Winning in Afghanistan: 
Afghan Force Development

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Introduction

- This briefing is based on a trip to Afghanistan in November 2006.
- Most of the material is adapted, or taken directly, from expert briefings provided on an unclassified level. The opinions are the author’s.
- The rise in threat activity is serious, but must be kept in context.
- The challenges to be overcome a far less serious than in Iraq.
- The US and NATO scored important victories in 2006.
- The Bush Administration is already considering major increases in military and economic aid and limited increases in US forces.
- NATO commanders understand the problems and weaknesses in current NATO forces and rules of engagement, and are seeking to overcome them.
- 402,339 sq. miles (slightly smaller than Texas)
- No water areas
- No coastline: Landlocked
- Country divided by the Hindu Kush Mountain Range
- Has a comparatively fertile area in the north
- Elevation from 3000’ to 23,000’ above sea level
- Capital of Kabul is at 6000’ and is in a valley
The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

**AFGHANISTAN**
- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,056,947 people
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

**IRAQ**
- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 26,783,383 people
- Economy dominated by the oil sector and fertile river valleys
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
- **AFGHANISTAN** ~32,000
- **IRAQ** ~162,000
Key Trends

- Development of effective government and economy will take at least 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.
- Current Afghan government, and US and NATO aid and activity levels are inadequate.
- Reconstituted enemy is more lethal and shows increased capacity for effective asymmetric warfare, including effective information operations.
- Pakistan sanctuary is an enemy advantage.
- Major rise in violence in West and South.
- Rising threat in other areas.
- Violence likely to be at least equal next year and may well be higher.
- Afghan forces developing but require major increases in aid and years of support.
- NATO effort has insufficient forces and only US, Canadian, British, Danes, Estonians, and Dutch forces are in the fight. Romanians have been in limited action but are largely road bound due to wrong APCs.
- Increased Narco-trafficking/crime.
- Threat exploits limited transportation infrastructure.
- Image-risk of US defeat in Iraq strong morale builder for Taliban-Al Qa’ida.
Afghan Government Weaknesses

- Continuing tension between government in Kabul and ethnic and sectarian regions: Warlords, Mujahideen, regional leaders, legislature, and president.
- Lack of qualified officials, depth in actual government.
- Corruption and nepotism.
- Impact of dependence on narcoeconomy, backlash against it.
- Weakness, corruption, and ineffectiveness of justice system and police.
- Pashtun tensions with other groups, tribalism.
- Resentment of modernization and reform; religious and cultural backlash.
- Poor quality of governance; failure to provide effective services and presence in field: Water, roads, schools, health, security.
- Critical infrastructure and water problems.
- Lack of economic progress and reform; scale of aid program and government activity.

Rampant corruption, absence of rule of law, and failure of Government to provide equitable social services are rapidly undermining Afghan popular support for democratic governance model and possibly foreign military presence.
That Said, the War in Afghanistan is Eminently Winnable - I

- The threat is not yet strong; it is growing because the NATO and US levels of effort are so weak.
- The insurgent movements do not command popular support; they grow because of a near sanctuary in Pakistan, the slow growth of the Afghan government’s presence and services in the field, exploiting tribal and religious issues, and their ability to exploit the lack of security and to intimidate.
- The CFC-A phrase that the problem is not that the enemy is strong, but that the Government of Afghanistan is weak is accurate.
- Patience, a long war strategy, and adequate resources can make all the difference.
- The 10th Mountain Division has achieved counter-insurgency campaign success in extending the reach of the Government of Afghanistan wherever it has been able to mass enough forces, ensure permanent post-operation Afghan National Security force presence, secure Afghan cooperation to replace ineffective & corrupt leaders, and deliver sufficient reconstruction projects such as roads, bridges, micro-power, irrigation systems, schools, and clinics.
That Said, the War in Afghanistan is Eminently Winnable - II

- The Bush Administration is examining plans from the Embassy/CFC-A team in Afghanistan to provide the resources that are needed.
- Effective plans for developing Afghan army and police force are now underway.
- Synchronizing community engagement with maneuver and development is fundamental.
- The civil aid program is well-organized, properly audited, has effectiveness measures and focuses on both Afghan needs and what Afghans want.
- CFC-A and Embassy emphasis on road building and water & power development in the East & the South is well-placed.
- The current campaign plan is sound, but synchronizing information ops with other activities is the a weakness.
- CERP is a war-winning asset, but ISAF needs an equivalent.
- A focus on developing Afghan governance and rule of law, rather than national Afghan politics, at a realistic pace could accomplish a great deal.
The Need for Action, However, is Urgent

- The next year is likely to be as bloody as this year.
- Major new funds are needed now and over time for economic aid ("build") and the create effective Afghan governance and military and police forces ("win" and "hold").
- Even if the US funds all current recommendations, they won’t make a difference on the ground for at least a year.
- More troops are essential now to keep from going backwards; if NATO lacks the will to come forward the US must make up the difference for at least a year to buy time, probably longer.
- Increased funds are need now, even in small amounts for the auxiliary police from all donors plus rapid donations of compatible equipment (east block) from former Warsaw Pact nations are a must.
- Security progress is blocked by the gap between what the IMF and World Bank see (correctly) as sustainable salary levels for the ANA, ANP, and ANAP and what must be paid to recruit and hold the size and quality of forces. The only out is a long term (at least 10 year) commitment to pay the salaries from the international community.
Key Steps Toward Victory - I

- Take a realistic approach to NATO’s current failures and weaknesses. Seek the added forces, added aid resources integration, force strength that are really needed.

- Adopt a true long war strategy for creating an effective Afghan political and governance system and focus on effective local services and program, and focus on mid-term water, road, and other projects to create viable economic alternatives.

- Provide the full package of supplemental US funding and added forces being sought by the embassy and military team.

- Bite the bullet and add two more US infantry battalions and more SOF.

- Drastically increase number of non-military US Government governance, justice, counter-narcotic and economic reconstruction experts assigned to US Embassy and PRTs. The US military and CIA are disproportionally carrying the weight of what must be an all-government effort with the robust delivery of non-military campaign effects.

- Elevate information to the status of a major line of operations.

- Treat counter narcotics as an integral element of counterinsurgency.
Key Steps Toward Victory - II

- Face the real-world dangers imposed by Pakistani action and put the necessary pressure (with major aid incentives) on Pakistan.

- Talk to Iran and Central Asian neighboring states; there may be little to gain, but there is little to lose. Engage with Russia, India, and China as well, to address their own regional power vital interests.

- Seek substantial British reinforcements. Accept the trade-off Britain may have to make between stepped up withdrawals in Iraq and deploying adequate forces in Afghanistan.

- Proliferate best counterinsurgency practices from U.S. agencies to the wider NATO/ISAF effort.

- Create a NATO in-country counterinsurgency school to ensure uniform doctrine and especially sharing of best business practices.

- Plan to provide US precision, netcentric airpower for all NATO as well as the current mix of US, Canadian, British, Romanian, Dutch, and soon Polish ground forces.
Key Steps Toward Victory - III

- Develop a GOA-authored and owned whole-of-government campaign plan.
- Bolster GOA capacity and capability, especially at province/district level.
- Promote greater emphasis on IO and CN, in the context of a comprehensive GOA campaign plan.
- Promote the innovative CFC-A “Afghan First” Program that focuses on development of Afghan productive capacity with the USG, NATO, and international community to stimulate economic growth and employment.
- Improve the quality of Afghan Army and Police trainers by utilizing more active duty combat-seasoned officers and NCOs.
- Increase the size, scope, and quality of the ANSF training effort; the Afghan Army and Police are growing stronger but need both more ETTs and OMLTs AND more teams with previous combat experience to continue to be effective, especially with combat-experienced Afghan Army and Police forces. Provide robust resourcing for these teams.
- Proliferate best-practice methods of cooperation with GOA and Afghan forces, applied by US military forces, to the wider force.
Best Practices in Afghanistan

1. Rotation policies that allow units to become intimately familiar with a specific local operating area and population, and continually return to it
2. Focus on securing and controlling the population (rather than killing insurgents) as the primary mission
3. Robust, locally tailored information ops targeted to marginalize the enemy
4. Personal engagement with population and community leaders before, during and after operations
5. Intimate cooperation in joint planning and execution with GOA leaders at Province and District level
6. Close and sincere partnering and collaborative relationships with ANSF
7. Rapid exploitation using CERP to bring tangible benefits when the population supports the government
8. Synchronized application of political, economic and security measures
9. Calibrated use of firepower that is sparing but robust when necessary
10. Targeted information and development activities that force the population to choose between the GOA and the insurgents

U.S. forces and agencies in Afghanistan that consistently apply these practices are among the best we currently field anywhere.
Principles of ANA Force Building

- Loyal to the Government of Afghanistan
- Disciplined and professional
- Ethnically diverse
- Multi-year process
- Affordable
- Sustainable
ISAF
(International Security Assistance Force)

CJSOTF
SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CJTF-76

AVIATION BRIGADE
TF FALCON

MILITARY POLICE
TF Guardian

MULTI PURPOSE
TF TIGER

ENGINEER
TF CHAMBERLAIN

LOGISTICS COMMAND
TF Muleskinner

RC East
TF SPARTAN

RC West
PRT

RC North
Herat, Farah

RC South
PRT

PRT
J-Bad, A-Bad, Parwan, Gardez,

PRT
Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Maimana, Feyzabad, Pol-e-Khumri

PRT
Kandahar, Khowst Ghazni, Qalat, Tarin Kowt

US Ambassador Kabul

Operational Employment

Security Assistance

TC PHOENIX
ETT Requirements: 16 per BN (2/Co, 6/Bn HQ); 16 per BDE HQ, 16 per Corps HQ, 9 per Garrison
Enhancing Regional Security Through Engagement

Engagement & Coordination at all levels

- Tripartite Commission
- Shuras
- Daily patrols
- Border Security Sub-Committee Meeting
- Border Flag Meetings
- Parliamentary briefings
- Rehearsals
- Key Leader Engagements
CJTF Phoenix Assigned Strength

**US Military = 2,748**
- Army: 2,119
- Marine: 69
- Navy: 328
- Air Force: 232

**Coalition Military = 147**
- French: 24
- German: 7
- Romanian: 28
- Great Britain: 47
- Canada: 18
- Mongolia: 21
- New Zealand: 2

**Civilian Support = 1,353**
- Interpreters: 546
- KBR: 752
- MPRI: 55

**OMLTs = 409**
- French: 7
- German: 43
- Great Britain: 165
- Slovenia: 5
- Dutch: 50
- Canada: 43
- Croatians: 28
- Italians: 91
- Swedish: 6
- Norwegians: 9

**4,695**

As of 22 Nov 2006
Expected OMLT Fielding
OMLT NATIONS REPRESENTED

- CANADA
- CROATIA
- FRANCE
- ITALY
- GERMANY
- NETHERLANDS
- NORWAY

- POLAND
- ROMANIA
- UNITED KINGDOM
- UNITED STATES
- SLOVENIA
- SWEDEN
Lines of Operation

Establish and Enhance ANA Training Command

Professional / Self Sustaining Afghan National Army (Main Effort)

Sustainment Operations for Afghan National Army

Major Operations

Phase 1: Phoenix Spear ‘JUL-SEP’

Phase 2: Phoenix Hunting ‘OCT – FEB’

Phase 3: Phoenix Summit ‘MAR – JUN’

ISAF Phase 4

Updated Task Organization

Trained Values Based Reliable

Proactive Combat-Ready Competent Respected

Sustainable Self-Sufficient Force
Train to Fight

Establish and Enhance ANA Training Command

- Capacity
- ANA Capability

- Establish MTT Program
- Academics – Literacy Plan
- Pride in Uniform
- Standardized Battle Drills

“For – With – By”
Mentor to Fight

Professional / Self Sustaining Afghan National Army (Main Effort)

- Training
  - Confirm Capabilities
  - Kandak Level operations
  - Green, Amber, Red
  - METL Focus
- Own and lead Battle Space Operations
- Equipping
- Stationing
- Winter Combat Operations
- Partners

Battalion-level offensive operations
+ Battle Tracking of all friendly forces in AO
+ Coordination with adjacent units
= Full Common Operating Picture

“For – With – By”
Sustain the Fight

Provide Sustainment Operations for Afghan National Army

- Administrative Support and Training
- Logistical Support and Training
- Develop Programs, Processes & Procedures
- ANA Conducting Winter Sustainment OPS
- CJTF Phoenix V Battle Rhythm
- Targeting
  - Information Operations / CERP / CMA / VETCAP
  - Resource Allocation

“For – With – By”
CJTFPHX Key Tasks

Main Effort: ANA Embedded Training Teams

- Mentor ANA in:
  - Leadership, staff, and support functions
  - Planning, assessing, supporting, and execution of operations and training
  - Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- Provide ANA Access to Combat Enablers:
  - Close Air Support / Fires
  - Medical Evacuation
  - Quick Reaction Force
  - Redundant C2 capability

- Sustain ANA units:
  - Monitor ANA Pay operations and personnel
  - Contract or cash purchase ANA support / sustainment
  - Assist ANA forces in forecasting requirements
  - Assist ANA forces in planning, developing, and executing Combat Service Support
CJTFPHX Key Tasks con’t

Other ANA Support:

• School House & Doctrine (TRADOC)
  - Develop and execute institutional training programs
  - Synchronize Soldier, NCO, and Officer course POIs
  - Update and translate doctrinal and training publications

• Logistical Support (LTF)
  - Maintain and sustain ANA forces (ANA Depot level support)

• Partnership Program
  - Participants w/CJTF-76, CJSOTF and ISAF
Key Kabul Locations

- BAF
- CAMP PHOENIX
- KMTC
- POL-E-CHARKHI
- KMNB
- PALACE, ISAF HQ, US Embassy, Camp Eggers
- Darulaman & Camp Julian
ETT Key Tasks

- Assist the ANA in the building of training, personnel, and logistics systems.
- Assist the ANA in building a force that understands and executes Western/NATO doctrine with regards to tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Build and develop a values based NCO corps.
- Build and develop an officer corps that is self reliant, operates using initiative, and focuses on soldier care in the accomplishment of its mission.
ETT Skill Sets

- Technically and Tactically Proficient
- Situational Awareness, Sound Judgment, Initiative, and ability to operate independently
- Culturally sensitive and ability to build personal bonds with the Afghans—RELATIONSHIPS and Trust are the key to success for the mission.
- Understanding of U.S. and NATO Compatible Doctrine
- Ability to work with and advise leadership from CO through Brigade Level
- Patience
US Aid Team Efforts -PRTS

- Assist in the development of a legitimate Afghan security and political infrastructure by building Afghan institutional capacity and supporting the legitimate Afghan government.
- Facilitate reconstruction by initiating and prioritizing reconstruction projects, promoting economic development, and coordinating with UN agencies, NGOs, and Afghan government officials.
- Develop a close working relationship with Afghan government ministries at the provincial level, UN agencies, and NGOs in order to promote unity of effort in achieving common objectives.
- Enhance security, in parallel with conventional forces, by developing relationships with the local population, promoting knowledge of ongoing international and Afghan government efforts, collecting and disseminating intelligence, and defeating ACM, warlords, and other anti-stability actors.
- US PRTs spend about $6.4M each; allows the PRT commander and his DoS & USAID partners to assess his local area along with the elders/provincial leaders and decide which projects should be prioritized. This leads to greater security of the area, as the people there have more invested in each project.
Lessons Learned

- Embedded trainers must have the experience base to mentor their counterparts (need right number and rank)
- Coalition trainers are key - technical expertise.
- Timely equipment donations/fielding are critical to mission success
- Officer and NCO Corps integration training is essential
- LOG for ANA is a major effort
- ANA is a force multiplier
- Creating an army takes time: quality over quantity
The US Supplemental Military Aid Package

- FY07 Supplemental package submission is under review within OSD
- Cost of total package far less than current one-year operating costs of US forces in Afghanistan which = over $10 billion USD Following OSD review, approval, will be reviewed by Office of Management and Budget and then submitted to Congress in early 2007
- Expect Congressional action spring 2007; with funds becoming available in July 2007
- New realities on the ground—reconstituted threat, continued narco-terrorism—and persistent problems with infrastructure, require dramatic action and increased resources in the FY07 Supplemental budget
Defeat CF/ANSF

Link CF/ANA to unpopular actions
Infiltrate security services
Reduce CF/ANSF freedom of movt
Fix CF to urban areas and LOCs
Attack Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police & Civilians
“Emerging TTP”

ENDSTATE
Moderate, stable, representative Afghanistan

ENDSTATE
Re-establish Taliban Government in Afghanistan

Coalition Forces/GoA

- Credible ANSF
- ANSF/CF defeat elements of AQ, TB, HQN, HiG, and IJU/IMU
- Afghan led
- Coherent campaign plan

Taliban

- Provide capable shadow govt
- Exploit eradication effort
- Identify GoA with W influence
- Reduce Intl Participation
- Institute Talibanization
- Assassinate GoA officials

Security

- Responsive, representative, and capable govs at all levels
- Extend reach of Afghan govt
- Credible Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Defeat CF/ANSF

- Clear
- Undermine National Gov
- Separate Population
- Build
- Engage

Economic Development

- Viable Provincial/District level infrastructures
- Determine AF needs at local level
- Flexible approach to reconstruction

Border Strategy

- Develop cross border cooperation with PAKMIL
- Interdict Taliban network
- Collaborative operations and planning
- Effective, responsive tactical comms

ENDSTATE
Re-establish Taliban Government in Afghanistan

Competing Lines Of Operation

Governance and Justice

Hold

Taliban Main Effort

Shaping Effort

UNCLASSIFIED
## Goals in Developing Afghan Capability

### Afghan National Police
- Critical to the counter-insurgency fight is the need to build trust between the Afghan National Police & populace

### Afghan Border Police
- Capability increased by US Military Police mentorship and increased Coalition Forces presence

### Afghan National Auxiliary Police
- 11,271 man force designed to provide additional security for a period of one year to augment the ANP in designated provinces. Allows continued security once an area is brought under GoA control.

### Afghan National Civil Order Police
- Provides a riot control capability in the largest cities.
- Extends GoA influence to the remote provinces and provides additional presence to establish security.

### Afghan National Army
- Parallel planning conducted at Afghan General Headquarters & Afghan Army Corps levels
- Multi-Corps operations
- Afghan National Army General Headquarters supports construction of combat outposts
- Afghan Air Corps supports with cargo aircraft, lift and attack helicopters
Ethnically diverse population

- 44% Pashtun
- 25% Tajiks
- 10% Hazaras
- 8% Uzbek
- 12% Other

80% of population is rural

A male dominated tribal society where the people do not think of themselves as Afghans, but as Pashtun or Uzbek.
Current Afghan National Security Forces

- MOD/ANA - Force of choice, in the fight, capable of contributing effects at all levels (MOD/General Staff through Kandak)
  - Still developing capability. Serious manning and equipment problems.
  - Needs resources and time to become effective; has been rushed into the fight.

- MOI/ANP - Pay and Rank Reform 50%, equipping 60% (move 35%, shoot 85%, commo 60%), training 75%, facilities 25%.
  - Sporadic effectiveness, building trust of Afghan people, taking up the fight along side the ANA, Regional Commands effective
  - Insufficient partnership capacity commitment from the International Community
Afghan National Army – Current Status

- ~30,100 Soldiers; growing to 50,000 for now
  - 5 Maneuver Corps / 10 Brigade Headquarters
  - Emerging Air Corps (Presidential Airlift focus)
- Insufficient assigned personnel, low numbers present for duty
- Pay, benefits, and administration major problems.
- Some ethnic and sectarian tensions
- Not trained and equipped for level of threat than may now be developing.
- Improving training base
- Afghan units directly in “the Fight;” 5 Corps supporting current combat operations
- Collective combat skills improving
- Growing competent and confident leaders
- Comprehensive deliberate approach to building values-based all national force increasingly delivering results but will require more time and patience
- Aggressive partnering with US forces enhancing unit proficiency; NATO partnering lagging

Current force levels have insufficient capability and capacity, making them heavily reliant upon U.S. and Coalition forces for combat enablers.
## Building Afghan National Army (ANA)

### Required to Counter Threat

### Current Situation

**Build and sustain:**
- 50,000-strong, 10-Brigade ANA
- Basic Infantry force
- Air Corps for Presidential airlift only
- Partnering with Coalition required to conduct COIN

**Deficiencies:**
- Donated weapons unreliable
- No combat enablers
- Insufficient force protection

### Build and Sustain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Body Armor/Kevlar/HMMWV’s</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commandos</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainable Airlift and Attack Capability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission-effective Weapons/Artillery</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enabling Units</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Additional Troops</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force Protection</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Body armor; Kevlar helmets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Advanced first aid kits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Up-armored HMMWVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Counter-Insurgency Capability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 6 Commando Battalions w/ COIN focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Specialized training; Rapid deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small, capable Air Corps</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mi-17/ Mi-35 lift/attack helicopters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fixed wing tactical airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reliable Weapons</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assault rifles; machineguns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Howitzers; Mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Support Units</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Engineering units; counter-IED capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Military Intel companies; Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Force Structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 70,000-Soldier Army; fully equipped/ trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 14 brigades; 70 battalions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Efforts to Strengthen the Afghan Army

- **Goal for the ANA:** Set the conditions for the ANA to be able to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations (COIN) by end of CY08

- **FY07 Supplemental will provide resources to train, equip, sustain:**
  - An ANA commando capability—roughly equivalent to US Army Rangers
  - Improved ANA mobility and force projection capability by expanding the Air Corps to include fixed-wing and rotary-wing transport assets and rotary-wing gun ships
  - An enhanced 50,000 soldier (10 Brigade) force structure with reliable weapons, increased force protection.
  - An expanded ANA which adds 20,000 soldiers (4 Brigades), who will be manned, trained, equipped to the enhanced level described above

- Allows for sufficient force structure for country with size, topography of Afghanistan

- Combat enablers (i.e. military intelligence, combat engineers) to leverage ANA capabilities; included in the expanded force structure

- **Important for ANA to be a credible respected force domestically; as an all-ethnic and national apolitical institution, it will greatly help contribute to national unity as the country confronts political challenges in the coming years.**
Afghan National Army Program

Program to date
$1,225 Million

Completed - 7 Brigades
Under Construction - 2 Brigades

Projects Completed
Over 100 throughout Afghanistan
Including Hospitals (Regional BDE and National), Log Depots (all classes), Central Movement

- Funded - Awarded
- Funded - Not Awarded
- Not Funded - Not Awarded
ANA Garrison Locations

Current Permanent Garrison
Future Permanent Garrison
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force Structure Authorized Strength</td>
<td>30,912</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assigned Strength</td>
<td>23,087</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWOL</td>
<td>3,830</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective PDY Strength</td>
<td>15,245</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authorized Leave</td>
<td>2,415</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDY/Other Auth Lv</td>
<td>1,597</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constructive Assigned Strength</td>
<td>19,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AS OF 14 AUGUST 2006
ANA CURRENT TASK ORGANIZATION – CORPS AND BELOW

GoA MoD

Kabul

Gardez

Kandahar

Herat

MeS

HSSC

Kab

PeC Dar

Kho Gar

Kan Qal TS

Her

MeS

CS

CSS

CSS
## 2ND BDE, 205TH CORPS UNIT DISPOSITION

### 205TH CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>U.S. ETTs</th>
<th>ANA</th>
<th>TERPS</th>
<th>OMLT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2ND BDE HQ</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1/2/205</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 2/2/205</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 3/2/205</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 4/2/205</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 5/2/205</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL 2ND BDE</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
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![Map of 2ND BDE, 205TH CORPS UNIT DISPOSITION](image-url)
3rd BDE, 205th Corps Unit Disposition

205th Corps

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<thead>
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<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1/3/205</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total 2/3/205</td>
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207TH CORPS UNIT DISPOSITION

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209TH CORPS UNIT DISPOSITION

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## Army Combat Force Generation

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- ⭐️ Man 70-84%
- ⭐️ Equip 70-84%
- ⭐️ Train = 70-84%

NLT Sep 07
Afghan National Police – Current Status

- 49,700 trained and equipped police:
  - Uniform, Standby (Quick Reaction Force), Border, Counter-Narcotics Police, and Afghan National Auxiliary Police

- ANP reliability and credibility are weak; not previously recruited, trained, equipped, facilitated for emerging threat.

- Reforming the force:
  - Moving in stages. All Regional, Border, Uniform, Standby & Provincial Police Commanders have been selected, in position, and making a difference; District Chiefs of Police selected in October
  - Pay and Rank Reform still encountering major problems but progressing

- Police operations and coordination with Afghan Army is improving:
  - Police Regional Commands are being established; enhancing command & control, coordination, & planning; good US military innovation - commands are coterminous with Army and National Security Directorate Regional Commands, greatly increasing Afghan and NATO operational and intelligence effectiveness.
  - Integrated in coalition and ISAF Operations
  - Mentor presence having an effect

- Developing partnership opportunities with Coalition & NATO-ISAF:
  - Border Police successfully partnered with US Military Police Brigade during current combat operations
  - Police partnering with U.S. Special Forces developing
  - NATO-ISAF needs to step up and partner with Afghan Police
Building Afghan National Police (ANP)

**Required to Counter Threat**

**Current Situation**

**Build and equip:**
- 62,000-strong, trained ANP
- Uniformed Police: law enforcement patrolmen
- Border Police: border checkpoints; tariffs
- Stand-by Police: Reserve Force

**Deficiencies:**
- No Crowd control
- Limited Counter-Narcotics Capability
- Weak Counter-Insurgency (COIN) capability
- No Counter IED
- Insufficient force protection

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Special training/equipping for 5K policemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Armored/SWAT Vehicles and HMMWVs</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Tactical Gear, Body Armor, Sniper Equipment</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- CNPA Training and Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>- CNPA Weapons, Ammunition, Vehicles</td>
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<td>- K-9 Kennels &amp; Veterinary Services</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Border Surveillance &amp; Enhanced Force Protection</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Surveillance system equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Binoculars; Cameras; Video equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Advanced first aid kits</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Increased Force Structure</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 82,000 police officer force structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Additions to current units</td>
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Efforts to Strengthen the Afghan Police

- **Goal for the ANP**: Set the conditions for the ANP to be able to ensure the Rule of Law exists throughout the entire country of Afghanistan.

- **FY07 Supplemental** will provide resources to train, equip, sustain:
  - The ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police) that will provide COIN first-responder capability
    - Will allow the police to better respond to emergencies like the May 06 riots in Kabul
  - The existing 62,000 member ANP with weapons to match those carried by insurgents, criminal gangs, narco-terrorists; as well as adequate mobility, comms and force protection equipment
  - Expand the ANP by 20,000 police officers
  - Provide more mentors (both civilian and military police professionals): at least 2000 more personnel are required to provide complete mentoring at the district and provincial levels.
Afghan National Police (ANP) Initiatives

- Although corruption, ineffective leadership, under-manning and equipment issues continue to plague the progress of both the ANP and Afghan Border Police (ABP), there have been gains within this area that allow this policing function to grow as a professional force.

- In Khost, the Khost ANP/Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) model has integrated and synchronized the efforts of the PRT, its Police Training Assistance Team (PTAT), maneuver units operating throughout the province, contractor mentors, and the MP platoon IOT support capacity building, partnership, and combined operations.

- In Bamyan, the New Zealand PRT has instituted extensive capacity building programs both at the PRT and at the Bamyan Regional Training Center (RTC) to include: Literacy Training; Mechanics and Drivers Train-Trainer Program; District Commander Seminars; Office Management Training and Additional Weapons Qualification Training.

- The Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) implementation in Ghazni has set the stage for the successful expansion throughout RC-East and RC-Central. TF SPARTAN has planned for and stands ready to implement ANAP throughout its Area of Responsibility (AOR) – projects 95% implementation in applicable provinces and districts within 1 year, if and when approved by the Ministry of Interior (MOI).

- A 10th Mountain Division combat brigade has initiated the first comprehensive recruiting campaign tied to kinetic and non-kinetic operations, to include an effort to tie RTC class schedules to ANP recruiting goals and efforts.
Afghan National Police Program

Program to date
$187 Million

Completed
2 Border Police sites
4 Highway Police sites
6 Provincial Police HQs

Under Construction
2 Regional Logistic Centers/ Uniform Police Regional HQs
21 Border Police HQs
10 Uniform Police Provincial HQs
2 Standby Police Battalion HQs
5 Criminal Investigation Division sites
352 Site Assessments

FY06 Supplemental:
$18 M
80 District Police HQs