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While I was the commander of the U.S. Central Command, we ran an inter-agency exercise to address issues dealing with a post war Iraq or an Iraq that imploded and required our intervention. I did this because a number of leaders in the region expressed concern about our ability to deal with these issues and because I felt we had not planned for these as well as we should have. In addition, from my experiences in a number of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, the Former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, I knew that the possible scope of the problems and the difficulty of the tasks required much more planning and preparation. I also knew that other government agencies had to be involved in this planning since the requirement is not solely a military one. My comments are based on this background. In addressing the issues that might be faced in a post conflict Iraq, the first question that has to be answered deals with the end state envisioned or desired. Do we want to transform Iraq or just transition it out from under the unacceptable regime of Saddam Hussein into a reasonably stable nation. Transformation implies significant change in forms of governance, in economic policies, in regional status, in security structure, and in other areas. Without a determination of the scale and scope of change desired, it is not possible to judge the cost and level of effort required. Certainly there will not be a spontaneous democracy so the reconstruction of the country will be a long, hard course regardless of whether a modest vision of the end state is sought or a more ambitious one is chosen.

We should be careful whose predictions of potential outcomes of the situation that we accept. No one can be sure about exactly what the scope of the problems will be once military action begins. We can only provide a broad bracket of the scope of the potential challenges we would face. The "it depends" answer to assessments will be the best analysis we can offer in most cases. A reasonable middle of the road assessment is probably prudent for planning. Overall it will not be as good as the optimists predict or as bad as the pessimists describe.

A lot of thought has been given to the kinds of problems and tasks that we will face in the aftermath. I have read several recent studies and pieces produced by groups of knowledgeable people. Generally these works have, in my opinion, captured the broad requirements and the issues very well. Defining the problem, however, is only half the task. The other half deals with how you solve the problem. I have not seen a lot of specifics in this area. By this I mean descriptions of the organizations needed, the

assignment of responsibilities, the lines of authority, the coordinating mechanisms, the resources necessary, and other hard recommendations on what is needed on the ground.

There are four areas or categories that all efforts will fall under. These are the security, political, economic, and recovery/reconstruction dimensions of the problem. They cannot be worked separately or in sequence, so close coordination between these functional areas is vitally important. Also, they do not begin after military action starts but must begin ahead of the fighting, run parallel to it, and continue well after it ends or subsides. The tasks in each of these areas will be considerable. I can offer a few examples for each.

The security dimension will require tasks to be performed such as maintenance of law and order, force protection, peacekeeping, protection of threatened groups, dealing with civil unrest and acts of retribution, countering external threats, and developing local security capabilities. The political part will require such things as establishing an interim or transitional government, laying the foundation for a final form of governance, ensuring coordination of all activities, developing the principles and procedures for establishing civil functions, dealing with procedures for accountability, and coordinating the regional and international involvement. The economic area would involve dealing with issues such as energy production, employment restructuring, regional economic impacts, status of foreign debt, restructuring of the economic base, and soliciting and managing donor contributions. The recovery and reconstruction element will deal with the immediate and long term humanitarian needs, infrastructure repair and replacement, consequence management, WMD accountability, and the reestablishment of services. Again, these tasks are just examples and certainly are not the complete requirement; but, they give a sense of the scope of the post conflict demands.

I would offer several points of advice from my experiences and analysis of what has to be done in a post conflict environment.

1. Each of the four areas mentioned needs a separate structure, on the ground, to work the tasks in that area. That doesn't mean that organizations with primary duties in another area cannot be tasked to support, such as the military, a part of the security element, assisting in humanitarian efforts; however, it does mean there has to be a distinct organization accountable and in charge of each of these functional areas.
2. Everything must be closely coordinated. A coordinating mechanism(s) needs to be in place and clear lines of authority must be established. There will be natural friction between the areas so, at some level, there must be an ultimate authority that can provide immediate decisions and deconfliction directions.
3. The resources and organizations required must be identified, provided, and effectively managed. The military cannot be stuck with the whole mission as has happened in the past.
4. These efforts must be planned for and the structures and resources established before military action begins. The effort does not start after military action but runs parallel to it. There should be no gaps.

5. We should do everything under international institutions if at all possible. Our motives will always be suspect in this endeavor and it will be difficult to get partners in the messy "day after" business, but the cover of the international organizations will make easier, maybe even inviting. International agencies, private volunteer agencies, and non-governmental agencies are critical to success. They must be empowered and encouraged to do the necessary work in close coordination with our governmental agencies.
6. You need someone in charge on the ground. That doesn't mean that person has to command all forces and agencies but it does mean he, or she, has to have coordinating authority.
7. Internal order will be the most critical factor in keeping positive momentum and progressing toward full reconstruction. This task will be the priority.
8. Images are everything, particularly in the early stages of the mission. Intelligent and active information operations will make or break the mission from the beginning.
9. Regional nations and agencies should be a part of the effort if possible. Regional involvement that works counter to the objective has to be prevented.
10. The decision on the scope of the vision must be made early. Is it Iraq transformed or Iraq simply transitioned?

This is a broad description of the requirement as I see it. Certainly there are experts in each of the areas I mentioned who are far better qualified than I am to address the specifics in their area of expertise. I am happy, however, to answer any of your questions as best I can.