PROJECTS	KNOWN FUNDING
COMPLETED	5499	\$315,092,302	15797	\$4,048,940,958
ONGOING	2318	\$260,844,485	17265	\$4,082,854,650
PLANNED/FUNDED	357	\$15,755,260	1212	\$4,232,480,384
TOTAL	8174	\$591,692,047	34274	\$12,364,275,992

Cost unknown for 35% of projects.

*Includes multi-million dollar road, power grid and ANA construction projects.




These figures are based on information supplied to the ACSP Cell, HQ ISAF by Donors and other organisations and do not reflect the whole R&D picture. Graphic representation does not include Multi-million dollar projects.

Multi-million dollar projects are not depicted in the graphic.




Completed/Ongoing R&D by Province



As of 1 Sep 07



Completed, Ongoing, Planned/Funded R&D by Province (\$/pers)



Spending in High Risk Provinces

* Reported data captures an estimated 80% of all R&D
 * Totals do not include multi-million dollar road, power grid or ANA construction projects

as of 1 Sep 07

Military Lessons About Development

- ◆ *Dollars = Bullets. No resources, no victory*
- ◆ *You win in the field and where you fight.*
- ◆ *Military must have substantial aid funds for own priorities: CERP or Commander's Emergency Relief Program*
- ◆ *Jobs, right now, are more critical than development and sustained employment.*
- ◆ *Military EPRT or EPRT is better than no civilian EPRT or PRT, and often as good or better than civilian PRT.*
- ◆ *Aid must visibly affect the entire area, and appear to meet common needs or be equitable.*
- ◆ *You can't develop and lose the war.*
- ◆ *Some NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with war.*
- ◆ ***But**, military that doesn't protect NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with victory.*

Afghanistan Way Ahead

United Nations Millennium Development Goals

Afghan National Development Strategy

Security

Enemy
Afghan National
Security Forces
Border

Governance

Government
Population
Legal Process

Development

Education
Health Care
Agriculture
Roads

Security

Governance

Governance
Rule of Law
Human Rights

Econ & Social Development

Education
Health
Agriculture
Rural Development
Infrastructure
Natural Resources
Private Sector
Social Protection

Security

Governance

Gender Equality

Development

Universal Primary Education
Improve Maternal Health
Reduce Child Mortality
Control HIV/AIDS/Diseases
Build Global Partnerships
Environmental Stability
Eradicate Extreme Poverty

2007

2008

2013

2020