

Non-proliferation and Counter-terrorism Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Meeting Global Obligations through Regional Security Architectures?

TANYA OGILVIE-WHITE

This article explores the relationship between global and regional governance in tackling terrorism in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to the security of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) materials. Part one describes the global multilateral non-proliferation instruments established since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 — particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 — analysing the extent to which ASEAN members have been fulfilling the binding legal obligations that they entail. Part two assesses the role of three of Southeast Asia's regional security frameworks (APEC, ARF, and ASTOP) in setting the regional non-proliferation and counter-terrorism agenda, charting their successes and failures in promoting compliance with global instruments, and in ensuring that pledges made by ministers in international and regional forums are followed through at the national level. It argues that ASEAN perceptions of West-centric security agendas, combined with frustrations that regional and global institutions are insensitive to local particularities, are undermining opportunities for achieving effective regional governance, even though concerted efforts are being made in the area of capacity-building. Bilateral security arrangements and single-issue multilateral discussions have been more successful than more ambitious regional frameworks at building trust and confidence and fostering genuine security cooperation.

Keywords: non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional security cooperation, global governance, Southeast Asia, United Nations.

The prevention of catastrophic terrorism, the consequences of which were witnessed so graphically on 11 September 2001 (9/11), calls for international cooperation on a scale and at a level never witnessed before. Although security priorities and threat perceptions continue to vary widely from superpower to micro-state, and from one region to another, ordinary people everywhere felt a collective revulsion and a shiver down the spine that day, and many recognized the need for new, collaborative approaches to security. Subsequent terrorist attacks around the world, combined with revelations over the existence of nuclear black market networks and reports that Osama Bin Laden considers it a “duty” for Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons, have augmented this mutual insecurity and fostered a desire for stronger security mechanisms. This presents both challenges and opportunities for the international community: short-term challenges to build effective security institutions to prevent and respond to global terrorism, and longer-term opportunities to forge new cultures of peace and cooperation in the process. As highlighted in *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, the report of the United Nations’s High-Level Panel, success in meeting these challenges will be dependent upon the willingness of states and international organizations to harness their energy to strengthen global and regional institutions.¹

This article explores the relationship between global and regional governance in tackling terrorism, with particular reference to the security of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) materials in Southeast Asia. Although the prevention of criminal and terrorist access to nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities in the former Soviet Union and Pakistan are considered the top priority in the race against catastrophic terrorism (Perkovich et al. 2005), certain developments in Southeast Asia have focused international attention on the region’s research reactors and future nuclear power plants as potential targets for terrorists intent on acquiring nuclear and radioactive materials (Abuza 2002; Ogilvie-White 2004; Roston 2002; Shafie and Thayer 2003). In particular, concerns have been raised due to a worrying combination of regional risk factors: the expansion of nuclear energy and research; lax procedures for protecting, controlling, and accounting for nuclear and radioactive materials; and mounting evidence that Southeast Asia has become a significant base for international terrorists. Recent reports revealing the involvement of key individuals from Southeast Asia in the nuclear black market and in Al Qaeda’s attempts to acquire NBCR weapons create the impression that Southeast Asia is becoming an increasingly significant supplier of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) materials and expertise.²

This article also explores the role of regional institutions in encouraging security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in relation to NBCR security, and assesses their achievements in ensuring the implementation of, and compliance with, global multilateral non-proliferation agreements. The first part of the article describes the global multilateral non-proliferation instruments that have been established or consolidated since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, analysing the extent to which ASEAN members have been co-operating with these initiatives. The second part analyses the role of three Asia-Pacific regional security frameworks, charting their successes and failures both in setting the regional non-proliferation agenda and in ensuring that pledges made by ministers at the regional level are followed by positive action at the national level.

Part One: Global Non-proliferation and Counter-terrorism Obligations

Prevention of catastrophic terrorism will require major security cooperation at the regional and global levels, and will be dependent on every state introducing effective domestic controls to prevent the theft and illicit trade of sensitive materials within and across their borders. Such controls have obvious relevance for states, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, which hold quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and they are equally significant for states with nuclear research programmes, and where dual-use technologies are employed in the industrial, health, and agricultural sectors (Ogilvie-White 2004). Less apparent, perhaps, is the rationale for introducing complex, expensive domestic controls in countries with very limited utilization of dual-use technologies, no WMD-related trade, and no plans to introduce such activities. Despite this, the raft of global non-proliferation measures that have been introduced in recent years imposes obligations on every state, from the micro-states of the South Pacific to the most powerful states in the world. While on one level this appears inappropriate, given that security concerns and priorities vary tremendously from one state to another and from region to region, the rationale for the introduction of an inclusive and comprehensive security apparatus is that global frameworks are only ever as good as their weakest link. In a world blighted by transnational crime and organizations constantly seeking to exploit loopholes, no state, however geographically remote, isolated, or undeveloped, can be left outside the framework. This section outlines one of the key new instruments

of the post-9/11 global non-proliferation architecture, and examines its implications for ASEAN members.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540

The current trend towards the global governance of WMD materials is reflected in the introduction of increasingly intrusive non-proliferation instruments, from the beefed up inspections of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Additional Protocol, to the series of stringent non-proliferation commitments outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The key difference, however, is that the Additional Protocol aims to prevent, monitor, and detect clandestine nuclear activities of state parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is currently a voluntary measure, whilst the UN resolutions are aimed at preventing non-state activities and are mandatory. They represent a new departure in the evolution of the non-proliferation regime, in that they impose compulsory commitments on all states, with no option to withdraw from or relinquish responsibility for the global non-proliferation effort.³ Whilst there is room for significant leeway in the interpretation of the text, and in the imposition of penalties on states in clear violation of their obligations, this does represent a new departure in terms of the resolutions' universality and scope.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) was adopted by consensus on 28 April 2004, building upon the non-proliferation commitments set out in Resolution 1373 (2001), which set out a broad-based series of obligations in support of counter-terrorism. Crucially, it universalizes the non-proliferation initiatives originating in multilateral forums, such as the G8, affirms the importance of the WMD treaties and conventions, and makes it obligatory on all states to comply with these instruments (Steyn 2005; Woodward 2005).⁴ In this way, the resolution aims to plug the gaps in the existing WMD regimes, which have not achieved universality, and applies them more specifically to the non-state actor problem. The text of the resolution requires states to "refrain from providing any support" to non-state actors' efforts to engage in any activity involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems.⁵ States must also adopt and enforce national regulations to prohibit any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring, or using these weapons. This obliges states to introduce and implement a series of domestic controls on WMD materials, including the following: the accounting and securing of such items in

production, use, storage, and transport; developing and maintaining appropriate effective physical protection measures; controlling the export, import transit, trans-shipment and re-export of such items; setting up controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment; establishing end-user controls; enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of export control laws and regulations; and establishing border control measures to detect, deter, prevent, and combat the illicit trafficking and brokering of WMD materials (Steyn 2005).

Although the committee set up by the UN Security Council to monitor the implementation of the resolution (the “1540 Committee”) has not set out specific requirements and standards by which to judge compliance, it is tasked with reviewing states’ reports on their implementation efforts, which they are obliged to submit. Fulfilling these wide-ranging non-proliferation obligations and submitting timely reports constitutes a serious challenge for most countries, including many in the developed world, but for countries with insufficient resources and low capacity it presents a major headache.⁶ The text of the resolution does, however, recognize this problem, and invites states that are in a position to do so to offer assistance in response to specific requests from states that lack the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to meet their obligations.⁷

Reports to the 1540 Committee

Non-cooperation of Southeast Asian states with the 1540 Committee could be detrimental to the global non-proliferation effort, conceivably leading to spillover effects in any part of the world — particularly those with lax controls that could be exploited. Given their strong connections with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with its reservations over the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime and oft-stated suspicions regarding the role of export controls, one would expect some reluctance on the part of ASEAN members to fulfil their obligations under UNSCR 1540, particularly given that it drew much of its inspiration from a series of G8 and US-led initiatives. This, combined with the cultural particularities of the region, such as the principle of non-interference and the customs associated with informal ASEAN diplomacy, might lead to predictions of deliberate non-compliance and obstruction by states in the region in response to instruments of global governance that are highly formalized, legalistic, and intrusive in nature, and inspired

by the most developed and powerful states in the world (Goh 2003; Heller 2005).⁸

This tension is certainly observable, with some ASEAN members expressing their concerns over what they see as the heavy-handed imposition of Western security agendas on the developing nations of the South, without any thought for the specific security needs of different regions.⁹ The articulation of such sentiments is interpreted in a negative light by some political commentators, particularly in the United States, where they are cited as evidence of foot-dragging and cultural relativism by developing states. Some go as far as to suggest that states expressing reservations over the wisdom of universal “one size fits all” counter-terrorism initiatives are not genuinely committed to fighting terrorism, and are simply using arguments over cultural particularities and poor capacity as an excuse not to fulfil obligations.¹⁰ This criticism may be valid in some cases, although it should be noted that ASEAN members’ comments in international forums regarding their reservations are usually accompanied by statements of support for UN counter-terrorism initiatives.¹¹ It is notable that all ten members of ASEAN have now submitted national reports to the 1540 Committee, and although most of these were late and some were superficial in nature (in common with ASEAN reports to the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee), this does demonstrate a mutual willingness to be seen to be complying with international counter-terrorism instruments and norms. Moreover, none of the reports contains the political rhetoric that often dominates ASEAN statements in international non-proliferation and disarmament forums, which usually express the anti-Western ideology of the NAM. Rather, the individual ASEAN country reports are businesslike and straightforward reviews of domestic efforts to introduce non-proliferation regulations, varying from the comprehensive reports of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, to the scanty documents submitted by Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.

Implementation of UNSCR 1540

A careful reading of the 1540 reports exposes poor capacity as a significant problem hampering the implementation of UN counter-terrorism measures. Significantly, a number of the reports contained requests for assistance, including the Philippines, which requested outside help in issues of export controls and in compliance with international conventions and protocols.¹² Cambodia requested assistance from the Security Council and member states to help

it perform basic tasks, and put forward numerous proposals to help facilitate this. For example, the report requests that the Director General of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) help Cambodian legislators to “collect laws for establishing national authority, roles and duties ... for chemical weapons” and help train Cambodian officials to build a database of hazardous chemicals and help monitor their use.¹³ These requests echo those contained in reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee under Resolution 1373, a number of which fail to directly address the WMD issue under paragraph 4, but call for expert assistance in building domestic counter-terrorism frameworks, in training officials, and in the provision of adequate resources.¹⁴ These requests appear to be genuine, and are being addressed by the Chairs of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committees, who have promised to focus assistance efforts where the needs are most pronounced and to member states “who are willing, but not capable, to implement the far-reaching [counter-terrorism] provisions”.¹⁵ Mihnea Ioan Motoc, the Chair of the 1540 Committee, has reassured such states that dialogue and assistance will be forthcoming, as the Committee has reached the substantive phase of its activities and thus is beginning to focus on capacity-building and the provision of technical assistance, with the help of a team of experts.

Lack of capacity does not, however, provide a convincing explanation as to why ASEAN members have not made sufficient efforts to fulfil their obligations under operative paragraph eight of UNSCR 1540, which requires all states to “promote the universal adoption and full implementation ... of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons”.¹⁶ Most had already signed up to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) before Resolutions 1373 and 1540 were passed and, as illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 below, little progress has been made since that time in achieving full ratification/accession to the relevant treaties, conventions, and protocols. The argument that because all states in the region had signed the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) by 1998 their non-proliferation or counter-terrorism responsibilities are already largely fulfilled, is unsettling for many in a world where transnational criminal gangs and terrorist organizations are seeking WMD. While the SEANWFZ is a useful instrument for preventing regional, state-to-state proliferation, it was never intended as a solution to the non-state actor problem. Thus in the context of the recent expansion of Islamic extremism in

Table 1
Membership of WMD Treaties and Conventions, Southeast Asia

	<i>CTBT</i>	<i>SEANWFZ</i>	<i>CWC</i>	<i>BTWC</i>	<i>CTBT</i>
Brunei	Signed 22/01/97	Acceded 22/11/96	Acceded 28/07/97	Acceded 31/01/96	Acceded 26/3/85
Cambodia	Ratified 10/11/00	Acceded 27/03/97	Acceded 08/02/05	Signed 09/03/83	Acceded 2/6/72
Indonesia	Signed 24/09/96	Acceded 10/04/97	Signed 13/01/93	Acceded 04/02/92	Ratified 12/7/79
Laos	Ratified 05/10/00	Acceded 16/07/96	Acceded 25/02/97	Acceded 20/03/73	Ratified 20/2/70
Malaysia	Signed 23/07/98	Acceded 11/10/96	Acceded 20/04/00	Acceded 06/09/91	Ratified 5/3/70
Myanmar	Signed 25/11/96	Acceded 27/03/97	Signed 14/01/93	Signed 10/04/72	Acceded 2/12/92
Philippines	Ratified 23/02/01	Signed 15/12/95	Acceded 15/07/96	Acceded 21/05/73	Ratified 5/10/72
Singapore	Ratified 10/11/01	Acceded 27/03/97	Acceded 21/05/97	Acceded 02/12/75	Ratified 10/3/76
Thailand	Signed 12/11/96	Acceded 20/05/97	Acceded 10/12/02	Acceded 28/05/75	Acceded 2/12/72
Vietnam	Signed 24/09/96	Acceded 26/11/96	Acceded 30/09/98	Acceded 20/06/80	Acceded 14/6/82

CTBT = Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

SEANWFZ = Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

CWC = Chemical Weapons Convention.

BTWC = Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention.

NPT = Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

the region, combined with the indigenous development and civil use of NBCR materials, plus the launch of nuclear energy programmes in Indonesia and Vietnam, any complacency is greeted with nervousness by states that are impatient to achieve universality.¹⁷

The non-ratification of legal instruments is only the beginning of the issue, for simply signing up to agreements is virtually meaningless unless serious efforts are made to implement the necessary national controls to prevent terrorist access to sensitive materials and technologies. In the context of WMD terrorism, the phrase “in, but

Table 2
**Membership of Key International Nuclear Security Agreements,
 Southeast Asia**

	<i>SA</i>	<i>AP</i>	<i>CPPNM</i> ¹⁸	<i>JC</i>
Brunei	365 4/11/87	No	No	No
Cambodia	586 17/12/99	No	No	No
Indonesia	283 14/7/80	In force 29/9/99	Ratified 5/11/86	Signed 6/10/97
Laos	599 5/4/01	No	No	No
Malaysia	182 29/2/72	No	Acceded Oct/03	No
Myanmar	477 20/4/95	No	No	No
Philippines	216 16/10/74	Signed 30/9/97	Ratified 22/9/81	Signed 10/3/98
Singapore	259 18/10/77	No	No	No
Thailand	241 16/5/74	No	No	No
Vietnam	376 23/2/90	No	No	No

SA = Safeguards Agreement.

AP = Additional Protocol.

CPPNM = Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

JC = Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention).

complacent” is almost as disturbing as “in, but cheating” — a phrase sometimes used by international lawyers to describe the problem of non-compliance plaguing the WMD regimes. Unfortunately, several of the Southeast Asian reports to the 1540 Committee suggest that complacency is a key problem where the important issue of export controls is concerned.¹⁹ Although such controls are widely viewed by non-proliferation experts as an essential element in any comprehensive non-proliferation and anti-terrorism framework, most ASEAN members

have traditionally regarded them with suspicion, viewing them as barriers to economic development at best, and, at worst, as part of a deliberate strategy on the part of the most developed states to maintain the status quo. This attitude has hindered the introduction of appropriate controls in some of the most vulnerable regions of the world, including major trans-shipment and assembly points for critical strategic dual-use goods and technologies. Part of the reasoning behind UNSCR 1540 is that it should help ease concerns over inequitable export control regimes, raise awareness that domestic export controls need not undermine economic productivity, and build consensus on the universal requirement to apply domestic controls on the trade in and movement of sensitive technologies. However, a review of ASEAN submissions to the 1540 Committee reveals that, though free of the ideological rhetoric associated with some NAM statements on this issue, progress in this area has not been impressive to date.

With the notable exception of Singapore, Southeast Asia's export control systems remain unsophisticated and weak.²⁰ Brunei, for example, has sent representatives to regional workshops, but has not taken domestic measures to strengthen or clarify its export control system. This might not appear too serious a problem given that the sultanate has little in the way of WMD dual-use or WMD-related trade, but the development of an indigenous petrochemical industry in the country is raising concerns. Likewise, Myanmar and Vietnam, though they attended the major export control workshops, problems of domestic corruption and political apathy have meant that apparent enthusiasm to cooperate at the regional level has not been mirrored by parallel efforts at the national level. This could represent a potential proliferation risk, given that Myanmar and Vietnam are both suspected of having illicit chemical weapons programmes, and both appear to be engaged in, or at least aspire to, indigenous nuclear programmes.²¹ In a number of cases, especially Cambodia, energetic regional participation has been followed by a disappointingly poor record on introducing domestic controls due to ongoing problems with corruption and insufficient capacity due to financial and technical constraints.²² Some of the most worrying gaps, however, are present in some of Southeast Asia's most technically advanced states: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Although Indonesia and the Philippines have both been cooperating with the United States and the IAEA to secure nuclear and radiological materials within their borders, export controls remain nascent in both countries, with insufficient legislation covering chemical and biological dual-use items.²³ Thailand

has established a legal framework for export control legislation, but its system remains embryonic despite a growing chemical sector and industries with nuclear and missile dual-use potential.²⁴

Given time, incentives, and encouragement, and if current international and regional capacity-building efforts continue, the indications are that many of these nascent systems will grow and be consolidated — most problems appear to be related to low prioritization and/or national capacity. Where Malaysia and Laos are concerned, however, the gaps in the system may be more difficult to close. In Malaysia, where only minor, primarily legislative changes have been introduced, most of which are superficial, the problem appears to be one of ideology (Jones 2004). Despite revelations that a Malaysian firm manufactured some of Libya's nuclear equipment, and regardless of US efforts to persuade Malaysia to adopt more stringent export controls, its foreign minister explained that he did not currently “see any necessity” to sign the Additional Protocol, and its export controls remain some of the most rudimentary in the region.²⁵ In its report to the 1540 Committee, Malaysia admitted that its trade regulations were driven by economic rather than security considerations, and explained that it was not a lack of capacity that was hindering the development of a more comprehensive export control system, implying that its reasons are ideological rather than practical. Overcoming this kind of deliberate resistance, which stems from a long-held hostility to export controls, is likely to be difficult.

Part Two: Regional Responses to Global Challenges

UNSCR 1540 recognizes the need to “enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels” in order to strengthen a global response to the threat of WMD terrorism.²⁶ As Gareth Evans pointed out in his speech on the UN High Level Panel Report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, a number of recommendations have been made aimed at the better functioning of regional security institutions (Evans 2004). For example, countries in a position to offer support to states within their region have been encouraged to do so, and better coordination between institutions and agencies has been promoted, in the interests of building an effective collective security system. The need for what has been termed “security subsidiarity” — whereby greater responsibility for terrorism prevention is exercised by individual states and regional bodies — is widely acknowledged by national governments and international organizations alike. In the context of Southeast Asia,

Australia has been particularly quick to respond to this call, holding bilateral security dialogues with Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand; providing assistance and training in nuclear safeguards and export controls;²⁷ and signing Memorandums of Understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.²⁸ However, Australia's success in pursuing bilateral initiatives of this kind has not been matched in the realm of multilateral regional security cooperation. In Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific more generally, security institutions have either been slow to take on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation responsibilities, or, as in the case of APEC, the active pursuit of a regional security community by some members has not be greeted enthusiastically by others, creating internal institutional divisions. This section explores some of these frustrations and tensions, analysing the debate within regional forums on the subject of WMD terrorism prevention.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

The rapid evolution of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) security agenda, to run parallel to the organization's original focus on trade and economic development, is not a welcome development as far as some ASEAN members are concerned. According to reports, division within ASEAN over the pros and cons of APEC's foray into the counter-terrorism realm is creating a fault-line within the organization (Simon 2003). Whereas Singapore and Thailand have welcomed US-led initiatives within this context, officials from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam have openly expressed reservations, arguing that they do not wish to be associated with the US "War on Terror", which is widely regarded amongst their populations as anti-Muslim, unilateral, pre-emptive, and disproportionately military. But such reservations go much deeper than the stated concern over the US foreign and security policy agenda to a longer-term preoccupation with the issue of cultural pluralism. While APEC has traditionally operated on the basis of "non-binding commitments, open dialogue, and equal respect for the views of all participating economies" — which sits comfortably within the Asian diplomatic tradition — some ASEAN members are worried that the West-centric counter-terrorism agenda is forcing institutional change within APEC in favour of a more legalistic, formal framework.

Recent developments suggest that these concerns are not without foundation, as there have been moves amongst some of APEC's Western members to introduce stronger, more formal mechanisms,

particularly with respect to the institution's evolving security role. More specifically, this relates to the work of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), which senior APEC officials agreed to establish during the October 2002 Economic Leaders Meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico.²⁹ Unlike parallel regional security institutions, which have issued numerous consensus statements in favour of concrete counter-terrorism cooperation but have achieved little in the way of actual deliverables, the CTTF is emerging as an action-oriented security actor, drawing APEC members into an ever-deeper series of counter-terrorism commitments. Similar to the agenda of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee, states are required to provide written reports (known as counter-terrorism actions plans, or CTAPS) to the CTTF, outlining the counter-terrorism measures that they have undertaken, including in the area of WMD proliferation. Significantly, these reports are not a mere diplomatic gesture, to be filed away and forgotten, but functional documents, which are to be cross-analysed and used for monitoring and assessment purposes.³⁰ This exercise is somewhat at odds with the informal dialogue mechanisms that previously dominated APEC interactions in the economic realm, and although Western states have been at pains to emphasize that the work of the CTTF is based on the objective of achieving secure conditions for the facilitation of trade and commerce in the Asia-Pacific, not all APEC members are convinced by such assurances.

Malaysian officials have been the most outspoken in their opposition to APEC's increasing focus on security. At the November 2004 APEC Summit in Santiago, Malaysia's Trade Minister, Rafidah Aziz, argued that security issues were becoming unjustifiably dominant at the forum, sidetracking the meeting from key trade and economic issues. Hence he asserted that "some APEC developed economies are pushing to expand the APEC agenda beyond its current economic mandate to include the twin agenda on security issues like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".³¹ These views are widely shared in the Malaysian administration, which might help explain why, of all the CTAPs, Malaysia's is the only report that completely omits section A5, which asks states to comment on steps that they have taken "to eliminate the severe and growing danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by strengthened non-proliferation regimes and adopting and enforcing effective export controls".³² While reports differ in the level of detail provided in this section, with some providing only a cursory answer, Malaysia is the only state to delete the entire section. Furthermore, of the 21 APEC members, only Papua New Guinea and Malaysia failed

to provide an updated report in February 2005 in preparation for the sixth CTTF meeting in Seoul.³³

The Chair's Summary Report of the May 2005 CTTF meeting, held in Jeju, Korea, reveals that divisions within APEC over the legitimacy and wisdom of its security role are deepening. Disagreements centred on three issues: Japan's proposal to conduct a survey of members' domestic export controls; Canada's proposal to introduce a formal consultation mechanism for the CTTF along lines similar to the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED); and a US proposal to adopt the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the IAEA Guidance for the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources as a compulsory APEC standard.³⁴ Japan's proposal, which was intended to identify capacity-building needs to improve export controls, garnered mixed responses, with some states insisting that it should not be included in the APEC process, but rather should be conducted independently and on a voluntary basis. Though Canada's proposal for a formal CTTF Consultation Mechanism was enthusiastically welcomed by New Zealand and Australia, both of which offered to draft a paper outlining the various options for the mechanism, a number of APEC members objected to the notion of a "formal" arrangement.³⁵ Finally, the debate over the US plan regarding IAEA codes on nuclear security appears to have been most heated and extended, despite prior discussion of it at the March meeting of the CTTF in Seoul.³⁶ Although Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, and the United States voiced support for the proposal, which aims to reduce the threat of radiological terrorism, Malaysia openly opposed the introduction of the IAEA's Code as an APEC standard, arguing that APEC was not the best venue to deliberate the issue of nuclear security, with China and Indonesia also expressing reservations.³⁷

Thus it appears that APEC is suffering from internal fractures along ideological lines: while some members support the imposition of the formal, increasingly intrusive and West-dominated global governance agenda onto regional institutional frameworks, others are less comfortable with this transition, and are seeking reassurance that cultural diversity and political pluralism, including in the realm of hard security, will not be squashed either deliberately or as an unintended consequence of the global focus on counter-terrorism cooperation. Acknowledgement of the implications of this division has appeared in the form of a "Cross-Cultural Communication" initiative, proposed by Korea at the March 2005 APEC Senior Officials' Meeting.³⁸ The first paragraph of the proposal states: "In progressing towards APEC's

long-term vision of an Asia-Pacific Community, a lot of difficulties originate from the differences in the level of development, political and economic systems, history, culture, life-style and religion among member economies.” It goes on to argue that such differences cannot be bridged without “extraordinary efforts”, and suggests the creation of an APEC Network on Cross-Cultural Communications as a partial solution. This network would facilitate cultural exchanges between members with the goal of enhancing mutual understanding in the APEC region, thus increasing the chances for APEC to evolve into an effective regional security community.

Regional Cooperation: The ARF Process

Concrete actions towards the prevention of WMD terrorism were initially slow to emerge under the ARF process, with statements emerging from the annual meetings after the atrocities of September 2001 rather vague and seemingly more concerned with holding the line rather than adopting new initiatives. This is apparent in the statement issued at the 9th Meeting of the ARF, which took place in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, on 31 July 2002.³⁹ Rather than pressing for the urgent implementation of national controls, the statement merely “noted” the consultations between the Nuclear Weapon States and ASEAN concerning the former’s signing of the Protocol of the Treaty on the SEANWFZ, and pointed to the pivotal role of the NPT in preserving peace and security in the world. Beyond this, the ministers covered old ground, “reaffirming” the importance of the nuclear testing moratorium, “reiterating” the objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons, and “acknowledging” the importance of promoting universality of the CWC and BTWC. The only new initiatives to appear in the statement related to the prevention of conventional terrorism, and the financing of terrorist activities.

Reports emanating from the most recent meetings reveal an increasing awareness of the need to cooperate at a regional and international level in order to deal with the threat of NBCR terrorism, but whilst consensus statements on this issue represent a step in the right direction, they are not often being backed with practical steps to prevent and detect the theft and misuse of sensitive materials. Unless such steps are taken, the political commitments made at these regional meetings will appear increasingly hollow and futile. The outcome of the 2nd ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, which was held in Manila

on 30–31 March 2004, is a case in point.⁴⁰ This meeting called on individual states to address the problem of nuclear security, asking states to make “efforts to support internationally agreed security standards such as the ISPS and various UN security conventions and protocols”. However, since the meeting few additional states in the region have signed up to the relevant conventions and protocols covering WMD proliferation, and only Indonesia and the Philippines have taken pro-active steps to cooperate with the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan. The situation is not universally negative, however, as the same meeting reached agreement on some significant measures to strengthen transport security, outlined in *The ARF Statement on Strengthening Transport Security Against International Terrorism*.⁴¹ The Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of this meeting stated that participants recognized the need to intensify bilateral, regional, and global cooperation in maritime security, including initiating specific agreements regarding customs operation and the conduct of border patrols.⁴² Significantly, the statement declared that ARF states would undertake to implement their commitments under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Ship and Port Security Code by the agreed date of 1 July 2004 — a pledge that many participants appear to have acted upon, according to IMO Secretary-General, Efthimios Mitropoulos.⁴³

The ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-proliferation, issued at the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum, held in Jakarta on 2 July 2004, represents progress in that it made more specific commitments in relation to nuclear security outlined in *The ARF Statement on Non-proliferation*.⁴⁴ This reaffirmed the need for member states to adhere to and implement each of the operative paragraphs outlined in UNSCR 1540, reiterating the need to address the issue of non-proliferation and disarmament in a wide and comprehensive manner, taking into account the ARF participants’ resources and capacities. It also stressed the importance of ARF members strengthening their national legislation regarding WMD — including regarding illicit trafficking and export controls, and urged ARF participants to enhance their levels of regional cooperation among each other and also with the IAEA and OPCW. Beyond reinforcing the obligations outlined in UNSCR 1540, the statement included more specific measures to increase regional assistance and strengthen WMD mechanisms, including a pledge to maximize the provision of technical expertise amongst ARF participants; a decision to encourage the ARF Chair to explore with the ASEAN Secretariat, or, if established, an ARF Unit, whether it would be willing to record requests from ARF participants

for assistance; and a political commitment amongst ARF participants to work towards following the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.⁴⁵

Although there is broad recognition that ARF meetings and consensus statements play an important role in fostering cooperation, the ARF has traditionally been criticized for failing to go far enough due to the limitations imposed upon it by its founding principles — particularly the principles of consensus and non-interference (Leifer 1996; Simon 1998). These, combined with low institutionalization and non-binding decisions, ensure that the ARF has no capacity for autonomous activity as a security actor. Although the role of the ARF chair includes the right to select topics to be included on the agenda of ARF ministerial meetings, the mere discussion of and agreement on security measures does not necessarily lead to action or progress, leading some scholars to conclude that the ARF's security role is largely irrelevant, representing nothing more than a talking shop for diplomats and other government officials (Umbach 2002). Although it is not often stated in such blunt terms, there is also a sense of frustration over the institution's lack of capacity for independent action from within the Western members of the ARF, which would like to see more concrete steps taken to broaden and deepen regional security cooperation. However, such proponents of stronger regional security frameworks overlook the existence of significant and deliberate international restrictions on the development of regional institutions as independent security actors (Graham 2004). The United Nations Charter, for example, discourages strong regionalism in the security sphere in the interests of global cohesion where matters of peace and security are concerned. These reservations were based on the fear of the organization's founders that a powerful regional organization could attempt to dominate the global order by force. Thus they decided that all military enforcement actions in matters of international peace and security should be left to the UN Security Council, which under Article 53 of the UN Charter prohibits regional agencies from implementing initiatives that are not UN-mandated. Although the current UN reform process may result in greater flexibility in the interpretation of Article 53 in recognition of the growing importance of regional cooperation, it is likely that constraints on regional agencies will remain for the reasons they were originally imposed.⁴⁶ Thus it is probable that, even if a consensus existed amongst ARF members to act with greater regional autonomy, such action would continue to be proscribed by the United Nations.

The ASTOP Talks

In contrast to the slow and difficult progress made by larger institutional security initiatives, the Asian Senior-level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP), which are hosted in Tokyo, appear to have been reasonably productive and comparatively harmonious, suggesting that ad hoc, single-issue approaches to regional security cooperation may be more workable than formal institution-building. The ASTOP Talks include high-ranking officials from ASEAN, as well as Australia, China, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, who meet to discuss and evaluate regional commitments and efforts to prevent WMD proliferation. Crucially, this dialogue is conducted according to Asian diplomatic conventions, and as a result appears to foster a greater degree of trust amongst participants, thus achieving more in terms of consensus and compromise, facilitating agreement on a series on counter-terrorism measures, particularly in relation to WMD. This process may also have been facilitated by the timing and context of the meetings, which have been held in the shadow of a series of terrorist attacks in Asia and the ongoing North Korean nuclear crisis. Thus, in addition to the greater sensitivity to cultural particularities that characterizes the meetings, heightened threat perceptions may have concentrated the minds of participants and led to a sense of urgency that has been lacking in other forums.

Two ASTOP meetings have been held to date: the first in November 2003, the second in February 2005. The latter focused on the non-proliferation activities of ASEAN, the ARF, and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the progress since the first meeting 18 months earlier. According to the published agenda, participants discussed a number of topics aimed at improving regional non-proliferation efforts, including strengthening participation of Asian states in IAEA Additional Protocol to strengthen nuclear inspections on their respective territories, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).⁴⁷ Delegates also focused on the “difficulties and obstacles Asian countries may face in implementing treaties and norms related to disarmament and non-proliferation” and “the possibilities for cooperation in overcoming obstacles”. They identified steps to take, stressing the importance of raising domestic awareness and strengthening the implementation of international non-proliferation obligations both through “soft” approaches, such as capacity-building, and “hard” approaches, such as improved equipment and facilities. The participating nations agreed that developing countries in the region should receive assistance to help

them improve domestic export controls to stem the flow of nuclear materials and technology.

One of the most interesting aspects of these meetings is that they have facilitated high-level contact between ASEAN members, the United States, and China, allowing them to engage in the type of quiet, non-confrontational, and private dialogue that is consistent with ASEAN diplomatic practices. Thus, while progress on many of the issues on the agenda has been slow to materialize, the fact that contentious and politically sensitive topics are being discussed in a dedicated forum represents significant progress in terms of the development of regional security cooperation. Growing agreement between participants over the role of the US-led PSI is particularly interesting as, with the exception of Singapore, it was originally greeted with the same suspicion by ASEAN members as it was by China. However, discussion of the initiative within the ASTOP forum appears to have significantly reduced regional resistance to it, leading to an emerging consensus in Southeast Asia over the benefits of interdicting WMD and missile-related shipments on an informal, cooperative basis. Since the first ASTOP meeting in 2003, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia have now either actively joined or verbally endorsed the PSI, and Malaysia has indicated that it may be willing to participate in future PSI activities.⁴⁸ While Indonesia continues to be outspoken in its opposition to the initiative, this does represent a significant turnaround in regional attitudes, suggesting that, under the right conditions, ASEAN members are more willing to accept the US counter-terrorism agenda, and see mutual benefits accruing through cooperation.

Conclusion

Global counter-terrorism instruments, such as UNSCR 1540, are bringing all states into a universal framework aimed at increasing the security of NBCR materials and expertise. The necessity of such instruments is not in doubt, as evidenced by the gaps in the existing non-proliferation regimes, which are not universal in nature and have failed to deal effectively with the non-state actor problem — as exposed by the AQ Khan proliferation network. It is also widely acknowledged that the evolving non-proliferation framework imposes major burdens on developing states, some of which do not appear to face a direct threat from NBCR trafficking, due to their limited utilization of dual-use technologies and their lack of WMD-related trade. This problem has been recognized by the UN Counter-Terrorism

and 1540 committees and by numerous developed countries, which have offered technical and financial assistance to states struggling to comply with their growing non-proliferation obligations.

Different types of regional security institution have an important role to play in helping states meet the challenges posed by new counter-terrorism measures, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that opportunities for capacity-building at the regional level are being seized by states in the Asia-Pacific, both by states that are genuinely committed to reducing security threats, and, as has sometimes been suggested, by states that wish to obtain handouts and are willing to accept the conditions that are attached (Buzan and Waever 2003; Nabers 2004; Schirm 2002). Less tangible, but equally significant, is the role that regional institutions can play in bridging the divide between the so-called universalism of global governance and the cultural particularities of different regions. Although it is not always the case, regional security institutions can potentially afford greater recognition to states that feel threatened and undermined by global institutions and Western security agendas (Deacon 2001; Graham 2004). This is one of the most important functions of ARF, in that it promotes a more holistic approach to regional security, encouraging security cooperation over issues such as environmental degradation, weapons proliferation, and trans-national crime, without trampling cultural and societal sensitivities to the degree that global mechanisms often do. This approach is not without its difficulties and frustrations, however, in that a respect for cultural norms slows the pace of institution-building and places limits on the nature and scope of their activities, which to some might appear counter-productive at a time when urgent and drastic measures are needed to tackle genuine security threats. In response, some APEC members have been pushing hard and fast to develop a regional security institution that is more action-oriented and dynamic. However, as this article has argued, these efforts appear to be backfiring to some extent, exposing an ideological fault-line through the institution that appears to be reducing the opportunities for genuine security cooperation.

While large, ambitious forums along the lines of APEC and ARF have an important role to play in promoting cross-cultural communication on security matters, experience to date suggests that, where NBCR security issues are concerned, concrete action and cooperation is more likely at the bilateral and sub-regional level. The challenges associated with the effective implementation of UNSCR 1540 are more likely to be met through smaller, issue-specific forums, such as ASTOP, and by bilateral security discussions, which set limited,

focused objectives and thus have a greater chance of achieving them. Recognition of this should assist policy-makers in closing the gaps that currently exist in the non-proliferation regime, helping to ensure that the weakest links in the global counter-terrorism effort are closed.

NOTES

- 1 United Nations, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 2004, <http://www.un.org/secureworld>.
- 2 According to information extracted during interrogations of two key members of Jemaah Islamiyah, who were captured in Southeast Asia in 2001–2002, an Al Qaeda plan to develop NBCR weapons was in the early conceptual stages when it was cut short by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Officials believe the chemical and biological weapons programme was being run by Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain and US-trained bio-chemist, under the direction of Riduan Isamuddin, an Indonesian accused of heading Al Qaeda's operations in Southeast Asia. Information has also come to light that Al Qaeda attempted to buy a quantity of enriched uranium from Sudan in the early 1990s, and that more recent attempts have been made to acquire fissile and radioactive materials from other sources. Although all the evidence collected to date suggests that Al Qaeda, despite its efforts, has never developed or acquired a nuclear weapon, it does appear to have come close to constructing a radiological dispersal device. "Afghanistan Invasion Halted Early Stages of Al Qaeda WMD Programs, Security Officials Say", Associated Press, 26 January 2004; Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials"; Associated Press, "Text: Ashcroft on Dirty Bomb", 10 June 2002.
- 3 Until the introduction of these resolutions, the most comprehensive non-proliferation agreement was the NPT, which provides state parties with the option to withdraw from the Treaty under Article X. North Korea is the only state in the history of the Treaty to withdraw, but there are concerns that this action might lead to a spate of withdrawals, particularly if it tests its nuclear capability.
- 4 The resolution was drafted in broad terms, with many requirements and penalties for non-fulfilment left vague and open to interpretation. Some scholars have made the valid point that this leaves room for differences in implementation, although it must be acknowledged that this is typical of all multilateral agreements, which rely heavily on the language of diplomacy to have any chance of achieving consensus.
- 5 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540(2004).
- 6 The fact that fulfilment of the obligations set out in 1540 is a demanding task, is evidenced by the comments by Ellen Margrethe Loj, the Danish Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Asked what should be done in response to states that do not fulfil their obligations, she stressed that many states genuinely lack the capacity to implement them, requiring assistance. She pointed out that implementation had been very difficult for Denmark. See UN Press Briefing, "Press Conference by Chairs of Security Council Committees Concerning Terrorism", 28 June 2005, <http://www.un.org>.

- 7 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540(2004).
- 8 Rather than the formal, legalistic approach to interaction and cooperation, which was first developed and exported by the European colonial powers and which now underpins international approaches to global governance, the ASEAN members have developed their institutional framework on a locally bred, informal, personalistic, and private political culture. At its heart is the principle of quiet consultation, known as *musyawarah*, as the basis of settling differences between neighbours. This involves seeking agreement, harmony, and consensus over confrontation, accepting the need for sensitivity, politeness, and agreeability in dealings with others, and engaging in private elitist diplomacy over frank, open discussion of disagreements. Largely reflecting this informal, consultative approach, all instruments of ASEAN and the ARF work on a voluntary basis: there are no institutionalized enforcement structures, verification mechanisms, or official sanctions for uncooperative behaviour.
- 9 See comments by Laxanachantorn Laohaphan of Thailand in United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Encourages Work of Revitalized Counter-Terrorism Committee”, 59th Meeting, 19 October 2004, SC/8221, <http://www.un.org>. See also remarks by Lauro Baja of the Philippines in United Nations Information Service, “Security Council Briefed by Chairmen of Anti-Terrorism Committees; Calls for Strengthened Cooperation, Enhanced Information Sharing”, 26 April 2005, SC/8366, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org>. For more general ASEAN reservations, see note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the 1540 Committee, 3 May 2005, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/117, p. 4.
- 10 For example, such comments were made by anonymous reporters at the Press Conference by the Chairs of the Terrorism Committees in June 2005. Stating that certain countries used excuses to justify their lack of political will to cooperate with the 1540 Committee, one correspondent asked whether the chairpersons were willing to identify such countries, and what would be done to punish them. In response, Mihnea Loan Motoc, the Romanian Chair of the 1540 Committee stated that the Committees were not in the “naming and shaming business”. UN Press Briefing, “Press Conference by Chairs of Security Council Committees Concerning Terrorism”, 28 June 2005, <http://www.un.org>.
- 11 The country reports are all available at the website of the 1540 Committee, <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/index.html>.
- 12 Specifically, the Philippines requested assistance in the following areas: training first responders; border control; the physical protection of Research Reactor PRR-1; enhancement and upgrade of container and cargo security in several seaports; and drafting of appropriate laws governing border monitoring. *Initial Report of the Republic of the Philippines on Measures Taken in Implementation of Security Council 1540 (2004)*, S/AC.44/2004/(02)34, pp. 12–13, <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/index.html>.
- 13 Annex to the note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, 21 March 2005, S/AC.44/2004/(02)/110, p. 4.
- 14 Second Supplementary Report to the Counter-terrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council’s Resolution 1373 (2001), S/2003/1171, p. 10.

- 15 UN Press Briefing, “Press Conference by Chairs of Security Council Committees Concerning Terrorism”, 28 June 2005, <http://www.un.org>.
- 16 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540(2004), Operative Paragraph (OP) 8.
- 17 It will be interesting to note which states sign up to the new International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which opened for signature on 14 September 2005. This convention, which was adopted without a vote in the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005, specifically aims to prevent and suppress acts of nuclear terrorism. The text of the treaty can be viewed in portable document format (pdf) at <http://www.un.int/usa/a-59-766.pdf>
- 18 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) is currently in the process of being strengthened through the adoption of additional measures to avert smuggling of nuclear materials or sabotage of facilities. UN News Centre, “In Face of Potential Nuclear Terrorism, States Seek to Strengthen UN-Backed Treaty”, 30 June 2005, <http://www.un.org>.
- 19 Operative Paragraph (OP) 2 of Resolution 1540 deals with this issue, requiring parties to state the domestic laws they have in place which “prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”.
- 20 The key legislative measure, which forms the linchpin of Singapore’s domestic efforts, is the 2003 Strategic Goods (Control) Act, which includes “catch-all” provisions and covers imports and exports, re-export, trans-shipments, and intangible transfers of goods and technology that could be used for WMD development. Thanks to this, four other acts — the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act, the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition Act), the Arms Offence Act, and the Arms and Explosives Act — and a bilateral cooperation agreement with Japan, Singapore is developing more effective ways to deal with the growing problem of illicit transfer of sensitive weapons materials, which will hopefully encourage other regional states to follow its lead. Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), “East Asian Governments Report on Export Control and Nonproliferation Progress: Review of Reports to the 1540 Committee”, *Asian Export Control Observer*, no. 6, February/March 2005.
- 21 “Myanmar–North Korea Nuclear, Missile Cooperation Alleged”, *Asian Export Control Observer*, no. 1, April 2004, pp. 11–12; “North Korea Reactor for Myanmar”, *News Insight*, 6 May 2004; and Alan Boyd, “Myanmar Aims for Missiles and Misses”, *Asia Times Online*, <http://www.atimes.com>; and E.J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas”, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, September/October 1997, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.
- 22 CNS, “2004 in Review: Export Controls and Nonproliferation in East Asia”, no. 5, December 2004–January 2005, p. 7.
- 23 The fact that Indonesia recently co-hosted a workshop on the Biological Weapons Convention with Australia, which included discussion on improving security and oversight of pathogens and toxins and implementation of effective export controls as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, may signal a more proactive stance on this issue by Indonesia. “East Asian Governments Report on Export Control and Nonproliferation Progress: Review of Reports to the 1540 Committee”, p. 18.
- 24 CNS, “2004 in Review: Export Controls and Nonproliferation in East Asia”, p. 10.

- 25 CNS, "East Asian Governments Report on Export Control and Nonproliferation Progress: Review of Reports to the 1540 Committee", p. 22.
- 26 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540(2004).
- 27 Australia has hosted and co-hosted a number of significant capacity-building workshops, including (with Singapore), an ARF Confidence Building Measure workshop titled "Managing the Consequences of a Major Terrorist Attack" in Darwin in June 2003; the "Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security Conference: Protecting Against Nuclear Terrorism", in November 2004; and (with Indonesia), the "Regional Biological Weapons Convention Workshop", in Melbourne in February 2005, all of which were attended by various Southeast Asian government representatives. CNS, "2004 in Review: Export Controls and Nonproliferation in East Asia", p. 6.
- 28 ARF Annual Security Outlooks: Australia, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf>.
- 29 See the official APEC website, <http://www.apecsec.org.sg>, and "CTTF Terms of Reference", submitted to the Senior Officials Meeting, Seoul, Korea, 3–4 March 2005, 2005/SOM1/026anxa_rev2. The work of the CTTF is founded on the APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, which commits it to assisting members in the identification of CT needs; coordinating capacity-building, and technical assistance programmes; and facilitating cooperation between APEC forums on CT issues.
- 30 This activity, which is to be completed by experts in July/August 2005, is intended to provide information for the CTTF's future work. A sanitized version of the final CTAPs cross-analysis will be posted on the APEC website, with only authorized individuals gaining access to the full report. APEC, "CTTF 2005 Work Plan", 6th CTTF Meeting, Seoul, Korea, 3–4 March 2005, 2005/SOM1/026anxb.
- 31 Quoted in CNS, "APEC Countries Discuss Export Controls, Regional Security", *Asian Export Control Observer*, no. 5 (December 2004/January 2005), p. 18.
- 32 Malaysian CTAP, submitted in October 2004. The CTAPs are available on the APEC website at <http://www.apec.org>.
- 33 See <http://www.apec.org>.
- 34 APEC, "Counter-Terrorism Task Force Chair's Summary Report", Senior Officials' Meeting II, Jeju, Korea, 30–31 May 2005, 2005/SOM2/028.
- 35 The aim of this mechanism is twofold: (a) to incorporate non-members of APEC in Southeast Asia (Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia) into the framework, and (b) to forge links and encourage cooperation between the CTTF and other international and regional CT bodies.
- 36 APEC, "CTTF 2005 Work Plan", 6th CTTF Meeting, Seoul, Korea, 3–4 March 2005, 2005/SOM1/026anxb. This proposal was included as point E.4 of the "2005 CTTF Work Plan", under the heading "Consider New Initiatives".
- 37 APEC, "Counter-Terrorism Task Force Chair's Summary Report", Senior Officials' Meeting II, Jeju, Korea, 30–31 May 2005, 2005/SOM2/028.
- 38 APEC, "Promoting Cross-Cultural Communication Within the APEC Region", Senior Officials' Meeting I, Seoul, Korea, 3–4 March 2005, 2005/SOM1/041.
- 39 ARF, Chairman's Statement, 9th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, 31 July 2002, <http://www.aseansec.org/12661.htm>.
- 40 Co-Chairs Summary Report of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional

- Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Manila, 30–31 March 2004, <http://www.aseansec.org/16101.htm>.
- 41 ARF, “Chairman’s Statement, The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum”, paras. 25–26, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf>.
- 42 ARF, “Co-Chairs’ Summary Report of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime”, para. 5, <http://www.aseansec.org>.
- 43 On 30 June 2004, Mr Mitropoulos stated that “the figures released indicate that the number of port facility security plans submitted and approved has increased significantly in the week before 1 July 2004. ... Although the figures are changing constantly, at the moment the percentage of port facility plans approved has caught up with the percentage of International Ship Security Certificates issued. It is clear that all parties concerned, Governments and the industry alike, are doing their utmost to be ready for the entry-into-force date”. IMO, “ISPS Code Status Update 2005: Continued Improvement in ISPS Code Implementation”, <http://www.imo.org>.
- 44 “ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Non-Proliferation”, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2 July 2004, <http://www.aseansec.org>.
- 45 ARF, “Chairman’s Statement, The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum”, sections 5(C), 6(A), and 6(B).
- 46 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty addressed this issue, and decided in favour of Security Council primacy where military enforcement is concerned. It concluded that “those calling for an intervention must formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on his own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter”. Quoted in Graham (2004, p. 127).
- 47 CNS, “East Asian Governments Report on Export Control and Nonproliferation Progress: Review of Reports to the 1540 Committee”, p. 7.
- 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Chairman’s Summary, Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation, Tokyo, 13 December 2003, <http://www.mofa.go.jp>; US Department of State, “Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative”, 27 October 2004, <http://www.state.gov>.

REFERENCES CITED

- Abuza, Zachary. 2002. “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network”. *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 3.
- Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deacon, Bob. 2001. “The Social Dimension of Regionalism: A Constructive Alternative to Neo-Liberal Globalisation?” *GASPP Occasional Paper*, no. 8.
- Evans, Gareth. 2004. “Global and Regional Security: Our Shared Responsibility”. Speech to the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 15 December 2004.

- Goh, Gillian. 2003. "The 'ASEAN Way': Non-intervention and ASEAN's Role in Conflict Management". *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, no. 1.
- Graham, Kennedy. 2004. *Regional Security and Global Governance: A Study of Interaction between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council with a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism*. Bruges, Belgium: United Nations University, CRIS.
- Heller, Dominik. 2005. "The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 1.
- Jones, Scott A. 2004. "Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response". <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi>.
- Leifer, Michael. 1996. "The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security". *Adelphi Papers*, no. 302. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nabers, Dirk. 2004. "The War on Terrorism and Security Cooperation in the Pacific". Paper presented to the 39th Otago Foreign Policy School, University of Otago.
- Ogilvie-White, Tanya. 2004. *Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia*. The Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Occasional Paper Series. <http://www.uq.edu.au>.
- Perkovich, George, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal. 2005. *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Roston, Michael. 2002. "Nuclear Archipelagos? Secure Nuclear Materials in Southeast Asia". *PacNet Newsletter* (CSIS Pacific Forum), no. 25.
- Schirm, Stefan A. 2002. *Globalization and the New Regionalism: Global Markets, Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Shafie, Mohd and Carlyle A. Thayer. 2003. "Security, Political Terrorism and Militant Islam in Southeast Asia". *Trends in Southeast Asia Series*, no. 7.
- Simon, Sheldon W. 1998. "Security Prospects in Southeast Asia: Collaborative Efforts and the ASEAN Regional Forum". *Pacific Review* 11, no. 2.
- . 2003. "President Bush Addresses Anti-terror Agenda in Southeast Asia". *Comparative Connections* (Pacific Forum CSIS). <http://www.csis.org>.
- Steyn, Ben. 2005. "Understanding the Implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1540". *African Security Review* 14, no. 1.
- Umbach, Frank. 2002. *Conflict or Cooperation in Asia: China's Integration into Regional Security Structures and the Consequences for Europe*. Munich: Oldenbourg.
- Woodward, Angela. 2005. "Non-State Actors and WMD — UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Monitoring Implementation". *INESAP Bulletin* 24. <http://www.inesap.org>.

TANYA OGILVIE-WHITE is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and Communication, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

Copyright of *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* is the property of Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.