Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S. Policy

Perspectives on U.S. Policy toward the South China Sea

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Former Commander in Chief, JMSDF Fleet
History: Two Major Sea Combats

1974: V-C

1988: V-C
Hot Spots: Spratly Islands

Vietnam: 5
Philippines: 6
Malaysia: 1
Taiwan: 1
Total: 13

Island with Airstrip: 4

PRC: Only Rocks
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island’s Name</th>
<th>Area (SQ km)</th>
<th>Practical Control</th>
<th>Claimants</th>
<th>Air Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Itu Aba Is.</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>V, P, PRC</td>
<td>R/W:1,150m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thitu Is.</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td>R/W:1,800m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West York Is.</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spratly Is.</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>T, PRC</td>
<td>R/W: 500m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Cay</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Cay</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin Cowe Is</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaita Is.</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanshan Is.</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Swallow Reef</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>T, PRC</td>
<td>R/W:1,300m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamyit Is.</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat Is.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Reef</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>V, T, PRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Aces in the Spratly Islands - 1

Thitu Is. (P) : 1800m/6,000ft

Spratly Is. (V) : 500m/1,700ft
4 Aces in the Spratly Islands - 2

Itu Aba Is. (T): 1,150m/4,000ft

Swallow Reef (M): 1,300m/4,300ft
Platas Islands

Pratas Is. (T): 1,500m 5,000ft
Recent Events
PLA’s Assertive and Unilateral Adventurism

- PPC’s Oil Drilling Attempt in Paracel Islands
  Vietnam and PRC

- Second Thomas Shoal: Blockade of Supply Ship
  Philippines and PRC

- James Shoal: Provocation by the Force
  Malaysia and PRC

- Johnson South Reef: Land Filling of the Reef
  Vietnam/Philippines and PRC

- Scarborough Shoal: Seizure of the Shoal
  Philippines and PRC
Real Issues: Reclamation!

China’s Strategic Goal:

Monopolistic Control of South China Sea (SCS)

- Northern SCS: Practical Control
  Woody Island

Strong Appetite for Reclamation

- Southern SCS: Spratly Islands
  No Foot Print → Johnson South Reef

- Eastern SCS: No Foot Print
  No Foot Print → Scarborough Shoal
Woody Island (PRC)
Potential ASW Airbase in South China Sea

RW: 2,400m/8,000ft with Parallel Taxi Way
Sufficient land space for military facilities/installations
Johnson South Reef - 3

Original

2012. 3

2013. 2

2014. 2

Serious Environmental Destruction

Breakwater

3~400m
Johnson South Reef – 4

Conceptual Picture of the Future Reef
2,500m Class RW+Taxi Way
Port Facilities for Deep Draft Ships
Scarborough Shoal - 15 km - 9 mile

Reclamation: 3 km RW
Port Facilities

23 km - 14 mile

16 km - 10 mile
Scarborough Shoal-2

Wide Area for Reclamation

Large Air Field

2,500m-3,000m RW

TAC-Air, Large Transport, MPA

Large Port for Deep Draft Ships

Depth of Water: 10~20m

Ideal Naval and Air Base in the Eastern SCS

Sufficient Logistic Support Capability

Game-changer of SCS Power Balance
South China Sea
Strategic Spots for Sea Control

- Sanya
- Woody Island
- Scarborough Shoal
- Johnson South Reef

Distances:
- 700 km
- 900 km
- 650 km
Future Course of Actions (USA+Japan)

Reclamation: Game-changer in SCS Power Game
  If Realized: Extremely Favorable Situation to China
  Unfavorable Situation to USA and Japan

Issues
  ● Unilateral action at Disputed Islands
  ● UNCLOS: Semi-Submerges Rocks?
  ● Double Standard: Japans Case
  ● Destruction of Great Nature: Coral Reef Destruction
  ● Island: Easy to take but Difficult to Defend (IJPN)
  ● Offensive Capability (U.S. Forces)
Thank you for your patience!

Ready Force for Peace