

**CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**U.S., NATO AND THE EU:
PARTNERSHIP FOR SECURITY IN A TROUBLED WORLD**

**WELCOME AND MODERATOR:
JULIANNE SMITH,
DIRECTOR, EUROPE PROGRAM,
CSIS**

**SPEAKER:
HERVÉ MORIN,
FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE**

MONDAY, MARCH 2, 2009

*Transcript by
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

JULIANNE SMITH: Well, good afternoon. My name is Julianne Smith. I am the director of the Europe Program here at CSIS and I want to thank all of you for braving the snow and the chilly temperatures and the wind today for coming out and joining us for this statesman's forum with French minister of defense, Minister Hervé Morin. We are so pleased to welcome him here this afternoon.

As most of you know, the minister has had a very distinguished career, both at the local level, at the national level inside France. I just wanted to highlight a couple of his many achievements and parts of his career. After studying law and political science, he was appointed the service administrator in the French national assembly. He was also a lecturer at Paris 5, the Rene Descartes University.

In 1993, he joined the French ministry of defense and from '95 to '97 he worked for Francois Leotard, the state minister and minister of defense. Of course, simultaneously, the minister has had a very rich political career, having served both on town councils, he's served as the mayor of a city and he was also a member of parliament. Today he's the chair of a new centrist party in France – some of you may know it – the Nouveau Centre – an appropriate title, of course.

The minister today will speak on the “U.S., NATO and the E.U.: Partnership for Security in a Troubled World.” We're looking forward to his presentation. Obviously there's a long list of issues to address – not just the issues that are in the headlines today – not just Afghanistan, but a very rich and wide agenda. And so we are so pleased that he's here. With the NATO summit, of course, just four weeks away and the expected move for France to become fully integrated into the NATO alliance, we feel that this meeting couldn't be more timely.

And we are so pleased that he took some time out of his very busy schedule to join us here today. The minister will be presenting his remarks in French and I hope you all have translation, should you need it. And then after he makes his opening remarks, we will of course take your questions. Without further ado, thank you, Mr. Minister, for joining us. Please join me in welcoming him to CSIS.

(Applause.)

(Note: Mr. Morin's comments are delivered via translator.)

HERVÉ MORIN: Well, I can see that the relations between the U.S. and France are very good because it's snowing in Washington and as well as it's snowing in Paris. Ladies and gentleman, I am very happy to be here in Washington. I was here a year ago where I had the pleasure to spend a great dinner with Bob Gates and at the end of the dinner I told him, I hope that next year when I come back I have the opportunity to see you again.

And he had this sense of humor. He said, well, before that I have to convince my wife and I'm noticing that there is at least one family where it's not the wife who decides and where the husband is able to impose a few decisions and I'm very happy to come to Washington to see him again and broach a few topics who are among the topics I will broach during this – a bit long intervention, you will forgive me for that.

First, thank you to enable me to make a speech on this topic for the minister of defense of France and the convinced European that I am. I think that Europe is the political construction. Europe is a federation sui generis which is building up, but I think that European building up is not contradictory; this political buildup is not contradictory to the fact that we are friends of Americans and we are allies with the Americans. There is no contradiction between European building up of European defense and the fact to preserve the trans-Atlantic link.

I would like to remind you a coincidence: The last French presidency of the European Union was held during the second quarter of 2000 and, like the one that has just come to an end, it had saw the election of a new president of the United States; don't be afraid, of course, the resemblance remains here. Is it, ladies and gentlemen, possible to remember the world before 9/11, before Iraq, before Afghanistan, before Georgia, before the discovery of Iran's secret military nuclear program, before the financial crisis?

Well, ladies and gentlemen, for many reasons the period in which we are entering is a turning point of a new world. Why this period more than another one? Because this administration with a huge hope that came along with the election of Barak Obama sees the opportunity to rebuild the world order in cooperation with the rest of the world and especially with Europe in a spirit of shared responsibility.

Ladies and gentlemen, I know that Europeans keep saying this when you see them: Do not have – let us know a single-sided view of the world. The globalization, the growth of Asia and also of South-South relations, the arrival of new powers, the high expectations to the enlargement of the Security Council do not give us much time to react and to think differently. Our time is that of relative powers and this brings us be aware of our common interests in terms of security.

I know that the Americans have some trouble to think this, to adapt their mental map but I think that today's world and tomorrow's world is a world where the balance of powers is changing, where we are seeing a transfer of powers which is unavoidable and that must happen. And the financial crisis we are a living through is a new revealer of interdependencies and fragilities of each of us; no country, and I insist, no country in the world is sheltered from the economic and social and hence political consequences of this long-lasting crisis.

And nobody can think that the world that we can see not far from us will be the same as the one of yesterday and today and for 50 years and we're celebrating this year the 20th anniversary of the fall of Berlin Wall; the Europeans' strong albeit tragic history. Know now the necessity of cooperation from states and this is the model that Europe can propose today: partnership rather than sterile rivalry, assume interdependency rather than isolated ventures, the

respect of the other one rather than blind single-sidedness, cooperation rather than competition between the states.

And this cooperation between the states is unavoidable; it will happen anyway for one reason: because we are in a finite world – this world is finite in terms of resources, in terms of resources of capabilities, there are no new borders, if I can say. We know the global side of the world; we have to transfer from a world of competition to a world system of cooperation between the states. And this system of cooperation between the states, ladies and gentlemen, those who have achieved it much better than the others are the Europeans.

Europeans were able to go beyond their national interests to find the general interest of the European Union and this sketch is valid at the scale of the whole world. We have gone from a system of powers to a system where we have built a school of peace and stability based on respect of law and standards. And in this is troubled environment, Europe and America have an essential role to play but they will not be able to play it – only provided they are united and strong and proud of their respective values that are the base of our system.

We need a renovated trans-Atlantic partnership between an America open to the others – an America open to the others, I repeat – and Europe which is finally reinforcing. And let me, at first even if it's a bit rude because I'm on your land here, on your territory, to talk about the reinforcing Europe. European construction and Atlantic alliance during this last half-century have been both pillars of strong ambition for Europeans and set up a framework of collective security that can ensure prosperity and stability of the continent.

The OSCE when it created a Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok is the third pillar of this process that made it possible for over 20 years to make a great political and economic transition in peace. European Union as well as NATO are poles of stability; unique poles of stability and security in the world. The urging request of those who want to become members are the best proofs.

But beside these remarkable achievements, there have been failures (that must hide the face ?). At the top of those, of course, the Balkan conflicts at the heart of the European continent which revealed the insufficiencies of Europeans and it revealed quite very late, the going to sleep of most of European nations in front of their obligation to taking charge during defense without thinking they could be base their defense on the Americans.

And in 1962 John Fitzgerald Kennedy had proposed an answer based on two pillars; let us say it straight forwardly: The conditions for such a situation have never been met and this is the responsibility the Europeans. Other more recent failures: the frozen conflicts from the former Soviet Union, the Jordan crisis reminded us that it could generate into an open war and here for the first time in history the European Union managed to stop the spiral of violence.

What happened with Georgia, what is happening now with piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the setting up of the first naval operation of the European Union – and let me remind you it's the first naval operation of European command from the British – so, by a British admiral. It's quite important in terms of symbol; it is significant military presence and it is a strong symbol of

the European construction and it is also the testimony of a silent revolution, that of the building up of Europe of defense. Twenty years ago Europe of defense was taboo; you couldn't find one political official who used, who had the guts to talk about this concept. It was all about common security of the western European Union, everybody forgot about the existence, which was the arm of the common security and defense policy; and this was 20 years ago.

You would have never found a statement by Helmut Kohl or François Mitterrand using these very words of European defense. And 10 years ago there was not a taboo anymore but it was an intellectual concept that, at best, made people smile in such a room as we are here now today. And since I haven't seen you smile I think that we have made progress. Worse, some and many here in the United States on the American continent only saw an element of nuisance, an annoying element and now today a Europe of defense is on its track.

In 1998 while the French-British statement of Saint-Malo was published, who would have thought, I remind you that this French-British statement, the U.S. administration of that time had seen this with a very, Mrs. Albright was not very happy about that. If you prove this, that maybe probably was true. So 10 years after Saint-Malo, who would have thought that Europe would have launched 20 civil operations, six military operations on various theaters such as Bosnia, the Gulf of Aden, the heart of Africa, Indonesia, the Caucasus.

Who would have thought you could've seen a EUFOR-Chad operation in the very depths of the Chad desert, gathering Irish, Swedish, Polish, Danish, Romanian soldiers to guarantee the safety of Darfur refugees; and some of them, these Europeans are not even members of the Atlantic Alliance. Nobody could have thought this 10 years after the statement of Saint-Malo. Of course I did not know of the problems of fourth generation that are as much present and even more within the European Union than in NATO and the capability shortages that are quite so severe, but you cannot escape the reality: Europe of defense is an unavoidable future to ensure our security.

And this Europe of defense for us is a priority – a military and political priority – because Europeans must have the means to act by themselves. What we want is that the Europeans have an autonomous military capability to lead, to conduct robust military operations. Of course, they do not have the size or dimension of what the alliance can do but that can have an autonomous military capability. What can be an economic power representing 25 percent of the world's trade exchanges that would not have the military means to implement its political choices?

When he talked to the conference of security in Munich, President Sarkozy reminded the choice offered to the old continent – let me this – his words were really very fair and true: Does Europe want peace or does it just want to be left in peace? This is the very topic. And the sadly reminding name of the Bavarian capital can only strengthen the value of the test offered to Europe for the future. The interest, which has been very well understood by the Americans, is to have strong European allies. Having weak allies is useless, and this is a source of annoyance.

I've often told Robert Gates in our meetings that there was a major contradiction in the American concept. And it has raised, over time, by the statement of George Bush last year at the summit of Bucharest, and it has leaving, progressively, from the American mind. But there was

a contradiction, having the Europeans to be adults – the be responsible for their own security – and to participate in the security burden, what the Americans keep requesting to ask them to do more for their defense, while, at the same time, not considering them as adults and as responsible. How do you want us, if we are not responsible, to dedicate more assets?

I had given him this image: It is like a child who wants to walk; you have to give him the opportunity to stand up. And this was the contradiction, for a long time, of the American administration. They wanted the Europeans to do more for their security without having this autonomous capability that we are wishing to have. And that's why, during the French presidency, we have set up the axis of a consistent security policy.

We set a level of ambition for operations – 60,000 soldiers over the long term – we have set up objectives to reinforce our military capabilities and approved concrete projects for deploying a tactical transport fleet, an aircraft carrier group, new satellite program interoperability. We have acknowledged the necessity to restructure our defense industries, to set up global groups and the European action centers. We want to set up a technological database, and for this, we have finally given work to the European Defence Agency.

We will develop, in Europe, the key capabilities. We will favor exchanges, investment in research and technology between civil and military, and this is the framework we set during the French presidency. Oh, I can talk to you about this again, but for example, we decided to build up a system of surveillance of maritime coasts. From the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, we have only one network of surveillance on our coasts for, if possible, some intervention capabilities. And this will take time, but this kind of decision shows that the Europeans have decided to assume their own responsibilities in this world.

But this is not a competition, but a complement to the renovation of NATO, and this is the second topic I would like to broach. By reminding on the 27th of August, 2007, that NATO as well as European Defence are basic pillars of our security. The president of the republic reminded a basic evidence. Strasbourg-Kehl will be the first summit of the alliance held in France. For too long, I know this and have lived it in my own bodies as soon as I was appointed as minister, France was accused of wanting to weaken NATO. This was unfair.

France, for over 10 years, has taken a growing place in NATO. It is one of the greatest contributors to the operations. It is commanding NATO operations. But it commanded in Kosovo, it commanded in Afghanistan, it is taking part in all force generations for the strategic reserve force since 2001. It is participating without failing, and we're one of the very few countries that always met the deadlines. We have participated in the NRF since 2003 or 2004, but the misunderstanding remained. Why is France remaining aside of the introverted structures of NATO?

The conviction – and even, we are participating in 36 committees out of 38, and we have 120 officers in the headquarters, so we have already done a long part of the road, and the conviction of the president of the republic – and this is mine – is that France can renovate its relations with NATO by being an independent ally and this independence cannot be discussed or negotiated, and a free partner of the United States. But to demonstrate this, prior to this, we had

to re-launch the European Defence – what we put on the table when we had the European presidency has been accepted, and that's the way we re-launched the European Defence.

Of course, this is creating expectations, especially that NATO makes more room for Europe. And there is consistency in our approach; we want an autonomous defense capability of the Europeans and since we have more weight in security and since we have done this effort, then we will be able to take a larger place in NATO. We increase Europe's military capabilities and Europe is able to have more weight within the Atlantic alliance. And this renovation that we are carrying on of the relations of France with NATO shall have benefits for the alliance, for Europe and for France without putting into question the independence of our country.

Since, if the alliance has evolved much from its creation, but what is not changing is the basic pact that is uniting us since the Treaty of Washington. The security of the alliance cannot be divided. This pact is binding Europe and America, but it is also an expression of the alliance of Europeans among themselves. Everybody has forgot that the Treaty of Lisbon – and we hope it will come into force – is referring to this. What we are expecting from the summit of the 60th anniversary of NATO is the reassertion of this solemn commitment for the future, and also, the necessity of the construction of European defense. And this is what we are expecting from the summit of Strasbourg-Kehl.

And it is also to turn to the future and think about the alliance we will need. We were talking about this before starting this meeting. So time has come, now, to start the work on a new strategic concept, and this must also be the summit of Strasbourg-Kehl. We will have to draw the conclusions and consequences for the missions and the organization of the alliance, but also for the cooperation between the European Union and NATO. There are some questions that we have to put on the table. I will list a few of them.

Which complementarities do we have with NATO? You can see very well, for example, that we cannot imagine the Atlantic alliance intervening to make a stability and security operation in Africa. But, on the other hand, Europeans have their place here, and this is what's happening now. Second question: Is the Atlantic alliance a global organization or sub-regional organization, or is it, before all, a collective security pact? To us, it is both a pact and a system of collective security. That's the first thing.

Is NATO this system of collective security or, progressively, should the Atlantic alliance become a tool for peacekeeping at the service of the U.N.? For us, it must be, before all, a pact of collective security between Europeans and Americans. Third question: I do not like this word, but it is the only one which is coming to my mind – the borders of the alliance. How far can we enlarge the Atlantic alliance, knowing very well – and I'm telling you this because I'm deeply convinced of it and that you know it – that enlarging NATO too much will weaken it. And you will not keep the strength of Article V if you keep enlarging NATO.

What are the new missions of the alliance? Shall we deal with missile defense, counterterrorism? Shall we consider the problems of environmental protection that have consequences in terms of security and stability? Shall we deal with cyber attacks? These are

topics that must be broached by the Atlantic alliance. These are topics that have to be worked on in the coming years. The transformation has been started, but it must increase.

This will be the task of the future secretary general that we will appoint in a few months, but this will also be that of the nations in favor of an improved efficiency of the structure. And this was also one of the works we were talking about. It is the reorganization of NATO structures. How can you be more efficient with less bureaucracy? Three-hundred and twelve committees and subcommittees, and on this topic, we are partners with the British and the Americans. There are three countries who are permanently requesting that NATO should be restructured, and we have to work together on this topic, which is a difficult topic.

Finally, the last topic I would like to broach: It is how to set the conditions for success in Afghanistan. In 2009, our priority is to ensure that the Afghan people can take part freely in the presidential election. I read the statements of President Karzai, and we should invite him to discuss with all Afghan political officials on the dates for the elections, since in order for the elections to be a success, the conditions of organization and security of these elections must be met. And before any decision on the state, it is important for all these criteria to be taken into account. The success of these elections will be the best political answer to fundamentalists – the best answer, also, to the doubts that can rise within democracies.

And beyond this, the basic aim is for Afghanistan not to become a sanctuary for terrorists who threaten our democracies anymore. What shall we do? Of course, we must remain militarily committed as long as possible. It is out of the question to abandon Afghanistan, but our objective is clear and there was a French request in Bucharest – transfer to the Afghans the responsibility for their own security. And that's what France will do this year in the region's center around Kabul, and this goes through the extraordinary training of the Afghan army and a much more efficient cooperation in the field of police.

Afghan authorities must also do more for governance and counter-narcotics. This responsibility, we are sharing it, to develop agriculture, to block the importation of chemical products, including by force, and shut down the billions of dollars generated by their criminal actions. And this is a second axis. The Afghan people must also be convinced that alliance soldiers can guarantee their freedom and security and that they will not stay in the country forever. And this is a true problem. Without the support of the Afghan people, we will fail.

I know that the latest "Bible" is the French officer who wrote in English, Galula. I guess that all of you have read this. I read it during one weekend about two or three weeks ago, and this writing should inspire, in depth, our action towards the Afghan population. This goes, also, through a strong respect of the Afghan people's traditions – of its faith – and we must do everything we can do to avoid side effects and collateral damage, which of course, is giving strength to the recruiting Taliban.

And we have to support dialogue and reconciliation with all who want to stop using violence – who want to stop working with terrorists. We have to invite the Karzai government to undertake this process of dialogue and national reconciliation, and there's no better period than

an electoral period to discuss with those you are opposed to. And it's the best time, because through the election, you are shaping the future of your country.

And that's one of the mistakes of the international community – thinking about an own system of governance for Afghanistan. You cannot have an ethnic-centered system; you cannot impose a democratic system on a people used to having a tribal system, which has never known essential states. So we have to invent a system of governance adapted to Afghanistan's history.

And finally, we have to assist Pakistan, because we will not have any peace in Afghanistan without stability in Pakistan. The Pakistani government knows that this stability goes through suppressing terrorism on both sides of the border. Let's take President Zardari at his word, but let's be clear: There are no good and bad terrorists; all networks must be tracked down, anywhere they are.

And finally, I would like to say as soon as we have redefined our whole concept in Afghanistan with increased participation of the Americans, quite rapidly we'll have to set schedules – timelines – periods of time or meeting points or at least some dates from which we could consider that we have set such and such objective. And why not set, quite rapidly, a date that could announce the beginning of the withdrawal of the alliance's forces?

Finally, last topic, we must also, together, redefine our relations with Russia. This would be my conclusive words. We have to invent a new partnership with Russia. We have to create confident relations with Russia. The economic crisis is touching Russia on its face, which has been made fragile by the fall of oil prices and the absolutist character of its production system. It can't be excluded that Moscow should become self-centered again and shall use the temptation to control the Caucasus republics.

But I want to be optimistic and we have to think about how to rebuild a future of cooperation and of confidence, because if you have a look at Russia's borders, you will notice that it is with the Europeans that the Russians have interests in building a strategic and confident partnership. And I have noticed, through our relations with the Putin or Medvedev administration, that the Berlin Wall has not always fallen in your heads. And on both sides – the European side and the Russian side – we need to break our prevention and to build a strategic partnership based on a relation of confidence.

I'm convinced that, as much for the Russians as for ourselves, a – (inaudible) – is possible, and let's believe President Medvedev. He's proposed a new security treaty in Europe. Let us propose to him that the OSCE is the framework of the discussion of a new treaty of security in Europe. Let us enable the proposal of the United States to re-launch strategic talks be a success. We wish negotiations, post-START, to have good conclusions. We must go on with cooperation with the European Union in order to build with Russia an economic and human space.

We have to work together on the threats that are concerning all of us – terrorism, proliferation – starting with interests to Iran's ballistic and nuclear programs, which is at the door of Russia and Europe – efforts of dialogue, but also increasing sanctions if required. This is a

nice topic for us to broach our relations with Russia under a new angle, and with the ambition to build a relation of confidence.

Ladies and gentlemen, many observers have underlined in the latest months, how much the burden imposed on the new president of the United States was heavy – two major commitments, the threat of terrorism and an unprecedented economic and financial crisis, the threat of a major crisis with Iran and its nuclear program. And one was about to say – and let us say it – we have to have the U.S. and the world reconciled with each other, and that's the greatest stake for President Obama.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, the burden imposed to the president of the United States is huge, but it will be all the easier as it will be borne by a common message that will be forwarded by the Europeans and by the Americans, since we have the same values. We believe in a world of stability and security; we believe in a world of peace; and we believe in a world of democracy. Thank you for your attention.

(Applause.)

MS. SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. We have roughly 45 minutes for a few questions. I'm going to ask folks to identify themselves and wait for the microphones.

Before I turn to the audience, I did want to pose a question myself: Mr. Minister, you opened by giving us a wonderful tour of all of the many challenges that we face and highlighting the evolution that we've seen in recent years in what defines the trans-Atlantic relationship, in many ways. It's not just about Europe or the United States; it's about how we look at many challenges around the world and how we work with new partners.

In light of the evolution of the threats we face; in light of the revolution inside the European Union and your comments about the evolution of European defense, I'm sorry, I wanted to ask you about the structures with which we try to tackle these challenges. I mean, is it a question of, in terms of what we're facing now, reforming existing institutions, bringing reform to the EU-U.S. relationship, particularly in light of some of the changes on the defense side of the equation? Is it a question of reforming NATO?

Or is it a question of looking for new ways to cooperate, looking to focus on the connective tissue between the EU and NATO, looking at other institutions – you mentioned the OSCE, the U.N.? I mean, I'm just wondering if, in light of all the changes we've seen over the last 20 years, if we've got the structure in place that allows Europe and the United States to focus on many of the common challenges that we face, whether it's climate or defense and security-related, Iran, Pakistan, how do we go about tackling the fact that the structures we have in place still, to this day, seem rather inadequate?

MR. MORIN: That's a huge question. But at least there is one thing which is certain: We have to invent, between NATO and the European Union, a structure which makes it possible to implement this complementarity. I think we need, at one time or another, to create a high-level group that would gather the main people in charge of NATO and of the EU, so that this

dialogue can exist. Of course, it exists, but at least, we need a high-level group that makes it possible to have a permanent dialogue between NATO and the European Union.

But, I was about to say, this dialogue will also occur through Europeans and the EU that take into account better their problem of security, and as such, have more power to be heard in the trans-Atlantic alliance. We probably need a structure that enables a permanent dialogue between NATO and the EU, but beyond and more generally – and this is what we are trying to defend – it is the idea that the Europeans, who are taking a major part of their responsibility – a more important, actually – part of their responsibility are able to count more within the Atlantic alliance.

And, since they have more influence, to create the dialogue that makes it possible to build up this new layout of security. And it is because we have a stronger Europe, which is able to have more weight within the Atlantic alliance, that it will be able to dialogue within the alliance in a more balanced partnership, and this is what we are seeking, because behind all this – and this is the question I was asking at the beginning of my introduction of my conference – the time of the hyperpower is finished; we are now in a world of relative powers. And the transfer of power is underway, whether you want it or no. And this is the reality. So we will need and you will also need a new relationship and I'm convinced of this.

MS. SMITH: Great, thank you very much. Yes, Reggie? Please do wait for the microphone.

Q: Thank you. I'm Reginald Dale of CSIS. Thank you for that very clear and interesting talk. I'd like to follow-up and actually broaden Judy's question and then ask a more practical one. At the beginning of your talk, you talked about how the European Union could be a model for cooperation more widely around the world, between other countries. But the European Union has only achieved the degree of cooperation it has through a very complex institutional structure in which a lot of sovereignty has been pulled.

Are you suggesting some sort of frame of world governments that would be – require some sort of new institutional framework, globally, not just across the Atlantic? And the more practical question is, when you talk about strengthening the European defense effort, making it more autonomous, making people more committed to it, how does that fit with a future, in the next few years, in which defense budgets are going to be under extreme pressure and may even be reduced? Thank you.

MR. MORIN: Well, I'm a happy defense minister, because the budget of equipment of the defense ministry is growing by 20 percent for 2009. So we have at least the proof – the evidence – that the economic crisis in a country does not automatically reduce the defense budget. And even, it was an argument for me to the president of the republic when I proposed to him that my ministry takes part in the economic re-launch program so that one euro spent for equipment, since we do not buy all our equipment in the United States, is one euro which is spent for the French defense industry and these are French employees, French – (inaudible) – and even European research offices.

So we have an equipment budget which is increasing by 20 percent in 2009 and, as a whole, thanks to the restructuring of our defense, we will reduce and rationalize the structures. With a year or so, there was a lot of work to do. And all the savings we are making in our operating costs, we reinvested by 100 percent – 100 percent is dedicated to investment. I do not have the feeling that the British budget is falling. I haven't seen any such figures, because these are the two main countries in the field of defense.

My German counterpart also sees his budget at roughly the same level and I don't think that the Europeans are on a slope to reduce their military effort – you cannot do this forever, otherwise we would not have any money anymore. And to the contrary, for us, when we are talking about the Europe of defense, it is the idea of pooling of some programs. And this Europe of defense is – these are not additional expenses or additional burdens. To the contrary, it is the way to rationalize a certain number of programs.

I will take some concrete examples: Today, we have European industries that are working on the same research programs or have research offices working on the same programs and what we propose is that these industries, instead of conducting their own identical programs on some topics, do it in common, either via common assets or research offices. And we have some very good talks with Finmeccanica on certain topics.

My Polish colleague is interested in partnership between the French naval industry and the Polish naval industry, and I told my British colleague I was very much ready to envisage an industrial partnership in the field of land forces, primarily between BAA and Nexter. And I told my German colleague that, in the field of submarines, we could do things together instead of being in competition.

At first, the Europe of defense is also a way to rationalize to have better cost efficiency, but to keep this industrial and technological basis. For instance, the relations between Europe and the U.S. has a ration of one-to-six. If the Europeans do not rationalize – if they do not pool their programs – one day will come – this can come very rapidly – when Europeans will be totally in the hands of the American industry. Do not see here a hostile statement, but to the contrary, it is the will of the Europeans to have their autonomous capacity.

Well, you can see that the international institutions are not tailored to the current world anymore. They have been invented in 1945, after the end of World War II. The difference between those who won the war and those who lost the war. And you can see that these institutions must be renovated. We cannot go on with a Security Council in the U.N. which looks like the way it looks now.

In the field of world governance, we have governance in the commercial field, which works quite well, which is the World Trade Organization, but we have to invent a new one for environment-related problems. We have, on the political and strategic questions, a Security Council which is dealing with the new, emerging world. How can it be that Brazil and India are not in the Security Council? How can they not be members of the Security Council and take part in the elaboration of this new world?

How is it possible that we do not have any African country? How can we exclude all Arab countries? And the cooperative world I wish we are turning to can exist only if you do not exclude the others. If cooperation requires to take decisions together and share them together and to create decision-making systems in which decisions is shared and ambitions are shared by everybody. And this is what we have to build.

So we have a governance in the field of environmental protection to create, we have to change the governance within the United Nations, we have to reinvent international institutions which reflect the world which is emerging right now, and we cannot keep institutions dating back to 1945.

MS. SMITH: All right, Stewart? And we'll take two together – if you could just hand the microphone to your right after you're done, Stewart, that would be great.

Q: Mr. Minister, thank you very much for a presentation which was very clear, very interesting and very ambitious. Do you see any opportunities to improve the cooperation between Paris and Washington in the field of security, or between the European Union and the United States? I think, for example, about Africa. Our new African Command is interested in developing local forces in Africa, or contributing to maritime operations on the eastern and western coasts of Africa. Do you see any opportunities to improve cooperation?

MS. SMITH: Thanks, could you just – go ahead. Do you want to come up to the – okay, go ahead.

Q: Thank you very much. I unfortunately don't speak French as well as Stew does.

MR. : (Inaudible, off mike, laughter.)

Q: My name is John Sandrock (sp). I'm now with Analytic Services, which is a Washington-based, mostly defense contractor. I was very pleased to hear you mention the OSCE. Two of us, at least, in this room have a strong and long connection with the OSCE. Bob Beecroft, of course, over here, was the OSCE ambassador in Bosnia-Herzegovina; I was in Tajikistan for 15 months and for six months of that, I was the acting head of mission. But my question goes to the fact that the Helsinki Accord, 1975, established certain norms and principles which all the participating states have agreed to adhere to.

But over the last 10, 15 years, it seems like we're cherry-picking what we want to agree to and what we don't. Georgia comes to mind – what's happened there – the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and others. I wonder if you could envision a role for the OSCE in the future as a stronger, rejuvenated organization, and how that would be – how would that come about? The forum for security cooperation exists; it's existed for a long time. Can we reinvigorate that? Is this a pattern that could be used to address other issues? How do you maintain ODIHR out of Warsaw and its capabilities and its requirements? Thank you.

MR. MORIN: First, I think that cooperation between the United States and Europe, or between the U.S. and France, is excellent. That's the truth. I have the feeling, through the

discussions we have with the American administration on even the most sensitive topics, and even in some periods where the relations between France and the United States were quite tense, this cooperation never, never came down.

There are some topics we cannot deal with in public, but on all these topics, partnership between France and the United States has never been distorted as far as basic topics are concerned. And I notice that cooperation between France and the United States – between Europe and the United States – whether about counterterrorism, intelligence – this cooperation is very strong.

Can it be improved? Of course it can be improved. You can always improved things. If something cannot be improved, then that would mean that life is at its best. You took an example, which is the training of security forces through your – how do you call this – AFRICOM. And, if I understood well, that you have copied on what we are doing, since we have been doing this for many years. It's a good example, and we were doing it on the French level, and we decided to do it at a European level.

Are there any fields in which, to me, cooperation should be improved very naturally just like that? I do not have any major topics coming to my mind. It can seem surprising to you, but our pilots of the Navy are trained on American aircraft carriers for many years, we have long-standing exchanges of information, we have programs that enable French officers to come to your forces and vice versa. I go to French units and I find American soldiers who are here in an exchange period – cooperation period, training period. And we have some cooperation levels that are quite excellent.

In 10 minutes, once I have left the room, I will tell you, oh shit, I should have thought about this one, but to tell the truth, each time I meet American officials, at no time for some cooperation, except on some topics I will not talk to you about, we have the feeling that we are talking about problems of cooperation, because it is working so well at the lowest levels that very rarely do we need to mention them at the political level.

But, to the contrary, let me tell you, even if it's not the same topic, in the field of industrial cooperation, we cannot have two languages. See, you cannot have the will, on the one hand, to have open states and, on the other hand, to refuse to be open, if you see what I mean. When a European contract is better than an American product, it's better because we win all contracts and we beat you everywhere. The MRTT – the air tanker won by Aerobus – won in Australia, won in the Gulf countries, even in Saudi Arabia.

And when a product is better, you have to accept that it's better in its own country and you should not consider that it is – that's the first time we have a better product at what you do, so that was a good chance for us. It was a good opportunity for me to convey this message, since I know that the competition has reopened, so I had to say this. So about the OSCE, let us give it as a framework to have the opportunity to take part in the elaboration of a new security pact before asking about other missions the OSCE could have, I think let us remain in the spirit of Helsinki – ensure stability and security, take care of human rights. And this is, to my mind, a beautiful mission for an organization which, indeed, has been too much forgotten for a few years.

MS. SMITH: Yes, sir, go ahead, please. Do wait for the microphone.

Q: Thank you for – also, for a very, very concise and –

MS. SMITH: Can you introduce yourself, sir?

Q: Yes, I'm Leonard Oberlander (sp), an independent consulting international liaison. I'm not representing an organization that I'm affiliated with here in my question. I'd like to ask you, in this very comprehensive discussion regarding relations between NATO and the European Union and international structures, we're talking principally about civil servants of the several nations involved.

In the private sector, which you just touched on, there are also many structures that are corporate structures, which are international. In the United States, many industries are owned, for instance, by Russians and by owners of other countries. There are partnerships and joint ventures internationally, among the nations of NATO, European Union, Russia and others. How do you see these relationships in the private sector and the relationships in the government sector driving each other, one from an economic, profitable standpoint and the other from international cooperation standpoint? Thank you.

MS. SMITH: And then, Avis, I'm going to give you the floor.

Q: I'm Avis Boleyn. Mr. Minister, thank you very much for your very clear intervention and very informational. France is a nuclear power, one of two in Europe. Could you say a word about how you envisage this nuclear capacity in the framework of your reintegration into NATO? Do you envisage a role such as that of Great Britain or, as always, the French nuclear capability must remain independent?

MR. MORIN: I hope I will not disappoint you madam, but this nuclear capacity is a fully independent capability and we would like to keep this stance of the statement of Tewart (ph) of 1974. We have built this deterrence force, independent force, and let me remind you that in the decision, the motivation of Charles de Gaulle to leave the integrated command of NATO, when you have a look at the letter he had sent and the content of the problem at that time, he was mentioning, of course, his will to quit the logic of blocs, since we had quite a few attentions.

Actually, there was a kind of warming of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western countries. He mentioned the fact that there were foreign forces in France and the occupation of our airspace by foreign military air forces and the third topic was the independence and autonomy of France as far as its deterrence force was concerned. And this was the main debate.

So of course, we cannot imagine one second that we could change our strategy in that field. I will also remind you that the principle of this deterrence force is full autonomy and it is the least – minimum required force. It is dimensioned according to this principle. So no evolution on this topic. As far as the other question – I'm sorry – I did not really see what you

were mentioning in the relationship between the private sector, Russia and the European Union. I didn't really understand what it was about. Do you want to try to ask the question again?

Q: Yes, I'll phrase it a little bit differently. The relations between NATO, European Union and Russia and other countries is sometimes defined as tense, as competitive and needing reform and are difficult to manage. On the other hand, in the private sector, the private corporations of these nations have formed partnerships, joint ventures, they're cooperating with each other. There is very little characterization of tenseness and their aims are for profitability of the shareholders and cooperate with each other to achieve that – not national interest or national security or patriotic motivations, which are the governments' motivating forces.

Which is driving which? How do you see what the private sector is doing as influence NATO, European Union, Russia relations for instance, and what the countries are doing and the government institutions are doing which might be influencing the private sector? Which is influencing which and how?

MR. : What's the question?

MR. MORIN: That's a huge question. What I know is that it's relations between human beings which are building confidence, conditions for confidence and dialogue as much as the structures. So if the private structures are able to create the conditions for dialogue and the relationships between the human beings in these private sector are able to build confidence relationships, you mentioned NATO, the European Union, Russia – it's all the best.

And this is also globalization. It's also the fact that the exchange of information of human beings and assets lead to create the conditions for a new relationship that, of course, can influence the public structures you were mentioning. Of course, I think it's natural; that's the way it works.

MS. SMITH: Okay, great. Let's do one quick round. We have a gentleman here, here and then the woman way in the back. So just these three. Sorry I couldn't get to everybody. Go ahead. Please keep your questions short.

Q: Minister, Robert Wall, I'm a reporter with "Aviation Week," and since you brought up military hardware, I thought I could ask you about the A400M. Have you made any progress talking to Berlin and London in getting requirements and contractual relief as you're trying to do to restructure that program? And secondly, if you can't, what will France do? (In French.)

MS. SMITH: And this gentleman right here – yeah.

Q: (Via translator.) Thank you, Mr. Minister. I'm Nevit Mandelli.

My name is Nevit Mandelli. I'm with the International Peace Operations Association. A couple days – or last week, General Abdul Rahim Wardak, the minister of defense from Afghanistan gave a talk a few blocks away in which he argued against the notion of lowering

expectations granted the challenges in Afghanistan. And I'm wondering what are your thoughts on that.

MS. SMITH: And the woman – question about whether or not we should be lowering our expectations in Afghanistan – the goals. Should we be scaling back our objectives.

Q: I'm Jill Marie Perion (sp). I work for Physicians for Social Responsibility. In March 2008, President Sarkozy said that France will re-strengthen the disarmament force through transparency. What is the plan of France to reach that aim?

MR. MORIN: Well, actually, there is no country more transparent than France. And we have full transparency. I will send you back to the statement of Cherbourg by the president of the republic. We have mentioned during the construction of a new nuclear submarine, he wrote the whole deterrence policy of France.

And all of our facilities are checked and they can all be checked. And in France they will probably be the country which is applying transparency most rigorously. And, quite frankly, we are fully, fully transparent and irreproachable. All of our facilities can be checked, controlled. The IAEA comes to us and makes checks. If the whole world could be as transparent as France on the nuclear facilities, I can promise you would have much, much less trouble.

About the Afghan defense minister – (inaudible) – you met General Wardak. Well, I think we have only one aim. There are not several of them; it's to enable Afghanistan to be a sovereign state in terms of security and peace. Of course, the notion of security and peace is not the same as in a Western country, but this is the aim. We cannot have any other aim.

Of course, we have to make a difference between security in Afghanistan and security in our own towns and they are different. They don't have the same history; they don't have the same system. The only aim for the international community is a sovereign state living in peace and security. I do not see any other aim.

About the A400M, another excellent program of the European industry which has a few delays, let me remind you, you had five years' delay on the C-17. It is very difficult for me to broach this topic that I know by heart since I've been spending a lot of time on it. I regularly meet with my European counterparts because it is led within the framework of OCCAR. So all decisions have to be taken within – we have seven of us. And this is the charm of Europe.

So it is difficult for me to broach this topic because of the contractual relationship that we have with EADS and the deadlines we have with them, but the will of France is to act so that we can have the type of transport aircraft capabilities that the Europeans need and of course this, according to the delays we have with the A400M to foresee a provisional temporary solution since our Transalls are at the end of their lives and between the A400M, the arrival of the A400M within our forces and the reduction of our transport fleet, we will probably need to find temporary solutions.

And European cooperation can help us. Some European countries have transport capabilities that they could make available to other countries. We also have – why not NATO, which has its C-17 fleet? We are having close work on all of this and I will present to the president of the republic a few proposals in a few months. But this program is for us a main program of Europe and we have it in our heart. It is a – we are having discussions. It is a – there are shareholders involved in this and I cannot talk more about this subject.

MS. SMITH: Well, Mr. Minister, we're so pleased, again, that you could take time out of your schedule to join us. Unfortunately, Dr. John Hamre, the president of CSIS was not able to be with us. He's over in Asia at this very minute. But he wanted me to pass on a token of his appreciation. John actually comes from the Great Plains and he likes to turn to Native American history to show his appreciation. He's asked me to pass on a talking stick.

I guess as tribal history goes, around the council fire, the person holding this stick actually had the floor. (Laughter.) So we yield the floor to you and hope that you will come back to CSIS. Thanks again for joining us today.

(Applause.)

(END)