How Demography Foretold the Arab Spring:

Age Structure and the Chances for Liberal Democracy in North Africa and the Middle East

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
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


Year (5-yr period)

Transitional


Population age structures


2005





Data: UN Population Division, 2007

Tunisia













Figure 2. Population age structures of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and the UK in 2010. Data Source: UN Population Division, 2009.

Four categories: four individual countries



ISRAEL: Shifting composition in a relatively stable age structure




Fig. 3. Projected changes in the composition of Israel's age structure, 2005 to 2030.

Hobbesian (or Authoritarian) Bargain Hypothesis:


Citizens are willing to cede political rights and civil liberties for physical and economic security.

[corollary: things are peaceful, I want my rights back]

Youth Bulge Hypothesis:


Populations with large proportions of young adults in their workingage population are at an elevated risk of political violence due to the ease of recruitment.

- (a) rapid rate of workforce growth, unemployment
- (b) culture typified by experimentation/passion/interest in novelty, idealism, risk-taking, ideological naïveté, and creativity.





Net


Median Age (Years)




* Conflict involves a more youthful minority









Youth bulges and the path to liberal democracy: 8 selected states

Some anecdotal evidence of rises as youth bulge declines.

Figure 1





Figure 1. Trends in the proportion of young adults in the working-age population and freedom scores in eight recently democratized and democratizing countries. Data sources: Freedom House (2008); UN Population Division (2007); Executive Yuan, Republic of China (2008).

Why does this model work?

Fate of States rising to liberal democracy during the decade



	Median Age (2010)	Probability of Liberal Democracy (FREE) (2010)	YEAR of a 50% Chance (MA=28.9) (UN Medium Variant, 2009)	Current FH Assessment (2010)	Current FH Score
Cyprus	36.5	0.76	1986	Free (since 1981)	1.0
Lebanon	29.2	0.51	2009	Partly Free	4.0
Tunisia	29.1	0.51	2011	Not Free	6.0
Turkey	28.3	0.48	2012	Partly Free	3.0
Iran	26.8	0.43	2014	Not Free	6.0
Algeria	26.2	0.41	2017	Not Free	5.5
Morocco	26.2	0.41	2017	Partly Free	4.5
Libya	26.2	0.41	2020	Not Free	7.0
Qatar	24.2	0.34	? (no projections)	Not Free	5.5
Egypt	23.9	0.33	2026	Not Free	5.5
Bahrain	23.0	0.30	? (no projections)	Not Free	5.5
Jordan	22.8	0.29	2028	Not Free	5.5
Syria	22.5	0.28	2031	Not Free	6.5
Oman	19.7	0.19	? (no projections)	Not Free	5.5
United Arab Emirates	19.6	0.18	? (no projections)	Not Free	5.5
Kuwait	19.5	0.18	? (no projections)	Partly Free	4.5
Saudi Arabia	19.4	0.18	? (no projections)	Not Free	6.5
Iraq	19.3	0.17	~2040	Not Free	5.5
Yemen	17.8	0.12	>2040	Not Free	5.5
Palestinian Territories	17.6	0.11	>2040	Occupied	Х
20	23.9	6			
States	Mean Median Age	Expected Liberal Democracies			

Model Predictions and Observations:

 Not ready for liberal democracy? Liberal democracies should be rare and unstable among youthful age structures (median age <= 25.0).

2007 (8), 2010 (6), decline of 25%

2. From 2010 to 2019. Expect half of the states to pass through 50-50 benchmark to rise to liberal democracy (FH "Free").


Two regional clusters of non-liberal states:

North Africa (Morocco to Egypt)


northwest corner of South America (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador)

3. Age isn't enough. Liberal democracies should prevail among agestructurally mature countries (median age > 35.0) and should be stable.

2007 (32), 2009 (33), 2010 (32), decline of 3% last year 89 % of age-structurally mature countries are "free"








Youthful Age Structures

median age <25.0

Within category

Recently departed category






Youthful Age Structures

median age <25.0

Within category

Recently departed category






Youthful Age Structures

median age <25.0

Within category

Recently departed category






median age <25.0

The Demographic Arc of Instability

Within category

Recently departed category






median age >25.0 to \leq 35.0


- Recently entered category
- Within category
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- Recently entered category
- Within category
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




median age >25.0 to <35.0

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




median age >25.0 to <35.0

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




The Demographic Turning Point

- Recently entered category
- Within category
- Recently departed category





Mature Age Structures

median age >35.0 to <45.0

- Recently entered category
- Within category
- Recently departed category


☐ Temporary migrant-influenced age structure



Post-mature states








Mature Age Structures

median age >35.0 to <45.0

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- Within category
- Recently departed category

Temporary migrant-influenced age structure

Post-Mature Age Structures





median age >45.0

- Recently entered category
- Within category

Post-mature states







Mature Age Structures

median age >35.0 to <45.0

- Recently entered category
- Within category
- Recently departed category

Post-Mature Age Structures

median age >45.0

- Recently entered category
- Within category