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The Iraq War After Five Years: The Surge, Current Status, and Military Lessons

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*Revised March
24, 2008*

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The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

◆ *Political Accommodation*

◆ *Security*

◆ *Governance*

◆ *Development*

Political Accommodation

*(+Foreign Pressure &
Threats)*

Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Challenges

◆ *Sectarian Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi'a. 1% Other*

◆ *Iraq: 60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other*

◆ *Ethnic Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, Other 4%*


◆ *Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%, Turkman, Assyrian & Other 3%*

◆ *Tribal Challenges*

◆ *Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided*


◆ *Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily urbanized.*

Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions




Adapted from CIA map

Iraq Still Faces Deep Ethnic and Sectarian Divides



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

Iraq's Differ Sharply by Sect and Ethnicity Over the Future Nature of Governance



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

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
Iraq Lessons

- ◆ *Work with and around central Government; move towards open lists and local representatives.*
- ◆ *Work in “Iraqi time,” but keep up pressure from behind scenes.*
- ◆ *Deal with ethnic and sectarian “fault lines*
- ◆ *Create parallel efforts to strength local and provincial governments, and hold elections.*
- ◆ *Give all elements role in government and security forces.*
- ◆ *Push government spending & fairly share money.*
- ◆ *Halt worst ethnic and sectarian violence & cleansing.*
- ◆ *Employment is critical, particularly young men.*
- ◆ *Address external pressures and threats.*

Security Force Multipliers:


*Host Country Forces &
Threat Fault Lines*


The Ground Campaign



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Key Surge Operations






Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008


Overall Weekly Attack Trends

September 25, 2004 – February 22, 2008



Source: MNF-I SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008.
 Chart includes executed attacks and potential (found and cleared) attacks.


Civilian Deaths January 2006 – February 2008



Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) and (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of Feb 23 2008 (*EOM Feb 2008 projected)

** Reflects a new metric for civilian deaths that includes a broader set of Iraqi reports than were included in the Dec 2007 report. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths January 2006 – February 2008




Includes
Sunni on
Sunni and
Shi'ite on
Shi'ite

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments CIOC Trends Database (Coalition and Iraqi Reports) as of Feb 23 2008 (*EOM Feb 2008 projected)


Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 21

Iraqi Forces and U.S. Military Deaths in Iraq January 2006 – February 2008



Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008; DoD News Releases and CIDNE as of Feb 23 2008. Includes deaths within Iraq only. U.S. deaths under investigation are classified as battle deaths.

Weapons Caches Found by Coalition and Iraqi Forces January 1, 2004 – February 22, 2008



Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008.


Caches Found and Cleared




Year	Anbar	Iraq
2007	3156	6959
2006	941	2662
2005	1043	2863
2004	410	1712




Caches Found & Cleared in 2007





Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 23


Average Daily Attacks by Province July 2007 – November 2007



Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.
 Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.

Average Daily Executed Attacks by Province

December 1, 2007 – February 22, 2008




These four provinces have approximately 42% of the population but account for 86% of executed attacks.

Since the last reporting period, executed attacks have significantly decreased in all provinces (43% decline in Baghdad Province), with the exception of Ninewa Province which has seen an 17% increase.

Source: MNF-I SPA Assessments. SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Feb 23 2008. Data reflects executed enemy attacks targeted against coalition, ISF, civilians, Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations. Does not include IEDs and mines found and cleared.

State of al-Anbar

1. AQI neutralized in the population centers
2. AQI ideology thoroughly discredited
3. Popular support for continued violence is absent
4. Cells splintering/fighters deserting
5. Tribes mobilized against AQI
6. ISF support is strong
7. Traditional FFF routes gone
8. AQI now on outside looking in; lack access to population
9. Post-conflict competition, extremely complex



CLC Contributions

■ Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) partnering with CF and ISF since 17 June have contributed to significant reductions in:

- Deaths
- MNF-I equipment losses
- MNF-I replacement costs

■ MNF-I average monthly savings over cost of 51K CLCs is ~\$5.3M for UAH BD/BL replacement costs alone

	MNF-I Monthly Average		
	Prior to CLC (15 Sep 06 - 16 Jun 07)	Since CLC (17 Jun - 24 Nov 07)	Monthly Change
KIA (CF, ISF, CIV) <small>(SIGACTS III CF + HN reports)</small>	(90, 509, 3020)	(60, 385, 1615)	(-30, -124, -1405)
HMMWV (UAH) Battle Loss (BL) <small>(primarily due to IEDs)</small>	93	39	-54
BL Vehicle Replacement Costs (@ \$200K ea)	\$18.5M	\$7.8M	-\$10.7M
CLC Costs Disbursed (\$300/month)	\$0	\$5.4M	+\$5.4M


Monthly savings over cost of CLCs ~\$5.3M.

• CLCs have contributed to increased total IED and Caches Found/Cleared (F/C):

- 28% increase since June in caches found
- CLCs led CF to discover one of the largest EFP stockpiles found in Iraq to date (MND-N)
- CLCs reported and marked 8 VBIEDs in Adhamiyah, with 5 confirmed and reduced without incident (MND-B)


• CLCs continue to work with ISF and CF forces:

- Over 800 checkpoints manned (MND-C)
- Combined IA and CLC checkpoint repelled AQI attack in a 2-hour battle on 22 Nov (MND-C)



More IEDs F/C than IED explosions in Nov 07


Views of Sons of Iraq and Awakening Councils Are Favorable But Differ Sharply by Sect and Ethnicity




Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

The Sons of Iraq:

A Case Study




How Iraqi Public Opinion Has Changed Since the Surge




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
Improving views of Security Since the Surge



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008




Source: January 2008 Nationwide Poll




Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 27

Zooming in On Baghdad



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008


Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-08 (Trend in Total Incidents)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	16	23
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	4
■ Assasination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16	21	16
■ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
■ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16	6	13
■ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46	82	62
■ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71	103	77


Source: Iraqi Official,

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007-08 (Monthly Distribution)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Total
■ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71	103	77	1076'
■ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46	82	62	1162'
■ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16	6	13	305'
■ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2'
■ Assassination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16	21	16	177'
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	15'
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	16	23	55'


Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007-08 (Trend in Total Casualties)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126	123	116
■ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29	31	28
■ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84	77	72
■ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104	153	197
■ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329	311	453

Source: Iraqi Official


Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007-08 (Monthly Distribution by Type)



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	:Total
Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329	311	453	7432'
Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104	153	197	3187'
ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84	77	72	987'
ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29	31	28	458'
Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126	123	116	4814'


Source: Iraqi Official

Iraqis See Significant Shifts as Result of “Surge,” But Situation is Still Tenuous



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

Iraqis Are Now More Favorable to US Presence as Result of “Surge”



Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008

The “Surge”

- ◆ *What Went Right in Original Strategy*
 - ◆ *US build-up to 20 brigades*
 - ◆ *Shift in tactics to lasting forward deployment.*
 - ◆ *Only fight where can both “win” and “hold.”*
 - ◆ *Exploitation of major advances in IS&R.*
 - ◆ *Surge airpower as well as ground forces.*
- ◆ *What Went Sort of Right*
 - ◆ *Iraqi government support of operations against both Sunni & Shi’ite violent extremists*
 - ◆ *Iraqi Army deployment, although slower than planned and Iraqi forces far less ready.*
 - ◆ *Expansion of embeds, partner units, partner cells.*
 - ◆ *Focus on Baghdad*

The “Surge”

◆ *Synergy and Serendipity*

- ◆ *Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes*
- ◆ *Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed to sons of Iraq*
- ◆ *Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire.*
- ◆ *Kurds wait on Article 140*

◆ *What Went Wrong*

- ◆ *Iraqi police generally fell short, did not perform.*
- ◆ *Negligible progress in rule of law*
- ◆ *Extremely slow progress in political accommodation.*
- ◆ *US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal.*
- ◆ *Iraqi government spending on development, services, and security.*
- ◆ *Impact of British defeat in the south*
- ◆ *Growing Iranian role and influence*

.....secure the population.....

CLEAR

9 Division-level, full-spectrum surge operations conducted since June 2007:

- MARNE TORCH
- MARNE AVALANCHE
- MARNE HUSKY
- MARNE TORCH II
- MARNE ANVIL
- MARNE SENTRY
- MARNE COURAGEOUS
- MARNE ROUNDUP
- MARNE THUNDERBOLT

Combined operations have resulted in:

- 3,802 extremists detained; (41 DIV HVIs)
- 1,506 IEDs found and cleared
- 718 caches found and cleared

Surge Operations led to:

CONTROL

- MND-C's occupation of 50 bases - Iraqi Security Forces living on 24
- 12,194 MND-C Soldiers (75%) are living on these bases amongst the Iraqi population


CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program)

RETAIN

- 1021 total CERP projects obligated, infusing \$117 million into local economies
- 132 total Micro-Grants (FY07 & FY08), providing \$819,788 in capital to local entrepreneurs
- Improved capacity of 10 health clinics through application of CERP


...and defeat sectarian violence

Attack Trends
(Since 01 June 07)



- 74% decrease in all forms of attacks per month
- 89% decrease in IDF per month
- 63% decrease in SAF attacks per month
- 70% decrease in IED attacks per month

Casualty Trends
(Since 01 June 07)



- Civilian casualties have decreased 81%
- MND-C casualties have decreased 85%
- Iraqi Security Force casualties have decreased 87%

Sons of Iraq

- 31,999 Sons of Iraq across MND-Center
- 27,752 Sons of Iraq are contracted through 150 contracts to provide infrastructure security for their nation
- The 150 security contracts are composed of 112 Sunni, 30 Shia, and 8 mixed Sunni/Shia contracts
- SOIs have provided intelligence that has led to the capture of 5 HVIs and 427 insurgents
- SOI Groups are developed in areas where there is no Iraqi Security Force presence
- SOIs are effective and since 15 June have turned-in or located:
 - 385 caches
 - 286 IEDs
 - Based on tips received, 70 rewards paid to SOIs totaling \$300,860

GOVERNANCE

PIC (Provincial Iraqi Control)

A partnership arrangement in which CF transfer security authority to Iraqi Provinces.

- All courts functioning and staffed
- Laptop computers with Iraqi Law database from 1917 – present provided to all judges

Babil (PIC JUN 2008)

- 88% (\$112M) of Budget Committed
- 11 Courts - 85 Judges
- New Hilla Jail opened SEP 2007
- 6.5 of hours of residential electricity daily
- 65% Access to clean water

Karbala (PIC OCT 2007)

- 90% (\$64M) of Budget Committed
- 3 Courts - 43 Judges

Najaf (PIC DEC 2006)

- 100% (\$88M) of Budget Committed
- 7 Courts - 39 Judges
- 6.5 of hours of residential electricity daily
- 60% Access to clean water

Wasit (PIC APR 2008)

- 100% (\$83M) of Budget Committed
- 7 Courts - 44 Judges
- 20 of hours of residential electricity daily
- 75% Access to clean water

Baghdad (Mahmudiyah and Mada'in)

- 2 Courts
- 8 Judges
- Model Bridge Internment facility at 4/6 Iraqi Army

MEASURES OF PROGRESS

Jurf As Sakhr: formerly AQI sanctuary

- New local council and governance building
- Roads paved and improved
- Ambulance/emergency response capability improved
- 2 schools renovated
- 6 new markets opened facilitated by Micro-Grants

Arab Jabour: formerly AQI sanctuary

- 29 Micro-Grants for local businesses
- Local community council formed
- Opening of Governance Center where GOI, civic groups, and local council can operate freely
- 3 schools opened, 1 renovated

Mada'in Qada

- Improved water infrastructure capacity by 400% for irrigation
- Improved drinking water capacity by 200%
- 62 Micro-Grants for local businesses
- 12 schools renovated; 13 renovations ongoing

Agriculture: working toward reestablishing Iraq's #1 industry

- 97 new farm organizations (COOPs, Unions, and Farmer's Associations)
- 5 Veterinary Operations
- \$22.8 committed for 71 CERP projects improving agriculture and irrigation systems

Iskandariyah Industrial Complex (IIC)


- SCAI (State Company Automotive Industries): At its peak, the SCAI employed 6,000 workers. There are currently 1,000 workers.
- SCMI (State Company Mechanical Industries): At its peak, the SCMI employed 6,000 workers. There are currently 1,000 workers.
- VOTECH: Currently has 200 students enrolled with the goal to service 1,000 students by June 08
- Scrap Metal: MND-C monitoring the IIC scrap initiative. This is one of 7 GOI designated scrap yards and is also the most developed in the country.



**Multi-National Division Center
Operation Iraqi Freedom
AS OF 26 JAN 08**

TF Marne's mission is to block accelerants into Baghdad, secure the population, and defeat sectarian violence in order to create the conditions for long term Iraqi self-reliance.

- 16,372 Coalition forces from 8 Nations
- 20,240 Iraqi Army Forces
- 3rd Infantry Division
- 6 US Brigades
- 1 Georgian Brigade
- The 8th Iraqi Army Division
- The 4th BDE, 6th Iraqi Army Division
- 2 Iraqi National Police Brigades
- 1 Iraqi Dept of Border Enforcement Brigade
- 29 IA and NP Transition Teams




The “Surge”

- ◆ *The Uncertainties of a “Long War”*
 - ◆ *Sunni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political accommodation.*
 - ◆ *Sons of Iraq*
 - ◆ *Sadr vs. ISCI*
 - ◆ *Stable autonomy for Kurds.*
 - ◆ *Open list and air elections at national, provincial, and local level.*
 - ◆ *Creation of Effective governance and services at national, provincial, and local level.*
 - ◆ *Resolving petroleum and national budget issues.*
 - ◆ *Move from aid and government subsidies to sustained development and employment.*
 - ◆ *Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf*
 - ◆ *US and Iraqi domestic politics*

Tactical Lessons

- ◆ *Adequate forces key to success.*
- ◆ *Need for forward deployment, and “win,” “hold,” and “build” efforts at local level.*
- ◆ *Create parallel efforts to strengthen local and provincial governments, and tribal leaders.*
- ◆ *Exploit enemy extremism, mistakes.*
- ◆ *Develop/encourage local forces, and integrate into security forces and employment programs.*
- ◆ *Encourage and capitalize on local HUMINT.*
- ◆ *Solve the detainee problem to the extent possible.*
- ◆ *Kill the cadres, not the low-level fighters.*
- ◆ *Exhibit great care in raids, air strikes, regarding civilian casualties collateral damage.*

Military Presence Per Capita (Soldiers per Thousand Inhabitants in peak year)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.

Force Structure Lessons

- ◆ *Uparmoring (ATGM?)*
- ◆ *Counter IED, counter-suicide bombing: Defeat through action, not just technical means*
- ◆ *Forward operating bases (FOBs) versus main operating bases (MOBs)*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*
- ◆ *Vital role of air support, helicopter gunships and mobility.*
- ◆ *Special Forces as critical as “win and hold.”*
- ◆ *Local forces an essential force multiplier.*
- ◆ *Advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets critical.*
- ◆ *Value of operational awareness, “Blue Force Tracker.”*


The AirLand Campaign: The Air Side of the “Surge”

The Rising Role of Airpower in Combat

- **Steady rise in combat sorties.**
- **The rise in Iraq has been driven largely by the surge.**
 - **40% rise in fixed wing combat sorties since 2004.**
 - **25% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Iraq since 2004**
 - **97% rise in CAS/Strike sorties in Afghanistan since 2004.**
- **The rise in Afghanistan has been driven by a far more steady increase in pressure from the Taliban since 2005.**
- **In both wars, only a limited number of combat sorties actually dropped unguided or guided heavy munitions. Most only used guns, small rockets or did not use a weapon.**
 - **Percentage using munitions has increased with the intensity of combat in both wars.**
 - **Still only 23% in Afghanistan in 2007; 6% in Iraq.**

OIF Monthly Close Air Support Sorties with Munitions Dropped: 2004-2007


(Does not Include 20 & 30 mm cannon and rockets)



Source: CENTAFCAOC, 5 December 2007.

CAS Sorties with Munitions Dropped: Iraq vs. Afghanistan

(Excluding 20mm and 30mm rounds and unguided rockets)



◆ Afghanistan	178	163	310	202	179	288	368	670	181	98	289	0	0
■ Iraq	89	36	52	45	44	171	303	166	90	42	81	0	0

The Role of Tankers, Airlift, and Air Drops

- The data do not cover the initial deployments, areas where airlift also played a critical role.
- There is no way to measure the number of land movements or personnel who were not exposed to IEDs, ambushes and land attacks.
- It is clear that tanker and airlift missions have been critical “enablers” in the recent fighting.
- Tanker sorties have not increased strikingly in recent combat, although they rose by some 15% in 2007. What is striking, however, is that the number of receiving aircraft increased sharply as combat became more intense that year, rising from 42,083 to 73,175 (some 74%)
- Airlift has played relatively constant role as a critical source of troop movements and supplies.
- The cargo delivered by airdrops, which play a critical role in dealing with the lack of road and poor terrain in Afghanistan, increased by 75% in 2006, and by over 90% in 2007.

AirLand Lessons

- ◆ *Fixed and rotary wing air critical component of success.*
- ◆ *Adequate force levels critical.*
- ◆ *Advanced IS&R again critical, but*
- ◆ *Air far more effective with forces on ground, HUMINT from host-country forces.*
- ◆ *Restraint in targeting and strike authorization critical, as is reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*
- ◆ *Value of all-weather, all terrain capability*
- ◆ *Risk of dividing forces and roles and missions by ally; Unity of command, purpose, ROEs*


Building Host Country Forces

Congressional Aid Appropriations to ISF: FY2003-FY2007

STATUS OF ISFF FUNDS

\$ Billions

Sources: P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-161; Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, ISFF Funds Execution Report (1/8/2008)



Notes:


1. Numbers are affected by rounding.
2. The last update for ISFF Quick Response Fund (QRF) obligated and expended figures was provided by DoD, *Secretary of the Army Update*, on September 30, 2007.

Timeline of US Aid to ISF: FY2003-FY2007

TIMELINE OF ISFF OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES

\$ Billions

Sources: DoD, *Secretary of the Army Updates* (8/31/2005 – 9/30/2007); GRD, *2207 Finance Report* (6/3/2007); Corps of Engineers Financial Management System, *ISFF Funds Execution Report* (1/8/2008)




Notes:

1. Numbers are affected by rounding.
2. DoD, *Secretary of the Army Updates* were not available for the months of October 2007 and November 2007.

US Military Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan			2.21	1.9	0.58	2.04	1.85
■ Afghanistan			3.26	14.63	21.32	25.49	58.14
■ Iraq	0.23			5.67	42.14	52.75	184.07

Iraqi Security Forces

Iraq Security Forces as of January 31, 2008 ^a			
Component	Current Authorized Personnel ^b	Assigned Personnel ^c	Total Trained Personnel to date ^d
Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces ^e			
Iraqi Police Service ^f	288,001	279,870	166,037
National Police ^g	33,670	33,531	44,156
Border Enforcement	38,205	40,852	28,023
Total MoI	359,876	354,253	238,216
Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces ^h			
Army	186,352	160,248	180,263
Support Forces	17,369	18,087	19,750
Air Force	2,907	1,344	1,370
Navy	1,483	1,123	1,194
Total MoD	208,111	180,802	202,577
Counter Terrorism Bureau			
Special Operations	4,857	3,144	3,709
Total Iraqi Security Forces	572,844	538,199	444,502

a Numbers do not include ministry staffs.

b Numbers reflect Government of Iraq (GOI) authorizations.

c Numbers are based upon GOI payroll data and do not reflect present for duty totals.

d Numbers reflect assigned personnel that have received training.

e Numbers reflect total ISF personnel trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due to casualties, AWOL, and normal separation.

f MoI strength does not reflect investigative and administrative forces, the MoI HQ, MoI Forensics, Dignitary Protection, or contracted guards.

g MoI Police Support Unit, Provincial Security Force, and Emergency Response Unit personnel are part of the Iraqi Police Service and does not include other Ministry FPS.

h The MoD strength are derived from Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs).


Growing Strength of Iraqi Army; But Still Needs Help Through 2012

Red Below 60%	Amber 60 – 74%	Yellow 75 – 89%	Green 90% and above
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
	AUTH	ASSIGNED (Pay data)		Present for Duty			
	Total	Total	% of Auth	Total	% of Assigned	% of Auth	Weekly Change (% PFD auth)
Joint Headquarters Command (JHQ)	0	1615					
Ministry of Defense Headquarters (MOD)	0	1262					
IGFC HQs	1145	872	76%	879	101%	98%	0%
1st Division	11652	12953	111%	8737	75%	75%	-2%
2nd Division (Includes 6th IAIB)	13152	12876	98%	8136	83%	62%	-3%
3rd Division	9213	8763	95%	5912	67%	64%	0%
4th Division (Includes 4/4 & 13 IAIBs)	24968	25993	104%	18349	73%	73%	1%
5th Division	9963	10936	110%	8536	86%	86%	7%
6th Division (Includes 16th IAIB)	16152	17907	111%	12988	72%	80%	0%
7th Division	9213	9887	107%	6246	63%	68%	0%
8th Division (Includes 17th IAIB)	10152	15403	152%	11751	76%	116%	0%
9th Division (Includes 11th IAIB)	11585	12592	109%	9096	72%	79%	1%
10th Division	14091	18121	129%	14608	81%	104%	2%
11th Division	5954	7768	130%	4560	77%	77%	-4%
14th Division	0	0		0			
SUB-TOTAL OF GROUND FORCES	137241	153871	112%	109578	71%	80%	0%
Support CMD elements (RSUs and GSUs)	10101	9833	97%				
Training and Doctrine Command (ITBs, RTCs)	5482	7619	139%				
ISOF	2936	4026	137%				
Air Force	2900	1221	42%				
Navy	1483	1109	75%				
TOTAL OF UNITS WITH AUTHORIZATIONS	160143	177479	111%				
As Of:				28-Dec-07			

****14th Div is shown but its numbers are not counted in the totals. 3/8 reflags to 1/14, 5/10 reflags to 2/14, and 3/14 is in Force Generation.**

Near Term Iraqi Force Goals



MoD Forces: Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I as of Feb 6 2008 (based on Jan 2008 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.

Iraqi Ground Forces Personnel as of January 17, 2008			
Unit	HRIMS Authorized ^a	Assigned as percent Authorized	Present-for-Duty as percent Authorized
Iraqi Ground Forces Command HQ	1,145	59%	59%
1st Division	11,652	111%	74%
2nd Division (including 6th IAIB ^b)	13,152	100%	68%
3rd Division	8,463	94%	77%
4th Division (includes 4/4 & 13 IAIBs)	24,969	108%	72%
5th Division	9,963	119%	88%
6th Division (includes 16th IAIB)	16,902	117%	82%
7th Division	9,213	107%	70%
8th Division (includes 17th IAIB)	10,152	159%	125%
9th Division (includes 11th IAIB)	11,585	116%	78%
10th Division	9,213	135%	114%
11th Division	8,393	96%	71%
14th Division	6,774	109%	69%
Total Fielded Ground Forces	141,576	113%	81%
Additional Units Planned or In Generation, and 120% manning initiative^d	50,561		
Total Ground Forces Fielded and Planned	192,137		

Source: DoD Quarterly Report, March, 2008. Pg. 53

Still Need Years for MOD and Military

TRA 3 Effective w/ Considerable Limitations 60-84%			TRA 2 Effective w/ Limitations 65-84%			TRA 1 Effective 85%		
Category	Capability and Principal Metric	Status	Category	Capability and Principal Metric	Status			
1. Man	Capability: Recruit, assign and sustain personnel in a functioning pers management system Metric: Operational units maintain 95% authorized strength at Battalion level tracked by JHQ	↑	8. Fuel	Capability: Supply Fuel to Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) for the COIN Fight. Metric: COIN operations unencumbered by fuel shortages; <10% reliance on Coalition	↑			
2. Pay/ Promote	Capability: Establishment of effective and timely pay and promotion systems Metric: 95-100% assigned paid correctly; routine, transparent promotion system	↑	9. Move	Capability: Distribution assets capable of supporting IAF lines of communication first to fourth line. Metric: Iraqi Army capable of coordinating, controlling, and executing movements, Manning and Equipment to execute first and second line distribution. Contract/mechanism in place to execute 3-4 line distribution.	↔			
3. Train	Capability: Training management system that produces a trained force capable of winning the COIN fight. Metric: Sufficient quantity of trained Soldiers, Officers, NCOs, and units capable of winning the COIN fight.	↔	10. Life Support	Capability: Reliable food service and base management support system Metric: QA system implemented; 100% contracts paid on time; disruptions in service corrected < 72hrs	↓			
4. Equip	Capability: Capability: MOD Ability to Acquire Equipment using direct & FMS for the COIN Fight. Metric: Interim: Foreign Military Sales management Long Term: MOD JHQ Annual Acquisition Plan & Strategies by trained acquisition staff	↔	11. Intel	Capability: Deliver timely, relevant Intelligence products to decision makers and the war fighters. Metric: Intel-based targeting	↗			
5. Sustain	Capability: Supply the COIN fight Metric: Interim solution – FMS Sustainment Case; long-term solution – stockage at Depot, RSUs, CSU to user achieve 80% of target	↔	12. Operations and Command and Control	Capability: Effective Command & Control of the Joint Forces for the COIN effort. Metric: The JHQ demonstrates progressive C2 capability during transition toward self-sufficiency to execute effective COIN Ops	↗			
5. Arm	Capability: Provide ammunition for the COIN fight. Metric: Ammunition system functional and responsive, system manned with personnel trained and available for duty. Sustainment stocks on hand and on order. Required ammunition on hand in units.	↔	13. Discipline	Capability: Operating Military Justice System Metric: CDRs using Military Justice System to maintain order & discipline.	↓			
7. Fix	Capability: Retains general-support maintenance Metric: Iraqi control of National Maintenance Contract; contracted mechanics diminished over time; reporting reflects readiness.	↔	14. Health	Capability: Provide for a fit force ready for the fight. Metric: Manned & Operating TMCs	↔			

Making Progress and Increase in TRA Status ↑	Making Progress with no change in TRA Status ↗	No change - ↔	Loosing Progress with no change in TRA Status ↘	Loosing Progress with a decrease in TRA Status ↓
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
Army Lessons - I

- ◆ *Realistic timelines are critical components of success. Years longer than initially predicted.*
- ◆ *No plan and no resources = no force*
- ◆ *Training does not create effective forces, experience, embeds, and partner units do.*
- ◆ *Leadership key problem and takes time and experience.*
- ◆ *Unclear can transfer Western experience with NCOs.*
- ◆ *Retention is a key problem: Overmanning, pay and allowances, deployment locations and cycles.*
- ◆ *Pay, facilities, equipment and weapons, medical care, disability and payments if killed are critical.*
- ◆ *Land-air C4I/battle management interface critical to reducing friendly fire.*

Army Lessons - II

- ◆ *Force expansion must take account of quality, not just quantity.*
- ◆ *Finding effective trainers and embeds a critical problem; training the trainers only part of the story.*
- ◆ *Use and improve the host country military culture; don't replace it.*
- ◆ *Deal realistically with ethnic, sectarian, and tribal problems; don't try to solve problems by denial.*
- ◆ *Move new units slowly into combat; don't rush or use them up.*
- ◆ *Build up from the battalion level, but have clear force goals.*
- ◆ *Equipment, weapons, and ammunition deliveries must match pace of force expansion.*
- ◆ *Maintenance, support, supply key problems in force building.*

Mol National Police Forces: Operational Readiness



Source: MNF-I as of Feb 6 2008 (based on Jan 2008 data). Does not include units not yet formed or not reporting.

Still Need Years for MOI and Police

TRA 3 Effective w/ considerable limitations (40-64%)			TRA 2 Effective w/ limitations 65-84%			TRA 1 Essential 85%		
Category	Capability and Principle Metric	Status	Category	Capability and Principle Metric	Status			
1. Man	<u>Capability:</u> Generate and sustain Iraq Police Service, National Police, Department of Border Enforcement and Port of Entry. <u>Metric:</u> Maintain personnel strength to sustain effective operations	↗	8. Fuel	<u>Capability:</u> Civil Security Forces are supplied the correct type and quantity of fuel to meet mission requirements. <u>Metric:</u> Civil Security Forces receive the correct types and quantities of fuel that match projected operational requirements on a monthly basis.	↔			
2. Train	<u>Capability:</u> Training management system that produces, sustains, and regenerates qualified Civil Security Force. <u>Metric:</u> Number of un-trained Policemen employed by Iraqi Security Forces.	↗	9. Move	<u>Capability:</u> The ability of one National Police Battalion to deploy within Iraq and conduct contingency operations independently or as part of a Task Force. <u>Metric:</u> The unit's ability to train, deploy, sustain and command/control independently or as part of a Task Force.	↑			
3. Pay & Promote	<u>Capability:</u> Establish effective payroll execution systems. <u>Metric:</u> 95% of assigned personnel are paid correctly and on time.	↔	10. Life Support	<u>Capability:</u> The life support across the Civil Security Force achieves the minimum required standard to enhance operational effectiveness. <u>Metric:</u> Civil Security Force life support systems meet or exceed the standards set by the appropriate Iraqi authorities.	↑			
4. Equip	<u>Capability:</u> The effective delivery of equipment and supplies that meet operational requirements. <u>Metric:</u> The supply system is able to procure and deliver equipment that matches documented TCE and TDA requirements.	↗	11. Operations	<u>Capability:</u> Iraqi Security and Support forces conduct effective policing operations across Iraq. <u>Metric:</u> Specific data pulls from the police activities, report, investigations, logs, and interaction with local communities.	↔			
5. Sustain	<u>Capability:</u> Sustainment of Civil Security Force equipment to maximize overall operational effectiveness. <u>Metric:</u> Operational stock levels are able to meet 90% of the force's demand for items on the critical item list.	↗	12. Discipline	<u>Capability:</u> The disciplinary code within the MOI is functional and effective. <u>Metric:</u> Capability to detect and examine violations and apply appropriate punitive measures in an effective and efficient manner.	↗			
6. Arm	<u>Capability:</u> Ammunition and weapons are available to meet CSF operational and training requirements. <u>Metric:</u> The type and quantity of operational stocks of weapons and ammunition are capable of maintaining Civil Security Force operational effectiveness.	↑	13. Health	<u>Capability:</u> Provide the Ministry of Interior a fit police force for security operations <u>Metric:</u> Capable and Functioning Level I and II Health Services in the Directorate of Border Enforcement and National Police	↔			
7. Fix	<u>Capability:</u> Civil Security Force automotive, communications, and weapons systems are maintained effectively <u>Metric:</u> Civil Security Forces are able to maintain a 90% operational ready rate for automotive, communications and weapons systems.	↔	14. Command & Control	<u>Capability:</u> Provide effective C2 for Police Operations across Iraq. <u>Metric:</u> Command centers have the staff, collect/distribute information, and utilize C2 voice/data architecture to facilitate command and control of internal security forces Iraq - wide.	↔			

Making Progress and Increase in TRA Status ↑	Making Progress with no change in TRA Status ↗	No change = ↔	Loosing Progress with no change in TRA Status ↘	Loosing Progress with a decrease in TRA Status ↓
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Police Lessons

- ◆ *MODs are bad enough; MOIs are a nightmare.*
- ◆ *May be mission impossible if seek a competent national and/or paramilitary force.*
- ◆ *Reality will be regional with national elements.*
- ◆ *Paramilitary mission will often simply be too difficult to add to task of creating effective army.*
- ◆ *Same need for embeds, partners, and win and hold forward presence. Training only small part of story.*
- ◆ *Police require courts and rule of law, governance, and services.*
- ◆ *Pay and allowances, facilities, weapons and equipment, medical care, disability, and death benefits again critical.*

Governance

*Presence and Services =
Legitimacy and Support*

The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

◆ *Political Accommodation*

◆ *Security*

◆ *Governance*

◆ *Development*


Uncertain Spending & Budget Sharing

Figure 2.37

BUDGET EXPENDITURE COMPARISON FOR 2006 AND 2007

\$ Billions

Source: Treasury, Response to SIGIR Data Call (1/4/2008)



Notes:

1. Numbers are affected by rounding.
2. 2007 expenditure data is reported for the period January through September 2007.

- Spend on salaries, central government operating costs, but not on capital development.
- At end 2007, had spent 71% of salary budget, 25% of capital budget.
- Total Capital budget for 2007 was \$10.1 billion, or 25% of total vs. 18% in 2006.
- But, \$6.4B of \$10.1 billion was for central government ministries, \$1.6 billion went to Kurdish region, and only \$2.1 billion went to other provinces.
- Central government ministries get 76% of total budget, Finance Ministry gets 34%.


Transfer of Provinces to Iraqi “Control:” Transfers Without Security or Budget Sharing

Figure 2.38

PROVINCES TRANSFERRED TO PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL


Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, Provincial Iraqi Control, www.mnf-iraq.com (1/17/2008)

- Province Transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control
- Not Yet Transferred
- Kurdish Region; Provinces have collectively been returned to Regional Iraqi Control (RIC)



Plans for Transfer of Provinces

Original target date of PIC transfer of security control to Iraqis set for June 2006



- Original target date of PIC transfer of security control to Iraqis set for June 2006
- Extended per June 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per September 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per December 2006 9010 Report
- Extended per December 2007 9010 Report
- Extended per March 2007 9010 Report
- Achieved PIC Status


Military Lessons About Governance

- ◆ *Foreign military forces are the proxy and get the blame.*
- ◆ *Inevitably linked to success in political accommodation and security.*
- ◆ *Central governments are hardest to fix, and will always lack core competence.*
- ◆ *You win at the provincial and local level and you win where you fight*
- ◆ *Legitimacy and popular support are not the product of elections, but of the quality of representation and services that affect local populations.*
- ◆ *The rule of law, key utilities, education, and medical support are key tests.*
- ◆ *Local legitimacy and security cannot be separated from sectarian, ethnic, and tribal issues.*
- ◆ *Long time lines, limited outside competence in aid.*

Development

Dollars Can Be Bullets

Total Reconstruction Funds Now = \$113.9 Billion



a. Includes August 11, 2004 transfer of \$86 million cash from the Central Bank of Iraq for CERP at the authorization of the Ministry of Finance.

b. In previous Quarterly Reports, SIGIR reported approximately \$20 billion in DFI cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. SIGIR has rene that number to reect only reconstruction funding, which is approximately \$7 billion, according to GAO Report 05-876 (July 28, 2005, p. 2).

c. Table 2.1 includes a breakdown of Iraqi capital budget expenditures, CY 2003-2008.

d. Where Iraq-only appropriations are unavailable, SIGIR assigned 85% for Iraq based on historical trends.

e. May include humanitarian aid or other types of assistance.

f. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, January 4, 2008.

Note: This quarter, SIGIR changed methodology for reporting international donor pledges. Beginning with the January 2008 Quarterly and Semiannual Report to Congress, SIGIR will use the ocial U.S. government source — DoS:NEA-I — as the sources for pledge data. The dollar change from last quarter is due to the revised reporting method.

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2008, p. 17.

Rising Iraqi Capital Budgets

IRAQI CAPITAL BUDGETS FOR RECONSTRUCTION, CY 2003-2008


CALENDAR YEAR	IRAQ CAPITAL BUDGET (DINARS)	CONVERSION RATIO ^a	IRAQ CAPITAL BUDGET (\$ US)	DOCUMENT SOURCE(S)
2003	Not Provided in Dinars	NA	\$609,500,000	"Republic of Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses 2003," July-December
2004	5,114,323,000,000	1,500	\$3,409,548,667	"Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005"
2005	7,550,000,000,000	1,500	\$5,033,333,333	"Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005"
2006	9,272,000,000,000	1,500	\$6,181,333,333	"GOI 2006 Budget" (as approved by TNA and written into law December 2005); U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008
2007	12,675,560,005,000	1,260	\$10,059,968,258	"GOI Budget 2008: Overview of Revenue and Expenditure, 2007-2008;" U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2007
2008	16,030,822,000,000	1,200	\$13,359,018,333	"GOI Budget 2008: Overview of Revenue and Expenditure, 2007-2008"
Total			\$38,652,701,925	

^aSource of dinar/\$US conversion ratio: U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR, January 21, 2008.

TABLE 2.1

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, January 30, 2008, p. 18.


Iraq's Growing Oil Export Wealth



- 2006 Revenue Estimate: \$31.3 Billion
- 2007 Revenue Estimate: \$41.0 Billion
- 2008 Revenue Estimate: \$11.6 Billion (ytd)

Annual Foreign Aid Per Capita

(Annual assistance over the first two years of nation-building)



Source: John Godges, "Afghanistan in the Edge," Rand Review, Summer 2007, p. 17.

CRS Estimate of Total Cost of War To US Through FY2008


(CRS estimates in billions of budget authority)

By Operation and Funding Source	FY 01 & FY 02 ^a	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FY 06	FY 07	FY 08 ^b	Cum. Enacted thru FY08 Consol.Ap props	Pending FY 08 Req. ^a	Cum: FY01-FY08 Req.
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)^c										
Department of Defense	0	50.0	56.4	83.4	98.5	129.6	74.7	492.0	79.6	571.6
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops ^d	0	3.0	19.5	2.0	3.2	3.2	0.9	31.7	2.5	34.2
VA medical ^e	0	0	0	0.2	0.4	0.9	0.7	2.2	0.0	2.2
Total: Iraq	0.0	53.0	75.9	85.5	102.0	133.6	76.4	525.9	82.3	608.3
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)/Afghanistan and GWOT										
Department of Defense	20.0	14.0	12.4	17.2	17.9	34.9	12.6	128.9	21.7	150.6
Foreign Aid and Diplomatic Ops ^d	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	1.1	10.6	0.9	11.5
VA Medical ^e	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.3
Total: OEF	20.8	14.7	14.5	20.0	19.0	36.9	14.0	139.8	22.8	162.7

Does not include FY2009 supplementals or future costs. CBO Estimates that cost of next 10 years for both OIF and OEF would be \$570 billion more if troops fell to 30,000 by 2010, or \$1,055 billion if feel to 75,000 by 2013

CRS Estimate of US Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars


(In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



	2001 & 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
■ Afghanistan	20.8	14.7	14.5	20	19	36.9	14
■ Iraq	0	53	75.9	85.8	102	133.6	76.4

Source: CRS RL-33110, February 8, 2008, pp. 11 & 13. Afghan costs include GWOT.

CRS Estimate of US DoD Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)




	2001 & 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
■ Afghanistan	20	14	12.4	17.2	17	34.9	12.6
■ Iraq	0	50	56.4	84.3	98.5	129.6	74.7

GAO Estimate of Cost of War To DoD Through FY2007

Figure 2: DOD's Reported GWOT Obligations for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 by Operation

Dollars (in billions)



GWOT obligations per fiscal year

- Operation Iraqi Freedom
- Operation Enduring Freedom
- Operation Noble Eagle

Source: GAO-08-423R, GWOT, January 30, 2008, p 5

Estimated Cost of a Long-Term US Presence in Iraq

(Billions of \$US 2008 dollars)

	Assuming Combat Operations ^a	Assuming Non- Combat Operations ^b
One-Time Costs ^c	4 to 8 ^d	8
Total Continuing Annual Costs	25	10 ^e

a. For this scenario, CBO assumed that the United States would maintain approximately 55,000 military personnel in Iraq, which would operate at a pace and conduct missions similar to those of units currently deployed there.

b. For this scenario, CBO assumed that the United States would maintain approximately 55,000 military personnel in Iraq whose operations would be consistent with those undertaken in a non-combat environment.

c. These costs would probably be incurred over a period of several years.


d. The long-term deployment of our heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) in Iraq might require the purchase of additional HBCT equipment sets. However, given the Army's current inventories of combat vehicles, purchasing four full sets of HBCT equipment might not be necessary. Therefore, CBO included a range of one-time procurement costs for this scenario. The high end of the range, \$8 billion represents the cost of four full HBCT sets, and \$4 billion represents the cost of buying roughly half that amount of equipment.

e. CBO's estimate assumes that U.S. forces stationed in Iraq would not be able to rely heavily on Iraq's civilian economy and infrastructure for support for the foreseeable future. Estimated costs could decline if Iraq's economy and infrastructure were to develop significantly overtime. For instance, the current incremental cost of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea is less than \$1 billion annually.

Source: Congressional Budget Office, "The Possible Costs to the US of Maintaining a Long-Term Military presence in Iraq," September 2007.

CBO Projection of Impact of Annual Cost of War(s) on DoD Budget Through FY2025

(Billions of 2008 Dollars of Total Obligational Authority)




Source: CBO, Long Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: detailed Update for FY2008, march 2008, <http://www.cbo.gov/publications/bysubject.cfm?cat=38>


If the program in the 2008 FYDP was carried out as currently envisioned, the demand for defense resources, excluding funding for contingencies, would average \$521 billion a year between 2014 and 2025, CBO projects about 8 percent more than the 2008 request excluding emergency supplemental funding.

CBO made projections of potential unbudgeted costs (shown by the dashed red lines in the figure). CBO projects that resource demands including unbudgeted costs will average about \$146 billion a year through 2013 and about \$100 billion annually between 2014 and 2025. Those values are about 29 percent and 19 percent higher, respectively, than the amounts excluding those unbudgeted costs. Assumptions underlying the projections for unbudgeted costs include the following: Costs for weapons programs grow as they have since the Vietnam War; and The United States continues to conduct military operations overseas as part of the global war on terrorism (represented as with Contingency Unbudgeted Costs in the figure), albeit with levels of deployed personnel declining by 2014 to about 35 percent of current deployments.

CBO Projection of Impact of Annual Cost of War(s) on GNP Through FY2025



CRS Estimate of US Cost of Aid in Afghan and Iraq Wars (In \$US Current Billions in Budget Authority)



	2001 & 2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
■ Afghanistan	0.8	0.7	2.2	2.8	1.1	1.9	1.1
■ Iraq	0	3	19.5	2	3.2	3.2	0.9


Total US Aid Funds

U.S. SUPPORT FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION (\$ BILLIONS)

U.S. FUND	APPROPRIATED	ALLOCATED	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
IRRF 1	\$2.475	\$2.475	\$2.232	\$2.139
IRRF 2	18.439	18.306	17.823	16.706
IRRF Total	\$20.914	\$20.781	\$20.055	\$18.845
ISFF FY05	\$5.391	\$5.315	\$5.259	\$5.090
ISFF FY06	3.007	3.007	3.000	1.813
ISFF FY07	5.542	5.492	2.451	1.199
ISFF FY08	1.500	-	-	-
ISFF Total	\$15.440	\$13.814	\$10.698	\$8.102
ESF FY03	\$0.050	-	\$0.050	\$0.050
ESF FY06 Supplemental	1.485	1.485	1.186	0.527
ESF FY06, State	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.005
ESF FY07 Supplemental	1.554	1.554	0.986	0.020
ESF FY07, Continuing Resolutions	0.123	0.105	0.100	0.010
ESF FY08	0.015	-	-	-
ESF Total	\$3.287	\$3.205	\$2.383	\$0.612
CERP FY04	\$0.140	-	\$0.030	\$0.030
CERP FY05	0.718	-	0.733	0.621
CERP FY06	0.708	-	0.473	0.363
CERP FY07	0.725	-	0.787	0.430
CERP FY08	0.370	-	0.145	0.033
CERP Total	\$2.661	-	\$2.168	\$1.477
Other Funding	\$5.183	\$0.261	\$0.151	\$0.025
Total U.S. Appropriated	\$47.485	\$38.061	\$35.455	\$29.060

Source:
SIGIR, Quarterly
Report, January
30, 2008, p. 22

US Total Assistance Per Capita Per Year (Constant Dollars)




	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	8.1	4.29	3.02	5	5.84
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	25.02	43.59	78.68	86.79	120.32
■ Iraq	0.24	0.01	1.62	157.42	332.7	277.39	333.76

Source: USAID, US Overseas Loans and Grants, UN Population Prospects

US Economic Assistance Per Capita Per Year

(Constant Dollars)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
■ Pakistan	0.16	1.45	5.89	2.39	2.44	2.96	3.99
■ Afghanistan	2.1	4.68	21.76	28.96	57.36	61.3	62.19
■ Iraq	0	0.01	1.62	151.75	290.56	224.64	149.7

Military Lessons About Development

- ◆ *Dollars = Bullets. No resources, no victory*
- ◆ *You win in the field and where you fight.*
- ◆ *Military must have substantial aid funds for own priorities: CERP or Commander's Emergency Relief Program*
- ◆ *Jobs, right now, are critical, not development or sustained employment.*
- ◆ *Military EPRTs are better than no civilian PRT and often as good or better than civilian PRT.*
- ◆ *Aid must visibility affect the entire area, and appear to meet common needs or be equitable.*
- ◆ *You can't develop and lose the war.*
- ◆ *Some NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with war.*
- ◆ *Military that doesn't protect NGOs and aid workers can't come to grips with victory.*