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**CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
(CSIS)**

BRAZIL: A DEFENSE OVERVIEW

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JOHANNA MENDELSON FORMAN: How's that? I'll start again. Thank you very much for being here at CSIS this morning. We're so honored to have such a distinguished guest, but first I'd like to say a few words about our other distinguished guest, a counselor and trustee of CSIS, General Brent Scowcroft who is here with us this morning to host and convene this event. General Scowcroft is a general who needs no introduction in Washington, but I still feel that we should say a few words about his accomplishments.

He is president of the forum on international policy, and of course as many of you know, he was the national security advisor for presidents Bush and Ford, and he had many distinguished positions within the United States government as a military advisor over the course of his career. But one of the most notable, I think, things he has done outside the government is he served on the secretary general's high-level panel on threats, challenges, and changes, one of the reports on collective security that really is laying the way for a new vision of the way international security works. And he was the only American on that panel and did an extremely important job in representing the interest not only of our country but of the global community in a rapidly changing world.

So I am going to say once again welcome to everybody here. We have in our presence many ambassadors, including the United States ambassador to Brazil, Ambassador Sobel, and the ambassador of Brazil to the United States, Ambassador Antonio Patriota, in our company as well as many other distinguished individuals whom we will speak to later. Thank you. General Scowcroft?

(Applause.)

GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, Johanna, I don't know if I've ever been to where the introducer gets introducer to do the introduction. (Laughter.) But anyway, I am very pleased and I want to say on that high-level panel was the former secretary general of the OAS, Mr. Suarez of Brazil, and we worked very closely together. This is a distinct pleasure for me. It's very rare in my experience to find someone with experience in all three branches of government at the high level. Today we have such a person with us, His Excellency Nelson Jobim.

In 2007 last year, President Lula appointed him as Brazil's minister of defense, and this is but the latest chapter in a most distinguished career. Let me call attention only to a few of the most significant in a remarkably varied pattern of activities. From 1995 to 1997, Minister Jobim served President Cardoso as Brazil's minister of justice, thus getting credentials in the executive department. Following that post, Minister Jobim, who is an attorney by training, moved to the judicial branch. He spent almost a decade in its top tier and capped by a nine-year career on the supreme court serving as Brazil's

chief justice from 2004 to 2006. In the legislative branch, he served two four-year terms as a federal deputy in the Brazilian chamber of deputies.

In addition, as a politician, Minister Jobim has been party leader of the PMDP. He was rapporteur for Brazil's constitutional revision in the early '90s. He has led Brazilian delegations in conferences on criminal activity, money laundering, human rights, social policy, organized crime, and drugs. His academic activities have included teaching positions at the Federal University of Santa Maria in his home state and at the University of Brasilia and he has written books on electoral law.

This is an important time, I think, for all of us. And I think this visit is an important one. The United States has been understandably preoccupied with activities in another part of the world. And consequently, there has been a relative period of inactivity and inattention with one of our closest friends in the hemisphere. I'd like to point out that the first name in the now-famous acronym BRIC happens to be Brazil. I think it is high time that with the world changing the way it is, that our two countries establish the kind of dialogue that is essential if we are to move forward in this very complex time. And I can think of no better way to start than with our distinguished guest today. And I think we are all honored to have him with us. And I ask you to join me in welcoming His Excellency Nelson Jobim, the defense minister of Brazil.

(Applause.)

[NOTE: MR. JOBIM'S COMMENTS ARE DELIVERED VIA TRANSLATOR]

NELSON JOBIM: (Inaudible, audio break) – in history. Even at independence, there was a transition that brought to Brazil and left in Brazil the Portuguese royal family. Peter the First became Peter the Fourth in Portugal after he resigned. When republic was proclaimed, what happened was actually a military coup against the liberal cabinet of the viscount of black gold, Ouro Preto. And republic is born, bringing with it the imperial habits. (Inaudible) – who is an important figure in Brazil, was pro-imperial, pro-empire and became a late Republican.

We see it all the time. In 1980s at the end of government, President – (inaudible) – when there was a change in the opposition elite that was the opposition to the regime, when that elite took over the leadership of Brazilian institutions in its imaginary – it remains something important for the historical process, important in – as far as its effects are concerned – all of us identify that that point, defense with military, and military with political repression. So the defense, as well as security, were linked to political repression. And it was used in this sense. Defense and security, and more especially defense, which I have to talk about, stayed outside – was kept outside the political agenda because of it. Nobody wanted to touch that issue.

In 1986, '87, '88, when the constitution was being elaborated, there were very seldom to have politicians who wanted to deal with that issue. Nobody wanted to know about it because it was seen as someone who it was somebody trying to bring back the

previous regime. So the issue and the policy of defense became exclusively a military issue and in a bargain relationship between the civilian power giving minimal resources to the military forces, so that they will be kept alive, so to speak.

In July of this year, after some resistance, when I finally accepted invitation of the president to become the defense minister – and the reasons that led me to accept it were the problems that we are living now in the civilian era. There was a disaster, an air accident with TAM Airlines, and it was a very tense situation in Brazil vis-à-vis civilian aviation. But that's something momentary. You know that the issue of the civilian aviation is controlled by the military because of historical reasons. We discussed with President Lula about the need to put back defense into the national agenda. And we had to rescue the issue of defense with something that was necessary related to the interest of the country and modernity and it could not be dealt exclusively by the military. I was saying then that the military have the duty to evaluate the strategic possibilities of certain actions. But it belongs to the civilian power to define the tasks to be developed.

So with participation of Minister Mangabeira Unger who presently is the secretary for long-term issues, we created a committee supported by the president and chaired by the minister of defense to prepare a plan, a strategic national plan for defense. And the methodology we are using - we have applying I; we have the debates going on; and we want to finish this activity by September of this year. And the methodology is to identify tasks to be developed, to be executed. For instance, monitoring borders of the coast and the airspace in peace circumstances – this is a task to be developed by the forces, monitoring in peacetime of our coast, of our territory and the airspace.

Another hypothesis – penetration of borders by a paramilitary force with stealth or non-stealthy help or complacency of a bordering country: that's another hypothesis. We formulate different hypotheses and working hypotheses and we ask each force what they propose to fulfill the task that was determined and identified. Once we have an answer on how the force will act, we post some specific questions.

One of them, the first one, after we got a response of how that force wants to fulfill its mission – the first question is what changes in the profile and organization of that force is necessary in order to execute the task? That is, the force will keep the model existing so far, or do we have to change the profile of these forces in including its organization, its geographical positioning even. This second specific question is linked to operational practices. What changes in the operational practices can help the right fulfillment, the correct fulfillment of that task, profile organization, operational practices.

And finally, what new equipment are a priority in order to have a better fulfillment of that task? In other words, equipment that will be used by the forces is linked to the task as defined by the civilian power. And they have to define the way it will be executed. That has been approved by the civilian power, and the civilian power will determine the changes of profile, organization and practices, and equipment that become necessary.

All of these hypotheses have the same specific questions. Actually, vis-à-vis the Amazon, region, you know that Brazil, of the three large geographic areas of Brazil, Brazil is part of the river plate basin and the Amazon. We don't belong to the Andean aspect that is one of the three big aspects of South America. Now, transversally, to all of the questions, there is a questioning – a transversal (?) question that crosses all of them so to speak. And the forces also have to answer to that. What in priority initiatives they have in order to contribute to the defense industry and how those initiatives are linked to the initiatives of other forces? In other words, methodology – the methodology applies sets and problems. That is, we want to remind that we have to consider two situations in this problem.

First of all, the present situation of insecure peace in the world and the porous borders of Brazil – one element. And the second one, besides these porous borders, we are surrounded by a South American environment – some with huge problems of economic viability and a possible future situation in the world of a conflagration that will go beyond the concept of contained regional wars. All of this is an issue – not a fact but an eventuality, a possibility. And in order to have a force that would – (inaudible) – enemies that we know we have to answer that. And we want to close that work already.

We started the discussion with the forces. We are trying to see how we can fulfill this task to establish deterrence. The first impact with the forces was the action of self-protection – you know that those changes that take place in the world always are delayed by the most solid institutions. And we have to keep in mind that armies organized for conventional wars are very little-used in the modern world. We should understand changes, the alterations that the modern world imposed – in other words, the existence of asymmetric wars by national states against the institutions, organizations that are criminal or not. But not necessarily dispute of states between states – no, now it's a different model.

Now, this new model have to lead us to think and in general remember that the French before the Second World War, they prepared themselves for a war that was similar to the First World War. And they built the Maginot Line with fixed lines. And the Germans came with the blitzkrieg, and in a few weeks, they took over, notwithstanding the warnings of General De Gaulle about the need for mobility.

Well, in our opinion, we need – as far as Brazil is concerned – to create an operational and technological group for the army. But we have to take into account that the Amazon and the river plate basin of Brazil require a completely different preparation because it's different. Armored troops, armored forces in the Amazon is unthinkable. You cannot get into there. What we need in the Amazon is the model of soldier that we have who is prepared for the war in the jungle with actions that are very, very much a guerilla kind of action and not conventional war.

But if this applies to the Amazon, it does not apply to the southern part of the country. In the analysis we prepared at that point. It was said that our border problem is west, to the west. And the mass of the armed forces barracks are in east because the issue

of the western borders only became a possible problem in the 20th century. And the tradition of the army was to have its barracks on the list – big barracks in – (inaudible) – because of the peculiarities and the problems that we could foresee in the beginning of the 20th century in Argentina. And everything close to the beaches was great for the military; the beaches are wonderful in Brazil, by the way. But our problem wasn't that one.

So we are checking and verifying that with complete transparency, tranquility, and great seriousness with the Brazilian officers. And this implies one thing: national capabilities. When we are dealing with equipment, Brazil can not become equipment that is shelf equipment that will stay on the shelves. It needs the technological capability of generating a basic defense industry, a Brazilian industry that might provide capability to the Brazilian forces.

In conflicts and tensions between countries when they occur, the first manifestation is that the exporter of military products will cut its exports. And if the imports of the Brazilian armed forces will depend on importation from countries, it cannot deter. It just cut the provision and there is no deterrence. And this is why Brazil developed in a very successful way its program of enriching nuclear fuel. We have already the full cycle to go from yellow cake to go to the enriched product. So that is why Brazil is now looking for partners. We are talking to France in order to build in Brazil the non-nuclear part of the nuclear propulsion submarine.

Taking into account the extension of the Brazilian territory, the extension of what we call the blue water of Brazil, which is exactly where we have today the great wealth in oil and energy, and this is why we are going towards this partnership, so that we will affect the system. Remember, keep in mind that we have 3,000,559 square kilometers of exclusive economic zones. Those are waters under Brazilian jurisdiction. And we have to have deterrence capability, not only on the surface – because we know perfectly that surface nowadays is easily detectable.

I remember a general that a few years ago, he wouldn't allow the incoming foreign airplanes that people had to be concerned that they might take pictures of situations in Brazil. So we were all concerned about it. Now, we have Google. Just click and there it is. You see everything; makes no sense this kind of discourse. No, no, no, we cannot allow them to take pictures. Just go in Google; it's in the house. They are coming into your house practically. So we have to have that modernity of perception for this situation.

And this is what we are doing in Brazil. We are discussing the preparation of this kind of land, this concern to prepare short-, medium-, and long-term national capabilities; technological vanguard and national capabilities to verify acute questions. Yes, today, for instance, in the morning, the General Saito (sp) and the ambassador in our group, they were at Langley Air Force Base. We visited; we had General Matte (sp) and had a long conversation. He is the chief of the joint force and general colleague who is of the air attack force.

And we checked and verified the American projects of the F35 airplane. And then, the question comes in – it's a big plane. It's a great plane. It's a big project. Now, let's see if it fits our needs. And our needs are defined exactly by this program to see if this equipment is the one that's adequate to our position of monitoring our territory, our airspace in Brazil. Or maybe it is more important to spend that money, \$70 million a piece, in disseminating airplanes below 3,000 feet that we have. It's a political issue to be solved.

With the definition by the military of what I'm calling after its evaluation of strategic probabilities and its two main paths: preparation and command of war. And then, we will have a logic that the civilian power will determine in a national alliance situation because if we don't bring defense to the national agenda, the costs of defense will be reduced brutally because it won't have the support of the taxpayers who have to give the financial aspect of it. It has to do with the nation. It's not political parties.

And on South America, since the beginning, on the 14th of this month, I, the minister of defense, should start visiting all countries of South America. On the 14th, I have a meeting with President Chavez of Venezuela. And afterwards, we will go to Suriname and Guyana. The following week, we are going to Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador; afterwards, Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay, and then Argentina and Uruguay in order to discuss a Brazilian proposal for the creation of a South American defense council integrated by the ministers of defense or their equivalents in South America.

This council would contribute to creating a South American defense identity. It's obvious that South American identity that will take into account, of course, the three main areas: the Amazon, the Andean, and the river plate area, and this concept would be based in common principles: respecting sovereignty, self-determination, territorial integrity of the states, and non-intervention in internal affairs. This is part of the U.N. Charter.

This council could have – and Brazilian proposal is in that line – the following attributions articulate measures of increasing security trust in South America, including common defense politics and white books in exchange of people, which is very important in this area. Preparation and training of military all over the Americas, military exercises – joint military exercises, joint participation in peacekeeping operations of the U.N., integration of industrial bases of defense, joint analysis of aspects of the national conjuncture, and regional and sub-regional situations in the areas of security and defense as well as the possibility of coordinated action when we face risks and threats to the security of state's articulation and coordination of positions in multilateral fora about security and defense like the InterAmerican Defense Board, Commission of – (inaudible) – Security, and the conference of ministers of defense of the Americas that brings in all of the continent.

The main region for the creation of this council is exactly to have a forum of the continent, of the South American continent, in order to be able to speak with a strong

voice. Isolated, we won't be anything in the international area. The continent needs to think big because this is the only way to be big. Whoever thinks small knows that we will remain small and we will discuss dust that is on the refrigerator, something like that. This is our objective.

That is true; that is true. Women could tell you that. This concept could be concentrated on the exam of political strategy issues in the region. And it might be the appropriate environment for debating regional problems. We know, for instance, that notwithstanding Brazil not having any border conflict, no problems on its borders, everything solved – the Rio Branco baron solved it at the beginning of the 20th century in the foreign ministry. But we know that the continent does have border problems. Venezuela didn't recognize the pope's decision on the Esequibo region that belongs to Guyana now. We have a problem there of Chile, for instance, Bolivia, and Peru as far as Bolivia's access to the ocean north of Chile. Those are issues that are slipping.

We have to take into account the possibility of in case this comes up again, we have to talk, through exchange of experiences, personal relations that are essential in this area, the possibility of having military officers in all of Latin America that have a link among themselves, that they probably studied together, they were colleagues together, and then will be able to solve our problems.

It's a moment, ladies and gentlemen of having in this perspective a concept of defense that would face important issue – will tackle important issues, which is the case, for instance, of the use of defense instruments in fighting organized crime. Should it continue outside the range of the armed forces or not? We should bring it to the table and open a debate on that.

In Brazil, one of the basic discussions we are having is about the use of armed forces in urban conflicts that take place in Rio, the shantytown problems, crime problems. In the Brazilian jargon, we call it using armed forces to assure law and order – GLO in Portuguese, that's the acronym. We have expertise in that Brazil has shown complete expertise in dealing with urban issues with its activities in Haiti, through those activities it was demonstrated. It was exactly an urban problem that we tackled; and on the other side, we also had organized gangsters, especially in the City de Soleil, which is the classic one so to speak. And the success of Brazilian troops is absolute; it's complete in this area.

The way of controlling the urban environment – it is difficult that troops cannot be used to do that in its own country. But in order to be used in its own country with its goal – if there is a basic problem that nobody talks about or nobody has wanted to discuss but has to be faced, which is the legal statute of these troops. One thing, our Brazilian troops operating in Haiti under the U.N. flag with the legal statute defined by U.N. resolutions and accepted in Haiti through treaties by Haiti with the U.N. Another issue is to use these drop troops in Brazilian territory, which we have to use the local laws, Brazilian laws.

We had an example. In 1994-95, I became the justice department during the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. I became minister of justice. In the previous of Itamar Franco who became president when President Collor was impeached, we had sent troops to the Rio de Janeiro to control some shantytowns, favelas. Then, we closed that work in February '95. But many soldiers who did operate and lead the troop are answering to the common justice because of acts they performed during that mission. You cannot try to use troops of that kind. In order to use the troop, you need the statutes. You have to know what statute, what law can be prepared.

Those very curious problems, by the way, you remember that in Brazil for a time in the '90s, it was very much discussed at the chamber of deputies. And I was the chairman of the justice commission at the chamber. And we were discussing the new models of police investigation, like bugs and so on. One of them was you should call the infiltrated agent, a police person that we put inside, a mole that we put inside a criminal organization. And it was very interesting because everybody agreed on how efficient the agent would be.

So I, who am an old lawyer, I said, since we all agree that we should have this model of infiltrated agent, of a mole, the question we have to make is what crime can he commit? If you take someone from police and put it inside a criminal organization and say that you cannot commit a crime, you're killing that person. So how far can he go? Can he violate women? Can he steal? Can he kidnap someone? Is he capable? Can he kill someone? So then things changed; that essentialist conception of the concept of crime, very typical of our Aristotelian-Thomist culture made any kind of discussion inviolable. The same goes for this problem.

What actions can the military perform assuring law and order that cannot be pursued by common justice? Why, because it's internalized in ourselves the use of force in conventional war where the individual on the other side is the enemy. In this other side, you have a criminal individual and not an enemy. And then, things become very complex and we still don't have a culture that is sufficient for that kind of focus.

I am going too far. But I just want to tell you with complete transparency that I hope that this year, we have already created this council, this South American council of defense. And we will be able to have a forum for the region, for the continent to debate its issues, including humanitarian actions that should take place, coordinated by the council itself. Brazil in this moment is helping Bolivia because of the accidents. It just said that we are there with 70 soldiers and so on. But if we can coordinate that in an organization of that nature, it will become efficient and we have the cohesion of a great continent that needs to leave its rhetoric flights and go into concrete actions that might lead to development and peace in the region, essentially take into account that freedom coincides very much with economic development.

Hunger does not help very much to have conceptions of freedom. The capability of hunger of destroying any intention and any action trying to talk about principles only takes place when you have something in your stomach. Be assured of that. Brazil wants

to contribute with its own development with our region in order to achieve that. And the United States could also think in this kind of situation and contribution that they could provide to Latin America, but from an eye-to-eye level. Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

MS. FORMAN: Thank you so much, Minister. The minister has been kind enough to take some questions from the audience. So we have microphones roving around, and if you'll please identify yourself and your affiliation please? We'll just begin the question period as soon as the minister gets his earpiece of.

MR. JOBIM: This?

MS. FORMAN: This. Okay? Okay. Yes, sir?

Q: Yes, I'm Richard Downey from the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. Mr. Minister, thank you very much for some fascinating remarks. And I wanted to ask you about the defense council, the South American Defense Council that you mentioned. (Cross talk.) I'm sorry, I wanted to ask you about the South American Defense Council that you mentioned. And you're going on a visit to Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and all the other countries throughout South America. And I wonder if you might comment on Hugo Chavez's recent remarks on a military alliance through ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative. And I wonder if the South American Defense Council, if you see any particular tension with this effort on the part of Hugo Chavez or perhaps is this a reaction or a response to this effort by Hugo Chavez?

MR. JOBIM: I want to say that the first thing in this type of proposal or conduct has a lot to do with diplomacy. I follow a biblical rule. Each day, with agony, and the conjunction agonies does not produce any favorable thing. At this moment, what we want is to create the council. President Chavez has an interest in the creation of – in the formation of this council. I talked to Chavez in February when I visited – went in a visit with President Lula. Lula exposed the model that we intend to do. My trip to Venezuela was to define the acceptance by President Chavez and this minimal agenda that I referred to.

The existence of the council will make it viable for other problems to be taken into consideration in the future. And the future only can define this, because it will anticipate everything. We may not end up having the council after all. So it's a strategic situation, so we have to convey that theme in a way because the council is not against anyone. It's a council to include positions, unification of unique points of view and work for all South America.

MS. FORMAN: Okay, I have Mark Schneider on my list next.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Minister. Mark Schneider, the International Crisis Group. I think we all appreciate the way in which you demonstrated the –

MR. JOBIM: Excuse me. It's the technology. (Laughter.) Okay, I can hear you.

Q: As I said, I think we all appreciated the way that you demonstrated looking at legal issues as they apply to the use of military force. The last few days, we published a report on drug trafficking in the Western Hemisphere and I think gave copies to one of your aides. And what we found was that these policies that are designed to reduce demand in the consumer countries are not being successful. And the policies that are designed to reduce supply in the producer countries are not being successful.

You mentioned drug trafficking and organized crime as a major threat. Brazil is the only country that has borders with all three of the major producers of cocaine. And what we found was an increase in the flow of cocaine –

MR. JOBIM: Brazil?

Q: – to Europe through Brazil, as well as increased consumption in South America. And I'm curious whether or not there's already steps that have been taken? You mentioned border monitoring. Is CVOM an effective mechanism for helping to control border, the transit of cocaine through the Amazon? Are there steps that you would like to see Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia take in conjunction with your military and with your police in trying to do more to stop the flow across borders?

MR. JOBIM: (Inaudible, audio break) – refining in Colombia. In '89, we had some events when I was deputy – some events about the internal circulation in Brazil. We didn't have in those days an instrument called Sibam (ph), a service of vigilance, of watchful – in '95, in the government of – in '95, while I was already in the ministry of justice, we started to elaborate together with the air force and the armed force a program and introduction of Sibam in Brazil.

It was curious, very curious this situation, because there was solicitation in Brazil between enterprises that could supply radar and other equipment and resources. So an American – (inaudible) – and a French company called Transant (sp) – today is Talais (sp) in France that produces this equipment. There was a dispute between the State Department of the United States and the Department of Commerce because the State Department didn't want to authorize these instruments to be transferred to Brazil. But then, after a long discussion and dialogue and chief of service of drugs here in the United States was Mutafré (ph). So I had a lot of contacts with him.

Today, we have installed the services of watchfulness of the Amazoni and we have an understanding with Peru, with Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador that integrated Amazonian process that has to do with transferring the technology through Sibam to supervise all this region. The air force of Brazil – part of Sibam is headquartered in Manaus, so these efforts are being developed so we can have this type of situation under control. We have to make political accord in consumer countries. And so, the consumer countries are to be fought.

So I should count that in 1989, I came to New York and our ambassador in New York, Dr. Paolo Nogueira (sp) Batista – he has already passed on – I watched a very curious debate at the United Nations about the drug consumed. And there was a senator of the Republican Party that sustained and discussed with the Brazilian ambassador about the fight against the drugs. And the Brazilian ambassador then showed to the American senator that the largest purchaser, buyer of acetone in the United States was Colombia. And this is an element that is one of the basic elements to refined cocaine. But business is business, as said the senator. This meaning that there were actions – they didn't want the actions that could be working on the precursors.

So later on, in the mid-90s, there were agreements firmed about these basic elements. And this was a general – there is no doubt; this is a big worry. But it's not possible to control drugs without monitoring from space because the Amazon region – I don't know if you've been there – the flora, the jungle covers everything. As a minister of justice, I went to the region of – (inaudible) – near Colombia border and Bolivia for a program of destruction of landing sites that had been constructed by the traffickers of drugs. They would take a paste of coke to Peru, going through Colombia and Brazil. But they needed to – they used a small – they needed small planes and little landing sites. So we went along to destroy them.

In the Amazon, you don't see anything. You see a river. You don't see anything because the jungle hides everything from view. So when approaching one of the landing sites, I looked down – there was a helicopter – from the helicopter and there was some plane, a little larger than this, a little more than the size of this room. And I saw the pilot, I said, there is the landing strip. There was 1,500 meters of jungle covering the whole thing. So to find these sites, it is almost impossible. You have to do the monitoring that we are doing in the region now in relation to the Sibani that we are developing together with the collaboration of several forces in – (inaudible).

So in the Amazon region, about two or three weeks ago, we identified a little production of cocaine within the Brazilian territory through this system of monitoring. So all that was burned and we fought that.

MS. FORMAN: This gentleman in the –

Q: Aston Hansen.

MS. FORMAN: Aston Hansen. Are there – yes, this gentleman in the rear?

Q: (Translated from Portuguese) – F35, does it take part in the process of the elicitation that is dragging or how is the process of elicitation? Does it continue? Condoleezza Rice was in Brazil recently and talked to President Lula and she mentioned about this council. Do you have any news about the perspective?

MR. JOBIM: I have just met with the secretary of State. I had met with Gates, the secretary of Defense. We talked for a long time with Dr. Rice. The question about 15 minutes before I came here, we had a long 40-minute conversation. So I showed to her what we were doing. I was not asking her for her permission, but just informing her about what we were doing. And she thought it extraordinarily interesting, this initiative, including Mr. Gates had asked us about which way they could help. So we said what the United States can help with at this point is to just watch us and stay away because we are doing this in South American, which is an effort that is recognized by the United States.

But I want to leave this very clear. Transparency – the talks we had here in the United States are absolutely transparent. So this is very important for the continent. This is what we said. And we notified an international partner, that is the United States. But I left it very clear that this decision was ours, internal, and that this is clearly a South American problem.

So I was welcomed and she praised the initiative. She said it was very important in the international sector. So we are advancing very fast.

The F35 is not subject to elicitation, but the problem of the use or not the use of planes of this nature, perhaps a plane that is going to cost \$70 or 60 million, we have to balance this against our interests. So this is a discussion that goes through the strategic plan of defense to find out if this is necessary for efforts of monitoring. We have an extension of 22 million square kilometers, so visibility that we have. We have to have monitoring because you know that radar – are a species of flashlight. They are on top. But you have triangular spaced underneath that are not seen. That's why we need the monitoring planes. So let's imagine that were only \$10 million – that would cost \$700 million for 10 planes or \$700 million for what is more important? What is more imperative? The answer is the plan of strategic defense. Thank you very much.

MS. FORMAN: Thank you. We have time for one more question. This gentleman on the – there. Thank you.

Q: Thank you, Minister. I was very happy with your presentation. Under – (inaudible) – Brazilian ambassador as a secretary of the Organization of American States, I was very happy with it because of the clarity, the idea that you exposed of a council that will be the basis of a market for an industrial – (inaudible) – increasing our independence in relation to the military equipment, but also, because it reflects that essential political strategy and defense mechanism.

Even for a historic recent history, the inheritance of dictatorships that we have, there is a lot of discussion on these subjects, even while the organized crime are so powerful that it controls territories and threatens the constitutive elements of the idea of sovereignty. There is some fear to use defense forces in security, so I have discussed this subject, including with the members of your ministry. And what I say is, we don't want to present solutions but I'd like to – (inaudible) – subjects not to exist so we could discuss this theme. I want to thank you very much for the initiative and hope that it works.

And I'd like our contact through the board that has to do with the defense of our security, multi-dimensional. It's a question, a development that did democracy that we could organize this debate. That is fundamental. Since one of the problems with our citizens, especially those that are poorer, have not enough resources to pay for private security. The individuals can circulate, can walk through the streets without being threatened. So I'd like a very brief comment from you how you see this use of forces, the use of forces in exceptional situations in internal circumstances.

MR. JOBIM: One of the tasks submitted to the armed forces and presented to them to be developed is in the sixth hypothesis of use of forces in participation of internal situations to guarantee the order. The questions that are raised about this – which are the worries about these forces with the conditions and the mechanisms so this can be taken, can be valuable? It looks like common sense that if you have an organization of this nature, you can use it.

However, the discussion is made about the necessity of the use, but not about how to use it. So exactly the object of use depends on the rules of how to use it. Let's make it very clear. Let's use for example the forces in the problem in one shantytown in Rio de Janeiro. Do we think a sergeant would tell all his soldiers that should open fire when he is going to be criminally responsible for that? So if we don't have a clear idea of how to act and what to do, nobody is going to face the risk of knowing that that soldier that is under his order and in the charge and the new tenet is so close that he is not going to be putting his soldiers in a situation like that.

So we ask, where are the situations, the mechanisms for usage because this is an area – including in our constitution. The problem is to know how to use. And it's funny that there are not many people trying to analyze this. But it's very difficult to find a partner that is willing to define how she used this. So these are subjects that have to be brought up in absolute transparency.

And I want to take it to define this. What are the rules of the game because nobody plays the game without rules? I myself would never involve the forces without having a rule of protection, unless I'm completely wrong and completely irresponsible. This is what creates the creation of this question. All of them, what type of education and formation in the academies is necessary? In the studies that they perform, all this has to be defined. Otherwise, this won't work and will not create solutions. So we have to have transparency to face this. In my age now, I have reached, I have gone through all of these different – (inaudible) – and I have turned my little purse throughout the – (inaudible).

So I have no desire to go around doing these things, but I have to do my task, the one that President Lula encharged me of until the moment he wants me to do. If we don't run ahead, the preoccupations mentioned by the ambassador become discussions that will be only academic. I have the experience and this is a fundamental point. We have to have results, not only discussions. Operating in a basis of mistakes at times but success in other, but we hope for a doctrine that will give us a guarantee to develop all our efforts.

And I want that it's fundamental, that you think in these terms, because in Brazil when there was a process of 64, the military forces policy, the police and those linked to the public security became – started being controlled by the national army, so since 1930, those forces that controlled the everything. That was a decision of Getúlio Vargas, the dictator to chop off the arm of those forces. So the union cut the possibility of the governors or anybody else in the civilian field to act. And everything was reserved. The dominance was entirely by the army. And so, the superior school of war at the time created the concept of internal war to allow for the forces to be used internally to combating communists and other political enemies. With this decision to use the military police, they took to the army not only the equipment of the effected, but the instruction, the military instruction.

And while by doing this, taking everything to the army, the academies of military police , there were instructions passed on to them to the infantry soldier when the instructions should be coming from a distinct different – from an infant. So there was tremendous confusion and the impossibility of the military forces to deal with the enemies. So they had this great distortion in Brazil that changed everything. So we had to redo the whole curriculum, integrate this curriculum because now it is now possible. Why, because this is a national problem; it's not only military problem.

And it has transformed to a nation problem, so the military are the ones that are – I say it again – that will evaluate the strategic probabilities of the necessary action defined by the civilian activity. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MS. FORMAN: Thank you, Minister Jobim and thank you to our audience on this Friday. And we hope that this is the beginning of a series of visits that you come pay to CSIS along with other officials from your government. And thank you, General Scowcroft, for joining us today.

(END)