

# *CSIS*

---

Center for Strategic and International Studies  
1800 K Street NW • Washington, DC 20006  
Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746  
Email: [Acordesman@aol.com](mailto:Acordesman@aol.com)

## **International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism: Making the Myth A Reality**

**Anthony H. Cordesman  
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy**

**Revised: September 5, 2005**

# The Changing Threat

- **Loss of limits on violence and choice of targets: Eschatological and extreme goals justify violence as an end in itself**
- **“Clash within a civilization:” Violent Neo-Salafi extremism at the national, international, and regional level: Al Qa’ida, etc.**
- **Growth and exploitation of ethnic and sectarian conflicts: Kurds, Berbers, Turcomans; Shi’ites, Sunnis, Christian, Jews.**
- **Transformation of Arab-Israeli conflict into asymmetric war within Palestinian movement and potentially Israel and Lebanon; state exploitation of proxies and vice versa.**
- **Ideological -- largely religious -- challenges to secular and moderate regimes: Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.**
- **Growing risk of use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons: “Superterrorism.”**
- **Efforts to create “clash of civilizations:” provoke religious tension and conflict between Islamic world, and West and other non-Islamic societies.**
- **Impact of US and Western intervention; Islamic immigration to Europe and US.**
- **Ability to exploit “weapons of mass media:” Instant satellite news, cell phones, internet; create loose, informal networks cutting across national and regional lines.**
- **Blurring of lines between State and Non-State Actors.**

# **International Cooperation: The Problem of Myth**

- **Cooperation can be based on trust and common values: One man's terrorist is another man's terrorist.**
- **A definition of terrorism exists that can be accepted by all.**
- **Intelligence can be freely shared.**
- **Other states can be counted on to keep information secure, and use it to mutual advantage.**
- **International institutions are secure and trustworthy.**
- **Internal instability and security issues do not require compartmentation and secrecy at national level.**
- **The "war on terrorism" creates common priorities and needs for action.**
- **Global and regional cooperation is the natural basis for international action.**
- **Legal systems are compatible enough for cooperation.**
- **Human rights and rule of law differences do not limit cooperation.**
- **Most needs are identical.**
- **Cooperation can be separated from financial needs and resources.**

# **International Cooperation: Key Sensitivities**

- **The Arab-Israeli conflict: Hamas, PIJ, Hezbollah, Israeli extremists, role of Syria and Iran in using proxies.**
- **The impact of US intervention in the region: Role in Iraq and Afghanistan, ties to Israel.**
- **Post 9/11 tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia; US and West and Islamic world.**
- **Special needs to deal with ongoing struggles in Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, etc.**
- **Sensitivity of Islamic extremism;**
- **Divisions between Sunnis, Shi'ites, and by sect.**
- **Berber issue in North Africa**
- **Cultural tensions over Islamic immigration to Europe, “culture shock.”**
- **Different views of reform; how to address the “causes” of terrorism.**
- **Views of threat or non-threat from Iran.**
- **The broader Kurdish issue: e.g. PKK.**
- **Freedom of speech vs. counterterrorism: e.g. radical clerics incitement in the UK.**
- **The Chechens’ “struggle” for independence vs. Russian security; autocracy in Central Asia.**
- **Spillover of problems in Pakistan, South Asia, East Asia, South Asia.**
- **Divisions between individual Arab countries in North Africa, Levant, Gulf and Arabia.**
- **Differences over control of charities, financial institutions, fund transfers.**
- **Differences over control of population movements; tracking individuals.**

# International Cooperation: Dealing with Reality

- Cooperation cannot be based on trust and common values: One man's terrorist is may be another man's freedom fighter, proxy, or source.
- Intelligence cannot (and *will not*) be freely shared, particular raw and sensitive intelligence.
- Large numbers of other states *cannot* be counted on to keep information secure, and will often attempt to use it to national advantage.
- International institutions leak and are politicized. Unless specially designed for other purposes, and even then present unusual risks.
- Internal instability and security issues are political "crown jewels" and the resulting sensitivity leads to extensive compartmentation and limits on cooperation.
- The "war on terrorism" often does *not* create common priorities and needs for action.
- Bilateral, multilateral, and national clusters of cooperation – not international or regional organizations are the natural basis for cooperation.
- Legal systems often differ sharply and present major problems in cooperation.
- Differences in approaches to human rights and rule of law differences can sharply limit cooperation, and create a major political and media impact.
- Many needs are not identical, and national priorities are often sharply different.
- Cooperation *cannot* be separated from financial needs and resources, and many regional states have severe limits in terms of resources and/or specialized expertise.

# Making Real World Cooperation Effective

- **Strengthen bilateral and “cluster” cooperation in more sensitive areas according to national priorities and needs.**
- **Find approaches to international and regional cooperation that bypass national and regional sensitivities.**
  - **Compartment counterterrorism from ordinary diplomacy, limit open/transparent operations.**
  - **Avoid common lists of terrorists and organizations.**
  - **Avoid making counterterrorism another forum for regional disputes and controversies.**
  - **Avoid efforts to create a common definition of “terrorism.”**
  - **Avoid focusing on sensitive aspects of intelligence.**
- **Many areas of broad cooperation still remain:**
  - **National designation of organizations and individuals.**
  - **Selective international action in many areas: Controlling funds transfers, tracking movement, etc.**
  - **Sharing of training methods, defensive and response systems.**
  - **Legislation, efforts at reform and dealing with causes of terrorism, standards for law and human rights.**

# “Modular” Cooperation

**Sharing of systems, tactics, technology that can be exchanged between friendly nations, and also be supported on an international or regional level:**

- **Help in design of national and regional counterterrorism centers; improving such facilities.**
- **Immigration management, ergonomics, personnel tracking systems.**
- **Training systems for most force elements.**
- **Tactics for most missions.**
- **Case studies and models in integrating regular military, internal security, and police operations.**
- **Case studies and models in dealing with human rights and rule of law issues.**
- **Equipment and systems design for many defense systems: E.g. CBRN detections and characterization; IED and bomb detection/prevention, IT defense, critical infrastructure defense.**
- **Equipment and systems design for many aspects of response: E.g. CBRN response; emergency medical response, maintaining civil order, etc.**
- **Threat assessment techniques; vulnerability analysis, lethality and damage assessment models, methods of risk analysis.**
- **Information Technology (IT) systems and subsystems.**
- **Law enforcement, counter-drug interface tactics, systems, and training.**
- **Financial regulation, control, and tracking systems.**
- **Educational efforts, dialogue, media outreach.**

# Capacity Building: Assisting Developing Countries

- *Help countries with their immigration control:* introduce secure biometric systems to track immigrants and visitors.
- *Improve aviation security:* including the sharing of surveillance and bomb detection equipments.
- *Build up port and maritime security:* improve countries' patrol and interdiction capacity. This includes sharing of radar technology and training methods of navy and coast guards.
- *Customs cooperation:* assist countries in controlling their borders and developing sound customs laws to control their borders.
- *Export control:* help countries counter arms, drug, and explosive smuggling and preventing them from falling the hands of terrorists.
- *Law-enforcement cooperation:* developing countries need training counter-terrorism operations such as tracking and prevention suicide bombing, and best practices in responding to attacks.
- *Help countries build their counter-terrorist financing operation including:* developed countries and international organizations should help developing countries meet FATF standards and other counter-money-laundering measures.
- *Counter-CBRN terrorism:* share methods and data on how to prevent and respond CBRN terrorist attacks.
- *Developing counter-terrorism legislation:* Assisting countries develop legislation for domestic implementation of international conventions and protocols in countering terrorism.



# Intelligence Cooperation

- **Sharing of intelligence that can be exchanged between friendly nations, and be supported on an international or regional level at some levels:**
- **Transfer of selected data, focused cooperation, in areas of common interest.**
- **Release of generic data at secure and open levels.**
- **Hierarchical secure, standardized systems for sharing finished data in agreed areas. Standardization of collection, reporting, content, and IT systems in select areas.**
- **Sub-regional “cluster” and specialized regional organizations; integrated and virtual staffs.**
- **Creation of Interpol-like “national” designation systems identifying organizations and individuals as “terrorist;” creation of common centers and/or data bases.**
- **Exchange of intelligence officers and common cells.**
- **Exchange training systems, less sensitive collection and analytic methods, IT system design.**
- **Agreements for common operations, especially in security areas.**
- **Exchange/sale/transfer of secure communications gear, collection gear (UAVs, etc.)**
- **Open source designation and reporting.**
- **Near Real-time exchange of critical data on IT system or “hotline” basis.**

# Realistic Role of the Interpol

- Provide technical expertise to help authorities find *counterfeit* documents because they have the world's largest counterfeit documents. Documents include passports, currency, banking statements, etc. During the inception of the Interpol ASF-STD database in October 2002, there were only 3,150 documents recorded. As of 21 January 2005, there are already 5,699,686 stolen travel documents that are recorded into the ASF-STD Database, coming from 67 member-countries.
- Provide a forum for international security and law enforcement agencies to meet and exchange ideas and information on best practices.
- Develop and implement international standards to facilitate cooperation between states and enhance international counter-terrorism efforts. This includes sharing of most wanted lists and the tracking of individual terrorists and their financing.
- *Interpol's Fusion Task Force* provides global secure police communication services and databases and offer operational police support to member states. It was created in 2002, and currently it had more than 177 members. It had developed a database of suspected terrorist who trained in Al-Qaida's in Afghanistan.
- *Interpol Incident Response Teams (IRTs)* are temporary Interpol advisory teams of Criminal Intelligence Officers, Analysts, IT experts and other personnel from the General Secretariat. An IRT is deployed, on request of a Member Country and offers a host of operational services; most notably, real-time database queries in coordination with the Command Center at the General Secretariat, analytical assistance, and coordination of support from other Interpol Member Countries in specialized areas such as ballistics, DVI, expertise in the area of counterfeits, etc. In 2004, eight IRTs have been deployed worldwide in response to request of member-countries in managing terrorist incidents.

# Countering Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing

- Strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and encourage countries to comply with these requirements.
- Create Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in every country that meet the Egmont Group Definition and Standards and encourage the sharing of information and expertise between national and regional FIUs.
- Identify individuals and entities that are suspected of money laundering, terrorist financing, or supporting drug or arms trafficking and share the information at the FIU with other countries on the international level.
- Find comprehensive and universal standards to ensure that charitable, humanitarian, and non-profit organizations are not abused by extremists that are based on the FATF recommendations and other international standards.
- Create national systems for collecting and analyzing international wire transfers including, *hawalah*, by FIUs to detect and prevent money from reaching extremists organizations.
- Create a system to use frozen terrorist assets and distribute the money to compensate victims of terrorism.
- Develop laws and the judicial capacity to prosecute money launderers and to protect national banks from being abused by terrorist organizations.

# Countering CRBN-Terrorism: A Realistic Approach

## ■ Prevent Proliferation:

- Strengthen the NPT to include proliferation to terrorist organizations and stricter punishment for states with WMD capabilities that are considered sponsored of terrorism.
- Protect fissile materials and their production from being used by terrorists organizations established under the Lugar-Nunn initiative.
- Strengthen the NPT or introduce new measure stop any proliferation or enrichment of Uranium and Plutonium.
- Protect ports from the transfer of materials that can be used for CBRN weapons.
- Share best practices between states for screening materials and containers.

## ■ Protect after attack to minimize the damage:

- Build possible scenarios and contingencies plans.
- Train and build capacity of first responders and investigators to manage a CBRN attack.
- Governments must have clear plans to deal with public information and warning to counter panic, inform the media, and minimize economic impacts.
- Share data and training methods with other countries.
- Prepare disaster management agencies to deal with a WMD attack.

# Low Controversy Cooperative Activities

- *Establish a resource centre at the disposal of law enforcement sub-regionally regionally or worldwide*
- *Develop an Incident Response Guide for law enforcement and responder; include CBRN.*
- *Provide training and awareness programs, including sub-regional and regional workshops*
- *Information Technology, collection, defense, response, critical infrastructure meetings and workshops.*
- *Create international stockpiles for rapid deployment of response equipment like vaccines and medicines designed to deal with both bioterrorism and natural outbreaks and medical needs. Compartmented national efforts can be wasteful and expensive; coordinated international efforts could achieve major economies of scale and developed synergies between dealing with terrorism and public health needs.*
- *Cooperation in developing response plans to deal with public information and warning to counter panic, inform the media, and minimize economic impacts.*
- *Cooperation in establishing suitable national controls on imports, equipment and supply sales and access to key facilities*
- *Exchange data on methods of program management and measures of effectiveness: The response to biological threats has moved far beyond the point where programs should continue that are not subject to stringent performance review, peer review, well-defined milestones, cost-containment and other measures of effectiveness. The exchange of such key management tools can aid all countries involved.*
- *Focus on common efforts to develop high cost defense and response systems such as detection and warning systems and net works: Some capabilities are so costly that they deserve special attention as areas for international cooperation. This could include common research and development efforts for new treatments, and common test and evaluation efforts for detection and warning systems.*

# Controversial Cooperation Measures I

- *End the compartmentation of national analysis, planning, and programs that artificially distinguishes between domestic and international terrorism, and attempts and successful incidents. Focus on high risk forms of terrorism and combine warning and analytic functions.* The US and some other countries have created national terrorism centers that can perform these functions. There are still indications, however, that such centers often artificially compartment their incident reporting and pattern analysis, and do not adequately characterize the nature of terrorist, covert, and proxy efforts to acquire biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
- *Create hierarchies of intelligence to allow maximum sharing of data at the national and international level, and in a standardized and near real time form:* The US has already found that excessive compartmentation and secrecy are the natural allies of terrorism. Exposing sources and methods is dangerous, as is giving too much information at the unclassified level, or to insecure national and international entities. In almost every case, however, it is possible to create levels of intelligence that can be shared. Gross, excessive overclassification, and compartmentation within and between agencies and elements of government, is the international norm.
- *Establish an international center(s) for tracking, characterizing, and analyzing terrorist incidents, terrorists, and terrorist activities:* There is a broad need for a center that can provide reliable tracking and characterization of all types of terrorist incidents, including known attempts, and for supporting pattern and trend analysis on a sophisticated basis. Such a center would almost certainly have to be managed by governments or an international organization like Interpol, and would probably have to operate at both the classified and unclassified levels. It might be necessary to create a separate mix of an open-source international center and separate intelligence centers, with the latter including only countries capable of secure cooperation.
- *Set international standards for incident reporting for both attempts and actual attacks that include enough technical data to fully access the level of success in manufacturing, weaponizing, and preparing to disseminate biological weapons. Provide a reliable database on suppliers, facilities used, technical problems encountered, and technical progress.*

# Controversial Cooperation Measures II

- *Create secure regional centers that can operate at high levels of classification and security for tracking, characterizing, and analyzing terrorist incidents, terrorists, and terrorist activities:* There is no true international community in dealing with bioterrorism. Too many states are proliferators and potential actors in support terrorists, covert and false flag operations, and potential use of non-state groups as proxies. Even organizations like NATO and the EU would require careful compartmentation because of some of their members. Smaller, fully secure groups, are, however, better than none – particularly if they include the leaders in biotechnology, intelligence, defense, and response.
- *Create a specialized element in such a center(s) for tracking and analyzing cover, and proxy WMD attacks, with specialized expertise to analyze the equipment and agents used, levels of technical sophistication, nature of dual-use exploitation, and technology transfer. Create pattern analysis of trends, sharing of methods between terrorist groups, and establish a detailed near-real time basis for risk assessment. Provide both secure and open analysis to meet the needs of the full range of defenders and responders.*
- *International efforts are needed to establish suitable controls on equipment and supply sales and access to key facilities.* The present controls and safeguards on access to the equipment, supplies, and facilities needed for terrorist attacks are often inadequate to the point of being negligible – particularly if the actors manufacturing agents is willing to take high personal risks and risk to those around them. Industry experts, medical and biological research experts, and research and manufacturing administrators need to be consulted to determine what kind of national and international controls are justified and needed.
- *Create suitable international legislation and law enforcement procedures to deal with low and high level threats.* As Interpol notes in a March 2005 review of bioterrorism, “In many countries, criminal justice systems are constrained by inadequate legal frameworks.” Without laws that criminalize activity, there is no basis for legal assistance or co-operation. There is therefore an urgent need to ensure that countries are adequately prepared for, protected from, and able to respond to attacks.
- *Create an international system for tracking individuals with special forms of expertise, as well as procedures for vetting and clearing workers and researchers.*

# Controversial Cooperation Measures III

- *Create standardized and rigorous large-scale attack models for public policy and planning purposes:* National efforts need rigorous cooperative efforts to create reliable analytic models, with red team and peer review to challenge the results. Expert guidance is needed to provide more reliable models and data for planning and simulation by defenders and responders, and for developing intelligence and warning indicators. International analysis might be a task for international organizations like the World Health Organization, with the support of national laboratories, although security problems may again restrict a great deal of the effort to select groups of nations capable of cooperating at high levels of security.
- *Examine options for international cooperation at the “fusion level:”* Organizations like the WHO, FAO, and Interpol all have significant potential capabilities in these areas, and some progress is already being made in creating analytic and tracking capabilities in these organizations. More repaid and structured progress is needed, however, and some form of “fusion” or near-real time integration of their efforts may be required.
- *Create international and regional centers to coordinate key activities:* There are limits to international cooperation and trust, but there are many areas like research, development of warning and detection systems, response methods and technology, and stockpiling of vaccines where international cooperation may be possible at the region level, and where international organizations could play a major role. There may also be a number of areas where it will be far more cost-effectiveness to sponsor international efforts than purely national ones, or to specialize in ways where one nation’s efforts support those of others.
- *Create international and regional centers to exchange data on methods of defense and response:* It should be substantially easier to foster international exchange of many of the methods nations use in defense and response, and some aspects of intelligence and law/regulatory enforcement. This can include experience with training, legal solutions, etc. Such exchanges may be essential to real-world progress in poorer and developing countries, and will be critical to richer and more developed countries as well. Effective national defense requires international action.
- *Create transparency in actual progress in creating international cooperation:* It is far easier to talk about international cooperation than it is to achieve, and far easier to hold meetings and commission studies of how to cooperate than actually do anything. International organizations should be held to the same demanding performance standards as national efforts, and they have no conceivable excuse for anything other than total transparency as to programs, costs, and measures of effectiveness. The “actions not words” test is critical.



# Political, Educational, Cultural Cooperation

**Cooperation at the political level and in public diplomacy can be critical:**

- **Common efforts to condemn terrorism, label organizations and individuals as threats.**
- **Religious and counter-terrorism dialogues and meetings.**
- **Lead role for Islamic states in countering extremism and “deviants.” Support, not challenge from West.**
- **Cooperation in blocking movement of spokesmen and actors, reviewing requests for asylum, movement of propaganda.**
- **Cooperation in ensuring maximum freedom of movement for non-terrorists.**
- **Education and educational reform**
- **Religious efforts to counter extremism and intolerance.**
- **Mutual education of media; common briefings.**
- **Exchanges on values, perceptions, and popular reactions to counterterrorism efforts.**
- **Supporting role of legitimate human rights organizations.**
- **Cooperation in outreach to media.**
- **Cooperation in public diplomacy.**
- **Economic aid and assistance.**

# Realistic Role of the United Nations

- Provide a legitimate platform to take a global stand against terrorism.
- The Counter Terrorism Committee and the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UNODC can help create universal legal instruments against translational terrorism.
- The UN can act as a hub to inform countries about current universal human rights, humanitarian, and refugee laws and help countries find a balance between them and security.
- Act as a platform to develop cultural and religious dialogues, especially between the Islamic and Western worlds, to highlight shared values, encourage co-existence, bridge cultural divides, and educate the public about the danger of terrorism to the world.
- Ensure the adoption of a universal convention against the use of WMDs in acts of terrorism, and strengthen relevant UN agencies such as the IAEA to develop measures to prevent terrorist from acquiring WMD capabilities.
- Issue an annual report on terrorist incidents, progress against terrorist organizations, and the track trends in the global war against terrorism.
- *The Counter-Terrorism Information and Sources* provide member states with comprehensive information on best practices and potential assistance programs, which was developed by the CTC.

# Islamic-Western Coexistence

- Foster dialogue and understanding between the two cultures through:
- *Cultural educational exchanges:* Governmental and NGOs should create scholarships and exchange programs from people from both parts of the world to travel and interact with each other to build business and educational networks as well as enhance their understanding of each other.
- *Interfaith dialogue:* religious leaders should highlight the shared values of the “Abrahamic faiths” and allow the “Judio-Christian” tradition to expand to the “Judio-Christian-Muslim.”
- *Enlist the help of Muslim communities in the West:* Arab-American and others in the west should be consulted and partnered with western organizations to bridge the cultural and understanding gaps between the West and Islam.
- *Fight Inflammatory Statements:* Leaders and opinion makers on both sides have to oppose and condemn inflammatory rhetoric. Religious leaders have to preach tolerance and avoid divisive language.
- *Develop American studies departments in Middle Eastern colleges:* Currently there are only two American studies departments in the MENA region. More should be built and supported to enhance understating and expose college students in the region to American history and culture.
- *Intellectual dialogue:* scholars should develop a partnership at the institutional and personal levels to debate issues of mutual interests, especially the future relationship between the Islamic world and the West.
- *Cultures are meant to be different:* Muslims have to be reassured that they can be modern and keep their faith and tradition, and the West need to understand that modernization does not necessarily mean westernization.

# Perceptions about Religion

## Which Religion is more violent?

|               | Islam | Judaism | Christianity |
|---------------|-------|---------|--------------|
| Netherlands   | 88%   | 2%      | 3%           |
| France        | 87%   | 2%      | 2%           |
| Spain         | 81%   | 4%      | 2%           |
| Germany       | 79%   | 3%      | 2%           |
| Poland        | 77%   | 5%      | 3%           |
| India         | 73%   | 2%      | 5%           |
| Russia        | 71%   | 10%     | 3%           |
| US            | 67%   | 4%      | 9%           |
| Great Britain | 63%   | 4%      | 8%           |
| Canada        | 61%   | 4%      | 8%           |
| Jordan        | 1%    | 98%     | 1%           |
| Morocco       | 3%    | 83%     | 5%           |
| Lebanon       | 18%   | 66%     | 15%          |
| Indonesia     | 11%   | 63%     | 10%          |
| Pakistan      | 6%    | 51%     | 4%           |
| Turkey        | 15%   | 20%     | 46%          |

- Westerners and people in India chose Islam as the most violent religion.

- People in Muslim countries chose Judaism as the most violent.

- Turkey is the only exception, where Christianity was chosen to be most violent.


Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics, July 14, 2005.

# Role of Muslim Scholars and Leaders

- ***Highlight shared values with the people of the book:*** Muslim leaders must reinstate the concept of the people of the book in their sermons, writings, and fatwas. Muslim leaders should work on redefining the word “infidel” and educate the Muslim public and world at large on Islamic tradition of co-existence with other faiths.
- ***Educational reforms:*** The role of *madrasas* in spreading extremism is often overestimated by western analysts. In the past, however, extremists have been instrumental in shaping religious curricular in public schools and the same groups are resisting reforming the educational systems in some Muslim countries. Religious scholars have to take the lead in embedding tolerance of other faiths and other Muslim sects in the curriculum.
- ***Streamlining the fatwa process:*** Muslim scholars delegitimizing extremists’ fatwas that incite violence. At this point, self-appointed clerics issue fatwas at will that are contradictory to Islamic teaching. These fatwas need to be countered with condemnation and delegitimization by Muslim scholars from all sects.
- ***Speak louder:*** Moderate or mainstream Muslims have been criticized for not speaking forcefully against terrorism. Muslim Ulemas in Mecca and Alazhar have condemn acts of terrorism any where and against anyone, especially suicide attacks, but they need to be more engaging and reach Muslim youths not only in the Muslim world but in Europe and North America.
- ***Emphasize that Muslims are the victims of terrorism:*** Muslims have been suffering from acts of terrorism for the last 30 years. Most of the victims of the bombings in Riyadh, Jeddah, Bali, Casablanca, Tunisia, Sharm El-Sheikh, Tabah, Lebanon, Iraq, and Pakistan are Muslims. Leaders in the Islamic world have to highlight that the first victim of terrorism are Muslims and stand up against clerics who condone killing of other Muslims as collateral damage of a war against “infidels,” e.g. Nasir Al-Fahd’s fatwa in May 2003.

# Muslims Public Attitude Toward Terrorisms I


Do Muslims feel that Islamic extremism is a threat to their country?



Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics, July 14, 2005.

# Muslims Public Attitude Toward Terrorisms II

Support of suicide bombing is declining in Muslim world: Violence against civilian targets is justified?




|                 | 2004    | 2005 | 2002     | 2005 | 2002   | 2005 | 2002    | 2005 | 2002   | 2005 |
|-----------------|---------|------|----------|------|--------|------|---------|------|--------|------|
|                 | Morocco |      | Pakistan |      | Turkey |      | Lebanon |      | Jordan |      |
| DK              | 8%      | 3%   | 23%      | 10%  | 14%    | 13%  | 6%      | 10%  | 43%    | 1%   |
| Never           | 38%     | 79%  | 38%      | 46%  | 64%    | 66%  | 12%     | 33%  | 22%    | 11%  |
| Rarely          | 15%     | 5%   | 5%       | 19%  | 7%     | 6%   | 9%      | 19%  | 26%    | 31%  |
| Often/Sometimes | 40%     | 13%  | 33%      | 25%  | 13%    | 14%  | 73%     | 39%  | 8%     | 57%  |

Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics, July 14, 2005."

# Muslims Public Attitude Toward Terrorisms III

Do you support Violence against Civilians in Defense of Islam?




Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics, July 14, 2005.



# Muslims Public Attitude Toward Terrorisms IV

## Confidence in Osama bin Laden?



Source: The Pew Global Attitude Project, "Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics, July 14, 2005.


# Immigration: Living between Two Worlds I

- ***Ghettoization of European Muslims:*** Muslims in Western Europe more and more live in the same neighborhood and don't feel part of a larger European society.
- ***Islamic identify vs. assimilation:*** A report by the Pew Global Attitudes Project published on July 14, 2005 found that most Europeans, with the exception of Poland (42%) feel that Muslims in their country want to remain distinct from the general population (Germany 88%, Russia 72%, Spain 68%, Netherlands 65%, Great Britain 62%, France 59%). The US's public attitude was split, 49% of Americans felt that American-Muslims wanted to remain "distinct."
- ***Negative attitudes towards further immigration from the MENA:*** According the Pew Global Attitudes Survey, the majority of Europeans think the immigration from the MENA region is a bad thing, and them appose Turkey's bid to join the EU. (*Immigration from the MENA region is a bad thing: Netherlands 67%, France 81%, Germany 76%, Britain 44%, Spain 32%, Poland 26%*).
- ***Dissidents vs. extremists:*** Many so-called dissidents left their home countries in fear of jail and punishment for advocating violence or overthrowing local governments. Many of them have found safe havens in European cities such as London. Now, these individuals have created a support base around them and are preaching violence against their adopted country. A realistic approach against these individuals must be adopted. This can include deporting them to their home countries or trying them locally for advocating violence.
- ***Partnering with the Muslim community:*** Muslim communities in the West can be the best asset against terrorists. The authorities should build a cooperative partnership to share information about extremists and report any suspicious activities in their communities. "Random" arrest and deportation, however, will hurt any cooperation efforts and will alienate the Muslim communities.
- ***Limiting backlash:*** Overreaction by Western countries to incidents of terrorism can embolden extremists and alienate and isolate Muslim communities in the West, which are vital to counter-terrorism efforts.

# Immigration: Living between Two Worlds II

## Average Annual Net Number of Immigrants Per Decade By Major Areas: 1950-2050

(Net number of migrants in thousands)



|  | 1950-1960 | 1960-1970 | 1970-1980 | 1980-1990 | 1990-2000 | 2000-2010 | 2040-2050 |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <span style="color: #00B0F0;">■</span> Africa        | -166      | -220      | -293      | -244      | -269      | -410      | -322      |
| <span style="color: #00AEEF;">■</span> Asia          | 165       | 77        | -416      | -595      | -1,434    | -1,244    | -1,204    |
| <span style="color: #FFD700;">■</span> Europe        | -480      | -64       | 304       | 479       | 1,139     | 937       | 699       |
| <span style="color: #FFA500;">■</span> Latin America | -58       | -288      | -388      | -649      | -798      | -740      | -567      |
| <span style="color: #A9A9A9;">■</span> North America | 403       | 387       | 748       | 924       | 1,277     | 1,360     | 1,300     |
| <span style="color: #4682B4;">■</span> Oceania       | 85        | 109       | 44        | 84        | 86        | 98        | 94        |

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, United Nations, February 2005. Page 19

Note: the forecast is based on medium variant. The minutes means outflow of people from the specified region

# Economic Dynamics in the MENA

- Much of the region cannot afford to provide more water for agriculture at market prices, and in the face of human demand; much has become a “permanent” food importer.
- Employment and education will be critical challenges to regional stability.
- Hyperurbanization and a half-century decline in agricultural and traditional trades impose high levels of stress on traditional social safety nets and extended families
- Broad problems in integrating women effectively and productively into the work force.
- Much of the region has had limited or no real growth in per capita income, and growing inequity in the distribution of that income, for more than two decades. Oil states are the exception.
- Overall economic growth is too low.
- The Middle East is not competitive with the leading developing regions.
- The region is not competitive in trade except in oil and petroleum exports.
- Radical economic changes are affecting traditional regional societies.
- “Oil wealth” has always been relative, and cannot sustain employment and balanced development in most countries in the region.
- In spite of decades of reform plans and foreign aid, there are no globally competitive economies in any of the MENA states.
- Too many countries have a sustained debt and budget crisis.

# Key Economic Indicators 2003-04


|              | GDP<br>(\$Billion) | GDP Per Capita<br>(\$) | Defense Budget<br>(\$Million) |
|--------------|--------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Algeria      | 65                 | 2,050                  | 170                           |
| Bahrain      | 8.2                | 11,460                 | 175                           |
| Egypt        | 67.5               | 1,000                  | 9,900                         |
| Iran         | 128                | 1,930                  | 3,000                         |
| Jordan       | 10.1               | 1,910                  | 886                           |
| Kuwait       | 40.3               | 16,930                 | 3,800                         |
| Lebanon      | 18.2               | 4,050                  | 512                           |
| Libya        | 17.6               | 3,170                  | 742                           |
| Morocco      | 43.7               | 1,450                  | 1,800                         |
| Oman         | 21                 | 8,200                  | 2,500                         |
| Qatar        | 19.2               | 30,820                 | 1,900                         |
| Saudi Arabia | 211                | 9,380                  | 18,700                        |
| Syria        | 21.7               | 1,250                  | 1,500                         |
| Tunisia      | 25.2               | 2,550                  | 493                           |
| UAE          | 78                 | 19,350                 | 1,600                         |
| Yemen        | 11.4               | 593                    | 797                           |

Source: IISS, Military Balance 2003-2004.

# Economic Growth?

## Real Growth GDP Growth in MENA Countries 1997-2006

(Growth Rates %)



Source: The IMF, *World Economic Outlook: Globalization and External Imbalances*, April 2005, Page 210

# Oil Revenues: Their Impact on Reform I

|              | Nominal \$Billions |                 |                 |                 | Constant 2004 \$Billions |                 |                 |                 |
|--------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|              | Change 2005/2004   | 2004E           | 2005F           | 2006F           | 1972E                    | 1980E           | 1998E           | 2005F           |
| Algeria      | 31%                | \$22.70         | \$29.80         | \$30.40         | \$4.90                   | \$26.10         | \$6.40          | \$29.80         |
| Indonesia    | -165%              | \$0.60          | -\$0.40         | -\$0.80         | \$3.30                   | \$30.10         | \$3.50          | -\$0.40         |
| Iran         | 27%                | \$32.20         | \$41.00         | \$43.30         | \$15.10                  | \$26.60         | \$11.90         | \$41.00         |
| Iraq         | 6%                 | \$18.20         | \$19.30         | \$19.40         | \$5.30                   | \$54.80         | \$7.60          | \$19.30         |
| Kuwait       | 35%                | \$27.40         | \$36.90         | \$40.30         | \$10.20                  | \$38.00         | \$9.10          | \$36.90         |
| Libya        | 31%                | \$18.20         | \$23.90         | \$24.80         | \$10.80                  | \$45.10         | \$6.70          | \$23.90         |
| Nigeria      | 27%                | \$29.80         | \$37.70         | \$41.10         | \$7.70                   | \$48.40         | \$9.90          | \$37.70         |
| Qatar        | 26%                | \$13.50         | \$17.00         | \$17.20         | \$1.60                   | \$10.90         | \$3.90          | \$17.00         |
| Saudi Arabia | 30%                | \$115.60        | \$150.10        | \$154.30        | \$17.10                  | \$211.70        | \$39.70         | \$150.10        |
| UAE          | 29%                | \$30.20         | \$39.00         | \$42.70         | \$3.80                   | \$38.20         | \$10.90         | \$39.00         |
| Venezuela    | 19%                | \$29.80         | \$35.50         | \$34.40         | \$11.20                  | \$36.80         | \$13.50         | \$35.50         |
| <b>TOTAL</b> | <b>27%</b>         | <b>\$338.30</b> | <b>\$429.80</b> | <b>\$447.20</b> | <b>\$91.10</b>           | <b>\$566.60</b> | <b>\$123.20</b> | <b>\$429.80</b> |

# Oil Revenues: Their Impact on Reform II

- **Fluctuations of oil revenues makes budget planning difficult and uncertain preventing governments from delivering on funding many important social, entitlement, economic programs that are important to counter-terrorism efforts.**
- **Due to high oil prices and increased production levels, OPEC countries have seen high oil revenues for fiscal year 2004-2005.**
- **High oil revenues may work both ways. It may give governments in the region a level of comfort that they don't have, or it may give them a chance to temporarily improve their economic conditions and buy them time to catch up on large entitlement programs and aging infrastructure.**




# Youth Explosion I

- *Population growth is creating a “youth explosion.”* This growth has already raised the size of the young working age population (ages 20 to 24) in the Gulf area from 5.5 million in 1970 to 13 million in 2000, million. Conservative estimates indicate it will grow to 18 million in 2010 and to 24 million in 2050. If one looks at the MENA region as a whole, age 20-24s have grown steadily from 10 million in 1950 to 36 million today, and will grow steadily to at least 56 million by 2050.
- *The World Bank estimates that some 36% of the total MENA population is less than 15 years of age versus 21% in the US and 16% in the EU. The ratio of dependents to each working age man and woman is three times that in a developed region like the EU. The US State Department has produced estimates that more than 45% of the population is under 15 years of age.*
- *Youth unemployment provides a recruitment pool for extremists:* Most of the MENA countries have large unemployment rates. People in the region tend to blame this on governments in the region and outside supporters such as the US. The unemployed have proven to be a fertile ground for extremists’ recruitments.
- *Immigration is being driven by economic and social forces and creates new challenges of its own.* It is hardly surprising therefore that the Arab Development Report should mention surveys where 50% of the young Arab males surveyed stated their career plan was to immigrate
- *Youth confusion:* With the explosion of the methods of communications such as satellite channels, internet, cell phones, etc the youth in the region are being bombarded by messages from all sides. Extremists have utilized these methods and the alienation of youth by what they consider to be “cultural invasions.”

# Youth Explosion II

(Percentage of Population Age 0-14)



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, United Nations, February 2005. Note: the forecast is based on medium variant.


# Youth Explosion III

(Percentage of Population Age 0-14)

|           | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2020 | 2030 | 2040 | 2050 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Algeria   | 40.1 | 43.8 | 48.4 | 45.8 | 43   | 34.1 | 29.6 | 27   | 26.1 | 22.3 | 18.9 | 18.2 |
| Bahrain   | 42.3 | 43.1 | 46   | 34.7 | 31.5 | 28.2 | 27.1 | 24.1 | 19.8 | 18.2 | 17.4 | 16.3 |
| Egypt     | 39.7 | 42.5 | 41.4 | 41.4 | 41.1 | 35.9 | 33.6 | 32.5 | 29.7 | 25.8 | 23.3 | 20.9 |
| Iran      | 39.1 | 43.8 | 44.6 | 44.7 | 44.7 | 35.2 | 28.7 | 25.2 | 25.4 | 20.6 | 18   | 17.8 |
| Iraq      | 40.5 | 46.1 | 47.4 | 47.1 | 44.6 | 42.7 | 41   | 39   | 34.6 | 30.8 | 27.3 | 24.3 |
| Jordan    | 45.7 | 44.4 | 45.9 | 49.4 | 46.8 | 39.3 | 37.2 | 34.9 | 29.2 | 25.2 | 21.6 | 19.2 |
| Kuwait    | 36.1 | 34.8 | 43.4 | 40.2 | 36.6 | 26   | 24.3 | 24   | 21.8 | 18.8 | 17.8 | 17.1 |
| Lebanon   | 34.2 | 40.6 | 42.4 | 38.1 | 35.4 | 30.7 | 28.6 | 26.4 | 23.4 | 21.1 | 18.7 | 17.7 |
| Libya     | 41.9 | 43.3 | 44.9 | 46.7 | 43.7 | 32.9 | 30.1 | 29.5 | 27.2 | 21.9 | 19.1 | 18.6 |
| Morocco   | 44.4 | 44.8 | 47.6 | 43   | 39.7 | 33.4 | 31.1 | 29.5 | 26.9 | 23.4 | 21   | 19.2 |
| Oman      | 42.3 | 46.2 | 47.8 | 45.5 | 44.1 | 36.5 | 34.5 | 32.2 | 29.3 | 25.8 | 22.7 | 20.6 |
| Palestine | 45.7 | 44.4 | 45   | 47.5 | 46.7 | 46.5 | 45.5 | 44.3 | 38.8 | 34.1 | 30.1 | 26.3 |
| Qatar     | 42.3 | 39   | 36.7 | 32.3 | 27.7 | 26.1 | 21.7 | 22.3 | 20.6 | 18.5 | 17.7 | 16.5 |
| Saudi     | 42   | 43.3 | 44.5 | 44.3 | 41.6 | 39.6 | 37.3 | 34.7 | 30.4 | 26.7 | 22.8 | 19.9 |
| Syria     | 41.4 | 45.7 | 47.9 | 49.1 | 48.1 | 40.3 | 36.9 | 35.1 | 30.8 | 25.3 | 21.5 | 19.4 |
| UAE       | 42.3 | 43.7 | 34.6 | 28.6 | 29.9 | 24.6 | 22   | 20.6 | 19   | 17   | 15.3 | 14.5 |

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Note: the forecast is based on Medium Variant.

# Population Trends in MENA I



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, United Nations, February 2005.

Note: the forecast is based on medium variant.

# Population Trends in MENA I

(Population in Thousands)

|                  | 1950   | 1960   | 1970   | 1980   | 1990   | 2000   | 2005   | 2010   | 2020   | 2030    | 2040    | 2050    |
|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Algeria</b>   | 8,753  | 10,800 | 13,746 | 18,811 | 25,291 | 30,463 | 32,854 | 35,420 | 40,624 | 44,706  | 47,508  | 49,500  |
| <b>Bahrain</b>   | 116    | 156    | 220    | 347    | 493    | 672    | 727    | 791    | 910    | 1,016   | 1,100   | 1,155   |
| <b>Egypt</b>     | 21,834 | 27,840 | 35,285 | 43,860 | 55,673 | 67,285 | 74,033 | 81,133 | 94,834 | 107,056 | 117,803 | 125,916 |
| <b>Iran</b>      | 16,913 | 21,704 | 28,805 | 39,330 | 56,674 | 66,365 | 69,515 | 74,283 | 85,036 | 92,253  | 98,023  | 101,944 |
| <b>Iraq</b>      | 5,340  | 7,332  | 10,112 | 14,093 | 18,515 | 25,075 | 28,807 | 32,534 | 40,522 | 48,797  | 56,694  | 63,693  |
| <b>Jordan</b>    | 472    | 896    | 1,623  | 2,225  | 3,254  | 4,972  | 5,703  | 6,338  | 7,556  | 8,672   | 9,556   | 10,225  |
| <b>Kuwait</b>    | 152    | 278    | 744    | 1,375  | 2,143  | 2,230  | 2,687  | 3,047  | 3,698  | 4,296   | 4,840   | 5,279   |
| <b>Lebanon</b>   | 1,443  | 1,888  | 2,390  | 2,698  | 2,741  | 3,398  | 3,577  | 3,773  | 4,140  | 4,428   | 4,611   | 4,702   |
| <b>Libya</b>     | 1,029  | 1,349  | 1,986  | 3,043  | 4,334  | 5,306  | 5,853  | 6,439  | 7,538  | 8,345   | 9,015   | 9,553   |
| <b>Morocco</b>   | 8,953  | 11,626 | 15,310 | 19,527 | 24,696 | 29,231 | 31,478 | 33,832 | 38,327 | 42,016  | 44,801  | 46,397  |
| <b>Oman</b>      | 456    | 565    | 747    | 1,187  | 1,843  | 2,442  | 2,567  | 2,863  | 3,481  | 4,053   | 4,554   | 4,958   |
| <b>Palestine</b> | 1,005  | 1,101  | 1,096  | 1,476  | 2,154  | 3,150  | 3,702  | 4,330  | 5,694  | 7,171   | 8,661   | 10,058  |
| <b>Qatar</b>     | 25     | 45     | 111    | 229    | 467    | 606    | 813    | 894    | 1,036  | 1,158   | 1,263   | 1,330   |
| <b>Saudi</b>     | 3,201  | 4,075  | 5,745  | 9,604  | 16,379 | 21,484 | 24,573 | 27,664 | 34,024 | 40,132  | 45,309  | 49,464  |
| <b>Syria</b>     | 3,495  | 4,620  | 6,378  | 8,978  | 12,843 | 16,813 | 19,043 | 21,432 | 26,029 | 29,983  | 33,297  | 35,935  |
| <b>Tunisia</b>   | 3,530  | 4,221  | 5,127  | 6,454  | 8,219  | 9,563  | 10,102 | 10,639 | 11,604 | 12,379  | 12,810  | 12,927  |

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Note: the forecast is based on Medium Variant.

# The Role of the West in the Clash Within Civilization I

- *Implement a broadly-based reform strategy:* Social, economic, and political reforms should be supported, but in an evolutionary sense. The US and Western states, however, cannot be seen as pushing these reforms in ways that discredit local officials and reformers. Outside pressure for change will be resisted even if the reforms are necessary, and too much overt pressure is counterproductive.
- *One size does not fit all.* The Arab and Islamic worlds are not monolithic. Each country requires different sets of reforms and needs. Some need help in reforming their political process, others need economic aid, and others need special attention to their demographic dynamics and population control. The West, therefore, must avoid any generalized strategy of dealing with the Arab-Islamic world as one entity.
- *Work on a country-by-country approach and rely on strong country teams, not regional approaches:* Regional polices, meetings and slogans will not deal with real world needs or provide the kind of dialogue with local officials and reformers, tailored pressure and aid, and country plans and policies that are needed. Strong country teams both in Washington and in US Embassies are the keys to success.
- *Recognize that the pace of reform will be relatively slow if it is to be stable and evolutionary, and dependent on partnership and cooption.* Artificial deadlines and false crises can only lead to failed tactics and strategies. Outside support for reform must move at the base countries can actually absorb, and shift priorities to reflect the options that are actually available. History takes time and does not conform to the tenure of any given set of policymakers.

# The Role of the West in the Clash Within Civilization II

- *Carefully support moderate voices:* “Moderates” in the region do need the support of the West, but obvious outside backing can hurt internal reform efforts. Moreover, “moderate” must be defined in broad terms. It does not mean “secularist” and it does not necessarily mean “pro-American.” It also, however, does not mean supporting voices that claim to support freedom and democracy, but are actually the voice of extremism.
- *Democratization is only part of reform and depends on creating a rule of law, checks and balances and a separation of powers, protection for minorities and human rights, and effective political parties.* Trying to force or “rush” democracy on Middle Eastern countries is impractical and counterproductive. The goal should be to help MENA countries develop more pluralistic and representative governments that respect the rights of minorities.
- *Recognize that the key to effective action is local political action, dialogue, education, efforts to use the media, and public diplomacy:* The West and the US cannot hope to win a struggle for Islam and reform from the outside. It is the efforts of local governments, reformers, educators, and media that will be critical. Encouraging and aiding such efforts is far more important than advancing the image of the US or Western states or trying to shape local and regional attitudes through Western public diplomacy.
- *Avoid generalizing about Muslims:* generalizing Islam as a source of violence and discriminating against Muslims in the west can alienate “uncommitted” Muslims.
- *Demonizing any part of Islam will aid extremists:* The problem of terrorism is not the problem of “puritan” or “Wahabi” Islam, but the attitude of violence and intolerance of politically motivated groups that exploit religious teaching to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their recruits and followers. To defeat these groups, their motivations need to be understood and fought at their roots. E.g. Al-Qaida’s goal of ruling the “Arabian Peninsula.”

# The Role of the West in the Clash Within Civilization III

- *Avoid supporting “secularism” against “traditionalism:”* The region has seen its share of failed governance systems. Most efforts to secularize have failed and the US should not be seen as a driving force behind what may be assured failure. Moreover, the word “secularism” translate into “elmaniyah” is often intermingled with “atheism.”
- *Don’t try to divide and conquer:* The West should stay clear of issues like Sunni-Shiite frictions, and taking sides with ethic and sectarian groups. It does not serve anyone when they’re played against each other. The Iran-Iraq War was a perfect example of how interfering can backfire. The US should avoid playing any role that could encourage such divisions, particularly given the current environment in Iraq.
- *Liberalism vs. counter-terrorism:* The liberty democratic societies afford people is sometimes the same tool extremists use to spread their hateful ideology. The west must be careful in advocating immediate liberalization and freedom of speech of the Middle East.
- *Apply a single set of standards to Western and regional counterterrorism:* Do what you preach and preach what you do. The West and specifically the US should void being seen as supporting violation of human rights and abusive security measures in counter-terrorism, which advocating human freedom. Violence by states against civilians be it Russia, Egypt, or Israel should be equally condemned.