

**EDWARD N. LUTTWAK**  
SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
ADD: 4510 Drummond Avenue, Chevy Chase MD 20815 USA.  
Tel. 301 656 1972 Fax 301 907 8164  
[eluttwak@hotmail.com](mailto:eluttwak@hotmail.com)

STATEMENT of Edward N. Luttwak before the Committee on  
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate , Hearings on “ Securing America’s  
Interest in Iraq: the remaining options”  
Tuesday , January 23, 2007

#### SUMMARY

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views on this most important issue. It is an honor to do so, especially now that the prudent and bipartisan leadership of Senator Biden and Senator Lugar further enhance the authority of this committee.

I am convinced that disengagement is the best course of action for the United States, for Iraq, and indeed for the region as a whole, which like Iraq itself, must find its own equilibrium to attain stability.

Further, I believe that disengagement is the only course of action that is sustainable over time, as opposed to troop surges or any other temporary expedient.

**Disengagement is not withdrawal.**

It is not the leap in the dark of simple abandonment. US troops would no longer patrol towns and villages, would no longer conduct cordon-and-search operations, they would no longer man or over-watch outposts and check-points. But not all US troops would be withdrawn from Iraq.

Significant US forces, including ground troops, would remain within safe bases in Iraq to support the elected government, to deter foreign invasions, to dissuade visible foreign intrusions, and strike at any targetable concentrations of hostiles, including Jihadis should they emerge. Suitable bases would include at least one of the four airports within or near Baghdad, if not the ex-Saddam international airport, and the "Green Zone" at least for a while, as well as desert bases--which already exist.

Normal logistic supply would be by air --there is already a daily C-130 shuttle service from Kuwait. Transporter convoys for tracked and other heavy vehicles would be rare.

At present, the logistic supply of our very dispersed forces by helicopters as well as truck convoys accounts for a large proportion of total costs (including contractor-protected civilian truck convoys).

Transport by road specifically accounts for most of our casualties, directly inasmuch as convoys are preferred targets, and indirectly because troops operating or overwatching check-points are themselves especially vulnerable.

### *Disengagement would not increase the violence*

Only disengagement can reduce the violence in the long run, by generating the political reactions discussed below. .

But this does not mean that disengagement would significantly increase violence in the short run. Indeed it could not do so.

The reason is that the total number of US troops in Iraq -- including the "surge" - is so small, and their linguistic and other police skills are so limited, that US troops have but little effect on day-to-day security. They cannot protect Iraqis from one another, because their presence in any one location merely displaces attacks to another location --unless our soldiers are attacked themselves, which is a sad way indeed of reducing Iraqi casualties.

As all know by now, the US has never had enough troops to secure the Baghdad metropolis, let alone Iraq as a whole. The NYPD has an authorized uniformed strength of 37,838, while US "rifle" strength in Iraq (as opposed to overhead) has never been more than twice that -- whereas by standard criteria it should be ten times larger or more. The often quoted requirement of at least 400,000 ground troops within Iraq was and is an impossibility, for it would require a combined pre-deployment, deployed, and post-deployment total of 1.2 million. As compared to such numbers, the planned "surge" is insignificantly small.

### *The tactical level: counterinsurgency as malpractice*

Crippling tactical limitations inherent to the situation in Iraq would make even 400,000 troops insufficient. Our troops are fine combat soldiers, structured and trained to fight against "high-contrast" enemies they can detect, identify, locate and strike. Our troops are not and cannot become an Arabic-speaking Mesopotamian constabulary. They cannot casually stop to chat at street corners to sense attack warnings, and collect intelligence on the enemy. .

Nor are they receiving timely and accurate information from US or Iraqi intelligence organizations--- there are just too many insurgent groups and they are far too unstable for penetration to work in the usual way.

Therefore, our troops cannot patrol or outpost effectively ---they are acting blind. Likewise, the high-quality raiding units in Iraq can only go into action very rarely, because it is only very rarely that they receive timely target Intelligence.

Intelligence is to counterinsurgency what firepower is to conventional warfare – and we just do not have it, making the sacrifices of our troops on the ground mostly futile. That is what disengagement would reduce: futile rather than effective operations.

### *Why disengage ?*

The US has been interposed between Arab Sunni and Arab Shia . That has de-responsibilized the Arab Shia majority to such an extent that some Shia, notably the Jaysh Al-Madhi, have felt free to attack American and other coalition troops even while those same troops were primarily protecting the Arab Shia as a whole, against Arab Sunni attacks. Other Shia groups that have not attacked us but have simply pursued their own purely factional aims, while relying on the US to ensure Shia rule.

For many if not most Arab Sunnis on the other hand, the US must be the enemy because it upholds majority rule, while they are a minority population that nevertheless believes itself to be uniquely entitled to rule Iraq. As all know by now, for even moderately fundamentalist Sunnis, the Shia are disqualified from political power because under Muslim law only Muslims may rule a Muslim state--while the Shia for them are heretics. The Salafist subset among the fundamentalists notoriously goes beyond that, defining Shias as apostates, a capital offense in all orthodox interpretations of Muslim law.

Therefore, to now add US troops would increase this harmful interposition, further de-responsibilizing the Shia majority. By contrast, with disengagement, both Arab Shia and Arab Sunnis would become responsible for their own security, as the Kurds have been all along. That would force the Arab Shia factions, including their rival militias, to stabilize relations among themselves, and them with the Arab Sunnis. That may involve violence as well as talks and some population movements, but all three have been underway already, and there really is no saying which would be more favored by a reduction of the US footprint in Iraq. The violence so far has been tragic indeed, but it has also separated previously mixed populations, reducing the motives and opportunities for further violence. It is time for the Iraqis to make their own history --and that does not mean that the bloodshed will increase.

### *Why not simply withdraw ?*

With disengagement, Iraq's elected government and frontiers can be safeguarded by few troops at moderate cost. By contrast, to simply withdraw all US forces would needlessly abandon Iraq to chaos, and to America's worst enemies. It would be an irresponsible leap in the dark

### *Why the risks in Iraq and the region around it are much smaller than they seem*

It was the ambitious project of the Bush Administration to transform the entire Middle East, by remaking Iraq into an irresistible model of prosperous democracy.

Having failed in that worthy purpose, it has inadvertently achieved something else that can serve US interests quite well: without wishing too, the US has activated rival forces inside Iraq and across the region --the Sunni states viz the "Shia crescent" of Iran, Shia-Iraq, Syria and the Hezbollah of Lebanon.

Because the Shia inside Iraq need US support, as do the Sunni states outside Iraq to contain the "Shia crescent", the US could now control both Iraq and much of the region with very little force and some competent diplomacy .

"Divide and rule" is the hostile depiction of such statecraft , and historically its goal was empire on the cheap.

Nobody wanted this, but US policy should recognize the new realities. Just by acting very naturally to safeguard our interests we will be balancing hostile forces against each other, achieving stability at a much lower cost in US blood and treasure. .

What past imperial statesmen strove for with much cunning and cynicism, the Bush Administration has engendered inadvertently. But the result is exactly the same, and it does make large US forces in place redundant, and even counter-productive..

Also submitted for the record :

1. Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement ;
2. Counter-insurgency as Malpractice

Edward N. Luttwak

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Given all that has happened in Iraq to date, the best strategy for United States is disengagement. This would call for the careful planning and scheduling of the withdrawal of American forces from much of the country --while making due provisions for sharp punitive strikes against any attempts to harass the withdrawing forces. But it would primarily require an intense diplomatic effort, to prepare and conduct parallel negotiations with several parties inside Iraq and out. All have much to lose or gain depending on exactly how the American withdrawal is carried out, and this gives Washington a great deal of leverage that should be used to advance American interests.

The United States cannot threaten to unleash anarchy in Iraq in order to obtain concessions from others, nor can it make transparently conflicting promises about the country's future to different parties. But once it has declared its firm commitment to withdraw -- or perhaps, given the widespread conviction that the United States entered Iraq to exploit its resources, once visible physical preparations for an evacuation have begun--the calculus of other parties must change. In a reversal of the usual sequence, the American hand will be strengthened by withdrawal, and Washington may well be able to lay the groundwork for a reasonably stable Iraq. Nevertheless, if key Iraqi factions or Iraq's neighbors are too short-sighted or blinded by resentment to cooperate in their own best interests, the withdrawal should still proceed, with the United States making such favorable or unfavorable arrangements for each party as will most enhance the future credibility of American diplomacy.

The United States has now abridged its vastly ambitious project of creating a veritable Iraqi democracy to pursue the much more realistic aim of conducting some sort of general election. In the meantime, however, it has persisted in futile combat against factions that should be confronting one another instead. A strategy of disengagement would require bold, risk-taking statecraft of a high order, and much diplomatic competence in its execution. But it would be soundly based on the most fundamental of realities: geography alone ensures all other parties are far more exposed to the dangers of an anarchical Iraq than the United States itself.

#### Precedents

If Iraq could indeed be transformed into a successful democracy by a more prolonged occupation, as Germany and Japan were after 1945, then of course any disengagement would be a great mistake. In both of those countries, however, by the time of the American occupation the populations were already well educated and thoroughly disenthralled from violent ideologies, and so they eagerly collaborated with their occupiers to construct democratic institutions. Unfortunately, because of the hostile sentiments of the Iraqi population, the relevant precedents for Iraq are far different.

The very word guerilla acquitted its present meaning from the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain and the Indies presented a draft constitution that for the first time in the Spain's history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and the church. Ecclesiastical overlords still owned 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe's most wretched tenants. Yet the Spanish peasantry did not rise to demand the immediate implementation of the new constitution. Instead, they obeyed the priests who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. For Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that mattered for most Spaniards-- not what was proposed but by whom. Actually, by then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were massacred by the very peasants and plebeians they wanted to emancipate, mustered into a militia of the "Holy Faith" by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally scion of Calabria's largest land-owning family. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all promises of merely material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan. Spain's clergy repeated Ruffo's feat, and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first clause of Joseph's draft constitution had declared the Roman Apostolic Catholic church the only one allowed in Spain.

The same dynamic is playing itself out in Iraq now, down to the ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the draft constitution and the emergence of truculent clerical warlords. Since the invasion in 2003, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their mostly "Christian" allies are in Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland as well as to steal the country's oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy--except for women's rights, which are promoted in earnest, the clerics say, to induce Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families by aping the shameless disobedience of Western women. The vast majority of Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers and semi-literate at best, naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely incomprehensible--that foreigners have been unselfishly expending their own blood and treasure to help them. As opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, accordingly, Americans and their allies are widely hated as the worst of invaders, out to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil, but also of their religion and even their family honor. The most direct and visible effects of these sentiments are the deadly attacks against the occupiers and their Iraqi auxiliaries, the aiding and abetting of such attacks, and their gleeful celebration by impromptu crowds of spectators. When

the victims are members of the Iraqi police or National Guard, as is often the case these days, bystanders, family members, and local clerics routinely accuse the Americans of being the attackers--usually by missile strikes that cleverly simulate car-bombs. As to why the Americans would want to kill Iraqis they are themselves recruiting, training, and paying, no explanation is offered, because no obligation is felt to unravel each and every sub-plot of the dark Christian conspiracy against Iraq, the Arab world, and Islam.

But it is the indirect effects of the insurgency that end whatever hopes of genuine democratization may still linger. The mass instruction of Germans and Japanese into the norms and modes of democratic governance, already much facilitated by pre-existing if imperfect democratic institutions, was advanced by mass media of all kinds as well as by countless educational efforts. The work was done by local teachers, preachers, journalists, and publicists who adopted as their own the democratic values proclaimed by the occupiers. But the locals were recruited, instructed, motivated, and guided by Occupation political officers, whose own cultural understanding was enhanced by much communing with ordinary Germans and Japanese.

In Iraq, none of this has occurred. An already difficult task has been made altogether impossible by the refusal of Iraqi teachers, journalists, and publicists--let alone preachers--to be instructed and instruct others in democratic ways. In any case, unlike Germany or Japan after 1945, Iraq after 2003 never became secure enough for Occupation personnel to operate effectively, let alone carry out mass political education in every city and town as was done in Germany and Japan.

### No Democrats, No Democracy

Of course, many Iraqis would deny the need for any such instruction, viewing democracy as a simple affair that any child can understand. That is certainly the opinion of the spokesmen of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for example. They have insistently advocated early elections in Iraq, brushing aside the need for procedural and substantive preparations as basic as the compilation of voter rolls, and seeing no need at all to allow time for the gathering of consensus by structured political parties. However moderate he may ostensibly be, the pronouncements attributed to Sistani reveal a confusion between democracy and the dictatorial rule of the majority, for they imply that whoever wins 50.01% of the vote should have all of the government's power. That much became clear when Sistani's spokesmen vehemently rejected Kurdish demands for constitutional guarantees of minority rights. Shiite majority rule could thus end up being as undemocratic as the traditional Sunni-Arab ascendancy.

The plain fact is that there are not enough aspiring democrats in Iraq to sustain democratic institutions. The Shiite majority includes cosmopolitan figures but by

far its greater part has expressed in every possible way a strong preference for clerical leadership. The clerics, in turn, reject any elected assembly that would be free to legislate without their supervision, and could thus legalize, for example, the drinking of alcohol or the freedom to change one's religion. The Sunni-Arab minority has dominated Iraq from the time it was formed into a state and its leaders have consistently rejected democracy in principle for they refuse to accept a subordinate status. As for the Kurds, they have administered their separate de facto autonomies with considerable success, but it is significant that they have not even attempted to hold elections for themselves, preferring clan and tribal loyalties to the individualism of representative democracy.

Accordingly, while elections of some kind can still be held on schedule, they are unlikely to be followed by the emergence of a functioning representative assembly, let alone an effective cohesive government of democratic temper. It follows that the United States has been depleting its military strength, diplomatic leverage and treasure in Iraq to pursue a worthy but unrealistic aim.

Yet Iraq cannot simply be evacuated, abandoning its occupation-sponsored government even if legitimized by elections, to face emboldened Ba'ath loyalists and plain Sunni-Arab revanchists with their many armed groups, local and foreign Islamists with their terrorist skills, and whatever Shia militias are left out of the government. In such a contest, the government, with its newly raised security forces of doubtful loyalty, is unlikely to prevail. Nor are the victors likely to peacefully divide the country among themselves, so that civil war of one kind or another would almost certainly follow. An anarchical Iraq would both threaten the stability of neighboring countries and offer opportunities for their interference – which might even escalate to the point of outright invasions by Iran or Turkey or both, initiating new cycles of resistance, repression, and violence.

### How to Avoid a Rout

The probable consequences of an abandonment of Iraq are so bleak that few are willing to contemplate them. That is a mistake, however: it is precisely because unpredictable mayhem is so predictable that the United States might be able to disengage from Iraq at little cost, or even perhaps advantageously.

To see how disengagement from Iraq might be achieved with few adverse effects, or even turned into something of a success, it is useful to approach its undoubted complications by first considering the much simpler case of a plain military retreat. A retreat is notoriously the most difficult of military operations to pull off successfully. At worst, it can degenerate into a disastrous rout. But a well-calculated retreat can not only extricate a force from a difficult situation, but in doing so actually turn the tide of battle by luring the enemy beyond the limits of its strength until it is overstretched, unbalanced, and ripe for defeat. In Iraq

the United States faces no single enemy army it can exhaust in this way, but rather a number of different enemies whose mutual hostility now lies dormant but could be catalyzed by a well-crafted disengagement.

Because Iraq is under foreign occupation, nationalist and pan-Arab sentiments currently prevail over denominational identities, inducing Sunni and Shiite Arabs to unite against the invaders. And so long as Iraqis of all kinds believe that the United States has no intention of withdrawing, they can attack American forces to express their nationalism or Islamism without calculating the consequences for themselves of a post-American Iraq. That is why Moktada al-Sadr's Shiite militia felt free to attack the U.S. troops that elsewhere were fighting Sunnis bent on restoring their ancestral supremacy, and why the action was applauded by the clerics and Shiite population at large. Yet if faced by the prospect of an imminent American withdrawal, Shiite clerics and their followers would have to confront the equally imminent threat of the Ba'ath loyalist and Sunni fighters--the only Iraqis with recent combat experience, and the least likely to accept Shiite clerical rule.

That is why, by moving to withdraw, the United States could secure what the occupation has never had, namely the active support of its greatest beneficiaries, the Shiite clerics and population at large. What Washington needs from them is a total cessation of violence against the Coalition throughout Iraq, full cooperation with the interim government in the conduct of elections, and the suspension of all forms of support for other resisters. Given that there is already some acquiescence and even cooperation, this would not require a full reversal in Shiite attitudes.

## The Neighbors

Iran, for its part, has much to fear from anarchy in Iraq, which would offer it more dangers than opportunities. At present, because the Iranians think the United States is determined to remain in Iraq no matter what, the hard-liners in Iran's government feel free to pursue their anti-American vendetta by political subversion, by arming and training al-Sadr's militia, and by encouraging the Syrians to favor the infiltration of Islamist terrorists into Iraq.

Yet anarchy in Iraq would threaten not merely Iran's stability but also its territorial integrity. Minorities account for more than half the population, yet the government of Iran is not pluralist at all. It functions as an exclusively Persian empire that suppresses all other ethnic identities and imposes the exclusive use of Farsi in public education, thus condemning all others to illiteracy in their mother tongues. Moreover, not only the Ba'hai but also more combative heterodox Muslims are now persecuted. Except for some Kurds and Azeris, no minority is actively rebellious as yet, but chaos in Iraq could energize communal loyalties in Iran--certainly of the Kurds and Arabs. An anarchical Iraq would

offer bases for Iranian dissidents and exiles, at a time when the theocratic regime is certainly weaker than it once was: its political support has measurably waned, its revolutionary and religious authority is now a distant memory, and its continued hold on power depends increasingly on naked force – and it knows it. Once the United States commits to a disengagement from Iraq, therefore, a suitably discreet dialogue with Iranian rulers should be quite productive. Washington would not need to demand much from the Iranians: only the end of subversion, arms trafficking, hostile propaganda, and Hizballah infiltration in Iraq. Ever since the 1979 revolution, the United States has often wished for restraint from the theocratic rulers of Iran, but has generally lacked the means to obtain it. Even the simultaneous presence of U.S. combat forces on both the eastern and western frontiers of Iran has had little impact on the actual conduct of the regime, which usually diverges from its more moderate declared policies. But what the entry of troops could not achieve, a withdrawal might, for it would expose the inherent vulnerability to dissidents of an increasingly isolated regime..

As an ally of long standing, Turkey is in a wholly different category. It has helped the occupation in important ways --after hindering the initial invasion-- but it has done less than it might have done. The reason is that Turkish policy on Iraq has focused to an inordinate extent on the enhancement of the country's Turkmen minority, driven not by a dubious ethnic solidarity (they are Azeris, not Turks) but by a desire to weaken the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Turkmen are concentrated in and around the city of Kirkuk, possession of which secures control of a good part of Iraq's oil-production capacity. By providing military aid to the Turkmen, the Turkish government is therefore assisting the anti-Kurdish coalition in Kirkuk, which includes Sunnis actively fighting Americans. This amounts to indirect action against the United States at one remove. There is no valid justification for such activities, which have increased communal violence and facilitated the sabotage of oil installations.

Like others, the Turkish government must have calculated that with the United States committed to the occupation, the added burden placed on Iraq's stability by their support of the Turkmen would make no difference. With disengagement, however, a negotiation could and should begin to see what favors might be exchanged between Ankara and Washington--in order to ensure that the American withdrawal benefits Turkish interests while Turks stop making trouble in Iraqi Kurdistan.

With Friends like These..

Even Kuwait, whose very existence depends on American military power, now does very little to help the Occupation and the interim Iraqi government. The Kuwaiti Red Crescent Society has sent the odd truck-loads of food into Iraq, and

a gift of some sixty million dollars has been announced, though not necessarily delivered it. Given Kuwait's exceptionally high oil revenues, however, not to mention the large revenues of Kuwaiti sub-contractors working under Pentagon logistics contracts, this is less than paltry. The serious amounts of aid that Kuwait could well afford would allow the interim government to extend its authority, and help the post-election government to resolve differences and withstand the attacks destined to come against it. In procuring such aid, it would not take much reminding that if the United States cannot effect a satisfactory disengagement, the Kuwaitis will be more than 10,000 miles closer to the ensuing anarchy than the Americans themselves.

As for the Saudi regime, its relentlessly ambiguous attitude is exemplified by its July 2003 offer of a contingent of "Islamic" troops to help garrison Iraq. Made with much fanfare, the offer sounded both generous and courageous. Then it turned out that the troops in question were not to be Saudi at all--in other words, the Saudis were promising to send the troops of other, unspecified Muslim countries -- and these imaginary troops were to be sent on condition that an equal number of US troops be withdrawn.

In the realm of action rather than empty words, the Saudis have not actually tried to worsen American difficulties in Iraq, but they have not been especially helpful either. As with Kuwait, their exploding oil revenues could underwrite substantial gifts to the Iraqi government, both before and after the elections. But Riyadh could do even more. All evidence indicates that Saudi volunteers have been infiltrating into Iraq in greater numbers than any other nationality. They join the other Islamists whose attacks kill many Iraqis and some Americans. The Saudis share a long border with Iraq along which there are few and rather languid patrols, rare control posts, and no aerial surveillance, even though it could be readily provided. And the Saudis could try to limit the flow of money to the Islamists from Saudi Jihad enthusiasts, and do more to discourage the religious decrees that sanction the sanctity killing of Americans in Iraq.

As it is, the Saudi authorities are doing none of this. Yet an anarchical Iraq would endanger the Saudi regime's already fragile security, not least by providing their opponents all the bases they need and offering Iran a tempting playground for expansion. Here too, therefore, hard-headed negotiations about the modalities of an American withdrawal would seem to hold out possibilities for significant improvements.

The Syrian regime, finally, could also be engaged in a dialogue, one in which the United States presents two scenarios. The first is a well-prepared disengagement conducted with much support from inside and outside Iraq, that leaves it with a functioning government. The second is all of the above reinforced by punitive action against Syria if it sabotages the disengagement --much easier to do once American forces are no longer tied down in Iraq. For all its anti-American bluster, the Syrian regime is unlikely to risk confrontation, especially when so

little is asked of it: a closure of the Syrian-Iraqi border to extremists, and the end of Hizballah activities in Iraq, funded by Iran but authorized by Syria. Of all Iraq's neighbors only Jordan has been straightforwardly cooperative, incidentally without compromising any of its own sovereign interests.

### The Ultimate Logic of Disengagement

Even if the negotiations here advocated fail to yield all they might, indeed even if they yield not much at all, the disengagement should still occur-- and not only to keep faith with the initial commitment to withdraw--the United States cannot play diplomatic parlor games. Given the bitter Muslim hostility to the presence of American troops - labeled "Christian Crusaders" by the preachers- its continuation can only undermine the legitimacy of any American-supported Iraqi government. With Iraq more like Spain in 1808 than Germany or Japan after 1945, any democracy left behind is bound to be more veneer than substance in any case. Its chances of survival will be much higher if pan-Arab nationalists, Islamists and foreign meddlers are neutralized by diplomacy and disengagement. The alternative of a continuing garrison would only evoke continuing hostility to both Americans and any Iraqi democrats. Once American soldiers leave Iraqi cities, towns and villages, some might remain awhile in remote desert bases to fight off full-scale military attacks against the government--but even this might incite opposition, as happened in Saudi Arabia.

A strategy of disengagement would require much skill in conducting parallel negotiations. But its risks are actually lower than the alternative of an indefinite occupation, and its benefits might surprise us. An anarchical Iraq is a far greater danger to those in or near it than to the United States. It is the time to collect on that difference.

\*\*\*\*

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

4510 Drummond Avenue, Chevy Chase MD 20815 USA.

Tel. USA [001] 301 656 1972 Fax USA [001] 301 907 8164

eluttwak@hotmail.com

### **MODERN WAR : Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice**

#### **The theory of counterinsurgency warfare.**

Two American generals of exceptional intelligence who distinguished themselves in Iraq, James N. Mattis of the Marine Corps and David H Petraeus of the Army, each now in charge of the training and doctrine command of his own service, have recently circulated the text of a new "counter-insurgency" field manual, (FM 3-24 DRAFT) which they propose for official use

Its doctrines emerges from the chapter titles . After a first chapter of definitions which any military manual must have--their most elemental function is to provide a common language, the battlefield is no place for semantic debate-- in the second and first substantive chapter , “Integrating Civil and Military Activities”, the essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents is duly recognized and strongly emphasized. That is hardly an original discovery as the two generals and their staffs would be the first to recognize, yet it still necessary to affirm what should be obvious, because amidst the frustrations of fighting the mostly invisible enemy, it is hard to resist the tempting delusion that some clever new tactics, or even some clever new technology can defeat the insurgents.

Much more questionable is the proposition that follows, which is presented as self-evident, that a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that it can be won by providing better government.

The extraordinary persistence of dictatorships as diverse in style as the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea and Syria shows that government needs no popular support when it has obedience..

As for better government , that is certainly wanted in France, Norway or the United States but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many people prefer indigenous and religion oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders.

The very word *guerilla* , which is now refers only to a tactic, was first used to describe the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators, under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain presented a draft constitution that for the first time in Spain’s history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and of the church. At that time, Abbeys, Monasteries and Bishops still owned every building and every piece of land in 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants. Yet the Spanish peasantry did not rise to demand the immediate implementation of the new constitution that would liberate them, and allow them to keep their harvests for themselves. Instead, they obeyed the priests who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. For Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that mattered to most Spaniards-- not what was proposed but by whom.

Actually, by then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were massacred by the very peasants and plebeians they wanted to emancipate, mustered into a militia of the "Holy Faith" ( Santa Fede) by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally a member of Calabria's largest land-owning family, who lead his men forward on horseback. . Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all promises of material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan. Spain's clergy did the same , and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first clause of Joseph's draft constitution had not only recognized the Roman Apostolic Catholic church but stated that it was the only one allowed in Spain.

The same kind of politics are now in evidence in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the new Iraqi constitution, and the emergence of clerical warlords as ready to use violence as Cardinal Ruffo. . Since the invasion in 2003, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their "Christian" allies are in Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland as well as to steal the country's oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy--except for women's rights, which the clerics say are only propagandized to persuade Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families, by imitating the shameless nakedness and impertinence of Western women.

The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis, assiduous mosque-goers, illiterates or at best semi-literate, naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable--that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and money to help them. They themselves would never invade a foreign country except to loot it , as Iraq invaded Kuwait making Saddam Hussein genuinely popular as troops brought back their loot, from automobiles to gold jewelry stolen while searching houses. In Iraq , as many opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, the Americans and their allies are widely considered to be the worst of invaders, who came to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil, but also of their religion and even their family honor. Many Muslims around the world believe as much, even in Turkey, whose most successful recent film depicted an American and Jewish military doctor who was operating on Iraqis not to save their lives but to remove their kidneys, which he was sending back to the US for transplantation, for his personal profit of course (he was Jewish after all). It is the same in Afghanistan, where the American imposed quota of women parliamentarians has not only caused widespread resentment but has cost the lives of several, including a member of parliament killed by her husband after she had dishonored the

family and scandalized the local mullahs by contradicting a man in public –in the course of a televised parliamentary debate.

In other words, “Integrating Civil and Military Activities” to improve local conditions need not gain public support—and even if did, it does not automatically follow that it would be decisive, or even important.

Next comes a very long section on “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency” which reflects the crucial predicament of counter-insurgency warfare: the unseen enemy, who can choose when to emerge from civilian cover to launch his attacks, and increasingly can attack by remote control, reducing his exposure or not being exposed at all. Everywhere outgunned, and in Iraq if not Afghanistan outnumbered as well, the insurgents would be easily defeated if their invisibility could be stripped away. That much is obvious. But the authors then automatically assume that it is an Intelligence problem to identify the insurgents among the population, another very questionable proposition as we shall see, because it really is a political problem which always has a political solution, however unpalatable that may be.

In any case proceeding on their premise, the detailed headings that follow point to different ways of overcoming the invisibility of the insurgents, by using all possible Intelligence source, methods and assets. There is “Intelligence Characteristics in Counterinsurgency” which points to the need to have rather different skills and talents when the targets are extremely “low contrast” insurgents, as opposed to airfields or warships; then there is “Predeployment planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” that recognizes and emphasizes the specificity of counterinsurgency as to time, place, population, culture and more, as opposed to general-purpose Intelligence preparations for regular war. For example, it is useful to have trained Arabic-speaking interrogators if an Arab-speaking country is invaded, and at a less elementary level, it is useful to have some cultural instruction before trying to analyze the behavior of the locals.

After that comes “Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations” on the different ways of using regular forces with their regular platforms and sensors to find the elusive insurgents, which may or may not work but which certainly entails such things as the use of ultra-sophisticated and very expensive F-15s and F-18s with the most advanced sensors to detect and track the man, the boy and the donkey who may or may not be transporting an “improvised explosive device” to its intended emplacement.

Then comes the delicate subject of “Counterintelligence and Counter-reconnaissance”. The second of these is straightforward enough: before attacking a target, it is usually essential to observe it in order to plan the action, and with a bit of luck such observers can be spotted by alert defenders. Often the best way of protecting potential targets is to anticipate attacks against them by

counter-surveillance (or “counter-reconnaissance”) , to then pre-empt or ambush the attackers.

What is delicate is the “Counterintelligence” part , which points to the likelihood of insurgent penetrations of the local forces that are supposedly fighting the insurgency-- the friends and allies in need that are being provided with training, weapons and money. There are always penetrations, even in the best of military forces as well as Intelligence services, but there is a difference in scale between the consequences of a traitor or two, and wholesale enlistments to serve the enemy cause (or the inadvertent recruitment of enemies into the ranks) . For example, it must be universally recognized by now that in Iraq many if not most of the Shiites in the army and police are actually under the orders of one of the Shiite militias, including the “Mahdi army” that occasionally launches surprise attacks on American or British forces. Equally , many of the Kurds who are paid by the government or by the Americans directly are in the service of either Barazani or Talebani, who trade under the labels of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan . Far more dangerously, the Sunnis in the army and police who have been recruited, trained, equipped and salaried to fight the Sunni insurgents are just as likely to help the insurgency , or even to be insurgents themselves, on temporary detachment to the government forces so to speak. That is the only way that Sunnis whose families live among the Sunni population can both receive a salary and also keep their families alive. But again that is really a political problem, which has an unpalatable solution that is certainly more reliable than “ Counterintelligence” could ever be.

Next there is “ Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion” , which refers to the sharing and integration of Intelligence, which comes in separate channels from different services, branches and individual sources but which is needed by subjects. That is true of regular war operations as well, but is more critical when the targets are almost always unstable, elusive and low-contrast even if identifiable at all, as they rarely are.

After that , there are more predictable chapters on “Designing Counter intelligence Operations” executing them, and developing “ Host Nation” security forces , whose relative brevity underlines the emphasis the authors place on Intelligence operations. Recent scandals readily explain the need for an entire chapter on “ Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency “ , and the following chapter on “ Building and Sustaining Capability for Counterinsurgency Logistics “ also reflects the unhappy experience of Iraq.

Ammunition supply ,usually the biggest item along with fuel in regular operations is no problem at all because very little ammunition is expended , yet logistics are still a big problem in Iraq because needed items cannot simply be trucked from A to B without a high risk of destructive attacks by insurgents, hi-jacking by militias in need of supplies, highway robbery or opportunistic looting by ordinary civilians ( there are many natural predators in the

population, probably because of the high proportion of ex-nomads and their direct descendants, for whom the razzia is still an honorable and manly tradition). Truck convoys can be more secure if rather less efficient, but their safety depends on the quality of their escorts, which are necessarily very scarce and expensive if they are US troops (the British near the seaport as is their wont are more easily supplied), less scarce but even more expensive if they are security contractors, and very cheap but extremely unreliable if they are Iraqi soldiers or police. The end result is that very often hyper-expensive helicopter hours are used to carry even low-value, non-urgent supplies instead of trucks, which is one reason why the occupation costs so much even though very little ordnance is being expended.

Incidentally, in spite of all the advances of "jointness", when the US Air Force tried to help out the Army (.....and dissuade it from acquiring its own intra-theater fixed-wing aircraft) by providing a regular shuttle service of C-130 turboprop transports between Kuwait and different bases in Iraq reserved for Army use, the aircraft ended up carrying mostly "sailboat fuel", ie., they flew empty because it was easier for Army formations to use their own organic helicopters and smaller fixed-wing aircraft than to "interface" with the Air Force.

Two more things can be noted about the new field manual before turning to the peculiar politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There is an Appendix to the chapter on the "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" which further emphasizes its importance and includes a section on "Linguistic Support". That is a sad story indeed, when the astonishing linguistic incapacity of US military forces and Intelligence organizations is contrasted with the abundance of American civilians who speak all known foreign languages, and the brilliant record of foreign language education in the US Army and Navy, which used to produce as many good Chinese and Japanese speakers as they wanted by selecting for natural aptitude in the recruit pool; giving them a year of intensive courses, eight hours a day, six days a week; and quickly sending away those who failed to keep up with their classes. Nothing prevents doing the same for Arabic, Persian and, say, Azeri now, except for an unwillingness to invest in the future, and probably a lack of disciplined volunteers who are willing to learn a language eight hours a day, six days a week for a whole year or more. A final point about FM 3-24 DRAFT. It ends with a list of suggested readings, and the first book on the list is Small Wars: A Tactical Handbook for Imperial Soldiers (1890) by Charles E. Calwell.

The previous counterinsurgency Field Manual 07-22, also had such a list, and its first book was The Battle of the Casbah 1955-57 by Paul Aussaresses. Is it therefore that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backwards, from the doubts of the 1950s back to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, because alas, as will be argued in what follows, one needs to go back even

further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means.

### **Counterinsurgency in practice: Iraq.**

We begin with some elementary observations. Formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, the armed forces of the most advanced countries and certainly of the United States, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years, even while the occasional North Vietnamese regular unit that ventured to fight conventionally was efficiently destroyed.

The same two-part proposition is unnecessarily being proven all over again in Iraq, damaging the reputation of the United States for wisdom and strength, misusing fine soldiers, wasting vast amounts of money on skillful but ineffectual air and ground operations, inflicting added suffering on Iraqis at large, and taking the lives of young Americans whose sacrifice, one fears, will be deemed futile.

There is no mystery about the first part of the proposition. Because of their abundant resources and all-round competence, morale, discipline, and skills, the armed forces of the United States on the largest scale, and of other advanced countries on their scale, can usually generate much more firepower than their antagonists. These days, moreover, they can do so with routine precision because of sensors that reveal targets even in poor visibility, platforms and weapons that can reach targets at any planetary range, accurate guidance and homing devices, and command and communication networks that combine all those abilities.

Up to a point, the second part of the proposition is merely the logical consequence of the first: faced with especially superior firepower, insurgents strive to be especially elusive—more so than if they were facing less formidable regular forces—and as targets diminish, so does the value of firepower.

But there is much more to it than that. Specifically, there is the matter of politics, on both sides, the politics that—necessarily—is insufficiently present in FM 3-24 DRAFT.

Unless they confine their operations to thoroughly deserted areas where there is no one to observe them, insurgents must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. Whether they fail to report the insurgents to the authorities out of sympathy for their cause, or in terror of their vengeance, is entirely irrelevant. In either case, the insurgents are in control of the population around them, and not the authorities. That essentially *political* advantage is enough to allow

motivated insurgents to overcome all manner of tactical weaknesses in combat skills and weapons.

As in so many previous cases, in a manner abundantly familiar from previous insurgencies, that is now happening in Iraq, where insurgents live very safely in Sunni-Arab city districts, towns and villages, emerging to place bombs or launch attacks when it suits them, before resuming innocuous civilian identities once again.

Local insurgents may indeed pass unobserved to their neighbors when inactive, but not when they take up weapons and gather for operations, while the foreign volunteers among them necessarily attract attention even when they carry no weapons because of their distinct speech and manner. Many of the local inhabitants certainly know who the insurgents are and where they keep their stores of explosives and weapons, but they are not telling. That is why US Army and Marine patrols cannot find insurgents unless they choose to reveal themselves by engaging in direct combat, which of course they rarely do, and only when they think that they have a great advantage. The mostly futile patrols therefore expose soldiers to the mines, remote-controlled side explosives, snipers and mortar bombs that inflict daily casualties.

Naturally, every form of technical intelligence and every possible sensor is being employed to supplant the lack of very elementary but indispensable human intelligence, including synthetic-aperture radars aboard big four-engine aircraft and the infra-red and video sensors of the latest targeting pods on two-seat heavyweight jet fighters. The expense of these flights alone is huge, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars a month, but the results are very meager. The aim was to gather immediately actionable imagery especially at night, showing for example insurgents placing side-bombs alongside US patrol routes, or approaching oil pipelines bearing explosives. Failing that, it was at least hoped that possible insurgent activities would be detected for further investigation, for example people furtively bringing things to isolated buildings at night. But in practice unless they carry recognizable weapons, it is simply impossible to differentiate between insurgents and innocent people going about their peaceful business. In the meantime, very elaborate equipment that is very costly to operate and which is very effective in identifying armored vehicles, bunkers, missile launchers and any other readily recognizable target of classic form is still being employed every day in futile attempts to detect deliveries of a few dollars of food, or the emplacement of readily improvised explosive devices. This too is an aspect of the structural unsuitability of modern armed forces to fight elusive enemies that present no stable targets.

The essentially *political* advantage of the insurgents in commanding at least the silence of the local population, cannot be overcome by technical means no matter

how advanced. Nor can the better operational methods and tactics advocated in FM 3-24 DRAFT be of much help. So few of the insurgents ever engage in direct combat, so much of the insurgency takes covert forms, ranging from the infiltration of the government to bombings, sabotage and assassinations, that the tactical defeats inflicted on the insurgents -including the killing of their top leaders and heroes-- have no perceptible impact on the volume of the violence, and of its political consequences.

In Iraq, as noted there is supposed to be a far better way of finding insurgents than patrols driving about, or sensors howsoever sophisticated: the Iraqi police and Army. Their recruitment, training, equipment and upkeep, itself a very costly enterprise in both money and blood, is also yielding meager results because the politics of the situation are again central, and again unfavorable.

It is easy to recruit local auxiliaries in any poor country, and in Iraq too as well as any number of Shiites and Kurds, Sunni Arabs also can readily be recruited -in recent decades that is how many of them made a living, by exploiting their privileged access as Sunnis and Arabs to prized military and police salaries. Other jobs were much less desirable because they required work, and now in any case they are very scarce. But while they are willing to wear the uniforms and accept training up to a point, Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni-Arab ascendancy over Iraq. Besides, their families would be in deadly peril if they were suspected of loyalty to their government, and by extension to the Americans. Some of those policemen and soldiers know much about the insurgents and where exactly they might be found, but are still of no help in finding them, because they are insurgents themselves, as noted above. Even if specifically ordered into action on those rare occasions in which there is overt combat, most Sunni-Arab policemen and soldiers will not fight the insurgents; if they cannot simply stand back quietly, they are apt to desert, usually with their weapons. As for Army and police units manned mostly by Shiite Arabs or Kurds, they are not actively disloyal but they cannot gather information on the insurgents either. Sunni Arab civilians will not confide in them any more than in Americans, and perhaps less, because sooner or later the Americans will leave Iraq but the Kurds and Shiite will not, and are therefore the greater enemy.

The adverse political terrain of counter-insurgency is simply a given in Iraq as everywhere else, for if insurgents do not receive, or cannot forcibly exact at least the passive collaboration of the population at large, they normally cannot survive at all.

**The easy and reliable way of defeating all insurgencies everywhere.**

Perfectly ordinary regular armed forces, with no counterinsurgency doctrine

or training whatever have in the past regularly defeated insurgents, by using a number of well-proven methods. It is enough to consider them to see why the armed forces of the United States or of any other advanced and/or democratic country cannot possibly use them.

The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate civilians at large, or terrorize them if it comes to that.

For instance, whenever insurgents are believed to present in a fairly circumscribed locality such as a village, small town or distinct city district --a very common occurrence in Iraq at present as in other insurgencies --local leaders can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to mass executions.

That is why the Ottoman Empire could control entire provinces with a few feared janissaries and a squadron or two of cavalry. The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender, or else. Few ever wanted to find out just what that else might be --a massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades. So it was mostly by social pressure rather than brute force that the Ottomans preserved their rule: it was the leaders of each ethnic or religious group inclined to rebellion that did their best to keep things quiet and if they failed, they were quite likely to tell the Turks where to find the rebels before more harm was done. .

Long before, the Romans knew how to combine sticks and carrots to obtain obedience and suppress insurgencies. Conquered peoples too proud to accept the benefits of their rule, from public baths and free circus shows to reliable law courts, were "de-bellicized", a very Roman idea. It was done by killing all who dared to resist in arms --it made good combat practice for the legions --by selling into slavery any who were captured in battle or near enough to be implicated, by levelling towns that held out under siege instead of promptly surrendering, and by readily accepting as peaceful subjects and future citizens all who accepted Roman rule. In the first two and most successful centuries of imperial Rome, some 300,000 soldiers in all --only half of them highly trained legionary troops--were enough to secure a vast empire that stretched well beyond the Mediterranean basin that formed its core, today the territory of some 30 European, Middle Eastern and North African states. The Romans could not disperse their soldiers in hundreds of cities, thousands of towns and countless hamlets to repress riot or rebellion--the troops were needed to guard the frontiers first of all. Instead they relied on deterrence, which was periodically reinforced by exemplary punishments. Most inhabitants of the empire never rebelled after their initial conquest. A few tribes and nations had to be

re-conquered after trying and failing to overthrow Roman rule. A few simply refused to become obedient, and they were killed off : "you make a solitude and call it peace" was the bitter complaint of a Scottish chieftain (as reported by the staunch imperialist Tacitus)

Terrible reprisals to deter any form of resistance were standard operating procedure for the German armed forces in the Second World War, and very effective they were in containing resistance with very few troops. As against all the dramatic films and books that describe the heroic achievements of the resistance all over occupied Europe, military historians have documented the tranquillity which the German occupiers mostly enjoyed, and the normality of collaboration not merely by notorious "collaborators" such as the incautious French poet or the failed Norwegian politician, but by vast numbers of ordinary people , Polish railwaymen for example secured the entire sustenance of the German eastern front. As for the daring resistance attacks that feature in the films, they did happen but not often , and not because of any lack of bravery in fighting the routinely formidable Germans, but because of the terrible punishments they inflicted on the population, routinely killing many for each German killed.

I

Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of their reprisals outweighs either the desire to help the insurgents if any, or their own threats. The Germans also established secure and economical forms of occupation by exploiting isolated resistance attacks to achieve much broader demonstration effects. Lone German despatch riders were easily toppled by tensed wires or otherwise intercepted and killed, but then troops would arrive on the scene to burn or demolish the buildings round about if any, or the nearest village in lieu, seizing and killing anyone who aroused suspicion, or just happened to be there. After that, after word of the terrible deeds duly spread and was duly exaggerated as often as not, German despatch riders could safely continue on their way, until reaching some other and uninstructed part of the world where the sequence would have to be repeated.

In Vietnam at war likewise, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were skilled in using terror to secure their pervasive territorial control , and very ready to use any amount of violence against civilians, from countless individual assassinations to mass executions, as in Hue in 1968. The Communist cause had its enthusiasts, "fellow travelers" and opportunistic followers, but Vietnamese who were none of the above, and not outright enemies to be killed, were

compelled to collaborate actively or passively by the threat of the violence so liberally used.

That is exactly what the insurgents in Iraq are now doing and that is no coincidence because it must be the same in all insurgencies. Locals who are not sympathetic to begin with, who cannot be recruited to the cause, are compelled to collaborate just the same by the fear of violence against themselves or their families, readily reinforced by the demonstrative killing of those who insist in refusing to help the resistance : neutrality is not an allowed option.

By contrast, the capacity of American armed forces to inflict collective punishments does not extend much beyond curfews and other such restrictions , inconvenient to be sure and perhaps sufficient to impose real hardship, but obviously insufficient to out-terrorize insurgents . Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population –the real “terrain” of any insurgency. .

To be sure, the ordinary administrative functions of government can also be employed against the insurgents, less compellingly perhaps but without need of violence. Insurgents everywhere seek to prohibit any form of collaboration or contact with the authorities, but they cannot normally prevent civilians from entering government offices to apply for obligatory licenses, permits, travel documents and such. That provides venues for intelligence officers on site to ask applicants to provide information on the insurgents, in exchange for the approval of their requests and perhaps other rewards. This effective and straightforward method has been widely used, and there is no ethical or legal reason why it should not be used by the armed forces of the United States as well. But it does require the apparatus of military government, complete with administrative services for civilians. During and after the Second World War, after very detailed preparations, the US Army and Navy governed the American zone of Germany, all of Japan and parts of Italy. Initially US officers were themselves the administrators, with such assistance from local officials as they chose to re- employ. Since then, however, the United States has eschewed the role of the Occupier, preferring in both Vietnam long ago and now in Iraq to leave government to the locals, while assuming the rather awkward role of a disproportionally powerful ally with combat forces in place and provider of military assistance, but not of everyday civil administration.

That reflects another kind of politics, manifest in the ambivalence of a United States government that is willing to fight wars, that is willing to start wars because of future projected threats, that is willing to conquer territory or even entire countries, and yet is unwilling to govern what it conquers, even for a few years.

That is why for all the real talent manifest in the writing of FM 3-24 DRAFT , its prescriptions are in the end of little use or none. All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the prudent preparations, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents , the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation. END