The Evolving Security Situation in Iraq:
The Continuing Need for Strategic Patience

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Arleigh A. Burke Chair

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# The Challenge of Strategic Patience

- Consolidate gains against Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia
- Move towards stable accommodation: Change de-Baathification law, provincial powers act and elections, oil law, etc.
- Keep Shi'ite militias (Sadr forces) under control, and prevent more sectarian and ethnic cleansing in greater Baghdad area.
- Consolidate creation of tribal militias, ensure they get proper central government support, and that central government recognizes importance of Sunni Sheiks.
- Stabilize provinces that still have serious conflict - Ninewa, Salah ad Din, Diyala -- and prevent Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia forces from moving north.
- Avoid major intra-Shi'ite power struggles and conflicts in south.
- Limit Kurd, Arab, minority fighting in North.
- Resolve the "federalism" issue through peaceful referendums.
- Develop truly capable Iraqi Army and regular forces to phase US role down to overwatch.
- Find solution to failure to develop effective approach to police force, and to dealing with local security forces, militias, and Facilities Protection Force.
- Establish effective local criminal justice system and local, provincial and national government presence.

Mapping Progress: The Fighting in 2007

- **Major gains in defeating Al Qa'ida and reducing its area of operations.**
- **Shift from "win" tactics to "win and hold;" deny Al Qai'da the ability to recover.**
- **Sufficient US forces for Baghdad area and Diyala.**
- **Spontaneous "tribal awakening" in Anbar, creating of local forces, spread into other areas.**
- **Growing support from Iraqi Army**
- **Sadr and JAM largely stands aside, although potential threat remains.**
- **Reduction in flow of foreign fighters, pressure from Syria and Iran**
- *But:*
- *Al Qa'ida far from defeated and shifting to other areas.*
- *Iran and Syria still present problems.*
- *Arab-Kured-Turcoman tensions a serious threat in north.*
- *Inter-Shi'ite (Sadr vs. Hakim factions) serious problem in south.*
- *Ethnic and sectarian cleansing continue at lower level.*
- *Crime and violence, often with ethno-sectarian links, remain critical problems.*

Al Qaeda in Iraq
December 2006

"Battle of the Baghdad Belt"

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Key Surge Operations

Al Qaeda in Iraq
December 2007

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Remaining Violence Localized to Four Provinces
But, still serious in mixed areas

- **Baghdad Province is still the most violent area in spite of major drop in violence.**

- **Salah ad Din, Ninewa, and Diyala remain serious problem areas.**

- **Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia seems to be trying to shift operations to Ninewa.**

- **May be problems in count because of difficulty in track all violent incidents nationwide**

- **Shift to Ninewa impacts on Arab-Kurdish-minority tensions.**

Average Daily Attacks by Province
July 2007 – November 2007

These four provinces have approximately 42% of the population but account for 80% of attacks.

Attacks in Baghdad Province have decreased approximately 53% since last reporting period.

Source: SIGACTS III Database (Coalition Reports only) as of Nov 30 2007.
Data reflects enemy attacks targeted against Coalition, ISF, civilians, infrastructure, Iraqi government organizations and reconstruction operations centers.

Source: Department of Defense. 12-2007

Phantom Phoenix: The Continuing Operational Challenge: 1-16 January 2008

- **18 battalion-level joint operations**
- **1,023 detainees**
- **121 enemy killed in action and 14 wounded in action**
- **92 high value individuals captured or killed**
- **351 caches found and cleared**
- **410 IEDs found and cleared**
    - **3 VBIED and IED factories dismantled**
    - **18 VBIEDs**
   - **25 HBIEDs**
- **4 tunnel complexes**

Operation Phantom Phoenix

Patterns in Overall Iraqi Violence:
## *Major Progress. But Not Yet Victory*

- **MNF-I Data in January 2008 show a major drop in deaths and violence in Iraq from early 2006 through mid January 2008**
  - ○ **Civilian deaths are down to 1/6th of peak. Combined Coalition and Iraqi data show are down from peak of 3,000 per month in November 2006 to around 700 in December 2007. (Coalition count alone shows drop from over 1,500 in October-November 2006 to around 300 in December.**
  - ○ **Attack frequency down to early 2005 levels by end of 2007; less than 40% of peak.**
- **Total high profile bombings down from peak of around 130 in June 2007 to around 40 in December 2007.**
- **IED explosions are down to about one-third of peak level in 2006-2007.**
- **Discovery of weapons and explosive caches – shaped heavily by Iraqi HUMINT – are well over twice 2006 levels nationally, and three times higher in Anbar.**

Coalition, Iraqi Security Force & Civilian Deaths

Source: SIGACTS (CF reports only) & CIOC Trends (CF & Iraqi reports checked for duplication) as of 12 Jan 08. Does not include civilian deaths due to accidents unrelated to friendly or enemy actions.

Iraqi Civilians Killed in 2007

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

13

Coalition Killed in Action in 2007

Note: Graph shows all Coalition deaths attributed to combat action in Iraq

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Overall Attack Trends in 2007

Note: Graph includes potential attacks (IEDs/mines found and cleared) and executed attacks

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Overall Weekly Iraq Attack Trends
25 September 2004 – 11 January 2008

■ Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Facilities
■ Bombs (IEDs and Mines), Both Found and Exploded
■ Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks
■ Mortar, Rocket, and Surface-to-Air Attacks

Ramadan
16OCT-14NOV04
06OCT-04NOV05
24SEP-23OCT06
13SEP-13OCT07

Fardh al-Qanoon,
15 February 2007

Parliamentary
elections,
15 December 2005

Samarra mosque
bombing,
22 February 2006

Iraqi elections,
30 January 2005

Constitutional
referendum,
15 October 2005

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)

Legend:
- Total HPA Explosions
- Car Bomb
- Suicide Car Bomb
- Suicide Vest

IED Explosions Incidence
1 January 2004 – 11 January 2008

Recent Trends in IED Explosions

Caches Found and Cleared

Year	Anbar	Iraq
2004	410	1712
2005	1272	2863
2006	1213	2662
2007	3155	6960

Caches Found & Cleared in 2007

Region	2006	2007	Difference
All of Iraq	2662	6956	4294
Baghdad Sec Dist	213	1284	1071
Northern Iraq	566	1213	647
Al Anbar	941	3155	2214

Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07

Source: MNF-I, January 17, 2008

Patterns in Ethno-Sectarian Violence:
## *The Worst Violence is Way Down*

Ethno-Sectarian incidents – including Shi'ite on Shi'ite and Sunni on Sunni - down from peak of nearly 1,100 in December 2006 to a little over 100 in November 2007

Ethno-Sectarian deathss down from peak of nearly 2200 in December 2006 to around 200 in November 2007.

"The more striking trend is the reduction in ethno-sectarian incidents and deaths. Both measures of ethno-sectarian violence have fallen below one-fifth of the levels of a year ago—and are now mostly limited to the mixed Sunni-Shi'a areas of west Baghdad and Rusafa. Earlier practices in which the community targeted by a car bomb retaliated, with a resulting increase in ethno-sectarian killings, have become less common over the past few months. This is in part attributable to the call for restraint by community leaders and by security measures such as the Joint Security Stations, checkpoints and "gated communities," which promote better population security.

"The geographical concentration of attacks continues to shift as Coalition and Iraqi forces keep pressure on AQI and extremists, driving AQI further east and north as it searches for more secure operating areas and confronts local extremist groups that previously controlled those areas. As a result, high-profile attacks have increased slightly in Ninewa Province, while they have fallen off in Anbar and Baghdad. Specifically, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Anbar Province have dropped 91% from January 2007 to November 2007, while attacks in the ten Baghdad security districts declined 67% for the same period.

"The growing support of the local population resulted in the establishment of the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) program in which a growing number of local citizens take part in the protection of their neighbor-hoods. 7 Some CLC groups form neighbor-hood watches, while others have been placed under U.S.-funded contracts to protect critical infrastructure. Some of the participants are reviewed for hiring by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). About 69,000 individuals are partici-pating as members of the CLC program; approximately 80% are Sunni and 20% are Shi'a. Members of CLC groups have chosen to protect their neighborhoods and many are from former insurgent and other illegally armed groups. They have been persuaded to fight against extremists under Coalition force supervision. The GoI has issued an order to the Iraqi Army and police forces requiring cooperation with CLCs. The CLC program is proving crucial to the counterinsurgency effort but the slow pace of integrating the CLC members into GoI institutions, lack of alternative employment and fears by the Maliki government that these forces may return to violence or form new militias are of concern. The CLCs will require continued assistance from Coalition forces until the GoI assumes full responsibility for the program."

Source of Quotes: *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*, December 2007

Ethnic and Sectarian Violence Is Also Down
But, less violent problems remain very serious

- Ethno-Sectarian attacks – including Shi'ite on Shi'ite and Sunni on Sunni - down from peak of nearly 1,100 in December 2006 to a little over 100 in November 2007

- Ethno-Sectarian deaths down from peak of nearly 2200 in December 2006 to around 200 in November 2007.

  - Baghdad levels show similar drop

- Trends would be much clearer if shown by province for the high conflict provinces, or mapped in terms of sectarian and ethnic migration.

- Does not take account of lower levels of violence that still shape much of environment, displacements, extortion, home and business seizures, kidnapping that now characterize a large portion of sectarian and ethnic cleansing.

- Does not take account of pervasive criminal violence and extortion and corruption by police, security forces, and officials.

- Cannot gauge impact on repatriation of 2.4 million Iraqi refugees inside and outside Iraq.

Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions

Trends in Ethno-Sectarian Deaths: May 06-Dec 07
(Includes Shi'ite on Shi'ite & Sunni on Sunni)

Source: MNF-I, January 14, 2008

Trends in Ethno-Sectarian Incidents and Deaths During Peak Period of Fighting in "Surge"
## (Includes Shi'ite on Shi'ite & Sunni on Sunni)

Source : *Measuring Security and Stability*
in Iraq, December 2007

Patterns in Violence and Casualties in Baghdad Show the Need For Strategic Patience

- Very real progress in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad in both terms of areas at risk and numbers of deaths.

- *But,* stable victory in the area where the US and Iraqi surge has been most effective still requires time and political accommodation.

- US ability to secure Sunni and Shi'ite zones, and some mixed areas, in Baghdad has not yet brought lasting stability and security to city.

- Rushing down US troops could leave too few troops to cover a renewal of sectarian cleansing in greater Baghdad and deal with most violent provinces, much less new outbreaks of fighting in North and South.

- Need time and US aid to provide Iraqi police and criminal justice system, effective government presence and services, and translate progress in accommodation at legal and legislative levels into stable, functioning city.

- Iraqi data for Baghdad are less favorable than US data. They are uncertain and may be exaggerated for Sadrist political purposes.

Baghdad Neighborhoods

Ethno-Sectarian Violence

DEC 06

APR 07

SEP 07

DEC 07

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

— All of Iraq
— Baghdad Security Districts

Density plots depict incidents where deaths occurred from any means that were clearly ethno-sectarian in motivation, to include car bombs.

Density ← → Most
Least

Neighborhood Sect Legend

75% Shi'a	76% Sunni
51% Shi'a / 25% Sunni	51% Sunni / 25% Shi'a
Unknown	Mixed - No majority

Source: CIOC Trends (CF & Iraqi reports checked for duplication) as of 12 Jan 08.

Zooming in On Baghdad

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007

(Trend in Total Incidents)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
■ Assasination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16
□ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
■ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16
■ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46
□ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71

Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence in 2007

(Monthly Distribution)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
☐ IED	55	65	33	82	63	133	96	84	63	78	73	71	896*
☐ Mortar	87	74	43	83	90	190	138	89	76	54	48	46	1018*
☐ Car Bomb	26	23	19	38	35	20	35	15	24	20	15	16	286*
☐ Bicycle Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2*
■ Assasination	0	21	13	13	23	15	16	0	0	9	12	16	140*
■ Suicide Bomb	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6*
■ Katyusha	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	9	16*

Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007

(Trend in total Incidents)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126
□ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29
■ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84
■ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104
□ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329

Source: Iraqi Official

Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in 2007

(Monthly Distribution by Type)

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
☐ Wounded Civilian	206	512	403	1104	999	530	893	507	437	461	287	329	6668*
☐ Dead Civilian	255	256	198	495	344	190	300	235	219	143	98	104	2837*
☐ ISF Wounded	55	45	69	100	88	95	119	40	31	58	54	84	838*
☐ ISF Dead	28	36	33	25	32	35	69	22	23	41	26	29	399*
■ Body Found	395	365	324	411	726	548	596	421	324	174	165	126	4,575*

Source: Iraqi Official

The Iraq Challenge

- **Success is an option, but half a decade of tasks remain:**
  - ☐ Doubtful that can get rapid progress in conciliation, but slow conciliation is far better than division or civil war, and far easier to talk about abandoning Iraq than to do it if trigger a humanitarian disaster.
 - ☐ Consolidate progress in Iraq forces: Independent for internal security by 2012; create ability to defend against foreign threats by 2018.
  - ☐ Restructure police and criminal justice efforts, make local security real.
  - ☐ Build effective governance and services at national, provincial, and local level.
  - ☐ New focus on economic and aid dimensions; longer-term programs for petroleum, development, and aid.
  - ☐ Solve "federalism" and ethno-sectarian issues.
  - ☐ Contain or limit Iran, resolve Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish issue, and reassure Sunni allies have not abandoned Iraqi Sunnis.
- **If military succeeds, and political accommodation happens, need to phase out US forces at rate that best achieves Iraqi and regional stability.**
- **If efforts fail, need phased cuts tied to clear political efforts, aid, and at least option of seeking to bloc civil war turning into military bloodbath. Extreme caution in intervening, but need to develop a Plan B flexible enough to react to events in Iraq.**
- **Need to talk to key allies and powers in region now. Reassure that will not leave Gulf, will aid them in dealing with Iran, and seeking some form of stability in Iraq. Need clear basing plans to handle withdrawal from Iraq.**

The Civil Challenge

- **Implement De-Ba'athification law (2008-2009)**

- **Deal with the issue of federalism in ways that resolve Kurd-Arab-Turcoman tensions; Shi'ite power struggle in south, Sunni concerns in west, mixed areas in center, and create a stable Baghdad. (2008-2010)**

- **Pass oil law, share revenues, renovate petroleum sector, and expand in ways acceptable to all factions. (2008-2009)**

- **Pass laws for provincial and local elections and create effective local authorities. (2008-2009)**

- **Define powers of local and provincial authorities, create effective mix of governance and services. (2008?)**

- **Revise constitution to meet needs of all major factions. (2008-2009)**

- **Create effective criminal justice system and local rule of law. (2008-2010)**

- **Government spending and revenue sharing that meet both ethno-sectarian concerns and practical needs of governance. (2008-2009)**

- **Revive national infrastructure in terms of water, power, roads, rail, petroleum exports, financial institutions, communications, etc. (2009-2011)**

- **Create economic base for jobs, growth, acceptable levels of employment and income distribution. (2008-2014)**

The Security Challenge

- **Create Iraqi-US security plan and relations for true strategic partnership (2008-2009)**

- **Iraqi force development: The Defense Minister's Timing:**
  - ☐ **Create Iraqi army and police strong enough to take over internal security tasks (2012-2014?)**
  - ☐ **Create Iraqi army, air, and navy capable of all internal security tasks (2015?)**
  - ☐ **Create Iraqi forces capable of defending nation against all external threats (2018?)**

- **Resolve the problem of National Police, local forces, ethnic and sectarian militias and integrate into ISF or civil economy. (2009-2011)**

- **Create an effective mix of local, provincial, federal, and national police, courts, and rule of law. (2008-2011)**

Near Term Iraqi Force Goals

Growing Strength of Iraqi Army

Red Below 60%	Amber 60 – 74%	Yellow 75 – 89%	Green 90% and above

| | AUTH | ASSIGNED (Pay data) | | Present for Duty | | | |
	Total	Total	% of Auth	Total	% of Assigned	% of Auth	Weekly Change (% PFD auth)
Joint Headquarters Command (JHQ)	0	1615					
Ministry of Defense Headquarters (MOD)	0	1262					
IGFC HQs	1145	672	59%	679	101%	59%	0%
1st Division	11652	12953	111%	8737	67%	75%	-2%
2nd Division (Includes 6th IAIB)	13152	12876	98%	8136	63%	62%	-3%
3rd Division	9213	8763	95%	5912	67%	64%	0%
4th Division (Includes 4/4 & 13 IAIBs)	24969	25993	104%	18349	71%	73%	1%
5th Division	9963	10936	110%	8536	78%	86%	7%
6th Division (Includes 16th IAIB)	16152	17907	111%	12968	72%	80%	0%
7th Division	9213	9887	107%	6246	63%	68%	0%
8th Division (Includes 17th IAIB)	10152	15403	152%	11751	76%	116%	0%
9TH Division (Includes 11th IAIB)	11585	12592	109%	9096	72%	79%	1%
10th Division	14091	18121	129%	14608	81%	104%	2%
11th Division	5954	7768	130%	4560	59%	77%	-4%
14th Division	0	0		0			
SUB-TOTAL OF GROUND FORCES	137241	153871	112%	109578	71%	80%	0%
Support CMD elements (RSUs and GSUs)	10101	9633	95%				
Training and Doctrine Command (ITBs, RTCs)	5482	7619	139%				
ISOF	2936	4026	137%				
Air Force	2900	1221	42%				
Navy	1483	1109	75%				
TOTAL OF UNITS WITH AUTHORIZATIONS	160143	177479	111%				

**14th Div is shown but its numbers are not counted in the totals. 3/8 reflags to 1/14, 5/10 reflags to 2/14, and 3/14 is in Force Generation.

As Of: 28-Dec-07

Current Capability of MOD and Military

| | | | TRA 4 Ineffective <50% | TRA 3 Effective w /considerable limitations 50-64% | TRA 2 Effective w / limitations 65-84% | TRA 1 Effective 85% |

Category	Capability and Principal Metric	Status	Category	Capability and Principal Metric	Status
1. Man	**Capability**: Recruit, assign and sustain personnel in a functioning pers management system **Metric**: Operational units maintain 95% authorized strength at Battalion level tracked by JHQ	↑ (yellow)	8. Fuel	**Capability**: Supply Fuel to Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) for the COIN Fight. **Metric**: COIN operations unencumbered by fuel shortages; <10% reliance on Coalition	↑ (green)
2. Pay/ Promote	**Capability**: Establishment of effective and timely pay and promotion systems **Metric**: 95-100% assigned paid correctly; routine, transparent promotion system	↑ (yellow)	9. Move	**Capability**: Distribution assets capable of supporting IAF lines of communication first to fourth line. **Metric**: Iraqi Army capable of coordinating, controlling, and executing movements. Manning and Equipment to execute first and second line distribution. Contract mechanism in place to execute 3/4 line distribution.	↔ (yellow)
3. Train	**Capability**: Training management system that produces a trained force capable of winning the COIN fight. **Metric**: Sufficient quantity of trained Soldiers, Officers, NCOs, and units capable of winning the COIN fight.	↔ (orange)	10. Life Support	**Capability**: Reliable food service and base management support system **Metric**: QA system implemented; 100% contracts paid on time; disruptions in service corrected < 72hrs	↓ (red)
4. Equip	**Capability**: Capability: MOD Ability to Acquire Equipment using direct & FMS for the COIN Fight. **Metric**: Interim: Foreign Military Sales management; LongTerm: MOD /JHQ Annual Acquisition Plan & Strategies by trained acquisition staff	↔ (yellow)	11. Intel	**Capability**: Deliver timely, relevant Intelligence products to decision makers and the war fighters. **Metric**: Intel-based targeting	↗ (orange)
5. Sustain	**Capability**: Supply the COIN fight **Metric**: Interim solution – FMS Sustainment Case; long-term solution – stockage at Depot, RSUs, GSU to user achieve 90% of target	↔ (orange)	12. Operations and Command and Control	**Capability**: Effective Command & Control of the Joint Forces for the COIN effort. **Metric**: The JHQ demonstrates progressive C2 capability during transition toward self-sufficiency to execute effective COIN Ops	↗ (orange)
6. Arm	**Capability**: Provide ammunition for the COIN fight. **Metric**: Ammunition system functional and responsive, system manned with personnel trained and available for duty. Sustainment stocks on hand and on order. Required ammunition on hand in units.	↔ (orange)	13. Discipline	**Capability**: Operating Military Justice System **Metric**: CDRs using Military Justice System to maintain order & discipline	↓ (red)
7. Fix	**Capability**: Reliable general-support maintenance **Metric**: Iraqi control of National Maintenance Contract; contracted mechanics diminished over time; reporting reflects readiness	↔ (orange)	14. Health	**Capability**: Provide for a fit force ready for the fight **Metric**: Manned & Operating TMCs	↔ (yellow)

| Making Progress and Increase in TRA Status ↑ | Making Progress with no change in TRA Status ↗ | No change = ↔ | Loosing Progress with no change in TRA Status ↘ | Loosing Progress with a decrease in TRA Status ↓ |

Current Capability of MOI and Police

	TRA 4 Ineffective <50%	TRA 3 Effective w /considerable limitations (50-64%)	TRA 2 Effective w / limitations 65-84%	TRA 1 Effective >85%		

Category	Capability and Principle Metric	Status	Category	Capability and Principle Metric	Status
1. Man	Capability: Generate and sustain Iraq Police Service, National Police, Department of Border Enforcement and Port of Entry. Metric: Maintain personnel strength to sustain effective operations	↗	8. Fuel	Capability: Civil Security Forces are supplied the correct type and quantity of fuel to meet mission requirements. Metric: Civil Security Forces receive the correct types and quantities of fuel that match projected operational requirements on a monthly basis.	↔
2. Train	Capability: Training management system that produces, sustains, and regenerates qualified Civil Security Force. Metric: Number of un-trained Policemen employed by Iraqi Security Forces.	↗	9. Move	Capability: The ability of one National Police Battalion to deploy within Iraq and conduct contingency operations independently or as part of a Task Force. Metric: The unit's ability to train, deploy, sustain and command/ control independently or as part of a Task Force.	↑
3. Pay & Promote	Capability: Establish effective payroll execution systems. Metric: 95% of assigned personnel are paid correctly and on time.	↔	10. Life Support	Capability: The life support across the Civil Security Force achieves the minimum required standard to enhance operational effectiveness. Metric: Civil Security Force life support systems meet or exceed the standards set by the appropriate Iraqi authorities.	↑
4. Equip	Capability: The effective delivery of equipment and supplies that meet operational requirements. Metric: The supply system is able to procure and deliver equipment that matches documented TOE and TDA requirements	↗	11. Operations	Capability: Iraqi Security and Support forces conduct effective policing operations across Iraq. Metric: Specific data pulls from the police activities, report, investigations, logs, and interaction with local communities	↔
5. Sustain	Capability: Sustainment of Civil Security Force equipment to maximize overall operational effectiveness. Metric: Operational stock levels are able to meet 90% of the force's demand for items on the critical item list.	↗	12. Discipline	Capability: The disciplinary code within the MOI is functional and effective. Metric: Capability to detect and examine violations and apply appropriate punitive measures in an effective and efficient manner.	↗
6. Arm	Capability: Ammunition and weapons are available to meet CSF operational and training requirements. Metric: The type and quantity of operational stocks of weapons and ammunition are capable of maintaining Civil Security Force operational effectiveness.	↑	13. Health	Capability: Provide the Ministry of Interior a fit police force for security operations Metric: Capable and Functioning Level I and II Health Service in the Directorate of Border Enforcement and National Police	↔
7. Fix	Capability: Civil Security Force automotive, communications, and weapons systems are maintained effectively Metric: Civil Security Forces are able to maintain a 90% operational ready rate for automotive, communications and weapons systems	↔	14. Command & Control	Capability: Provide effective C2 for Police Operations across Iraq. Metric: Command centers have the staff, collect/distribute information, and utilize C2 voice/data architecture to facilitate command and control of internal security forces Iraq - wide.	↔

Making Progress and Increase in TRA Status ↑	Making Progress with no change in TRA Status ↗	No change = ↔	Loosing Progress with no change in TRA Status ↘	Loosing Progress with a decrease in TRA Status ↓