Speech by Senator Richard Lugar
CSIS Conference on Transatlantic Efforts for Peace and Security
On the Occasion of Norway's Centennial Anniversary
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It is a pleasure to participate in this conference marking the centennial of Norway's founding and the beginning of the close Norwegian-American alliance. I thank CSIS and my good friends John Hamre and Ambassador Knut Vollebaek for this invitation to speak. Dr. Hamre and Ambassador Vollebaek have given generous support to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to myself during my chairmanship, and I am grateful for their wise counsel.

It is an especial honor to be with King Harald and Queen Sonja. Their visit to our country has been eagerly anticipated, especially by the many Americans of Norwegian descent who fondly embrace the homeland of their ancestors. We admire the graciousness and leadership of the royal couple. Our warmest wishes are with them and the Norwegian people as they celebrate Norway's centennial.

I also would like to acknowledge the outstanding work of Foreign Minister Petersen. I have had the pleasure to get to know him through several mutual endeavors during the last two years. I appreciate his strong advocacy on behalf of the Transatlantic Alliance and the energy and thoughtfulness that he has applied to leading Norway's ambitious foreign policy agenda.

At the heart of that agenda has been Norway's unwavering commitment to international service. Norway has been a model of global citizenship and peace-making. It has dedicated resources to achieving peace and development that are far beyond its relative size and population. It consistently ranks among the top nations in the percentage of GDP that it dedicates to foreign economic assistance. It is a generous contributor to international peacekeeping missions, and it has sponsored numerous peace negotiations, including those involving Israel and the Palestinians and the warring factions in Sri Lanka.

In Europe, Norway has been a leader in the vital effort to control weapons of mass destruction. Close to its borders it has devoted funds to dismantling deteriorating Russian submarines and to improving the safety of spent nuclear fuel. Norway initiated the important Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program, or AMEC, in which the United States, Russia, and Norway seek to address environmental problems associated with the decommissioning of Russia's nuclear submarine fleet. It is also taking the lead in removing and replacing Russia's vulnerable strontium-powered lighthouses in the Barents Sea region. These lighthouses contain radioactive material that could be used to construct dirty bombs. Far from its borders, Norway has contributed resources to the critical work of destroying Russia's massive stockpiles of chemical weapons at Shchuchye, Russia. Norway was the first non-member of the G-8 to join the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction – also known as the "10 Plus 10 over 10 initiative."

This short list only scratches the surface of Norway's activism. As we contemplate the future of the Transatlantic Alliance, it is useful to observe how Norway has maintained its strong commitment to the Alliance, while still asserting itself on independent projects and goals around the world.

During the last three years, the alliance between Europe and the United States has experienced severe strains that have caused many commentators to question whether it can survive and, if it does survive, whether it will remain relevant. These are fair questions, but we should resist the impulse to believe that our current differences have no precedent. We should recall, for example, the consuming public debate that occurred in Europe and the United States during the early 1980s over the deployment of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The NATO allies had made the collective decision to deploy these weapons in response to

the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate missiles aimed at targets throughout Western Europe. But this decision produced conflict in the U.S.-European relationship. Anti-nuclear demonstrations occurred frequently across Europe. On one day in 1983, protests in Europe collectively drew more than two million people. Throughout this difficult period, there was much debate about whether the Transatlantic Alliance would be damaged. But the Western allies maintained their cohesion, and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War.

The lesson in this historic reflection is not that our alliance will automatically bounce back after periodic internal conflicts. Rather, the lesson is that maintaining an alliance is hard work. No matter how close allies become, centrifugal forces generated by basic differences in the size, location, wealth, histories, and political systems of nations tend to pull alliances apart. Alliances work over long periods of time only when alliance leaders and citizens continually reinvigorate the union and its purposes.

Unfortunately, rhetoric emanating from both sides of the Atlantic has not helped the relationship during the last several years. Some politicians and members of the media in Europe and the United States have promoted caricatures and oversimplifications that appeal to the resentments and prejudices of their electorates. But we must be honest with ourselves that our differences are not merely the result of unfortunate rhetoric. The roles played by Europe and the United States in the world have led to different priorities on some important issues. The alliance will be healthier if we recognize these differences and honestly debate them.

During the last two years, the war in Iraq has been the focal point of these differences. In the United States, the debate that preceded the Iraq war in early 2003 centered on the question of whether the United States should make concessions to world opinion or pursue its perceived national security interests unencumbered by the constraints of the international community. But this was a false choice. National security decision-making can rarely be separated from the constraints of the international community, because American resources and influence are finite.

Meanwhile, European governments have been slow to acknowledge that notwithstanding anti-American public opinion in Europe, their nations have the same interest as the United States in ensuring that Iraq becomes a stable democratic country that can be a catalyst for positive change in the Middle East.

I am confident that the United States and Europe will work through these challenges. The recent visits to Europe by Secretary of State Rice and President Bush underscored the enduring mutual interests of the alliance and the common bonds of history, culture, and devotion to democratic freedom. We should never forget that the Transatlantic Alliance was founded to defend freedom. At its most fundamental level, the advancement of freedom still should be the core mission of the alliance.

Last November, President Bush asked me to lead the delegation of American observers to the Ukrainian elections. I was inspired by the courage of so many Ukrainians who demonstrated their passion for free expression and democracy. As corrupt authorities tried to disrupt the election and intimidate citizens, brave people pushed back by keeping the election on track and preventing chaos.

On the way home, I stopped in Germany, where I met with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. He asked for my opinion on how the Transatlantic Alliance could be reinvigorated. I told him that the answer could be found in Ukraine, Georgia, and other nations that were struggling to establish democracy. The people of Ukraine and Georgia have responded heroically to the hope and justice embodied in fair elections, a free press, free market economics, religious tolerance, and civil liberties. They also want to join a Europe that is whole and free.

Nascent democracies will succeed more readily if they have help from the West. More precisely, they need *coordinated* help from the West. They need a unified Transatlantic Alliance that can provide a grassroots support system for democracy. Such a system depends on the resources and expertise that can be provided by the entire alliance. In addition, people who are embracing freedom with the hope of gaining the security and economic benefits that come with membership in the democratic club want to see that club unified and strong. The encouragement and inspiration that we can provide is much greater when we demonstrate that the alliance can overcome its internal problems.

Alliance members must understand that the creation and nurturing of new democracies is not a charitable cause. The security of our alliance depends as much on their success as they depend on us. Ultimately, without the advancement of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Caucuses, Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and beyond, we will have a very difficult time winning the war against terrorism, maintaining economic stability, ensuring adequate energy supplies, and protecting the global environment. We must expand the community of nations that will be dedicated to global action on these fronts. This means expanding democracy, which empowers people, restrains would-be dictators, and opens nations to cooperation on a range of urgent problems.

The most important of these problems, in my view, is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Along with democracy building, the Transatlantic Alliance must be devoted to the painstaking work of controlling these weapons. Even if we succeed spectacularly at building democracy around the world, bringing stability to failed states, and spreading economic opportunity broadly, we will not be secure from the actions of small, disaffected groups that acquire weapons of mass destruction. Everything is at risk if we fail in this one area.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the goal of most disarmament efforts was to prevent war between nations by balancing armaments so that aggressors did not have an advantage. During the Cold War, in the era of Mutual Assured Destruction, arms control often had more narrow purposes. We hoped to limit the costs of the arms race, reduce the prospects of a successful nuclear first strike by either side, and implement confidence building measures to prevent an accidental holocaust. Ironically, we think of the 1970s and 1980s as the "golden era of arms control" because of the dramatic summitry of the period and the complex arms control agreements struck by the alliances led by the United States and the Soviet Union. But if we are to survive and prosper, we must make our present time the real "golden age of arms control." Twenty years from now, we must be able to look back and marvel at all that we accomplished.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem. It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. Beyond the horrific loss of life, proposals to advance the standard of living throughout the world would be undercut by the uncertainty and fear that would follow a catastrophic terrorist attack.

The bottom line is this: for the foreseeable future, the nations of the Transatlantic Alliance will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The minimum standard for victory is the prevention of any of the individual terrorists or terrorist cells from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. This is a far more exacting arms control goal than existed during the 1970s and 1980s, when a successful agreement might allow for thousands of new nuclear weapons.

I believe that we can develop the international practices and norms that can almost guarantee that terrorists will not have access to nuclear weapons. In doing so, we can transform our world into a place that is more secure and more connected than it has ever been.

As part of the global war against terrorism, the United States and its allies must establish a worldwide system of accountability for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In such a system, every nation that has weapons and materials of mass destruction must account for what it has, safely secure what it has, and demonstrate that no other nation or cell will be allowed access. If a nation lacks the means to do this, the international community must provide financial and technical assistance.

In 1991, I joined with former Senator Sam Nunn to establish the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. This initiative brought Americans and Russians together to ensure the safety and destruction of the huge stockpile of weapons and materials of mass destruction left over from the former Soviet Union. The program has demonstrated over the last thirteen years that extraordinary international relationships are possible to improve controls over weapons of mass destruction.

Working in concert, the United States and Russia have destroyed 6,564 nuclear warheads and dismantled hundreds of bombers, missiles, and submarines of the former Soviet Union that were built to deliver them. The Nunn-Lugar Program is employing in peaceful pursuits tens of thousands of Russian weapons scientists who are no longer tempted to sell their knowledge. The program also has made progress toward protecting nuclear material, biological weapons laboratories, and chemical weapons stockpiles. Nunn-Lugar facilitated the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these three nations emerged as the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Today, all three are nuclear weapons free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

Beyond statistics, the program has served as a bridge of communication and cooperation between the United States and Russia, even when other aspects of the relationship were in decline. It has improved military-to-military contacts and established greater transparency in areas that used to be the object of intense secrecy and suspicion.

In this context, the decision in 2002 by the G-8 nations to devote $20 billion to securing weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union over 10 years was an incredibly important development. The participation of the G-8 and other allied nations, including Norway, greatly improves the diplomatic strength that can be brought to bear on safeguarding weapons of mass destruction. We welcome not only the commitment of funds, but also the infusion of ideas from allies on how dismantlement efforts can be accelerated.

Now we must not only accelerate weapons dismantlement in Russia, we must replicate our work with Russia in as many countries as possible and build a global coalition to support non-proliferation.

Many questions have been raised about the security of Pakistan=s nuclear program. Similar questions may be directed at India=s program. North Korea, Iran, Syria, and other nations present unique and difficult proliferation challenges. We cannot afford to be defeatist. Using the Cooperative Threat Reduction model, we should attempt to forge relationships to control weapons of mass destruction in previously reticent or hostile nations.

In addition, we should take opportunities to erect an international system to secure vulnerable stockpiles of conventional weapons. In the Senate, I have introduced legislation modeled on the original Nunn-Lugar Act that targets conventional weapons, including tactical missiles and man portable air defense systems, or MANPADS. Reports suggest that Al Qaeda has attempted to acquire these kinds of weapons. In

addition, unsecured conventional weapons stockpiles are a major obstacle to peace and economic development in regions suffering from instability.

My bill declares it to be the policy of the United States to seek out surplus and unguarded stocks of conventional armaments for elimination. It authorizes the Department of State to carry out a global effort to destroy such weapons and to cooperate with allies and international organizations when possible.

Last August, I visited Albania, Ukraine, and Georgia. Each of these countries has large stockpiles of MANPADS and tactical missiles, and each has requested U.S. assistance to destroy them. On August 27, 2004, I stood in a remote Albanian military storage facility as the base commander unloaded a fully functioning MANPAD from its crate and readied it for use. Fortunately, the 79 MANPADS that I saw that day were destroyed on September 2, but there are many more like them throughout the world.

I believe that the Transatlantic Alliance has a window of opportunity to address proliferation threats around the world. We must make the safe storage, accountability, and destruction of nuclear, biological, chemical, and even conventional weapons a fundamental objective of our alliance.

In 2005, in addition to Norway's centennial, we celebrate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II and we contemplate the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events should remind us of how important the Transatlantic Alliance is to our future. The Allied victory in World War II, for which so many Americans and Norwegians suffered, could not have been achieved without the sacrifice of people from dozens of allied nations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki should remind us that we must have a similar alliance commitment to preventing the next use of nuclear weapons. I am optimistic about what we can achieve together. I am especially heartened, as I am today, whenever I encounter the unfailing dedication and spirit of Norwegian friends.

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