Iraq Policy Considerations after September 11

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Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee and discuss Iraq. I will focus first on the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and secondly on the broader Iraq problem.

The Baghdad regime has had the intention of acquiring weapons of mass destruction since the 1970's when most of their programs began. As is well known, the Baghdad regime successfully developed long range missiles with chemical and biological warheads in the 1980's. They came very close to achieving a nuclear weapon capability just before the war in 1991.

Iraq used over 100,000 chemical munitions during its war with Iran. It used a variety of chemical munitions against its own population as well. Best known was the attack against the Kurdish city of Halabja. Immediate casualty figures numbered in the thousands, with long term effects that have not been calculated. There are no confirmed reports of biological weapons use, but the evolving study of health conditions in Kurdistan point to a growing possibility that biological agents caused some of the extraordinary incidences of cancers, birth defects and major diseases now prevalent. Interestingly, Baghdad has blamed similar health problems on the presence of depleted uranium shells used by coalition forces in the south of Iraq in 1991.

UNSCOM and the IAEA were able to account for much of the Iraqi WMD programs. Despite a systematic policy by Iraq to conceal the full extent of their programs, much was learned-albeit with some key gaps.

A few salient points are worth recalling from UNSCOM's work. First, the level of effort and resources committed to these programs was enormous. Billions of dollars, thousands of people, and hundreds of buildings were dedicated to developing and producing these weapons.

Second, the origins of the programs and their purposes are not fully understood, but they were not simply military in nature. In particular, the biological weapons (BW) program appears to have had its origins in the security services. No military concept was ever presented for their research or production. In fact, Iraq claimed that their Ministry of Defense had nothing to do with the BW development program.

Third, when UNSCOM and IAEA left in December 1998, there certainly remained in Iraq the intellectual know-how to continue all these programs. UNSCOM had significant concerns about remaining production capability and indeed, weapons themselves. During the period of time UNSCOM still worked in New York, but was not in Iraq, it continued to collect evidence on ongoing Iraqi work in all areas of WMD. I doubt anyone believes Iraq has stopped its WMD efforts. Even while UNSCOM was operating with our most creative and intrusive inspection
techniques, we remained deeply concerned that programs continued clandestinely—albeit at a reduced level.

Fourth, Iraq is actively and apparently successfully developing both liquid and solid fuelled ballistic missiles. The United Nations resolution banning Iraqi WMD programs does permit missiles of ranges under 150 kilometers. While UNSCOM was in Iraq, we monitored these programs quite carefully. In particular, a program called the Al Samoud was being energetically pursued. It has been tested frequently. It may or may not exceed the permitted range, but what is clear is that Iraq is developing an indigenous missile capability that did not exist before the war. This sizeable commitment of resources by a regime which pleads that the United States is starving its population via sanctions, puts in bold relief their true intentions and priorities.

A final observation about UNSCOM's investigation of Iraq's BW program is relevant under today's circumstances. The BW program was the least understood program and the one Iraq obfuscated the most. There are multiple reasons for this. One is that the purpose behind the development of certain biological agents and weapons was probably not military. For example, Iraq produced large amounts of an agent called Aflatoxin. Exposure to this causes cancer over a period of years. Such exposure might prevent a lieutenant from becoming a colonel, but it is difficult to envision a military purpose—especially bearing in mind that Iraq had extensive experience with the tactical military use of chemical weapons against Iran in the eighties. Their successful use of chemical weapons was one factor that reinforced their commitment to WMD.

We also know Iraqi scientists conducted some experiments in mixing Aflatoxin with a non-lethal agent-CS, or tear gas—commonly used as a riot control tool. The question is what purpose is served by camouflaging the dispersal of an agent that causes cancer?

Another aspect of Iraq's BW research is also troubling. Experiments were conducted with substances that cause agricultural damage such as wheat cover smut. This indicates they were investigating potential economic weapons. Moreover, such agents could easily be deployed in ways that would make their origin virtually impossible to trace. If a potential enemy can harm you without you knowing who did it, it makes deterrence very difficult. Recent events underscore the importance of being able to identify the culprit in a terror attack. Conversely, opponents may increasingly seek to conceal their complicity through various methods.

If I may expand my remarks beyond Iraq's WMD capabilities, I would like to make a few observations drawing upon several years of experience in dealing with Iraq and senior Iraqi government officials.

The regime in Iraq sees itself at war with the United States. It is a military and economic war that is ongoing. The regime is intent on winning and is willing to pay a heavy price to reemerge as the dominant country in the region. Baghdad, with help from friends on the Security Council, has been successfully eroding the consensus that has contained it during the past decade. They have astutely distributed economic favors in ways that win them support. Baghdad has convinced many that the regime is inevitable and therefore must be accepted. Moreover, those who befriend Baghdad will profit. A blind eye is turned to past aggression and atrocities. The regime, at tremendous cost to its own population, seeks to outlast the United States.

At the same time, the Iraqi professionals, technocrats, and even government officials, while they serve their country, would like nothing better than to be reconnected with the rest of the world—including the United States.

The magnitude of the tragedy of Iraq can best be appreciated when you consider two alternative futures for Iraq over the next few years. Presently, Iraq, under the current regime, is on a path of growing threat to the region and the world. It has not lost its ambition to dominate the region through military intimidation. It has growing WMD capabilities, and a significant conventional military. It also will have the increasing leverage of growing oil production—potentially growing to 4-5 million barrels per day in the next few years. Its practice of domestic oppression is certainly not
decreasing. Iraq's best and brightest escape if at all possible. Further, there can be no doubt that
the regime will continue its battle with the United States. The regime has supported and harbored
terrorists in the past and will continue in the future. The regime can be expected to use whatever
means possible to attack the United States if it can, and can get away with it.

An alternative future is an Iraq governed by a regime which follows international norms and with
which the United States could have normal relations. Such a regime could not only free Iraq from
its current quagmire, but could change much in the Middle East. A growing Iraqi economy with
the reconstitution of normal international commerce, educational systems and societal revival
could go a long way toward addressing some of the endemic problems in the region. It certainly
would release energies and talents of the Iraqi people who currently either escape or suffocate
under the current regime.

The difference between these two futures is huge, and growing. The threat Iraq poses will
continue to grow if the present regime continues to renew itself. The policy of containment has
succeeded in deferring the Iraqi problem not solving it. The potential that Baghdad could act
overtly or covertly against the United States remains high. Moreover, there has been a
tremendous cost to the Iraqi people. They have had to suffer under Baghdad's repression for
another decade while Iraq was contained.

Obviously, the world will watch closely to see how the United States addresses the Iraq problem.
Many regional states have become convinced that they must seek their own accommodation with
the regime as it poses both a growing threat and reward in terms of oil exports. No firm policy has
emerged from Washington in recent years that would lead to other conclusions. Regional states
will also watch how the present campaign against terror plays out. If it does not include an Iraq
component, the conclusion will be drawn that either the United States accepts, if not desires, the
present circumstances in Iraq-- or is powerless to change them.

There is an opportunity now to refocus how the world is dealing with Iraq. The threat posed by
this regime needs to be highlighted. Certainly the world is right to worry about the suffering of the
Iraqi people. But, the actions over the past few years have had the effect of conveying legitimacy
on this regime-a regime that has invaded two neighbors and used chemical weapons on its own
population. Trusting that this regime, which has used chemical weapons against its own
population, won't use them elsewhere is foolish. So far, the American military presence has
deterred such attacks. But over the long term, only when there is new leadership in Baghdad will
there be real improvement to regional security and the Iraqi people.