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# **Security and WMD Issues in a Post-Saddam Iraq**

**Testimony Before the  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

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Let me begin by saying that I endorse this war, but I do so with reluctance and considerable uncertainty.

**We need to understand some realities about the security situation in Iraq, the Middle East, and world opinion that are going to be very unpopular with many in the US.**

**If things go well, we are going to get rid of a loathsome dictator and a serious threat in terms of WMD, but we are going to accomplish far less to influence the overall security of the region than some people think:**

- The broader regional process of proliferation will continue.
- We will probably have a window of time to fully disarm Iraq of its present weapons of mass destruction and production facilities, but we will not get rid of its scientists. Iraq will also retain and build new dual use facilities that will ensure it has a rapid break capability to make biological and chemical weapons, and UAVs.
- We will have to free a new Iraqi government from sanctions, and existing arms control agreements will limit Iraq, but not bind it or its neighbors.
- Virtually all of the regional tensions that exist now will still exist after the war, and the critical economic, social, and demographic problems that will affect the region for decades will still be there.
- Rather than “stabilize” the Middle East, the war will open up other issues in addition to the problem of nation building in Iraq. We will see a massive reexamination of ties to US in view of preemptive action and talk of regime change, expose Iran’s internal problems, create a host of new demands for action on Israeli-Palestine front, and at most produce a brief pause in Islamic extremism and terrorism – if indeed the fighting and its aftermath do not stimulate them.

**I have raised the problems we face in more depth in the testimony I am submitting for the: Peace as a Self-Inflicted Wound.**

- It outlines the full range of challenges we face, and describe how important it is for us to follow any military victory by winning the peace.
- I would add to the points in this paper that we are involved in what is in many ways a “coalition of the unwilling” where our message so far seen in much of the world as confused and seen largely in negative terms.
- No regional ally shares common values or goals for Iraq, and only Israel and Kuwait support our security goals.

- We have a failed public diplomacy that began in the Clinton Administration and which has had continued in a very different form under President Bush. The announcements that Undersecretary Grossman and Undersecretary Feith made here this morning are important, but they come far too late to shape the debate in the region. The reality is also that only President Bush and Secretary Powell can speak with the rank and influence that is necessary to give these messages abroad.
- We will enter Iraq with most of the people and the media in the region fearing we have broad ambitions for regime change, for controlling Iraq and the Gulf for oil or profit, that we plan to go on to attack other countries in further conflicts, or that we are acting as a tool of Israel or some other mysterious force.
- We will conduct a war in a region where public opinion polls show the polarizing political issue is the constant portrayal of Palestinian suffering in the local media, sermons, and politics, and where some 70% of the population blames US for many of Israel's actions.
- We also inherit a mess in economic, demographic, and energy terms.
- Yet, the day we invade Iraq, we will take responsibility for its future and the blame not only for the impact of a war but most of Saddam Hussein's decades of mistakes.
- The fact that such perceptions are unfair, and based on a false image of our motives, is irrelevant.
- We will need to do everything at once by way of humanitarian action and nation building in a climate where we will only be forgiven for winning the war if we decisively win the peace.
- No one can do all of the necessary tasks well, and virtually none of them can be accomplished instantly or quickly, **but** we at most have two years before the Iraqis either again fully control their own destiny or we are their new enemy.
- The key to any real, grand strategic victory is success in nation building on Iraqi terms. It is providing security, taking rapid action to bring the Iraqis together, and then letting the Iraqis decide their future – not imposing our views, or our values beyond the level they can accept.

**In short, every American who supports this war must understand that how we leave Iraq will ultimately be far more important than how we enter it.**

- If we do not leave Iraq -- being seen as having liberated Iraq to make its own security decisions as well as its own oil, political, and other decisions -- this war should never be fought at all.

**Now, turning to the particular focus of this hearing, we face a daunting challenge. We are inheriting a military and security apparatus that have taken Saddam Hussein and his cronies some 30 years to build.**

--I have prepared a separate paper for the record that describes the Iraqi armed forces and security forces in detail, and I think that before anyone talks about Iraqi forces in theory, it is vital for them examine their structure and complexity in depth.

In brief, we are dealing with a core of some 20,000 men in the security services and some 70-80,000 in SRF and RG, plus another 250,000 that make up the core of the regular army, air force, air defense force, and navy.

- Those Iraqis in uniform are perhaps easiest to identify as potential problems, but often are more tools than guilty.
- The complex, overlapping structure of the civilian and military security services presents a more serious challenge.
  - The security services permeate the Iraqi government at every level. Often the men with the best skills -- like the former KGB -- took the worst jobs in supporting the regime.
  - *Some forces need to be disbanded and purged out of jobs in the rest of government. We can roughly assume that this is true of the Special Republican Guards, the National Security Council or al-Majlis al-Amn al-Qawmi. or Al Estikhbarat al Askariyya,. The Military Security Service, or al Amn al Askariyya (which operates throughout the armed forces and, reports directly to the Presidential Palace, and deals with subversion within the armed forces), and the General Security Services (GSS) or General Security Directorate (GSD) or Amn al Amm: All of these services need to be disbanded and their members need to be kept out of government for some time.*
  - *We need to be more careful about purging RG, The Military Intelligence Service (MIS), General Intelligence Directorate (GID) or Iraqi Intelligence Service (IID) or Mukhabarat. There may be members or cadres professional and neutral enough so that a core of capability may be worth preserving.*
  - *The Regular Army, in general, should be seen differently. We should not reject its structure or members. This may be the core we can build upon*
- We also need to firmly understand that there are many tools and loyalists in the rest of government who are as bad as the members of the security services -- if not worst -- even though the majority may be innocent and vital to the effective future governance of Iraq. These include men in the:

- Ministries – e.g. MIO, NIOC, and Min of Information – often as guilty.
- No clear line of separation in governates and communities.
- Judiciary, legal profession are also problems.
- There are tribal and clan alignments that will require careful deconstruction, knowing that some tribes and clans are deeply divided. This issue extends to Shi'ite tribes as well and goes far beyond Saddam loyalists like the Abu Nassir.
- Must carefully evaluate academic and scientific community, understand attitudes and motives of those who proliferated. See as threat in terms of exile and terrorism.

**At the same time, we must be very careful about casting the first stone. There are countless Iraqis who have gone along with Saddam to survive and/or because no other career was available.**

- The Iran-Iraq War and ethnic fighting with Shi'ite and Kurd have created a structure where otherwise decent men have been caught up in human rights abuses, the use of chemical weapons, and aggression.
- It is not going to be easy to judge or winnow out this structure, and applying theoretical international standards raises as many moral issues as it resolves.
- Exiles are not necessarily better because they lost in the struggle for power.

**This suggests several things:**

- The threshold for any war crimes or other trials must be set high.
- The South African model of “truth commissions” may be the best way of dealing with most cases involving the armed forces, security services, and others.
- Iraqis, not Americans or international bodies must make most of the judgments.
- The key objective must be to broaden the ethnic and religious base of the Iraqi state's armed forces and security services while avoiding ethnic or religious judgments and exclusions.

**As we examine how to rebuild Iraq's military and security forces, we also need to remember that we are dealing with an intensely nationalist country for which**

**military security is a real issue, where depoliticizing the armed forces will be difficult, if not impossible, and where we will face deep mistrust:**

- A pluralist, and republican state requires an army and security forces where Kurds, Shi'ites, and Turcomans must have fair representation, as must urban Sunnis and those who are not Tikritis and part of Saddam's or the Baath power structure.
- No future Iraqi government will easily place any trust in the Turks or Iranians. It will at best place limited trust in the Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians, and smaller GCC states.
- The "new" Iraq will be shaped by the old Middle East. It will still be anti-Israeli at least at the popular level, and short of a peace, Israel will be an "enemy."
- We must help reshape Iraq's forces and security services in the face of great – if sometimes unstated – Iraqi fears of US neoimperialism and past British interventions.
- We are dealing with a nation and a region where there are five branches of government: executive, legislative, judicial, army, and the security forces. Rolling them back to three will not be easy.
- The Iraqi military has more political legitimacy, limited as legitimacy has been, than monarchy or political parties like Ba'ath.

**In broad terms, a force of some 200,000-250,000 might be what is needed, with a new focus on professionalism, defense, but life will not be that simple.**

- A "Pax Americana" is no substitute for an "Iraq for the Iraqis". In fact, we must remember that the very word "occupation" is as bad in dealing with the Arab world as the word "crusade."
- We must create a republican force in the sense of a new ethnic balance at every level of command between Sunni, Shi'ite, Kurd, and Turcoman.
- Talk about "disarmament is not enough. The Iraqi conventional forces will need some rebuilding. They will have suffered from three major wars, and from 10 years without arms sales. This will create a major problem in force modernization at a time many competing demands will exist for scarce resources.
- Need to think out conscription as way of ensuring ethnic shares.
- Not discharge tens of thousands of men into nowhere, create Weimar-like malcontents.

- Our concepts of what kind of military balance is just or needed may not suit Iraqi view. Theoretical balances will win little acceptance. If we want a stable legacy, we must discuss, not dictate.

**We will need to provide Iraq with some answer to a proliferating region: Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Israel plus Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.**

- If we do not extend deterrence, some future government is likely to return to WMD.
- We must also never forget that our span of control will be brief, and those who make initial promises may not be around to keep them.
- We will need a new mix of containment, arms control, and security partnerships of which Iraq is a member, but where the goal is regional stability on regional terms.
- Victory may well be only a prelude to new efforts to resolve the Second Intifada and India-Pakistan conflict if we really want to take medium to long-term steps to reduce the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction. We cannot solve the problem one country or one regime at a time.

