

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Press Briefing: President Obama at the G20, ASEAN, and East Asia Summits

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COLM F. QUINN: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to CSIS to discuss President Obama's trip to China and Laos. If you haven't, please grab yourself a snack, grab yourself a coffee before we begin. My name is Colm Quinn. I'm our deputy director of strategic communications here at CSIS, and I'll be getting out of the way very shortly to introduce these folks.

On my left is Mike Green, who's our senior vice president for Asia and our Japan chair. To his left is Matt Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy and senior adviser for Asian economics here at CSIS. Heather Conley, alongside him, is the SVP for Europe, Eurasia and the Arctic, as well as director of our Europe Program. And then finally is Amy Searight, who we're very happy to have joined us this summer from the Pentagon, where she was deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia. She is now senior adviser and director of our Southeast Asia Program.

Just a point of order before we begin. Our panelists will give brief remarks, and following that we'll open this up for questions. When we do go to those questions, if you could please use those mics in front of you. We will be recording a transcript, so it will be easier for us to pick you up and you can find yourselves when you're looking for it afterwards.

So that's all for me. I'm going to hand over to Mike.

MICHAEL GREEN: Thank you, Colm. Good morning.

This is President Obama's last trip to Asia as president, and he will leave next week. He arrives in China on the 3rd, in Hangzhou, and he'll have bilateral summits with President Xi Jinping – actually, a series of meetings: small group discussion of strategic issues, a broader group discussion of economics.

And then, September 4th and 5th in China, the Chinese government will host the G-20 meeting, which he'll attend. Matthew will talk more about that.

On the evening of the 5th, he flies to Laos for a bilateral in Laos and then a speech, probably his final speech on Asia policy as president, the East Asia Summit – the U.S.-ASEAN Summit with the leaders of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and then the full East Asia Summit, and Amy will talk more about that. And there will be bilaterals with Erdogan of Turkey and other leaders, including leaders from Europe, President Putin; and Heather will help address what issues might come up there.

This being his last trip, I've received a lot of questions already about how to think about President Obama's legacy in Asia. And in a shameless self-promotion, let me say I have a book coming out shortly on the history of U.S. strategy in Asia called "By More Than Providence," Columbia University Press. It's a good stocking stuffer. You'll need a big stocking; covers 240 years of history. But I've been thinking in the past few years a lot about where we are in the arc of history of American engagement with Asia. And so let me offer some opening thoughts on the Obama legacy in Asia from that historical context, with the caveat that most historians would

say it's too early to make such a judgment. But the reality is, for decades afterwards, there won't be a consensus anyway. So let me make a first stab at that to provide some framing context.

The main thing I would say is that, after seven-plus years, there's far more continuity in President Obama's Asia policy than discontinuity. It's not a radical departure from what Bush, Clinton and Bush did, but neither is it a bold new discontinuity or departure from what previous presidents did.

The first president to declare themselves the first Pacific president was Richard Nixon, who had served in the Pacific, hailed from California. Taft had been governor general in the Philippines, Herbert Hoover had been a businessman in China and muttered Mandarin around the White House, John F. Kennedy served in the Pacific, and so forth.

And many of the initiatives that have come to prominence over the last seven years began in the Bush, and in the case of the defense realignment in the earlier Clinton administrations. But, broadly speaking, in a historical context I think what President Obama has done is build on a set of broad policies started many decades earlier. Every president since Richard Nixon has built part of their Asia policy around engagement with China, and that fundamentally hasn't changed. Every president since Reagan has complemented that approach by building up our alliances and partnerships to maintain a favorable balance of power and contend with an increasingly confident and, recently, assertive China. For the Clinton administration, it was building up the U.S.-Japan alliance. For the Bush administration – I was the senior Asia official in the NSC – it was building on top of that, broadening our partnership with India. I think for President Obama the signature accomplishment strategically is filling in the Southeast Asia piece, very much building along those lines.

So let me just focus first on that, Southeast Asia. I think historians will probably say, if they look closely at the so-called rebalance or pivot, that the most significant legacy for the president is going to be engagement of Southeast Asia. President Obama and Matt had a lot to do with this, was the first president to join the East Asia Summit. President Bush decided not to for a variety of reasons, including the Saffron Revolution in Burma and so forth. But President Obama – and maybe Matt could speak to this – after some debate decided he would join the East Asia Summit and created the ASEAN Summit with the ASEAN leaders. And Secretaries Clinton and Kerry have attended every meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the foreign ministers meeting in Asia, and their predecessors in the Clinton and Bush administrations missed a number of them.

In historical perspective, this is probably the most deliberate and sustained engagement of Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War. Subsequent presidents have had spurts of energy, but no sustained comprehensive approach. And I think the Obama administration will deserve some rightful credit for reconnecting to Southeast Asia and opening up in a sustained way an engagement strategy.

Now, on this trip I'm sure that will be part of the celebration. The East Asia Summit, which is based in ASEAN, and the U.S.-ASEAN Summit will show that, and I think probably the president's speech in Laos will show that. Laos is sort of the last of the ASEAN countries to

really get this kind of high-profile attention from the U.S. Its record on democracy and human rights is imperfect, but this is a long play.

Other aspects will be challenging on this trip – I think Amy will talk about this, President Duterte in the Philippines – but basically every country in Southeast Asia has improved relations with the U.S. over the past eight years. A lot of it has to do with China's rise, but I think sustained diplomacy explains it. The exception is Thailand, which is complicated.

I think where the president will probably get somewhat lower marks – not disastrous, but below par compared to previous presidents – is in the management of great power relations: Japan, China. President Obama inherited pretty stable relations with China, and a strong relationship with Japan, and a strong relationship with India. For a variety of reasons, he'll hand off to his successor a relationship with Japan that has more pillars under it – the Defense Guidelines Review, a successful visit to Hiroshima – but a bit of a trust deficit, for reasons I can explain; and a relationship with China that is scratchy, to say the least, and really on the edge, quite unsettled.

Now, a lot of this has to do with factors beyond the control of the United States. The financial crisis in 2008 and '09 suggested to many in Beijing that the U.S. was entering a period of secular decline and that it was China's moment. Xi Jinping has turned out to be a much more nationalistic leader than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. But at least some of this has been the result of inconsistent stewardship of strategy in Asia.

The basic problem has been that when the pivot was announced in 2011 and the rebalance, the bottom line was never clear. In 2009, President Obama and President Hu announced they would respect China's core interests in Asia, which was received very badly in India and Japan and elsewhere. In 2011, when Hu Jintao came to Washington, they took that "core interests" out of the joint statement and the president announced the rebalance in Australia, which had a heavy military dimension – well-received among allies, very badly received in China. In 2012 President Xi proposed a new model of great power relations, and the administration embraced that in 2012 and '13. It was very badly received in Japan and India and elsewhere because the new model of great power relations, as articulated by Beijing, says that Russia, China and the U.S. are great powers; Japan, India, Australia, other democracies are not. So this back and forth has I think exacerbated what was already a growing problem with a China that was more assertive in the context of the financial crisis.

Now, the Chinese overplayed their hand and played it too early. And I think what you'll see is a lot of support and encouragement for U.S. engagement precisely because the Chinese overplayed their hand. But I also think you will see in this summit and in the meeting with Xi Jinping no grand joint declaration as we saw early in the administration, no celebration, perhaps some agreements on climate change, but a pretty rough and scratchy relationship. We don't know whether China will reclaim more islands and build more airfields, as many respect, in response to the UNCLOS arbitration panel's ruling in favor of the Philippines. Nobody expected China would take its next move before the G-20, when every leader in the world is in China. But there's an open question whether the next big move will happen after that. And we

have great difficulties with China in the U.N, and we have great difficulties operationally with a steadily increasing show of force in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

And then the incomplete would be TPP. I'm certain that the president will say publicly and privately that he's committed to passing TPP in the lame duck of Congress. I think most experts who follow this closely would say it's a long shot. I certainly hope he succeeds, because I think the next president will have a very hard time getting back to TPP quickly. The good news is the agreement will probably be ratified in the Japanese Diet in the fall. It will hold, I think, in Australia, in Vietnam and elsewhere. We would suffer a hit in terms of credibility and reputation without TPP, but I think we have time to recover. I think we have a couple years to recover because the region generally wants it.

And then the last one, North Korea. And all I can say about North Korea is that no president has handed to his successor a better situation on North Korea than they inherited because North Korea just keeps blowing through every agreement. And Kim Jong-un may not remain quiet while the world's attention is on that part of the world.

So let me end there and turn over to Matt.

MATTHEW GOODMAN: OK. Well, from the sublime to the ridiculous. I'll do the G-20. I'm happy to pile on on the East Asia Summit, but I'll leave that to Amy, who was also very involved and certainly more recently involved.

So the Group of 20 Summit will be held in Hangzhou, China on September 4th and 5th. This is the 11th leaders summit since the G-20 was elevated from a finance ministry forum to a leaders forum in the middle of the global financial crisis in 2008. It's President Obama's 10th of those 11 summits.

So the G-20 brings together about 80 percent of the global economy. It's actually – the math in the G-20 never works, so it's actually a G-63. I've just counted it up. It's 19 individual countries plus the EU 28 plus nine invited guest countries plus seven international financial institutions and the U.N. and so forth, so that makes 63 by my count. So there are going to be a lot of people around the table.

The White – from a U.S. perspective, from a White House perspective, I think this is also kind of a legacy tour, a legacy trip, because if you recall in January 2009, when the president came into office, the U.S. economy was and the global economy was kind of crashing and burning, and the G-20 was part of the effort to stabilize, sort of to right the plane in part by bringing the passengers up front to help steer the plane. And so, through these regular summits, the effort has been to try to get cooperation on global growth, on financial stability, and on reform of the international financial architecture so that these sorts of things don't happen again.

And I think the president and the White House are going to want to celebrate the progress that's been made in at least stabilizing things and getting some growth back on track, getting more financial stability, avoiding protectionism. That's a big accomplishment of the G-20 that

they're going to tout, that they didn't slide into 1930s-style protectionism. But there's been a lot of little protectionism, which will be a source of great concern.

Climate change, as Mike mentioned, I think is another piece of the G-20 broader agenda that the president's going to want to highlight.

I think the – but there are still major challenges of global growth. It's inadequate, insufficient. Only the U.S. is really growing at all, and even that's underwhelming. There will be concerns about trade, protectionism, and sort of a slip back into parochialism. So I think the president's going to want to sort of take that on.

And there's a particular concern about overcapacity, particularly in the steel and other commodities sectors. And I think that's going to be a major topic of conversation, certainly one the White House is going to want to emphasize. And I even think the word "steel" is going to be mentioned in the communique of the G-20, which is pretty unusual. So that's going to be one of the headlines, I think, coming out of this, including possibly establishing some sort of global forum to talk about overcapacity.

From a Chinese perspective, it's really mostly about the show. China, when they host these international events – APEC, the Olympics – we all remember the show from those things. And so – and in the positive sense, China wants to be a good steward of this organization, which it helped to co-found. It's the first time it's chairing it. It's a real milestone in China's participation in global economic governance, and I think it's important for this to go well. China has identified four themes to – as really adjectives to describe the word "growth" that they're looking to support, which are four "I"s, letter "I"s: innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive. So those are the four adjectives. And they all have very particular meaning. I think of the four the inclusive is probably the most important for China. They want to get all these people around a table and show that they're kind of a leader of the world, and of the developing world in particular. But innovation is important to them. Of course, they're committed to a stronger growth story.

And interconnected gets to issues of infrastructure and trade connectivity that they want to highlight, so there'll be some outcomes there. I think China also has an interest in seeing progress on energy and climate change being highlighted. But honestly, I would say the big headlines from this trip, even the G-20 portion of this trip, are going to be not in the communique of the G-20, but more in what goes on in the margins and the hallways, including in the bilateral, which is my way of handing off to Heather.

HEATHER CONLEY: Thank you, Matt. Good morning, everyone. I'm going to be your brief European interlude to this Asian discussion, and will focus on President Obama's bilateral meeting with Turkish President Erdogan, his informal meeting with Russian President Putin, and then to give you a bit of European context, particularly in light of this morning's announcement regarding Apple.

Sort of pulling from Mike's thought about legacy, indeed, there will be a very interesting legacy discussion regarding President Obama's Turkey policy, because as you recall, in 2009 in

one of his first speeches as president going abroad in Ankara, he delivered a keynote speech where he called the U.S.-Turkish relationship a model partnership, and certainly Turkey to become a model partner for the Middle East. And today, I think we see a very fundamentally changed relationship between the United States and Turkey.

You have two descriptions right now of U.S. government officials. Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes describes the U.S.-Turkish relationship in the context of a broad and active agenda. Special Envoy Bret McGurk described it yesterday as Turkish intervention in Syria, unacceptable and a source of deep concern. So you certainly don't have necessary agreement within the U.S. government about the shape and contour of this relationship. I would describe it as one that's rapidly deteriorating.

It's been an historic number of U.S. senior visits to Turkey following the July 15th coup. You had chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford, the first senior U.S. official to arrive in Turkey after the coup. You had Vice President Biden's visit last week, August the 24th. And now you have this bilateral meeting between President Erdogan and President Obama on the 4th. Clearly, Syria will be a critical element of that agenda.

A plan that the U.S. government had been formulating related to Syria, I think now no longer exists. And this meeting with President Erdogan has to reconstitute a strategy for Syria. The original plan was to close the Turkish border where ISIS controls – there's a gap between where Syrian Kurds control the west and the east of the border, but the center is where the Islamic State still rests. And with Syria's – Turkey's – excuse me – Turkey's military intervention, again, at the timing of Vice President Biden's visit to Turkey, again, signals, I think, the great break in this relationship.

So I hope we'll see from this bilateral meeting a new understanding about the objectives of the Syrian strategy. I think it's going to be extremely difficult to move the PYD – the Syrian Kurdish military east of the Euphrates. That is the guarantee that the Obama administration has made to Turkey. That will be very difficult. And it's clear that Turkey is continuing its intervention. So this will be a huge element of this bilateral discussion.

The second element is clearly centered around the status of the extradition of Mr. Gulen, which was also a very important part of the conversation during Vice President Biden's trip last week. And other than sending a Justice Department/State Department team last week to Turkey, it's unclear, that process. And it's unclear whether the strategic U.S.-Turkey relationship will absolutely rest on whether Mr. Gulen is extradited or not. So clearly this relationship is near a breaking point, and it will be very interesting to see how President Obama couches the future of that relationship.

After that heavy lift, we're told that there will be an informal meeting between President Putin and President Obama. And the discussion will also be Syria, as well as Ukraine. Now, again, on Syria we have interesting developments of a Turkey-Russia rapprochement, and to see how that understanding works, and whether Russia will work to be a cooperative partner in Syria. Even after last week's marathon meeting between Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov, we just see absolutely no productivity. We see lots of meetings. We just see no

outcomes. And I think it's – I think questions need to be raised about what this ongoing dialogue is producing. And I think it has produced very little.

On Ukraine, although not certainly the headlines that Syria is grabbing, the ceasefire agreement is rapidly deteriorating in Ukraine as well, with two weeks ago a very serious buildup in Crimea, Russia's unannounced snap military exercises on the Ukrainian border. This is an unsolved issue. It's continuing to deteriorate. And it's very unclear how and what the role of the U.S. will be in helping to shape that outcome.

We are not sure whether President Putin will be meeting with French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It's unclear. That meeting's been cancelled, put back on, and cancelled again. We'll see if this Normandy format, minus Ukraine – because it's unclear whether Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko would be part of that discussion. Again, there is no clear solution and Russia continues its military buildup. And the ceasefire violations continue. So this will – again, the legacy of President Obama's Russia policy is very much a question mark.

Finally, just a little bit of European context. I hope another informal meeting that we don't know about, but that is scheduled in the margins of the G-20, is President Obama's meeting with Prime Minister – British Prime Minister Theresa May. This is her coming out party. It's her first major international event. Prime Minister May will be having a meeting with President Putin. This is actually an important meeting as well. British-Russian relations have been very rocky, to say the least. And there's been a sense of seeking to normalize that relationship. The U.K. has been a stalwart force on maintaining robust EU sanctions against Russia, because of events in Ukraine and Crimea. So we'll see what that turns out to be.

It'll also be interesting, Theresa May's visit to China, as it comes when one of her first issues as prime minister was to review a major Chinese investment in the U.K., the nuclear power plant Hinkley Point, which has created a little tension. Certainly the Chinese government, very upset by this decision being reviewed. And she'll have to work very hard to put some minds at ease. And we're also very interested to see, of course, as Brexit negotiations are ongoing what form that will take and, again, what impact that will have on the global economy.

Finally, I couldn't end without a brief note on sort of European relations with China, particularly in the European spectrum. Very much over capacity in steel, Matt. Steel will certainly be on the minds of Europeans. Very concerned about over capacity, market economy status. There's growing unease about Chinese investment in Europe, I would say, on a larger trend. And certainly we will be looking – German Chancellor was just in China in June. Her 10th visit. She's been the one European leader that has been seized with trying to create a robust economic relationship.

And now German business leaders are increasingly speaking out about all the problems that American businesses have been having in China. Now certainly Germany companies and others are expressing very similar issues. And as much as we're extremely concerned about the status of TPP, I would argue our European colleagues – both German and French – are increasingly not happy with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. So TTIP is as

strained as TPP. So certainly at the global economy, free trade is not in good shape on both sides of these trading blocs.

So with that, Amy, over to you.

AMY SEARIGHT: Thank you. Thank you, Heather.

OK, so for the second half of the trip, to kind of return to some of the themes that Mike laid out, this is going to be very much about President Obama's signature foreign policy initiative, the rebalance or the pivot. And from the beginning, this has really had Southeast Asia at the center. And it's – specifically it's had a real embrace of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as an organization and a support for ASEAN and the central role that it plays as a convener in the region, and a central player in the regional security architecture.

And the rebalance has also been very much about building up new cooperative relationships with emerging partners, new partners. And Laos is a very good example of that. So Laos is chair of ASEAN this year, which is why it's hosting the main summits in its country. And so President Obama will be the first sitting president to ever visit Laos. And we have been building up our relationship with Laos on a number of fronts. And so the bilateral visit will very much serve to highlight our bilateral relationship, particularly in the area of development assistance, where we have some programs on health and nutrition and agriculture, and legacy of war issues where we do a lot of work on unexploded ordnance and cooperation in finding remains of our missing in action.

President Obama will travel to Luang Prabang, where he will hold a town hall with young leaders of Laos, very similar to the youth engagement – the town hall that he did in Malaysia last year. And for those of you who may have seen this, it was covered live on television. And it's a really great example of a free flowing exchange of ideas with the president and the United States and youth leaders in Southeast Asia. And I think it's very meaningful, especially for them to be able to have that kind of exchange. And as Mike said, there's going to be a wide-ranging speech on Asia that President Obama will deliver in Laos, that I think will attempt to capture all of the progress that the Obama administration has made under the rebalance and look towards the future of our relationship.

On the second day in Laos, President Obama will meet with all 10 of the leaders of ASEAN. This will be the ninth time that President Obama has met with ASEAN leaders, a U.S.-ASEAN summit, which is pretty remarkable in eight years. The last time he met with them was in February in Sunnylands, California. And this meeting in Laos will be very much about building on the momentum that was achieved in Sunnylands. So I think there'll be a real focus on discussion around the South China Sea and maritime security cooperation more broadly.

There'll also be a focused discussion on economic engagement, and the Obama administration will announce some elaboration of its U.S.-ASEAN Connect initiative that initially announced in Sunnylands. And this is an attempt to try to bring together a number of different programs that are run by many different agencies – to bring it together into a common platform to really promote engagement with the private sector around issues of infrastructure and

entrepreneurship and innovation. There'll also be a real – there'll be a discussion on some transnational issues like counterterrorism and climate change. And then I think there'll be a real emphasis on youth engagement through the YSEALI initiative, the young leaders of Southeast Asia, and women's leadership as well.

And then finally is the main event, which is the East Asia Summit. And this brings together all 10 years from ASEAN, with their eight dialogue partners, which in addition to the U.S. includes China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Russia. The East Asian summit has really emerged. It celebrated its 10th anniversary last year in Malaysia. So this'll be the 11th time it's met. And it's really emerged as the premier leader-led forum for discussion in the region on political and security issues.

This'll be the fifth time that President Obama has participated in the East Asian Summit. And I expect he will use this as an opportunity to advance the rules-based order in the context of specific challenges, most notably perhaps the South China Sea, and recent development related to the South China Sea, including the ruling by the Geneva-based – excuse me – Hague-based arbitral tribunal panel in the case that the Philippines brought against China on maritime issues in the South China Sea. I'm sure that President Obama will reiterate the U.S. views that this ruling is final and binding. But at the same time, we also see it as an opportunity – a turning point for using more diplomacy to try to resolve some of these disputes.

Another topic will be North Korea, and the need to enforce U.N. sanctions against North Korea and its recent behavior.

And also there will be, I think, more discussion than before on the issue of human trafficking and migration.

And then finally, in addition to these summits – and President Obama, of course, will be meeting with the 10 ASEAN leaders as a group – there will be some limited amount of time to have some other bilateral meetings with some Asian leaders. I'm told he's not going to have very much time, so I don't think there's going to be a lot of bilaterals. And of course, he has met a lot of Southeast Asian leaders recently. He just was in Vietnam in May. He's hosting Aung San Suu Kyi here in Washington, D.C. the week after he gets back. He hosted President Jokowi here late last year.

But the one – the one Southeast Asian leader that I'm pretty confident he's going to meet with is President Duterte, the new president of the Philippines who was elected in June. He's a very colorful figure, of course. He's made some very controversial remarks and has taken some very troubling steps on domestic policy in terms of dealing with drugs and crime that has caused real human rights concerns. But I think in the larger context the U.S.-Philippine alliance has made great strides in recent years with the negotiation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, and the beginning of implementing that, and a – and a number of other things we've been doing to build capacity for the Philippines in terms of its security as well as economic areas. So I think this will be a good opportunity for President Obama to sit down with President Duterte and touch base on all of our cooperation and build that relationship.

I'll stop there.

MR. QUINN: OK. We're now going to open it up to questions. Just a few points of order. If you could say your name and what outlet you're with, that'll help with the transcript. There's a few people there in the back. Don't worry; we've got microphones for you as well.

Sir.

Q: Hi. Chen Weihua with China Daily.

Matthew, I have two questions for you. I mean, everyone's talking about the need to boost global growth. What, in your mind, China and the U.S., maybe other major economy, should do, I mean, individually or maybe together in this regard?

Second, can you explain to the average people what G-20 has accomplished over the years? Thank you.

MR. GOODMAN: OK, good questions.

On growth, I think that they – the U.S. and China will be aligned in wanting more – a combination of more demand stimulus and structural reform; the U.S. perhaps a little more accent on the former, stimulating demand through fiscal and monetary policy, and China a little more on the structural reform agenda. The challenge in the G-20 is that not everybody agrees – everybody agrees on structural reform because everybody knows they have to fix their own economies, but it's very difficult politically and it's really domestically – it's based on domestic policy decisions and political choices that are very difficult for a group like this to do anything other than to say structural reform is an important thing and we should all be doing that in our own countries.

On demand, the problem is that one country in particular – and I won't mention any names, but its initials are Germany – (laughter) – is very opposed to any talk of fiscal stimulus. And Germany is the host of the G-20 next year, so they're already part of the so-called troika of leaders – with the previous host, Turkey, and the future one, Germany, with China. So I just don't think there's going to be any substantive progress on demand stimulus, and so that's a real challenge.

Overall, I would say, as I said in my introductory remarks, the G-20 – what I would say and what I think President Obama's going to say to the American people about the G-20 is that the G-20 has done three broad things.

It has set an agenda for global economic cooperation, and that's important for trying to talk about these issues of growth, financial stability, tax reform. There are other things that people have talked about, where the leaders have set an agenda, a political agenda for global economic cooperation.

Secondly, it has solved some problems, starting with intervening to prevent a deep and lasting crisis in the global economy and financial system. More specifically, it solved some specific smaller problems like advancing the trade agenda or doing – improving, you know – cracking down on tax evasion and so forth.

And then the third thing is it has helped to build habits of cooperation. It has brought together countries representing a very diverse group of economies, large and small, to talk about common interests, common challenges. And that's a big deal. I mean, it's something that doesn't happen very often, and so I think the G-20 as a group can take credit. And the fact that China – the largest emerging market, second-largest economy in the world – is now chairing this group shows that there has been tremendous progress in advancing international discussion and cooperation.

So I think those are the things I'd emphasize.

MR. QUINN: George Condon.

Q: George Condon, National Journal.

Mike, you talked about how the president built on previous administrations. And, Amy, you talked about the strides the president made in Southeast Asia. But is there any reason to believe that anything on the pivot or in Southeast Asia endures past January 20th, that this will last?

MR. GREEN: I'll take first – (off mic).

Lots of reasons. The simplest is, if you look at the structure of international relations, with all respect to our European friends, the dynamism, both good and bad, is shifting to the Far East. And the developments in the Far East now are affecting the globe after centuries where the West basically, you know, influenced the Far East. And Americans know that pretty consistently. There's one exception in a new pupil, but pretty consistently polls which ask Americans what region of the world is most important to U.S. interests have showed Asia as number one for the past five years. And it was Europe for decades before that in the German Marshall Fund, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Pew and so forth.

We did our own survey at CSIS of our counterparts, basically – think tankers and academics and elites and former government officials in 10 countries – and we asked about the goal of the rebalance. Do you support it? Should it continue? And over 80 percent in Asia said yes, outside of China. It was the reverse in China; only about 20 percent in China thought it was a good thing. But the most interesting result was in the U.S. over 90 percent said yes. And we sent this survey to Hudson, Heritage, AEI. So I think beyond Republican/Democrat, Right/Left politics, at the elite level, if you will, there's a broad consensus. And precisely because it's not new, it's built on – the G-20 started at the end of Bush, TPP at the end of Bush, these – the Japan policy that I worked on in the Bush administration started in Clinton – there's a lot more continuity. And so I'm pretty optimistic about it.

To me, the wild card there, too, one is, do you get senior people in the next administration who know Asia? Candidly, we don't have that right now. If you look – survey the top ranks of the U.S. government right now, the literacy and experience working on Asia is not as strong as the aspirations, and it's lower than it was in the first Obama term or Bush or Clinton, I think. So will senior deputy secretaries, secretaries be people who instinctively get Asia and will do it?

And then the other question is, what happens in the Middle East and Russia? And we're a global power; how much bandwidth will the next president have to continue this work? But I'm pretty optimistic, actually.

MS. SEARIGHT: To add briefly more on the Southeast Asia piece of it, I think it is – it will be enduring, although a lot will depend on the new leadership coming in with a new administration, as Mike says. But, you know, I've seen with an organization, certainly within the Pentagon but within other agencies as well, just a real shift in focus and priorities and programs and real, you know, frameworks and agreements towards Southeast Asia in particular compared to, you know, previous administrations.

So, to take Defense, for example, first of all, you do have a very knowledgeable and committed leader in Secretary Carter. But you know, over the last couple of years, it hasn't just been Secretary Carter's engagement or President Obama's engagement on defense and security cooperation. It's been, you know, the whole of the department. You know, PACOM has shifted more and more to a focus on Southeast Asia, and ASEAN in particular. And we've developed new frameworks with particular countries. We've negotiated access agreements with the Philippines and with Australia. We're doing more than we've ever done before with countries like Malaysia and Indonesia and India. We've broken new ground with countries like Vietnam in defense cooperation.

So these are real gains that, I mean, they – of course they need to be – that momentum needs to be maintained, and the energy and attention that will be needed to move those things forward, but I'm pretty – I think the new administration is inheriting a much more robust set of relationships really across the region, and there's a real regional demand signal for maintaining those relationships and frameworks. So I think it will probably carry forward.

I think the one real – you know, as has already been mentioned, the one real vulnerability is on the economic side because we have made a lot of real gains on the security side. On the economic side, we've negotiated this very complex and landmark agreement in the TPP. But it's now quite vulnerable, and we'll have to wait and see whether the U.S. can pass it.

Q: Angela Greiling Keane with Bloomberg.

One thing I didn't hear you mention is cybersecurity. And clearly that's something of interest with some of the bilateral relationships, and there's a group of senators that are pressuring Obama to try to make cybercrimes a priority with the G-20 discussions. Where do you think that'll play, both at the G-20 summit broadly as well as in the bilats, especially with China and Russia?

MR. GREEN: Our cyber expert is Jim Lewis here at CSIS, by the way. The four of us sort of somehow manage to make our iPhones work. (Laughter.) But politically – I'll speak for myself – (laughter) – I don't manage to make my iPhone work. (Laughter.)

Politically, Heather will speak to Russia; very, very significant problem. With China it's a significant problem, too. I think you will have some fact sheets. The administration is not going to do big announcements on U.S.-China relations the way they did the first few years. It's just too – there are too many scratchy, negative, difficult places to be celebratory.

The view on cyber is quite divided, I find, between the State Department and the Pentagon. The Pentagon's view I would surmise as being we are already in a state of cyberwarfare with China/Russia in real time. The State Department will focus on cyber dialogues and efforts to talk about cyber. I think the reality lies more in the Pentagon's view of what's happening with China. I don't think it's very likely the administration will come out at the end with any kind of workable framework with China on cyber at all. And part of that is because the deterrence side of it, the cost to China hasn't been established.

I think Russia's probably an even bigger problem, but Heather can explain.

MS. CONLEY: I certainly hope President Obama raises the cyber question. Clearly, the U.S. government is struggling over the DNC hacks, you know, getting from attribution to cost imposition. And very much as they struggled, I think, with the OPM hack as well, it's deliberation upon deliberation. To speak of our colleague, Jim Lewis has just written a piece on that. He believes the cost imposition should be swift if it, in fact, is attributable and understood.

So, for Russia, it is clearly a tool of statecraft to influence, to shape, to coerce, to confuse. We've seen this across Europe in particular, whether it's information operations – it can also be critical infrastructure, as we've actually been seeing in Ukraine in December, when a grid's taken down. These are great challenges, and they influence how our societies function. So getting our arms around this, but being extremely clear, particularly with Russia, that these acts will have costs I think is vital.

Now, the question of how and how President Obama will approach that, what decisions will be reached, I think at an informal meeting there's not going to be an enormous amount that may be able to be messaged publicly, but I certainly hope there's some strong messages privately.

MR. GREEN: Can I make one quick – putting my historian's hat on – point on this? Administrations in the last six months historically are loathe to impose costs, for two reasons. One, because you risk creating a crisis for your successor, and any responsible steward of foreign policy doesn't want to do that. And the second is it can ruin your legacy if the other side retaliates in your final months in office. So, personally, I would be surprised if the kind of cost imposition we're talking about becomes a feature of our policy in the next, you know, nine months or so.

Q: Hi, Mr. Goodman. OK, my name is Sally Zhang from CCTV America.

I have a question for Mr. Goodman. So you have some experience working in the White House. Can you share your expectation or prediction? This time Obama travels to Asia for G-20. Can he actually generate any legacies of his administration in terms of the U.S.-China relations?

MR. GOODMAN: Well, I think – I mean, Mike also worked in the White House, and both Amy and Heather also worked in administrations and dealt with some of these issues. But I think Mike laid it out fairly nicely, what the overall legacy in Asia is. And I agree with almost everything he said. I think U.S.-China relations are a central piece of what this president and the last seven presidents have spent a lot time focused on.

And I think the president going to China for – I've forgotten – I've lost count of how many times he's been there, but it's been at least four or five times as president – is trying to leave a relationship in which we are engaging constructively to try to both promote areas where we can cooperate – and there are a number of those. I mean, climate change has been mentioned by several of us, and that's one which I think the White House wants to emphasize. And by the way, in the G-20 and working together in 2008 and 2009 to try to prevent this global meltdown, that was a signature accomplishment.

At the same time, this engagement also has to be to manage competition, because we have competition in our relationship. As an economist, competition doesn't bother me on one level. I think it's something that you'd have to deal with to make yourself stronger. But honestly, of course, there are also aspects of this competition that are troubling and problematic, and the president is going to want to be very clear to President Xi and to Prime Minister Li, when he sees him at the East Asia Summit, that we have to find a way of resolving these issues and managing them.

So I think there's going to be a very sharp message on the concerns about maritime issues, about cybersecurity, about trade and investment challenges in the relationship, which are heating up as well. So I think it's – you know, it's all of that.

Q: Can I follow-up a question with Heather? So, G-20 is supposed to be the platform for economic cooperation. So how important is the voices of the emerging markets in the current context?

MS. CONLEY: Maybe Matt's probably better placed in that. I think that for me it's been watching, the last several years, the evolution the previously the G-8, G-7, to the G-20. And I think in some ways the focus on bringing in new voices to help enlarge this conversation has been very, very important. What's been interesting for me to watch the evolution of Europe becoming much more active. And it needs to be more active in Asia with emerging economies.

And this is work that actually the Obama administration has been pursuing to try to get other, larger developed powers to work with, engage in the institutional architecture, the economic architecture, because we're seeing that impacts in emerging economies are felt in

developed economies, and vice versa. For me, Brexit is an example of that, that we are so interconnected. We just are struggling with our geometry, if you will, of the right balance of voices that can shape it.

I would almost argue in watching the G-7 that they're – the G-7 more of a political, security body that talks about economics – I wouldn't be surprised if the G-20, although they agenda was rough, will start going into new political areas because, again, it's a table of new voices to wrestle with these larger, more complex issues.

MR. GOODMAN: I would just say two quick additions to that. One, in Pittsburgh, when the U.S. hosted the third summit in the fall of 2009, the G-20 agreed under U.S. leadership that the G-20 would become the preeminent forum for our international economic cooperation. And that word, "our" is important to people who are not in the group. This is just to coordinate among the countries that are actually in the room, not to impose on others. But the point is, that was a very conscious decision by the Obama administration to embrace a broader table setting, in which emerging economies, including China, were very much empowered and equal partners. So that's the first point.

The second point is, China's hosting. I mean, China is, again, the largest, fastest-growing emerging market in the world. And it is hosting this forum. So that, I think, speaks for itself that emerging countries have a lot more voice.

MR. QUINN: Howard.

Q: Thanks. Howard LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor.

Michael, I guess I'd like to ask you – you've talked a lot about the scratchy state of U.S.-China relations. And obviously this visit is coming in the context of a presidential campaign which, especially if you go back to the primaries, there was a lot of talk about need for a tougher stance with China, both economically and in terms of security in the South China Sea and that, you know, this president has sort of just kind of paved the way and not done much to stand up to China. And I'm wondering if you expect to sort of that context, any messaging back to the U.S. electorate, to the, you know, American people to kind of address that characterization of the administration.

MR. GREEN: Or others?

Q: You know, from – I'm sorry –

MR. GREEN: From the president?

Q: Yeah, from the president. You know, we always say these summits – you know, half of it is what's being messaged, you know, back to a domestic audience.

MR. GREEN: Right. You know, in the end China may dodge that bullet because the quality of the rhetoric between the two leading presidential candidates has become so base and

so low that China may actually get a free pass in this election, who knows. I travel in Asia a lot, as do my colleagues, and I don't mind saying broadly that there is deep, deep anxiety about Donald Trump, especially among our allies, but even in Beijing. The views in Beijing I find are mixed. There's some who look at it as an opportunity, because Donald Trump never mentions human rights, criticizes our allies, and so forth. And there are others who are worried, especially Chinese who have investments in the United States.

I think the view in Beijing – and this has been the view since 1995 – is that Hillary Clinton will be tougher on them than Secretary Kerry or than President Obama was. She gave a speech in the U.N. Year of the Woman in 1995 that was well-received internationally, but very scratchy and uncomfortable and controversial for the Chinese. And the Chinese scholars and journalists attribute to the troubles in U.S.-China relations to the rebalance, and they usually blame her. There was an op-ed, I think, in the People's Daily when Secretary Kerry was announced, welcoming him, because he would be wise enough not to meddle in the Far East like Hillary Clinton. (Laughs.)

And so across the region I think there's broadly an expectation that things will be tougher with China. But this is an election that has unnerved everyone. I mean, Secretary Clinton's opposition to TPP has gone deeper than I think either Australia or Japan or the other TPP partners expected. And they're all very nervous that if she wins, she might try to force a renegotiation. I have not heard her use the word "renegotiation." Maybe I'm wrong. There are always side letters in these trade agreements. There may be ways to do this. But they are starting to realize if it doesn't get through in the lame duck, it will be very hard for her to pivot back to the position she had as secretary of state.

So this election has unnerved friends and allies. And that's going to be something I think President Obama's going to have very much in mind. I'm sure it will come up among friends – like the Singaporeans or Japan and Australia, the Europeans. I'm sure it will. He's already said that happened in the last meeting. I don't think he can reassure by commenting on the election publicly very much. If I were advising him, I'd say look at the opinion polls that Americans have about free trade and allies and Asia. It hasn't – they haven't been dented by this election. I would point to the continuity that we talked about.

And I think for the most part our TPP partners are not giving up on us and are in for the long haul. They don't have much of a choice. But it is definitely going to be an atmospheric factor in this trip that the president's going to have to really think about and reassure without, you know, overstepping and ending up becoming – you know, sort of fueling an even more destructive debate back here.

MS. SEARIGHT: Can I just add one point, since TPP has come up a few times. I don't disagree with Mike that, you know, our TPP partners will stick with us for a few years because, you know, everyone recognizes the tremendous potential. And so if we have to stall, it's definitely a suboptimal outcome but, you know, no one, I think, is going to walk away from the table right away.

However, I also just want to underscore that for many of these countries, countries like Vietnam and Malaysia and Japan, I mean, they have put – their leadership has put some real things on the table in the negotiations that have come with some real political costs and political risks. And so it is going to be tremendously damaging to U.S. credibility, you know, the sense that the U.S. is a reliable partner, if we look like we're willing to walk away from TPP. So I just think we need to bear that in mind, that, you know, it puts countries – like Vietnam, for example – in a really difficult position.

MR. QUINN: I'm going to go to this side of the room here. Stefan.

Q: Yeah, good morning. Stefan Grobe, Euronews.

Heather, I wonder whether you could comment on the Apple case and the U.S. reaction to that, and put it in some sort of broader perspective. Apple is not the most popular company in this town, as we know, but the reaction of the Treasury Department was, I mean, very clear but also very muted. How do you see, you know, trade going forward? The German government's assessment is that TTIP is dead. Is this just another death-knell for TTIP? What's your point?

MS. CONLEY: Certainly, I share with a colleague, I think the U.S. and the EU have gotten into a negative cycle on trade, economic investment. And we need to stop and try to return to a more positive dynamic. Clearly, Secretary Lew last week – they knew this was coming and the U.S. has already registered its increasing concern about the direction. And clearly, we all woke up to this shock of a 13 billion euro fine. I have to say, for me – just as an individual – equal shock at the level of taxes that Apple paid as well. And that gets back to the G-20 agenda of tax evasion and how challenging this is in a globalized context for multinational firms that are able to use – where there's not a level playing field. And we know Irish corporate tax rates have been a cause of concern within the EU for many, many years.

I think the question is, is this the best way to address it? And I think increasingly it's not just been the Apple case, but it's been a whole series of anti-competition measures, particularly for American IT firms. We're really struggling – we've always, I think, looked – the U.S. and Europe have been friendly competitors at trying to bring our values, but get great economic growth. And somehow that cycle began to change. And now we're seeing each other as increasing obstacles to this. And we've got to get out of this dynamic quickly. And I think the U.S. has to spend a little more time engaging Europe in this conversation. It's a very complex conversation, dealing at both the national and the European level. It's not easy, but I think we see now the stakes are enormous.

I'm increasingly concerned. We are a year out from German parliament elections. And the Germans are acting a little more American – too American-like in their election campaign. They're starting too early. And we're seeing a great division, obviously, within the Social Democratic Party, and what the vice chancellor has been saying, not only on TTIP but on Russia, on migration, on Turkey. There are – there's a very important, and I think divisive, dynamic that is occurring within the coalition government. But, look, the stakes are high. On Sunday, Mecklenburg – I mean, the chancellor's going to be getting those results while she's in Asia. We will see how this dynamic works out.

But the fact of the matter is on TTIP, the electoral calendar has always worked against this. And it's clear to me that there is no possibility of movement on TTIP until the French presidential elections and the German parliament elections occur in 2017. Well, then we – in 2018, we get to our midterm elections. And then in 2019, European Parliament elections. And then 2020, we're back to general elections. So unless we change the dynamic about – among our publics about trade – and in the German context, I think it's become a vehicle for anti-Americanism in general, with a lot of specific concerns. In France, it's more classic protectionism. In the U.S., it's just anger against trade in general.

We have to change the dynamic where everyone sees that there are benefits to trade, not just a small group. And until we change that dynamic, I think it's going to get harder and harder for election cycles to sort of support in ratifying these important free trade agreements.

MR. QUINN: Hey, folks, we are coming up a little bit against – so I'm going to try to get in a few more – a few more questions. This gentleman here.

Q: Thank you very much. My name is Tatsuya Mizumoto from Jiji Press.

About South China Sea issue, China have already declared that they are not going to accept any international ruling. Can the president get any positive reaction from President Xi? I'm just wondering if both leaders can have positive conversation about South China Sea. Thank you.

MR. GREEN: And my answer would be no, that we are not operating under the same basic assumption about what's at stake in the South China Sea. The Chinese side will not yield on its assertion that it has complete sovereignty. The U.S. and our allies will not yield on the jurisdiction of this decision and the binding nature of the decision, or on our, frankly, much more important resistance to the use of coercion against smaller states to change the status quo, which is what China is doing in the South China Sea and trying to do, vis-à-vis Japan, in the East China Sea.

The operational tempo, the number of ships and planes, the caliber of weapons, the nature of those ships on the Chinese side, is all on a steady increase in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The big, dramatic move by China would be to do land reclamation and build another airfield on Scarborough Shoals. You'll see it first on AMTI, our website. That would be a very big move before G-20 for China, very self-defeating. And it could be before the presidential elections you may not see that, but we are moving in largely different directions.

The administration, I think, wisely, and the Philippines and others, are – remain calm and not victorious about the tribunal decision, in the hope they can get some traction going. But I think what Xi Jinping will say is that you if you want – he talks about the Thucydides trap, the idea that rising powers seem to always fight the status quo powers. And if you want to avoid that, you need to agree to this new model of great power relations. You need to agree to make some concessions to China. The president won't accept that. The president will talk about the things Amy said. And we'll come out of this with essentially no resolution, in my view.

And then, you know, it depends on how much risk Xi Jinping wants to take, and how firmly we are about freedom of navigation operations and continuing work with the Philippines. And Mr. Duterte is a kind of variable on this. But I think despite what he's saying, his government's pretty much on the same track. I don't know if Amy would agree with that.

Q: My name is Tanaka from NHK.

I'd like to ask a question on TPP. I think a lot of Asian countries are wondering whether U.S. can – President Obama can pass the TPP in the Congress. And I think a lot of people are watching his speech in Laos very closely. So is how can he really, like, convince the Asian leaders that he can, you know, make this case – make this TPP –

MR. GOODMAN: Well, I haven't said anything about TPP. And I just want to be on the record as saying what everybody else has said, which is that TPP is absolutely essential to the pivot, the rebalance strategy. It's essential to the U.S. position in Asia. It's essential to our economic strategy of the last 70 years of trying to create – champion a rules-based order. And that's very important. And self-advertising, I'm doing a piece today which you'll see a little later about that aspect of this, rule-making in TPP.

It's absolutely critical. The fact that it was agreed is a significant accomplishment, and signed. A lot of people though that wasn't going to happen. I've always been an optimist about TPP. And the optimistic position has been the correct position. Everything that was supposed to happen has happened, as long as you didn't pick a date. And so I'm not going to pick a date, but I believe TPP will ultimately be ratified by all 12 members of TPP, including the United States. And I think the president will try to assure leaders in Asia that that's his belief and his strong intention, and he's going to work as hard as he can before he leaves office to try to get this ratified.

I personally think it's going to be a long shot, as Mike said, to get it done during the lame duck, but I think it's possible. So I want to leave on an optimistic note. It is still possible. Anything is possible in politics. Politicians can decide and say things today that they decide and feel they feel differently about on another day. And so I would listen not to politicians, what they're saying today, listen to what they're saying on November 9th, the day after the election.

MR. QUINN: OK, folks, at the very back there.

Q: Thank you. I'm Yoko Matsukawa with Jiji Press.

I have a question about Brexit. So, after Brexit vote, Secretary Lew – Treasury Lew started saying that the highly integrated relationship between U.K. and EU is something best for the international economic society. But the interests among, you know, Europe and U.K. seem to be a little different. So I wonder how Obama – President Obama is going to push this discussion in G-20 meeting or at the bilateral meeting, and how we can expect the accomplishment in the—you know, in the discussion? Also, I wonder whether we can expect

some statement or the discussion about the monetary policy or the exchange rate, you know, situation.

MS. CONLEY: I don't imagine that Brexit will be a part of any of the formal conversations at the G-20. I would suspect it would be left to the informal bilateral conversations. In fact, tomorrow there will be a meeting at Chequers. Prime Minister May will sit down with her three key Cabinet ministers to talk about the different options. We don't know what these negotiations will look like because the British government has not pronounced how it wishes to proceed, and the European Union is allowing the British government to help understand that.

But clearly – and we won't know the full impact. The economic data will be very delayed until we really understand. But it was not as awful and catastrophic that some economists had predicted after the markets got over the initial shock of the decision. But this will – this will be a different relationship, regardless of the process that they proceed.

What I found so interesting about the U.S. government comment, when President Obama visited London a month before the U.K. referendum, there was a message of actual, you know, some punishment, that the U.K. would go into the “back of the queue” if they decided to vote to leave the European Union. And then the next – and the day after the referendum, it was the “indispensable partner” and we want to see the closest possible relationship. So maybe it's just not politicians that say one thing and then the day after realize something else. Obviously, our position has shifted.

I think there will be questions about what free trade arrangements will be made. But again, I think right now, for the G-20, it's trying to make sure that Brexit doesn't have an immediate short-term impact on global stability. I think we've sort of passed that marker. But now the question is in the long term, and that actually gets to monetary policy and the Bank of England, some of its decisions as well as the ECB's. And I don't know, Matt – I'll sort of toss this – whether negative interest rates and a very accommodative policy – obviously, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has been extremely concerned because that great current account surplus in the saver nations are being punished for \$13 trillion of value in negative interest rates. So I don't know if that will be discussed in the G-20.

MR. GOODMAN: I think actually that Brexit will actually still be talked about in the G-20, not so much because of its financial impact. I agree, sort of the worry about its immediate impact is passed – but it still is a pretty big growth event. You know, by the IMF's forecast, it's going to shave something like almost a percent off British growth, and that Britain – by the way, people forget Britain is still the fifth-largest economy in the world. It's a large economy. So when my British friends say it's a small island nation, I always remind them it's a huge economy. It has a big impact. So there will be talk about that and how to deal with that.

I think on the monetary issues there's general agreement that monetary policy – the people who criticize where we are in certain countries and negative interest rates and the Fed's positions, but I think there's broad agreement that monetary policy has gone nearly as far as it can in addressing the fundamental growth story, if not completely exhausted or gone beyond

where it should be. So everybody's agreed on that. And I think then the question is, should therefore the emphasis be put on more fiscal-based stimulus versus structural reform? And that's really the U.S.-Germany debate to a large extent. But I think that's going to be the main – the main focus or contention and difference in the room in the G-20.

MR. QUINN: OK, folks, we're coming up against time here, so let's just go to the final questions, if there's anyone here. This man's had his hand up for a while.

Q: (Off mic) – Gomez (sp) with Fox News.

This question is for Heather, actually. You mentioned cyber. And specifically to the topic with cybersecurity and the Russians, you said there's concern about the fact that they – these Russian hacks were targeted towards the DNC and other Democratic organizations. However, they were also targeting organizations like CSIS. And is there a greater concern that they're also – these Russian hackers are attacking outside groups, groups on the periphery, groups that are supplement and not direct government, or just – or political organizations? Thank you.

MR. GOODMAN: We take exception to the term that we're on the periphery of – (laughter).

MS. CONLEY: There certainly I think the challenge for the U.S. government, just speaking for the DNC hacks – and sort of when it gets to the heart of democratic processes and our election, I think there the U.S. government has to make a decision about attribution and then deciding if there are costs to that – if, in fact, attribution is made with confidence, and then action. I think the longer we debate over what to do and whether it gets caught up in legacy or it's a difficult thing to do at the end of the administration, the problem is our lack of resolve then messages to those that are using these tools: keep pushing the envelope, keep pushing the boundaries, there is really not that cost imposition. So I think that's the – that's the cycle we get into.

And I think in some ways the good news has been there has been an enormous amount of investigative journalism and transparency into this, and putting more focus on it so Americans are aware that this type of behavior is going on. So it's exposing it, but then it is finding those tools to address it. And some of those tools we may be aware of publicly. I'm sure most of those tools we're not aware of. And – but that there is that reaction.

Think tanks are not immune to these types of attacks. Specifically, when we – when we talk about and expose – our research exposes this type of activity and makes policy recommendations on how to stop it. This is where we're really entering what I would consider uncharted territory, when you have state actors that are trying to shape and influence outcomes. And we better get a quick handle on this before it does some significant damage.

So the good news is I think more so than ever Americans are aware of the challenge. As a government, the decision has to be made what to do about it.

MR. QUINN: OK, folks, we're going to leave it there. Please take a look at your inboxes later today. We will be sending out the transcript. For anyone today who wants to follow up with any of our expert panel today, please get in touch with myself. I'm Colm Quinn. Also, Brandon Schwartz and Andrew Schwartz in our External Relations Office. Thank you very much.

(END)