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Violence in Iraq: Reaching an “Irreducible Minimum”

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CSIS


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
February 25, 2008

Mapping Progress: The Fighting in 2007²

- Major gains in defeating Al Qa'ida and reducing its area of operations.
- Shift from “win” tactics to “win and hold;” deny Al Qai'da the ability to recover.
- Sufficient US forces for Baghdad area and Diyala.
- Spontaneous “tribal awakening” in Anbar, creating of local forces, spread into other areas.
- Growing support from Iraqi Army
- Sadr and JAM largely stands aside, although potential threat remains.
- Reduction in flow of foreign fighters, pressure from Syria and Iran
- *But,*
- *Al Qa'ida in Iraq far from defeated, problem of “irreducible minimum,” and shifting to Mosul other areas.*
- *Iran and Syria still present problems, and Iran-ISCI ties a major issue.*
- *Arab-Kurd-Turcoman tensions a serious threat in north.*
- *Inter-Shi'ite (Sadr vs. Hakim factions) serious problem in south.*
- *Ethnic and sectarian cleansing continue at lower level.*
- *Crime and violence, often with ethno-sectarian links, remain a critical problems.*



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008




Remaining Violence Localized to Four Provinces *But, still serious in mixed areas*

- **Baghdad Province is still the most violent area in spite of major drop in violence.**
- **Salah ad Din, Ninewa, and Diyala remain serious problem areas.**
- **Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia seems to be trying to shift operations to Ninewa.**
- **May be problems in count because of difficulty in track all violent incidents nationwide**
- **Shift to Ninewa impacts on Arab-Kurdish-minority tensions.**

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Average Daily Attacks by Province July 2007 – November 2007




Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.

Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.

Patterns in Overall Iraqi Violence: *Major Progress. But Not Yet Victory*


- **MNF-I Data in January 2008 show a major drop in deaths and violence in Iraq from early 2006 through mid January 2008**
 - **Civilian deaths are down to 1/6th of peak. Combined Coalition and Iraqi data show are down from peak of 3,000 per month in November 2006 to around 700 in December 2007. (Coalition count alone shows drop from over 1,500 in October-November 2006 to around 300 in December.**
 - **Attack frequency down to early 2005 levels by end of 2007; less than 40% of peak.**
- **Total high profile bombings down from peak of around 130 in June 2007 to around 40 in December 2007.**
- **IED explosions are down to about one-third of peak level in 2006-2007.**
- **Discovery of weapons and explosive caches – shaped heavily by Iraqi HUMINT – are well over twice 2006 levels nationally, and three times higher in Anbar.**

Coalition, Iraqi Security Force & Civilian Deaths




Source: SIGACTS (CF reports only) and CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports checked for duplication) as of 26 Jan 08.
Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.

Iraqi Civilians Killed in 2007




Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Coalition Killed in Action in 2007




Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Overall Attack Trends in 2007




Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends

25 September 2004 – 25 January 2008



Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 26 Jan 08. Chart includes potential attacks (IEDs/mines found and cleared) and executed attacks.


High Profile Attacks (Explosions)



Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 26 Jan 08. Does not include VBIED/SVBIED/SVEST found and cleared.


IED Explosions Incidence

1 January 2004 – 25 January 2008



Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 26 Jan 08.

Recent Trends in IED Explosions



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008


Caches Found and Cleared



Year	Anbar	Iraq
2007	3156	6959
2006	941	2662
2005	1043	2863
2004	410	1712



Caches Found & Cleared in 2007



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Patterns in Ethno-Sectarian Violence: *The Worst Violence is Way Down*

Ethno-Sectarian incidents – including Shi'ite on Shi'ite and Sunni on Sunni - down from peak of nearly 1,100 in December 2006 to a little over 100 in November 2007

Ethno-Sectarian deathss down from peak of nearly 2200 in December 2006 to around 200 in November 2007.

“The more striking trend is the reduction in ethno-sectarian incidents and deaths. Both measures of ethno-sectarian violence have fallen below one-fifth of the levels of a year ago—and are now mostly limited to the mixed Sunni-Shi'a areas of west Baghdad and Rusafa. Earlier practices in which the community targeted by a car bomb retaliated, with a resulting increase in ethno-sectarian killings, have become less common over the past few months. This is in part attributable to the call for restraint by community leaders and by security measures such as the Joint Security Stations, checkpoints and “gated communities,” which promote better population security.

“The geographical concentration of attacks continues to shift as Coalition and Iraqi forces keep pressure on AQI and extremists, driving AQI further east and north as it searches for more secure operating areas and confronts local extremist groups that previously controlled those areas. As a result, high-profile attacks have increased slightly in Ninewa Province, while they have fallen off in Anbar and Baghdad. Specifically, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Anbar Province have dropped 91% from January 2007 to November 2007, while attacks in the ten Baghdad security districts declined 67% for the same period.


“The growing support of the local population resulted in the establishment of the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) program in which a growing number of local citizens take part in the protection of their neighbor-hoods. 7 Some CLC groups form neighbor-hood watches, while others have been placed under U.S.-funded contracts to protect critical infrastructure. Some of the participants are reviewed for hiring by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). About 69,000 individuals are partici-pating as members of the CLC program; approximately 80% are Sunni and 20% are Shi'a. Members of CLC groups have chosen to protect their neighborhoods and many are from former insurgent and other illegally armed groups. They have been persuaded to fight against extremists under Coalition force supervision. The GoI has issued an order to the Iraqi Army and police forces requiring cooperation with CLCs. The CLC program is proving crucial to the counterinsurgency effort but the slow pace of integrating the CLC members into GoI institutions, lack of alternative employment and fears by the Maliki government that these forces may return to violence or form new militias are of concern. The CLCs will require continued assistance from Coalition forces until the GoI assumes full responsibility for the program.”

Source of Quotes: *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*, December 2007


But Problems Remain Serious

- **Ethno-Sectarian attacks – including Shi'ite on Shi'ite and Sunni on Sunni - down from peak of nearly 1,100 in December 2006 to a little over 100 in November 2007**
- **Ethno-Sectarian deaths down from peak of nearly 2200 in December 2006 to around 200 in November 2007.**
 - **Baghdad, Anbar, and central Iraq levels show similar drop**
- **National trends do not reflect “hotspots” in higher conflict provinces, or map sectarian and ethnic migration.**
- **Trends do not take account of lower levels of violence that still shape much of environment, displacements, extortion, home and business seizures, kidnapping that now characterize a large portion of sectarian and ethnic cleansing.**
- **Do not take account of pervasive criminal violence and extortion and corruption by police, security forces, and officials.**
- **Cannot gauge impact on repatriation and relocation of 2 to 4 million Iraqi refugees inside and outside Iraq.**

Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions



Trends in Ethno-Sectarian Deaths: May 06-Dec 07 (Includes Shi'ite on Shi'ite & Sunni on Sunni)




Density plots depict incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs.

Source: MNF-I, January 14, 2008

Trends in Ethno-Sectarian Incidents and Deaths During Peak Period of Fighting in “Surge”

(Includes Shi'ite on Shi'ite & Sunni on Sunni)




Patterns in Violence and Casualties in Baghdad Show the Need For Strategic Patience





- Very real progress in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad in both terms of areas at risk and numbers of deaths.
- *But*, stable victory in the area where the US and Iraqi surge has been most effective still requires time and political accommodation.
- US ability to secure Sunni and Shi'ite zones, and some mixed areas, in Baghdad has not yet brought lasting stability and security to city.
- Rushing down US troops could leave too few troops to cover a renewal of sectarian cleansing in greater Baghdad and deal with most violent provinces, much less new outbreaks of fighting in North and South.
- Need time and US aid to provide Iraqi police and criminal justice system, effective government presence and services, and translate progress in accommodation at legal and legislative levels into stable, functioning city.
- Iraqi data for Baghdad are less favorable than US data. They are uncertain and may be exaggerated for Sadrist political purposes.

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
Baghdad Neighborhoods




Ethno-Sectarian Violence



Density plots depict incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs.




Zooming in On Baghdad



Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007


(Trend in Total Incidents)



Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007


(Monthly Distribution)



Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007

(Trend in total Incidents)




	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126
■ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29
■ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84
■ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104
■ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329

Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007

(Monthly Distribution by Type)




Source: Iraqi Official

Other Threats also Show the Need For Strategic Patience

- **Need to consolidate gains with “Sons of Iraq,” show Sunnis they can have a role in the government. Provide base for Shi’ite popular security role in south.**
- ***Need to defeat AQI in Mosul, Diyala, etc. Ensure violence stays at “Irreducible Minimum” .***
- **Resolve the Kurd, Arab, minority issue; solve the Article 140 Problem.**
- **Move towards stability in the south without a confrontation with the Sadrists or breakdown in ceasefire, seeing the Hakim faction (ISCI) takeover without popular support, crisis over control of Basra, *and limit Iranian influence.***
- **Create local and provincial governments and security that can counter weakness, incompetence, corruption and factionalism in central government .**
- **Create central government capable of providing services, spending budget fairly and effectively, managing national security and infrastructure.**
- **Provide economic hope and security, especially 15-25 age group.**

State of al-Anbar

1. AQI neutralized in the population centers
2. AQI ideology thoroughly discredited
3. Popular support for continued violence is absent
4. Cells splintering/fighters deserting
5. Tribes mobilized against AQI
6. ISF support is strong
7. Traditional FFF routes gone
8. AQI now on outside looking in; lack access to population
9. Post-conflict competition, extremely complex



CLC Contributions


- Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) partnering with CF and ISF since 17 June have contributed to significant reductions in:

- Deaths
- MNF-I equipment losses
- MNF-I replacement costs

- MNF-I average monthly savings over cost of 51K CLCs is ~\$5.3M for UAH BD/BL replacement costs alone

	MNF-I Monthly Average		
	Prior to CLC (15 Sep 06 - 16 Jun 07)	Since CLC (17 Jun - 24 Nov 07)	Monthly Change
KIA (CF, ISF, CIV) (SIGACTS III CF + HN reports)	(90, 509, 3020)	(60, 385, 1615)	(-30, -124, -1405)
HMMWV (UAH) Battle Loss (BL) (primarily due to IEDs)	93	39	-54
BL Vehicle Replacement Costs (@ \$200K ea)	\$18.5M	\$7.8M	-\$10.7M
CLC Costs Disbursed (\$300/month)	\$0	\$5.4M	+\$5.4M
Monthly savings over cost of CLCs ~\$5.3M.			

- CLCs have contributed to increased total IED and Caches Found/Cleared (F/C):
 - 28% increase since June in caches found
 - CLCs led CF to discover one of the largest EFP stockpiles found in Iraq to date (MND-N)
 - CLCs reported and marked 8 VBIEDs in Adhamiyah, with 5 confirmed and reduced without incident (MND-B)
- CLCs continue to work with ISF and CF forces:
 - Over 800 checkpoints manned (MND-C)
 - Combined IA and CLC checkpoint repelled AQI attack in a 2-hour battle on 22 Nov (MND-C)



More IEDs F/C than IED explosions in Nov 07

.....secure the population...

CLEAR

9 Division-level, full-spectrum surge operations conducted since June 2007:

MARNE TORCH
MARNE AVALANCHE
MARNE HUSKY
MARNE TORCH II
MARNE ANVIL
MARNE SENTRY
MARNE COURAGEOUS
MARNE ROUNDUP
MARNE THUNDERBOLT

Combined operations have resulted in:

- 3,802 extremists detained; (41 DIV HVIs)
 - 1,506 IEDs found and cleared
 - 718 caches found and cleared

Surge Operations led to:

CONTROL


- MND-C's occupation of 50 bases
 - Iraqi Security Forces living on 24
- 12,194 MND-C Soldiers (75%) are living on these bases amongst the Iraqi population

CERP (Commander's Emergency Response Program)

- 1021 total CERP projects obligated, infusing \$117 million into local economies
- 132 total Micro-Grants (FY07 & FY08), providing \$819,788 in capital to local entrepreneurs
- Improved capacity of 10 health clinics through application of CERP


...and defeat sectarian violence

Attack Trends (Since 01 June 07)



- 74% decrease in all forms of attacks per month
 - 89% decrease in IDF per month
 - 63% decrease in SAF attacks per month
 - 70% decrease in IED attacks per month

Casualty Trends (Since 01 June 07)



- Civilian casualties have decreased 81%
- MND-C casualties have decreased 85%
- Iraqi Security Force casualties have decreased 87%

Sons of Iraq

- 31,999 Sons of Iraq across MND-Center
- 27,752 Sons of Iraq are contracted through 150 contracts to provide infrastructure security for their nation
 - The 150 security contracts are composed of 112 Sunni, 30 Shia, and 8 mixed Sunni/Shia contracts
- SOIs have provided intelligence that has led to the capture of 5 HVIs and 427 insurgents
- SOI Groups are developed in areas where there is no Iraqi Security Force presence
- SOIs are effective and since 15 June have turned-in or located:
 - 385 caches
 - 286 IEDs
 - Based on tips received, 70 rewards paid to SOIs totaling \$300,860

....create the conditions for long term Iraqi self-reliance

GOVERNANCE

PIC (Provincial Iraqi Control)

A partnership arrangement in which CF transfer security authority to Iraqi Provinces.

- All courts functioning and staffed
- Laptop computers with Iraqi Law database from 1917 – present provided to all judges

Babil (PIC JUN 2008)

- 88% (\$112M) of Budget Committed
 - 11 Courts - 85 Judges
- New Hilla Jail opened SEP 2007
- 6.5 of hours of residential electricity daily
 - 65% Access to clean water

Karbala (PIC OCT 2007)

- 90% (\$64M) of Budget Committed
 - 3 Courts - 43 Judges

Najaf (PIC DEC 2006)

- 100% (\$88M) of Budget Committed
 - 7 Courts - 39 Judges
- 6.5 of hours of residential electricity daily
 - 60% Access to clean water

Wasit (PIC APR 2008)

- 100% (\$83M) of Budget Committed
 - 7 Courts - 44 Judges
- 20 of hours of residential electricity daily
 - 75% Access to clean water

Baghdad (Mahmudiyah and Mada'in)

- 2 Courts
- 8 Judges
- Model Bridge Internment facility at 4/6 Iraqi Army

MEASURES OF PROGRESS

Jurf As Sakhr: formerly AQI sanctuary

- New local council and governance building
 - Roads paved and improved
- Ambulance/emergency response capability improved
 - 2 schools renovated
- 6 new markets opened facilitated by Micro-Grants

Arab Jabour: formerly AQI sanctuary

- 29 Micro-Grants for local businesses
 - Local community council formed
- Opening of Governance Center where GOI, civic groups, and local council can operate freely
 - 3 schools opened, 1 renovated

Mada'in Qada

- Improved water infrastructure capacity by 400% for irrigation

- Improved drinking water capacity by 200%
 - 62 Micro-Grants for local businesses

Agriculture: working toward reestablishing Iraq's #1 industry

- 97 new farm organizations (COOPs, Unions, and Farmer's Associations)
 - 5 Veterinary Operations
- \$22.8 committed for 71 CERP projects improving agriculture and irrigation systems

Iskandariyah Industrial Complex (IIC)

- SCAI (State Company Automotive Industries): At its peak, the SCAI employed 6,000 workers. There are currently 1,000 workers.
- SCMI (State Company Mechanical Industries): At its peak, the SCMI employed 6,000 workers. There are currently 1,000 workers.
- VOTECH: Currently has 200 students enrolled with the goal to service 1,000 students by June 08
 - Scrap Metal: MND-C monitoring the IIC scrap initiative. This is one of 7 GOI designated scrap yards and is also the most developed in the country.


TASK FORCE MARNE



Multi-National Division Center Operation Iraqi Freedom AS OF 26 JAN 08

TF Marne's mission is to block accelerants into Baghdad, secure the population, and defeat sectarian violence in order to create the conditions for long term Iraqi self-reliance.

- 16,372 Coalition forces from 8 Nations
 - 20,240 Iraqi Army Forces
 - 3rd Infantry Division
 - 6 US Brigades
 - 1 Georgian Brigade
 - The 8th Iraqi Army Division
- The 4th BDE, 6th Iraqi Army Division
 - 2 Iraqi National Police Brigades
- 1 Iraqi Dept of Border Enforcement Brigade
 - 29 IA and NP Transition Teams



The Longer-Term Iraq Challenge: Security, Governance, and Development³⁶

- **Success is an option, but half a decade of tasks remain:**
 - Doubtful that can get rapid progress in conciliation, but slow conciliation is far better than division or civil war, and far easier to talk about abandoning Iraq than to do it if trigger a humanitarian disaster.
 - Consolidate progress in Iraq forces: Independent for internal security by 2012; create ability to defend against foreign threats by 2018.
 - Restructure police and criminal justice efforts, make local security real.
 - Build effective governance and services at national, provincial, and local level.
 - New focus on economic and aid dimensions; longer-term programs for petroleum, development, and aid.
 - Solve “federalism” and ethno-sectarian issues.
 - Contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.
- **If military succeeds, and political accommodation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.**
- **If efforts fail, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and at least option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath. Extreme caution in intervening, but need to develop a Plan B flexible enough to react to events in Iraq.**
- **Need to talk to key allies and powers in region now. Reassure that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq. Need clear basing plans to handle exist and forces keep.**

The Security Challenge:

Making Things work Over Time

37

- **Create Iraqi-US security plan and relations for true strategic partnership (2008-2009)**
- **Iraqi force development: The Defense Minister's Timing:**
 - Create Iraqi army and police strong enough to take over internal security tasks (2012-2014?)
 - Create Iraqi army, air, and navy capable of all internal security tasks (2015?)
 - Create Iraqi forces capable of defending nation against all external threats (2018?)
- **Resolve the problem of National Police, local forces, ethnic and sectarian militias and integrate into ISF or civil economy. (2009-2011)**
- **Create an effective mix of local, provincial, federal, and national police, courts, and rule of law. (2008-2011)**