

**NATO Beyond the Lisbon Summit
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The CSIS Kissinger Chair, Europe and International Security Programs, and New European Democracies Project, in cooperation with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Polish Institute of International Affairs, organized a November 29 conference on “NATO Beyond the Lisbon Summit.” NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James G. Stavridis and U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy gave keynote addresses. Other senior American and European officials and experts and over 200 participants discussed the Lisbon Summit decisions and four sets of issues central to their implementation: adapting collective defense obligations to emerging security challenges, the transition in Afghanistan, enhancing political consultations and crisis management capabilities, and expanding the Alliance’s cooperation with Russia.

Highlights

- The Lisbon Summit set a clear strategic direction for the Alliance. It provided guidance for adaptation of NATO’s military posture to deal with emerging security challenges, outlined a strategy for security transition and long-term cooperation with Afghanistan, initiated reforms of Alliance structures to increase efficient use of resources, and advanced partnerships with Russia and other countries. It also reaffirmed the Alliance as a cornerstone of U.S. security.
- While the Alliance has a strategic blueprint, hard work and further resource commitments are required to build it. The European level of ambition will be determinate. Achieving the critical military capabilities and reforms endorsed at Lisbon will require strong support and further cooperation among the UK, France, and Germany, defense integration among smaller European countries, pooling arrangements, and real progress toward a European pillar.
- The planned transition to an Afghan lead in security starting in 2011 will be hampered by shortcomings of the Afghan security forces and government and by substantial shortfalls of qualified trainers. NATO needs to develop its comprehensive approach and work more effectively with a diverse range of civilian partners if it is going to stabilize Afghanistan.
- Lisbon reaffirmed collective defense (Article 5) as a core mission of NATO. A range of new threats including terrorism, cyber, and energy disruptions call for enhanced Allied political consultations and crisis management capabilities that could head off an Article 5 action. The mandated deterrence and defense posture review should be open to further reductions of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons but preserve a role for them in Alliance strategy and take into account the UK and French deterrents, as well as the impact of missile defense.
- The Lisbon NATO-Russia Council decisions create opportunities to deepen cooperation with Russia on such issues as Afghanistan, piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and missile defense. Lisbon also called for strengthening partnerships with other countries in Europe, Eurasia, the Mediterranean, Middle East, and East Asia, as well as with the United Nations, European Union, OSCE, and other international institutions.

Opening Keynote: NATO's Way Ahead After Lisbon

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Admiral James G. Stavridis provided a strategic overview of the Alliance's enduring value, military transformation, progress in Afghanistan and other operations, development of partnerships, and key security challenges ahead. He said the Lisbon Summit was very successful on a number of fronts. It set a clear strategic direction for the Alliance over the coming decade, demonstrated that NATO is continuing to adapt its military posture to emerging 21st century challenges, reaffirmed the transatlantic link as a cornerstone of U.S. security, outlined a strategy for security transition and long-term cooperation with Afghanistan, and advanced partnerships with Russia and other countries.

Admiral Stavridis noted that leadership of the International Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is NATO's most demanding current operation and has illustrated that military operations alone can't deliver security in such contingencies. The Comprehensive Approach, which was reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept approved at Lisbon, will be essential to success in Afghanistan and most future NATO operations. NATO needs a diverse range of partners—including diplomats and officials from a wide range of civilian agencies and experts from many international and non-governmental organizations—if it is going to succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan. The ISAF coalition includes 48 troop contributing countries and 70 funding countries. He cited the approximately seven million pupils in school in Afghanistan today—three million of them female—and the 27,000 Afghan soldiers learning to read as among the most lasting achievements of the ISAF mission. By next summer 100,000 members of the Afghan National Security Forces will have a basic level of literacy, and NATO trainers are also teaching them how to provide for their country's security. Building partnership capacity and making security local are key elements of Alliance strategy in promoting the Comprehensive Approach. Continued progress in training the Afghan National Security Forces, will be essential to realizing the phased, conditions-based transition to an Afghan lead in security starting in 2011 that was agreed by ISAF contributors in Lisbon.

Admiral Stavridis emphasized the continued development of partnerships as critical to Alliance success in the future. He noted the participation of President Medvedev in the Summit and the decisions of the NATO-Russia Council as major positives that create opportunities to deepen bilateral cooperation on such issues as piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, Afghanistan, and missile defense. If this cooperation advances, Russia could become a strategic partner. Stavridis also mentioned that the Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and ISAF are opportunities to deepen partnerships with a wide range of nations outside Europe. He praised Turkey's influential role in developing partnerships with the Islamic world.

In the face of diverse new security threats including ballistic nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, piracy, and cyber attacks, Stavridis noted the enduring importance of Article 5 as the bedrock of the Alliance. SACEUR pointed out that dealing with these new threats require adapting Allied military forces and command structures and realizing the critical defense capabilities package endorsed in Lisbon. However, he noted that European and U.S. defense budgets and overall governmental resources are being squeezed by the global financial crisis. Shrinking and aging populations in most NATO countries will limit recruiting pools for their volunteer forces. NATO has a GDP of \$31 trillion with seven million men under arms (active and reserve) and 3,400 ships. NATO is still a big and capable Alliance despite current budget constraints and Stavridis believes it can accomplish its ambitious goals in a difficult time by utilizing its resources smarter. He cited the appropriate downsizing of the NATO military command structure from 13,000 to 9,000 personnel as a contribution to that effort. Stavridis concluded that the Lisbon Summit has given NATO new direction and dynamism. He said the

Alliance will need to remain militarily capable and more effective in communicating to a diverse global audience that is a force for good.

Article 5 and Emerging Security Challenges Under NATO's New Strategic Concept

Experts on the first panel explored the nuances of the Strategic Concept and the implications of emerging security challenges for the collective self-defense obligations codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Lisbon reaffirmed Article 5 as a core mission of NATO. However, panelists noted the debate during the drafting of the Strategic Concept, as to whether a range of new threats including terrorism, cyber attacks, and energy disruptions would constitute “armed attack” and thereby trigger Article 5 obligations. The drafters of the new Strategic Concept decided not to provide a complete definition of what constitutes an “armed attack.”

Territorial defense against armed attack remains a central pillar of NATO military planning, but Allied leaders must now consider how to maintain an effective and affordable defense architecture in an environment of irregular, asymmetrical, and ambiguous threats. These complex challenges, along with constrained financial resources and a lack of consensus on how to best deal with future threats, has moved NATO to better define its mission and extend its definition of security. The Lisbon Summit attempted to create a new storyboard for NATO. It reassured its member states that Article 5 will remain the cornerstone of NATO's mission, backed by prudent military contingency plans, and that there is no contradiction between these efforts and cooperation with Russia.

One panelist argued that Iran's potential emergence as a nuclear weapons state with long-range ballistic missiles capable of threatening European territory and populations makes Article 5 salient in the traditional sense. But defense of Allied territory must also embrace critical infrastructure protection, cyber defense, and consequence management. Whether some of these new threats should be classified as Article 5 attacks remains to be seen, but several questions merit further scrutiny. How should Allies view a cyber attack and how should such an attack be met? Would it require a collective response? Are there instances in which a country would be left to deal with certain kinds of attacks alone? Is NATO willing and prepared to act preventively to stop a large-scale terrorist attack against a member nation? Such preventive military actions would require exquisite and compelling intelligence warning.

A European panelist noted that Lisbon marked the first time a strategic concept has been set in a global rather than a European context. He fears the ease with which agreement was reached reflects not a shared level of ambition but a lack of interest. He noted that the British Strategic Defence and Security Review and recent French and German defense cuts were announced before the Strategic Concept. This speaker argued that the real test of the Strategic Concept will be the European level of ambition. Without the concomitant political will in the three power capitals of Europe—London, Paris, and Berlin which represent 65 percent of all defense expenditure in NATO Europe and 88 percent of all research and technology investment—the Strategic Concept will not move beyond the rhetorical. For most Europeans the most important recent events in Europe were the Irish debt crisis and the threat of financial and economic contagion, not the Lisbon Summit or the Franco-British defense treaty. This speaker expressed concern that with the 19 NATO Europe members spending less than \$U.S. 4 billion annually on defense, NATO Europe will make only marginal improvements in capabilities to undertake various missions. He argued that achieving critical capabilities will require more synergy among the bigger European powers, some form of defense integration among the smaller ones, and an entirely new European pillar. He also called for NATO's entire exercise, training, and simulation program to be updated on a new model of defense education aimed at exploiting comparative advantages.

Another European panelist stressed the need to muster the resources and political will to realize key goals and begin the transition to Afghan security lead in Afghanistan. He noted there was a concern in Central Europe that global challenges and Afghanistan would dominate the new Strategic Concept. However, the Strategic Concept is well-balanced identifying Article 5 and new threats as two sides of the same coin. Reaffirmation of Article 5 as the core mission of NATO and steps to make NATO more visible on the territory of member states—for example by deployment of missile defense sites in Romania and Poland—is reassuring to Central and East European governments. He expressed satisfaction with the NATO-EU section of the Concept and noted that the Polish presidency of the EU in 2011 would seek to improve that relationship.

American and European panelists agreed that NATO's nuclear footprint must change, but adjusting the U.S. nuclear deployments in Europe should be done in ways that don't undermine the credibility of extended deterrence. Lisbon endorsed the notion of further nuclear reductions, and the U.S. is committed to negotiating with Russia on further reductions of all types of nuclear weapons once the new START Treaty enters into force. Both European panelists argued that the deterrence and defense posture review mandated by the Lisbon Summit Declaration must preserve a role for nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy. One speaker said U.S. theater nuclear weapons are essential to NATO's deterrent posture, but only if taken in conjunction with the UK and French deterrents and missile defense. He contended that developing a common European and U.S. threat assessment will be as important as consultations and command and control arrangements in developing an effective missile defense system.

One panelist agreed that NATO is a key player in protecting the "global commons," but European navies have too few, very expensive ships to exercise effective sea control. This calls for more, smaller ships, networked with partners around the world. In dealing with the cyber threat, panelists agreed that NATO should enhance its cyber deterrence by redoubling efforts to protect critical nodes and develop some counter-cyber punishment capabilities.

NATO in Afghanistan: Moving Toward Transition in 2011

The second panel addressed the conditions-based transition in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has presented NATO with its toughest challenge in the recent past and in the near-term future. NATO and Afghanistan have entered a new phase of effort, which will see the lead for security passing from the former to latter. The Alliance must ensure that conditions for lasting security exist before the transition takes place in order for the process to be orderly. Despite progress made in combating the insurgency, violence still remains a concern. One significant challenge for Afghanistan is the spread of violence to the North, which must be taken seriously and proper measures should be made to prevent or limit it.

One panelist put the conflict in Afghanistan into perspective when he stated that the West has now been engaged in fighting in Afghanistan longer than the Soviet Union was. He contended that the U.S. and NATO finally have a coherent and well-resourced strategy after eight years of war. However, ISAF forces lack a truly comprehensive civil-military plan as there is no coordination with the Kabul government and there remains a massive disconnect between short-term and long-term assistance in the field. The most significant problem for NATO is a substantial shortfall of qualified trainers. NATO counts pledges as if the trainers were in the field. A full complement of trainers and mentors needs to be in place and operating by the spring of 2011. In terms of operational effectiveness, he would not rate any Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) forces as ready. He also cited the overall increase in national caveats on how their forces in ISAF can be used forces as severely limiting Alliance effectiveness.

Another panelist countered that the insurgency didn't really gain strength until 2006, and a serious counterinsurgency strategy was implemented beginning in 2009. He lamented that analysts often fail to see how far Afghanistan has progressed. Since the beginning of 2002, Afghanistan's GDP and exports have tripled, literacy has and will continue to increase, access to health care, electricity, and education has increased, and child mortality is down. Another panelist noted that the Afghan National Security Forces would grow to 300,000 in 2011. A recent poll conducted by the Asia Foundation has shown that the Afghan population is increasingly concerned about government corruption. Yet many believe their country is moving in the right direction and have a positive perception of their government. Afghanistan today is safer for the average civilian than Mexico is for the average Mexican or Colombia for the average Colombian.

In terms of the prospects for peaceful resolution of the conflict, this panelist noted that one beneficial effect of President Obama's establishment of a deadline for commencing troop withdrawals is that it has caused key players to look beyond conflict in its current form and to position themselves for the future. While the Taliban have not signaled that they are prepared to negotiate, they have shown they are ready to talk about talks. Any peace settlement will require an external and internal dynamic. Afghanistan is different from many countries like the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. In the two latter cases, many ethnicities did not want to live within the same state. This is not the case in Afghanistan as it is a weak state and has historically been at peace rather than a strong state torn apart by ethnic rivalries. The conflict is over power share, not national identity. One might expect the current talk about talks to go on for at least a year, then negotiations themselves to last two more years beyond that. During this time, violence is likely to rise and attempts at negotiation and a conditions-based transition are essential.

The panel also discussed the role of Afghanistan's neighbors and how they see the 2014 transition. One speaker argued that both Russia and China have an interest in NATO stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, but do not want to see a long-term NATO presence in Central Asia. Moscow and Beijing also find it reassuring to have the United States preoccupied with Afghanistan, because Washington is less able to be involved militarily elsewhere. Moreover, the U.S. is seeking help from Russia and China in stabilization efforts. Nevertheless, if the U.S. is successful, that would mean the U.S. and NATO might be able to stabilize other situations in Asia and elsewhere. This enhancement of NATO's wider role would not be welcome in China or Russia.

In the opinion of one panelist, NATO's need for cooperation with neighbors also undermines democracy promotion in Central Asia as the U.S. is reluctant to address human rights violations and undemocratic behavior. The democratic agenda does not seem as important now, which is convenient for many Central Asian governments.

The most complicated situation for NATO in the region is Pakistan. Pakistan fears that a NATO withdrawal following some success in Afghanistan, would open the door for a bigger Indian role in the country. On the other hand, the return of the Taliban to power would be very risky for Pakistan. This panelist does not expect easy dialogue with neighbors over the stabilization of Afghanistan, but does not see durable progress without it. The only way forward is to engage neighbors and to prepare them for 2014 and beyond. One panelist concluded by stating that a resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan and for the stabilization of the region requires strong U.S. leadership and that political mediation, especially with Iran, Russia, and China should start right now.

Luncheon Keynote: Outcomes of Lisbon, Pathways Forward

The Honorable Michèle Flournoy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy at the United States Department of Defense, began her luncheon keynote by proclaiming the outcome of the summit met two important achievements and presented one opportunity. The two achievements include a strategy for Afghanistan and a rebalancing of NATO to meet future challenges. A new opportunity has also been presented to NATO for improving cooperation with Russia on a number of defense related issues.

Undersecretary Flournoy underscored that with the conclusion of Lisbon there is a much work to be done in order to implement the new Strategic Concept. While the Alliance has a blue print, it must now undertake the hard work to build it.

While Alliance forces and civilians have been involved in Afghanistan for nine years, the right strategy and resources have been introduced only in the last eighteen months. After months of tough fighting, the momentum of the Taliban has been stopped and reversed, while training forces have been supporting the government and development. These achievements are supported by the Lisbon outcomes, where Afghans and Allies showed solidarity, resolve, and commitment. The Alliance has endorsed a transition process in which the Afghans will gradually take the lead in providing their own security.

The transition will be based on a careful assessment of Afghan capabilities to take control of the territory. The principle remains “in together and out together”. This will ensure that Afghanistan will never be a threat again to its neighbors or a base for terrorist operations. Fully consistent with the U.S. government’s approach, July 2011 will mark not withdrawal, but the end of the surge. The right strategy, tactics, leadership, and resources are now in place, but require time and patience to be successful. Apart from this joint framework launched at Lisbon, we also have a commitment of allies to provide trainers. These trainers represent the “ticket to transition,” by creating credible and effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). She noted that ANSF had exceeded their force goals for 2010. NATO troop reductions will be conditioned on the Afghans ability to provide security in their own provinces, districts, and communities and steady progress is being made in terms of quality and retention. It is important to make sure all pledges are filled and all trust funds are properly resourced. In Lisbon we saw real commitment and Afghanistan was listed as NATO’s priority in the near term.

While Afghanistan remained a key component of the Alliance’s talks, Lisbon launched more initiatives to give NATO a new mission statement and restructure it to meet future challenges. While it was feared that these changes would split the Alliance, the Strategic Concept is very balanced with Article 5 reconfirmed as the cornerstone of the Alliance and new missions like missile defense are included. Real threats to our security are articulated within the Strategic Concept, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, disruptions in the global commons, cyber warfare, environmental and resource constraints, and the chronic instability that fosters extremism and erodes the rule of law.

While we have committed to critical capabilities, we also have to take financial realities into account. Spending cuts must be done carefully to avoid hollowing out forces. Better integration of national defense programs could help ensure that overall capabilities of the Alliance remain in balance and can deal with emerging threats. She welcomed the increasing cooperation between the United Kingdom and France as a positive development in this regard. She noted a [2005 CSIS report](#) that set out an approach to better integration of Allied defense planning. Such reforms face substantial structural obstacles. While progress in rebalancing efforts to match threats and fiscal challenges has been made, we must now shift to implementation. We cannot announce a new

Alliance for the future, while denying it the capabilities to be successful in these uncertain economic times. Meaningful steps to reform the Alliance itself have been taken to streamline bureaucracy, making more funds available for operations. The command structure will be more deployable, effective, efficient, and eliminate overhead costs while the doubling of support services will be achieved.

Flournoy asserted that reform is a key part of the agenda and has to permeate to NATO member nations. National decisions need to mirror the challenges and decisions in Lisbon. Funds have to be shifted from tail to tooth, investing in capabilities that forces require in order to conduct operations effectively and efficiently. Secretary Gates has spearheaded an efficiency review, which gives services the chance for reinvesting funds to provide them with needed capabilities. Apart from the need to reform nationally, collaboration among NATO member states can also increase both affordability and capability. Anglo-French cooperation is a very positive development and she strongly urged others to collaborate. We are not doing enough to share our plans and to systematically identify collaboration potential. If we fail to take advantage of this potential, it results in duplication and a shortfall in core capabilities that could render NATO less effective in its operations. While cooperation is encouraged, Flournoy underscored the need to ensure that significant national decisions are not made in a vacuum and without reference to their consequences for the Alliance as a whole.

Finally, in terms of NATO-Russia cooperation, important agreements on three points have been reached: 1) the joint review of common security challenges and cooperation in five key areas including counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction, disaster management, piracy, and Afghanistan; 2) more cooperation on Afghanistan: counter-narcotics training for Afghanis, enhanced two-way transit to support ISAF operations, and training of Afghan helicopter pilots; and, 3) missile defense as NATO and Russia agreed to a restart of tactical ballistic missile defense and are developing a comprehensive framework for future cooperation.

While the Strategic Concept has been completed, the real work has yet to begin. The proof of success for the Strategic Concept will be in its implementation. We have to make sure agreements are fully realized. We know the Russians have more questions and we have to work together to answer them.

Political Consultations and Crisis Management

The third panel examined on the implications of the Lisbon Summit on Article 4, the provisions for political consultations on security concerns, as a critical component of the Alliance's cohesiveness and crisis management capabilities. The discussion focused on making Article 4 operational in the complex, evolving security environment.

Crisis management and prevention have taken on new prominence in the Strategic Concept. While Article 4 has often been seen as a slippery slope to deeper engagement, the perception is changing. NATO has begun to see that judicious and prudent political intervention early on could prevent the need for NATO crisis response or even Article 5 actions. There were a number of reasons why the erosion of the political consultation component of NATO became a concern. First, the emergence of new, complex challenges made some question whether they could be handled solely by military action. There were other concerns, such as Iran, where many Europeans did not see NATO as the automatic or best venue for discussions. With the emergence of ESDP/CFSP, many European governments gave priority to consultations in EU councils.

Former German Chancellor Schroeder's assessment at the 2005 Munich Security Conference that NATO was "no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate

strategies” struck a chord in Washington because some were unsure of his intention. But many knew he was right and that steps were needed to revitalize NATO political consultations. The NATO Group of Experts in 2009 heard a number of concerns. Some felt the North Atlantic Council’s focus had become too narrow, and was dominated by discussion of current operations rather than emerging strategic issues such as Iran, the greater Middle East, and the rise of China and India. However, this narrowing of the Council’s focus was not due to the lack of trying by the U.S. to turn attention to broader issues. The U.S. offered to brief the Council on a range of issues besides those of immediate concern. However, it was met with resistance by those who wanted to keep NATO confined to a military role and not allow it to infringe upon the prerogatives and deliberations of the European Union.

One panelist noted it was actually Allied military leaders who urged the Group of Experts not to underestimate the importance of the Alliance’s political unity. NATO’s lackluster performance with respect to reassuring Turkey about security commitments during the Iraq Wars in 1991 and 2003 and its very circumspect response to the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 suggested that weaknesses stemmed from the lack of cohesion. In the case of Georgia, the Alliance lacked a basic situational awareness to respond. The Alliance was caught off guard and had little in the way of a strategic idea to respond. In the end, the Alliance was flat footed in those crisis periods.

In an effort to improve NATO’s capabilities, the Group of Experts recommended more routine consultations on geostrategic trends, increased intelligence sharing, and more analysis. The new Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO as an essential forum for transatlantic consultations on all matters of interest to the Alliance and its member states. The Strategic Concept also clarifies that invoking discussions under Article 4 should be a judiciously-guarded right and make clear that it could be a preamble to more serious actions.

In paragraph 25, the new Strategic Concept calls for steps to enhance capabilities across the crisis management spectrum. Intelligence sharing would enable the Alliance to better predict where crises might occur. It also stresses the importance of partnerships. These consultations could become very important to dealing with an emerging crisis and enhance civil-military planning across the crisis spectrum. Developing a modest civilian crisis management capability, and looking at how to better plan for crisis management and integrate civil-military structures, also remains an objective of NATO.

Past civilian-military crisis management activities also provide some relevant lessons. For example, the elaborate plans that NATO and the U.S., UK, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany developed in the political and military realm to test the intentions of the Soviet Union and East German authorities in the context of a Berlin crisis have been explored in an incisive article by Diego Ruiz Palmer.¹ All of these analyses were backed with robust intelligence collection and sharing among the four powers, which played an important reassurance function for the Alliance as a whole. These plans may be instructive in thinking about dealing with potential crises vis a vis Iran, cyber attacks, or Russian intervention in neighboring countries. Such grey area challenges—not clearly Article 5 situations—are arenas where integrated political and military planning could enhance Alliance capacity to prevent and manage future crises. NATO used to make regular use of simulation exercises involving political, as well as military, authorities. Integrated NATO political-military gaming and planning for future contingencies should be revitalized.

¹ Diego Ruiz Palmer, “Dans l’ombre de la guerre froide... Live Oak 1959-1990,” *Air Fan, Le magazine de l’aéronautique militaire internationale*, No 383, Paris, October 2010.

In terms of adapting political activities of the Alliance, panelists agreed the Lisbon Summit was quite a success. The backdrop of the Summit was inauspicious: a with a combination of problems in Afghanistan, diminishing resources for defense, a sense of ambivalence of the U.S. toward Europe, and the financial crisis and bailouts in Europe. The Alliance sought to focus its attention on future challenges, which completely changed the dynamic of NATO policy. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to NATO and discussion of Article 4 underscored the Alliance's role as a political entity.

Article 4 states that parties to the North Atlantic Treaty will consult whenever any party perceives a threat to its security, territorial integrity, or political independence. The strength of this commitment was brought into question in 1991 and again in 2003 when Turkey requested consultation on the eve of the Gulf and Iraq wars. The Turks approached the Alliance and asked for preventive deployment of common NATO assets to Turkey for fear of the Iraq threat. This caused great divisiveness in the Alliance, especially between France and Germany with the United States. This divisiveness was harmful to the Alliance in some respects and Article 4 was tainted by this messy experience. The Group of Experts concluded that Article 4 should not be the "poor stepchild" of Article 5. Rather, it played out in the context of the Group of Experts on Georgia and how to make the Alliance more effective on such security concerns.

One panelist underscored the flexibility of the Alliance, global threats, and the need to consult. The Strategic Concept has given a lot of momentum to this idea. The changing environment has reaffirmed crisis management as a core task, requiring the need for extensive consultation. The NAC represents the transatlantic alliance, which given its importance, should clearly be the forum where each member state may discuss their own threat perceptions without the fear of triggering internal antibodies, because these imply a hard NATO commitment. The Alliance needs to nurture a political role for NATO in a way that avoids being politicized.

In addition, the Secretary General needs to be empowered to put these issues on the agenda, not just the member states. This would create an environment more conducive to open discussions. Furthermore, NAC meetings could also be more subject specific, inviting experts for discussions on issues. NATO should take an active role in consultation with other countries and international organizations. The EU should also be a part of this, when possible. There are many instances in which the NAC should take an active role in consultations including on Iran, Russian involvement with neighbors, and cyber.

NATO played a key role in preventing the outbreak of war in Macedonia and Serbia, working through political means with the EU and OSCE. However, these are overshadowed by the Balkan failures and in the case of Macedonia, by the September 11, 2001 attacks. However, these cases suggest that NATO has a positive recent track record in crisis management.

Allied leaders agreed at Lisbon that NATO should play a role in coordinating civilian efforts in unstable and dangerous environments and even providing limited civilian capabilities when partners fail to deliver. Implementation of this decision will need to be monitored carefully one panelist predicted, because some member nations will want to constrain NATO's role in this area.

In the end, the success of the summit will depend on political will. While what was accomplished at Lisbon was within the Alliance context, U.S. leadership remains crucial for the functioning of NATO. If the U.S. does not believe in it, the others will not follow. This may bother some of the European allies, but it will bother them more if the Alliance is allowed to petrify.

Another key question is how resources will be utilized in order to confront new challenges and implement this new vision of Article 4 in an era of governmental austerity. One panelist

remarked that resources should be divided among three categories: 1) Operations in Afghanistan; 2) New threats and challenges; and, 3) Article 5 preparations.

The panel expressed hope that the NATO budgets will increase in the future to properly meet expectations set forth by the new Strategic Concept. While keeping the financial constraints presented by the current global economic crisis in mind, the Alliance must also maintain crucial capabilities. Allied and NATO budgets must ensure that they are delivering the best value for money expended, which would result in enhanced capabilities.

One panelist brought up the issue of NATO-EU cooperation. Secretary General Rasmussen's efforts to enhance this partnership called for both sides to make some accommodation on issues of mutual concern. The panelist urged Turkey to stop using its NATO veto as a bargaining chip in dealings with the EU, as it is counterproductive. The EU should allow Turkey to participate in the European Defence Agency and Turkey should agree that Cyprus can participate in meetings between the EU and NATO. Improving the EU-NATO relationship will be a focus of the Polish EU presidency in 2011.

Impact on NATO-Russia Relations

A European participant noted that NATO-Russia relations suffer from a deficit of confidence. He contended that the main problem with NATO-Russian relations is that Russia is not interested in being a member of the Alliance. Although some in the West want to believe that Russia will one day be part of NATO, the decision is entirely up to Russia. NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO. While Russia faces a number of external security challenges, NATO is not among them. At the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon, President Medvedev did not use these same words but projected a similar message.

NATO and Russia should have more regular political dialogue and exchanges of information in crises. Additionally, a redefinition of the essence of transatlantic relations is required with a stronger, more inclusive European organization, which is uncontested among the U.S., Russia, and NATO. The shift of U.S. policy to establish a genuine partnership opens up new prospects for the security system. The Euro-Atlantic security community should prepare specific suggestions for improving Russia-NATO relations, as well as establishing an undivided security space.

An American participant said NATO and Russia are looking for inclusiveness based on mutual interdependence. In the 18 or 19 months since Secretary of State Clinton pushed the "reset button," the U.S. has achieved some real results. The Obama administration has returned to arms control negotiations and concluded a new START Treaty. The second major area of cooperation with Russia where Obama has made progress is in limiting the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea. There have been new UN resolutions for sanctions, to which the Russians have agreed to adhere.

One major issue has changed the basis for NATO-Russia relations: Afghanistan. Thanks to agreements with Russia on the Northern Distribution Network, U.S. military planners now have the ability of flying supplies to Afghanistan from the central United States over the North Pole and Russian territory. This idea of greater cooperation on Afghanistan was not an initiative of the U.S. government, but rather it was President Medvedev's idea. On the other hand, the United States has not made any progress with Russia on the issue of Georgia and Washington is quite concerned about the situation in the North Caucasus. Each of the last three U.S. administrations all had their own resets with Russia that yielded some benefits, but ultimately had no legs. The Obama administration needs to make this process irreversible. This can be accomplished partly

by Russia's WTO accession and attempts to make Russia more intertwined with the rules-based international economics system, an increased role for Russia in the G20, and continued cooperation on counter-narcotics and terrorism. Also, the scope of this relationship can be expanded by trying to do advance cooperation in other areas ranging from energy efficiency to search-and-rescue in the Arctic.

One panelist argued Moscow's biggest concern is the trajectory of NATO-Russia relations over the long term. He called for a reset policy in NATO-Russia relations. There is scope for greater cooperation on Afghanistan including on training Afghan security forces, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism. At Lisbon NATO and Russia agreed to develop a broader joint assessment of the global security situation, which can identify mutual concerns and areas for further cooperation. There is a long way to go, but there is reason to be cautiously optimistic.

Another panelist described Russia as divided between two camps. One camp includes influential people including Prime Minister Putin who come from the nationalist camp, are inherently anti-Western, and see Russia as a separate pole. Putin and others in this camp are quite hostile to NATO. The other camp is more receptive to modernization in the greater context and more open to NATO engagement. President Medvedev has shown more of an affinity for this camp.

Another panelist argued that the resurgence of Eurasia could have a positive effect on Russia-NATO relations. He noted that Eurasia is not well connected to the rest of the world and falls within the arc of instability, which is also part of a postulated Islamist caliphate. Factors contributing to this include the influence of radical Islam, the effects of the Israel-Palestine conflict, single commodity economies, the lack of democracy, and ungoverned areas. However, we are now witnessing a fundamental change occurring and there are signs that Eurasia is being reconnected. He argued that resurgence of Eurasia is the greatest geopolitical challenge and opportunity of our time. Russia and NATO share the strategic goal of stabilizing the area. Iran, Afghanistan, and nuclear security were the main reasons for the Obama administration to engage with Russia. The Russian perception of the shifting balance of power was accelerated with the global financial crisis. They believed the greatest beneficiary of the crisis has been China, which gave Russia incentive to change their relationship with the West.

Russia-NATO relations have been slowly restored and the Russian government had a positive assessment of the Lisbon Summit. Russian modernization has been premised on closer integration into a broader European space. If Russia fully accepts that this benefit and closer political ties with the West will enhance Moscow's ability to deal with their main security challenges, deeper cooperation with NATO may be possible in the future. Modest steps towards greater cooperation in the North Caucasus is also possible as NATO and Russia share expertise on counter terrorism, but this is not likely fast or soon. Finally, NATO's aim should be to bolster appreciation in Moscow that visions of regional domination and disconnectedness are strategic overreach. NATO should take advantage of this and to advance cooperation on mutual interests.

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