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### **Dimensions of the Challenges**

- In the strategic sphere
  - Complexities of nuclear deterrence
- In the energy sphere
  - Obstacles to nuclear energy expansion
- In the non-proliferation sphere
  - Stranglehold of old shibboleths



# CHALLENGES OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

### **India's Nuclear Reality**

- Two geographically contiguous nuclear powers
- Territorial disputes and a history of wars
- With different nuc doctrines and capabilities
- Both in a robust mutual nuclear and missile proliferation relationship
- Both use proxies to complicate security
- Two nuclear dyads + one nuclear triangle
- Existential risks of nuclear war
- Threat from NSAs with/without state complicity

#### Visible NW Trends

- Inventory build-up
  - China has biggest arsenal after US & Russia
  - Pakistan likely to be the fifth largest
- Improvements in range, accuracy, reliability
  - From liquid to solid fuel mobile missiles
  - Dispersal of missiles over triad
  - Improvements in penetrability (esp in China)
    - Missiles equipped with countermeasures
    - MIRVed and MARVed missiles
- Cruise missile proliferation

# India – China Strategic Stability

- General sense of nuclear stability
  - 'Similar' nuclear doctrines
  - Focus of both on eco growth & social devp
  - High bilateral economic trade
  - Many levels of political engagement
  - Mutual vulnerability to 'unacceptable damage'

# India – China Strategic Stability

### Worrisome trends

- China's growing military capabilities
- Lack of clarity on intentions
- Low interest in settling territorial issues
  - Nettlesome behaviour on Arunachal Pradesh
- ASAT & BMD tests Jan 2007 & Jan 2010
- Large deployment of conventional missiles
- Relationship with Pakistan

# Pakistan's Nuclear Strategy

- Role of Pak NW
  - To deter war with conventionally superior military
  - Continue sub-conventional 'cuts'
- Modus operandi
  - Deliberate projection of uncertain behaviour to heighten nuclear danger
  - Uncontrollable escalatory spiral against conv attack
    - Reduces <u>risk of retaliation</u> against proxy war
    - "Risk maximising approach" plays on enemy's fear
    - Brinkmanship rests on <u>uncertainty & cultivated irrationality</u>

# **India- Pak Strategic Stability**

- Brinksmanship aimed at India & international audience
- Move towards TNWs greater instability
- Derives deterrence from instability
- Unsatisfactory experience of CBMs



# CHALLENGES IN NUCLEAR ENERGY EXPANSION

# **Present Status of Nuc Energy**

- 21 operational nuclear power plants
  - **2** BWRs + 18 PHWRs (220 & 540 MWe)
  - First LWR at KK went critical in 2013
- 3% of total electricity gen 4780 MWe
- 350 reactor years of experience
- Full fuel cycle capability
- Trained manpower
- Mature nuclear industry

### **Future Ambitions**

- **20,000 MWe by 2020**
- **63,000** MWe by 2032
  - 20 imported LWRs 8 new nuclear parks
  - Indigenous 700 MW PHWRs
    - 4 X 700 MW under construction
    - 7 more planned in 2012-17
  - **2** x 500 MW FBRs



### **Ability to Achieve Goals**

Handicapped in the past by international sanctions and isolation

- Entry into international nuclear commerce in 2008
  - Series of steps multilateral and bilateral

### **Opening of Opportunities**

- CNAs with 10 countries in 3 years
- Spurt in nuclear fuel availability
  - Immediate benefit
  - Restore lost installed capacities (60 to 90%)
  - Bring on line new indigenous planned plants
- Import of larger reactors
  - 1000 to 1650 MWe
  - In principle approval to 30,000 MW capacity

### **Present Bottlenecks**

- Restoring Public Confidence
  - Proactive engagement to
    - Explain strategic reqmt of nuclear energy
    - Inclusive approach at tactical level

- Addressing Nuclear Liability Issues
  - Concerns of investors international & domestic




# CHALLENGES FROM NON-PROLIFERATION SHIBBOLETHS



- Still smarting over the exceptionalisation of India
  - Blame USA for not extracting enough
  - Blame India for Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation
- Little appreciation of Indian efforts to be part of non-proliferation regime

### **Indo-US Nuclear Deal – Some Facts**

- 2005 to 2008 -- negotns bet both democracies
- Due legislative processes to create legal conditions
- Not just bilateral arrangement
- Compliance with IAEA & NSG processes
- Exceptionalisation earned
  - Consistent responsible nuclear behaviour
  - Non-proliferation commitments



### Non-proliferation commitments

- Sustained moratorium on nuclear testing
- Support for FMCT
- Signed additional protocol
- Implementation of Separation Plan
  - CIRUS shutdown; safeguards on facilities
- Participation in NSS GCNEP on track
- Harmonisation of XCs
- NSG membership yet not in sight

# Sino-Pak Nuclear Cooperation

- Onus of responsibility on Indo-US nuclear deal?
- Pre dates the deal
- Civilian nuclear energy agreement in 1986
- China joined NPT in 1992 & NSG in 2004
- Grandfather argument in 2009 for two NPPs
- Two more now on offer energy logic
- NSG silence no procedures, no processes, de facto exemption
- Who is undermining NSG credibility?