

**Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,  
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia**

***U.S. STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN:  
ACHIEVING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE  
GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES***

A Statement by

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you on an issue that has reached a crisis point. The president and his new national security adviser have both said that “we are not winning.” Others have talked about a “stalemate.”

Let’s be more frank: we may be winning tactical battles, but we are clearly losing the war, and 2009 and 2010 will be years of crisis.

Under the right circumstances, and with the right resources and implementation, President Obama’s proposed shifts in strategy may well be enough to win the war. It is up to this Congress to fully exercise its role in ensuring that resources are adequate and are being used to win, and that we do not again fall into the trap of lying to ourselves about what is happening. For seven years, we have overpromised and underperformed. We have spun what is happening into victory while the enemy has gained, and we have sent men and women home in body bags. It is time to underpromise and overperform.

The trends in Afghanistan are not good. The decline in our position can be measured in crude terms by looking at the trends in violence, although our count ignores many of the most critical trends in Afghan-on-Afghan violence and are far more accurate in some parts of the country than in others.

Some of these trends are shown in the maps and charts attached to this testimony. Others are clear in even the most basic statistics.

- The average monthly number of major incidents rose from only 50 in 2002 to 80 in 2003, 150 in 2005, 425 in 2006, and 566 in 2007. Suicide bombings rose from 1 in 2001 and 0 in 2002 to 2 in 2003, 6 in 2004, 21 in 2005, 123 in 2006, and 160 in 2007, and reached just over 120 by the end of the first six months of 2008.
- The number of IEDs and roadside bombs rose from 22 in 2002 to 83 in 2003, 325 in 2004, 782 in 2005, 1,931 in 2006, and 2,615 in 2007, although the number of effective IED attacks remained low.
- The number of attacks in the peak month in each year rose from 400 in 2005 to 800 in 2006 and 1,000 in 2007, and reach 1,000 in September 2008.
- Attacks causing at least one death rose from 366 in 2005 to 695 in 2006 and 892 in 2007, and the number killed, injured, or kidnapped rose from 1,540 in 2005 to 3,557 in 2006 and 4,672 in 2007. Peak monthly U.S. casualties (killed and wounded) rose from less than 20 from 2002 to 2003 to the mid-30s in 2004, 70 in 2005 and 2006, and 130 in 2007.
- These figures rose by roughly a third between 2007 and 2008, as the NATO/ISAF figures attached to this analysis show.

- During 2008, there was a 33% increase in kinetic events or military clashes, a 27% increase in indirect fire attacks, and a 67% increase in surface to air fire.
- In 2008 the number of IED attacks—the most serious source of casualties—rose by 27%. There was a 119% increase in the number of attacks on government of Afghanistan personnel, and 50% rise in kidnappings and assassinations. The number of suicide attacks dropped by 5%, but their lethality and skill increased, and so did estimates of the number of suicide bombers in training. The number of NATO/ISAF deaths rose by 35%, and civilian deaths rose by 40 to 46%.
- The situation deteriorated further in late 2008 and early 2009, in part because the weather permitted more Jihadist movement. Clashes and attacks in the first two months of 2009 were twice the numbers as during the same period in 2008. They surged by 131% in the eastern province of Kunar relative to the same month in 2008, highlighting the growth of the threat in the east as well as in the south.
- This situation continued to deteriorate in March. U.S. forces reported that “kinetic activity” in eastern Afghanistan increased by 68 percent this year compared to the same 80-or-so-day span last year. In the two provinces bordering Pakistan’s Waziristan Provinces, violence involving Western troops is up 90 percent, and attacks rose by 130% in the area across from the Mohmand and Bajaur tribal areas—where the Pakistani military claimed the Taliban had “lost.”

The US and her allies continue to win every tactical engagement. The fact is, however, that tactical victories are irrelevant if the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan continue, if the insurgency gathers strength, and if the insurgency steadily expands its areas of influence. We are fighting a battle of political attrition on the enemy’s terms, and they are winning.

U.S. and UN intelligence maps that were issued or leaked during 2005 to 2007, and more recent NATO/ISAF maps issued in January 2009, show that the size of the high-risk areas inside Afghanistan have increased by 30% to 50% every year since 2005. Kabul is scarcely under siege, but it has turned from a city where NATO/ISAF and aid personnel could wander as tourists to one so filled with violence that the U.S. and foreign compounds have become the equivalent of a “Green Zone.” There has been a particularly serious increase in violence in the Afghan-Pakistan border area. There were 431 insurgent attacks in the Khyber border area during January to November 2007, and 625 during the same period in 2008—an increase of 45%.

The president recognized these realities in his speech on March 27, and he advanced a range of concepts that may be able to address them. Let me stress, however, that these were concepts and not a strategy. The president took immediate steps to confirm the deployment of 17,000 more troops and provide some 4,000 more advisers to develop Afghan security forces—advisers that our commanders in the field have needed for more than three years.

He raised the need for more proactive contributions to the fighting by the Afghan and Pakistani governments. He talked about a far better focused and honest aid effort and more aid to Pakistan. He put a critical new emphasis on diplomacy in dealing with both governments and with neighboring states.

He also called for a major shift from our present focus on tactical victories to holding territory, providing Afghans with lasting security, and rushing in civilian advisers to provide jobs, better governance, and development in the field. Put differently, he called for a shift to the “clear, hold, and build” tactics that recognize that counterinsurgency is won at the local level and can never be won by military means.

Those who helped draft these concepts know, however, that they are still concepts. They also do not guarantee victory, even in the sense of destroying al Qaeda and other jihadist power, bring some stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and largely replace our forces and allied forces with Afghan and Pakistani forces.

The administration’s shift in strategy, if properly resourced and implemented, can win the war. Our enemies are still relatively weak and heavily dependent on paid part-time fighters and exploiting the power vacuum left by too few NATO/ISAF troops and half-willing, half-able Afghan and Pakistan governments. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hekmatyar, Haqqani, and all of their ilk are extreme and unpopular.

The odds are better than even, but they are not good. We face two to three years of bitter fighting to come. We will probably not score significant gains in 2009, and we will need to be involved in armed nation building well beyond the president’s present term and phase into post-conflict reconstruction activities that may well extend beyond 2018. If we are not prepared and willing to this, we will almost certainly lose. Moreover, this is our war. Our allies and host country partners are critical, but it is our actions and resources that will determine whether we win or lose.

Moreover, and this is critical, the president did not really advance a “strategy”:

- There are no clear benchmarks for action, progress, or to measure success.
- We do not yet have a clear plan for using U.S. troops, improving the role of our allies, and solving NATO’s command and caveat problems.
- We do not have a plan or schedule for bringing in the civilian expertise we need in the field or recasting a corrupt and ineffective aid program to put the resources in Afghanistan and where they can defeat the enemy.
- We don’t have a budget or a long-term spending plan; we will have to fall back on supplementals for at least one more year.
- We do not have a detailed plan to build up credible Afghan security forces, to create a fully effective army of the size that is needed, or to correct the near disaster that has failed to produce an effective Afghan National Police. The core of the program may now be there, but the resources are not.

- We do not have a plan to use Afghans to provide the level of local and provincial governance, development, and rule of law that will ultimately be as critical to success as creating effective Afghan forces.
- We do not have a clear plan to implement tied aid to Pakistan, to get Pakistan to play the necessary role in FATA and the Baluchi border area, or to persuade its leaders, its military, and its people that this war is as critical to them—if not more so—than it is to us.
- Our top intelligence and policy officials admit that we do not yet have the range of metrics to fully understand what is happening and measure success or failure.

Let me stress the fact that I believe we may well be able to develop these capabilities—particularly the Afghan part. We do, however, need to stop talking concepts and create real facts on the ground, and we cannot wait to do this perfectly and in ways that deploy as many accountants as troops. We need to operate on the principle that there are no good intentions, there are only successful actions.

And this brings me to my conclusion. The Congress has four critical roles to perform.

- First, it must decide whether it is as committed to this war as our president. It needs to accept the cost, the risk, and recognize that losing is not an exit strategy, it is defeat. It needs to recognize that killing bin Laden without “win, hold, build” will probably only create a martyr, and that there is no way to inflict a lasting defeat on al Qaeda if you leave a power vacuum in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. It needs to understand that any perceived defeat threatens the future of a nuclear Pakistan, will greatly strengthen jihadists throughout the world, and ultimately end in moving the conflict somewhere else.
- Second, it needs to get critical resources forward and focus on when they actually arrive and whether they meet the need. This is not the time to temporize, delay, or create a long list of legislative milestones. That can come, but not before 2010 at the earliest. We need to move enough resources to give the president and our forces the initiative and the ability to act, and we needed to do it in 2005.
- Third, the Congress needs to look forward to fully exercising its role in ensuring that resources are adequate, and are being used to win. Congress must ensure that progress reporting on Afghanistan is honest, and that we do not again fall into the trap of lying to ourselves about what is happening.
- Fourth, Congress needs to demand that a real, detailed strategy is ready this summer, and it needs to demand honest reporting and real measures of effectiveness. It needs to push the administration into showing it is fully supporting our commanders with the resources they need and into cleaning up the mess that is coming out of far too many U.S., UN, allied, and NGO economic aid efforts. It then needs to insist on regular reviews of our strategy and its effectiveness.


But with all due respect, let me suggest there are things the Congress should not do. It should not make counternarcotics reform, or mid- and long-term development goals and political and social reform, until we have made far more military progress. It should not legislate diplomacy in the form of sanctions or deadlines. It should not try to mandate an exit strategy without a destination. It should not try to turn the chaos of war into an accounting exercise where the focus is how the

last dollar was spent rather than on how to spend in ways that are effective. It should not attempt to micromanage operations or visit our commanders to the point where Codels become a new threat.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, and I look forward to your questions.





## UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2005 versus 2007



Source: Senlis Council. "Afghanistan, Decision Point 2008", London, 2008, p. 27;


## UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones: 2008



**Rise in Afghan Violence:****2002-2007 Average Annual Monthly Incidents**



## Security Summary: February 2009



Except for the two items with asterisks, the source of information on this slide is the NATO JOIIS database.

\* Source: ABC News / BBC / ARD Poll conducted 30 Dec 08 – 12 Jan 09 and published on 9 Feb 09.

\*\* Source: CSTC-A.

40% of Afghans say country headed in right direction, 38% say headed in wrong direction\*

For Jan and Feb 09, 80% of kinetic events occurred in 11% of the districts

### Feb09 vs. Previous 3 Months' Average (i.e. Nov08-Jan09)

INS Initiated Attacks: +12% ↑  
IED Events: -15% ↓ (57% of all casualties since Jan 07)  
Attacks on GIRoA: -37% ↓  
Suicide Attacks: +3% ↑  
Kidnappings/Assassinations: +20% ↑  
ISAF Deaths: +21% ↑  
ANSF Deaths: -27% ↓  
Civilian Deaths: +9% ↑


### Building Host Nation Capacity:\*\*

ANA: 77 total Kandak BNs formed  
47 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD  
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded


Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## Insurgent Activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan: 2007



Source: Senlis Council, “Stumbling into Chaos, Afghanistan on the Brink.” November 2007, p. 8.


## Taliban Presence in November 2008



Source: ICOS, "The Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance," December 2008, p.9.


## Insurgency vs. GIRoA Influence

“Between the Anti-Government Elements (AGE)\* and the Government, who has more influence in your area?”



Source: NATO/ISAF “Metrics Brief February 2009.” Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.


## Transportation Infrastructure



Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.



## Insurgent Attacks




Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 –Jan 09), insurgent attacks are up 12% overall:

- Direct Fire attacks are up 54%
- Indirect Fire attacks are down 32%
- IEDs are down 15%
- Surface to Air Fire is down 50%
- Mild weather, increased troop strength, and an offensive spirit resulted in significantly more kinetic events this winter
- Insurgents shifting tactics toward softer targets

Adapted From: NATO/ISAF “Metrics Brief February 2009.” Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## IED Events (Found and Detonated)




- Comparing Feb 09 to the previous three month period (Nov 08 –Jan 09):
- Total IED events were down 15%
- Total casualties from IED events were down 26%(for ISAF, IED casualties down 45%)
- For the 3-month period ending Feb 09 relative to the same period ending Feb 08, discoveries (IED finds by ISAF / ANSF plus turn-ins by local nationals) were up 66%
- Since January 2007, discoveries account for 52%of all IED events

Adapted from: NATO/ISAF “Metrics Brief February 2009.” Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.




## Civilian Deaths



Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## Military Deaths \*


- Comparing Feb 09 to the previous 3 month period (Nov 08 – Jan 09) :
  - Total military deaths are down 21%
  - ANSF deaths are down 29% (though ANA deaths are up 21%)
  - ISAF deaths are up 21%



\*Attributed to insurgent initiated attacks (direct fire, indirect fire, IEDs, and surface-to-air fire)

Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## ANA Size and Capability




Source: CSTC-A

- ANA Increasingly Conducting and Leading Operations (56% in last 90 days)
- 95 of 160 units fielded; 82,781 assigned (will grow to 134,000 by Dec 2011)
- ANA Air Corps have over tripled monthly troop and cargo capacity since Feb 08
- Air Corps flying 90% of all Afghan missions

Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## Healthcare


Community Health Workers



	Under five Mortality rate	Children % not growing normally
Afghanistan	19.1	45
Algeria	4.9	6
Ghana	10	25
Kenya	12.2	23
Malaysia	0.5	18
Morocco	4.4	9
Peru	3.9	8
Sudan	10.7	17
Uzbekistan	6.9	19

Source: WSSCC WASH


Nationwide Results



Source: MRA, ANQAR 2.0, Dec 08





*How would you rate the quality of the healthcare available in your area?"*

Results by Province



Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## Education



Source: NATO/ISAF "Metrics Brief February 2009." Strategic Advisory Group, HQ ISAF. March, 2009.

## The Challenge of Reporting on the War

New NATO/ISAF reporting that maps and charts the course of the war in Afghanistan is now available provides important insight into the trends in the war in Afghanistan, and show the situation at the point the President announces his new strategy. It is important to note, however, that many of the "favorable" trends are favorable because they use a 90 day rolling average as a basis of comparison for February statistics which means they reflect a downward trend in threat activity because they compare the worst winter months for fighting with an earlier period where fighting is more intense. NATO indicates that it will return to comparing rolling trends to a similar timeframe in 2008 from March onwards. These comparisons of multiple years are far more useful than comparisons of one sequential period to another in a highly seasonal war.

### The Limits to the Analysis We Have

The new NATO/ISAF data are extremely helpful, and do a much better job of explaining the tactical situation. At the same time, they fall short of providing meaningful transparency into what is a war of political attrition fought in two different countries, and what is really happening in the political and economic dimensions.

NATO/ISAF does not map the combined situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there are serious limits on the scope of its analysis which still focuses on the tactical or "kinetic" situation, and which does not cover NATO/ISAF's ability to provide lasting security or "hold" capabilities, and the level of aid and development or "build" capabilities. Security is also an issue.

These data are also more favorable in describing Jihadist influence and activity than the UN estimates and maps and those of groups like the Senlis Council, although this does not mean that they are not correct. As a result, one UN and two Senlis maps are added to the NATO/ISAF data.

Even these data understate the scale of the problem since they do not count all the Afghan on Afghan violence that does not attack government officials and forces, and kidnappings, night letters, and Taliban attacks on Afghan civilians have spread to cover nearly half of the country. The UN rates nearly half the country as unsafe for movement by aid workers not supported by troops, and security has deteriorated sharply in Kabul, particularly in the last year. The level of violence, incidents, and casualties continues to rise, as does the frequency and intensity of combat. A new threat has also developed to US and NATO/ISAF lines of supply, as well as imports from Pakistan, during 2008. This is critical because at least 60% of all supplies come from ports in Pakistan across the border in the Khyber and FATA areas.

While detailed NATO/ISAF and US maps that show the growth of Taliban, Hekmatyar, and Haqqani areas of influence are classified, it is clear from unclassified briefings that these insurgent groups continue to expand their influence at the local level. Although they are controversial, estimates by the International Council on Security and Development (formerly the Senlis Council) indicate that the:<sup>1</sup>

Taliban now holds a permanent presence in 72% of Afghanistan, up from 54% a year ago. Taliban forces have advanced from their southern heartlands, where they are now the de facto governing power in a number of towns and villages, to Afghanistan's western and north-western provinces, as well as provinces north of Kabul. Within a year, the Taliban's permanent presence in the country has increased by a startling 18%. Three out of the four main highways into Kabul are now compromised by Taliban activity. The capital city has plummeted to minimum levels of control, with the Taliban and other criminal elements infiltrating the city at will.

The increase in their geographic spread illustrates that the Taliban's political, military and economic strategies are now more successful than the West's in Afghanistan. Confident in their expansion beyond the rural south, the Taliban is at the gates of the capital and infiltrating the city at will. Of the four doors leading out of Kabul, three are now compromised by Taliban activity. The roads to the west, towards the Afghan National Ring Road through Wardak to Kandahar have become unsafe for Afghan or international travel by the time travelers reach the entrance to Wardak province, which is about thirty minutes from the city limits.

The road south to Logar is no longer safe for Afghan or international travel. The road east to Jalalabad is not safe for Afghan or international travel once travelers reach the Sarobi Junction which is about an hour outside of the city. Of the two roads leaving the city to the north only one – the road towards the Panjshir valley, Salang tunnel and Mazar – is considered safe for Afghan and international travel. The second road towards the north that leads to the Bagram Air Base is frequently used by foreign and military convoys and subject to insurgent attacks.

By blocking the doors to the city in this way, the Taliban insurgents are closing a noose around the city and establishing bases close to the city from which to launch attacks inside it. Using these bases, the Taliban and insurgent attacks in Kabul have increased dramatically – including kidnapping of Afghans and foreigners, various bomb attacks and assassinations. This dynamic has created a fertile environment for criminal activity. The links between the Taliban and criminals are increasing and the lines between the various violent actors becoming blurred. All of these Taliban successes are forcing the Afghan government and the West to the negotiating table.

The Taliban are now dictating terms in Afghanistan, both politically and militarily. At the national level, talk of reconciliation and power sharing between undefined moderate elements of the Taliban movement and elected government officials is commonplace. At a local level, the Taliban is maneuvering skillfully to fill the governance void, frequently offering a mellower version of localized leadership than characterized their last stint in power.

At the same time, the Afghan government remains absent or ineffective in much of the country, most foreign aid has no practical impact on the security and stability of threatened areas, and the

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<sup>1</sup> See International Council on Security and development, *Struggle For Kabul: The Taliban Advance*, December 2008, pp. 3-5



combination of US, NATO/ISAF, and Afghan security forces is far too small to secure the countryside. Refugee problems and poverty are made worse by the problem of both personal and organized crime. While narcotics output is down -- largely because of a saturated market and dropping street price as well as drought issues -- it remains a key part of the national economy and a force behind both crime and corruption.

These problems are compounded by the situation in Pakistan. The Pakistani Army and government have not provided reliable reporting on military operations or a meaningful assessment of the growth of the threat inside Pakistan. Whatever the Pakistani military may have been, the steady politicization of Pakistan's military forces since Zia has left it largely an inept flatland army steadily more focused on internal control and whose finances and use of outside aid have become progressively more suspect. Few unclassified or reliable data are available on the expansion of Islamist extremist influence and control in the FATA (tribal areas) along the Afghan-Pakistan border in the east, but it is clear that this region has become the center of Al Qaeda operations. Furthermore, it seems apparent that near sanctuaries exist for two increasingly independent centers of Taliban activity as well as the Hekmatyar and Haqqani movements.

### **The Scope of the Analysis We Need**

If we are to win this war, we need a far greater degree of transparency, and a recognition that the war is extremely complex, that it cannot be solved by focusing on one element or country, and the use of information and metrics can be used both to show the need for sacrifice and sustained effort, and to put pressure of those who do not perform, in ways that can offset any negative impacts for disclosing such data to the enemy.

This does not mean disclosing sources and method, or truly sensitive data that could compromise operations or strategy. But, the Congress, media, and analysts, need a clear picture of the war that they can believe in. They do not need spin. They need data that show why this is a "long war," the impact of new tactics and forces, and that ties military action to aid. They need reporting that shows whether NATO/ISAF forces, military trainers and embeds, and aid workers have the level of resources required. They need reporting that shows the extent to which both Afghan and Pakistani forces and governments are active in the fight.

To be specific, a fully meaningful picture of developments would have to provide the following additional information:

1. A matching picture of the situation in Pakistan, and one that located and characterized the role of key threat forces in Pakistan, their strength, growth in areas of influence, and ties to other Jihadist and extremist movements.

2. Summary data on Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps activity to show the Pakistani military level of activity, and maps showing the scope and level of Pakistani civil government and aid activity. These need to be broken out in detail to cover the FATA and Baluchi border areas.

3. Security trends affecting NATO's key supply routes through Afghanistan and Pakistan.

4. Data that support an understanding of the key non-military elements of success in a counterinsurgency strategy.

- Key economic trends with an emphasis on the south, east, Kabul, and Kandahar, FATA, and the Baluchi border area.
- There needs to be a focus on key sectors affecting the insurgency, the motivation of young men, and the “build” aspects of operations, such as
  - Employment, status of agriculture, urban migration, etc.
  - Ratings of local governance.
  - Ratings of local police and rule of law.
  - Maps of PRT areas of operation and influence.
  - Maps show actual flow of aid expenditure in key provinces.
  - Detailed analysis of aid flows and impact that tie such activity clearly to its impact on warfighting.
- Polling of relevant Afghan and Pakistani attitudes towards Jihadist movement by movement, activity, and location – including negative and positive reactions.

5. ANA and ANP charts that show force growth against force goals, and ANP readiness. Similar data need to be developed for the Pakistani Frontier Corps and relevant elements of the Pakistani Army.

6. ANA and ANP, and Pakistani Frontier Corps and Pakistani Army, charts that show expanding areas of operation. These maps should show how ANSF forces are expanding their areas of operation and serve as metrics of operational success in giving “win” and “hold” an Afghan face. The same is needed for Pakistani forces.

7. Breakouts that show similar data in more detail for the East and South and that show activity in both Afghanistan and Pakistan relative to maps of location of the insurgent groups.

8. Data that show the threat in non-kinetic terms, that characterize each key element separately -- including the role of Al Qa’ida and foreign volunteers – as it exists and operates in both Afghanistan and Pakistan:

- Descriptions of activity, ideology, estimated force size, and objectives by individual movement and that define and characterize the threat.
- Divisions in the Taliban by area of operation should be clearly shown and characterized. The same is needed for the Hekmatyar and Haqqani groups.
- A detailed section is needed on Al Qaeda and foreign volunteers to highlight the continuing threat of international terrorism and regional impacts.
- Maps that counterbalance the UN maps and show the area and level of Jihadist influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan by district and how they have expanded and contracted since 2005. Detailed breakouts should be provided for the East and South
- Maps that show areas where Jihadists conduct operations against the local population – including breakouts of activity in addition to casualties that cover night letters, killings of tribal leaders, kidnappings, and the broader patterns of Jihadist violence.
- A summary analysis and mapping of levels of activity and influence in key cities like Kabul and Kandahar.
- Maps and charts by Jihadist element show growth in areas of influence and operation, breaking Kinetic activity out by movement, and describing goals and methods. These data should clearly cover both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- Summary maps and metrics that cover crime and narcotics and show the overlap – if any – with Jihadist activity.
- Polling of Afghan and Pakistani attitudes towards Jihadist movement by movement, activity, and location – including negative and positive reactions.

9. An analysis of NATO air and UCAV strikes that shows levels of fixed and rotary wing activity, estimated casualty effects, and ties strikes clearly to levels of success in striking at Taliban and other Jihadist cadres. NATO/ISAF need to explain and justify the air dimension of the war. I'd also add a summary slide here showing how the US and NATO/ISAF screen attack requests and the level of restraint and care in rules of engagement (ROEs).

10. Summary reporting on which elements of NATO are actually in the fight:

- Measures of activity by NATO/ISAF country in the field
- Data on the growth of forces, aid workers, and aid by country; and
- Maps of PRT areas of operation versus PRT location.
- Open reporting of member country caveats and problems in using national forces effectively, and of limits to aid and PRT activity that keep such activity too local and limited to be effective.
- Polling of Afghan and Pakistani attitudes towards US, NATO/ISAF, Afghan government, and Pakistani government activity – including negative reactions to the use of force.

11. Analysis of aid efforts that clearly recognizes the fact that this is armed nation building during a state of war, and not post-conflict reconstruction. Like every other aspect of

counterinsurgency, aid and development “is local.” It either supports a “win, hold, build” strategy or it doesn’t.

- Maps that show what level of aid actually reaches into key threat and high-risk areas, which provides, and estimated effect.
- Reporting that focuses almost exclusively on auditing how aid is spent by function and location with measures of effectiveness clearly tie to “win, hold, build” impact.
- Polling of Afghan and Pakistani attitudes towards aid activity – including negative reactions to the use of force.
- Summary analysis of aid activity by country, NGO, and UN element that rates effectiveness, actual flow of money into activity in country, and that separately names groups and individuals believed to be ineffective or corrupt.

12. Open analysis of the success or failure of key elements of Afghan and Pakistani government activity that puts direct pressure on both governments to act, eliminate the corrupt and inept, use aid honestly and effectively, avoid ties to narcotics, and avoid covert links to Jihadist forces like those of the Pakistani ISI.

- Maps that show what level of government activity actually reaches into key threat and high-risk areas, which provides, and estimated effect.
- Reporting that focuses almost exclusively on auditing how aid is spent by function and location with measures of effectiveness clearly tie to “win, hold, build” impact.
- Polling of Afghan and Pakistani attitudes towards, Afghan government, and Pakistani government activity.
- Summary analysis of activity by province and high threat or key that rates effectiveness, actual flow of money into activity in country, and that separately names groups and individuals believed to be ineffective or corrupt.