TRANSCRIPT

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CSDS- CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific

“Welcoming Remarks & Session I: Security and Defense”

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John J. Hamre: Good morning, everybody. My name is John Hamre. I’m the president here at CSIS. And I want to say a hardy welcome to you. We’ve got a small group here that’s live with us, and we’ve got a vast, vast army of people that are out watching us right now, which is really great. And I want to say thank you for all of you who are joining us. It’s a real privilege to have this opportunity to do this again jointly with the Center for Security Diplomacy and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance. And special thanks to Luis Simón. Thank you for bringing us together like this. And we’re privileged to have the opportunity to be with you today and to have your wisdom at the table with us.

Let me just say, for the audience, Kurt Campbell was supposed to be right next, but he has been called – (laughs) – with Jake Sullivan to go up to Capitol Hill. These things happen when you’re in a very high office like that. But he will be here at noon. So what we’re going to do is we’re going to start with a panel, you know, rather – we’re just going to invert things just a little bit. But so to just let you know what’s going on.

I’m really pleased that we have this opportunity to have a transatlantic conversation on the Indo-Pacific. I think this is really an important thing, and important time. You know, the war in Ukraine has really brought geopolitics back to the fore. You know, and we’re now living in a very uncertain time. Before the invasion President Putin met with President Xi, and issued a very long communique which, in essence, said there’s no limit to our partnership. A partnership without limits, you know. Well, what does that mean? You know, what does that mean? Now that Putin has moved in this very aggressive way against Ukraine, and really posed a threat to all of Europe, what does that now mean? And I think that’s the conversation we’re going to have today, throughout this – throughout this session.

I don’t think that we want to force a great bifurcation of the international system. It could happen. That could very well be the outcome of this. We don’t want that, but it could very well be the outcome. Even though President Xi said that the partnership with Russia had no limits, eh, it clearly has some limits. You know, I mean, we’re seeing that. They are observing the SWIFT sanctions, their banks are not violating the SWIFT sanctions. We have not seen significant materiel being shipped to Russia. A friend of mine, Tom Pickering, just this morning said, well, they’re straddling a fence but one foot’s in a holster – that’s the one in China – and the other one is dragging on the ground, you know? (Laughs.)

And that’s an awkward position for a country. And we don’t know what that means, you know? But I do think what is certain in this is that we are at a pivotal moment. It cannot be a better world for China if they only have one real partner going forward, and that’s Russia. You know, that cannot be a
good world for them. And it doesn’t mean that we should try to exploit this, but it does mean we need to find a time when we stand quite firmly about the values that has informed the transatlantic partnership now for 70 years. You know, those are values that’s – it’s a profoundly different world, you know, for Russia, for China. They draw a sense of government legitimacy from outside and impose it on citizens.

We have a system – Europe, the United States, Japan. We – Australia, Korea. We have a system where legitimacy of the government draws from below. It comes from how well we represent and improve the lives of our citizens. These are profoundly different structural values.

In our system, in the Western system, it’s the role of government to provide a coherent framework to balance individual freedom and liberties, on the one hand, and the needs of society collectively on the other and to find a constructive balance for those things. In authoritarian governments, it’s – the government decides to impose its view of the world and future on both society and individuals. OK, this is a very big divide, a profound divide. There’s no bigger division that we could conceive of.

Now, is it – it’s a formidable challenge. China, unlike the Soviet Union, this is – you know, the Soviet Union was never an economic power, you know, but China is an enormous economic challenge – enormous. And this competition now is much harder. They begin with 1.3 billion consumers. And the immediate neighborhood, they’ve got another billion or so, you know, to count on.

We have – we’ve got – collectively, we’ve got about 800 (million), 900 million consumers. Our companies have to make a profit. Their companies don’t. You know, we feel it’s the role of government to provide a level playing field for all companies. They’ll pick champions and give them all the advantages of being a national champion. So this is a profound and important competition. This is far bigger than what America could handle on its own. We’d be naïve if we thought we could. We really do need partners. In the deepest sense we need partners, partners that share the same worldview.

And so it’s with that perspective that we’re having this conference. And I’m grateful for having this opportunity. As I said, Dr. Campbell will join us later, but we’re very fortunate to have Eva Pejsova, who is going to – forgive me; I mean, I’m – for this. She’s going to lead this conversation with this panel. And I think we would be cheating you if I talked any further.

So let me turn to you, Eva, and let’s get this started for real. Thank you.
Eva Pejsova: Thank you. Thank you very much for having us, for hosting us here in D.C. I think it’s a great pleasure to be here. And what better way to celebrate the Europe Day, actually, with this very important conversation.

Looking at my calendar this morning, I realize that it’s been almost exactly 10 years since we first had this first joint declaration by then the high representative, Catherine Ashton, and Secretary of State Clinton in 2012 in Phnom Penh that started this idea of coordinating our efforts among transatlantic allies in Asia, frankly, that didn’t really take off as well as we could have hoped.

But of course much has changed over the last 10 years. In fact, it seems like a lifetime ago. Europe is not the same. The United States are not the same. The nature of transatlantic relations is definitely not the same. NATO is expanding its reach to Asia. And, of course, Asia is not the same place. China has become a much bigger challenge than we would have perhaps hoped or expected 10 years ago.

So here we are with clearly renewed effort to start this conversation or to revive this conversation again. We have an EU-U.S. dialogue on China since last year. But the question is, of course, should we expand beyond China? And, if yes, where? What are the main lines of convergence between the U.S. and Europe on this agenda? What are the benefits? What are the objections and objectives? And how can we even operationalize this cooperation bearing all the difficulties in mind?

So I’m happy to be here with a terrific lineup of speakers who probably don’t really need much introduction, definitely not here at CSIS. Victor Cha, who’s heading the Korea Chair here at CSIS; Mike Green, the Japan Chair at CSIS; our own Luis Simón, the director of CSDS; and Professor Yoko Iwama, who has joined us directly from Japan. And I’ll probably go straight to the speakers. If you could, perhaps in just five minutes, start with what you think is really the main important – the most important alliance in this transatlantic cooperation in the region? Please, Victor.

Victor Cha: Well, thank you, Eva, and it’s wonderful to be able to host you in person here at CSIS. I know we had this dialogue online and we’ve been trying to carry it forward. I also apologize for those of you traveling from Asia and Europe because jetlag is much more acute these days, just because we haven’t been used to it. I know that’s certainly been the case for me.

I’m going to, as Eva suggested, I’m going to just make four quick points with regard to transatlantic cooperation on the Indo-Pacific. The first is, that goes without saying, which is that there has been, as Eva suggested, from when this dialogue began to today, a substantial narrowing of views and tremendous overlap of views with regard to the Indo-Pacific, as we’ve seen
from the recent reports that have come out with regard to the EU perspective. On issues like shared values, support of the liberal international order, rule of law, climate, cyber, digital, there’s a great deal of overlap in the way that the United States and Europe think about the Indo-Pacific. I would argue that this has been driven by three things in particular: one has been initially the activities of China in the region, militarization of the South China Sea, actions in Hong Kong, generally more assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping. More recently it’s been the overt weaponization of economic interdependence that we’ve seen from China with regard to not just Asian but also European partners. And then, of course, the situation with Ukraine, which I’ll talk about a bit more in a minute.

So what does this all mean for Asia, this growing overlap between European and American views on Asia? Well, first, I think it means increasing European support for and participation in the efforts at coalition building that have been taking place in the Indo-Pacific, whether we’re talking about the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, the Quad, development assistance, the promotion of democracy and democratic values – these are all areas that matter and resonate deeply with both Americans, Asians, and Europeans. I think it also means that there will be a greater role for Europe to play in promoting supply chain resilience, whether this is in emerging technology, global health security, digital rules and norms, or good governance, these are all areas very active for the Biden administration in terms of their coalition approach to Asia, and I think there’s opportunities there for European participation.

We met as a group earlier in the morning and talked about how the theaters of Europe and Asia in terms of security now are greatly interconnected. They were – that connection was always latently there, but the combination of China’s more assertive policies and, of course, the war in Ukraine has made this interconnection very explicit. For Europe, as I suggested earlier, it means a greater attention to Asian security issues, but it also means, I would speak from the Asian perspective, a greater role for Asia in European security.

And this takes me to my third point, which is with regard to Ukraine. If China was the sort of gradual pacing challenge to the liberal international order, what’s happening in Ukraine is obviously the most acute and overt challenge to the liberal international order. I think what we’re seeing as a result of – however Ukraine turns out is a dynamic where countries in Asia and Europe will experience both a degree of internal balancing as well as external adhesion – internal balancing in terms of larger defense spending; we’re already seeing it being talked about by Japan. I think with the new government in Korea that starts tomorrow – today, we’ll also see enhanced defense spending on their part. We also see a lot of talk, both in Japan and in the new South Korean government, about strike capabilities – offensive...
strike capabilities. And again, I think this is part of an internal balancing dynamic that we’ll see.

Also, adhesion. And by that, I mean the willingness to work in partnership with the United States, in cooperation with countries multilaterally and in cooperation with countries bilaterally to try to create a greater degree of certainty and security in what they see as an unstable and unpredictable security environment.

So the question, I think, for many of the Asian countries is how much they will – how much support countries like Japan, Australia, and Korea are willing to give to what is happening in Ukraine. You know, Japan and Australia have been very forthright. Koreans have been, frankly, lagging a little bit. But in the end, the focus on sanctions, on the SWIFT sanctions, on energy sanctions and on providing military assistance and equipment I think has been uniform across Asian countries.

I think the big question going forward as the nature of the war changes is the extent to which Asian countries are going to provide more than simply military assistance and move into the area of lethal equipment and vehicles. And I know that Japan is limited in terms of what it can do. The new government in Korea has talked about pivoting to a much bigger and broader global role. They are invited to the NATO summit next – in Madrid. And it will be interesting to see what the new Yoon government does in this perspective.

Final point. Obligated to talk about North Korea. North Korea’s rash of missile threats this year have really started to raise the question of their desire to strongly challenge the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to its allies, not just in Asia but also in Europe, if North Korea perfects an ability to reach the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles that have multiple warheads and that have countermeasures attached to them.

European support for sanctions, obviously, is very important in this regard. European support for coalition building, in particular encouraging our Japanese and Korean friends to work with the United States in terms of improving trilateral cooperation, which has fallen by the wayside over the past few years, is important. And then, finally, Europe has been an important voice – has always been an important voice on North Korean human rights. And to the extent that Europe can continue to do that is not just an issue for human rights, but it’s a broader – it’s a broader human security issue for the Korean peninsula.

So, Eva, let me leave it at that. Thank you.
OK. Thank you very much, Victor. That was quite positive. I think I quite agree with the external adhesion part of it, for sure.

Mike, from the U.S., but also from the Japanese perspective, do you see Japan being receptive much to this, let’s say, greater transatlantic coordination on regional affairs?

There we go. There we go. I suspected, as always happens when the Korean chair hosts an event, the Japan chair guy's mic never works! (Laughter.) So I’m delighted to be here. Thank you, Eva. Thanks for letting me and Victor go first. You’re clearly adhering to the American first policy. (Laughter.)

So I was the strange sibling in my family. My brothers all learned Italian and French. My mom had been a diplomat in Europe. And I went off and did Japanese and Korean. But I started working very seriously on transatlantic approaches to the Indo-Pacific in 2004 and ’05, when I was the senior director for Asia in the Bush administration in the National Security Council. And we had an open fight between Brussels and Washington over the EU arms embargo, which the European Union was about to end, at a time when Beijing was promulgating the anti-secession law, legalizing military attack on Taiwan and, therefore, implicitly, the U.S. and Japan.

So I took a break from lunches and dinners with the ambassadors from Japan, and Korea, and Australia, and enjoyed some fine meals with the ambassadors from the EU countries. And my major contribution to this was suggesting that, as we found a way to deal with this transatlantic disagreement over the EU arms embargo – one of my transatlantic disagreements at the time – that we ought to have a strategic discussion on what the U.S. and Europe think is the future of Asia. Not just China, but Asia. So we’ve had those dialogues on and off since. And Kurt Campbell’s now doing an excellent job really adding some considerable weight to the transatlantic dialogue on the future of Asia.

So when you ask, what are the three most important things right now, I’d say number one is that conceptually the U.S. and Europe are converging with Japan and Australia, and now Korea, on our concept for what constitutes the international relations of this Indo-Pacific region and how it fits the global order, and we are increasingly premising our diplomacy and our Strategic Dialogue on the idea that this is a multi-polar region, a multi-polar region in which Japan, India, Korea, Australia, and Indonesia are key players, not just China.

And that may sound like a slightly academic development but it’s quite important because 10 years ago the Obama administration was embracing Xi Jinping’s proposal for a new model of great power relations, which was,
basically, a bipolar vision of the Trans-Pacific with China and the U.S. as the poles, and there was a big debate in Washington.

Now, the Trump and Biden administrations premised their policy on the idea that we work with our allies and partners, and the best way to shape our relationship with China is by strengthening our relations with allies and partners, and it's clear the European debate has moved in that direction, as has Korea's now, I think.

So that's the most important thing. And in the midst of that, you can see how in practical diplomatic terms it's taking effect. I was quite struck that Chancellor Scholz's first visit was not to China and Asia but to Japan. For years, CSIS hosted a U.S.-Germany dialogue on the future of China. We wanted to call it Asia and we fought hard to get our German counterparts to talk about Japan or Korea or Australia or India.

But Chancellor Scholz is, clearly, signaling with this summit where the center of gravity is for Germany in geopolitical terms and in terms of values, and that's a really important development, as is the EU leadership's visit to Tokyo in about – in just a few days.

The second major development, which Victor touched on and John Hamre touched on, is the growing unity between the Trans-Pacific and transatlantic or Atlantic-Pacific dialogues, particularly since the Ukraine invasion, of course. When I was in government, my favorite part of the State Department – actually, the only part of the State Department I really liked – (laughs) – was on the – and Victor will remember this – on the secretary of state's suite there's a conference room where you can sit at the table where the leaders sat for the G-7 summit in Williamsburg in the 1980s and I always would get there early so I could sit in Nakasone's seat because Nakasone, as the – as NATO was negotiating with the Soviet Union the removal of SS-20s over the Urals, basically, so they could aim at Japan and Korea, Nakasone spoke for Asia and said, no, we are in this together, and it was the first real geopolitical fusion of American allies and alliances in Europe and Asia, and we're kind of getting back to that.

It's been remarkable how much Japan, in particular, has not only stood up with the G-7 to oppose this brutal invasion and impose costs on Putin but how much Japan has led in getting Southeast Asia and other countries in Asia on board, and this is a very, very powerful lesson for China.

And it goes without saying that we are more interdependent with China economically than we are with Russia. But the flip side of that is true. The costs to China of decoupling or economic punishment are, potentially, far greater than for Russia and that is a very powerful dissuading effect, deterrent effect, in the western Pacific, and I think that what makes it
credible is that European governments are increasingly willing to take diplomatic risks to show solidarity with countries like Japan – participation in naval exercises, going to Japan first, not China. Things like that show the EU is willing to take – European leaders are willing to take some risk to stand up for their values and their partnerships even if China doesn’t like it, which suggests, of course, to Beijing that there could be even greater risks the EU would take or European leaders would take in a contingency in the western Pacific.

So I think those are the two big developments, and because they’re conceptual and because they’re strategic, they’re going to be lasting, in my view. They’re not temporary. We’ll talk later about it. I think the area where we’re not aligning well enough is on technology, actually, and on digital trade and technology standards where there’s still a cultural gap between the U.S. and Europe that hinders us. My guess is the initiative for things like digital trade and data reciprocity rulemaking is going to come out of the U.S.-Japan, and increasingly U.S.-Japan-Korea and Taiwan, dialogues. But it’s not going to work without Europe, so this is going to be an area where we have to – have to do better.

Dr. Pejsova: Thanks, Michael. And yes, we will discuss this, I believe, in the second session as well, so I guess the timing’s good. But we were trying to be polite as Europeans to get you, you know – let you the home advantage fully.

So now we’ll go back – well, go back – go home to – (laughs) – Europe with Luis. I mean, what would be the European take on this? Obviously, given the – given the current context, I suppose, that’s really making it more topical than ever.

Luis Simón: Thanks. Eva, thanks. And yeah, indeed, let me perhaps use Ukraine as a point of departure because, obviously, it’s central to any discussion on European security and defense policy today or any discussion on transatlantic relations.

And I realize – and we’ve been talking about this earlier – that there’s been an intense debate here in the United States about how the need to assist Ukraine and deter further aggression in Eastern Europe relates to other U.S. strategic priorities, including in particular the rebalance to Asia or the need to focus on competition with China. And it seems to me that current U.S. policy is actually premised on rejecting this as an either/or proposition, right, and we also talked about that.

But it’s true that the war in Ukraine has sort of led to a revival of NATO and sort of also underscores the centrality of the United States to European security – to the European security architecture, which is what – something that many in Europe seem to have forgotten. But contrary to I think what one
might intuitively think, my sense is the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the U.S. calculation of a long-term shift towards the – towards the Indo-Pacific, let alone alter the shift in the center of gravity of global politics towards that – towards that region I think, rather than reverse or halt that shift, which I would say is structural, I think the war in Ukraine and the response to it, what is actually does is illustrate powerfully how European geopolitical and security developments are increasingly affected by extra-European considerations and dynamics.

And we've already talked about how in the U.S. context considerations relating to China – how to manage China or the Indo-Pacific – have informed the debate here in Washington about how the U.S. should respond to the crisis in Ukraine. And we are following those debates closely in Europe because they have implications for discussions on transatlantic burden-sharing in the context of NATO but also EU-U.S. relations. But beyond that, I think – and again, we were talking about this earlier – that without China’s tacit support Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its ability to withstand sanctions over the long term would be probably compromised, and I think both NATO and the EU are taking good note of that and China’s image in Europe is taking a hit as a result of the – of the Ukraine crisis.

But I guess the – perhaps before wrapping up the broader point I would like to make relates, coming back to what Victor was saying, to the growing interdependence between the geostrategic dynamics in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Particularly at a time when the United States and its allies in both regions confront – and they’re increasingly recognizing this publicly – two great-power competitors that are challenging regional order in Europe and East Asia and also the broader international order – going back to what Mike was saying, right, the rules-based order.

And I think, like – to look at this from a material perspective, I think that as long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on U.S. power – also on allied power, but of course to a considerable extent on U.S. power – and as long as these two regions continue to exercise such a systemic pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will be intertwined whether we like it or not.

And I would even say, going back to what we’ve been discussing earlier, that U.S. allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific actually have a stake in the security – in preserving the security architecture in each other’s region, and more broadly in U.S. and allied – in the United States and its allies maintaining a strong position in the maritime domain and in the other global commons, which are critical, in turn, to projecting power and upholding the balance in Europe and East Asia. So it’s all linked. And I think that’s why we should link – we should look at deterrence and – the deterrence and alliance
architectures of Europe and the Indo-Pacific from an inter-theater perspective, so to speak.

Just very briefly before wrapping up, I think Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted demobilization of countries like Japan, Korea, Australia. And I think has been – that has gone down rather well in Europe. And I think we should – we now have the opportunity, going back to the NATO summit but also to the EU-U.S. dialogue, to build on that political momentum, to promote this sort of inter-theater thinking in the Euro-Atlantic and the Euro-Pacific. Which I think – I think that sort of inter-theater perspective can help the United States and its allies to collectively navigate the so-called two-front problem – the problem of deterring two great-power competitors in two distant regions, and adequately resource deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific simultaneously.

Because even though, and I believe the mutual defense commitments will remain intra-regional as opposed to inter-regional. I mean, that’s too far a step. But I think greater coordination between alliances in both regions – the core alliances in both regions could help ensure an optimal allocation of U.S. and allied resources. I think I’ll leave it at that, Eva. Thanks.

Dr. Pejsova: Thanks, Luis. I think the interconnectedness of the two theaters is really what connects us. I mean, that’s really the common thread of today’s conversations, and is probably going to be here to stay.

The second element is really NATO. And some of you has touched upon it, and Luis really started with. I think it’s a good transition to what Professor Iwama is prepared to say, because I believe you’re starting precisely on the NATO’s shifting focus, right? So that’ll be a nice way to kind of wrap this up.

Yoko Iwama: Right. Thank you. And thank you for inviting me. It’s been a while I was here – (laughs) – because of COVID. And it’s very nice to be back on such a nice weather day. Could you please show my slide? I’ve made some proposals. Well, most of my academic life, I’ve been studying Cold War Europe, and especially Germany, and how they survived this long period. And I was there in November 1989 when the wall came down. So my motivation in studying this is that we don’t repeat that agony in Asia, that we – whatever is coming, we fare that period maybe a little better than they did in Europe. Because I know how hard it was.

And these several years I’ve been having this feeling in my stomach that things are coming back just as they were in Europe. And Mike just mentioned Nakasone and SS20. That’s exactly how we feel sitting in Asia, in Japan, looking at Chinese missiles. So that concerns my proposal number one, which is a global double track proposal, which is exactly inspired by what Nakasone said at that time. That taking out SS20s should not be out of – just
out of Europe, but from all over the world – should be global. So we’re facing a huge missile and nuclear threat, combined Russian, China and North Korea, especially in Japan. But now Europe has also woken up because of Putin’s threat for us of nuclear weapons.

So we need to recreate deterrence. How do we do it? And I think there we need to coordinate between the European and the Asian front of simultaneously greatly enhancing intermediate-range missile capabilities. But I would suggest that we go non-nuclear first. Don’t just, you know, jump to nuclear capabilities, that we re-nuclearize our security environment just as they were in Cold War Europe. So my proposal is to enhance non-nuclear capabilities greatly in hundreds, if not thousands, on both European and Asian front. But to offer simultaneously a global disarmament proposal for – primarily for intermediate-range missiles.

But I think now there’s a great need to really reaffirm our commitment to values, such as non-use of nuclear weapons. And that has been violated. As we have seen, the threat of the use of nuclear weapon has become real. And I think we really need to reaffirm that norm with at least the Chinese, who together with all the nuclear powers, have the global responsibility of maintaining their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. So that’s the first part of my proposal.

The second part – exactly what Luis Simón said: We need to coordinate both fronts, and for that my proposal – and this is just an idea of establishing a maybe – I just put a name to that – NATO-Indo-Pacific Cooperation Council, “NICC” – (laughs) – just like the ones we had in the earlier days in the ‘90s when we started cooperating with the Eastern European partners. I think for many purposes, including missiles, missile defense, cybersecurity, intelligence space, we really need to exchange information, coordinate our resources, improve interoperability so that we can respond to crises at different places, be it Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Eastern Europe, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, wherever, when it happens. We know what’s happening and we can respond together. So I think G-7 summit in Germany at the end of June and then coming up of NATO Madrid summit, 29th, 30th June, would provide an ideal opportunity to launch such an initiative that we really stick together and show our solidarity and our determination to work together.

I’ll just stop with saying one more word. This might all sound like a new cold war, and what we need to do better than the Cold War – I said – I mentioned the nuclear aspect. The other aspect would be the developing world. How we reach out to the developing world, how we engage this part of the world so that they can believe their future lies in the free world, not on different types of society. And it’s not going to be easy, but, again, we know all about the wars, the surrogate wars that were fought all over the world during Cold War, which was a terrible suffering, and I hope that doesn’t repeat. So we
have – because of all the global questions like climate and so on, we need to engage the developing world. And, again, the G-7 summit coming up in Germany and next year the presidency moves to Japan, and Prime Minister Kishida has actually – he’s interested in holding it in Hiroshima and that would send out a sign for appealing to peace and norms throughout the global community and hope that would also kind of be reaching out to the developing world as well, not to the transatlantic world as we have understood it so far. Thank you.

Dr Green: Turn off your mic, please.

Dr. Pejsova: Sorry. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Professor.

I’m really grateful to hear that because you touched upon some of the concrete aspects as well, that we haven’t had time to actually get into, some of the ways how we can operationalize this relationship, and information sharing is, frankly, something that I believe we’ll need to discuss very seriously probably at the policymaking level. And of course the proposition of reaching out to the global south or the developing world has been here for a while and it’s something that needs to be tackled seriously. The question is whether if the same actors and knowing the frustration of those countries, you know, interacting with the Western world, if the same actors eventually reach out to them, whether, you know, we will manage to eventually overcome this frustration or persuade that there is something different and new that we can add.

I would like to perhaps open the floor for questions from the audience. We only have 10 minutes left, which leaves us perhaps with just a very few questions and a last round for reactions from the speakers. Ramon? And just to get the conversation going, if you could – you know, for your wrapping-up remarks, think of one thing, one concrete step that you would recommend to our policymakers in Washington and in Brussels that you would want them to think of. You know, what’s the next step? What would be the next thing to do? So that would be just my little question. Ramon? Do you want to say –

Q: Yeah, sure. Can I ask about – a question about Taiwan, and not as a scenario of a possible conflict but as a partner in all these initiatives that you have been mentioning? And I talk about this in a context of Europe being more willing to show its political support for Taiwan and always changing positions in the U.S. as well. So how to envision Taiwan cooperating in these initiatives you have been mentioning during your presentations? Thank you.

Dr. Pejsova: Excellent. Thank you. Thank you, Ramon.
Is there any other question? Or perhaps from our online audience? Yuichi.

Q: Well, thank you – thank you very much. Yuichi Hosoya from Keio University.

I have one question to panelists. During the Ukrainian war, there are several different kind of discussions or arguments whether we should use China to end the war, to isolate Russia, or whether we should confront both two authoritarian regimes, Russia and China. So what’s your position on during the – during the Ukraine war to deal with the rise of or the presence on China in the international community?

Dr. Pejsova: Thank you. That’s two very big questions and very important ones, so I’ll probably stop it at that, if that’s OK, for the last, what remaining, eight minutes. So, OK, Russia, China, and Taiwan, nothing lesser – (laughter) – in less than two minutes for each of you. And obviously, if you could come up with that one recommendation and somehow middle it in, it would be wonderful. Shall we start with the same order, and therefore we end with a non-U.S. thought?

Dr. Cha: OK. Big topics, and I’m going to answer the questions by not answering them. (Laughter.) And wanting to say something that – so the one specific thing, Eva, I would say in terms of cooperating so I’m not completely deflecting all the questions, is – and we talked about this morning – is more transatlantic and transpacific cooperation on the Global South, right, because, you know, in the current conflict with Ukraine, that’s one area that clearly stands out in terms of their positioning on the issue.

But what I wanted to talk about is that in our discussions about cooperation – transatlantic cooperation on the Indo-Pacific, Japan, obviously, figures very largely. Australia figures very largely. And I would just say that with a new government coming in in Korea, I think we should really expect to see a change in policies coming from Korea, very different from what we’ve had over the past five years.

There’s already talk about doubling or tripling overseas development assistance, pivoting to a global – a regional and a global role. I am actually quite curious to see what this new government will do on Ukraine. I think they’ll substantially increase their assistance with regard to – with regard to Ukraine. Very interested in participating in the Quad and the Quad working groups on climate change, on supply chain security. They proposed a 2+2+2 U.S., Japan, and Korea on supply chain security. They’re very enthusiastic about trilaterals with Australia – the U.S., Japan, and Australia. So I just expect to see a larger Korean footprint in regional as well as transatlantic discussions on the Indo-Pacific than we’ve – than we’ve seen before.

Dr. Pejsova: Thank you, Victor.
So, OK, we’re going down to one-minutes – (laughter) – but hope that we can go a little bit over time. Mike, please.

Dr. Green: On the Taiwan question, I was sent to Taipei with a group of former senior officials. Shortly after the invasion, we were sent by the White House to reassure about American commitments to the Taiwan Relations Act but also to hear President Tsai and the Taiwanese leadership’s views of what Ukraine meant, and there were two major themes.

One was Taiwan needs to do more to make itself a porcupine, to have the kind of what we might call territorial defense capabilities that Ukraine has used so effectively to defend itself.

The second theme was, interestingly, Europe matters. That was a – that was the other theme we heard everywhere. Not because people in Taiwan think that Spain will dispatch a frigate or anything like that, and not even because the Tsai government wants diplomatic relations; what they want is strategic dialogue. And so it seems to me a 1.5-track or second-track dialogue could be a critical part of that because they’ve realized how much Europe matters to Taiwan’s security in terms of broad responses to geopolitical shocks.

Hosoya-sensei’s question, no, we should not change our China policy in the vain hope that somehow Xi Jinping is going to decide to turn against Putin. He won’t. He’s straddling the fence, as Dr. Hamre said. But he does not want to see Putin fail and he will not do anything to help us on the merits of stopping Putin.

He’ll do what he has to do to protect Chinese companies from tertiary sanctions and things like that. And it’s a vain hope and, frankly, it was a vain hope for the Abe administration to think somehow there’s a China card we can use against Russia or a Russia card we can use against China.

One concrete step – there are a lot of things – I want to say something on technology but Matt Goodman should in the next panel. So my one concrete step is in the dialogue – the transit dialogue – we need to talk about contingencies more, and I don’t mean planning with the U.S. for military defense of Taiwan or Japan or Korea. I mean thinking through contingencies in western Pacific but also economic embargoes. We know China will embargo a country again the way it did Australia. It’ll probably be a European country. So how will we respond? So let’s introduce not just concepts and hopes and aspirations but a little bit of contingency discussions in the transatlantic relationship.

Dr. Simón: Yeah. Should I – yeah, let me perhaps follow up on Mike’s previous point and Yuichi’s question, which – on Sino-Russian relations, which, I think, is
actually an excellent example of why we should have a more structured political dialogue between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic allies because – I mean, there are lots of things that we should talk about, including contingencies and so on. But I think the Sino-Russian relationship is probably at the top of that list.

I think we should compare notes on how we see that relationship going forward because – and, ideally, we should move towards a common understanding of where the relationship is going and even negotiate a common narrative about how we talk about the Sino-Russian relationship because – and that could help mitigate the risks associated with this idea that we can lean – somehow lean on China to restrain Russia in the short term or even, as some other people have been saying, we can leverage Russia against China in the long term, right.

And I think beyond the pitfalls or merits of any such ideas – and I’m not going to get into that debate – I think the broader point is that whatever the United States and its allies in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific think they can do in relation to driving wedges between Russia and China, manipulating the relationship, they must remain aligned, I think, because if not, there’s a risk they may draw – we may draw different conclusions about where the Sino-Russian relationship is going and base our policies towards Russia and China on different premises, and that could actually even trigger a competition between the U.S. and its allies and among the allies themselves that could endanger this unity that we have been talking about. I’ll leave it at that.

Dr. Pejsova: Excellent point. Thank you very much.

Yoko, your final thoughts?

Dr. Iwama: OK. I’ll try to be brief.

The original NATO double-track decision in ’79 took about 10 years to materialize. So whatever we plan today, I think we should calculate at least 10 years to have some sort of effect and I think that’s the period of time we have to calculate. So but if you look at the actors – President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and Chancellor Scholz – and think about the passions they have, they actually share a lot about things like climate and nuclear nonproliferation.

So we have this short-term urgent need for risk management and kind of containment. But at the same time, we need to plan for longer, maybe better days, sketch and draw ideas. So I think there’s a double track way we should go. And so concerning China, if these things are to materialize we definitely need China to be on board. They may not be there tomorrow but we don’t
know where they will be in 10 years, and I think we should always keep the way open for them.

Dr. Pejsova: Thank you so much, Professor, and thank you all. This has been brief but intense, and we will make sure to actually try to compile a bit of recommendations or some of the main points that we have actually discussed here.

So thank you so much, and for those connecting online please stay for the second session, which will start immediately afterwards. I think we will just swap the places and we will be back at you. Thank you very much.

(END)