

A Direct Way to Close all Gaps within Budget

DIRECT • Space Transportation System Derivative

JUPITER 120
2011

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The Best Solution will Close ALL Gaps within Budget

The Workforce Gap

The Flight Gap

The Exploration Gap

The Budget Gap


The Contracts Gap

The COTS Gap

The International Gap

The Performance Gap

DIRECT Roadmap



DIRECT Delivers what United States Congress Authorized

-NASA Authorization Act of 2005

“The Administrator shall, to the fullest extent possible consistent with a successful development program use the personnel, capabilities, assets, and infrastructure of the Space Shuttle program in developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle, Crew Launch Vehicle, and a heavy-lift launch vehicle.”



*The best civil space policy to have been enunciated by a president in four decades or more, and the best authorization act to be approved by the Congress since the 1960s.**



A DIRECT Derivative of the Space Transportation System

DIRECT v2.0

simpler, safer, sooner.



DIRECT 'is' the Historic NASA STS Derived Approach



Step 1: Go to <http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp>

Step 2: Type in "National Launch System" or "Shuttle Derived" into the search box

Result: Over 190 detailed studies from 1978 to 2005 that use the DIRECT approach.

True STS derived systems have three things in common

- 1) They Retain the STS Stack configuration
- 2) They Reuse the 4-Segment SRB
- 3) They Keep the STS External Tank at a 8.4m dia.


Ares-I and Ares-V do none of these three things




Morton-Thiokol
1979 Proposal



National Launch
System (NLS)




Shuttle-C



Shuttle-B



Mars
Direct's
Ares



Buzz
Aldrin's
Aquila

DIRECT Maximizes the Space Transportation System

Ares-I

- New 5-Seg. SRB
- New J-2X Engine
- New Configuration
- New Infrastructure
- New Upper Stage



STS



Jupiter-120

- Existing 4-Seg. SRB
- Existing RS-68 Engine
- Existing Configuration
- Existing Infrastructure
- No Upper Stage



\$14.4 Billion*

Total Development Cost

\$9.5 Billion

March 2016**

Operational Date

September 2012


Bottom-line: DIRECT Closes the Gap within the Current Budget

*GAO Figure


** March 2016 recently revealed

The Jupiter-120 Protects the Heavy Lift Infrastructure

JUPITER 120



Add a 2nd Stage and LSAM and we can Return to the Moon



We Agree, It is Too Late to Switch Horses Now

*Ares Retains < 5%
of the STS Hardware or
Infrastructure*

*The Jupiter is a Direct
Derivative of STS*

**Breaking
News**

*Al-Li
Disposable
5.5-
Segment
SRB*

*Even
Longer
Tank*

*Six RS-68
Engines*



*Different
Upper
Stages*



*New
5-Segment
SRB*

*STS is the Horse
we are on not the
Ares-1*



*Common
Upper
Stage*

*Existing
Reusable
4-Segment
SRB*

*Same
8.4m
Tank*



Different Foot Print




Same Foot Print

DIRECT Provides a Smooth Transition from the Ares-1

Current Ares-I Contractors




Possible Jupiter Contractors




DIRECT Integrated Master Schedule

DIRECT INTEGRATED MASTER SCHEDULE



DAC - Design Analysis Cycle, SRR - System Requirement Review, SDR - System Definition Review, PDR - Preliminary Design Review, CDR - Critical Design Review, DCR - Design Certification Review, IOC - Initial Operational Capability, FOC - Full Operational Capability
 * - Assumes 1 x 4-segment SRB utilized for Ground Testing each year


The Jupiter is a More Capable Space Shuttle Replacement



ISS Service & Upgrade



Hubble Service & Upgrade



Lunar Capable Orion



That is Safer & Reusable

Enabling New Classes of Manned and Unmanned Missions

JWST Service & Upgrade



Discovering Other Earths in the Galaxy




*Mars Sample Return
Advancing Mars EDL*



*Find New Life
in the Solar System*




The ISS has a New Life as Platform for Testing Habitats



DIRECT Saves Money Now and Later

Costs are lower because of only one launch vehicle development
Recurring costs are amortized over a larger number of flights**



*NASA Administrator Dr. Griffin, Space Transportation Association, 22 January 2008


DIRECT Produces a More Capable Lunar Program

It's not a question of performance but what approach will adhere to policy and budget.

*The most obvious split involves launching two identical vehicles**

*This method ... was to be employed [for Apollo]**

*Knowledge of system reliability is enhanced by flight experience**





*NASA Administrator Dr. Griffin, Space Transportation Association, 22 January 2008

Wernher Von Braun Figured out Performance 46 Years Ago



“We found the Tanking Mode substantially superior to the Connecting Mode. The performance margin could be enlarged almost indefinitely by the use of additional tankers.”
- Dr Wernher Von Braun June 7, 1962



Orbital Propellant Depots are the Bridge to a Successful VSE

Flexible and Extensible Mission Designs

70% of the Mass is up for Commercial and International Participation


Builds the Base needed to Leveraging Lunar Resources

Enables the Reuse of Expensive Spacecraft

Amplifies the Capability of all Missions Regardless of Nation

Completely Negates the Need for Super Heavy Lift like the Ares-5

*The development and exploitation of space has, so far, been accomplished in a fashion that can be described as "all government, all the time". That's not the way the American frontier was developed, it's not the way this nation developed aviation, it's not the way the rest of our economy works, and it ought not to be good enough for space, either.**



The Best Solution will Close ALL Gaps within Budget

	<i>Ares-1/5</i>	<i>EELV/COTS</i>	<i>DIRECT</i>
<i>The Workforce Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The Flight Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The Exploration Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The Budget Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The Contracts Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The COTS Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The International Gap</i>	●	●	●
<i>The Performance Gap</i>	●	●	●



"From 1975-1981, between the retirement of the Apollo-Saturn system and the first flight of the Shuttle, the United States did not have the capability to send humans into space, our country was not driving the space exploration agenda, and our aerospace workforce was decimated. We lost valuable people from the program, people who never came back. We lost valuable skills that were relearned with difficulty, or not at all. We lost momentum. Let us learn from these experiences. Let us not repeat them. Let us at least make a new mistake."

- NASA Administrator Mike Griffin, August 31, 2005

*"You can always count on Americans
to do the right thing
after they've tried everything else."
- Winston Churchill*



www.directlauncher.com